pax_global_header00006660000000000000000000000064122603460170014513gustar00rootroot0000000000000052 comment=edc2e99687b050d5be21a78a66d038aa1fc068d9 libselinux-2.2.2/000077500000000000000000000000001226034601700136745ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-2.2.2/ChangeLog000066400000000000000000001200501226034601700154440ustar00rootroot000000000000002.2.2 2013-12-30 * Fix userspace AVC handling of per-domain permissive mode. 2.2.1 2013-11-06 * Remove -lpthread from pkg-config file; it is not required. 2.2 2013-10-30 * Fix avc_has_perm() returns -1 even when SELinux is in permissive mode. * Support overriding Makefile RANLIB from Sven Vermeulen. * Update pkgconfig definition from Sven Vermeulen. * Mount sysfs before trying to mount selinuxfs from Sven Vermeulen. * Fix man pages from Laurent Bigonville. * Support overriding PATH and LIBBASE in Makefiles from Laurent Bigonville. * Fix LDFLAGS usage from Laurent Bigonville * Avoid shadowing stat in load_mmap from Joe MacDonald. * Support building on older PCRE libraries from Joe MacDonald. * Fix handling of temporary file in sefcontext_compile from Dan Walsh. * Fix procattr cache from Dan Walsh. * Define python constants for getenforce result from Dan Walsh. * Fix label substitution handling of / from Dan Walsh. * Add selinux_current_policy_path from Dan Walsh. * Change get_context_list to only return good matches from Dan Walsh. * Support udev-197 and higher from Sven Vermeulen and Dan Walsh. * Add support for local substitutions from Dan Walsh. * Change setfilecon to not return ENOSUP if context is already correct from Dan Walsh. * Python wrapper leak fixes from Dan Walsh. * Export SELINUX_TRANS_DIR definition in selinux.h from Dan Walsh. * Add selinux_systemd_contexts_path from Dan Walsh. * Add selinux_set_policy_root from Dan Walsh. * Add man page for sefcontext_compile from Dan Walsh. 2.1.13 2013-02-01 * audit2why: make sure path is nul terminated * utils: new file context regex compiler * label_file: use precompiled filecontext when possible * do not leak mmapfd * sefcontontext_compile: Add error handling to help debug problems in libsemanage. * man: make selinux.8 mention service man pages * audit2why: Fix segfault if finish() called twice * audit2why: do not leak on multiple init() calls * mode_to_security_class: interface to translate a mode_t in to a security class * audit2why: Cleanup audit2why analysys function * man: Fix program synopsis and function prototypes in man pages * man: Fix man pages formatting * man: Fix typo in man page * man: Add references and man page links to _raw function variants * Use ENOTSUP instead of EOPNOTSUPP for getfilecon functions * man: context_new(3): fix the return value description * selinux_status_open: handle error from sysconf * selinux_status_open: do not leak statusfd on exec * Fix errors found by coverity * Change boooleans.subs to booleans.subs_dist. * optimize set*con functions * pkg-config do not specifc ruby version * unmap file contexts on selabel_close() * do not leak file contexts with mmap'd backend * sefcontext_compile: do not leak fd on error * matchmediacon: do not leak fd * src/label_android_property: do not leak fd on error 2.1.12 2012-09-13 * Add support for lxc_contexts_path * utils: add service to getdefaultcon * libsemanage: do not set soname needlessly * libsemanage: remove PYTHONLIBDIR and ruby equivalent * boolean name equivalency * getsebool: support boolean name substitution * Add man page for new selinux_boolean_sub function. * expose selinux_boolean_sub * matchpathcon: add -m option to force file type check * utils: avcstat: clear sa_mask set * seusers: Check for strchr failure * booleans: initialize pointer to silence coveriety * stop messages when SELinux disabled * label_file: use PCRE instead of glibc regex functions * label_file: remove all typedefs * label_file: move definitions to include file * label_file: do string to mode_t conversion in a helper function * label_file: move error reporting back into caller * label_file: move stem/spec handling to header * label_file: drop useless ncomp field from label_file data * label_file: move spec_hasMetaChars to header * label_file: fix potential read past buffer in spec_hasMetaChars * label_file: move regex sorting to the header * label_file: add accessors for the pcre extra data * label_file: only run regex files one time * label_file: new process_file function * label_file: break up find_stem_from_spec * label_file: struct reorg * label_file: only run array once when sorting * Ensure that we only close the selinux netlink socket once. * improve the file_contexts.5 manual page 2.1.11 2012-06-28 * Fortify source now requires all code to be compiled with -O flag * asprintf return code must be checked * avc_netlink_recieve handle EINTR * audit2why: silence -Wmissing-prototypes warning * libsemanage: remove build warning when build swig c files * matchpathcon: bad handling of symlinks in / * seusers: remove unused lineno * seusers: getseuser: gracefully handle NULL service * New Android property labeling backend * label_android_property whitespace cleanups * additional makefile support for rubywrap 2.1.10 2012-03-28 * Fix dead links to www.nsa.gov/selinux * Remove jump over variable declaration * Fix old style function definitions * Fix const-correctness * Remove unused flush_class_cache method * Add prototype decl for destructor * Add more printf format annotations * Add printf format attribute annotation to die() method * Fix const-ness of parameters & make usage() methods static * Enable many more gcc warnings for libselinux/src/ builds * utils: Enable many more gcc warnings for libselinux/utils builds * Change annotation on include/selinux/avc.h to avoid upsetting SWIG * Ensure there is a prototype for 'matchpathcon_lib_destructor' * Update Makefiles to handle /usrmove * utils: Stop separating out matchpathcon as something special * pkg-config to figure out where ruby include files are located * build with either ruby 1.9 or ruby 1.8 * assert if avc_init() not called * take security_deny_unknown into account * security_compute_create_name(3) * Do not link against python library, this is considered * bad practice in debian * Hide unnecessarily-exported library destructors 2.1.9 2011-12-21 * Fix setenforce man page to refer to selinux man page * Cleanup Man pages * merge freecon with getcon man page 2.1.8 2011-12-05 * selinuxswig_python.i: don't make syscall if it won't change anything * Remove assert in security_get_boolean_names(3) * Mapped compute functions now obey deny_unknown flag * get_default_type now sets EINVAL if no entry. * return EINVAL if invalid role selected * Updated selabel_file(5) man page * Updated selabel_db(5) man page * Updated selabel_media(5) man page * Updated selabel_x(5) man page * Add man/man5 man pages * Add man/man5 man pages * Add man/man5 man pages * use -W and -Werror in utils 2.1.7 2011-11-03 * Makefiles: syntax, convert all ${VAR} to $(VAR) * load_policy: handle selinux=0 and /sys/fs/selinux not exist * regenerate .pc on VERSION change * label: cosmetic cleanups * simple interface for access checks * Don't reinitialize avc_init if it has been called previously * seusers: fix to handle large sets of groups * audit2why: close fd on enomem * rename and export symlink_realpath * label_file: style changes to make Eric happy. 2.1.6 2011-09-15 * utils: matchpathcon: remove duplicate declaration * src: matchpathcon: use myprintf not fprintf * src: matchpathcon: make sure resolved path starts * put libselinux.so.1 in /lib not /usr/lib * tree: default make target to all not 2.1.5 2011-0826 * selinux_file_context_verify function returns wrong value. * move realpath helper to matchpathcon library * python wrapper makefile changes 2.1.4 2011-0817 * mapping fix for invalid class/perms after selinux_set_mapping * audit2why: work around python bug not defining * resolv symlinks and dot directories before matching 2.1.2 2011-0803 * audit2allow: do not print statistics * make python bindings for restorecon work on relative path * fix python audit2why binding error * support new python3 functions * do not check fcontext duplicates on use * Patch for python3 for libselinux 2.1.1 2011-08-02 * move .gitignore into utils * new setexecon utility * selabel_open fix processing of substitution files * mountpoint changing patch. * simplify SRCS in Makefile 2.1.1 2011-08-01 * Remove generated files, introduce more .gitignore 2.1.0 2011-07-27 * Release, minor version bump 2.0.102 2011-04-11 * Give correct names to mount points in load_policy by Dan Walsh. * Make sure selinux state is reported correctly if selinux is disabled or fails to load by Dan Walsh. * Fix crash if selinux_key_create was never called by Dan Walsh. * Add new file_context.subs_dist for distro specific filecon substitutions by Dan Walsh. * Update man pages for selinux_color_* functions by Richard Haines. 2.0.101 2011-03-23 * db_language object class support for selabel_lookup from KaiGai Kohei. 2.0.100 2011-03-09 * Library destructors for thread local storage keys from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.99 2011-03-01 * SELinux man page fixes from Dan Walsh. * selinux_status interfaces from KaiGai Kohei. 2.0.98 2010-12-16 * Turn off default user handling when computing user contexts by Dan Walsh 2.0.97 2010-12-02 * Thread local storage fixes from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.96 2010-06-14 * Add const qualifiers to public API where appropriate by KaiGai Kohei. 2.0.95 2010-06-10 * Remove duplicate slashes in paths in selabel_lookup from Chad Sellers * Adds a chcon method to the libselinux python bindings from Steve Lawrence 2.0.94 2010-03-24 * Set errno=EINVAL for invalid contexts from Dan Walsh. 2.0.93 2010-03-15 * Show strerror for security_getenforce() by Colin Walters. * Merged selabel database support by KaiGai Kohei. * Modify netlink socket blocking code by KaiGai Kohei. 2.0.92 2010-03-06 * Fix from Eric Paris to fix leak on non-selinux systems. * regenerate swig wrappers * pkgconfig fix to respect LIBDIR from Dan Walsh. 2.0.91 2010-02-22 * Change the AVC to only audit the permissions specified by the policy, excluding any permissions specified via dontaudit or not specified via auditallow. * Fix compilation of label_file.c with latest glibc headers. 2.0.90 2009-11-27 * add/reformat man pages by Guido Trentalancia . * Change exception.sh to be called with bash by Manoj Srivastava 2.0.89 2009-10-29 * Add pkgconfig file from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.88 2009-10-22 * Rename and export selinux_reset_config() 2.0.87 2009-09-25 * Add exception handling in libselinux from Dan Walsh. This uses a shell script called exception.sh to generate a swig interface file. * make swigify * Make matchpathcon print <> if path not found in fcontext file. 2.0.86 2009-09-02 * Removal of reference counting on userspace AVC SID's. 2.0.85 2009-07-14 * Reverted Tomas Mraz's fix for freeing thread local storage to avoid pthread dependency. * Removed fini_context_translations() altogether. * Merged lazy init patch from Stephen Smalley based on original patch by Steve Grubb. 2.0.84 2009-07-07 * Add per-service seuser support from Dan Walsh. * Let load_policy gracefully handle selinuxfs being mounted from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.83 2009-07-07 * Check /proc/filesystems before /proc/mounts for selinuxfs from Eric Paris. 2.0.82 2009-06-19 * Fix improper use of thread local storage from Tomas Mraz . * Label substitution support from Dan Walsh. * Support for labeling virtual machine images from Dan Walsh. 2.0.81 2009-05-15 * Trim / from the end of input paths to matchpathcon from Dan Walsh. * Fix leak in process_line in label_file.c from Hiroshi Shinji. * Move matchpathcon to /sbin, add matchpathcon to clean target from Dan Walsh. * getdefaultcon to print just the correct match and add verbose option from Dan Walsh. 2.0.80 2009-04-07 * deny_unknown wrapper function from KaiGai Kohei. * security_compute_av_flags API from KaiGai Kohei. * Netlink socket management and callbacks from KaiGai Kohei. 2.0.79 2009-03-11 * Netlink socket handoff patch from Adam Jackson. * AVC caching of compute_create results by Eric Paris. 2.0.78 2009-02-27 * Fix incorrect conversion in discover_class code. 2.0.77 2009-01-12 * add restorecon to python bindings from Dan Walsh. 2.0.76 2009-01-08 * Client support for translating raw contexts to colors via setrans. 2.0.75 2008-11-18 * Allow shell-style wildcards in x_contexts file. 2.0.74 2008-11-03 * Correct message types in AVC log messages. 2.0.73 2008-10-14 * Make matchpathcon -V pass mode from Dan Walsh. * Add man page for selinux_file_context_cmp from Dan Walsh. 2.0.72 2008-09-29 * New man pages from Dan Walsh. * Update flask headers from refpolicy trunk from Dan Walsh. 2.0.71 2008-08-05 * Add group support to seusers using %groupname syntax from Dan Walsh. * Mark setrans socket close-on-exec from Stephen Smalley. * Only apply nodups checking to base file contexts from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.70 2008-07-30 * Merge ruby bindings from Dan Walsh. 2.0.69 2008-07-29 * Handle duplicate file context regexes as a fatal error from Stephen Smalley. This prevents adding them via semanage. 2.0.68 2008-07-18 * Fix audit2why shadowed variables from Stephen Smalley. * Note that freecon NULL is legal in man page from Karel Zak. 2.0.67 2008-06-13 * New and revised AVC, label, and mapping man pages from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.66 2008-06-11 * Add swig python bindings for avc interfaces from Dan Walsh. 2.0.65 2008-05-27 * Fix selinux_file_context_verify() and selinux_lsetfilecon_default() to call matchpathcon_init_prefix if not already initialized. * Add -q qualifier for -V option of matchpathcon and change it to indicate whether verification succeeded or failed via exit status. 2.0.64 2008-04-21 * Fixed selinux_set_callback man page. 2.0.63 2008-04-18 * Try loading the max of the kernel-supported version and the libsepol-supported version when no manipulation of the binary policy is needed from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.62 2008-04-18 * Fix memory leaks in matchpathcon from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.61 2008-03-31 * Man page typo fix from Jim Meyering. 2.0.60 2008-03-20 * Changed selinux_init_load_policy() to not warn about a failed mount of selinuxfs if selinux was disabled in the kernel. 2.0.59 2008-02-29 * Merged new X label "poly_selection" namespace from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.58 2008-02-28 * Merged reset_selinux_config() for load policy from Dan Walsh. 2.0.57 2008-02-25 * Merged avc_has_perm() errno fix from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.56 2008-02-21 * Regenerated Flask headers from refpolicy flask definitions. 2.0.55 2008-02-08 * Merged compute_member AVC function and manpages from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.54 2008-02-08 * Provide more error reporting on load policy failures from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.53 2008-02-07 * Merged new X label "poly_prop" namespace from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.52 2008-02-06 * Disable setlocaldefs if no local boolean or users files are present from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.51 2008-02-05 * Skip userspace preservebools processing for Linux >= 2.6.22 from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.50 2008-01-28 * Merged fix for audit2why from Dan Walsh. 2.0.49 2008-01-23 * Merged audit2why python binding from Dan Walsh. 2.0.48 2008-01-23 * Merged updated swig bindings from Dan Walsh, including typemap for pid_t. 2.0.47 2007-12-21 * Fix for the avc: granted null message bug from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.46 2007-12-07 * matchpathcon(8) man page update from Dan Walsh. 2.0.45 2007-11-20 * dlopen libsepol.so.1 rather than libsepol.so from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.44 2007-11-20 * Based on a suggestion from Ulrich Drepper, defer regex compilation until we have a stem match, by Stephen Smalley. A further optimization would be to defer regex compilation until we have a complete match of the constant prefix of the regex - TBD. 2.0.43 2007-11-15 * Regenerated Flask headers from policy. 2.0.42 2007-11-08 * AVC enforcing mode override patch from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.41 2007-11-06 * Aligned attributes in AVC netlink code from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.40 2007-11-01 * Merged refactored AVC netlink code from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.39 2007-10-19 * Merged new X label namespaces from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.38 2007-10-15 * Bux fix and minor refactoring in string representation code. 2.0.37 2007-10-05 * Merged selinux_get_callback, avc_open, empty string mapping from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.36 2007-09-27 * Fix segfault resulting from missing file_contexts file. 2.0.35 2007-09-24 * Make netlink socket close-on-exec to avoid descriptor leakage from Dan Walsh. * Pass CFLAGS when using gcc for linking from Dennis Gilmore. 2.0.34 2007-09-18 * Fix selabel option flag setting for 64-bit from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.33 2007-09-12 * Re-map a getxattr return value of 0 to a getfilecon return value of -1 with errno EOPNOTSUPP from Stephen Smalley. * Fall back to the compat code for security_class_to_string and security_av_perm_to_string from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.32 2007-09-10 * Fix swig binding for rpm_execcon from James Athey. 2.0.31 2007-08-23 * Fix file_contexts.homedirs path from Todd Miller. 2.0.30 2007-08-06 * Fix segfault resulting from uninitialized print-callback pointer. 2.0.29 2007-08-02 * Added x_contexts path function patch from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.28 2007-08-01 * Fix build for EMBEDDED=y from Yuichi Nakamura. 2.0.27 2007-07-25 * Fix markup problems in selinux man pages from Dan Walsh. 2.0.26 2007-07-23 * Updated av_permissions.h and flask.h to include new nscd permissions from Dan Walsh. * Added swigify to top-level Makefile from Dan Walsh. 2.0.25 2007-07-23 * Fix for string_to_security_class segfault on x86_64 from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.24 2007-09-07 * Fix for getfilecon() for zero-length contexts from Stephen Smalley. 2.0.23 2007-06-22 * Refactored SWIG bindings from James Athey. 2.0.22 2007-06-20 * Labeling and callback interface patches from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.21 2007-06-11 * Class and permission mapping support patches from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.20 2007-06-07 * Object class discovery support patches from Chris PeBenito. 2.0.19 2007-06-05 * Refactoring and errno support in string representation code. 2.0.18 2007-05-31 * Merged patch to reduce size of libselinux and remove need for libsepol for embedded systems from Yuichi Nakamura. This patch also turns the link-time dependency on libsepol into a runtime (dlopen) dependency even in the non-embedded case. 2.0.17 2007-05-31 * Updated Lindent script and reindented two header files. 2.0.16 2007-05-09 * Merged additional swig python bindings from Dan Walsh. 2.0.15 2007-04-27 * Merged helpful message when selinuxfs mount fails patch from Dax Kelson. 2.0.14 2007-04-24 * Merged build fix for avc_internal.c from Joshua Brindle. 2.0.13 2007-04-12 * Merged rpm_execcon python binding fix, matchpathcon man page fix, and getsebool -a handling for EACCES from Dan Walsh. 2.0.12 2007-04-09 * Merged support for getting initial contexts from James Carter. 2.0.11 2007-04-05 * Merged userspace AVC patch to follow kernel's behavior for permissive mode in caching previous denials from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.10 2007-04-05 * Merged sidput(NULL) patch from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.9 2007-03-30 * Merged class/av string conversion and avc_compute_create patch from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.8 2007-03-20 * Merged fix for avc.h #include's from Eamon Walsh. 2.0.7 2007-03-12 * Merged patch to drop support for CACHETRANS=0 config option from Steve Grubb. 2.0.6 2007-03-12 * Merged patch to drop support for old /etc/sysconfig/selinux and /etc/security policy file layout from Steve Grubb. 2.0.5 2007-02-27 * Merged init_selinuxmnt() and is_selinux_enabled() improvements from Steve Grubb. 2.0.4 2007-02-23 * Removed sending of setrans init message. 2.0.3 2007-02-22 * Merged matchpathcon memory leak fix from Steve Grubb. 2.0.2 2007-02-21 * Merged more swig initializers from Dan Walsh. 2.0.1 2007-02-20 * Merged patch from Todd Miller to convert int types over to C99 style. 2.0.0 2007-02-01 * Merged patch from Todd Miller to remove sscanf in matchpathcon.c because of the use of the non-standard format %as. (original patch changed for style). * Merged patch from Todd Miller to fix memory leak in matchpathcon.c. 1.34.1 2007-01-26 * Merged python binding fixes from Dan Walsh. 1.34.0 2007-01-18 * Updated version for stable branch. 1.33.6 2007-01-17 * Merged man page updates to make "apropos selinux" work from Dan Walsh. 1.33.5 2007-01-16 * Merged getdefaultcon utility from Dan Walsh. 1.33.4 2007-01-11 * Merged selinux_check_securetty_context() and support from Dan Walsh. 1.33.3 2007-01-04 * Merged patch for matchpathcon utility to use file mode information when available from Dan Walsh. 1.33.2 2006-11-27 * Merged patch to compile with -fPIC instead of -fpic from Manoj Srivastava to prevent hitting the global offset table limit. Patch changed to include libsepol and libsemanage in addition to libselinux. 1.33.1 2006-10-19 * Merged updated flask definitions from Darrel Goeddel. This adds the context security class, and also adds the string definitions for setsockcreate and polmatch. 1.32 2006-10-17 * Updated version for release. 1.30.30 2006-10-05 * Merged patch from Darrel Goeddel to always use untranslated contexts in the userspace AVC. 1.30.29 2006-09-29 * Merged av_permissions.h update from Steve Grubb, adding setsockcreate and polmatch definitions. 1.30.28 2006-09-13 * Merged patch from Steve Smalley to fix SIGPIPE in setrans_client * Merged c++ class identifier fix from Joe Nall. 1.30.27 2006-08-24 * Merged patch to not log avc stats upon a reset from Steve Grubb. * Applied patch to revert compat_net setting upon policy load. 1.30.26 2006-08-11 * Merged file context homedir and local path functions from Chris PeBenito. 1.30.25 2006-08-11 * Rework functions that access /proc/pid/attr to access the per-thread nodes, and unify the code to simplify maintenance. 1.30.24 2006-08-10 * Merged return value fix for *getfilecon() from Dan Walsh. 1.30.23 2006-08-10 * Merged sockcreate interfaces from Eric Paris. 1.30.22 2006-08-03 * Merged no-tls-direct-seg-refs patch from Jeremy Katz. 1.30.21 2006-08-03 * Merged netfilter_contexts support patch from Chris PeBenito. 1.30.20 2006-08-01 * Merged context_*_set errno patch from Jim Meyering. 1.30.19 2006-06-29 * Lindent. 1.30.18 2006-06-27 * Merged {get,set}procattrcon patch set from Eric Paris. * Merged re-base of keycreate patch originally by Michael LeMay from Eric Paris. 1.30.17 2006-06-27 * Regenerated Flask headers from refpolicy. 1.30.16 2006-06-26 * Merged patch from Dan Walsh with: - Added selinux_file_context_{cmp,verify}. - Added selinux_lsetfilecon_default. - Delay translation of contexts in matchpathcon. 1.30.15 2006-06-16 * Merged patch from Dan Walsh with: * Added selinux_getpolicytype() function. * Modified setrans code to skip processing if !mls_enabled. 1.30.14 2006-06-16 * Set errno in the !selinux_mnt case. 1.30.13 2006-06-02 * Allocate large buffers from the heap, not on stack. Affects is_context_customizable, selinux_init_load_policy, and selinux_getenforcemode. 1.30.12 2006-06-02 * Merged !selinux_mnt checks from Ian Kent. 1.30.11 2006-05-24 * Merged matchmediacon and trans_to_raw_context fixes from Serge Hallyn. 1.30.10 2006-05-22 * Merged simple setrans client cache from Dan Walsh. Merged avcstat patch from Russell Coker. 1.30.9 2006-05-22 * Modified selinux_mkload_policy() to also set /selinux/compat_net appropriately for the loaded policy. 1.30.8 2006-05-17 * Added matchpathcon_fini() function to free memory allocated by matchpathcon_init(). 1.30.7 2006-05-16 * Merged setrans client cleanup patch from Steve Grubb. 1.30.6 2006-05-08 * Merged getfscreatecon man page fix from Dan Walsh. * Updated booleans(8) man page to drop references to the old booleans file and to note that setsebool can be used to set the boot-time defaults via -P. 1.30.5 2006-05-05 * Merged fix warnings patch from Karl MacMillan. 1.30.4 2006-05-05 * Merged setrans client support from Dan Walsh. This removes use of libsetrans. * Merged patch to eliminate use of PAGE_SIZE constant from Dan Walsh. * Merged swig typemap fixes from Glauber de Oliveira Costa. 1.30.3 2006-04-12 * Added distclean target to Makefile. * Regenerated swig files. 1.30.2 2006-04-11 * Changed matchpathcon_init to verify that the spec file is a regular file. * Merged python binding t_output_helper removal patch from Dan Walsh. 1.30.1 2006-03-20 * Merged Makefile PYLIBVER definition patch from Dan Walsh. 1.30 2006-03-14 * Updated version for release. 1.29.8 2006-02-27 * Altered rpm_execcon fallback logic for permissive mode to also handle case where /selinux/enforce is not available. 1.29.7 2006-01-20 * Merged install-pywrap Makefile patch from Joshua Brindle. 1.29.6 2006-01-18 * Merged pywrap Makefile patch from Dan Walsh. 1.29.5 2006-01-11 * Added getseuser test program. 1.29.4 2006-01-06 * Added format attribute to myprintf in matchpathcon.c and removed obsoleted rootlen variable in init_selinux_config(). 1.29.3 2006-01-04 * Merged several fixes and improvements from Ulrich Drepper (Red Hat), including: - corrected use of getline - further calls to __fsetlocking for local files - use of strdupa and asprintf - proper handling of dirent in booleans code - use of -z relro - several other optimizations * Merged getpidcon python wrapper from Dan Walsh (Red Hat). 1.29.2 2005-12-14 * Merged call to finish_context_translations from Dan Walsh. This eliminates a memory leak from failing to release memory allocated by libsetrans. 1.29.1 2005-12-08 * Merged patch for swig interfaces from Dan Walsh. 1.28 2005-12-07 * Updated version for release. 1.27.28 2005-12-01 * Added MATCHPATHCON_VALIDATE flag for set_matchpathcon_flags() and modified matchpathcon implementation to make context validation/ canonicalization optional at matchpathcon_init time, deferring it to a successful matchpathcon by default unless the new flag is set by the caller. 1.27.27 2005-12-01 * Added matchpathcon_init_prefix() interface, and reworked matchpathcon implementation to support selective loading of file contexts entries based on prefix matching between the pathname regex stems and the specified path prefix (stem must be a prefix of the specified path prefix). 1.27.26 2005-11-29 * Merged getsebool patch from Dan Walsh. 1.27.25 2005-11-29 * Added -f file_contexts option to matchpathcon util. Fixed warning message in matchpathcon_init(). 1.27.24 2005-11-29 * Merged Makefile python definitions patch from Dan Walsh. 1.27.23 2005-11-28 * Merged swigify patch from Dan Walsh. 1.27.22 2005-11-15 * Merged make failure in rpm_execcon non-fatal in permissive mode patch from Ivan Gyurdiev. 1.27.21 2005-11-08 * Added MATCHPATHCON_NOTRANS flag for set_matchpathcon_flags() and modified matchpathcon_init() to skip context translation if it is set by the caller. 1.27.20 2005-11-07 * Added security_canonicalize_context() interface and set_matchpathcon_canoncon() interface for obtaining canonical contexts. Changed matchpathcon internals to obtain canonical contexts by default. Provided fallback for kernels that lack extended selinuxfs context interface. 1.27.19 2005-11-04 * Merged seusers parser changes from Ivan Gyurdiev. * Merged setsebool to libsemanage patch from Ivan Gyurdiev. * Changed seusers parser to reject empty fields. 1.27.18 2005-11-03 * Merged seusers empty level handling patch from Jonathan Kim (TCS). 1.27.17 2005-10-27 * Changed default entry for seusers to use __default__ to avoid ambiguity with users named "default". 1.27.16 2005-10-27 * Fixed init_selinux_config() handling of missing /etc/selinux/config or missing SELINUXTYPE= definition. * Merged selinux_translations_path() patch from Dan Walsh. 1.27.15 2005-10-25 * Added hidden_proto/def for get_default_context_with_role. 1.27.14 2005-10-25 * Merged selinux_path() and selinux_homedir_context_path() functions from Joshua Brindle. 1.27.13 2005-10-19 * Merged fixes for make DESTDIR= builds from Joshua Brindle. 1.27.12 2005-10-18 * Merged get_default_context_with_rolelevel and man pages from Dan Walsh (Red Hat). 1.27.11 2005-10-18 * Updated call to sepol_policydb_to_image for sepol changes. 1.27.10 2005-10-17 * Changed getseuserbyname to ignore empty lines and to handle no matching entry in the same manner as no seusers file. 1.27.9 2005-10-13 * Changed selinux_mkload_policy to try downgrading the latest policy version available to the kernel-supported version. 1.27.8 2005-10-11 * Changed selinux_mkload_policy to fall back to the maximum policy version supported by libsepol if the kernel policy version falls outside of the supported range. 1.27.7 2005-10-06 * Changed getseuserbyname to fall back to the Linux username and NULL level if seusers config file doesn't exist unless REQUIRESEUSERS=1 is set in /etc/selinux/config. * Moved seusers.conf under $SELINUXTYPE and renamed to seusers. 1.27.6 2005-10-06 * Added selinux_init_load_policy() function as an even higher level interface for the initial policy load by /sbin/init. This obsoletes the load_policy() function in the sysvinit-selinux.patch. 1.27.5 2005-10-06 * Added selinux_mkload_policy() function as a higher level interface for loading policy than the security_load_policy() interface. 1.27.4 2005-10-05 * Merged fix for matchpathcon (regcomp error checking) from Johan Fischer. Also added use of regerror to obtain the error string for inclusion in the error message. 1.27.3 2005-10-03 * Changed getseuserbyname to not require (and ignore if present) the MLS level in seusers.conf if MLS is disabled, setting *level to NULL in this case. 1.27.2 2005-09-30 * Merged getseuserbyname patch from Dan Walsh. 1.27.1 2005-09-19 * Merged STRIP_LEVEL patch for matchpathcon from Dan Walsh. This allows file_contexts with MLS fields to be processed on non-MLS-enabled systems with policies that are otherwise identical (e.g. same type definitions). * Merged get_ordered_context_list_with_level() function from Dan Walsh, and added get_default_context_with_level(). This allows MLS level selection for users other than the default level. 1.26 2005-09-06 * Updated version for release. 1.25.7 2005-09-01 * Merged modified form of patch to avoid dlopen/dlclose by the static libselinux from Dan Walsh. Users of the static libselinux will not have any context translation by default. 1.25.6 2005-08-31 * Added public functions to export context translation to users of libselinux (selinux_trans_to_raw_context, selinux_raw_to_trans_context). 1.25.5 2005-08-26 * Remove special definition for context_range_set; use common code. 1.25.4 2005-08-25 * Hid translation-related symbols entirely and ensured that raw functions have hidden definitions for internal use. * Allowed setting NULL via context_set* functions. * Allowed whitespace in MLS component of context. * Changed rpm_execcon to use translated functions to workaround lack of MLS level on upgraded systems. 1.25.3 2005-08-23 * Merged context translation patch, originally by TCS, with modifications by Dan Walsh (Red Hat). 1.25.2 2005-08-11 * Merged several fixes for error handling paths in the AVC sidtab, matchpathcon, booleans, context, and get_context_list code from Serge Hallyn (IBM). Bugs found by Coverity. 1.25.1 2005-08-10 * Removed setupns; migrated to pam. * Merged patches to rename checkPasswdAccess() from Joshua Brindle. Original symbol is temporarily retained for compatibility until all callers are updated. 1.24 2005-06-20 * Updated version for release. 1.23.12 2005-06-13 * Merged security_setupns() from Chad Sellers. 1.23.11 2005-05-19 * Merged avcstat and selinux man page from Dan Walsh. * Changed security_load_booleans to process booleans.local even if booleans file doesn't exist. 1.23.10 2005-04-29 * Merged set_selinuxmnt patch from Bill Nottingham (Red Hat). 1.23.9 2005-04-26 * Rewrote get_ordered_context_list and helpers, including changing logic to allow variable MLS fields. 1.23.8 2005-04-25 * Merged matchpathcon and man page patch from Dan Walsh. 1.23.7 2005-04-12 * Changed boolean functions to return -1 with errno ENOENT rather than assert on a NULL selinux_mnt (i.e. selinuxfs not mounted). 1.23.6 2005-04-08 * Fixed bug in matchpathcon_filespec_destroy. 1.23.5 2005-04-05 * Fixed bug in rpm_execcon error handling path. 1.23.4 2005-04-04 * Merged fix for set_matchpathcon* functions from Andreas Steinmetz. * Merged fix for getconlist utility from Andreas Steinmetz. 1.23.3 2005-03-29 * Merged security_set_boolean_list patch from Dan Walsh. This introduces booleans.local support for setsebool. 1.23.2 2005-03-17 * Merged destructors patch from Tomas Mraz. 1.23.1 2005-03-16 * Added set_matchpathcon_flags() function for setting flags controlling operation of matchpathcon. MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY means only process the base file_contexts file, not file_contexts.homedirs or file_contexts.local, and is for use by setfiles -c. * Updated matchpathcon.3 man page. 1.22 2005-03-09 * Updated version for release. 1.21.13 2005-03-08 * Fixed bug in matchpathcon_filespec_add() - failure to clear fl_head. 1.21.12 2005-03-01 * Changed matchpathcon_common to ignore any non-format bits in the mode. 1.21.11 2005-02-22 * Merged several fixes from Ulrich Drepper. 1.21.10 2005-02-17 * Merged matchpathcon patch for file_contexts.homedir from Dan Walsh. * Added selinux_users_path() for path to directory containing system.users and local.users. 1.21.9 2005-02-09 * Changed relabel Makefile target to use restorecon. 1.21.8 2005-02-07 * Regenerated av_permissions.h. 1.21.7 2005-02-01 * Modified avc_dump_av to explicitly check for any permissions that cannot be mapped to string names and display them as a hex value. 1.21.6 2005-01-31 * Regenerated av_permissions.h. 1.21.5 2005-01-28 * Generalized matchpathcon internals, exported more interfaces, and moved additional code from setfiles into libselinux so that setfiles can directly use matchpathcon. 1.21.4 2005-01-27 * Prevent overflow of spec array in matchpathcon. 1.21.3 2005-01-26 * Fixed several uses of internal functions to avoid relocations. * Changed rpm_execcon to check is_selinux_enabled() and fallback to a regular execve if not enabled (or unable to determine due to a lack of /proc, e.g. chroot'd environment). 1.21.2 2005-01-24 * Merged minor fix for avcstat from Dan Walsh. 1.21.1 2005-01-19 * Merged patch from Dan Walsh, including: - new is_context_customizable function - changed matchpathcon to also use file_contexts.local if present - man page cleanups 1.20 2005-01-04 * Changed matchpathcon to return -1 with errno ENOENT for <> entries, and also for an empty file_contexts configuration. * Removed some trivial utils that were not useful or redundant. * Changed BINDIR default to /usr/sbin to match change in Fedora. * Added security_compute_member. * Added man page for setcon. * Merged more man pages from Dan Walsh. * Merged avcstat from James Morris. * Merged build fix for mips from Manoj Srivastava. * Merged C++ support from John Ramsdell of MITRE. * Merged setcon() function from Darrel Goeddel of TCS. * Merged setsebool/togglesebool enhancement from Steve Grubb. * Merged cleanup patches from Steve Grubb. 1.18 2004-11-01 * Merged cleanup patches from Steve Grubb. * Added rpm_execcon. * Merged setenforce and removable context patch from Dan Walsh. * Merged build fix for alpha from Ulrich Drepper. * Removed copyright/license from selinux_netlink.h - definitions only. * Merged matchmediacon from Dan Walsh. * Regenerated headers for new nscd permissions. * Added get_default_context_with_role. * Added set_matchpathcon_printf. * Reworked av_inherit.h to allow easier re-use by kernel. * Changed avc_has_perm_noaudit to not fail on netlink errors. * Changed avc netlink code to check pid based on patch by Steve Grubb. * Merged second optimization patch from Ulrich Drepper. * Changed matchpathcon to skip invalid file_contexts entries. * Made string tables private to libselinux. * Merged strcat->stpcpy patch from Ulrich Drepper. * Merged matchpathcon man page from Dan Walsh. * Merged patch to eliminate PLTs for local syms from Ulrich Drepper. * Autobind netlink socket. * Dropped compatibility code from security_compute_user. * Merged fix for context_range_set from Chad Hanson. * Merged allocation failure checking patch from Chad Hanson. * Merged avc netlink error message patch from Colin Walters. 1.16 2004-08-19 * Regenerated headers for nscd class. * Merged man pages from Dan Walsh. * Merged context_new bug fix for MLS ranges from Chad Hanson. * Merged toggle_bool from Chris PeBenito, renamed to togglesebool. * Renamed change_bool and show_bools to setsebool and getsebool. * Merged security_load_booleans() function from Dan Walsh. * Added selinux_booleans_path() function. * Changed avc_init function prototype to use const. * Regenerated headers for crontab permission. * Added checkAccess from Dan Walsh. * Merged getenforce patch from Dan Walsh. * Regenerated headers for dbus classes. 1.14 2004-06-16 * Regenerated headers for fine-grained netlink classes. * Merged selinux_config bug fix from Dan Walsh. * Added userspace AVC man pages. * Added man links for API calls to existing man pages documenting them. * Replaced $HOME/.default_contexts support with /etc/selinux/contexts/users/$USER support. * Merged patch to determine config file paths at runtime to support reorganized layout. * Regenerated flask headers with stable ordering. * Merged patch for man pages from Russell Coker. 1.12 2004-05-10 * Updated flask files to include new SE-X security classes. * Added security_disable function for runtime disable of SELinux prior to initial policy load (for /sbin/init). * Changed get_ordered_context_list to omit any reachable contexts that are not explicitly listed in default_contexts, unless there are no matches. * Merged man pages from Russell Coker and Dan Walsh. * Merged memory leak fixes from Dan Walsh. * Merged policyvers errno patch from Chris PeBenito. 1.10 2004-04-05 * Merged getenforce patch from Dan Walsh. * Fixed init_selinuxmnt to correctly handle use of "selinuxfs" as the device specification, i.e. mount selinuxfs /selinux -t selinuxfs. Based on a patch by Russell Coker. * Merged matchpathcon buffer size fix from Dan Walsh. 1.8 2004-03-09 * Merged is_selinux_mls_enabled() from Chad Hanson of TCS. * Added matchpathcon function. * Updated userspace AVC to handle netlink selinux notifications. 1.6 2004-02-18 * Merged conditional policy extensions from Tresys Technology. * Added userspace avc and SID table implementation. * Fixed type on size in getpeercon per Thorsten Kukuk's advice. * Fixed use of getpwnam_r per Thorsten Kukuk's advice. * Changed to use getpwnam_r rather than getpwnam internally to avoid clobbering any existing pwd struct obtained by the caller. * Added getpeercon function to encapsulate getsockopt SO_PEERSEC and handle allocation ala getfilecon. * Changed is_selinux_enabled to return -1 on errors. * Changed to discover selinuxfs mount point via /proc/mounts so that the mount point can be changed without rebuilding. 1.4 2003-12-01 * Merged another cleanup patch from Bastian Blank and Joerg Hoh. * Regenerate headers for new permissions. * Merged static lib build patch from Bastian Blank and Joerg Hoh. * Export SELINUXMNT definition, add SELINUXPOLICY definition. * Add functions to provide access to enforce and policyvers. * Changed is_selinux_enabled to check /proc/filesystems for selinuxfs. * Fixed type for 'size' in *getfilecon. * Dropped -lattr and changed #include's to * Merged patch to move shared library to /lib from Dan Walsh. * Changed get_ordered_context_list to support a failsafe context. * Added selinuxenabled utility. * Merged const patch from Thorsten Kukuk. 1.2 2003-09-30 * Change is_selinux_enabled to fail if policy isn't loaded. * Changed Makefiles to allow non-root rpm builds. * Added -lattr for libselinux.so to ensure proper binding. 1.1 2003-08-13 * Ensure that context strings are padded with a null byte in case the kernel didn't include one. * Regenerate headers, update helpers.c for code cleanup. * Pass soname flag to linker (Colin Walters). * Fixes for various items: add const as appropriate, handle missed OOM condition, clean up compile warnings (Colin Walters). 1.0 2003-07-11 * Initial public release. libselinux-2.2.2/LICENSE000066400000000000000000000020121226034601700146740ustar00rootroot00000000000000This library (libselinux) is public domain software, i.e. not copyrighted. Warranty Exclusion ------------------ You agree that this software is a non-commercially developed program that may contain "bugs" (as that term is used in the industry) and that it may not function as intended. The software is licensed "as is". NSA makes no, and hereby expressly disclaims all, warranties, express, implied, statutory, or otherwise with respect to the software, including noninfringement and the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Limitation of Liability ----------------------- In no event will NSA be liable for any damages, including loss of data, lost profits, cost of cover, or other special, incidental, consequential, direct or indirect damages arising from the software or the use thereof, however caused and on any theory of liability. This limitation will apply even if NSA has been advised of the possibility of such damage. You acknowledge that this is a reasonable allocation of risk. libselinux-2.2.2/Makefile000066400000000000000000000015041226034601700153340ustar00rootroot00000000000000SUBDIRS = src include utils man DISABLE_AVC ?= n DISABLE_SETRANS ?= n DISABLE_RPM ?= n DISABLE_BOOL ?= n ifeq ($(EMBEDDED),y) override DISABLE_AVC=y override DISABLE_SETRANS=y override DISABLE_RPM=y override DISABLE_BOOL=y endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_AVC),y) EMFLAGS+= -DDISABLE_AVC endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_BOOL),y) EMFLAGS+= -DDISABLE_BOOL endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_SETRANS),y) EMFLAGS+= -DDISABLE_SETRANS endif export DISABLE_AVC DISABLE_SETRANS DISABLE_RPM DISABLE_BOOL EMFLAGS all install relabel clean distclean indent: @for subdir in $(SUBDIRS); do \ (cd $$subdir && $(MAKE) $@) || exit 1; \ done swigify: all $(MAKE) -C src swigify $@ pywrap: $(MAKE) -C src pywrap $@ rubywrap: $(MAKE) -C src rubywrap $@ install-pywrap: $(MAKE) -C src install-pywrap $@ install-rubywrap: $(MAKE) -C src install-rubywrap $@ test: libselinux-2.2.2/VERSION000066400000000000000000000000061226034601700147400ustar00rootroot000000000000002.2.2 libselinux-2.2.2/include/000077500000000000000000000000001226034601700153175ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-2.2.2/include/Makefile000066400000000000000000000004711226034601700167610ustar00rootroot00000000000000# Installation directories. PREFIX ?= $(DESTDIR)/usr INCDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/include/selinux all: install: all test -d $(INCDIR) || install -m 755 -d $(INCDIR) install -m 644 $(wildcard selinux/*.h) $(INCDIR) relabel: indent: ../../scripts/Lindent $(wildcard selinux/*.h) distclean clean: -rm -f selinux/*~ libselinux-2.2.2/include/selinux/000077500000000000000000000000001226034601700170065ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-2.2.2/include/selinux/av_permissions.h000066400000000000000000001767641226034601700222450ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ #define COMMON_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define COMMON_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL #define COMMON_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define COMMON_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define COMMON_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define COMMON_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define COMMON_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define COMMON_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define COMMON_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define COMMON_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define COMMON_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL #define COMMON_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL #define COMMON_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL #define COMMON_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL #define COMMON_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL #define COMMON_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL #define COMMON_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define COMMON_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define COMMON_IPC__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define COMMON_IPC__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define COMMON_IPC__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define COMMON_IPC__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define COMMON_IPC__READ 0x00000010UL #define COMMON_IPC__WRITE 0x00000020UL #define COMMON_IPC__ASSOCIATE 0x00000040UL #define COMMON_IPC__UNIX_READ 0x00000080UL #define COMMON_IPC__UNIX_WRITE 0x00000100UL #define COMMON_DATABASE__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define COMMON_DATABASE__DROP 0x00000002UL #define COMMON_DATABASE__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define COMMON_DATABASE__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define COMMON_DATABASE__RELABELFROM 0x00000010UL #define COMMON_DATABASE__RELABELTO 0x00000020UL #define FILESYSTEM__MOUNT 0x00000001UL #define FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT 0x00000002UL #define FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT 0x00000004UL #define FILESYSTEM__GETATTR 0x00000008UL #define FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM 0x00000010UL #define FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO 0x00000020UL #define FILESYSTEM__TRANSITION 0x00000040UL #define FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE 0x00000080UL #define FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD 0x00000100UL #define FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET 0x00000200UL #define DIR__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define DIR__READ 0x00000002UL #define DIR__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define DIR__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define DIR__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define DIR__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define DIR__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define DIR__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define DIR__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define DIR__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define DIR__UNLINK 0x00000400UL #define DIR__LINK 0x00000800UL #define DIR__RENAME 0x00001000UL #define DIR__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL #define DIR__SWAPON 0x00004000UL #define DIR__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL #define DIR__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL #define DIR__ADD_NAME 0x00020000UL #define DIR__REMOVE_NAME 0x00040000UL #define DIR__REPARENT 0x00080000UL #define DIR__SEARCH 0x00100000UL #define DIR__RMDIR 0x00200000UL #define DIR__OPEN 0x00400000UL #define FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define FILE__READ 0x00000002UL #define FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL #define FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL #define FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL #define FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL #define FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL #define FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL #define FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL #define FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS 0x00020000UL #define FILE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00040000UL #define FILE__EXECMOD 0x00080000UL #define FILE__OPEN 0x00100000UL #define LNK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define LNK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL #define LNK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define LNK_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define LNK_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define LNK_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define LNK_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define LNK_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define LNK_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define LNK_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define LNK_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL #define LNK_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL #define LNK_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL #define LNK_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL #define LNK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL #define LNK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL #define LNK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL #define CHR_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define CHR_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL #define CHR_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define CHR_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define CHR_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define CHR_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define CHR_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define CHR_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define CHR_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define CHR_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define CHR_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL #define CHR_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL #define CHR_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL #define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL #define CHR_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL #define CHR_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL #define CHR_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL #define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS 0x00020000UL #define CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00040000UL #define CHR_FILE__EXECMOD 0x00080000UL #define CHR_FILE__OPEN 0x00100000UL #define BLK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define BLK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL #define BLK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define BLK_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define BLK_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define BLK_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define BLK_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define BLK_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define BLK_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define BLK_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define BLK_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL #define BLK_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL #define BLK_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL #define BLK_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL #define BLK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL #define BLK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL #define BLK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL #define BLK_FILE__OPEN 0x00020000UL #define SOCK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define SOCK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL #define SOCK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define SOCK_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define SOCK_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define SOCK_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define SOCK_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define SOCK_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define SOCK_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define SOCK_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define SOCK_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL #define SOCK_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL #define SOCK_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL #define SOCK_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL #define SOCK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL #define SOCK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL #define SOCK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL #define FIFO_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define FIFO_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL #define FIFO_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define FIFO_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define FIFO_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define FIFO_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define FIFO_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define FIFO_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define FIFO_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define FIFO_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define FIFO_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL #define FIFO_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL #define FIFO_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL #define FIFO_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL #define FIFO_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL #define FIFO_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL #define FIFO_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL #define FIFO_FILE__OPEN 0x00020000UL #define FD__USE 0x00000001UL #define SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define TCP_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define TCP_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define TCP_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define TCP_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define TCP_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define TCP_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define TCP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define TCP_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define TCP_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define TCP_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define TCP_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define TCP_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO 0x00400000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN 0x00800000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM 0x01000000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND 0x02000000UL #define TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT 0x04000000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define UDP_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define UDP_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define UDP_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define UDP_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define UDP_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define UDP_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define UDP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define UDP_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define UDP_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define UDP_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define UDP_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define UDP_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND 0x00400000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND 0x00400000UL #define NODE__TCP_RECV 0x00000001UL #define NODE__TCP_SEND 0x00000002UL #define NODE__UDP_RECV 0x00000004UL #define NODE__UDP_SEND 0x00000008UL #define NODE__RAWIP_RECV 0x00000010UL #define NODE__RAWIP_SEND 0x00000020UL #define NODE__ENFORCE_DEST 0x00000040UL #define NODE__DCCP_RECV 0x00000080UL #define NODE__DCCP_SEND 0x00000100UL #define NODE__RECVFROM 0x00000200UL #define NODE__SENDTO 0x00000400UL #define NETIF__TCP_RECV 0x00000001UL #define NETIF__TCP_SEND 0x00000002UL #define NETIF__UDP_RECV 0x00000004UL #define NETIF__UDP_SEND 0x00000008UL #define NETIF__RAWIP_RECV 0x00000010UL #define NETIF__RAWIP_SEND 0x00000020UL #define NETIF__DCCP_RECV 0x00000040UL #define NETIF__DCCP_SEND 0x00000080UL #define NETIF__INGRESS 0x00000100UL #define NETIF__EGRESS 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define PACKET_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define KEY_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define KEY_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define KEY_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define KEY_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define KEY_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define KEY_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define KEY_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define KEY_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define KEY_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define KEY_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define KEY_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define KEY_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define KEY_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define KEY_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define KEY_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define KEY_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define KEY_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define KEY_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define KEY_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define KEY_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define KEY_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define KEY_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO 0x00400000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NEWCONN 0x00800000UL #define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM 0x01000000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define PROCESS__FORK 0x00000001UL #define PROCESS__TRANSITION 0x00000002UL #define PROCESS__SIGCHLD 0x00000004UL #define PROCESS__SIGKILL 0x00000008UL #define PROCESS__SIGSTOP 0x00000010UL #define PROCESS__SIGNULL 0x00000020UL #define PROCESS__SIGNAL 0x00000040UL #define PROCESS__PTRACE 0x00000080UL #define PROCESS__GETSCHED 0x00000100UL #define PROCESS__SETSCHED 0x00000200UL #define PROCESS__GETSESSION 0x00000400UL #define PROCESS__GETPGID 0x00000800UL #define PROCESS__SETPGID 0x00001000UL #define PROCESS__GETCAP 0x00002000UL #define PROCESS__SETCAP 0x00004000UL #define PROCESS__SHARE 0x00008000UL #define PROCESS__GETATTR 0x00010000UL #define PROCESS__SETEXEC 0x00020000UL #define PROCESS__SETFSCREATE 0x00040000UL #define PROCESS__NOATSECURE 0x00080000UL #define PROCESS__SIGINH 0x00100000UL #define PROCESS__SETRLIMIT 0x00200000UL #define PROCESS__RLIMITINH 0x00400000UL #define PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION 0x00800000UL #define PROCESS__SETCURRENT 0x01000000UL #define PROCESS__EXECMEM 0x02000000UL #define PROCESS__EXECSTACK 0x04000000UL #define PROCESS__EXECHEAP 0x08000000UL #define PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE 0x10000000UL #define PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE 0x20000000UL #define IPC__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define IPC__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define IPC__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define IPC__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define IPC__READ 0x00000010UL #define IPC__WRITE 0x00000020UL #define IPC__ASSOCIATE 0x00000040UL #define IPC__UNIX_READ 0x00000080UL #define IPC__UNIX_WRITE 0x00000100UL #define SEM__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define SEM__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define SEM__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define SEM__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define SEM__READ 0x00000010UL #define SEM__WRITE 0x00000020UL #define SEM__ASSOCIATE 0x00000040UL #define SEM__UNIX_READ 0x00000080UL #define SEM__UNIX_WRITE 0x00000100UL #define MSGQ__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define MSGQ__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define MSGQ__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define MSGQ__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define MSGQ__READ 0x00000010UL #define MSGQ__WRITE 0x00000020UL #define MSGQ__ASSOCIATE 0x00000040UL #define MSGQ__UNIX_READ 0x00000080UL #define MSGQ__UNIX_WRITE 0x00000100UL #define MSGQ__ENQUEUE 0x00000200UL #define MSG__SEND 0x00000001UL #define MSG__RECEIVE 0x00000002UL #define SHM__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define SHM__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define SHM__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define SHM__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define SHM__READ 0x00000010UL #define SHM__WRITE 0x00000020UL #define SHM__ASSOCIATE 0x00000040UL #define SHM__UNIX_READ 0x00000080UL #define SHM__UNIX_WRITE 0x00000100UL #define SHM__LOCK 0x00000200UL #define SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV 0x00000001UL #define SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE 0x00000002UL #define SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER 0x00000004UL #define SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT 0x00000008UL #define SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY 0x00000010UL #define SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL 0x00000020UL #define SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER 0x00000040UL #define SECURITY__SETENFORCE 0x00000080UL #define SECURITY__SETBOOL 0x00000100UL #define SECURITY__SETSECPARAM 0x00000200UL #define SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT 0x00000400UL #define SYSTEM__IPC_INFO 0x00000001UL #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ 0x00000002UL #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD 0x00000004UL #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE 0x00000008UL #define CAPABILITY__CHOWN 0x00000001UL #define CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE 0x00000002UL #define CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH 0x00000004UL #define CAPABILITY__FOWNER 0x00000008UL #define CAPABILITY__FSETID 0x00000010UL #define CAPABILITY__KILL 0x00000020UL #define CAPABILITY__SETGID 0x00000040UL #define CAPABILITY__SETUID 0x00000080UL #define CAPABILITY__SETPCAP 0x00000100UL #define CAPABILITY__LINUX_IMMUTABLE 0x00000200UL #define CAPABILITY__NET_BIND_SERVICE 0x00000400UL #define CAPABILITY__NET_BROADCAST 0x00000800UL #define CAPABILITY__NET_ADMIN 0x00001000UL #define CAPABILITY__NET_RAW 0x00002000UL #define CAPABILITY__IPC_LOCK 0x00004000UL #define CAPABILITY__IPC_OWNER 0x00008000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_MODULE 0x00010000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_RAWIO 0x00020000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_CHROOT 0x00040000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_PTRACE 0x00080000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_PACCT 0x00100000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_ADMIN 0x00200000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_BOOT 0x00400000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_NICE 0x00800000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_RESOURCE 0x01000000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_TIME 0x02000000UL #define CAPABILITY__SYS_TTY_CONFIG 0x04000000UL #define CAPABILITY__MKNOD 0x08000000UL #define CAPABILITY__LEASE 0x10000000UL #define CAPABILITY__AUDIT_WRITE 0x20000000UL #define CAPABILITY__AUDIT_CONTROL 0x40000000UL #define CAPABILITY__SETFCAP 0x80000000UL #define CAPABILITY2__MAC_OVERRIDE 0x00000001UL #define CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN 0x00000002UL #define PASSWD__PASSWD 0x00000001UL #define PASSWD__CHFN 0x00000002UL #define PASSWD__CHSH 0x00000004UL #define PASSWD__ROOTOK 0x00000008UL #define PASSWD__CRONTAB 0x00000010UL #define X_DRAWABLE__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define X_DRAWABLE__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define X_DRAWABLE__READ 0x00000004UL #define X_DRAWABLE__WRITE 0x00000008UL #define X_DRAWABLE__BLEND 0x00000010UL #define X_DRAWABLE__GETATTR 0x00000020UL #define X_DRAWABLE__SETATTR 0x00000040UL #define X_DRAWABLE__LIST_CHILD 0x00000080UL #define X_DRAWABLE__ADD_CHILD 0x00000100UL #define X_DRAWABLE__REMOVE_CHILD 0x00000200UL #define X_DRAWABLE__LIST_PROPERTY 0x00000400UL #define X_DRAWABLE__GET_PROPERTY 0x00000800UL #define X_DRAWABLE__SET_PROPERTY 0x00001000UL #define X_DRAWABLE__MANAGE 0x00002000UL #define X_DRAWABLE__OVERRIDE 0x00004000UL #define X_DRAWABLE__SHOW 0x00008000UL #define X_DRAWABLE__HIDE 0x00010000UL #define X_DRAWABLE__SEND 0x00020000UL #define X_DRAWABLE__RECEIVE 0x00040000UL #define X_SCREEN__GETATTR 0x00000001UL #define X_SCREEN__SETATTR 0x00000002UL #define X_SCREEN__HIDE_CURSOR 0x00000004UL #define X_SCREEN__SHOW_CURSOR 0x00000008UL #define X_SCREEN__SAVER_GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define X_SCREEN__SAVER_SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define X_SCREEN__SAVER_HIDE 0x00000040UL #define X_SCREEN__SAVER_SHOW 0x00000080UL #define X_GC__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define X_GC__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define X_GC__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define X_GC__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define X_GC__USE 0x00000010UL #define X_FONT__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define X_FONT__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define X_FONT__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define X_FONT__ADD_GLYPH 0x00000008UL #define X_FONT__REMOVE_GLYPH 0x00000010UL #define X_FONT__USE 0x00000020UL #define X_COLORMAP__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define X_COLORMAP__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define X_COLORMAP__READ 0x00000004UL #define X_COLORMAP__WRITE 0x00000008UL #define X_COLORMAP__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define X_COLORMAP__ADD_COLOR 0x00000020UL #define X_COLORMAP__REMOVE_COLOR 0x00000040UL #define X_COLORMAP__INSTALL 0x00000080UL #define X_COLORMAP__UNINSTALL 0x00000100UL #define X_COLORMAP__USE 0x00000200UL #define X_PROPERTY__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define X_PROPERTY__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define X_PROPERTY__READ 0x00000004UL #define X_PROPERTY__WRITE 0x00000008UL #define X_PROPERTY__APPEND 0x00000010UL #define X_PROPERTY__GETATTR 0x00000020UL #define X_PROPERTY__SETATTR 0x00000040UL #define X_SELECTION__READ 0x00000001UL #define X_SELECTION__WRITE 0x00000002UL #define X_SELECTION__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define X_SELECTION__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define X_CURSOR__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define X_CURSOR__DESTROY 0x00000002UL #define X_CURSOR__READ 0x00000004UL #define X_CURSOR__WRITE 0x00000008UL #define X_CURSOR__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define X_CURSOR__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define X_CURSOR__USE 0x00000040UL #define X_CLIENT__DESTROY 0x00000001UL #define X_CLIENT__GETATTR 0x00000002UL #define X_CLIENT__SETATTR 0x00000004UL #define X_CLIENT__MANAGE 0x00000008UL #define X_DEVICE__GETATTR 0x00000001UL #define X_DEVICE__SETATTR 0x00000002UL #define X_DEVICE__USE 0x00000004UL #define X_DEVICE__READ 0x00000008UL #define X_DEVICE__WRITE 0x00000010UL #define X_DEVICE__GETFOCUS 0x00000020UL #define X_DEVICE__SETFOCUS 0x00000040UL #define X_DEVICE__BELL 0x00000080UL #define X_DEVICE__FORCE_CURSOR 0x00000100UL #define X_DEVICE__FREEZE 0x00000200UL #define X_DEVICE__GRAB 0x00000400UL #define X_DEVICE__MANAGE 0x00000800UL #define X_SERVER__GETATTR 0x00000001UL #define X_SERVER__SETATTR 0x00000002UL #define X_SERVER__RECORD 0x00000004UL #define X_SERVER__DEBUG 0x00000008UL #define X_SERVER__GRAB 0x00000010UL #define X_SERVER__MANAGE 0x00000020UL #define X_EXTENSION__QUERY 0x00000001UL #define X_EXTENSION__USE 0x00000002UL #define X_RESOURCE__READ 0x00000001UL #define X_RESOURCE__WRITE 0x00000002UL #define X_EVENT__SEND 0x00000001UL #define X_EVENT__RECEIVE 0x00000002UL #define X_SYNTHETIC_EVENT__SEND 0x00000001UL #define X_SYNTHETIC_EVENT__RECEIVE 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL #define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL #define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL #define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY 0x01000000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV 0x02000000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT 0x04000000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define DBUS__ACQUIRE_SVC 0x00000001UL #define DBUS__SEND_MSG 0x00000002UL #define NSCD__GETPWD 0x00000001UL #define NSCD__GETGRP 0x00000002UL #define NSCD__GETHOST 0x00000004UL #define NSCD__GETSTAT 0x00000008UL #define NSCD__ADMIN 0x00000010UL #define NSCD__SHMEMPWD 0x00000020UL #define NSCD__SHMEMGRP 0x00000040UL #define NSCD__SHMEMHOST 0x00000080UL #define NSCD__GETSERV 0x00000100UL #define NSCD__SHMEMSERV 0x00000200UL #define ASSOCIATION__SENDTO 0x00000001UL #define ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM 0x00000002UL #define ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT 0x00000004UL #define ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define APPLETALK_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define PACKET__SEND 0x00000001UL #define PACKET__RECV 0x00000002UL #define PACKET__RELABELTO 0x00000004UL #define PACKET__FLOW_IN 0x00000008UL #define PACKET__FLOW_OUT 0x00000010UL #define PACKET__FORWARD_IN 0x00000020UL #define PACKET__FORWARD_OUT 0x00000040UL #define KEY__VIEW 0x00000001UL #define KEY__READ 0x00000002UL #define KEY__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define KEY__SEARCH 0x00000008UL #define KEY__LINK 0x00000010UL #define KEY__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define KEY__CREATE 0x00000040UL #define CONTEXT__TRANSLATE 0x00000001UL #define CONTEXT__CONTAINS 0x00000002UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND 0x00400000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT 0x00800000UL #define MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO 0x00000001UL #define DB_DATABASE__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define DB_DATABASE__DROP 0x00000002UL #define DB_DATABASE__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define DB_DATABASE__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define DB_DATABASE__RELABELFROM 0x00000010UL #define DB_DATABASE__RELABELTO 0x00000020UL #define DB_DATABASE__ACCESS 0x00000040UL #define DB_DATABASE__INSTALL_MODULE 0x00000080UL #define DB_DATABASE__LOAD_MODULE 0x00000100UL #define DB_DATABASE__GET_PARAM 0x00000200UL #define DB_DATABASE__SET_PARAM 0x00000400UL #define DB_TABLE__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define DB_TABLE__DROP 0x00000002UL #define DB_TABLE__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define DB_TABLE__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define DB_TABLE__RELABELFROM 0x00000010UL #define DB_TABLE__RELABELTO 0x00000020UL #define DB_TABLE__USE 0x00000040UL #define DB_TABLE__SELECT 0x00000080UL #define DB_TABLE__UPDATE 0x00000100UL #define DB_TABLE__INSERT 0x00000200UL #define DB_TABLE__DELETE 0x00000400UL #define DB_TABLE__LOCK 0x00000800UL #define DB_PROCEDURE__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define DB_PROCEDURE__DROP 0x00000002UL #define DB_PROCEDURE__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define DB_PROCEDURE__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define DB_PROCEDURE__RELABELFROM 0x00000010UL #define DB_PROCEDURE__RELABELTO 0x00000020UL #define DB_PROCEDURE__EXECUTE 0x00000040UL #define DB_PROCEDURE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00000080UL #define DB_COLUMN__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define DB_COLUMN__DROP 0x00000002UL #define DB_COLUMN__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define DB_COLUMN__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define DB_COLUMN__RELABELFROM 0x00000010UL #define DB_COLUMN__RELABELTO 0x00000020UL #define DB_COLUMN__USE 0x00000040UL #define DB_COLUMN__SELECT 0x00000080UL #define DB_COLUMN__UPDATE 0x00000100UL #define DB_COLUMN__INSERT 0x00000200UL #define DB_TUPLE__RELABELFROM 0x00000001UL #define DB_TUPLE__RELABELTO 0x00000002UL #define DB_TUPLE__USE 0x00000004UL #define DB_TUPLE__SELECT 0x00000008UL #define DB_TUPLE__UPDATE 0x00000010UL #define DB_TUPLE__INSERT 0x00000020UL #define DB_TUPLE__DELETE 0x00000040UL #define DB_BLOB__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define DB_BLOB__DROP 0x00000002UL #define DB_BLOB__GETATTR 0x00000004UL #define DB_BLOB__SETATTR 0x00000008UL #define DB_BLOB__RELABELFROM 0x00000010UL #define DB_BLOB__RELABELTO 0x00000020UL #define DB_BLOB__READ 0x00000040UL #define DB_BLOB__WRITE 0x00000080UL #define DB_BLOB__IMPORT 0x00000100UL #define DB_BLOB__EXPORT 0x00000200UL #define PEER__RECV 0x00000001UL #define X_APPLICATION_DATA__PASTE 0x00000001UL #define X_APPLICATION_DATA__PASTE_AFTER_CONFIRM 0x00000002UL #define X_APPLICATION_DATA__COPY 0x00000004UL libselinux-2.2.2/include/selinux/avc.h000066400000000000000000000401741226034601700177360ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Access vector cache interface for object managers. * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_ #define _SELINUX_AVC_H_ #include #include #include #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * SID format and operations */ struct security_id { security_context_t ctx; unsigned int refcnt; }; typedef struct security_id *security_id_t; #define SECSID_WILD (security_id_t)NULL /* unspecified SID */ /** * avc_sid_to_context - get copy of context corresponding to SID. * @sid: input SID * @ctx: pointer to context reference * * Return a copy of the security context corresponding to the input * @sid in the memory referenced by @ctx. The caller is expected to * free the context with freecon(). Return %0 on success, -%1 on * failure, with @errno set to %ENOMEM if insufficient memory was * available to make the copy, or %EINVAL if the input SID is invalid. */ int avc_sid_to_context(security_id_t sid, security_context_t * ctx); int avc_sid_to_context_raw(security_id_t sid, security_context_t * ctx); /** * avc_context_to_sid - get SID for context. * @ctx: input security context * @sid: pointer to SID reference * * Look up security context @ctx in SID table, making * a new entry if @ctx is not found. Increment the * reference counter for the SID. Store a pointer * to the SID structure into the memory referenced by @sid, * returning %0 on success or -%1 on error with @errno set. */ int avc_context_to_sid(const security_context_t ctx, security_id_t * sid); int avc_context_to_sid_raw(const security_context_t ctx, security_id_t * sid); /** * sidget - increment SID reference counter. * @sid: SID reference * * Increment the reference counter for @sid, indicating that * @sid is in use by an (additional) object. Return the * new reference count, or zero if @sid is invalid (has zero * reference count). Note that avc_context_to_sid() also * increments reference counts. */ int sidget(security_id_t sid); /** * sidput - decrement SID reference counter. * @sid: SID reference * * Decrement the reference counter for @sid, indicating that * a reference to @sid is no longer in use. Return the * new reference count. When the reference count reaches * zero, the SID is invalid, and avc_context_to_sid() must * be called to obtain a new SID for the security context. */ int sidput(security_id_t sid); /** * avc_get_initial_sid - get SID for an initial kernel security identifier * @name: input name of initial kernel security identifier * @sid: pointer to a SID reference * * Get the context for an initial kernel security identifier specified by * @name using security_get_initial_context() and then call * avc_context_to_sid() to get the corresponding SID. */ int avc_get_initial_sid(const char *name, security_id_t * sid); /* * AVC entry */ struct avc_entry; struct avc_entry_ref { struct avc_entry *ae; }; /** * avc_entry_ref_init - initialize an AVC entry reference. * @aeref: pointer to avc entry reference structure * * Use this macro to initialize an avc entry reference structure * before first use. These structures are passed to avc_has_perm(), * which stores cache entry references in them. They can increase * performance on repeated queries. */ #define avc_entry_ref_init(aeref) ((aeref)->ae = NULL) /* * User-provided callbacks for memory, auditing, and locking */ /* These structures are passed by reference to avc_init(). Passing * a NULL reference will cause the AVC to use a default. The default * memory callbacks are malloc() and free(). The default logging method * is to print on stderr. If no thread callbacks are passed, a separate * listening thread won't be started for kernel policy change messages. * If no locking callbacks are passed, no locking will take place. */ struct avc_memory_callback { /* malloc() equivalent. */ void *(*func_malloc) (size_t size); /* free() equivalent. */ void (*func_free) (void *ptr); /* Note that these functions should set errno on failure. If not, some avc routines may return -1 without errno set. */ }; struct avc_log_callback { /* log the printf-style format and arguments. */ void #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((format(printf, 1, 2))) #endif (*func_log) (const char *fmt, ...); /* store a string representation of auditdata (corresponding to the given security class) into msgbuf. */ void (*func_audit) (void *auditdata, security_class_t cls, char *msgbuf, size_t msgbufsize); }; struct avc_thread_callback { /* create and start a thread, returning an opaque pointer to it; the thread should run the given function. */ void *(*func_create_thread) (void (*run) (void)); /* cancel a given thread and free its resources. */ void (*func_stop_thread) (void *thread); }; struct avc_lock_callback { /* create a lock and return an opaque pointer to it. */ void *(*func_alloc_lock) (void); /* obtain a given lock, blocking if necessary. */ void (*func_get_lock) (void *lock); /* release a given lock. */ void (*func_release_lock) (void *lock); /* destroy a given lock (free memory, etc.) */ void (*func_free_lock) (void *lock); }; /* * Available options */ /* no-op option, useful for unused slots in an array of options */ #define AVC_OPT_UNUSED 0 /* override kernel enforcing mode (boolean value) */ #define AVC_OPT_SETENFORCE 1 /* * AVC operations */ /** * avc_init - Initialize the AVC. * @msgprefix: prefix for log messages * @mem_callbacks: user-supplied memory callbacks * @log_callbacks: user-supplied logging callbacks * @thread_callbacks: user-supplied threading callbacks * @lock_callbacks: user-supplied locking callbacks * * Initialize the access vector cache. Return %0 on * success or -%1 with @errno set on failure. * If @msgprefix is NULL, use "uavc". If any callback * structure references are NULL, use default methods * for those callbacks (see the definition of the callback * structures above). */ int avc_init(const char *msgprefix, const struct avc_memory_callback *mem_callbacks, const struct avc_log_callback *log_callbacks, const struct avc_thread_callback *thread_callbacks, const struct avc_lock_callback *lock_callbacks); /** * avc_open - Initialize the AVC. * @opts: array of selabel_opt structures specifying AVC options or NULL. * @nopts: number of elements in opts array or zero for no options. * * This function is identical to avc_init(), except the message prefix * is set to "avc" and any callbacks desired should be specified via * selinux_set_callback(). Available options are listed above. */ int avc_open(struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts); /** * avc_cleanup - Remove unused SIDs and AVC entries. * * Search the SID table for SID structures with zero * reference counts, and remove them along with all * AVC entries that reference them. This can be used * to return memory to the system. */ void avc_cleanup(void); /** * avc_reset - Flush the cache and reset statistics. * * Remove all entries from the cache and reset all access * statistics (as returned by avc_cache_stats()) to zero. * The SID mapping is not affected. Return %0 on success, * -%1 with @errno set on error. */ int avc_reset(void); /** * avc_destroy - Free all AVC structures. * * Destroy all AVC structures and free all allocated * memory. User-supplied locking, memory, and audit * callbacks will be retained, but security-event * callbacks will not. All SID's will be invalidated. * User must call avc_init() if further use of AVC is desired. */ void avc_destroy(void); /** * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass * @aeref: AVC entry reference * @avd: access vector decisions * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain * a new decision and add it to the cache. Update @aeref to refer to an AVC * entry with the resulting decisions, and return a copy of the decisions * in @avd. Return %0 if all @requested permissions are granted, -%1 with * @errno set to %EACCES if any permissions are denied, or to another value * upon other errors. This function is typically called by avc_has_perm(), * but may also be called directly to separate permission checking from * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but * should be released for the auditing. */ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref, struct av_decision *avd); /** * avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass * @aeref: AVC entry reference * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain * a new decision and add it to the cache. Update @aeref to refer to an AVC * entry with the resulting decisions. Audit the granting or denial of * permissions in accordance with the policy. Return %0 if all @requested * permissions are granted, -%1 with @errno set to %EACCES if any permissions * are denied or to another value upon other errors. */ int avc_has_perm(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref, void *auditdata); /** * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions * @avd: access vector decisions * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data * * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance * with the policy. This function is typically called by * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit() * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing. * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released * before calling the auditing code. */ void avc_audit(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd, int result, void *auditdata); /** * avc_compute_create - Compute SID for labeling a new object. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @newsid: pointer to SID reference * * Call the security server to obtain a context for labeling a * new object. Look up the context in the SID table, making * a new entry if not found. Increment the reference counter * for the SID. Store a pointer to the SID structure into the * memory referenced by @newsid, returning %0 on success or -%1 on * error with @errno set. */ int avc_compute_create(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, security_id_t * newsid); /** * avc_compute_member - Compute SID for polyinstantation. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @newsid: pointer to SID reference * * Call the security server to obtain a context for labeling an * object instance. Look up the context in the SID table, making * a new entry if not found. Increment the reference counter * for the SID. Store a pointer to the SID structure into the * memory referenced by @newsid, returning %0 on success or -%1 on * error with @errno set. */ int avc_compute_member(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, security_id_t * newsid); /* * security event callback facility */ /* security events */ #define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1 #define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE 2 #define AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE 4 #define AVC_CALLBACK_RESET 8 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE 16 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128 /** * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events. * @callback: callback function * @events: bitwise OR of desired security events * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions * * Register a callback function for events in the set @events * related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) and * and the permissions @perms, interpreting * @perms based on @tclass. Returns %0 on success or * -%1 if insufficient memory exists to add the callback. */ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback) (uint32_t event, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, access_vector_t * out_retained), uint32_t events, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms); /* * AVC statistics */ /* If set, cache statistics are tracked. This may * become a compile-time option in the future. */ #define AVC_CACHE_STATS 1 struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned entry_lookups; unsigned entry_hits; unsigned entry_misses; unsigned entry_discards; unsigned cav_lookups; unsigned cav_hits; unsigned cav_probes; unsigned cav_misses; }; /** * avc_cache_stats - get cache access statistics. * @stats: reference to statistics structure * * Fill the supplied structure with information about AVC * activity since the last call to avc_init() or * avc_reset(). See the structure definition for * details. */ void avc_cache_stats(struct avc_cache_stats *stats); /** * avc_av_stats - log av table statistics. * * Log a message with information about the size and * distribution of the access vector table. The audit * callback is used to print the message. */ void avc_av_stats(void); /** * avc_sid_stats - log SID table statistics. * * Log a message with information about the size and * distribution of the SID table. The audit callback * is used to print the message. */ void avc_sid_stats(void); /** * avc_netlink_open - Create a netlink socket and connect to the kernel. */ int avc_netlink_open(int blocking); /** * avc_netlink_loop - Wait for netlink messages from the kernel */ void avc_netlink_loop(void); /** * avc_netlink_close - Close the netlink socket */ void avc_netlink_close(void); /** * avc_netlink_acquire_fd - Acquire netlink socket fd. * * Allows the application to manage messages from the netlink socket in * its own main loop. */ int avc_netlink_acquire_fd(void); /** * avc_netlink_release_fd - Release netlink socket fd. * * Returns ownership of the netlink socket to the library. */ void avc_netlink_release_fd(void); /** * avc_netlink_check_nb - Check netlink socket for new messages. * * Called by the application when using avc_netlink_acquire_fd() to * process kernel netlink events. */ int avc_netlink_check_nb(void); /** * selinux_status_open - Open and map SELinux kernel status page * */ int selinux_status_open(int fallback); /** * selinux_status_close - Unmap and close SELinux kernel status page * */ void selinux_status_close(void); /** * selinux_status_updated - Inform us whether the kernel status has been updated * */ int selinux_status_updated(void); /** * selinux_status_getenforce - Get the enforce flag value * */ int selinux_status_getenforce(void); /** * selinux_status_policyload - Get the number of policy reloaded * */ int selinux_status_policyload(void); /** * selinux_status_deny_unknown - Get the behavior for undefined classes/permissions * */ int selinux_status_deny_unknown(void); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_H_ */ libselinux-2.2.2/include/selinux/context.h000066400000000000000000000022711226034601700206450ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _SELINUX_CONTEXT_H_ #define _SELINUX_CONTEXT_H_ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * Functions to deal with security contexts in user space. */ typedef struct { void *ptr; } context_s_t; typedef context_s_t *context_t; /* Return a new context initialized to a context string */ extern context_t context_new(const char *); /* * Return a pointer to the string value of the context_t * Valid until the next call to context_str or context_free * for the same context_t* */ extern char *context_str(context_t); /* Free the storage used by a context */ extern void context_free(context_t); /* Get a pointer to the string value of a context component */ extern const char *context_type_get(context_t); extern const char *context_range_get(context_t); extern const char *context_role_get(context_t); extern const char *context_user_get(context_t); /* Set a context component. Returns nonzero if unsuccessful */ extern int context_type_set(context_t, const char *); extern int context_range_set(context_t, const char *); extern int context_role_set(context_t, const char *); extern int context_user_set(context_t, const char *); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif libselinux-2.2.2/include/selinux/flask.h000066400000000000000000000141361226034601700202640ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ #ifndef _SELINUX_FLASK_H_ #define _SELINUX_FLASK_H_ /* * Security object class definitions */ #define SECCLASS_SECURITY 1 #define SECCLASS_PROCESS 2 #define SECCLASS_SYSTEM 3 #define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY 4 #define SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM 5 #define SECCLASS_FILE 6 #define SECCLASS_DIR 7 #define SECCLASS_FD 8 #define SECCLASS_LNK_FILE 9 #define SECCLASS_CHR_FILE 10 #define SECCLASS_BLK_FILE 11 #define SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE 12 #define SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE 13 #define SECCLASS_SOCKET 14 #define SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET 15 #define SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET 16 #define SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET 17 #define SECCLASS_NODE 18 #define SECCLASS_NETIF 19 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET 20 #define SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET 21 #define SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET 22 #define SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET 23 #define SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET 24 #define SECCLASS_SEM 25 #define SECCLASS_MSG 26 #define SECCLASS_MSGQ 27 #define SECCLASS_SHM 28 #define SECCLASS_IPC 29 #define SECCLASS_PASSWD 30 #define SECCLASS_X_DRAWABLE 31 #define SECCLASS_X_SCREEN 32 #define SECCLASS_X_GC 33 #define SECCLASS_X_FONT 34 #define SECCLASS_X_COLORMAP 35 #define SECCLASS_X_PROPERTY 36 #define SECCLASS_X_SELECTION 37 #define SECCLASS_X_CURSOR 38 #define SECCLASS_X_CLIENT 39 #define SECCLASS_X_DEVICE 40 #define SECCLASS_X_SERVER 41 #define SECCLASS_X_EXTENSION 42 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET 43 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET 44 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET 45 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET 46 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET 47 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET 48 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET 49 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET 50 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET 51 #define SECCLASS_DBUS 52 #define SECCLASS_NSCD 53 #define SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION 54 #define SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET 55 #define SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET 56 #define SECCLASS_PACKET 57 #define SECCLASS_KEY 58 #define SECCLASS_CONTEXT 59 #define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET 60 #define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT 61 #define SECCLASS_DB_DATABASE 62 #define SECCLASS_DB_TABLE 63 #define SECCLASS_DB_PROCEDURE 64 #define SECCLASS_DB_COLUMN 65 #define SECCLASS_DB_TUPLE 66 #define SECCLASS_DB_BLOB 67 #define SECCLASS_PEER 68 #define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 69 #define SECCLASS_X_RESOURCE 70 #define SECCLASS_X_EVENT 71 #define SECCLASS_X_SYNTHETIC_EVENT 72 #define SECCLASS_X_APPLICATION_DATA 73 /* * Security identifier indices for initial entities */ #define SECINITSID_KERNEL 1 #define SECINITSID_SECURITY 2 #define SECINITSID_UNLABELED 3 #define SECINITSID_FS 4 #define SECINITSID_FILE 5 #define SECINITSID_FILE_LABELS 6 #define SECINITSID_INIT 7 #define SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET 8 #define SECINITSID_PORT 9 #define SECINITSID_NETIF 10 #define SECINITSID_NETMSG 11 #define SECINITSID_NODE 12 #define SECINITSID_IGMP_PACKET 13 #define SECINITSID_ICMP_SOCKET 14 #define SECINITSID_TCP_SOCKET 15 #define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_MODPROBE 16 #define SECINITSID_SYSCTL 17 #define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_FS 18 #define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_KERNEL 19 #define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_NET 20 #define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_NET_UNIX 21 #define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_VM 22 #define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_DEV 23 #define SECINITSID_KMOD 24 #define SECINITSID_POLICY 25 #define SECINITSID_SCMP_PACKET 26 #define SECINITSID_DEVNULL 27 #define SECINITSID_NUM 27 #endif libselinux-2.2.2/include/selinux/get_context_list.h000066400000000000000000000060451226034601700225420ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _SELINUX_GET_SID_LIST_H_ #define _SELINUX_GET_SID_LIST_H_ #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #define SELINUX_DEFAULTUSER "user_u" /* Get an ordered list of authorized security contexts for a user session for 'user' spawned by 'fromcon' and set *conary to refer to the NULL-terminated array of contexts. Every entry in the list will be authorized by the policy, but the ordering is subject to user customizable preferences. Returns number of entries in *conary. If 'fromcon' is NULL, defaults to current context. Caller must free via freeconary. */ extern int get_ordered_context_list(const char *user, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t ** list); /* As above, but use the provided MLS level rather than the default level for the user. */ int get_ordered_context_list_with_level(const char *user, const char *level, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t ** list); /* Get the default security context for a user session for 'user' spawned by 'fromcon' and set *newcon to refer to it. The context will be one of those authorized by the policy, but the selection of a default is subject to user customizable preferences. If 'fromcon' is NULL, defaults to current context. Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int get_default_context(const char *user, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t * newcon); /* As above, but use the provided MLS level rather than the default level for the user. */ int get_default_context_with_level(const char *user, const char *level, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t * newcon); /* Same as get_default_context, but only return a context that has the specified role. If no reachable context exists for the user with that role, then return -1. */ int get_default_context_with_role(const char *user, const char *role, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t * newcon); /* Same as get_default_context, but only return a context that has the specified role and level. If no reachable context exists for the user with that role, then return -1. */ int get_default_context_with_rolelevel(const char *user, const char *level, const char *role, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t * newcon); /* Given a list of authorized security contexts for the user, query the user to select one and set *newcon to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. Returns 0 on sucess or -1 otherwise. */ extern int query_user_context(security_context_t * list, security_context_t * newcon); /* Allow the user to manually enter a context as a fallback if a list of authorized contexts could not be obtained. Caller must free via freecon. Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. */ extern int manual_user_enter_context(const char *user, security_context_t * newcon); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif libselinux-2.2.2/include/selinux/get_default_type.h000066400000000000000000000011651226034601700225060ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* get_default_type.h - contains header information and function prototypes * for functions to get the default type for a role */ #ifndef _SELINUX_GET_DEFAULT_TYPE_H_ #define _SELINUX_GET_DEFAULT_TYPE_H_ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Return path to default type file. */ const char *selinux_default_type_path(void); /* Get the default type (domain) for 'role' and set 'type' to refer to it. Caller must free via free(). Return 0 on success or -1 otherwise. */ int get_default_type(const char *role, char **type); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ifndef _GET_DEFAULT_TYPE_H_ */ libselinux-2.2.2/include/selinux/label.h000066400000000000000000000077041226034601700202460ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Labeling interface for userspace object managers and others. * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #ifndef _SELABEL_H_ #define _SELABEL_H_ #include #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * Opaque type used for all label handles. */ struct selabel_handle; /* * Available backends. */ /* file contexts */ #define SELABEL_CTX_FILE 0 /* media contexts */ #define SELABEL_CTX_MEDIA 1 /* x contexts */ #define SELABEL_CTX_X 2 /* db objects */ #define SELABEL_CTX_DB 3 /* Android property service contexts */ #define SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_PROP 4 /* * Available options */ /* no-op option, useful for unused slots in an array of options */ #define SELABEL_OPT_UNUSED 0 /* validate contexts before returning them (boolean value) */ #define SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE 1 /* don't use local customizations to backend data (boolean value) */ #define SELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY 2 /* specify an alternate path to use when loading backend data */ #define SELABEL_OPT_PATH 3 /* select a subset of the search space as an optimization (file backend) */ #define SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET 4 /* total number of options */ #define SELABEL_NOPT 5 /* * Label operations */ /** * selabel_open - Create a labeling handle. * @backend: one of the constants specifying a supported labeling backend. * @opts: array of selabel_opt structures specifying label options or NULL. * @nopts: number of elements in opts array or zero for no options. * * Open a labeling backend for use. The available backend identifiers are * listed above. Options may be provided via the opts parameter; available * options are listed above. Not all options may be supported by every * backend. Return value is the created handle on success or NULL with * @errno set on failure. */ struct selabel_handle *selabel_open(unsigned int backend, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts); /** * selabel_close - Close a labeling handle. * @handle: specifies handle to close * * Destroy the specified handle, closing files, freeing allocated memory, * etc. The handle may not be further used after it has been closed. */ void selabel_close(struct selabel_handle *handle); /** * selabel_lookup - Perform labeling lookup operation. * @handle: specifies backend instance to query * @con: returns the appropriate context with which to label the object * @key: string input to lookup operation * @type: numeric input to the lookup operation * * Perform a labeling lookup operation. Return %0 on success, -%1 with * @errno set on failure. The key and type arguments are the inputs to the * lookup operation; appropriate values are dictated by the backend in use. * The result is returned in the memory pointed to by @con and must be freed * by the user with freecon(). */ int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *handle, security_context_t *con, const char *key, int type); int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *handle, security_context_t *con, const char *key, int type); /** * selabel_stats - log labeling operation statistics. * @handle: specifies backend instance to query * * Log a message with information about the number of queries performed, * number of unused matching entries, or other operational statistics. * Message is backend-specific, some backends may not output a message. */ void selabel_stats(struct selabel_handle *handle); /* * Type codes used by specific backends */ /* X backend */ #define SELABEL_X_PROP 1 #define SELABEL_X_EXT 2 #define SELABEL_X_CLIENT 3 #define SELABEL_X_EVENT 4 #define SELABEL_X_SELN 5 #define SELABEL_X_POLYPROP 6 #define SELABEL_X_POLYSELN 7 /* DB backend */ #define SELABEL_DB_DATABASE 1 #define SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA 2 #define SELABEL_DB_TABLE 3 #define SELABEL_DB_COLUMN 4 #define SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE 5 #define SELABEL_DB_VIEW 6 #define SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE 7 #define SELABEL_DB_BLOB 8 #define SELABEL_DB_TUPLE 9 #define SELABEL_DB_LANGUAGE 10 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* _SELABEL_H_ */ libselinux-2.2.2/include/selinux/selinux.h000066400000000000000000000645551226034601700206650ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _SELINUX_H_ #define _SELINUX_H_ #include #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Return 1 if we are running on a SELinux kernel, or 0 if not or -1 if we get an error. */ extern int is_selinux_enabled(void); /* Return 1 if we are running on a SELinux MLS kernel, or 0 otherwise. */ extern int is_selinux_mls_enabled(void); typedef char *security_context_t; /* Free the memory allocated for a context by any of the below get* calls. */ extern void freecon(security_context_t con); /* Free the memory allocated for a context array by security_compute_user. */ extern void freeconary(security_context_t * con); /* Wrappers for the /proc/pid/attr API. */ /* Get current context, and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getcon(security_context_t * con); extern int getcon_raw(security_context_t * con); /* Set the current security context to con. Note that use of this function requires that the entire application be trusted to maintain any desired separation between the old and new security contexts, unlike exec-based transitions performed via setexeccon. When possible, decompose your application and use setexeccon()+execve() instead. Note that the application may lose access to its open descriptors as a result of a setcon() unless policy allows it to use descriptors opened by the old context. */ extern int setcon(const security_context_t con); extern int setcon_raw(const security_context_t con); /* Get context of process identified by pid, and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getpidcon(pid_t pid, security_context_t * con); extern int getpidcon_raw(pid_t pid, security_context_t * con); /* Get previous context (prior to last exec), and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getprevcon(security_context_t * con); extern int getprevcon_raw(security_context_t * con); /* Get exec context, and set *con to refer to it. Sets *con to NULL if no exec context has been set, i.e. using default. If non-NULL, caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getexeccon(security_context_t * con); extern int getexeccon_raw(security_context_t * con); /* Set exec security context for the next execve. Call with NULL if you want to reset to the default. */ extern int setexeccon(const security_context_t con); extern int setexeccon_raw(const security_context_t con); /* Get fscreate context, and set *con to refer to it. Sets *con to NULL if no fs create context has been set, i.e. using default. If non-NULL, caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getfscreatecon(security_context_t * con); extern int getfscreatecon_raw(security_context_t * con); /* Set the fscreate security context for subsequent file creations. Call with NULL if you want to reset to the default. */ extern int setfscreatecon(const security_context_t context); extern int setfscreatecon_raw(const security_context_t context); /* Get keycreate context, and set *con to refer to it. Sets *con to NULL if no key create context has been set, i.e. using default. If non-NULL, caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getkeycreatecon(security_context_t * con); extern int getkeycreatecon_raw(security_context_t * con); /* Set the keycreate security context for subsequent key creations. Call with NULL if you want to reset to the default. */ extern int setkeycreatecon(const security_context_t context); extern int setkeycreatecon_raw(const security_context_t context); /* Get sockcreate context, and set *con to refer to it. Sets *con to NULL if no socket create context has been set, i.e. using default. If non-NULL, caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getsockcreatecon(security_context_t * con); extern int getsockcreatecon_raw(security_context_t * con); /* Set the sockcreate security context for subsequent socket creations. Call with NULL if you want to reset to the default. */ extern int setsockcreatecon(const security_context_t context); extern int setsockcreatecon_raw(const security_context_t context); /* Wrappers for the xattr API. */ /* Get file context, and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getfilecon(const char *path, security_context_t * con); extern int getfilecon_raw(const char *path, security_context_t * con); extern int lgetfilecon(const char *path, security_context_t * con); extern int lgetfilecon_raw(const char *path, security_context_t * con); extern int fgetfilecon(int fd, security_context_t * con); extern int fgetfilecon_raw(int fd, security_context_t * con); /* Set file context */ extern int setfilecon(const char *path, security_context_t con); extern int setfilecon_raw(const char *path, security_context_t con); extern int lsetfilecon(const char *path, security_context_t con); extern int lsetfilecon_raw(const char *path, security_context_t con); extern int fsetfilecon(int fd, security_context_t con); extern int fsetfilecon_raw(int fd, security_context_t con); /* Wrappers for the socket API */ /* Get context of peer socket, and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getpeercon(int fd, security_context_t * con); extern int getpeercon_raw(int fd, security_context_t * con); /* Wrappers for the selinuxfs (policy) API. */ typedef unsigned int access_vector_t; typedef unsigned short security_class_t; struct av_decision { access_vector_t allowed; access_vector_t decided; access_vector_t auditallow; access_vector_t auditdeny; unsigned int seqno; unsigned int flags; }; /* Definitions of av_decision.flags */ #define SELINUX_AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001 /* Structure for passing options, used by AVC and label subsystems */ struct selinux_opt { int type; const char *value; }; /* Callback facilities */ union selinux_callback { /* log the printf-style format and arguments, with the type code indicating the type of message */ int #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))) #endif (*func_log) (int type, const char *fmt, ...); /* store a string representation of auditdata (corresponding to the given security class) into msgbuf. */ int (*func_audit) (void *auditdata, security_class_t cls, char *msgbuf, size_t msgbufsize); /* validate the supplied context, modifying if necessary */ int (*func_validate) (security_context_t *ctx); /* netlink callback for setenforce message */ int (*func_setenforce) (int enforcing); /* netlink callback for policyload message */ int (*func_policyload) (int seqno); }; #define SELINUX_CB_LOG 0 #define SELINUX_CB_AUDIT 1 #define SELINUX_CB_VALIDATE 2 #define SELINUX_CB_SETENFORCE 3 #define SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD 4 extern union selinux_callback selinux_get_callback(int type); extern void selinux_set_callback(int type, union selinux_callback cb); /* Logging type codes, passed to the logging callback */ #define SELINUX_ERROR 0 #define SELINUX_WARNING 1 #define SELINUX_INFO 2 #define SELINUX_AVC 3 #define SELINUX_TRANS_DIR "/var/run/setrans" /* Compute an access decision. */ extern int security_compute_av(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd); extern int security_compute_av_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd); extern int security_compute_av_flags(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd); extern int security_compute_av_flags_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd); /* Compute a labeling decision and set *newcon to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int security_compute_create(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon); extern int security_compute_create_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon); extern int security_compute_create_name(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *objname, security_context_t * newcon); extern int security_compute_create_name_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *objname, security_context_t * newcon); /* Compute a relabeling decision and set *newcon to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int security_compute_relabel(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon); extern int security_compute_relabel_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon); /* Compute a polyinstantiation member decision and set *newcon to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int security_compute_member(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon); extern int security_compute_member_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon); /* Compute the set of reachable user contexts and set *con to refer to the NULL-terminated array of contexts. Caller must free via freeconary. */ extern int security_compute_user(const security_context_t scon, const char *username, security_context_t ** con); extern int security_compute_user_raw(const security_context_t scon, const char *username, security_context_t ** con); /* Load a policy configuration. */ extern int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len); /* Get the context of an initial kernel security identifier by name. Caller must free via freecon */ extern int security_get_initial_context(const char *name, security_context_t * con); extern int security_get_initial_context_raw(const char *name, security_context_t * con); /* * Make a policy image and load it. * This function provides a higher level interface for loading policy * than security_load_policy, internally determining the right policy * version, locating and opening the policy file, mapping it into memory, * manipulating it as needed for current boolean settings and/or local * definitions, and then calling security_load_policy to load it. * * 'preservebools' is a boolean flag indicating whether current * policy boolean values should be preserved into the new policy (if 1) * or reset to the saved policy settings (if 0). The former case is the * default for policy reloads, while the latter case is an option for policy * reloads but is primarily for the initial policy load. */ extern int selinux_mkload_policy(int preservebools); /* * Perform the initial policy load. * This function determines the desired enforcing mode, sets the * the *enforce argument accordingly for the caller to use, sets the * SELinux kernel enforcing status to match it, and loads the policy. * It also internally handles the initial selinuxfs mount required to * perform these actions. * * The function returns 0 if everything including the policy load succeeds. * In this case, init is expected to re-exec itself in order to transition * to the proper security context. * Otherwise, the function returns -1, and init must check *enforce to * determine how to proceed. If enforcing (*enforce > 0), then init should * halt the system. Otherwise, init may proceed normally without a re-exec. */ extern int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce); /* Translate boolean strict to name value pair. */ typedef struct { char *name; int value; } SELboolean; /* save a list of booleans in a single transaction. */ extern int security_set_boolean_list(size_t boolcnt, SELboolean * boollist, int permanent); /* Load policy boolean settings. Path may be NULL, in which case the booleans are loaded from the active policy boolean configuration file. */ extern int security_load_booleans(char *path); /* Check the validity of a security context. */ extern int security_check_context(const security_context_t con); extern int security_check_context_raw(const security_context_t con); /* Canonicalize a security context. */ extern int security_canonicalize_context(const security_context_t con, security_context_t * canoncon); extern int security_canonicalize_context_raw(const security_context_t con, security_context_t * canoncon); /* Get the enforce flag value. */ extern int security_getenforce(void); /* Set the enforce flag value. */ extern int security_setenforce(int value); /* Get the behavior for undefined classes/permissions */ extern int security_deny_unknown(void); /* Disable SELinux at runtime (must be done prior to initial policy load). */ extern int security_disable(void); /* Get the policy version number. */ extern int security_policyvers(void); /* Get the boolean names */ extern int security_get_boolean_names(char ***names, int *len); /* Get the pending value for the boolean */ extern int security_get_boolean_pending(const char *name); /* Get the active value for the boolean */ extern int security_get_boolean_active(const char *name); /* Set the pending value for the boolean */ extern int security_set_boolean(const char *name, int value); /* Commit the pending values for the booleans */ extern int security_commit_booleans(void); /* Userspace class mapping support */ struct security_class_mapping { const char *name; const char *perms[sizeof(access_vector_t) * 8 + 1]; }; extern int selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *map); /* Common helpers */ /* Convert between mode and security class values */ extern security_class_t mode_to_security_class(mode_t mode); /* Convert between security class values and string names */ extern security_class_t string_to_security_class(const char *name); extern const char *security_class_to_string(security_class_t cls); /* Convert between individual access vector permissions and string names */ extern const char *security_av_perm_to_string(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perm); extern access_vector_t string_to_av_perm(security_class_t tclass, const char *name); /* Returns an access vector in a string representation. User must free the * returned string via free(). */ extern int security_av_string(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av, char **result); /* Display an access vector in a string representation. */ extern void print_access_vector(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av); /* Set the function used by matchpathcon_init when displaying errors about the file_contexts configuration. If not set, then this defaults to fprintf(stderr, fmt, ...). */ extern void set_matchpathcon_printf(void (*f) (const char *fmt, ...)); /* Set the function used by matchpathcon_init when checking the validity of a context in the file contexts configuration. If not set, then this defaults to a test based on security_check_context(). The function is also responsible for reporting any such error, and may include the 'path' and 'lineno' in such error messages. */ extern void set_matchpathcon_invalidcon(int (*f) (const char *path, unsigned lineno, char *context)); /* Same as above, but also allows canonicalization of the context, by changing *context to refer to the canonical form. If not set, and invalidcon is also not set, then this defaults to calling security_canonicalize_context(). */ extern void set_matchpathcon_canoncon(int (*f) (const char *path, unsigned lineno, char **context)); /* Set flags controlling operation of matchpathcon_init or matchpathcon. */ #define MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY 1 /* Only process the base file_contexts file. */ #define MATCHPATHCON_NOTRANS 2 /* Do not perform any context translation. */ #define MATCHPATHCON_VALIDATE 4 /* Validate/canonicalize contexts at init time. */ extern void set_matchpathcon_flags(unsigned int flags); /* Load the file contexts configuration specified by 'path' into memory for use by subsequent matchpathcon calls. If 'path' is NULL, then load the active file contexts configuration, i.e. the path returned by selinux_file_context_path(). Unless the MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY flag has been set, this function also checks for a 'path'.homedirs file and a 'path'.local file and loads additional specifications from them if present. */ extern int matchpathcon_init(const char *path); /* Same as matchpathcon_init, but only load entries with regexes that have stems that are prefixes of 'prefix'. */ extern int matchpathcon_init_prefix(const char *path, const char *prefix); /* Free the memory allocated by matchpathcon_init. */ extern void matchpathcon_fini(void); /* Resolve all of the symlinks and relative portions of a pathname, but NOT * the final component (same a realpath() unless the final component is a * symlink. Resolved path must be a path of size PATH_MAX + 1 */ extern int realpath_not_final(const char *name, char *resolved_path); /* Match the specified pathname and mode against the file contexts configuration and set *con to refer to the resulting context. 'mode' can be 0 to disable mode matching. Caller must free via freecon. If matchpathcon_init has not already been called, then this function will call it upon its first invocation with a NULL path. */ extern int matchpathcon(const char *path, mode_t mode, security_context_t * con); /* Same as above, but return a specification index for later use in a matchpathcon_filespec_add() call - see below. */ extern int matchpathcon_index(const char *path, mode_t mode, security_context_t * con); /* Maintain an association between an inode and a specification index, and check whether a conflicting specification is already associated with the same inode (e.g. due to multiple hard links). If so, then use the latter of the two specifications based on their order in the file contexts configuration. Return the used specification index. */ extern int matchpathcon_filespec_add(ino_t ino, int specind, const char *file); /* Destroy any inode associations that have been added, e.g. to restart for a new filesystem. */ extern void matchpathcon_filespec_destroy(void); /* Display statistics on the hash table usage for the associations. */ extern void matchpathcon_filespec_eval(void); /* Check to see whether any specifications had no matches and report them. The 'str' is used as a prefix for any warning messages. */ extern void matchpathcon_checkmatches(char *str); /* Match the specified media and against the media contexts configuration and set *con to refer to the resulting context. Caller must free con via freecon. */ extern int matchmediacon(const char *media, security_context_t * con); /* selinux_getenforcemode reads the /etc/selinux/config file and determines whether the machine should be started in enforcing (1), permissive (0) or disabled (-1) mode. */ extern int selinux_getenforcemode(int *enforce); /* selinux_boolean_sub reads the /etc/selinux/TYPE/booleans.subs_dist file looking for a record with boolean_name. If a record exists selinux_boolean_sub returns the translated name otherwise it returns the original name. The returned value needs to be freed. On failure NULL will be returned. */ extern char *selinux_boolean_sub(const char *boolean_name); /* selinux_getpolicytype reads the /etc/selinux/config file and determines what the default policy for the machine is. Calling application must free policytype. */ extern int selinux_getpolicytype(char **policytype); /* selinux_policy_root reads the /etc/selinux/config file and returns the directory path under which the compiled policy file and context configuration files exist. */ extern const char *selinux_policy_root(void); /* selinux_set_policy_root sets an alternate policy root directory path under which the compiled policy file and context configuration files exist. */ extern int selinux_set_policy_root(const char *rootpath); /* These functions return the paths to specific files under the policy root directory. */ extern const char *selinux_current_policy_path(void); extern const char *selinux_binary_policy_path(void); extern const char *selinux_failsafe_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_removable_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_default_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_user_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_file_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_file_context_homedir_path(void); extern const char *selinux_file_context_local_path(void); extern const char *selinux_file_context_subs_path(void); extern const char *selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path(void); extern const char *selinux_homedir_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_media_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_virtual_domain_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_virtual_image_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_lxc_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_x_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_sepgsql_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_systemd_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_securetty_types_path(void); extern const char *selinux_booleans_subs_path(void); extern const char *selinux_booleans_path(void); extern const char *selinux_customizable_types_path(void); extern const char *selinux_users_path(void); extern const char *selinux_usersconf_path(void); extern const char *selinux_translations_path(void); extern const char *selinux_colors_path(void); extern const char *selinux_netfilter_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_path(void); /** * selinux_check_access - Check permissions and perform appropriate auditing. * @scon: source security context * @tcon: target security context * @tclass: target security class string * @perm: requested permissions string, interpreted based on @tclass * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @perm permissions are granted * for the SID pair (@scon, @tcon), interpreting the permissions * based on @tclass. * Return %0 if all @perm permissions are granted, -%1 with * @errno set to %EACCES if any permissions are denied or to another * value upon other errors. * If auditing or logging is configured the appropriate callbacks will be called * and passed the auditdata field */ extern int selinux_check_access(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, const char *tclass, const char *perm, void *auditdata); /* Check a permission in the passwd class. Return 0 if granted or -1 otherwise. */ extern int selinux_check_passwd_access(access_vector_t requested); extern int checkPasswdAccess(access_vector_t requested); /* Check if the tty_context is defined as a securetty Return 0 if secure, < 0 otherwise. */ extern int selinux_check_securetty_context(const security_context_t tty_context); /* Set the path to the selinuxfs mount point explicitly. Normally, this is determined automatically during libselinux initialization, but this is not always possible, e.g. for /sbin/init which performs the initial mount of selinuxfs. */ void set_selinuxmnt(const char *mnt); /* Check if selinuxfs exists as a kernel filesystem */ int selinuxfs_exists(void); /* clear selinuxmnt variable and free allocated memory */ void fini_selinuxmnt(void); /* Execute a helper for rpm in an appropriate security context. */ extern int rpm_execcon(unsigned int verified, const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]); /* Returns whether a file context is customizable, and should not be relabeled . */ extern int is_context_customizable(const security_context_t scontext); /* Perform context translation between the human-readable format ("translated") and the internal system format ("raw"). Caller must free the resulting context via freecon. Returns -1 upon an error or 0 otherwise. If passed NULL, sets the returned context to NULL and returns 0. */ extern int selinux_trans_to_raw_context(const security_context_t trans, security_context_t * rawp); extern int selinux_raw_to_trans_context(const security_context_t raw, security_context_t * transp); /* Perform context translation between security contexts and display colors. Returns a space-separated list of ten ten hex RGB triples prefixed by hash marks, e.g. "#ff0000". Caller must free the resulting string via free. Returns -1 upon an error or 0 otherwise. */ extern int selinux_raw_context_to_color(const security_context_t raw, char **color_str); /* Get the SELinux username and level to use for a given Linux username. These values may then be passed into the get_ordered_context_list* and get_default_context* functions to obtain a context for the user. Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. Caller must free the returned strings via free. */ extern int getseuserbyname(const char *linuxuser, char **seuser, char **level); /* Get the SELinux username and level to use for a given Linux username and service. These values may then be passed into the get_ordered_context_list* and get_default_context* functions to obtain a context for the user. Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. Caller must free the returned strings via free. */ extern int getseuser(const char *username, const char *service, char **r_seuser, char **r_level); /* Compare two file contexts, return 0 if equivalent. */ extern int selinux_file_context_cmp(const security_context_t a, const security_context_t b); /* * Verify the context of the file 'path' against policy. * Return 1 if match, 0 if not and -1 on error. */ extern int selinux_file_context_verify(const char *path, mode_t mode); /* This function sets the file context on to the system defaults returns 0 on success */ extern int selinux_lsetfilecon_default(const char *path); /* * Force a reset of the loaded configuration * WARNING: This is not thread safe. Be very sure that no other threads * are calling into libselinux when this is called. */ extern void selinux_reset_config(void); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif libselinux-2.2.2/man/000077500000000000000000000000001226034601700144475ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-2.2.2/man/Makefile000066400000000000000000000005711226034601700161120ustar00rootroot00000000000000# Installation directories. MAN8DIR ?= $(DESTDIR)/usr/share/man/man8 MAN5DIR ?= $(DESTDIR)/usr/share/man/man5 MAN3DIR ?= $(DESTDIR)/usr/share/man/man3 all: install: all mkdir -p $(MAN3DIR) mkdir -p $(MAN5DIR) mkdir -p $(MAN8DIR) install -m 644 man3/*.3 $(MAN3DIR) install -m 644 man5/*.5 $(MAN5DIR) install -m 644 man8/*.8 $(MAN8DIR) relabel: indent distclean clean: libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/000077500000000000000000000000001226034601700153055ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_add_callback.3000066400000000000000000000120121226034601700205620ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2004 .TH "avc_add_callback" "3" "9 June 2004" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_add_callback \- additional event notification for SELinux userspace object managers . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_add_callback(int (*" callback ")(uint32_t " event , .in +\w'int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)('u .BI "security_id_t " ssid , .br .BI "security_id_t " tsid , .br .BI "security_class_t " tclass , .br .BI "access_vector_t " perms , .br .BI "access_vector_t *" out_retained ")," .in .in +\w'int avc_add_callback('u .BI "uint32_t " events ", security_id_t " ssid , .br .BI "security_id_t " tsid ", security_class_t " tclass , .br .BI "access_vector_t " perms ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR avc_add_callback () is used to register callback functions on security events. The purpose of this functionality is to allow userspace object managers to take additional action when a policy change, usually a policy reload, causes permissions to be granted or revoked. .I events is the .RI bitwise- or of security events on which to register the callback; see .B SECURITY EVENTS below. .IR ssid , .IR tsid , .IR tclass , and .I perms specify the source and target SID's, target class, and specific permissions that the callback wishes to monitor. The special symbol .B SECSID_WILD may be passed as the .I source or .I target and will cause any SID to match. .I callback is the callback function provided by the userspace object manager. The .I event argument indicates the security event which occured; the remaining arguments are interpreted according to the event as described below. The return value of the callback should be zero on success, \-1 on error with .I errno set appropriately (but see .B RETURN VALUE below). . .SH "SECURITY EVENTS" In all cases below, .I ssid and/or .I tsid may be set to .BR SECSID_WILD , indicating that the change applies to all source and/or target SID's. Unless otherwise indicated, the .I out_retained parameter is unused. . .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT Previously denied permissions are now granted for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .I perms indicates the permissions to grant. .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE Previously granted permissions are now conditionally revoked for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .I perms indicates the permissions to revoke. The callback should set .I out_retained to the subset of .I perms which are retained as migrated permissions. Note that .I out_retained is ignored if the callback returns \-1. .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE Previously granted permissions are now unconditionally revoked for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .I perms indicates the permissions to revoke. .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_RESET Indicates that the cache was flushed. The SID, class, and permission arguments are unused and are set to NULL. .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE The permissions given by .I perms should now be audited when granted for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE The permissions given by .I perms should no longer be audited when granted for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE The permissions given by .I perms should now be audited when denied for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE The permissions given by .I perms should no longer be audited when denied for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, .BR avc_add_callback () returns zero. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. A return value of \-1 from a callback is interpreted as a failed policy operation. If such a return value is encountered, all remaining callbacks registered on the event are called. In threaded mode, the netlink handler thread may then terminate and cause the userspace AVC to return .B EINVAL on all further permission checks until .BR avc_destroy (3) is called. In non-threaded mode, the permission check on which the error occurred will return \-1 and the value of .I errno encountered to the caller. In both cases, a log message is produced and the kernel may be notified of the error. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "NOTES" If the userspace AVC is running in threaded mode, callbacks registered via .BR avc_add_callback () may be executed in the context of the netlink handler thread. This will likely introduce synchronization issues requiring the use of locks. See .BR avc_init (3). Support for dynamic revocation and retained permissions is mostly unimplemented in the SELinux kernel module. The only security event that currently gets excercised is .BR AVC_CALLBACK_RESET . . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_has_perm (3), .BR avc_context_to_sid (3), .BR avc_cache_stats (3), .BR security_compute_av (3) .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_audit.3000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700173210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_has_perm.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_av_stats.3000066400000000000000000000000331226034601700200420ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_cache_stats.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_cache_stats.3000066400000000000000000000044271226034601700205120ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2004 .TH "avc_cache_stats" "3" "27 May 2004" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_cache_stats, avc_av_stats, avc_sid_stats \- obtain userspace SELinux AVC statistics . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "void avc_av_stats(void);" .sp .BI "void avc_sid_stats(void);" .sp .BI "void avc_cache_stats(struct avc_cache_stats *" stats ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The userspace AVC maintains two internal hash tables, one to store security ID's and one to cache access decisions. .BR avc_av_stats () and .BR avc_sid_stats () produce log messages indicating the status of the access decision and SID tables, respectively. The messages contain the number of entries in the table, number of hash buckets and number of buckets used, and maximum number of entries in a single bucket. .BR avc_cache_stats () populates a structure whose fields reflect cache activity: .RS .ta 4n 14n .nf struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned entry_lookups; unsigned entry_hits; unsigned entry_misses; unsigned entry_discards; unsigned cav_lookups; unsigned cav_hits; unsigned cav_probes; unsigned cav_misses; }; .fi .ta .RE .TP .I entry_lookups Number of queries made. .TP .I entry_hits Number of times a decision was found in the .I aeref argument. .TP .I entry_misses Number of times a decision was not found in the .I aeref argument. .TP .I entry_discards Number of times a decision was not found in the .I aeref argument and the .I aeref argument was non-NULL. .TP .I cav_lookups Number of cache lookups. .TP .I cav_hits Number of cache hits. .TP .I cav_misses Number of cache misses. .TP .I cav_probes Number of entries examined while searching the cache. . .SH "NOTES" When the cache is flushed as a result of a call to .BR avc_reset () or a policy change notification, the statistics returned by .BR avc_cache_stats () are reset to zero. The SID table, however, is left unchanged. When a policy change notification is received, a call to .BR avc_av_stats () is made before the cache is flushed. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_has_perm (3), .BR avc_context_to_sid (3), .BR avc_add_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_cleanup.3000066400000000000000000000000241226034601700176450ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_open.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_compute_create.3000066400000000000000000000035101226034601700212200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "avc_compute_create" "3" "30 Mar 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_compute_create, avc_compute_member \- obtain SELinux label for new object . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_compute_create(security_id_t " ssid ", security_id_t " tsid , .in +\w'int avc_compute_create('u .BI "security_class_t " tclass ", security_id_t *" newsid ");" .sp .in .BI "int avc_compute_member(security_id_t " ssid ", security_id_t " tsid , .in +\w'int avc_compute_member('u .BI "security_class_t " tclass ", security_id_t *" newsid ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR avc_compute_create () is used to compute a SID to use for labeling a new object in a particular class based on a SID pair. This call is identical to .BR security_compute_create (), but does not require converting from userspace SID's to contexts and back again. .BR avc_compute_member () is used to compute a SID to use for labeling a polyinstantiated object instance of a particular class based on a SID pair. This call is identical to .BR security_compute_member (), but does not require converting from userspace SID's to contexts and back again. These functions return a SID for the computed context in the memory referenced by .IR sid . . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B EINVAL The .I tclass and/or the security contexts referenced by .I ssid and .I tsid are not recognized by the currently loaded policy. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_context_to_sid (3), .BR security_compute_create (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_compute_member.3000066400000000000000000000000361226034601700212240ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_compute_create.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_context_to_sid.3000066400000000000000000000035421226034601700212530ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2004 .TH "avc_context_to_sid" "3" "27 May 2004" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_context_to_sid, avc_sid_to_context, avc_get_initial_sid \- obtain and manipulate SELinux security ID's . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_context_to_sid(security_context_t " ctx ", security_id_t *" sid ");" .sp .BI "int avc_sid_to_context(security_id_t " sid ", security_context_t *" ctx ");" .sp .BI "int avc_get_initial_sid(const char *" name ", security_id_t *" sid ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Security ID's (SID's) are opaque representations of security contexts, managed by the userspace AVC. .BR avc_context_to_sid () returns a SID for the given .I context in the memory referenced by .IR sid . .BR avc_sid_to_context () returns a copy of the context represented by .I sid in the memory referenced by .IR ctx . The user must free the copy with .BR freecon (3). .BR avc_get_initial_sid () returns a SID for the kernel initial security identifier specified by .IR name . . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR avc_context_to_sid () and .BR avc_sid_to_context () return zero on success. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. .SH "NOTES" As of libselinux version 2.0.86, SID's are no longer reference counted. A SID will be valid from the time it is first obtained until the next call to .BR avc_destroy (3). The .BR sidget (3) and .BR sidput (3) functions, formerly used to adjust the reference count, are no-ops and are deprecated. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_has_perm (3), .BR avc_cache_stats (3), .BR avc_add_callback (3), .BR getcon (3), .BR freecon (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_destroy.3000066400000000000000000000000241226034601700177070ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_open.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_entry_ref_init.3000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700212330ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_has_perm.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_get_initial_context.3000066400000000000000000000000361226034601700222550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_context_to_sid.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_get_initial_sid.3000066400000000000000000000000361226034601700213500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_context_to_sid.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_has_perm.3000066400000000000000000000102211226034601700200140ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2004 .TH "avc_has_perm" "3" "27 May 2004" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_has_perm, avc_has_perm_noaudit, avc_audit, avc_entry_ref_init \- obtain and audit SELinux access decisions . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "void avc_entry_ref_init(struct avc_entry_ref *" aeref ");" .sp .BI "int avc_has_perm(security_id_t " ssid ", security_id_t " tsid , .in +\w'int avc_has_perm('u .BI "security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " requested , .br .BI "struct avc_entry_ref *" aeref ", void *" auditdata ");" .in .sp .BI "int avc_has_perm_noaudit(security_id_t " ssid ", security_id_t " tsid , .in +\w'int avc_has_perm('u .BI "security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " requested , .br .BI "struct avc_entry_ref *" aeref ", struct av_decision *" avd ");" .in .sp .BI "void avc_audit(security_id_t " ssid ", security_id_t " tsid , .in +\w'void avc_audit('u .BI "security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " requested , .br .BI "struct av_decision *" avd ", int " result ", void *" auditdata ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR avc_entry_ref_init () initializes an .B avc_entry_ref structure; see .B ENTRY REFERENCES below. This function may be implemented as a macro. .BR avc_has_perm () checks whether the .I requested permissions are granted for subject SID .IR ssid and target SID .IR tsid , interpreting the permissions based on .I tclass and updating .IR aeref , if non-NULL, to refer to a cache entry with the resulting decision. The granting or denial of permissions is audited in accordance with the policy. The .I auditdata parameter is for supplemental auditing; see .BR avc_audit () below. .BR avc_has_perm_noaudit () behaves as .BR avc_has_perm () without producing an audit message. The access decision is returned in .I avd and can be passed to .BR avc_audit () explicitly. .BR avc_audit () produces an audit message for the access query represented by .IR ssid , .IR tsid , .IR tclass , and .IR requested , with a decision represented by .IR avd . Pass the value returned by .BR avc_has_perm_noaudit () as .IR result . The .I auditdata parameter is passed to the user-supplied .B func_audit callback and can be used to add supplemental information to the audit message; see .BR avc_init (3). . .SH "ENTRY REFERENCES" Entry references can be used to speed cache performance for repeated queries on the same subject and target. The userspace AVC will check the .I aeref argument, if supplied, before searching the cache on a permission query. After a query is performed, .I aeref will be updated to reference the cache entry for that query. A subsequent query on the same subject and target will then have the decision at hand without having to walk the cache. After declaring an .B avc_entry_ref structure, use .BR avc_entry_ref_init () to initialize it before passing it to .BR avc_has_perm () or .BR \%avc_has_perm_noaudit () for the first time. Using an uninitialized structure will produce undefined behavior. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" If requested permissions are granted, zero is returned. If requested permissions are denied or an error occured, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. In permissive mode, zero will be returned and .I errno unchanged even if permissions were denied. .BR avc_has_perm () will still produce an audit message in this case. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B EACCES A requested permission was denied. .TP .B EINVAL The .I tclass and/or the security contexts referenced by .I ssid and .I tsid are not recognized by the currently loaded policy. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "NOTES" Internal errors encountered by the userspace AVC may cause certain values of .I errno to be returned unexpectedly. For example, netlink socket errors may produce .B EACCES or .BR EINVAL . Make sure that userspace object managers are granted appropriate access to netlink by the policy. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_context_to_sid (3), .BR avc_cache_stats (3), .BR avc_add_callback (3), .BR security_compute_av (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_has_perm_noaudit.3000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700215340ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_has_perm.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_init.3000066400000000000000000000131071226034601700171670ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2004 .TH "avc_init" "3" "27 May 2004" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_init \- legacy userspace SELinux AVC setup . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_init(const char *" msgprefix , .in +\w'int avc_init('u .BI "const struct avc_memory_callback *" mem_callbacks , .br .BI "const struct avc_log_callback *" log_callbacks , .br .BI "const struct avc_thread_callback *" thread_callbacks , .br .BI "const struct avc_lock_callback *" lock_callbacks ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR avc_init () is deprecated; please use .BR avc_open (3) in conjunction with .BR selinux_set_callback (3) in all new code. .BR avc_init () initializes the userspace AVC and must be called before any other AVC operation can be performed. A non-NULL .I msgprefix will be prepended to all audit messages produced by the userspace AVC. The default is `uavc'. The remaining arguments, if non-NULL, specify callbacks to be used by the userspace AVC. . .SH "CALLBACKS" The userspace AVC can be directed how to perform memory allocation, logging, thread creation, and locking via callback functions passed to .BR avc_init (). The purpose of this functionality is to allow the userspace AVC to be smoothly integrated into existing userspace object managers. Use an .B avc_memory_callback structure to specify alternate functions for dynamic memory allocation. .RS .ta 4n 10n 24n .nf struct avc_memory_callback { void *(*func_malloc)(size_t size); void (*func_free)(void *ptr); }; .fi .ta .RE The two fields of the structure should be pointers to functions which behave as .BR malloc (3) and .BR free (3), which are used by default. Use an .B avc_log_callback structure to specify alternate functions for logging. .RS .ta 4n 10n 24n .nf struct avc_log_callback { void (*func_log)(const char *fmt, ...); void (*func_audit)(void *auditdata, security_class_t class, char *msgbuf, size_t msgbufsize); }; .fi .ta .RE The .B func_log callback should accept a .BR printf (3) style format and arguments and log them as desired. The default behavior prints the message on the standard error. The .B func_audit callback should interpret the .I auditdata parameter for the given .IR class , printing a human-readable interpretation to .I msgbuf using no more than .I msgbufsize characters. The default behavior is to ignore .IR auditdata . Use an .B avc_thread_callback structure to specify functions for starting and manipulating threads. .RS .ta 4n 10n 24n .nf struct avc_thread_callback { void *(*func_create_thread)(void (*run)(void)); void (*func_stop_thread)(void *thread); }; .fi .ta .RE The .B func_create_thread callback should create a new thread and return a pointer which references it. The thread should execute the .I run argument, which does not return under normal conditions. The .B func_stop_thread callback should cancel the running thread referenced by .IR thread . By default, threading is not used; see .B NETLINK NOTIFICATION below. Use an .B avc_lock_callback structure to specify functions to create, obtain, and release locks for use by threads. .RS .ta 4n 10n 24n .nf struct avc_lock_callback { void *(*func_alloc_lock)(void); void (*func_get_lock)(void *lock); void (*func_release_lock)(void *lock); void (*func_free_lock)(void *lock); }; .fi .ta .RE The .B func_alloc_lock callback should create a new lock, returning a pointer which references it. The .B func_get_lock callback should obtain .IR lock , blocking if necessary. The .B func_release_lock callback should release .IR lock . The .B func_free_lock callback should destroy .IR lock , freeing any resources associated with it. The default behavior is not to perform any locking. Note that undefined behavior may result if threading is used without appropriate locking. . .SH "NETLINK NOTIFICATION" Beginning with version 2.6.4, the Linux kernel supports SELinux status change notification via netlink. Two message types are currently implemented, indicating changes to the enforcing mode and to the loaded policy in the kernel, respectively. The userspace AVC listens for these messages and takes the appropriate action, modifying the behavior of .BR avc_has_perm (3) to reflect the current enforcing mode and flushing the cache on receipt of a policy load notification. Audit messages are produced when netlink notifications are processed. In the default single-threaded mode, the userspace AVC checks for new netlink messages at the start of each permission query. If threading and locking callbacks are passed to .BR avc_init () however, a dedicated thread will be started to listen on the netlink socket. This may increase performance and will ensure that log messages are generated immediately rather than at the time of the next permission query. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Functions with a return value return zero on success. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "NOTES" The .I msgprefix argument to .BR avc_init () currently has a length limit of 15 characters and will be truncated if necessary. If a provided .B func_malloc callback does not set .I errno appropriately on error, userspace AVC calls may exhibit the same behavior. If a netlink thread has been created and an error occurs on the socket (such as an access error), the thread may terminate and cause the userspace AVC to return .B EINVAL on all further permission checks until .B avc_destroy is called. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR avc_open (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_netlink_acquire_fd.3000066400000000000000000000000341226034601700220450ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_netlink_loop.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_netlink_check_nb.3000066400000000000000000000000341226034601700214770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_netlink_loop.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_netlink_close.3000066400000000000000000000000341226034601700210500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_netlink_loop.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_netlink_loop.3000066400000000000000000000051731226034601700207250ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: KaiGai Kohei (kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com) 2009 .TH "avc_netlink_loop" "3" "30 Mar 2009" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_netlink_open, avc_netlink_close, avc_netlink_acquire_fd, avc_netlink_release_fd, avc_netlink_check_nb, avc_netlink_loop \- SELinux netlink processing . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_netlink_open(int " blocking ");" .sp .B void avc_netlink_close(void); .sp .B int avc_netlink_acquire_fd(void); .sp .B void avc_netlink_release_fd(void); .sp .B void avc_netlink_loop(void); .sp .B int avc_netlink_check_nb(void); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" These functions enable applications to handle notification of SELinux events via netlink. The userspace AVC normally checks for netlink messages on each call to .BR avc_has_perm (3). Applications may wish to override this behavior and check for notification separately, for example in a .BR select (2) loop. These functions also permit netlink monitoring without requiring a call to .BR avc_open (3). .BR avc_netlink_open () opens a netlink socket to receive SELinux notifications. The socket descriptor is stored internally; use .BR avc_netlink_acquire_fd (3) to take ownership of it in application code. The .I blocking argument controls whether the O_NONBLOCK flag is set on the socket descriptor. .BR avc_open (3) calls this function internally, specifying non-blocking behavior. .BR avc_netlink_close () closes the netlink socket. This function is called automatically by .BR avc_destroy (3). .BR avc_netlink_acquire_fd () returns the netlink socket descriptor number and informs the userspace AVC not to check the socket descriptor automatically on calls to .BR avc_has_perm (3). .BR avc_netlink_release_fd () returns control of the netlink socket to the userspace AVC, re-enabling automatic processing of notifications. .BR avc_netlink_check_nb () checks the netlink socket for pending messages and processes them. Callbacks for policyload and enforcing changes will be called; see .BR selinux_set_callback (3). This function does not block. .BR avc_netlink_loop () enters a loop blocking on the netlink socket and processing messages as they are received. This function will not return unless an error occurs on the socket, in which case the socket is closed. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR avc_netlink_acquire_fd () returns a non-negative file descriptor number on success. Other functions with a return value return zero on success. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR avc_open (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_netlink_open.3000066400000000000000000000000341226034601700207040ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_netlink_loop.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_netlink_release_fd.3000066400000000000000000000000341226034601700220340ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_netlink_loop.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_open.3000066400000000000000000000050671226034601700171730ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2008 .TH "avc_open" "3" "12 Jun 2008" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_open, avc_destroy, avc_reset, avc_cleanup \- userspace SELinux AVC setup and teardown . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_open(struct selinux_opt *" options ", unsigned " nopt ");" .sp .BI "void avc_destroy(void);" .sp .BI "int avc_reset(void);" .sp .BI "void avc_cleanup(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR avc_open () initializes the userspace AVC and must be called before any other AVC operation can be performed. .BR avc_destroy () destroys the userspace AVC, freeing all internal memory structures. After this call has been made, .BR avc_open () must be called again before any AVC operations can be performed. .BR avc_reset () flushes the userspace AVC, causing it to forget any cached access decisions. The userspace AVC normally calls this function automatically when needed, see .B NETLINK NOTIFICATION below. .BR avc_cleanup () attempts to free unused memory within the userspace AVC, but does not flush any cached access decisions. Under normal operation, calling this function should not be necessary. .SH "OPTIONS" The userspace AVC obeys callbacks set via .BR selinux_set_callback (3), in particular the logging and audit callbacks. The options which may be passed to .BR avc_open () include the following: .TP .B AVC_OPT_SETENFORCE This option forces the userspace AVC into enforcing mode if the option value is non-NULL; permissive mode otherwise. The system enforcing mode will be ignored. . .SH "NETLINK NOTIFICATION" Beginning with version 2.6.4, the Linux kernel supports SELinux status change notification via netlink. Two message types are currently implemented, indicating changes to the enforcing mode and to the loaded policy in the kernel, respectively. The userspace AVC listens for these messages and takes the appropriate action, modifying the behavior of .BR avc_has_perm (3) to reflect the current enforcing mode and flushing the cache on receipt of a policy load notification. Audit messages are produced when netlink notifications are processed. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Functions with a return value return zero on success. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR avc_has_perm (3), .BR avc_context_to_sid (3), .BR avc_cache_stats (3), .BR avc_add_callback (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR security_compute_av (3) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_reset.3000066400000000000000000000000241226034601700173400ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_open.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_sid_stats.3000066400000000000000000000000331226034601700202130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_cache_stats.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/avc_sid_to_context.3000066400000000000000000000000361226034601700212460ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_context_to_sid.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/checkPasswdAccess.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700207520ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/context_free.3000066400000000000000000000000271226034601700200550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/context_new.3000066400000000000000000000042761226034601700177370ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "context_new" "3" "20 December 2011" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" context_new, context_str, context_free, context_type_get, context_type_set, context_range_get, context_range_set,context_role_get, context_role_set, context_user_get, context_user_set \- Routines to manipulate SELinux security contexts . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "context_t context_new(const char *" context_str ); .sp .BI "const char * context_str(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "void context_free(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "const char * context_type_get(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "const char * context_range_get(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "const char * context_role_get(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "const char * context_user_get(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "int context_type_set(context_t " con ", const char *" type ); .sp .BI "int context_range_set(context_t " con ", const char *" range ); .sp .BI "int context_role_set(context_t " con ", const char *" role ); .sp .BI "int context_user_set(context_t " con ", const char *" user ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" These functions allow an application to manipulate the fields of a security context string without requiring it to know the format of the string. .BR context_new () returns a new context initialized to a context string. .BR context_str () returns a pointer to the string value of the .BR context_t , valid until the next call to .BR context_str () or .BR context_free () for the same .BR context_t* . .BR context_free () frees the storage used by a context. .BR context_type_get (), .BR context_range_get (), .BR context_role_get (), .BR \%context_user_get () get a pointer to the string value of a context component. .B Note: Values returned by the get functions are only valid until the next call to a set function or .BR context_free () for the same .B context_t structure. .BR context_type_set (), .BR context_range_set (), .BR context_role_set (), .BR \%context_user_set () set a context component. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On failure .BR context_*_set () functions return non-zero and 0 on success. The other functions return NULL on failure and non-NULL on success. On failure .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/context_range_get.3000066400000000000000000000000271226034601700210670ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/context_range_set.3000066400000000000000000000000271226034601700211030ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/context_role_get.3000066400000000000000000000000271226034601700207340ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/context_role_set.3000066400000000000000000000000271226034601700207500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/context_type_get.3000066400000000000000000000000271226034601700207540ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/context_type_set.3000066400000000000000000000000271226034601700207700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/context_user_get.3000066400000000000000000000000271226034601700207510ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/context_user_set.3000066400000000000000000000000271226034601700207650ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/fgetfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700176540ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfilecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/fgetfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700205250ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfilecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/fini_selinuxmnt.3000066400000000000000000000000331226034601700206000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/init_selinuxmnt.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/freecon.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700170040ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/freeconary.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700175200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/fsetfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700176700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/setfilecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/fsetfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700205410ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/setfilecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/get_default_context.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700214160ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/get_default_context_with_level.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700236400ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/get_default_context_with_role.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700234720ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/get_default_context_with_rolelevel.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700245220ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/get_default_type.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700207130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/get_ordered_context_list.3000066400000000000000000000075331226034601700224630ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "get_ordered_context_list" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux" .SH "NAME" get_ordered_context_list, get_ordered_context_list_with_level, get_default_context, get_default_context_with_level, get_default_context_with_role, get_default_context_with_rolelevel, query_user_context, manual_user_enter_context, get_default_role \- determine SELinux context(s) for user sessions . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int get_ordered_context_list(const char *" user ", security_context_t "fromcon ", security_context_t **" list ); .sp .BI "int get_ordered_context_list_with_level(const char *" user ", const char *" level ", security_context_t "fromcon ", security_context_t **" list ); .sp .BI "int get_default_context(const char *" user ", security_context_t "fromcon ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int get_default_context_with_level(const char *" user ", const char *" level ", security_context_t "fromcon ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int get_default_context_with_role(const char *" user ", const char *" role ", security_context_t " fromcon ", security_context_t *" newcon "); .sp .BI "int get_default_context_with_rolelevel(const char *" user ", const char *" level ", const char *" role ", security_context_t " fromcon ", security_context_t *" newcon "); .sp .BI "int query_user_context(security_context_t *" list ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int manual_user_enter_context(const char *" user ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int get_default_type(const char *" role ", char **" type ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR get_ordered_context_list () invokes the .BR security_compute_user (3) function to obtain the list of contexts for the specified .I user that are reachable from the specified .I fromcon context. The function then orders the resulting list based on the global .I \%/etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/default_contexts file and the per-user .I \%/etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/users/ file if it exists. The .I fromcon parameter may be NULL to indicate that the current context should be used. The function returns the number of contexts in the list, or \-1 upon errors. The list must be freed using the .BR freeconary (3) function. .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level () invokes the .BR \%get_ordered_context_list () function and applies the specified level. .BR get_default_context () is the same as .BR get_ordered_context_list () but only returns a single context which has to be freed with .BR freecon (3). .BR get_default_context_with_level () invokes the .BR get_default_context () function and applies the specified level. .BR get_default_context_with_role () is the same as .BR get_default_context () but only returns a context with the specified role, returning \-1 if no such context is reachable for the user. .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel () invokes the .BR \%get_default_context_with_role () function and applies the specified level. .BR query_user_context () takes a list of contexts, queries the user via stdin/stdout as to which context they want, and returns a new context as selected by the user (which has to be freed with .BR freecon (3)). .BR manual_user_enter_context () allows the user to manually enter a context as a fallback if a list of authorized contexts could not be obtained. Caller must free via .BR freecon (3). .BR get_default_type () Get the default type (domain) for .I role and set .I type to refer to it, which has to be freed with free. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR get_ordered_context_list () and .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level () return the number of contexts in the list upon success or \-1 upon errors. The other functions return 0 for success or \-1 for errors. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux (8), .BR freeconary (3), .BR freecon (3), .BR security_compute_av (3), .BR getseuserbyname (3) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/get_ordered_context_list_with_level.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700246730ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getcon.3000066400000000000000000000062751226034601700166620ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getcon" "3" "21 December 2011" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getcon, getprevcon, getpidcon \- get SELinux security context of a process freecon, freeconary \- free memory associated with SELinux security contexts getpeercon \- get security context of a peer socket setcon \- set current security context of a process . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getcon(security_context_t *" context ); .sp .BI "int getcon_raw(security_context_t *" context ); .sp .BI "int getprevcon(security_context_t *" context ); .sp .BI "int getprevcon_raw(security_context_t *" context ); .sp .BI "int getpidcon(pid_t " pid ", security_context_t *" context ); .sp .BI "int getpidcon_raw(pid_t " pid ", security_context_t *" context ); .sp .BI "int getpeercon(int " fd ", security_context_t *" context ); .sp .BI "int getpeercon_raw(int " fd ", security_context_t *" context ); .sp .BI "void freecon(security_context_t "con ); .sp .BI "void freeconary(security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int setcon(security_context_t " context ); .sp .BI "int setcon_raw(security_context_t " context ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getcon () retrieves the context of the current process, which must be free'd with freecon. .BR getprevcon () same as getcon but gets the context before the last exec. .BR getpidcon () returns the process context for the specified PID. .BR getpeercon () retrieves context of peer socket, and set .BI * context to refer to it, which must be free'd with .BR freecon (). .BR freecon () frees the memory allocated for a security context. .BR freeconary () frees the memory allocated for a context array. If .I con is NULL, no operation is performed. .BR setcon () sets the current security context of the process to a new value. Note that use of this function requires that the entire application be trusted to maintain any desired separation between the old and new security contexts, unlike exec-based transitions performed via .BR setexeccon (3). When possible, decompose your application and use .BR setexeccon (3) and .BR execve (3) instead. Since access to file descriptors is revalidated upon use by SELinux, the new context must be explicitly authorized in the policy to use the descriptors opened by the old context if that is desired. Otherwise, attempts by the process to use any existing descriptors (including .IR stdin , .IR stdout , and .IR stderr ) after performing the .BR setcon () will fail. A multi-threaded application can perform a .BR setcon () prior to creating any child threads, in which case all of the child threads will inherit the new context. However, .BR setcon () will fail if there are any other threads running in the same process. If the process was being ptraced at the time of the .BR setcon () operation, ptrace permission will be revalidated against the new context and the .BR setcon () will fail if it is not allowed by policy. .BR getcon_raw (), .BR getprevcon_raw (), .BR getpidcon_raw (), .BR getpeercon_raw () and .BR setcon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error \-1 is returned. On success 0 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " setexeccon "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getcon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700175130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getexeccon.3000066400000000000000000000047501226034601700175230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getexeccon" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getexeccon, setexeccon \- get or set the SELinux security context used for executing a new process rpm_execcon \- run a helper for rpm in an appropriate security context . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getexeccon(security_context_t *" context ); .sp .BI "int getexeccon_raw(security_context_t *" context ); .sp .BI "int setexeccon(security_context_t "context ); .sp .BI "int setexeccon_raw(security_context_t "context ); .sp .BI "int rpm_execcon(unsigned int " verified ", const char *" filename ", char *const " argv "[] , char *const " envp "[]); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getexeccon () retrieves the context used for executing a new process. This returned context should be freed with .BR freecon (3) if non-NULL. .BR getexeccon () sets .BI * context to NULL if no exec context has been explicitly set by the program (i.e. using the default policy behavior). .BR setexeccon () sets the context used for the next .BR execve (2) call. NULL can be passed to .BR setexeccon () to reset to the default policy behavior. The exec context is automatically reset after the next .BR execve (2), so a program doesn't need to explicitly sanitize it upon startup. .BR setexeccon () can be applied prior to library functions that internally perform an .BR execve (2), e.g. .BR execl *(3), .BR execv *(3), .BR popen (3), in order to set an exec context for that operation. .BR getexeccon_raw () and .BR setexeccon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .B Note: Signal handlers that perform an .BR execve (2) must take care to save, reset, and restore the exec context to avoid unexpected behavior. .BR rpm_execcon () runs a helper for rpm in an appropriate security context. The verified parameter should contain the return code from the signature verification (0 == ok, 1 == notfound, 2 == verifyfail, 3 == nottrusted, 4 == nokey), although this information is not yet used by the function. The function determines the proper security context for the helper based on policy, sets the exec context accordingly, and then executes the specified filename with the provided argument and environment arrays. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error \-1 is returned. On success .BR getexeccon () and .BR setexeccon () returns 0. .BR rpm_execcon () only returns upon errors, as it calls .BR execve (2). . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3), " getcon "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getexeccon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700203640ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getexeccon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000036511226034601700175150ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getfilecon" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getfilecon, fgetfilecon, lgetfilecon \- get SELinux security context of a file . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getfilecon(const char *" path ", security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int getfilecon_raw(const char *" path ", security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int lgetfilecon(const char *" path ", security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int lgetfilecon_raw(const char *" path ", security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int fgetfilecon(int "fd ", security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int fgetfilecon_raw(int "fd ", security_context_t *" con ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getfilecon () retrieves the context associated with the given path in the file system, the length of the context is returned. .BR lgetfilecon () is identical to .BR getfilecon (), except in the case of a symbolic link, where the link itself is interrogated, not the file that it refers to. .BR fgetfilecon () is identical to .BR getfilecon (), only the open file pointed to by filedes (as returned by .BR open (2)) is interrogated in place of path. .BR getfilecon_raw (), .BR lgetfilecon_raw () and .BR fgetfilecon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. The returned context should be freed with .BR freecon (3) if non-NULL. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, a positive number is returned indicating the size of the extended attribute value. On failure, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. If the context does not exist, or the process has no access to this attribute, .I errno is set to .BR ENODATA . If extended attributes are not supported by the filesystem, or are disabled, .I errno is set to .BR ENOTSUP . The errors documented for the .BR stat (2) system call are also applicable here. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3), " setfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700203570ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfilecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getfscreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000033401226034601700203650ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getfscreatecon" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getfscreatecon, setfscreatecon \- get or set the SELinux security context used for creating a new file system object . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getfscreatecon(security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int getfscreatecon_raw(security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int setfscreatecon(security_context_t "context ); .sp .BI "int setfscreatecon_raw(security_context_t "context ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getfscreatecon () retrieves the context used for creating a new file system object. This returned context should be freed with .BR freecon (3) if non-NULL. .BR getfscreatecon () sets *con to NULL if no fscreate context has been explicitly set by the program (i.e. using the default policy behavior). .BR setfscreatecon () sets the context used for creating a new file system object. NULL can be passed to .BR setfscreatecon () to reset to the default policy behavior. The fscreate context is automatically reset after the next .BR execve (2), so a program doesn't need to explicitly sanitize it upon startup. .BR setfscreatecon () can be applied prior to library functions that internally perform an file creation, in order to set an file context on the objects. .BR getfscreatecon_raw () and .BR setfscreatecon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .B Note: Signal handlers that perform a .BR setfscreatecon () must take care to save, reset, and restore the fscreate context to avoid unexpected behavior. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error \-1 is returned. On success 0 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3), " getcon "(3), " getexeccon "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getfscreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000321226034601700212310ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfscreatecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getkeycreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000033461226034601700205530ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getkeycreatecon" "3" "9 September 2008" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getkeycreatecon, setkeycreatecon \- get or set the SELinux security context used for creating a new kernel keyrings . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getkeycreatecon(security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int getkeycreatecon_raw(security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int setkeycreatecon(security_context_t "context ); .sp .BI "int setkeycreatecon_raw(security_context_t "context ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getkeycreatecon () retrieves the context used for creating a new kernel keyring. This returned context should be freed with .BR freecon (3) if non-NULL. .BR getkeycreatecon () sets *con to NULL if no keycreate context has been explicitly set by the program (i.e. using the default policy behavior). .BR setkeycreatecon () sets the context used for creating a new kernel keyring. NULL can be passed to .BR setkeycreatecon () to reset to the default policy behavior. The keycreate context is automatically reset after the next .BR execve (2), so a program doesn't need to explicitly sanitize it upon startup. .BR setkeycreatecon () can be applied prior to library functions that internally perform an file creation, in order to set an file context on the objects. .BR getkeycreatecon_raw () and .BR setkeycreatecon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .B Note: Signal handlers that perform a .BR setkeycreatecon () must take care to save, reset, and restore the keycreate context to avoid unexpected behavior. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error \-1 is returned. On success 0 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3), " getcon "(3), " getexeccon "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getkeycreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000331226034601700214120ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getkeycreatecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getpeercon.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700175160ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getpeercon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700203670ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getpidcon.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700173370ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getpidcon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700202100ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getprevcon.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700175370ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getprevcon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700204100ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getseuserbyname.3000066400000000000000000000017101226034601700205720ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getseuserbyname" "3" "29 September 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getseuserbyname \- get SELinux username and level for a given Linux username . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getseuserbyname(const char *" linuxuser ", char **" selinuxuser ", char **" level "); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getseuserbyname () retrieves the SELinux username and security level associated with a given Linux username. The SELinux username and security level can then be passed to other libselinux functions such as .BR \%get_ordered_context_list_with_level (3) and .BR \%get_default_context_with_level (3). The returned SELinux username and level should be freed by the caller using free. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, 0 is returned. On failure, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. The errors documented for the .BR stat (2) system call are also applicable here. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getsockcreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000033651226034601700207230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getsockcreatecon" "3" "24 September 2008" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getsockcreatecon, setsockcreatecon \- get or set the SELinux security context used for creating a new labeled sockets . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getsockcreatecon(security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int getsockcreatecon_raw(security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int setsockcreatecon(security_context_t "context ); .sp .BI "int setsockcreatecon_raw(security_context_t "context ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getsockcreatecon () retrieves the context used for creating a new labeled network socket. This returned context should be freed with .BR freecon (3) if non-NULL. .BR getsockcreatecon () sets *con to NULL if no sockcreate context has been explicitly set by the program (i.e. using the default policy behavior). .BR setsockcreatecon () sets the context used for creating a new labeled network sockets NULL can be passed to .BR setsockcreatecon () to reset to the default policy behavior. The sockcreate context is automatically reset after the next .BR execve (2), so a program doesn't need to explicitly sanitize it upon startup. .BR setsockcreatecon () can be applied prior to library functions that internally perform an file creation, in order to set an file context on the objects. .BR getsockcreatecon_raw () and .BR setsockcreatecon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .B Note: Signal handlers that perform a .BR setsockcreatecon () must take care to save, reset, and restore the sockcreate context to avoid unexpected behavior. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error \-1 is returned. On success 0 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3), " getcon "(3) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/getsockcreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000341226034601700215620ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getsockcreatecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/init_selinuxmnt.3000066400000000000000000000013221226034601700206200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "init_selinuxmnt" "3" "21 Nov 2009" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" init_selinuxmnt \- initialize the global variable selinux_mnt . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .BI "static void init_selinuxmnt(void);" .sp .BI "static void fini_selinuxmnt(void);" .sp .BI "void set_selinuxmnt(char *" mnt ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR init_selinuxmnt () initializes the global variable .I selinux_mnt to the selinuxfs mountpoint. .BR fini_selinuxmnt () deinitializes the global variable .I selinux_mnt that stores the selinuxfs mountpoint. .BR set_selinuxmnt () changes the selinuxfs mountpoint to .IR mnt . . .SH "AUTHOR" This manual page has been written by Guido Trentalancia . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/is_context_customizable.3000066400000000000000000000015621226034601700223350ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "is_context_customizable" "3" "10 January 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" is_context_customizable \- check whether SELinux context type is customizable by the administrator . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int is_context_customizable(security_context_t " scon ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This function checks whether the type of scon is in the .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/context/customizable_types file. A customizable type is a file context type that administrators set on files, usually to allow certain domains to share the file content. restorecon and setfiles, by default, leave these context in place. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns 1 if security context is customizable or 0 if it is not. Returns \-1 on error. . .SH "FILE" .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/context/customizable_types . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/is_selinux_enabled.3000066400000000000000000000011741226034601700212300ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "is_selinux_enabled" "3" "7 Mar 2010" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" is_selinux_enabled \- check whether SELinux is enabled . .SH "NAME" is_selinux_mls_enabled \- check whether SELinux is enabled for (Multi Level Securty) MLS . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B int is_selinux_enabled(); .sp .B int is_selinux_mls_enabled(); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR is_selinux_enabled () returns 1 if SELinux is running or 0 if it is not. On error, \-1 is returned. .BR is_selinux_mls_enabled () returns 1 if SELinux is running in MLS mode or 0 if it is not. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/is_selinux_mls_enabled.3000066400000000000000000000000361226034601700220770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/is_selinux_enabled.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/lgetfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700176620ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfilecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/lgetfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700205330ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfilecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/lsetfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700176760ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/setfilecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/lsetfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700205470ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/setfilecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/manual_user_enter_context.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700226430ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/matchmediacon.3000066400000000000000000000014061226034601700201660ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "matchmediacon" "3" "15 November 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" matchmediacon \- get the default SELinux security context for the specified mediatype from the policy . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int matchmediacon(const char *" media ", security_context_t *" con ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR matchmediacon () matches the specified media type with the media contexts configuration and sets the security context .I con to refer to the resulting context. .sp .B Note: Caller must free returned security context .I con using .BR freecon (3). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns 0 on success or \-1 otherwise. . .SH Files .I /etc/selinux/{POLICYTYPE}/contexts/files/media . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/matchpathcon.3000066400000000000000000000055111226034601700200440ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "matchpathcon" "3" "21 November 2009" "sds@tycho.nsa.gov" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" matchpathcon, matchpathcon_index \- get the default SELinux security context for the specified path from the file contexts configuration . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int matchpathcon_init(const char *" path ");" .sp .BI "int matchpathcon_init_prefix(const char *" path ", const char *" subset ");" .sp .BI "int matchpathcon_fini(void);" .sp .BI "int matchpathcon(const char *" path ", mode_t " mode ", security_context_t *" con "); .sp .BI "int matchpathcon_index(const char *" name ", mode_t " mode ", security_context_t *" con ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR matchpathcon_init () loads the file contexts configuration specified by .I path into memory for use by subsequent .BR matchpathcon () calls. If .I path is NULL, then the active file contexts configuration is loaded by default, i.e. the path returned by .BR selinux_file_context_path (3). Unless the .B MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY flag has been set via .BR \%set_matchpathcon_flags (3), files with the same path prefix but a .B \%.homedirs and .B .local suffix are also looked up and loaded if present. These files provide dynamically generated entries for user home directories and for local customizations. .BR matchpathcon_init_prefix () is the same as .BR matchpathcon_init () but only loads entries with regular expressions that have stems prefixed by .I \%prefix. .BR matchpathcon_fini () frees the memory allocated by a prior call to .BR matchpathcon_init. () This function can be used to free and reset the internal state between multiple .BR matchpathcon_init () calls, or to free memory when finished using .BR matchpathcon (). .BR matchpathcon () matches the specified pathname and mode against the file contexts configuration and sets the security context .I con to refer to the resulting context. The caller must free the returned security context .I con using .BR freecon (3) when finished using it. .I mode can be 0 to disable mode matching, but should be provided whenever possible, as it may affect the matching. Only the file format bits (i.e. the file type) of the .I mode are used. If .BR matchpathcon_init () has not already been called, then this function will call it upon its first invocation with a NULL .I path, defaulting to the active file contexts configuration. .BR matchpathcon_index () is the same as .BR matchpathcon () but returns a specification index that can later be used in a .BR matchpathcon_filespec_add (3) call. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 otherwise. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " set_matchpathcon_flags "(3), " set_matchpathcon_invalidcon "(3), " set_matchpathcon_printf "(3), " matchpathcon_filespec_add "(3), " matchpathcon_checkmatches "(3), " freecon "(3), " setfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/matchpathcon_checkmatches.3000066400000000000000000000032731226034601700225510ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "matchpathcon_checkmatches" "3" "21 November 2009" "sds@tycho.nsa.gov" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" matchpathcon_checkmatches, matchpathcon_filespec_add, matchpathcon_filespec_destroy, matchpathcon_filespec_eval \- check and report whether any specification index has no matches with any inode. Maintenance and statistics on inode associations . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "void matchpathcon_checkmatches(char *" str ");" .sp .BI "int matchpathcon_filespec_add(ino_t " ino ", int " specind ", const char *" file ");" .sp .BI "void matchpathcon_filespec_destroy(void);" .sp .BI "void matchpathcon_filespec_eval(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR matchpathcon_checkmatches () checks whether any specification has no matches and reports them. The .I str argument is used as a prefix for any warning messages. .sp .BR matchpathcon_filespec_add () maintains an association between an inode .I ino and a specification index .IR specind , and checks whether a conflicting specification is already associated with the same inode (e.g. due to multiple hard links). If so, then it uses the latter of the two specifications based on their order in the .I file context configuration. Returns the specification index used or \-1 on error. .sp .BR matchpathcon_filespec_destroy () destroys any inode associations that have been added, e.g. to restart for a new filesystem. .sp .BR matchpathcon_filespec_eval () displays statistics on the hash table usage for the inode associations. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 otherwise. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " matchpathcon "(3), " matchpathcon_index "(3), " freecon "(3), " setfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/matchpathcon_filespec_add.3000066400000000000000000000000451226034601700225230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon_checkmatches.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/matchpathcon_filespec_destroy.3000066400000000000000000000000451226034601700234640ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon_checkmatches.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/matchpathcon_filespec_eval.3000066400000000000000000000000451226034601700227220ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon_checkmatches.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/matchpathcon_fini.3000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700210400ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/matchpathcon_index.3000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700212220ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/matchpathcon_init.3000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700210560ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/mode_to_security_class.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700221310ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/print_access_vector.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700214260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/query_user_context.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700213360ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/rpm_execcon.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700176710ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getexeccon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_av_perm_to_string.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700230370ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_av_string.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700213120ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_check_context.3000066400000000000000000000012221226034601700221360ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_check_context" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_check_context \- check the validity of a SELinux context . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int security_check_context(security_context_t "con ); .sp .BI "int security_check_context_raw(security_context_t "con ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_check_context () returns 0 if SELinux is running and the context is valid, otherwise it returns \-1. .BR security_check_context_raw () behaves identically to .BR \%security_check_context () but does not perform context translation. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_check_context_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000421226034601700230060ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_check_context.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_class_to_string.3000066400000000000000000000055041226034601700225210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "security_class_to_string" "3" "30 Mar 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_class_to_string, security_av_perm_to_string, string_to_security_class, string_to_av_perm, security_av_string, mode_to_security_class \- convert between SELinux class and permission values and string names. . print_access_vector \- display an access vector in human-readable form. . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "const char *security_class_to_string(security_class_t " tclass ");" .sp .BI "const char *security_av_perm_to_string(security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " av ");" .sp .BI "int security_av_string(security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " av ", char **" result ");" .sp .BI "security_class_t string_to_security_class(const char *" name ");" .sp .BI "security_class_t mode_to_security_class(mode_t " mode ");" .sp .BI "access_vector_t string_to_av_perm(security_class_t " tclass ", const char *" name ");" .sp .BI "void print_access_vector(security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " av ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_class_to_string () returns a string name for class .IR tclass , or NULL if the class is invalid. The returned string must not be modified or freed. .BR security_av_perm_to_string () returns a string name for the access vector bit .I av of class .IR tclass , or NULL if either argument is invalid. The returned string must not be modified or freed. .BR security_av_string () computes a full access vector string representation using .I tclass and .IR av , which may have multiple bits set. The string is returned in the memory pointed to by .IR result , and should be freed by the caller using .BR free (3). .BR string_to_security_class () returns the class value corresponding to the string name .IR name , or zero if no such class exists. .BR mode_to_security_class () returns the class value corresponding to the specified .IR mode , or zero if no such class exists. .BR string_to_av_perm () returns the access vector bit corresponding to the string name .I name and security class .IR tclass , or zero if no such value exists. .BR print_access_vector () displays an access vector in human-readable form on the standard output stream. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR security_av_string () returns zero on success or \-1 on error with .I errno set appropriately. .BR print_access_vector () does not return a value. All other functions return zero or NULL on error. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B EINVAL A class or access vector argument is not recognized by the currently loaded policy. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR getcon (3), .BR getfilecon (3) .BR stat (3) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_commit_booleans.3000066400000000000000000000000421226034601700224660ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_av.3000066400000000000000000000135301226034601700214640ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_compute_av" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_compute_av, security_compute_av_flags, security_compute_create, security_compute_create_name, security_compute_relabel, security_compute_member, security_compute_user, security_get_initial_context \- query the SELinux policy database in the kernel . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int security_compute_av(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", access_vector_t "requested ", struct av_decision *" avd ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_av_raw(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", access_vector_t "requested ", struct av_decision *" avd ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_av_flags(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", access_vector_t "requested ", struct av_decision *" avd ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_av_flags_raw(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", access_vector_t "requested ", struct av_decision *" avd ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_create(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_create_raw(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_create_name(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", const char *"objname ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_create_name_raw(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", const char *"objname ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_relabel(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_relabel_raw(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_member(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_member_raw(security_context_t "scon ", security_context_t "tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", security_context_t *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_user(security_context_t "scon ", const char *" username ", security_context_t **" con ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_user_raw(security_context_t "scon ", const char *" username ", security_context_t **" con ); .sp .BI "int security_get_initial_context(const char *" name ", security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int security_get_initial_context_raw(const char *" name ", security_context_t *" con ); .sp .BI "int selinux_check_access(const security_context_t " scon ", const security_context_t " tcon ", const char *" class ", const char *" perm ", void *" auditdata); .sp .BI "int selinux_check_passwd_access(access_vector_t " requested ); .sp .BI "int checkPasswdAccess(access_vector_t " requested ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_compute_av () queries whether the policy permits the source context .I scon to access the target context .I tcon via class .I tclass with the .I requested access vector. The decision is returned in .IR avd . .BR security_compute_av_flags () is identical to .B security_compute_av but additionally sets the .I flags field of .IR avd . Currently one flag is supported: .BR SELINUX_AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE , which indicates the decision is computed on a permissive domain. .BR security_compute_create () is used to compute a context to use for labeling a new object in a particular class based on a SID pair. .BR security_compute_create_name () is identical to .BR \%security_compute_create () but also takes name of the new object in creation as an argument. When .B TYPE_TRANSITION rule on the given class and a SID pair has object name extension, we shall be able to obtain a correct .I newcon according to the security policy. Note that this interface is only supported on the linux 2.6.40 or later. In the older kernel, the object name will be simply ignored. .BR security_compute_relabel () is used to compute the new context to use when relabeling an object, it is used in the pam_selinux.so source and the newrole source to determine the correct label for the tty at login time, but can be used for other things. .BR security_compute_member () is used to compute the context to use when labeling a polyinstantiated object instance. .BR security_compute_user () is used to determine the set of user contexts that can be reached from a source context. It is mainly used by .BR get_ordered_context_list (). .BR security_get_initial_context () is used to get the context of a kernel initial security identifier specified by .I name .BR security_compute_av_raw (), .BR security_compute_av_flags_raw (), .BR \%security_compute_create_raw (), .BR \%security_compute_create_name_raw (), .BR \%security_compute_relabel_raw (), .BR \%security_compute_member_raw (), .BR \%security_compute_user_raw () and .BR \%security_get_initial_context_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .BR selinux_check_access () is used to check if the source context has the access permission for the specified class on the target context. .BR selinux_check_passwd_access () is used to check for a permission in the .I passwd class. .BR selinux_check_passwd_access () uses getprevcon() for the source and target security contexts. .BR checkPasswdAccess () is a deprecated alias of the .BR selinux_check_passwd_access () function. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 on error. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " getcon "(3), " getfilecon "(3), " get_ordered_context_list "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_av_flags.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700226360ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_av_flags_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700235070ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_av_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700223330ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_create.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700223170ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_create_name.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700233170ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_create_name_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700241700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_create_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700231700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_member.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700223230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_member_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700231740ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_relabel.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700224620ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_relabel_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700233330ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_user.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700220320ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_compute_user_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700227030ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_deny_unknown.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700220360ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_getenforce.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_disable.3000066400000000000000000000015401226034601700207230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_disable" "3" "21 Nov 2009" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_disable \- disable the SELinux kernel code at runtime . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int security_disable(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_disable () disables the SELinux kernel code, unregisters selinuxfs from .IR /proc/filesystems , and then unmounts .IR /selinux . .sp This function can only be called at runtime and prior to the initial policy load. After the initial policy load, the SELinux kernel code cannot be disabled, but only placed in "permissive" mode by using .BR security_setenforce(3). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR security_disable () returns zero on success or \-1 on error. . .SH "AUTHOR" This manual page has been written by Guido Trentalancia . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), " setenforce "(8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_get_boolean_active.3000066400000000000000000000000421226034601700231250ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_get_boolean_names.3000066400000000000000000000000421226034601700227550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_get_boolean_pending.3000066400000000000000000000000421226034601700232760ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_get_initial_context.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700233540ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_get_initial_context_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700242250ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_getenforce.3000066400000000000000000000016731226034601700214500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_getenforce" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_getenforce, security_setenforce, security_deny_unknown \- get or set the enforcing state of SELinux . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B int security_getenforce(void); .sp .BI "int security_setenforce(int "value ); .sp .B int security_deny_unknown(void); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_getenforce () returns 0 if SELinux is running in permissive mode, 1 if it is running in enforcing mode, and \-1 on error. .BR security_setenforce () sets SELinux to enforcing mode if the value 1 is passed in, and sets it to permissive mode if 0 is passed in. On success 0 is returned, on error \-1 is returned. .BR security_deny_unknown () returns 0 if SELinux treats policy queries on undefined object classes or permissions as being allowed, 1 if such queries are denied, and \-1 on error. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_load_booleans.3000066400000000000000000000043071226034601700221250ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_get_boolean_names" "3" "15 November 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API Documentation" .SH "NAME" security_load_booleans, security_set_boolean, security_commit_booleans, security_get_boolean_names, security_get_boolean_active, security_get_boolean_pending \- routines for manipulating SELinux boolean values . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int security_load_booleans(char *" path ");" .sp .BI "int security_get_boolean_names(char ***" names ", int *" len ");" .sp .BI "int security_get_boolean_pending(const char *" name ");" .sp .BI "int security_get_boolean_active(const char *" name ");" .sp .BI "int security_set_boolean(const char *" name ", int " value ");" .sp .BI "int security_set_boolean_list(size_t " boolcnt ", SELboolean *" boollist ", int " permanent ");" .sp .BI "int security_commit_booleans(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The SELinux policy can include conditional rules that are enabled or disabled based on the current values of a set of policy booleans. These policy booleans allow runtime modification of the security policy without having to load a new policy. The SELinux API allows for a transaction based update. So you can set several boolean values and then commit them all at once. .BR security_load_booleans () loads policy boolean settings. Path may be NULL, in which case the booleans are loaded from the active policy boolean configuration file. .BR security_get_boolean_names () provides a list of boolean names, currently supported by the loaded policy. .BR security_get_boolean_pending () returns the pending value for boolean or \-1 on failure. .BR security_get_boolean_active () returns the active value for boolean or \-1 on failure. .BR security_set_boolean () sets the pending value for boolean .BR security_set_boolean_list () saves a list of booleans in a single transaction. .BR security_commit_booleans () commits all pending values for the booleans. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Where not otherwise stated, functions described in this manual page return zero on success or \-1 on error. . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR getsebool (8), .BR booleans (8), .BR togglesebool (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_load_policy.3000066400000000000000000000042761226034601700216270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_load_policy" "3" "3 November 2009" "guido@trentalancia.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_load_policy \- load a new SELinux policy . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int security_load_policy(void *" data ", size_t "len ); .sp .BI "int selinux_mkload_policy(int " preservebools ");" .sp .BI "int selinux_init_load_policy(int *" enforce ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_load_policy () loads a new policy, returns 0 for success and \-1 for error. .BR selinux_mkload_policy () makes a policy image and loads it. This function provides a higher level interface for loading policy than .BR \%security_load_policy (), internally determining the right policy version, locating and opening the policy file, mapping it into memory, manipulating it as needed for current boolean settings and/or local definitions, and then calling security_load_policy to load it. .I preservebools is a boolean flag indicating whether current policy boolean values should be preserved into the new policy (if 1) or reset to the saved policy settings (if 0). The former case is the default for policy reloads, while the latter case is an option for policy reloads but is primarily used for the initial policy load. .BR selinux_init_load_policy () performs the initial policy load. This function determines the desired enforcing mode, sets the .I enforce argument accordingly for the caller to use, sets the SELinux kernel enforcing status to match it, and loads the policy. It also internally handles the initial selinuxfs mount required to perform these actions. .sp It should also be noted that after the initial policy load, the SELinux kernel code cannot anymore be disabled and the selinuxfs cannot be unmounted using a call to .BR security_disable (3). Therefore, after the initial policy load, the only operational changes are those permitted by .BR security_setenforce (3) (i.e. eventually setting the framework in permissive mode rather than in enforcing one). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 on error. . .SH "AUTHOR" This manual page has been written by Guido Trentalancia . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " security_disable "(3), " setenforce "(8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_mkload_policy.3000066400000000000000000000000401226034601700221400ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_policy.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_policyvers.3000066400000000000000000000006411226034601700215200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_policyvers" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_policyvers \- get the version of the SELinux policy .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B int security_policyvers(); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_policyvers () returns the version of the policy (a positive integer) on success, or \-1 on error. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_set_boolean.3000066400000000000000000000000421226034601700216060ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/security_setenforce.3000066400000000000000000000000321226034601700214500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so security_getenforce.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selabel_close.3000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700201560ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selabel_open.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selabel_lookup.3000066400000000000000000000032651226034601700203770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_lookup" "3" "18 Jun 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_lookup \- obtain SELinux security context from a string label . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "security_context_t *" context , .br .BI "const char *" key ", int " type ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup_raw('u .BI "security_context_t *" context , .br .BI "const char *" key ", int " type ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selabel_lookup () performs a lookup operation on the handle .IR hnd , returning the result in the memory pointed to by .IR context , which must be freed by the caller using .BR freecon (3). The .I key and .I type parameters are the inputs to the lookup operation and are interpreted according to the specific backend that .I handle is open on. .BR selabel_lookup_raw () behaves identically to .BR selabel_lookup () but does not perform context translation. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B ENOENT No context corresponding to the input .I key and .I type was found. .TP .B EINVAL The .I key and/or .I type inputs are invalid, or the context being returned failed validation. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selabel_open (3), .BR selabel_stats (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selabel_lookup_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000321226034601700212350ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selabel_lookup.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selabel_open.3000066400000000000000000000052171226034601700200260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_open" "3" "18 Jun 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_open, selabel_close \- userspace SELinux labeling interface . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "struct selabel_handle *selabel_open(int " backend , .in +\w'struct selabel_handle *selabel_open('u .BI "struct selinux_opt *" options , .br .BI "unsigned " nopt ");" .in .sp .BI "void selabel_close(struct selabel_handle *" hnd ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selabel_open () is used to initialize a labeling handle to be used for lookup operations. The .I backend argument specifies which backend is to be opened; the list of current backends appears in .B BACKENDS below. The .I options argument should be NULL or a pointer to an array of .B selinux_opt structures of length .IR nopt : .RS .ta 4n 16n 24n .nf struct selinux_opt { int type; const char *value; }; .fi .ta .RE The available option types are described in .B GLOBAL OPTIONS below as well as in the documentation for each individual backend. The return value on success is a non-NULL value for use in subsequent label operations. .BR selabel_close () terminates use of a handle, freeing any internal resources associated with it. After this call has been made, the handle must not be used again. . .SH "GLOBAL OPTIONS" Global options which may be passed to .BR selabel_open () include the following: . .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_UNUSED The option with a type code of zero is a no-op. Thus an array of options may be initizalized to zero and any untouched elements will not cause an error. .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE A non-null value for this option enables context validation. By default, .BR security_check_context (3) is used; a custom validation function can be provided via .BR selinux_set_callback (3). Note that an invalid context may not be treated as an error unless it is actually encountered during a lookup operation. . .SH "BACKENDS" .TP .B SELABEL_CTX_FILE File contexts backend, described in .BR selabel_file (5). .TP .B SELABEL_CTX_MEDIA Media contexts backend, described in .BR selabel_media (5). .TP .B SELABEL_CTX_X X Windows contexts backend, described in .BR selabel_x (5). .TP .B SELABEL_CTX_DB Database objects contexts backend, described in .BR selabel_db (5). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" A non-NULL handle value is returned on success. On error, NULL is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selabel_lookup (3), .BR selabel_stats (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selabel_stats.3000066400000000000000000000016561226034601700202260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_stats" "3" "18 Jun 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_stats \- obtain SELinux labeling statistics . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "void selabel_stats(struct selabel_handle *" hnd ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selabel_stats () causes zero or more messages to be printed containing backend-specific information about number of queries performed, number of unused entries, or other operational information. The messages are printed to standard error by default; a custom logging function can be provided via .BR selinux_set_callback (3). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" None. . .SH "ERRORS" None. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selabel_open (3), .BR selabel_lookup (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3000066400000000000000000000067271226034601700230330ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_binary_policy_path" "3" "15 November 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API Documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_path, selinux_policy_root, selinux_binary_policy_path, selinux_current_policy_path, selinux_failsafe_context_path, selinux_removable_context_path, selinux_default_context_path, selinux_user_contexts_path, selinux_file_context_path, selinux_media_context_path, selinux_contexts_path, selinux_booleans_path \- These functions return the paths to the active SELinux policy configuration directories and files . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B const char *selinux_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_policy_root(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_binary_policy_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_current_policy_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_failsafe_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_removable_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_default_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_user_contexts_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_usersconf_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_x_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_sepgsql_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_file_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_media_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_securetty_types_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_contexts_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_booleans_path(void); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" These functions return the paths to the active policy configuration directories and files based on the settings in .IR /etc/selinux/config . .sp .BR selinux_path () returns the top-level SELinux configuration directory. .sp .BR selinux_policy_root () returns the top-level policy directory. .sp .BR selinux_binary_policy_path () returns the binary policy file loaded into kernel. .sp .BR selinux_current_policy_path () returns the currently loaded policy file from the kernel. .sp .BR selinux_default_type_path () returns the context file mapping roles to default types. .sp .BR selinux_failsafe_context_path () returns the failsafe context for emergency logins. .sp .BR selinux_removable_context_path () returns the filesystem context for removable media. .sp .BR selinux_default_context_path () returns the system-wide default contexts for user sessions. .sp .BR selinux_user_contexts_path () returns the directory containing per-user default contexts. .sp .BR selinux_usersconf_path () returns the file containing mapping between Linux Users and SELinux users. .sp .BR selinux_x_context_path () returns the file containing configuration for XSELinux extension. .sp .BR selinux_sepgsql_context_path () returns the file containing configuration for SE-PostgreSQL. .sp .BR selinux_netfilter_context_path () returns the default netfilter context. .sp .BR selinux_file_context_path () returns the default system file contexts configuration. .sp .BR selinux_file_context_local_path () returns the local customization file contexts configuration. .sp .BR selinux_file_context_homedir_path () returns the home directory file contexts configuration. .sp .BR selinux_media_context_path () returns the file contexts for media device nodes. .sp .BR selinux_contexts_path () returns the directory containing all of the context configuration files. .sp .BR selinux_securetty_types_path () returns the defines tty types for newrole securettys. .sp .BR selinux_booleans_path () returns the initial policy boolean settings. . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_boolean_sub.3000066400000000000000000000014451226034601700214340ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_boolean_sub" "3" "11 June 2012" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_boolean_sub \- . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "char *selinux_boolean_sub(const char *" boolean_name ");" .sp .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_boolean_sub () searches the .I \%/etc/selinux/{POLICYTYPE}/booleans.subs_dist file for a maching boolean_name record. If the record exists the boolean substitution name is returned. If not .BR \%selinux_boolean_sub () returns the original .IR \%boolean_name . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR selinux_boolean_sub () returns the .I boolean_name or the substituted name on success. The returned value must be freed with .BR free "(3)." .BR selinux_boolean_sub () returns NULL on error. .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR security_get_boolean_names (3) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_booleans_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700217560ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_check_access.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700215360ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_check_passwd_access.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700231170ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_check_securetty_context.3000066400000000000000000000010201226034601700240610ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_check_securetty_context" "3" "1 January 2007" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_check_securetty_context \- check whether a SELinux tty security context is defined as a securetty context . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_check_securetty_context(security_context_t "tty_context ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_check_securetty_context () returns 0 if tty_context is a securetty context, returns < 0 otherwise. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_colors_path.3000066400000000000000000000021231226034601700214530ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_colors_path" "3" "08 April 2011" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_colors_path \- Return a path to the active SELinux policy color configuration file . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B const char *selinux_colors_path(void); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_colors_path () returns the path to the active policy color configuration file. .sp The path is built from the path returned by .BR selinux_policy_root "(3)" with .I /secolor.conf appended. .sp This optional configuration file whose format is shown in .BR \%secolor.conf (5), controls the colors to be associated with the .I raw context components of the .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)" function when information is to be displayed by an SELinux color-aware application. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, the path to the active policy color configuration file is returned. If a path is not available NULL is returned. . .SH "ERRORS" None. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_policy_root "(3), " selinux_config "(5), " selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3), " secolor.conf "(5)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_contexts_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700220230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_current_policy_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700232150ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_default_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700233440ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_default_type_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700226410ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_failsafe_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700234720ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_file_context_cmp.3000066400000000000000000000023241226034601700224630ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_file_context_cmp" "3" "08 March 2011" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_file_context_cmp \- Compare two SELinux security contexts excluding the 'user' component . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_file_context_cmp(const security_context_t " a ", " .RS .BI "const security_context_t " b ");" .RE . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_file_context_cmp () compares two context strings excluding the user component with .BR strcmp (3) as shown in the .B EXAMPLE section. .sp This is useful as for most object contexts, the user component is not relevant. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" The return values follow the .BR strcmp (3) function, where: .RS 0 if they are equal. .RE .RS 1 if .I a is greater than .I b .RE .RS \-1 if .I a is less than .I b .RE . .SH "ERRORS" None. . .SH "NOTES" The contexts being compared do not specifically need to be file contexts. . .SH "EXAMPLE" If context .I a is: .RS user_u:user_r:user_t:s0 .RE .sp and context .I b is: .RS root:user_r:user_t:s0 .RE .sp then the actual strings compared are: .RS :user_r:user_t:s0 and :user_r:user_t:s0 .RE .sp Therefore they will match and .BR selinux_file_context_cmp () will return zero. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_file_context_homedir_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700243460ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_file_context_local_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700240110ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_file_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700226370ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_file_context_verify.3000066400000000000000000000047211226034601700232130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_file_context_verify" "3" "08 March 2011" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_file_context_verify \- Compare the SELinux security context on disk to the default security context required by the policy file contexts file . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_file_context_verify(const char *" path ", mode_t " mode ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_file_context_verify () compares the context of the specified .I path that is held on disk (in the extended attribute), to the system default entry held in the file contexts series of files. .sp The .I mode may be zero. .sp Note that the two contexts are compared for "significant" differences (i.e. the user component of the contexts are ignored) as shown in the .B EXAMPLE section. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" If the contexts significantly match, 1 (one) is returned. .sp If the contexts do not match 0 (zero) is returned and .I errno is set to either .B ENOENT or .B EINVAL for the reasons listed in the .B ERRORS section, or if .I errno = 0 then the contexts did not match. .sp On failure \-1 is returned and .I errno set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B ENOTSUP if extended attributes are not supported by the file system. .TP .B ENOENT if there is no entry in the file contexts series of files or .I path does not exist. .TP .B EINVAL if the entry in the file contexts series of files or .I path are invalid, or the returned context fails validation. .TP .B ENOMEM if attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "FILES" The following configuration files (the file contexts series of files) supporting the active policy will be used (should they exist) to determine the .I path default context: .sp .RS .I contexts/files/file_contexts - This file must exist. .sp .I contexts/files/file_contexts.local - If exists has local customizations. .sp .I contexts/files/file_contexts.homedirs - If exists has users home directory customizations. .sp .I contexts/files/file_contexts.subs - If exists has substitutions that are then applied to the 'in memory' version of the file contexts files. .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" If the files context is: .RS unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 .RE .sp and the default context defined in the file contexts file is: .RS system_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 .RE .sp then the actual strings compared are: .RS :object_r:admin_home_t:s0 and :object_r:admin_home_t:s0 .RE .sp Therefore they will match and .BR selinux_file_context_verify () will return 1. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_getenforcemode.3000066400000000000000000000014001226034601700221210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_getenforcemode" "3" "25 May 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_getenforcemode \- get the enforcing state of SELinux . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_getenforcemode(int *" enforce ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_getenforcemode () Reads the contents of the .I /etc/selinux/config file to determine how the system was setup to run SELinux. Sets the value of .I enforce to 1 if SELinux should be run in enforcing mode. Sets the value of .I enforce to 0 if SELinux should be run in permissive mode. Sets the value of .I enforce to \-1 if SELinux should be disabled. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On failure, \-1 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_getpolicytype.3000066400000000000000000000011251226034601700220400ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_getpolicytype" "3" "24 Sep 2008" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_getpolicytype \- get the type of SELinux policy running on the system . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_getpolicytype(char **" policytype ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_getpolicytype () Reads the contents of the .I /etc/selinux/config file to determine the SELinux policy used on the system, and sets .I \%policytype accordinly. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On failure, \-1 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_homedir_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700233470ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_lsetfilecon_default.3000066400000000000000000000012261226034601700231540ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_lsetfilecon_default" "3" "21 November 2009" "sds@tycho.nsa.gov" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_lsetfilecon_default \- set the file context to the system defaults . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_lsetfilecon_default(const char *" path ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_lsetfilecon_default () sets the file context to the system defaults. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 otherwise. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_file_context_cmp "(3), " selinux_file_context_verify "(3), " matchpathcon "(3), " freecon "(3), " setfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_media_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700227770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_netfilter_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700237140ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700200740ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_policy_root.3000066400000000000000000000020611226034601700215010ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_policy_root" "3" "25 May 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_policy_root \- return the path of the SELinux policy files for this machine selinux_set_policy_root \- Set an alternate SELinux root path for the SELinux policy files for this machine. . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B const char *selinux_policy_root(void); . .sp .B int selinux_set_policy_root(const char *policypath); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_policy_root () reads the contents of the .I /etc/selinux/config file to determine which policy files should be used for this machine. . .BR selinux_set_policy_root () sets up all all policy paths based on the alternate root .I /etc/selinux/config file to determine which policy files should be used for this machine. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, selinux_policy_root returns a directory path containing the SELinux policy files. On failure, selinux_policy_root returns NULL. On success, selinux_set_policy_root returns 0 on success -1 on failure. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_raw_context_to_color.3000066400000000000000000000062131226034601700233770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_raw_context_to_color" "3" "08 April 2011" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_raw_context_to_color \- Return RGB color string for an SELinux security context . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_raw_context_to_color(security_context_t " raw ", " .RS .BI "char **" color_str ");" .RE . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color () returns a .I color_str associated to the raw context .I raw provided that the .BR mcstransd "(8)" daemon is running, the policy is an MLS type policy (MCS or MLS) and there is a color configuration file .BR \%secolor.conf (5) (see the .B FILES section). .sp The .I color_str string is a space separated list of eight hexadecimal RGB triples, each prefixed by a hash character (#). These represent the user:role:type:range components of the foreground and background colors. An example string is shown in the .B EXAMPLE section. The returned .I color_str string must be freed with .BR free "(3)." If a color has not been configured for a specific user, role, type and/or range component of context .IR raw "," then .BR \%selinux_raw_context_to_color () will select the color returned in .I color_str in order of precedence as follows: .RS role, type, range .br user, type, range .br user, role, range .br user, role, type .br .RE If there are no entries in the .BR secolor.conf (5) file for any of the components of context .I raw (or the file is not present), then the default string returned in .I color_str is: .sp .RS ----- user ---- ---- role ---- ---- type ---- ---- range ---- .br #000000 #ffffff #000000 #ffffff #000000 #ffffff #000000 #ffffff .sp .RE . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. .br On failure, \-1 is returned with .I errno set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .B ENOENT If the .BR mcstransd "(8)" daemon is not running. . .SH "FILES" .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color () obtains the translated entry from the active policy .BR secolor.conf "(5)" file as returned by .BR \%selinux_colors_path (3). The file format is described in .BR \%secolor.conf (5). . .SH "NOTES" 1. The primary use of .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color () is to return a color that corresponds to a range, that can then be used to highlight information at different MLS levels. .sp 2. The .BR mcstransd "(8)" daemon process security level must dominate the .I raw security level passed to it by the .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color () function. If not, the range color selected will be as defined by the order of precedence. . .SH "EXAMPLE" .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color () returns the foreground and background colors of the context string components (user:role:type:range) as RGB triples as follows: .sp user : role : type : range .br fg bg : fg bg : fg bg : fg bg .br #000000 #ffffff #ffffff #000000 #d2b48c #ffa500 #000000 #008000 .br black white : white black : tan orange : black green .br . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_colors_path "(3), " mcstransd "(8), " secolor.conf "(5), " selinux_raw_to_trans_context "(3), " selinux_trans_to_raw_context "(3), " free "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_removable_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700236740ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_securetty_types_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700234270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_set_callback.3000066400000000000000000000051641226034601700215550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selinux_set_callback" "3" "20 Jun 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_set_callback \- userspace SELinux callback facilities . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "void selinux_set_callback(int " type ", union selinux_callback " callback ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_set_callback () sets the callback indicated by .I type to the value of .IR callback , which should be passed as a function pointer cast to type .B union .BR selinux_callback . All callback functions should return a negative value with .I errno set appropriately on error. The available values for .I type are: .TP .B SELINUX_CB_LOG .BI "int (*" func_log ") (int " type ", const char *" fmt ", ...);" This callback is used for logging and should process the .BR printf (3) style .I fmt string and arguments as appropriate. The .I type argument indicates the type of message and will be set to one of the following: .B SELINUX_ERROR .B SELINUX_WARNING .B SELINUX_INFO .B SELINUX_AVC . .TP .B SELINUX_CB_AUDIT .BI "int (*" func_audit ") (void *" auditdata ", security_class_t " cls , .in +\w'int (*func_audit) ('u .BI "char *" msgbuf ", size_t " msgbufsize ");" .in This callback is used for supplemental auditing in AVC messages. The .I auditdata and .I cls arguments are the values passed to .BR avc_has_perm (3). A human-readable interpretation should be printed to .I msgbuf using no more than .I msgbufsize characters. . .TP .B SELINUX_CB_VALIDATE .BI "int (*" func_validate ") (security_context_t *" ctx ");" This callback is used for context validation. The callback may optionally modify the input context by setting the target of the .I ctx pointer to a new context. In this case, the old value should be freed with .BR freecon (3). The value of .I errno should be set to .B EINVAL to indicate an invalid context. . .TP .B SELINUX_CB_SETENFORCE .BI "int (*" func_setenforce ") (int " enforcing ");" This callback is invoked when the system enforcing state changes. The .I enforcing argument indicates the new value and is set to .I 1 for enforcing mode, and .I 0 for permissive mode. . .TP .B SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD .BI "int (*" func_policyload ") (int " seqno ");" This callback is invoked when the system security policy is reloaded. The .I seqno argument is the current sequential number of the policy generation in the system. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" None. . .SH "ERRORS" None. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selabel_open (3), .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_netlink_open (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_set_mapping.3000066400000000000000000000051311226034601700214460ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2008 .TH "selinux_set_mapping" "3" "12 Jun 2008" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_set_mapping \- establish dynamic object class and permission mapping . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .nf struct security_class_mapping { const char *name; const char *perms[]; }; .fi .sp .BI "int selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *" map ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_set_mapping () establishes a mapping from a user-provided ordering of object classes and permissions to the numbers actually used by the loaded system policy. Use of this function is highly preferred over the generated constants in the libselinux header files, as this method allows the policy's class and permission values to change over time. After the mapping is established, all libselinux functions that operate on class and permission values take the user-provided numbers, which are determined as follows: The .I map argument consists of an array of .B security_class_mapping structures, which must be terminated by a structure having a NULL name field. Except for this last structure, the .I name field should refer to the string name of an object class, and the corresponding .I perms field should refer to an array of permission bit names terminated by a NULL string. The object classes named in the mapping and the bit indexes of each set of permission bits named in the mapping are numbered in order starting from 1. These numbers are the values that should be passed to subsequent libselinux calls. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Zero is returned on success. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B EINVAL One of the class or permission names requested in the mapping is not present in the loaded policy. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "EXAMPLE" .RS .ta 4n 10n .nf struct security_class_mapping map[] = { { "file", { "create", "unlink", "read", "write", NULL } }, { "socket", { "bind", NULL } }, { "process", { "signal", NULL } }, { NULL } }; if (selinux_set_mapping(map) < 0) exit(1); .fi .ta .RE In this example, after the call has succeeded, classes .BR file , .BR socket , and .B process will be identified by 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Permissions .IR create , .IR unlink , .IR read , and .I write (for the .B file class) will be identified by 1, 2, 4, and 8 respectively. Classes and permissions not listed in the mapping cannot be used. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR avc_open (8), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_set_policy_root.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700223550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_policy_root.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_status_close.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700216500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_status_open.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_status_deny_unknown.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700232610ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_status_open.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_status_getenforce.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700226640ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_status_open.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_status_open.3000066400000000000000000000067571226034601700215230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_status_open" "3" "22 January 2011" "kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_status_open, selinux_status_close, selinux_status_updated, selinux_status_getenforce, selinux_status_policyload and selinux_status_deny_unknown \- reference the SELinux kernel status without invocation of system calls . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_status_open(int " fallback ");" .sp .BI "void selinux_status_close(void);" .sp .BI "int selinux_status_updated(void);" .sp .BI "int selinux_status_getenforce(void);" .sp .BI "int selinux_status_policyload(void);" .sp .BI "int selinux_status_deny_unknown(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Linux 2.6.37 or later provides a SELinux kernel status page; being mostly placed on .I /selinux/status entry. It enables userspace applications to mmap this page with read-only mode, then it informs some status without system call invocations. .sp In some cases that a userspace application tries to apply heavy frequent access control; such as row-level security in databases, it will face unignorable cost to communicate with kernel space to check invalidation of userspace avc. .sp These functions provides applications a way to know some kernel events without system-call invocation or worker thread for monitoring. .sp .BR selinux_status_open () tries to .BR open (2) .I /selinux/status and .BR mmap (2) it in read-only mode. The file-descriptor and pointer to the page shall be stored internally; Don't touch them directly. Set 1 on the .I fallback argument to handle a case of older kernels without kernel status page support. In this case, this function tries to open a netlink socket using .BR avc_netlink_open (3) and overwrite corresponding callbacks ( setenforce and policyload). Thus, we need to pay attention to the interaction with these interfaces, when fallback mode is enabled. .sp .BR selinux_status_close () unmap the kernel status page and close its file descriptor, or close the netlink socket if fallbacked. .sp .BR selinux_status_updated () informs us whether something has been updated since the last call. It returns 0 if nothing was happened, however, 1 if something has been updated in this duration, or \-1 on error. .sp .BR selinux_status_getenforce () returns 0 if SELinux is running in permissive mode, 1 if enforcing mode, or \-1 on error. Same as .BR security_getenforce (3) except with or without system call invocation. .sp .BR selinux_status_policyload () returns times of policy reloaded on the running system, or \-1 on error. Note that it is not a reliable value on fallback-mode until it receive the first event message via netlink socket. Thus, don't use this value to know actual times of policy reloaded. .sp .BR selinux_status_deny_unknown () returns 0 if SELinux treats policy queries on undefined object classes or permissions as being allowed, 1 if such queries are denied, or \-1 on error. .sp Also note that these interfaces are not thread-safe, so you have to protect them from concurrent calls using exclusive locks when multiple threads are performing. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR selinux_status_open () returns 0 or 1 on success. 1 means we are ready to use these interfaces, but netlink socket was opened as fallback instead of the kernel status page. On error, \-1 shall be returned. .sp Any other functions with a return value shall return its characteristic value as described above, or \-1 on errors. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR mmap (2), .BR avc_netlink_open (3), .BR security_getenforce (3), .BR security_deny_unknown (3) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_status_policyload.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700227020ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_status_open.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_status_updated.3000066400000000000000000000000371226034601700221710ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_status_open.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_user_contexts_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700230610ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_usersconf_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700221630ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/selinux_x_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461226034601700221670ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/set_matchpathcon_flags.3000066400000000000000000000042141226034601700220720ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "set_matchpathcon_flags" "3" "21 November 2009" "sds@tycho.nsa.gov" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" set_matchpathcon_flags, set_matchpathcon_invalidcon, set_matchpathcon_printf \- set flags controlling the operation of matchpathcon or matchpathcon_index and configure the behaviour of validity checking and error displaying . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "void set_matchpathcon_flags(unsigned int " flags ");" .sp .BI "void set_matchpathcon_invalidcon(int (*" f ")(const char *" path ", unsigned " lineno ", char *" context "));" .sp .BI "void set_matchpathcon_printf(void (*" f ")(const char *" fmt ", ...));" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR set_matchpathcon_flags () sets the flags controlling the operation of .BR matchpathcon_init (3) and subsequently .BR matchpathcon_index (3) or .BR matchpathcon (3). If the .B MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY flag is set, then only the base file contexts configuration file will be processed, not any dynamically generated entries or local customizations. .sp .BR set_matchpathcon_invalidcon () sets the function used by .BR matchpathcon_init (3) when checking the validity of a context in the file contexts configuration. If not set, then this defaults to a test based on .BR security_check_context (3), which checks validity against the active policy on a SELinux system. This can be set to instead perform checking based on a binary policy file, e.g. using .BR sepol_check_context (3), as is done by .B setfiles \-c. The function is also responsible for reporting any such error, and may include the .I path and .I lineno in such error messages. .sp .BR set_matchpathcon_printf () sets the function used by .BR matchpathcon_init (3) when displaying errors about the file contexts configuration. If not set, then this defaults to fprintf(stderr, fmt, ...). This can be set to redirect error reporting to a different destination. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 otherwise. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " matchpathcon "(3), " matchpathcon_index "(3), " set_matchpathcon_invalidcon "(3), " set_matchpathcon_printf "(3), " freecon "(3), " setfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/set_matchpathcon_invalidcon.3000066400000000000000000000000421226034601700231170ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/set_matchpathcon_flags.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/set_matchpathcon_printf.3000066400000000000000000000000421226034601700222730ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/set_matchpathcon_flags.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/set_selinuxmnt.3000066400000000000000000000000331226034601700204460ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/init_selinuxmnt.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setcon.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700166560ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setcon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221226034601700175270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setexeccon.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700175270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getexeccon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setexeccon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700204000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getexeccon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000034251226034601700175300ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "setfilecon" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" setfilecon, fsetfilecon, lsetfilecon \- set SELinux security context of a file . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int setfilecon(const char *" path ", security_context_t "con ); .sp .BI "int setfilecon_raw(const char *" path ", security_context_t "con ); .sp .BI "int lsetfilecon(const char *" path ", security_context_t "con ); .sp .BI "int lsetfilecon_raw(const char *" path ", security_context_t "con ); .sp .BI "int fsetfilecon(int "fd ", security_context_t "con ); .sp .BI "int fsetfilecon_raw(int "fd ", security_context_t "con ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR setfilecon () sets the security context of the file system object. .BR lsetfilecon () is identical to setfilecon, except in the case of a symbolic link, where the link itself has it's context set, not the file that it refers to. .BR fsetfilecon () is identical to setfilecon, only the open file pointed to by filedes (as returned by .BR open (2)) has it's context set in place of path. .BR setfilecon_raw (), .BR lsetfilecon_raw (), and .BR fsetfilecon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On failure, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" If there is insufficient space remaining to store the extended attribute, .I errno is set to either .BR ENOSPC , or .B EDQUOT if quota enforcement was the cause. If extended attributes are not supported by the filesystem, or are disabled, .I errno is set to .BR ENOTSUP . The errors documented for the .BR stat (2) system call are also applicable here. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(3), " freecon "(3), " getfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700203730ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/setfilecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setfscreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000000321226034601700203740ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfscreatecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setfscreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000321226034601700212450ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfscreatecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setkeycreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000000331226034601700205550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getkeycreatecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setkeycreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000331226034601700214260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getkeycreatecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setsockcreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000000341226034601700207250ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getsockcreatecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/setsockcreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000341226034601700215760ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getsockcreatecon.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/sidget.3000066400000000000000000000000361226034601700166470ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_context_to_sid.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/sidput.3000066400000000000000000000000361226034601700167000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_context_to_sid.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/string_to_av_perm.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700211100ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man3/string_to_security_class.3000066400000000000000000000000441226034601700225130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/000077500000000000000000000000001226034601700153075ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/booleans.5000066400000000000000000000045711226034601700172060ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "booleans" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" booleans \- The SELinux booleans configuration files . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The \fIbooleans\fR file, if present contains booleans to support a specific distribution. .sp The \fIbooleans.local\fR file, if present contains locally generated booleans. .sp Both files contain a list of boolean names and their associated values. .sp Generally the \fIbooleans\fR and/or \fIbooleans.local\fR files are not present (they have been deprecated). However if there is an SELinux-aware application that uses the libselinux functions listed below, then these files may be present: .sp .RS .BR security_set_boolean_list "(3) " .RS Writes a \fIbooleans.local\fR file if flag \fIpermanent\fR = \fI1\fR. .sp .RE .RE .RS .BR security_load_booleans "(3) " .RS Looks for a \fIbooleans\fR and/or \fIbooleans.local\fR file at \fBselinux_booleans_path\fR(3) unless a specific path is specified as a parameter. .RE .RE .sp \fBbooleans\fR(8) has details on booleans and \fBsetsebool\fR(8) describes how booleans can now be set persistent across reboots. .sp \fBselinux_booleans_path\fR(3) will return the active policy path to these files. The default boolean files are: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/booleans .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/booleans.local .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Both boolean files have the same format and contain one or more boolean names and their value. .sp The format is: .RS .I boolean_name .I value .sp .RE Where: .RS .I boolean_name .RS The name of the boolean. .RE .I value .RS The default setting for the boolean. This can be one of the following: .RS .IR true " | " false " | " 1 " | " 0 .RE .RE .RE .sp Note that if .B SETLOCALDEFS is set in the SELinux .I config file (see .BR selinux_config "(5)), then " selinux_mkload_policy "(3) will check for a " .I booleans.local file in the .BR selinux_booleans_path (3) and also a .I local.users file (see .BR local.users "(5)) in the " selinux_users_path "(3). " . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " booleans "(8), " setsebool "(8), " semanage "(8), " selinux_booleans_path "(3), " security_set_boolean_list "(3), " security_load_booleans "(3), " selinux_mkload_policy "(3), " selinux_users_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5), " local.users "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/customizable_types.5000066400000000000000000000033261226034601700213260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "customizable_types" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" customizable_types \- The SELinux customizable types configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The \fIcustomizable_types\fR file contains a list of types that can be customised in some way by SELinux-aware applications. .sp Generally this is a file context type that is usually set on files that need to be shared among certain domains and where the administrator wants to manually manage the type. .sp The use of customizable types is deprecated as the preferred approach is to use .BR semanage (8) .BR fcontext (8) .BR ... (8). However, SELinux-aware applications such as .BR setfiles (8) will use this information to obtain a list of types relating to files that should not be relabeled. .sp .BR selinux_customizable_types_path (3) will return the active policy path to this file. The default customizable types file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/customizable_types .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR is_context_customizable (3) reads this file to determine if a context is customisable or not for the active policy. . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the file consists of the following: .RS .I type .RE .sp Where: .RS .I type .RS The type defined in the policy that can be customised. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/customizable_types .br mount_loopback_t .br public_content_rw_t .br public_content_t .br swapfile_t .br sysadm_untrusted_content_t . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_customizable_types_path "(3), " is_context_customizable "(3), " semanage "(8), " setfiles "(8), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/default_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000046741226034601700207630ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "default_contexts" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" default_contexts \- The SELinux default contexts configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The default contexts configuration file \fIdefault_contexts\fR contains entries that allow SELinux-aware login applications such as .BR PAM "(8) " .sp SELinux-aware login applications generally use one or more of the following libselinux functions that read these files from the active policy path: .RS .BR get_default_context "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_role "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3) " .br .BR query_user_context "(3) " .br .BR manual_user_enter_context "(3) " .RE .sp The default context configuration file path for the active policy is returned by \fBselinux_default_contexts_path\fR(3). The default, default contexts file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/default_contexts .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the default configuration file consists of the following: .RS .I login_process user_login_process [user_login_process] ... .RE .sp Where: .RS .I login_process .RS This consists of a \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] entry that represents the login process context that are defined in the policy. .RE .I user_login_process .RS This consists of one or more \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] entries that represent the user login process context defined in the policy. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/default_contexts .br system_r:crond_t:s0 system_r:system_crond_t:s0 .br system_r:local_login_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0 .br system_r:remote_login_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 .br system_r:sshd_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 .br system_r:sulogin_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 .br system_r:xdm_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_default_contexts_path "(3), " PAM "(8), " selinux_default_type_path "(3), " get_default_context "(3), " get_ordered_context_list "(3), " get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_role "(3), " get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3), " query_user_context "(3), " manual_user_enter_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/default_type.5000066400000000000000000000022511226034601700200620ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "default_type" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" default_type \- The SELinux default type configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The \fIdefault_type\fR file contains entries that allow SELinux-aware applications such as \fBnewrole\fR(1) to select a default type for a role if one is not supplied. .sp \fBselinux_default_type_path\fR(3) will return the active policy path to this file. The default, default type file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/default_type .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp \fBget_default_type\fR(3) reads this file to determine a type for the active policy. . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line within the \fIdefault_type\fR file is formatted with \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR entries where: .RS .I role .RS The SELinux role. .RE .I type .RS The domain type that is returned for this role. .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/default_type .br auditadm_r:auditadm_t .br user_r:user_t . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " get_default_type "(3), " newrole "(1), " selinux_default_type_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/failsafe_context.5000066400000000000000000000037331226034601700207210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "failsafe_context" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" failsafe_context \- The SELinux fail safe context configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The .I failsafe_context file allows SELinux-aware applications such as .BR PAM "(8) " to obtain a known valid login context for an administrator if no valid default entries can be found elsewhere. .sp .BR selinux_failsafe_context_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default failsafe context file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/failsafe_context .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp The following functions read this file from the active policy path if they cannot obtain a default context: .br .RS .BR get_default_context "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_role "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3) " .br .BR query_user_context "(3) " .br .BR manual_user_enter_context "(3) " .RE . .SH "FILE FORMAT" The file consists of a single line entry as follows: .RS \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS .I role .I type .I range .RS A role, type and optional range (for MCS/MLS), separated by colons (:) to form a valid login process context for an administrator to access the system. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/failsafe_context .br unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_failsafe_context_path "(3), " PAM "(8), " selinux_default_type_path "(3), " get_default_context "(3), " get_ordered_context_list "(3), " get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_role "(3), " get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3), " query_user_context "(3), " manual_user_enter_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/file_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700202340ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/file_contexts.homedirs.5000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700220450ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/file_contexts.local.5000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700213250ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/file_contexts.subs.5000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700212070ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/file_contexts.subs_dist.5000066400000000000000000000000301226034601700222320ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/local.users.5000066400000000000000000000040111226034601700176230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "local.users" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" local.users \- The SELinux local users configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The file contains local user definitions in the form of policy language user statements and is only found on older SELinux systems as it has been deprecated and replaced by the \fBsemange\fR(8) services. .sp This file is only read by \fBselinux_mkload_policy\fR(3) when \fBSETLOCALDEFS\fR in the SELinux \fIconfig\fR file (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)) is set to \fI1\fR. .sp .BR selinux_users_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to the directory where this file is located. The default local users file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/users/local.users .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" The file consists of one or more entries terminated with '\fB;\fR', each on a separate line as follows: .RS \fBuser \fIseuser_id \fBroles \fIrole_id\fR [[\fBlevel \fIlevel\fR] [\fBrange \fIrange\fR]]\fB;\fR .RE .sp Where: .RS .B user .RS The user keyword. .RE .I seuser_id .RS The SELinux user identifier. .RE .B roles .RS The roles keyword. .RE .I role_id .RS One or more previously declared role identifiers. Multiple role identifiers consist of a space separated list enclosed in braces '{}'. .RE .B level .RS If MLS/MCS is configured, the level keyword. .RE .I level .RS The users default security level. Note that only the sensitivity component of the level (e.g. s0) is required. .RE .B range .RS If MLS/MCS is configured, the range keyword. .RE .I range .RS The current and clearance levels that the user can run. These are separated by a hyphen '\fB-\fR' as shown in the \fBEXAMPLE\fR section. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./users/local.users .br user test_u roles staff_r level s0 range s0 \- s15:c0.c1023; . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " semanage "(8), " selinux_users_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5), " selinux_mkload_policy "(3) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/media.5000066400000000000000000000000311226034601700164460ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_media.5 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/removable_context.5000066400000000000000000000022541226034601700211200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "removable_context" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" removable_context \- The SELinux removable devices context configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This file contains the default label that should be used for removable devices that are not defined in the \fImedia\fR file (that is described in .BR selabel_media "(5)). " .sp .BR selinux_removable_context_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default removable context file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/removable_context .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" The file consists of a single line entry as follows: .RS .IB user : role : type \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS .I user role type range .RS A user, role, type and optional range (for MCS/MLS) separated by colons (:) that will be applied to removable devices. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/removable_contexts .br system_u:object_r:removable_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_removable_context_path "(3), " selabel_media "(5), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/secolor.conf.5000066400000000000000000000063111226034601700177700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "secolor.conf" "5" "08 April 2011" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" secolor.conf \- The SELinux color configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This optional file controls the color to be associated to the context components associated to the .I raw context passed by .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)," when context related information is to be displayed in color by an SELinux-aware application. .sp .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)" obtains this color information from the active policy .B secolor.conf file as returned by .BR selinux_colors_path "(3)." . .SH "FILE FORMAT" The file format is as follows: .RS .B color .I color_name .BI "= #"color_mask .br [...] .sp .I context_component string .B = .I fg_color_name bg_color_name .br [...] .sp .RE Where: .br .B color .RS The color keyword. Each color entry is on a new line. .RE .I color_name .RS A single word name for the color (e.g. red). .RE .I color_mask .RS A color mask starting with a hash (#) that describes the hexadecimal RGB colors with black being #000000 and white being #ffffff. .RE .I context_component .RS The context component name that must be one of the following: .br .RS user, role, type or range .RE Each .IR context_component " " string " ..." entry is on a new line. .RE .I string .RS This is the .I context_component string that will be matched with the .I raw context component passed by .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)." .br A wildcard '*' may be used to match any undefined string for the user, role and type .I context_component entries only. .RE .I fg_color_name .RS The color_name string that will be used as the foreground color. A .I color_mask may also be used. .RE .I bg_color_name .RS The color_name string that will be used as the background color. A .I color_mask may also be used. .RE . .SH "EXAMPLES" Example 1 entries are: .RS color black = #000000 .br color green = #008000 .br color yellow = #ffff00 .br color blue = #0000ff .br color white = #ffffff .br color red = #ff0000 .br color orange = #ffa500 .br color tan = #D2B48C .sp user * = black white .br role * = white black .br type * = tan orange .br range s0\-s0:c0.c1023 = black green .br range s1\-s1:c0.c1023 = white green .br range s3\-s3:c0.c1023 = black tan .br range s5\-s5:c0.c1023 = white blue .br range s7\-s7:c0.c1023 = black red .br range s9\-s9:c0.c1023 = black orange .br range s15:c0.c1023 = black yellow .RE .sp Example 2 entries are: .RS color black = #000000 .br color green = #008000 .br color yellow = #ffff00 .br color blue = #0000ff .br color white = #ffffff .br color red = #ff0000 .br color orange = #ffa500 .br color tan = #d2b48c .sp user unconfined_u = #ff0000 green .br role unconfined_r = red #ffffff .br type unconfined_t = red orange .br user user_u = black green .br role user_r = white black .br type user_t = tan red .br user xguest_u = black yellow .br role xguest_r = black red .br type xguest_t = black green .br user sysadm_u = white black .br range s0:c0.c1023 = black white .br user * = black white .br role * = black white .br type * = black white .RE . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3), " selinux_colors_path "(3)" libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/securetty_types.5000066400000000000000000000025231226034601700206520ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "securetty_types" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" securetty_types \- The SELinux secure tty type configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The .I securetty_types file contains a list of types associated to secure tty type that are defined in the policy for use by SELinux-aware applications. .sp .BR selinux_securetty_types_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default securetty types file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/securetty_types .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR selinux_check_securetty_context "(3) reads this file to determine if a context is for a secure tty defined in the active policy. " .sp SELinux-aware applications such as .BR newrole "(1) use this information to check the status of a tty. " . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the file consists of the following entry: .sp .RS .I type .RS One or more type entries that are defined in the policy for secure tty devices. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/securetty_types .br sysadm_tty_device_t .br user_tty_device_t .br staff_tty_device_t . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_securetty_types_path "(3), " newrole "(1), " selinux_check_securetty_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/selabel_db.5000066400000000000000000000177551226034601700174700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: KaiGai Kohei 2009 .TH "selabel_db" "5" "01 DEC 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_db \- userspace SELinux labeling interface and configuration file format for the RDBMS objects context backend . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "security_context_t *" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "security_context_t *" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The DB contexts backend maps from a pair of object name and class into security contexts. It is used to find the appropriate context for database objects when relabeling a certain database. The returned \fIcontext\fR must be freed using \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) describes the function with its return and error codes. .sp The \fIobject_name\fR should be a fully qualified name using the hierarchy of database objects. For example, the \fBpg_class\fR table in the \fBpostgres\fR database and \fBpg_catalog\fR schema should be qualified as: .RS .B Bpostgres.pg_catalog.pg_class .RE .sp The \fBNOTES\fR section has further information on database support for namespace hierarchies. .sp The \fIobject_type\fR argument should be set to one of the following values: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_DB_DATABASE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a database itself, such as "postgres". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a schema object, such as "postgres.public". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_TABLE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a table object, such as "postgres.public.my_table" .TP .B SELABEL_DB_COLUMN The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a column object, such as "postgres.public.my_table.user_id" .TP .B SELABEL_DB_TUPLE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a table object which contains the tuples to be relabeled, such as "postgresql.public.my_table". Note that we have no way to identify individual tuple objects, except for WHERE clause on DML statements, because it has no name. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a procedure object, such as "postgres.public.my_func". Note that we don't support lookup of individual security contexts for procedures which have the same name but different arguments. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a sequence object, such as "postgres.public.my_seq". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_BLOB The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a large object, such as "postgres.16308". Note that a large object does not have a name, so it is identified by its identifier value. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_VIEW The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a view object, such as "postgres.public.my_view". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_LANGUAGE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a language object, such as "postgres.public.tcl". .RE .sp Any messages generated by \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) are sent to \fIstderr\fR by default, although this can be changed by \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .BR selabel_lookup_raw (3) behaves identically to \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) but does not perform context translation. .sp The \fBFILES\fR section details the configuration files used to determine the database object context. . .SH "OPTIONS" In addition to the global options described in \fBselabel_open\fR(3), this backend recognizes the following options: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH A non-null value for this option specifies a path to a file that will be opened in lieu of the standard DB contexts file. It tries to open the specfile designed for SE-PostgreSQL as default, so if another RDBMS uses this interface, it needs to give an explicit specfile designed for that RDBMS (see the \fBFILES\fR section for details). .RE . .SH "FILES" The database context file used to retrieve a context depends on the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR parameter passed to \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If \fINULL\fR, then the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value will default to the active policy database contexts location (as returned by \fBselinux_sepgsql_context_path\fR(3)), otherwise the actual \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value specified is used (this option must be used to support databases other than SE-PostgreSQL). .sp The default database object contexts file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/sepgsql_context .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp The entries within the database contexts file are shown in the \fBObject Name String Values\fR and \fBFILE FORMAT\fR sections. . .SH "Object Name String Values" The string name assigned to each \fIobject_type\fR argument that can be present in the database contexts file are: .TS center, allbox, tab(@); lI lB lB l . object_type@Text Name SELABEL_DB_DATABASE@db_database SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA@db_schema SELABEL_DB_VIEW@db_view SELABEL_DB_LANGUAGE@db_language SELABEL_DB_TABLE@db_table SELABEL_DB_COLUMN@db_column SELABEL_DB_TUPLE@db_tuple SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE@db_procedure SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE@db_sequence SELABEL_DB_BLOB@db_blob .TE . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line within the database contexts file is as follows: .RS .I object_type object_name context .RE .sp Where: .RS .I object_type .RS This is the string representation of the object type shown in the \fBObject Name String Values\fR section. .RE .I object_name .RS The key used to obtain the context based on the \fIobject_type\fR. .sp The entry can contain '*' for wildcard matching or '?' for substitution. .sp Note that if the '*' is used, then be aware that the order of entries in the file is important. The '*' on its own is used to ensure a default fallback context is assigned and should be the last entry in the \fIobject_type\fR block. .RE .I context .RS The security context that will be applied to the object. .RE .RE .sp The following example is for SE-PostgreSQL: .sp # ./contexts/sepgsql_contexts file .br # object_type object_name context .br db_database my_database system_u:object_r:sepgsql_db_t:s0 .br db_database * system_u:object_r:sepgsql_db_t:s0 .br db_schema *.* system_u:object_r:sepgsql_schema_t:s0 .br db_tuple row_low system_u:object_r:sepgsql_table_t:s0 .br db_tuple row_high system_u:object_r:sepgsql_table_t:s0:c1023 .br db_tuple *.*.* system_u:object_r:sepgsql_table_t:s0 . .SH "NOTES" .IP "1." 4 A suitable database contexts file needs to be written for the target RDBMS and the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR option must be used in \fBselabel_open\fR(3) to load it. .IP "2." 4 The hierarchy of the namespace for database objects depends on the RDBMS, however the \fIselabel*\fR interfaces do not have any specific support for a namespace hierarchy. .sp SE-PostgreSQL has a namespace hierarchy where a database is the top level object with the schema being the next level. Under the schema object there can be other types of objects such as tables and procedures. This hierarchy is supported as follows: .RS .RS .sp If a security context is required for "my_table" table in the "public" schema within the "postgres" database, then the \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) parameters for \fIobject_type\fR would be \fBSELABEL_DB_TABLE\fR and the \fIobject_name\fR would be "postgres.public.my_table", the security context (if available), would be returned in \fIcontext\fR. .RE .RE .IP "3." 4 If contexts are to be validated, then the global option \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR must be set before calling \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If this is not set, then it is possible for an invalid context to be returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_sepgsql_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/selabel_file.5000066400000000000000000000220511226034601700200030ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_file" "5" "01 Dec 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_file \- userspace SELinux labeling interface and configuration file format for the file contexts backend . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "security_context_t *" context , .br .BI "const char *" path ", int " mode ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "security_context_t *" context , .br .BI "const char *" path ", int " mode ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The file contexts backend maps from pathname/mode combinations into security contexts. It is used to find the appropriate context for each file when relabeling a file system. The returned \fIcontext\fR must be freed using \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) describes the function with its return and error codes, however the following \fIerrno\fR is clarified further for the file contexts backend: .RS .TP .B ENOENT No context corresponding to the \fIpath\fR and \fImode\fR was found - This will also be returned when the file contexts series of files have a context of \fB<>\fR against the \fIpath\fR (see the \fBFILE FORMAT\fR section). .RE .sp The \fIpath\fR argument should be set to the full pathname of the file whose assigned context is being checked. The \fImode\fR argument should be set to the mode bits of the file, as determined by \fBlstat\fR(2). \fImode\fR may be zero, however full matching may not occur. .sp Any messages generated by \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) are sent to \fIstderr\fR by default, although this can be changed by \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .BR selabel_lookup_raw (3) behaves identically to \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) but does not perform context translation. .sp The \fBFILES\fR section details the configuration files used to determine a file context. . .SH "OPTIONS" In addition to the global options described in .BR selabel_open (3), this backend recognizes the following options: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH A non-null value for this option specifies a path to a file that will be opened in lieu of the standard file contexts file. This value is also used as the base name for determining the names of local customization files. .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY A non-null value for this option indicates that any local customizations to the file contexts mapping should be ignored. .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET A non-null value for this option is interpreted as a path prefix, for example "/etc". Only file context specifications starting with the given prefix are loaded. This may increase lookup performance, however any attempt to look up a path not starting with the given prefix will fail. .RE . .SH "FILES" The file context files used to retrieve the default context depends on the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR parameter passed to \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If \fINULL\fR, then the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value will default to the active policy file contexts location (as returned by \fBselinux_file_context_path\fR(3)), otherwise the actual \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value specified is used. .sp If \fBSELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY\fR is set, then the following files will be processed: .RS .IP "1." 4 The mandatory file contexts file that is either the fully qualified file name from \fISELABEL_OPT_PATH.value\fR or if \fINULL\fR, then the path returned by \fBselinux_file_context_path\fR(3). .IP "2." 4 The optional local and distribution substitution files that perform path aliasing on the 'in memory' version of the file contexts file. .br These files have the same name as the mandatory file contexts file with the extensions \fI.subs\fR and \fI.subs_dist\fR added. .RE .sp If the \fBSELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY\fR is not set, then the following files will be processed: .RS .IP "1." 4 The mandatory file contexts file that is either the fully qualified file name from \fISELABEL_OPT_PATH.value\fR or if \fINULL\fR, then the path returned by \fBselinux_file_context_path\fR(3). .IP "2." 4 The optional local customizations file that has the same name as the mandatory file contexts file with the extension \fI.local\fR added. .br \fBselinux_file_context_local_path\fR(3) will return the default path to this file. .IP "3." 4 The optional user home directory customizations file that has the same name as the mandatory file contexts file with the extension \fI.homedirs\fR added. .br \fBselinux_file_context_homedir_path\fR(3) will return the default path to this file. .IP "4." 4 The optional local and distribution substitution files that perform any path aliasing on the 'in memory' version of the file contexts file (and the \fI.local\fR and/or \fI.homedirs\fR if present). These files have the same name as the mandatory file contexts file with the extensions \fI.subs\fR and \fI.subs_dist\fR added. .br \fBselinux_file_context_subs_path\fR(3) and \fBselinux_file_context_subs_dist_path\fR(3) will return the default paths to these files. .RE .sp The default file context series of files are: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.local .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.homedirs .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs_dist .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp Only the \fIfile_contexts\fR file is mandatory, the remainder are optional. .sp The entries within the file contexts series of files are shown in the \fBFILE FORMAT\fR section. . .SH "FILE FORMAT" .sp .SH "File Contexts Format" .sp Each line within the \fIfile_contexts\fR and the two customization files (\fI.local\fR and \fI.homedirs\fR) is as follows: .sp .RS .I pathname [file_type] context .RE .sp Where: .br .RS .I pathname .RS An entry that defines the pathname that may be in the form of a regular expression. .RE .I file_type .RS An optional file type consisting of: .RS \fI\-b\fR - Block Device \fI\-c\fR - Character Device .br \fI\-d\fR - Directory \fI\-p\fR - Named Pipe .br \fI\-l\fR - Symbolic Link \fI\-s\fR - Socket .br \fI\-\-\fR - Ordinary file .RE .RE .I context .RS This entry can be either: .RS .IP "a." 4 The security context that will be assigned to the file (i.e. returned as \fIcontext\fR). .IP "b." 4 A value of \fB<>\fR can be used to indicate that the matching files should not be re-labeled and causes \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) to return \-1 with \fIerrno\fR set to \fBENOENT\fR. .RE .RE .RE .sp Example: .RS # ./contexts/files/file_contexts .br # pathname file_type context .br /.* system_u:object_r:default_t:s0 .br /[^/]+ \-\- system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t:s0 .br /tmp/.* <> .RE .sp .SH "Substitution File Format" .sp Each line within the substitution files (\fI.subs\fR and \fI.subs_dist\fR) has the form: .RS .I subs_pathname pathname .RE .sp Where: .RS .I pathname .RS A path that matches an entry in one or more of the file contexts policy configuration file. .RE .I subs_pathname .RS The path that will be aliased (considered equivalent) with pathname by the look up process. .RE .RE .sp Example: .RS # ./contexts/files/file_contexts.subs .br # pathname subs_pathname .br /myweb /var/www .br /myspool /var/spool/mail .sp Using the above example, when \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) is passed a path of \fI/myweb/index.html\fR the function will substitute the \fI/myweb\fR component with \fI/var/www\fR, therefore the path used is: .sp .RS .I /var/www/index.html .RE .RE . .SH "NOTES" .IP "1." 4 If contexts are to be validated, then the global option \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR must be set before calling \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If this is not set, then it is possible for an invalid context to be returned. .IP "2." 4 If the size of file contexts series of files contain many entries, then \fBselabel_open\fR(3) may have a delay as it reads in the files, and if requested validates the entries. If possible use the \fBSELABEL_OPT_SUBSET\fR option to reduce the number of entries processed. .IP "3." 4 Depending on the version of SELinux it is possible that a \fIfile_contexts.template\fR file may also be present, however this is now deprecated. .br The template file has the same format as the \fIfile_contexts\fR file and may also contain the keywords \fBHOME_ROOT\fR, \fBHOME_DIR\fR, \fBROLE\fR and \fBUSER\fR. This functionality has now been moved to the policy store and managed by \fBsemodule\fR(8) and \fBgenhomedircon\fR(8). . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_file_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5), " lstat "(2), "selinux_file_context_subs_path "(3), " selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path "(3), " selinux_file_context_homedir_path "(3), "selinux_file_context_local_path "(3), " semodule "(8), " genhomedircon "(8) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/selabel_media.5000066400000000000000000000067451226034601700201570ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_media" "5" "29 Nov 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_media \- userspace SELinux labeling interface and configuration file format for the media contexts backend . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "security_context_t *" context , .br .BI "const char *" device_name ", int " unused ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "security_context_t *" context , .br .BI "const char *" device_name ", int " unused ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The media contexts backend maps from media device names such as "cdrom" or "floppy" into security contexts. It is used to find the appropriate context for establishing context mounts on these devices. The returned \fIcontext\fR must be freed using \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) describes the function with its return and error codes. .sp The integer lookup argument is currently unused and should be set to zero. .sp Any messages generated by \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) are sent to \fIstderr\fR by default, although this can be changed by \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .BR selabel_lookup_raw (3) behaves identically to \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) but does not perform context translation. .sp The \fBFILES\fR section details the configuration files used to determine the media context. . .SH "OPTIONS" In addition to the global options described in \fBselabel_open\fR(3), this backend recognizes the following options: .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH A non-null value for this option specifies a path to a file that will be opened in lieu of the standard \fImedia\fR contexts file. . .SH "FILES" The media context file used to retrieve a default context depends on the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR parameter passed to \fBselabel_open\FR(3). If \fINULL\fR, then the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value will default to the active policy media contexts location (as returned by \fBselinux_media_context_path\fR(3)), otherwise the actual \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value specified is used. .sp The default media contexts file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/media .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp Should there not be a valid entry in the \fImedia\fR file, then the default \fIremovable_context\fR file will be read (see \fBremovable_context\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line within the \fImedia\fR file is as follows: .RS .I device_name context .RE .sp Where: .RS .I device_name .RS The media identifier (e.g. cdrom, floppy, disk and usb). .RE .I context .RS The context to be used for labeling the device. .RE .RE .sp Example: .RS # contexts/files/media .br cdrom system_u:object_r:removable_device_t .br floppy system_u:object_r:removable_device_t .br disk system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t . .SH "NOTES" If contexts are to be validated, then the global option \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR must be set before calling \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If this is not set, then it is possible for an invalid context to be returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_media_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5), " removable_context "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/selabel_x.5000066400000000000000000000150361226034601700173400ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_x" "5" "29 Nov 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_x \- userspace SELinux labeling interface and configuration file format for the X Window System contexts backend. This backend is also used to determine the default context for labeling remotely connected X clients . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "security_context_t *" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "security_context_t *" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The X contexts backend maps from X Window System object names into security contexts. It is used to find the appropriate context for X Window System objects whose significance and/or usage semantics are determined primarily by name. The returned \fIcontext\fR must be freed using \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) describes the function with its return and error codes. .sp This backend is also used to determine the default context for labeling remotely connected X clients. .sp The \fIobject_type\fR argument should be set to one of the following values: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_X_PROP The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a window property, such as "WM_NAME". .TP .B SELABEL_X_SELN The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a selection, such as "PRIMARY". .TP .B SELABEL_X_EXT The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a protocol extension, such as "RENDER". .TP .B SELABEL_X_EVENT The .I object_name argument specifies the name of an event type, such as "X11:ButtonPress". .TP .B SELABEL_X_CLIENT The .I object_name argument is ignored, however it should be set to either \fI*\fR (an asterisk or 'wildcard' that will select the default entry) or a specific entry such as "remote" in the X contexts file as shown in the \fBEXAMPLE\fR section. The default context for labeling remote X clients is then returned. .TP .B SELABEL_X_POLYPROP Like .BR SELABEL_X_PROP , but checks if the property was marked as being polyinstantiated. See \fBNOTES\fR below. .TP .B SELABEL_X_POLYSELN Like .BR SELABEL_X_SELN , but checks if the selection was marked as being polyinstantiated. See \fBNOTES\fR below. .RE .sp Any messages generated by \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) are sent to \fIstderr\fR by default, although this can be changed by \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .B selabel_lookup_raw behaves identically to \fBselabel_lookup\fR but does not perform context translation. .sp The \fBFILES\fR section details the configuration files used to determine the X object context. . .SH "OPTIONS" In addition to the global options described in \fBselabel_open\fR(3), this backend recognizes the following options: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH A non-null value for this option specifies a path to a file that will be opened in lieu of the standard X contexts file (see the \fBFILES\fR section for details). .RE . .SH "FILES" The X context file used to retrieve a default context depends on the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR parameter passed to \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If \fINULL\fR, then the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value will default to the active policy X contexts location (as returned by \fBselinux_x_context_path\fR(3)), otherwise the actual \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value specified is used. .sp The default X object contexts file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/x_contexts .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp The entries within the X contexts file are shown in the \fBObject Name String Values\fR and \fBFILE FORMAT\fR sections. . .SH "Object Name String Values" The string name assigned to each \fIobject_type\fR argument that can be present in the X contexts file are: .TS center, allbox, tab(@); lI lB lB l . object_type@Text Name SELABEL_X_PROP@property SELABEL_X_SELN@selection SELABEL_X_EXT@extension SELABEL_X_EVENT@event SELABEL_X_CLIENT@client SELABEL_X_POLYPROP@poly_property SELABEL_X_POLYSELN@poly_selection .TE . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line within the X contexts file is as follows: .RS .I object_type object_name context .RE .sp Where: .RS .I object_type .RS This is the string representation of the object type shown in the \fBObject Name String Values\fR section. There can be multiple lines with the same \fIobject_type\fR string that will form a block of entries (each with a different \fIobject_name\fR entry). .RE .I object_name .RS These are the object names of the specific X-server resource such as \fBPRIMARY\fR, \fBCUT_BUFFER0\fR etc. They are generally defined in the X-server source code (\fIprotocol.txt\fR and \fIBuiltInAtoms\fR in the dix directory of the xorg\-server source package). The entry can contain '*' for wildcard matching or '?' for substitution. Note that if the '*' is used, then be aware that the order of entries in the file is important. The '*' on its own is used to ensure a default fallback context is assigned and should be the last entry in the \fIobject_type\fR block. .RE .I context .RS The security context that will be applied to the object. .RE .RE .sp Example 1: .sp .nf # object_type object_name context selection PRIMARY system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0 selection * system_u:object_r:xselection_t:s0 .fi .sp Example 2 - This example shows how a client entry can be configured to ensure an entry is always found: .sp .nf # object_type object_name context client * system_u:object_r:remote_t:s0 .fi . .SH "NOTES" .IP "1." 4 Properties and selections are marked as either polyinstantiated or not. For these name types, the "POLY" option searches only the names marked as being polyinstantiated, while the other option searches only the names marked as not being polyinstantiated. Users of the interface should check both mappings, optionally taking action based on the result (e.g. polyinstantiating the object). .IP "2." 4 If contexts are to be validated, then the global option \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR must be set before calling \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If this is not set, then it is possible for an invalid context to be returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_x_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/sepgsql_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000000261226034601700210000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_db.5 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/service_seusers.5000066400000000000000000000032751226034601700206150ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "service_seusers" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" service_seusers \- The SELinux GNU/Linux user and service to SELinux user mapping configuration files . .SH "DESCRIPTION" These are optional files that allow services to define an SELinux user when authenticating via SELinux-aware login applications such as .BR PAM "(8). " .sp There is one file for each GNU/Linux user name that will be required to run a service with a specific SELinux user name. .sp The path for each configuration file is formed by the path returned by .BR selinux_policy_root "(3) with " .IR /logins/username appended (where \fIusername\fR is a file representing the GNU/Linux user name). The default services directory is located at: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/logins .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR getseuser "(3) reads this file to map services to an SELinux user. " . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line within the \fIusername\fR file is formatted as follows with each component separated by a colon: .RS .IB service : seuser \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS .I service .RS The service name used by the application. .RE .I seuser .RS The SELinux user name. .RE .I range .RS The range for MCS/MLS policies. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLES" Example 1 - for the 'root' user: .RS # ./logins/root .br ipa:user_u:s0 .br this_service:unconfined_u:s0 .RE .sp Example 2 - for GNU/Linux user 'rch': .RS # ./logins/rch .br ipa:unconfined_u:s0 .br that_service:unconfined_u:s0 .RE . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " PAM "(8), " selinux_policy_root "(3), " getseuser "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/seusers.5000066400000000000000000000030741226034601700170720ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "seusers" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" seusers \- The SELinux GNU/Linux user to SELinux user mapping configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The .I seusers file contains a list GNU/Linux user to SELinux user mapping for use by SELinux-aware login applications such as \fBPAM\fR(8). .sp .BR selinux_usersconf_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default SELinux users mapping file is located at: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/seusers .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR getseuserbyname "(3) reads this file to map a GNU/Linux user or group to an SELinux user. " . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line of the .I seusers configuration file consists of the following: .sp .RS \fR[\fB%\fIgroup_id\fR]|[\fIuser_id\fR]\fB:\fIseuser_id\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS \fIgroup_id\fR|\fIuser_id .RS \fRThe GNU/Linux user id, or if preceded by the percentage (\fB%\fR) symbol, then a GNU/Linux group id. .br An optional entry set to \fB__default__\fR can be provided as a fall back if required. .RE .I seuser_id .RS The SELinux user identity. .RE .I range .RS The optional level or range for an MLS/MCS policy. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./seusers .br system_u:system_u:s0\-s15:c0.c255 .br root:root:s0\-s15:c0.c255 .br fred:user_u:s0 .br __default__:user_u:s0 .br %user_group:user_u:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " PAM "(8), " selinux_usersconf_path "(3), " getseuserbyname "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/user_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000052101226034601700203000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "user_contexts" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" user_contexts \- The SELinux user contexts configuration files . .SH "DESCRIPTION" These optional user context configuration files contain entries that allow SELinux-aware login applications such as .BR PAM (8) (running in their own process context), to determine the context that a users login session should run under. .sp SELinux-aware login applications generally use one or more of the following libselinux functions that read these files from the active policy path: .RS .BR get_default_context (3) .br .BR get_ordered_context_list (3) .br .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level (3) .br .BR get_default_context_with_level (3) .br .BR get_default_context_with_role (3) .br .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel (3) .br .BR query_user_context (3) .br .BR manual_user_enter_context (3) .RE .sp There can be one file for each SELinux user configured on the system. The file path is formed using the path returned by .BR \%selinux_user_contexts_path (3) for the active policy, with the SELinux user name appended, for example: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/users/unconfined_u .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/users/xguest_u .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp These files contain context information as described in the .B FILE FORMAT section. . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the user context configuration file consists of the following: .RS .I login_process user_login_process .RE .sp Where: .RS .I login_process .RS This consists of a \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] entry that represents the login process context. .RE .I user_login_process .RS This consists of a \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] entry that represents the user login process context. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # Example for xguest_u at /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/users/xguest_u .br system_r:crond_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:initrc_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:local_login_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:remote_login_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:sshd_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:xdm_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_user_contexts_path "(3), " PAM "(8), " get_ordered_context_list "(3), " get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_role "(3), " get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3), " query_user_context "(3), " manual_user_enter_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/virtual_domain_context.5000066400000000000000000000023251226034601700221600ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "virtual_domain_context" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" virtual_domain_context \- The SELinux virtual machine domain context configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The .I virtual_domain_context file contains a list of domain contexts that are available for use by the SELinux-aware virtulization API libvirt (see \fBlibvirtd\fR(8)). .sp .BR selinux_virtual_domain_context_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default virtual domain context file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/virtual_domain_context .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the file consists of an entry as follows: .RS .IB user : role : type \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS .I user role type range .RS A user, role, type and optional range (for MCS/MLS) separated by colons (:) that can be used as a virtual domain context. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/virtual_domain_context .br system_u:object_r:svirt_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " libvirtd "(8), " selinux_virtual_domain_context_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/virtual_image_context.5000066400000000000000000000023461226034601700217760ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "virtual_image_context" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" virtual_image_context \- The SELinux virtual machine image context configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The .I virtual_image_context file contains a list of image contexts for use by the SELinux-aware virtulization API libvirt (see \fBlibvirtd\fR(8)). .sp .BR selinux_virtual_image_context_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default virtual image context file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/virtual_image_context .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the file consists of an entry as follows: .RS .IB user : role : type \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS .I user role type range .RS A user, role, type and optional range (for MCS/MLS) separated by colons (:) that can be used as a virtual image context. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/virtual_image_context .br system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0 .br system_u:object_r:svirt_content_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " libvirtd "(8), " selinux_virtual_image_context_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-2.2.2/man/man5/x_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000000251226034601700175700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_x.5 libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/000077500000000000000000000000001226034601700153125ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/avcstat.8000066400000000000000000000014151226034601700170510ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "avcstat" "8" "18 Nov 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" avcstat \- Display SELinux AVC statistics . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B avcstat .RB [ \-c ] .RB [ \-f .IR status_file ] .RI [ interval ] . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Display SELinux AVC statistics. If the .I interval parameter is specified, the program will loop, displaying updated statistics every .I interval seconds. Relative values are displayed by default. . .SH OPTIONS .TP .B \-c Display the cumulative values. .TP .B \-f Specifies the location of the AVC statistics file, defaulting to .IR /selinux/avc/cache_stats . . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . The program was written by James Morris . . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/booleans.8000066400000000000000000000035041226034601700172070ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "booleans" "8" "11 Aug 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" booleans \- Policy booleans enable runtime customization of SELinux policy . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This manual page describes SELinux policy booleans. .BR The SELinux policy can include conditional rules that are enabled or disabled based on the current values of a set of policy booleans. These policy booleans allow runtime modification of the security policy without having to load a new policy. For example, the boolean httpd_enable_cgi allows the httpd daemon to run cgi scripts if it is enabled. If the administrator does not want to allow execution of cgi scripts, he can simply disable this boolean value. The policy defines a default value for each boolean, typically false. These default values can be overridden via local settings created via the .BR setsebool (8) utility, using .B \-P to make the setting persistent across reboots. The .B system\-config\-securitylevel tool provides a graphical interface for altering the settings. The .BR load_policy (8) program will preserve current boolean settings upon a policy reload by default, or can optionally reset booleans to the boot-time defaults via the .B \-b option. Boolean values can be listed by using the .BR getsebool (8) utility and passing it the .B \-a option. Boolean values can also be changed at runtime via the .BR setsebool (8) utility or the .BR togglesebool (8) utility. By default, these utilities only change the current boolean value and do not affect the persistent settings, unless the .B \-P option is used to setsebool. . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . The SELinux conditional policy support was developed by Tresys Technology. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR getsebool (8), .BR setsebool (8), .BR selinux (8), .BR togglesebool (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/getenforce.8000066400000000000000000000006201226034601700175220ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getenforce" "8" "7 April 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" getenforce \- get the current mode of SELinux . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B getenforce . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .B getenforce reports whether SELinux is enforcing, permissive, or disabled. . .SH AUTHOR Dan Walsh, . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR setenforce (8), .BR selinuxenabled (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/getsebool.8000066400000000000000000000021461226034601700173710ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getsebool" "8" "11 Aug 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" getsebool \- get SELinux boolean value(s) . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B getsebool .RB [ \-a ] .RI [ boolean ] . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .B getsebool reports where a particular SELinux boolean or all SELinux booleans are on or off In certain situations a boolean can be in one state with a pending change to the other state. getsebool will report this as a pending change. The pending value indicates the value that will be applied upon the next boolean commit. The setting of boolean values occurs in two stages; first the pending value is changed, then the booleans are committed, causing their active values to become their pending values. This allows a group of booleans to be changed in a single transaction, by setting all of their pending values as desired and then committing once. . .SH OPTIONS .TP .B \-a Show all SELinux booleans. . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . The program was written by Tresys Technology. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR setsebool (8), .BR booleans (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/matchpathcon.8000066400000000000000000000027411226034601700200600ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "matchpathcon" "8" "21 April 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" matchpathcon \- get the default SELinux security context for the specified path from the file contexts configuration . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B matchpathcon .RB [ \-V ] .RB [ \-N ] .RB [ \-n ] .RB [ \-m .IR type ] .RB [ \-f .IR file_contexts_file ] .RB [ \-p .IR prefix ] .RB [ \-P .IR policy_root_path ] .I filepath... . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR matchpathcon queries the system policy and outputs the default security context associated with the filepath. .B Note: Identical paths can have different security contexts, depending on the file type (regular file, directory, link file, char file ...). .B matchpathcon will also take the file type into consideration in determining the default security context if the file exists. If the file does not exist, no file type matching will occur. . .SH OPTIONS .TP .BI \-m " type" Force file type for the lookup. Valid types are .BR file ", " dir ", "pipe ", " chr_file ", " blk_file ", " .BR lnk_file ", " sock_file . .TP .B \-n Do not display path. .TP .B \-N Do not use translations. .TP .BI \-f " file_context_file" Use alternate file_context file .TP .BI \-p " prefix" Use prefix to speed translations .TP .BI \-P " policy_root_path" Use alternate policy root path .TP .B \-V Verify file context on disk matches defaults . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " .BR matchpathcon (3) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/sefcontext_compile.8000066400000000000000000000012661226034601700213020ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "sefcontext_compile" "8" "27 Jun 2013" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" sefcontext_compile \- compile file context regular expression files . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B sefcontext_compile inputfile . .SH "DESCRIPTION" sefcontext_compile is used libsemanage to compile file context regular expressions into prce format. sefcontext_compile writes the compiled prce file with the .bin suffix appended "inputfile".bin. This compiled file is used by libselinux file labeling functions. .SH "EXAMPLE" sefcontext_compile /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts . .SH AUTHOR Dan Walsh, . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR semanage (8), libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/selinux.8000066400000000000000000000107201226034601700170720ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux" "8" "29 Apr 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" SELinux \- NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) . .SH "DESCRIPTION" NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is an implementation of a flexible mandatory access control architecture in the Linux operating system. The SELinux architecture provides general support for the enforcement of many kinds of mandatory access control policies, including those based on the concepts of Type Enforcement®, Role- Based Access Control, and Multi-Level Security. Background information and technical documentation about SELinux can be found at http://www.nsa.gov/research/selinux. The .I /etc/selinux/config configuration file controls whether SELinux is enabled or disabled, and if enabled, whether SELinux operates in permissive mode or enforcing mode. The .B SELINUX variable may be set to any one of disabled, permissive, or enforcing to select one of these options. The disabled option completely disables the SELinux kernel and application code, leaving the system running without any SELinux protection. The permissive option enables the SELinux code, but causes it to operate in a mode where accesses that would be denied by policy are permitted but audited. The enforcing option enables the SELinux code and causes it to enforce access denials as well as auditing them. Permissive mode may yield a different set of denials than enforcing mode, both because enforcing mode will prevent an operation from proceeding past the first denial and because some application code will fall back to a less privileged mode of operation if denied access. The .I /etc/selinux/config configuration file also controls what policy is active on the system. SELinux allows for multiple policies to be installed on the system, but only one policy may be active at any given time. At present, multiple kinds of SELinux policy exist: targeted, mls for example. The targeted policy is designed as a policy where most user processes operate without restrictions, and only specific services are placed into distinct security domains that are confined by the policy. For example, the user would run in a completely unconfined domain while the named daemon or apache daemon would run in a specific domain tailored to its operation. The MLS (Multi-Level Security) policy is designed as a policy where all processes are partitioned into fine-grained security domains and confined by policy. MLS also supports the Bell And LaPadula model, where processes are not only confined by the type but also the level of the data. You can define which policy you will run by setting the .B SELINUXTYPE environment variable within .IR /etc/selinux/config . You must reboot and possibly relabel if you change the policy type to have it take effect on the system. The corresponding policy configuration for each such policy must be installed in the .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/ directories. A given SELinux policy can be customized further based on a set of compile-time tunable options and a set of runtime policy booleans. .B \%system\-config\-selinux allows customization of these booleans and tunables. Many domains that are protected by SELinux also include SELinux man pages explaining how to customize their policy. . .SH "FILE LABELING" All files, directories, devices ... have a security context/label associated with them. These context are stored in the extended attributes of the file system. Problems with SELinux often arise from the file system being mislabeled. This can be caused by booting the machine with a non SELinux kernel. If you see an error message containing file_t, that is usually a good indicator that you have a serious problem with file system labeling. The best way to relabel the file system is to create the flag file .I /.autorelabel and reboot. .BR system\-config\-selinux , also has this capability. The .BR restorcon / fixfiles commands are also available for relabeling files. . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . . .SH FILES .I /etc/selinux/config . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR booleans (8), .BR setsebool (8), .BR sepolicy (8), .BR system-config-selinux (8), .BR togglesebool (8), .BR restorecon (8), .BR fixfiles (8), .BR setfiles (8), .BR semanage (8), .BR sepolicy(8) Every confined service on the system has a man page in the following format: .br .B _selinux(8) For example, httpd has the .B httpd_selinux(8) man page. .B man -k selinux Will list all SELinux man pages. libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/selinuxenabled.8000066400000000000000000000010021226034601700203760ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinuxenabled" "8" "7 April 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" selinuxenabled \- tool to be used within shell scripts to determine if selinux is enabled . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B selinuxenabled . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Indicates whether SELinux is enabled or disabled. . .SH "EXIT STATUS" It exits with status 0 if SELinux is enabled and 1 if it is not enabled. . .SH AUTHOR Dan Walsh, . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR setenforce (8), .BR getenforce (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/selinuxexeccon.8000066400000000000000000000012631226034601700204410ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinuxexeccon" "8" "14 May 2011" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" selinuxexeccon \- report SELinux context used for this executable . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B selinuxexeccon .I command .RI [ fromcon ] . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .B selinuxexeccon reports the SELinux process context for the specified command from the specified context or the current context. . .SH EXAMPLE .nf # selinuxexeccon /usr/bin/passwd staff_u:staff_r:passwd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 # selinuxexeccon /usr/sbin/sendmail system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 system_u:system_r:system_mail_t:s0 .fi . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR secon (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/setenforce.8000066400000000000000000000011561226034601700175430ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "setenforce" "8" "7 April 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" setenforce \- modify the mode SELinux is running in . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B setenforce .RB [ Enforcing | Permissive | 1 | 0 ] . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Use .B Enforcing or .B 1 to put SELinux in enforcing mode. .br Use .B Permissive or .B 0 to put SELinux in permissive mode. If SELinux is disabled and you want to enable it, or SELinux is enabled and you want to disable it, please see .BR selinux (8). . .SH AUTHOR Dan Walsh, . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR getenforce (8), .BR selinuxenabled (8) libselinux-2.2.2/man/man8/togglesebool.8000066400000000000000000000011521226034601700200670ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "togglesebool" "8" "26 Oct 2004" "sgrubb@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" togglesebool \- flip the current value of a SELinux boolean . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B togglesebool .I boolean... . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .B togglesebool flips the current value of a list of booleans. If the value is currently a 1, then it will be changed to a 0 and vice versa. Only the "in memory" values are changed; the boot-time settings are unaffected. . .SH AUTHOR This man page was written by Steve Grubb . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR booleans (8), .BR getsebool (8), .BR setsebool (8) libselinux-2.2.2/src/000077500000000000000000000000001226034601700144635ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-2.2.2/src/.gitignore000066400000000000000000000001251226034601700164510ustar00rootroot00000000000000selinux.py selinuxswig_wrap.c selinuxswig_python_exception.i selinuxswig_ruby_wrap.c libselinux-2.2.2/src/Makefile000066400000000000000000000150361226034601700161300ustar00rootroot00000000000000# Support building the Python bindings multiple times, against various Python # runtimes (e.g. Python 2 vs Python 3) by optionally prefixing the build # targets with "PYPREFIX": PYTHON ?= python PYPREFIX ?= $(notdir $(PYTHON)) RUBY ?= ruby RUBYPREFIX ?= $(notdir $(RUBY)) # Installation directories. PREFIX ?= $(DESTDIR)/usr LIBDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/lib SHLIBDIR ?= $(DESTDIR)/lib INCLUDEDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/include PYLIBVER ?= $(shell $(PYTHON) -c 'import sys;print("python%d.%d" % sys.version_info[0:2])') PYINC ?= $(shell pkg-config --cflags $(PYPREFIX)) PYLIBDIR ?= $(LIBDIR)/$(PYLIBVER) RUBYLIBVER ?= $(shell $(RUBY) -e 'print RUBY_VERSION.split(".")[0..1].join(".")') RUBYPLATFORM ?= $(shell $(RUBY) -e 'print RUBY_PLATFORM') RUBYINC ?= $(shell pkg-config --cflags ruby) RUBYINSTALL ?= $(LIBDIR)/ruby/site_ruby/$(RUBYLIBVER)/$(RUBYPLATFORM) LIBBASE ?= $(shell basename $(LIBDIR)) VERSION = $(shell cat ../VERSION) LIBVERSION = 1 LIBA=libselinux.a TARGET=libselinux.so LIBPC=libselinux.pc SWIGIF= selinuxswig_python.i selinuxswig_python_exception.i SWIGRUBYIF= selinuxswig_ruby.i SWIGCOUT= selinuxswig_wrap.c SWIGRUBYCOUT= selinuxswig_ruby_wrap.c SWIGLOBJ:= $(patsubst %.c,$(PYPREFIX)%.lo,$(SWIGCOUT)) SWIGRUBYLOBJ:= $(patsubst %.c,%.lo,$(SWIGRUBYCOUT)) SWIGSO=$(PYPREFIX)_selinux.so SWIGFILES=$(SWIGSO) selinux.py SWIGRUBYSO=$(RUBYPREFIX)_selinux.so LIBSO=$(TARGET).$(LIBVERSION) AUDIT2WHYLOBJ=$(PYPREFIX)audit2why.lo AUDIT2WHYSO=$(PYPREFIX)audit2why.so ifeq ($(DISABLE_AVC),y) UNUSED_SRCS+=avc.c avc_internal.c avc_sidtab.c mapping.c stringrep.c checkAccess.c endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_BOOL),y) UNUSED_SRCS+=booleans.c endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_RPM),y) UNUSED_SRCS+=rpm.c endif GENERATED=$(SWIGCOUT) $(SWIGRUBYCOUT) selinuxswig_python_exception.i SRCS= $(filter-out $(UNUSED_SRCS) $(GENERATED) audit2why.c, $(wildcard *.c)) MAX_STACK_SIZE=32768 OBJS= $(patsubst %.c,%.o,$(SRCS)) LOBJS= $(patsubst %.c,%.lo,$(SRCS)) CFLAGS ?= -O -Wall -W -Wundef -Wformat-y2k -Wformat-security -Winit-self -Wmissing-include-dirs \ -Wunused -Wunknown-pragmas -Wstrict-aliasing -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith \ -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wwrite-strings -Wlogical-op -Waggregate-return \ -Wstrict-prototypes -Wold-style-definition -Wmissing-prototypes \ -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-noreturn -Wmissing-format-attribute \ -Wredundant-decls -Wnested-externs -Winline -Winvalid-pch -Wvolatile-register-var \ -Wdisabled-optimization -Wbuiltin-macro-redefined -Wmudflap -Wpacked-bitfield-compat \ -Wsync-nand -Wattributes -Wcoverage-mismatch -Wmultichar -Wcpp \ -Wdeprecated-declarations -Wdiv-by-zero -Wdouble-promotion -Wendif-labels -Wextra \ -Wformat-contains-nul -Wformat-extra-args -Wformat-zero-length -Wformat=2 -Wmultichar \ -Wnormalized=nfc -Woverflow -Wpointer-to-int-cast -Wpragmas -Wsuggest-attribute=const \ -Wsuggest-attribute=noreturn -Wsuggest-attribute=pure -Wtrampolines \ -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-sign-compare -Wjump-misses-init \ -Wno-format-nonliteral -Wframe-larger-than=$(MAX_STACK_SIZE) -Wp,-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 \ -fstack-protector-all --param=ssp-buffer-size=4 -fexceptions \ -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -fdiagnostics-show-option -funit-at-a-time \ -fipa-pure-const -Wno-suggest-attribute=pure -Wno-suggest-attribute=const \ -Werror -Wno-aggregate-return -Wno-redundant-decls override CFLAGS += -I../include -I$(INCLUDEDIR) -D_GNU_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 $(EMFLAGS) SWIG_CFLAGS += -Wno-error -Wno-unused-variable -Wno-unused-but-set-variable -Wno-unused-parameter \ -Wno-shadow -Wno-uninitialized -Wno-missing-prototypes -Wno-missing-declarations RANLIB ?= ranlib ARCH := $(patsubst i%86,i386,$(shell uname -m)) ifneq (,$(filter i386,$(ARCH))) TLSFLAGS += -mno-tls-direct-seg-refs endif SWIG = swig -Wall -python -o $(SWIGCOUT) -outdir ./ SWIGRUBY = swig -Wall -ruby -o $(SWIGRUBYCOUT) -outdir ./ all: $(LIBA) $(LIBSO) $(LIBPC) pywrap: all $(SWIGSO) $(AUDIT2WHYSO) rubywrap: all $(SWIGRUBYSO) $(SWIGLOBJ): $(SWIGCOUT) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SWIG_CFLAGS) $(PYINC) -fPIC -DSHARED -c -o $@ $< $(SWIGRUBYLOBJ): $(SWIGRUBYCOUT) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SWIG_CFLAGS) $(RUBYINC) -fPIC -DSHARED -c -o $@ $< $(SWIGSO): $(SWIGLOBJ) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -shared -o $@ $< -L. -lselinux $(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBDIR) $(SWIGRUBYSO): $(SWIGRUBYLOBJ) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -shared -o $@ $^ -L. -lselinux $(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBDIR) $(LIBA): $(OBJS) $(AR) rcs $@ $^ $(RANLIB) $@ $(LIBSO): $(LOBJS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -shared -o $@ $^ -lpcre -ldl $(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBDIR) -Wl,-soname,$(LIBSO),-z,defs,-z,relro ln -sf $@ $(TARGET) $(LIBPC): $(LIBPC).in ../VERSION sed -e 's/@VERSION@/$(VERSION)/; s:@prefix@:$(PREFIX):; s:@libdir@:$(LIBBASE):; s:@includedir@:$(INCLUDEDIR):' < $< > $@ selinuxswig_python_exception.i: ../include/selinux/selinux.h bash exception.sh > $@ $(AUDIT2WHYLOBJ): audit2why.c $(CC) $(filter-out -Werror, $(CFLAGS)) $(PYINC) -fPIC -DSHARED -c -o $@ $< $(AUDIT2WHYSO): $(AUDIT2WHYLOBJ) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -shared -o $@ $^ -L. $(LDFLAGS) -lselinux $(LIBDIR)/libsepol.a -L$(LIBDIR) %.o: %.c policy.h $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TLSFLAGS) -c -o $@ $< %.lo: %.c policy.h $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -fPIC -DSHARED -c -o $@ $< $(SWIGCOUT): $(SWIGIF) $(SWIG) $< $(SWIGRUBYCOUT): $(SWIGRUBYIF) $(SWIGRUBY) $< swigify: $(SWIGIF) $(SWIG) $< install: all test -d $(LIBDIR) || install -m 755 -d $(LIBDIR) install -m 644 $(LIBA) $(LIBDIR) test -d $(SHLIBDIR) || install -m 755 -d $(SHLIBDIR) install -m 755 $(LIBSO) $(SHLIBDIR) test -d $(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig || install -m 755 -d $(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig install -m 644 $(LIBPC) $(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig cd $(LIBDIR) && ln -sf ../../`basename $(SHLIBDIR)`/$(LIBSO) $(TARGET) install-pywrap: pywrap test -d $(PYLIBDIR)/site-packages/selinux || install -m 755 -d $(PYLIBDIR)/site-packages/selinux install -m 755 $(SWIGSO) $(PYLIBDIR)/site-packages/selinux/_selinux.so install -m 755 $(AUDIT2WHYSO) $(PYLIBDIR)/site-packages/selinux/audit2why.so install -m 644 selinux.py $(PYLIBDIR)/site-packages/selinux/__init__.py install-rubywrap: rubywrap test -d $(RUBYINSTALL) || install -m 755 -d $(RUBYINSTALL) install -m 755 $(SWIGRUBYSO) $(RUBYINSTALL)/selinux.so relabel: /sbin/restorecon $(SHLIBDIR)/$(LIBSO) clean: -rm -f $(LIBPC) $(OBJS) $(LOBJS) $(LIBA) $(LIBSO) $(SWIGLOBJ) $(SWIGRUBYLOBJ) $(SWIGSO) $(TARGET) $(AUDIT2WHYSO) *.o *.lo *~ distclean: clean rm -f $(GENERATED) $(SWIGFILES) indent: ../../scripts/Lindent $(filter-out $(GENERATED),$(wildcard *.[ch])) .PHONY: all clean pywrap rubywrap swigify install install-pywrap install-rubywrap distclean libselinux-2.2.2/src/audit2why.c000066400000000000000000000265141226034601700165570ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Workaround for http://bugs.python.org/issue4835 */ #ifndef SIZEOF_SOCKET_T #define SIZEOF_SOCKET_T SIZEOF_INT #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define UNKNOWN -1 #define BADSCON -2 #define BADTCON -3 #define BADTCLASS -4 #define BADPERM -5 #define BADCOMPUTE -6 #define NOPOLICY -7 #define ALLOW 0 #define DONTAUDIT 1 #define TERULE 2 #define BOOLEAN 3 #define CONSTRAINT 4 #define RBAC 5 struct boolean_t { char *name; int active; }; static struct boolean_t **boollist = NULL; static int boolcnt = 0; struct avc_t { sepol_handle_t *handle; sepol_policydb_t *policydb; sepol_security_id_t ssid; sepol_security_id_t tsid; sepol_security_class_t tclass; sepol_access_vector_t av; }; static struct avc_t *avc = NULL; static sidtab_t sidtab; static int load_booleans(const sepol_bool_t * boolean, void *arg __attribute__ ((__unused__))) { boollist[boolcnt] = malloc(sizeof(struct boolean_t)); boollist[boolcnt]->name = strdup(sepol_bool_get_name(boolean)); boollist[boolcnt]->active = sepol_bool_get_value(boolean); boolcnt++; return 0; } static int check_booleans(struct boolean_t **bools) { char errormsg[PATH_MAX]; struct sepol_av_decision avd; unsigned int reason; int rc; int i; sepol_bool_key_t *key = NULL; sepol_bool_t *boolean = NULL; int fcnt = 0; int *foundlist = calloc(boolcnt, sizeof(int)); if (!foundlist) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_MemoryError, "Out of memory\n"); return fcnt; } for (i = 0; i < boolcnt; i++) { char *name = boollist[i]->name; int active = boollist[i]->active; rc = sepol_bool_key_create(avc->handle, name, &key); if (rc < 0) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, "Could not create boolean key.\n"); break; } rc = sepol_bool_query(avc->handle, avc->policydb, key, &boolean); if (rc < 0) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "Could not find boolean %s.\n", name); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, errormsg); break; } sepol_bool_set_value(boolean, !active); rc = sepol_bool_set(avc->handle, avc->policydb, key, boolean); if (rc < 0) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "Could not set boolean data %s.\n", name); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, errormsg); break; } /* Reproduce the computation. */ rc = sepol_compute_av_reason(avc->ssid, avc->tsid, avc->tclass, avc->av, &avd, &reason); if (rc < 0) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "Error during access vector computation, skipping..."); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, errormsg); sepol_bool_free(boolean); break; } else { if (!reason) { foundlist[fcnt] = i; fcnt++; } sepol_bool_set_value(boolean, active); rc = sepol_bool_set(avc->handle, avc->policydb, key, boolean); if (rc < 0) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "Could not set boolean data %s.\n", name); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, errormsg); break; } } sepol_bool_free(boolean); sepol_bool_key_free(key); key = NULL; boolean = NULL; } if (key) sepol_bool_key_free(key); if (boolean) sepol_bool_free(boolean); if (fcnt > 0) { *bools = calloc(sizeof(struct boolean_t), fcnt + 1); struct boolean_t *b = *bools; for (i = 0; i < fcnt; i++) { int ctr = foundlist[i]; b[i].name = strdup(boollist[ctr]->name); b[i].active = !boollist[ctr]->active; } } free(foundlist); return fcnt; } static PyObject *finish(PyObject *self __attribute__((unused)), PyObject *args) { PyObject *result = 0; if (PyArg_ParseTuple(args,(char *)":finish")) { int i = 0; if (! avc) Py_RETURN_NONE; for (i = 0; i < boolcnt; i++) { free(boollist[i]->name); free(boollist[i]); } free(boollist); sepol_sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab); sepol_sidtab_destroy(&sidtab); sepol_policydb_free(avc->policydb); sepol_handle_destroy(avc->handle); free(avc); avc = NULL; boollist = NULL; boolcnt = 0; /* Boilerplate to return "None" */ Py_RETURN_NONE; } return result; } static int __policy_init(const char *init_path) { FILE *fp; char path[PATH_MAX]; char errormsg[PATH_MAX]; struct sepol_policy_file *pf = NULL; int rc; unsigned int cnt; path[PATH_MAX-1] = '\0'; if (init_path) { strncpy(path, init_path, PATH_MAX-1); fp = fopen(path, "r"); if (!fp) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "unable to open %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_ValueError, errormsg); return 1; } } else { fp = fopen(selinux_current_policy_path(), "r"); if (!fp) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "unable to open %s: %s\n", selinux_current_policy_path(), strerror(errno)); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_ValueError, errormsg); return 1; } } avc = calloc(sizeof(struct avc_t), 1); if (!avc) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_MemoryError, "Out of memory\n"); fclose(fp); return 1; } /* Set up a policydb directly so that we can mutate it later for testing what booleans might have allowed the access. Otherwise, we'd just use sepol_set_policydb_from_file() here. */ if (sepol_policy_file_create(&pf) || sepol_policydb_create(&avc->policydb)) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "policydb_init failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, errormsg); fclose(fp); return 1; } sepol_policy_file_set_fp(pf, fp); if (sepol_policydb_read(avc->policydb, pf)) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "invalid binary policy %s\n", path); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_ValueError, errormsg); fclose(fp); return 1; } fclose(fp); sepol_set_policydb(&avc->policydb->p); avc->handle = sepol_handle_create(); /* Turn off messages */ sepol_msg_set_callback(avc->handle, NULL, NULL); rc = sepol_bool_count(avc->handle, avc->policydb, &cnt); if (rc < 0) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, "unable to get bool count\n"); return 1; } boollist = calloc(cnt, sizeof(*boollist)); if (!boollist) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_MemoryError, "Out of memory\n"); return 1; } sepol_bool_iterate(avc->handle, avc->policydb, load_booleans, (void *)NULL); /* Initialize the sidtab for subsequent use by sepol_context_to_sid and sepol_compute_av_reason. */ rc = sepol_sidtab_init(&sidtab); if (rc < 0) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, "unable to init sidtab\n"); free(boollist); return 1; } sepol_set_sidtab(&sidtab); return 0; } static PyObject *init(PyObject *self __attribute__((unused)), PyObject *args) { int result; char *init_path=NULL; if (avc) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, "init called multiple times"); return NULL; } if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args,(char *)"|s:policy_init",&init_path)) return NULL; result = __policy_init(init_path); return Py_BuildValue("i", result); } #define RETURN(X) \ { \ return Py_BuildValue("iO", (X), Py_None); \ } static PyObject *analyze(PyObject *self __attribute__((unused)) , PyObject *args) { char *reason_buf = NULL; security_context_t scon; security_context_t tcon; char *tclassstr; PyObject *listObj; PyObject *strObj; int numlines; struct boolean_t *bools; unsigned int reason; sepol_security_id_t ssid, tsid; sepol_security_class_t tclass; sepol_access_vector_t perm, av; struct sepol_av_decision avd; int rc; int i=0; if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args,(char *)"sssO!:audit2why",&scon,&tcon,&tclassstr,&PyList_Type, &listObj)) return NULL; /* get the number of lines passed to us */ numlines = PyList_Size(listObj); /* should raise an error here. */ if (numlines < 0) return NULL; /* Not a list */ if (!avc) RETURN(NOPOLICY) rc = sepol_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid); if (rc < 0) RETURN(BADSCON) rc = sepol_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid); if (rc < 0) RETURN(BADTCON) tclass = string_to_security_class(tclassstr); if (!tclass) RETURN(BADTCLASS) /* Convert the permission list to an AV. */ av = 0; /* iterate over items of the list, grabbing strings, and parsing for numbers */ for (i=0; i= 3 permstr = _PyUnicode_AsString( strObj ); #else permstr = PyString_AsString( strObj ); #endif perm = string_to_av_perm(tclass, permstr); if (!perm) RETURN(BADPERM) av |= perm; } /* Reproduce the computation. */ rc = sepol_compute_av_reason_buffer(ssid, tsid, tclass, av, &avd, &reason, &reason_buf, 0); if (rc < 0) RETURN(BADCOMPUTE) if (!reason) RETURN(ALLOW) if (reason & SEPOL_COMPUTEAV_TE) { avc->ssid = ssid; avc->tsid = tsid; avc->tclass = tclass; avc->av = av; if (check_booleans(&bools) == 0) { if (av & ~avd.auditdeny) { RETURN(DONTAUDIT) } else { RETURN(TERULE) } } else { PyObject *outboollist; struct boolean_t *b = bools; int len=0; while (b->name) { len++; b++; } b = bools; outboollist = PyList_New(len); len=0; while(b->name) { PyObject *bool_ = Py_BuildValue("(si)", b->name, b->active); PyList_SetItem(outboollist, len++, bool_); b++; } free(bools); /* 'N' steals the reference to outboollist */ return Py_BuildValue("iN", BOOLEAN, outboollist); } } if (reason & SEPOL_COMPUTEAV_CONS) { if (reason_buf) { PyObject *result = NULL; result = Py_BuildValue("is", CONSTRAINT, reason_buf); free(reason_buf); return result; } RETURN(CONSTRAINT) } if (reason & SEPOL_COMPUTEAV_RBAC) RETURN(RBAC) RETURN(BADCOMPUTE) } static PyMethodDef audit2whyMethods[] = { {"init", init, METH_VARARGS, "Initialize policy database."}, {"analyze", analyze, METH_VARARGS, "Analyze AVC."}, {"finish", finish, METH_VARARGS, "Finish using policy, free memory."}, {NULL, NULL, 0, NULL} /* Sentinel */ }; 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libselinux-2.2.2/src/avc.c000066400000000000000000000651451226034601700154130ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Implementation of the userspace access vector cache (AVC). * * Author : Eamon Walsh * * Derived from the kernel AVC implementation by * Stephen Smalley and * James Morris . */ #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include "avc_sidtab.h" #include "avc_internal.h" #define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512 #define AVC_CACHE_MAXNODES 410 struct avc_entry { security_id_t ssid; security_id_t tsid; security_class_t tclass; struct av_decision avd; security_id_t create_sid; int used; /* used recently */ }; struct avc_node { struct avc_entry ae; struct avc_node *next; }; struct avc_cache { struct avc_node *slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; uint32_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */ uint32_t active_nodes; uint32_t latest_notif; /* latest revocation notification */ }; struct avc_callback_node { int (*callback) (uint32_t event, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, access_vector_t * out_retained); uint32_t events; security_id_t ssid; security_id_t tsid; security_class_t tclass; access_vector_t perms; struct avc_callback_node *next; }; static void *avc_netlink_thread = NULL; static void *avc_lock = NULL; static void *avc_log_lock = NULL; static struct avc_node *avc_node_freelist = NULL; static struct avc_cache avc_cache; static char *avc_audit_buf = NULL; static struct avc_cache_stats cache_stats; static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks = NULL; static struct sidtab avc_sidtab; static inline int avc_hash(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass) { return ((uintptr_t) ssid ^ ((uintptr_t) tsid << 2) ^ tclass) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1); } int avc_context_to_sid_raw(const security_context_t ctx, security_id_t * sid) { int rc; /* avc_init needs to be called before this function */ assert(avc_running); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&avc_sidtab, ctx, sid); avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } int avc_context_to_sid(const security_context_t ctx, security_id_t * sid) { int ret; security_context_t rctx; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(ctx, &rctx)) return -1; ret = avc_context_to_sid_raw(rctx, sid); freecon(rctx); return ret; } int avc_sid_to_context_raw(security_id_t sid, security_context_t * ctx) { int rc; *ctx = NULL; avc_get_lock(avc_lock); *ctx = strdup(sid->ctx); /* caller must free via freecon */ rc = *ctx ? 0 : -1; avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } int avc_sid_to_context(security_id_t sid, security_context_t * ctx) { int ret; security_context_t rctx; ret = avc_sid_to_context_raw(sid, &rctx); if (ret == 0) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rctx, ctx); freecon(rctx); } return ret; } int sidget(security_id_t sid __attribute__((unused))) { return 1; } int sidput(security_id_t sid __attribute__((unused))) { return 1; } int avc_get_initial_sid(const char * name, security_id_t * sid) { int rc; security_context_t con; rc = security_get_initial_context_raw(name, &con); if (rc < 0) return rc; rc = avc_context_to_sid_raw(con, sid); freecon(con); return rc; } int avc_open(struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { avc_setenforce = 0; while (nopts--) switch(opts[nopts].type) { case AVC_OPT_SETENFORCE: avc_setenforce = 1; avc_enforcing = !!opts[nopts].value; break; } return avc_init("avc", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } int avc_init(const char *prefix, const struct avc_memory_callback *mem_cb, const struct avc_log_callback *log_cb, const struct avc_thread_callback *thread_cb, const struct avc_lock_callback *lock_cb) { struct avc_node *new; int i, rc = 0; if (avc_running) return 0; if (prefix) strncpy(avc_prefix, prefix, AVC_PREFIX_SIZE - 1); set_callbacks(mem_cb, log_cb, thread_cb, lock_cb); avc_lock = avc_alloc_lock(); avc_log_lock = avc_alloc_lock(); memset(&cache_stats, 0, sizeof(cache_stats)); for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) avc_cache.slots[i] = 0; avc_cache.lru_hint = 0; avc_cache.active_nodes = 0; avc_cache.latest_notif = 0; rc = sidtab_init(&avc_sidtab); if (rc) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: unable to initialize SID table\n", avc_prefix); goto out; } avc_audit_buf = (char *)avc_malloc(AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE); if (!avc_audit_buf) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: unable to allocate audit buffer\n", avc_prefix); rc = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_MAXNODES; i++) { new = avc_malloc(sizeof(*new)); if (!new) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: only got %d av entries\n", avc_prefix, i); break; } memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new)); new->next = avc_node_freelist; avc_node_freelist = new; } if (!avc_setenforce) { rc = security_getenforce(); if (rc < 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: could not determine enforcing mode: %s\n", avc_prefix, strerror(errno)); goto out; } avc_enforcing = rc; } rc = avc_netlink_open(0); if (rc < 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: can't open netlink socket: %d (%s)\n", avc_prefix, errno, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (avc_using_threads) { avc_netlink_thread = avc_create_thread(&avc_netlink_loop); avc_netlink_trouble = 0; } avc_running = 1; out: return rc; } void avc_cache_stats(struct avc_cache_stats *p) { memcpy(p, &cache_stats, sizeof(cache_stats)); } void avc_sid_stats(void) { /* avc_init needs to be called before this function */ assert(avc_running); avc_get_lock(avc_log_lock); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); sidtab_sid_stats(&avc_sidtab, avc_audit_buf, AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE); avc_release_lock(avc_lock); avc_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%s", avc_audit_buf); avc_release_lock(avc_log_lock); } void avc_av_stats(void) { int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used; struct avc_node *node; avc_get_lock(avc_lock); slots_used = 0; max_chain_len = 0; for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { node = avc_cache.slots[i]; if (node) { slots_used++; chain_len = 0; while (node) { chain_len++; node = node->next; } if (chain_len > max_chain_len) max_chain_len = chain_len; } } avc_release_lock(avc_lock); avc_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%s: %d AV entries and %d/%d buckets used, " "longest chain length %d\n", avc_prefix, avc_cache.active_nodes, slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len); } hidden_def(avc_av_stats) static inline struct avc_node *avc_reclaim_node(void) { struct avc_node *prev, *cur; int try; uint32_t hvalue; hvalue = avc_cache.lru_hint; for (try = 0; try < 2; try++) { do { prev = NULL; cur = avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; while (cur) { if (!cur->ae.used) goto found; cur->ae.used = 0; prev = cur; cur = cur->next; } hvalue = (hvalue + 1) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1); } while (hvalue != avc_cache.lru_hint); } errno = ENOMEM; /* this was a panic in the kernel... */ return NULL; found: avc_cache.lru_hint = hvalue; if (prev == NULL) avc_cache.slots[hvalue] = cur->next; else prev->next = cur->next; return cur; } static inline void avc_clear_avc_entry(struct avc_entry *ae) { memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae)); } static inline struct avc_node *avc_claim_node(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass) { struct avc_node *new; int hvalue; if (!avc_node_freelist) avc_cleanup(); if (avc_node_freelist) { new = avc_node_freelist; avc_node_freelist = avc_node_freelist->next; avc_cache.active_nodes++; } else { new = avc_reclaim_node(); if (!new) goto out; } hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); avc_clear_avc_entry(&new->ae); new->ae.used = 1; new->ae.ssid = ssid; new->ae.tsid = tsid; new->ae.tclass = tclass; new->next = avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; avc_cache.slots[hvalue] = new; out: return new; } static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, int *probes) { struct avc_node *cur; int hvalue; int tprobes = 1; hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); cur = avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; while (cur != NULL && (ssid != cur->ae.ssid || tclass != cur->ae.tclass || tsid != cur->ae.tsid)) { tprobes++; cur = cur->next; } if (cur == NULL) { /* cache miss */ goto out; } /* cache hit */ if (probes) *probes = tprobes; cur->ae.used = 1; out: return cur; } /** * avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass * @aeref: AVC entry reference * * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the * @requested permissions between the SID pair * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions * based on @tclass. If a valid AVC entry exists, * then this function updates @aeref to refer to the * entry and returns %0. Otherwise, -1 is returned. */ static int avc_lookup(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref) { struct avc_node *node; int probes, rc = 0; avc_cache_stats_incr(cav_lookups); node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass, &probes); if (node && ((node->ae.avd.decided & requested) == requested)) { avc_cache_stats_incr(cav_hits); avc_cache_stats_add(cav_probes, probes); aeref->ae = &node->ae; goto out; } avc_cache_stats_incr(cav_misses); rc = -1; out: return rc; } /** * avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @ae: AVC entry * @aeref: AVC entry reference * * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass. * The access vectors and the sequence number are * normally provided by the security server in * response to a security_compute_av() call. If the * sequence number @ae->avd.seqno is not less than the latest * revocation notification, then the function copies * the access vectors into a cache entry, updates * @aeref to refer to the entry, and returns %0. * Otherwise, this function returns -%1 with @errno set to %EAGAIN. */ static int avc_insert(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, struct avc_entry *ae, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref) { struct avc_node *node; int rc = 0; if (ae->avd.seqno < avc_cache.latest_notif) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n", avc_prefix, ae->avd.seqno, avc_cache.latest_notif); errno = EAGAIN; rc = -1; goto out; } node = avc_claim_node(ssid, tsid, tclass); if (!node) { rc = -1; goto out; } memcpy(&node->ae.avd, &ae->avd, sizeof(ae->avd)); aeref->ae = &node->ae; out: return rc; } void avc_cleanup(void) { } hidden_def(avc_cleanup) int avc_reset(void) { struct avc_callback_node *c; int i, ret, rc = 0, errsave = 0; struct avc_node *node, *tmp; errno = 0; if (!avc_running) return 0; avc_get_lock(avc_lock); for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { node = avc_cache.slots[i]; while (node) { tmp = node; node = node->next; avc_clear_avc_entry(&tmp->ae); tmp->next = avc_node_freelist; avc_node_freelist = tmp; avc_cache.active_nodes--; } avc_cache.slots[i] = 0; } avc_cache.lru_hint = 0; avc_release_lock(avc_lock); memset(&cache_stats, 0, sizeof(cache_stats)); for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) { if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { ret = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); if (ret && !rc) { rc = ret; errsave = errno; } } } errno = errsave; return rc; } hidden_def(avc_reset) void avc_destroy(void) { struct avc_callback_node *c; struct avc_node *node, *tmp; int i; /* avc_init needs to be called before this function */ assert(avc_running); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); if (avc_using_threads) avc_stop_thread(avc_netlink_thread); avc_netlink_close(); for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { node = avc_cache.slots[i]; while (node) { tmp = node; node = node->next; avc_free(tmp); } } while (avc_node_freelist) { tmp = avc_node_freelist; avc_node_freelist = tmp->next; avc_free(tmp); } avc_release_lock(avc_lock); while (avc_callbacks) { c = avc_callbacks; avc_callbacks = c->next; avc_free(c); } sidtab_destroy(&avc_sidtab); avc_free_lock(avc_lock); avc_free_lock(avc_log_lock); avc_free(avc_audit_buf); avc_running = 0; } /* ratelimit stuff put aside for now --EFW */ #if 0 /* * Copied from net/core/utils.c:net_ratelimit and modified for * use by the AVC audit facility. */ #define AVC_MSG_COST 5*HZ #define AVC_MSG_BURST 10*5*HZ /* * This enforces a rate limit: not more than one kernel message * every 5secs to make a denial-of-service attack impossible. */ static int avc_ratelimit(void) { static unsigned long toks = 10 * 5 * HZ; static unsigned long last_msg; static int missed, rc = 0; unsigned long now = jiffies; void *ratelimit_lock = avc_alloc_lock(); avc_get_lock(ratelimit_lock); toks += now - last_msg; last_msg = now; if (toks > AVC_MSG_BURST) toks = AVC_MSG_BURST; if (toks >= AVC_MSG_COST) { int lost = missed; missed = 0; toks -= AVC_MSG_COST; avc_release_lock(ratelimit_lock); if (lost) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: %d messages suppressed.\n", avc_prefix, lost); } rc = 1; goto out; } missed++; avc_release_lock(ratelimit_lock); out: avc_free_lock(ratelimit_lock); return rc; } static inline int check_avc_ratelimit(void) { if (avc_enforcing) return avc_ratelimit(); else { /* If permissive, then never suppress messages. */ return 1; } } #endif /* ratelimit stuff */ /** * avc_dump_av - Display an access vector in human-readable form. * @tclass: target security class * @av: access vector */ static void avc_dump_av(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av) { const char *permstr; access_vector_t bit = 1; if (av == 0) { log_append(avc_audit_buf, " null"); return; } log_append(avc_audit_buf, " {"); while (av) { if (av & bit) { permstr = security_av_perm_to_string(tclass, bit); if (!permstr) break; log_append(avc_audit_buf, " %s", permstr); av &= ~bit; } bit <<= 1; } if (av) log_append(avc_audit_buf, " 0x%x", av); log_append(avc_audit_buf, " }"); } /** * avc_dump_query - Display a SID pair and a class in human-readable form. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class */ static void avc_dump_query(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass) { avc_get_lock(avc_lock); log_append(avc_audit_buf, "scontext=%s tcontext=%s", ssid->ctx, tsid->ctx); avc_release_lock(avc_lock); log_append(avc_audit_buf, " tclass=%s", security_class_to_string(tclass)); } void avc_audit(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd, int result, void *a) { access_vector_t denied, audited; denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; if (denied) audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; else if (!requested || result) audited = denied = requested; else audited = requested & avd->auditallow; if (!audited) return; #if 0 if (!check_avc_ratelimit()) return; #endif /* prevent overlapping buffer writes */ avc_get_lock(avc_log_lock); snprintf(avc_audit_buf, AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE, "%s: %s ", avc_prefix, (denied || !requested) ? "denied" : "granted"); avc_dump_av(tclass, audited); log_append(avc_audit_buf, " for "); /* get any extra information printed by the callback */ avc_suppl_audit(a, tclass, avc_audit_buf + strlen(avc_audit_buf), AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE - strlen(avc_audit_buf)); log_append(avc_audit_buf, " "); avc_dump_query(ssid, tsid, tclass); log_append(avc_audit_buf, "\n"); avc_log(SELINUX_AVC, "%s", avc_audit_buf); avc_release_lock(avc_log_lock); } hidden_def(avc_audit) static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd) { avd->allowed = 0; avd->auditallow = 0; avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; avd->seqno = avc_cache.latest_notif; avd->flags = 0; } int avc_has_perm_noaudit(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref, struct av_decision *avd) { struct avc_entry *ae; int rc = 0; struct avc_entry entry; access_vector_t denied; struct avc_entry_ref ref; if (avd) avd_init(avd); if (!avc_using_threads && !avc_app_main_loop) { (void)avc_netlink_check_nb(); } if (!aeref) { avc_entry_ref_init(&ref); aeref = &ref; } avc_get_lock(avc_lock); avc_cache_stats_incr(entry_lookups); ae = aeref->ae; if (ae) { if (ae->ssid == ssid && ae->tsid == tsid && ae->tclass == tclass && ((ae->avd.decided & requested) == requested)) { avc_cache_stats_incr(entry_hits); ae->used = 1; } else { avc_cache_stats_incr(entry_discards); ae = 0; } } if (!ae) { avc_cache_stats_incr(entry_misses); rc = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, aeref); if (rc) { rc = security_compute_av_flags_raw(ssid->ctx, tsid->ctx, tclass, requested, &entry.avd); if (rc && errno == EINVAL && !avc_enforcing) { rc = errno = 0; goto out; } if (rc) goto out; rc = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, &entry, aeref); if (rc) goto out; } ae = aeref->ae; } if (avd) memcpy(avd, &ae->avd, sizeof(*avd)); denied = requested & ~(ae->avd.allowed); if (!requested || denied) { if (!avc_enforcing || (ae->avd.flags & SELINUX_AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) ae->avd.allowed |= requested; else { errno = EACCES; rc = -1; } } out: avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } hidden_def(avc_has_perm_noaudit) int avc_has_perm(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref, void *auditdata) { struct av_decision avd; int errsave, rc; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, aeref, &avd); errsave = errno; avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata); errno = errsave; return rc; } int avc_compute_create(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, security_id_t *newsid) { int rc; struct avc_entry_ref aeref; struct avc_entry entry; security_context_t ctx; *newsid = NULL; avc_entry_ref_init(&aeref); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); /* check for a cached entry */ rc = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, 0, &aeref); if (rc) { /* need to make a cache entry for this tuple */ rc = security_compute_av_flags_raw(ssid->ctx, tsid->ctx, tclass, 0, &entry.avd); if (rc) goto out; rc = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, &entry, &aeref); if (rc) goto out; } /* check for a saved compute_create value */ if (!aeref.ae->create_sid) { /* need to query the kernel policy */ rc = security_compute_create_raw(ssid->ctx, tsid->ctx, tclass, &ctx); if (rc) goto out; rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&avc_sidtab, ctx, newsid); freecon(ctx); if (rc) goto out; aeref.ae->create_sid = *newsid; } else { /* found saved value */ *newsid = aeref.ae->create_sid; } rc = 0; out: avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } int avc_compute_member(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, security_id_t *newsid) { int rc; security_context_t ctx = NULL; *newsid = NULL; /* avc_init needs to be called before this function */ assert(avc_running); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); rc = security_compute_member_raw(ssid->ctx, tsid->ctx, tclass, &ctx); if (rc) goto out; rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&avc_sidtab, ctx, newsid); freecon(ctx); out: avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } int avc_add_callback(int (*callback) (uint32_t event, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, access_vector_t * out_retained), uint32_t events, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms) { struct avc_callback_node *c; int rc = 0; c = avc_malloc(sizeof(*c)); if (!c) { rc = -1; goto out; } c->callback = callback; c->events = events; c->ssid = ssid; c->tsid = tsid; c->tclass = tclass; c->perms = perms; c->next = avc_callbacks; avc_callbacks = c; out: return rc; } static inline int avc_sidcmp(security_id_t x, security_id_t y) { return (x == y || x == SECSID_WILD || y == SECSID_WILD); } static inline void avc_update_node(uint32_t event, struct avc_node *node, access_vector_t perms) { switch (event) { case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT: node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms; break; case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE: case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE: node->ae.avd.allowed &= ~perms; break; case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE: node->ae.avd.auditallow |= perms; break; case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE: node->ae.avd.auditallow &= ~perms; break; case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE: node->ae.avd.auditdeny |= perms; break; case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE: node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms; break; } } static int avc_update_cache(uint32_t event, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms) { struct avc_node *node; int i; avc_get_lock(avc_lock); if (ssid == SECSID_WILD || tsid == SECSID_WILD) { /* apply to all matching nodes */ for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { for (node = avc_cache.slots[i]; node; node = node->next) { if (avc_sidcmp(ssid, node->ae.ssid) && avc_sidcmp(tsid, node->ae.tsid) && tclass == node->ae.tclass) { avc_update_node(event, node, perms); } } } } else { /* apply to one node */ node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass, 0); if (node) { avc_update_node(event, node, perms); } } avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return 0; } /* avc_control - update cache and call callbacks * * This should not be called directly; use the individual event * functions instead. */ static int avc_control(uint32_t event, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, access_vector_t * out_retained) { struct avc_callback_node *c; access_vector_t tretained = 0, cretained = 0; int ret, rc = 0, errsave = 0; errno = 0; /* * try_revoke only removes permissions from the cache * state if they are not retained by the object manager. * Hence, try_revoke must wait until after the callbacks have * been invoked to update the cache state. */ if (event != AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE) avc_update_cache(event, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms); for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) { if ((c->events & event) && avc_sidcmp(c->ssid, ssid) && avc_sidcmp(c->tsid, tsid) && c->tclass == tclass && (c->perms & perms)) { cretained = 0; ret = c->callback(event, ssid, tsid, tclass, (c->perms & perms), &cretained); if (ret && !rc) { rc = ret; errsave = errno; } if (!ret) tretained |= cretained; } } if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE) { /* revoke any unretained permissions */ perms &= ~tretained; avc_update_cache(event, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms); *out_retained = tretained; } avc_get_lock(avc_lock); if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif) avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno; avc_release_lock(avc_lock); errno = errsave; return rc; } /** * avc_ss_grant - Grant previously denied permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions to grant * @seqno: policy sequence number */ int avc_ss_grant(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno) { return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); } /** * avc_ss_try_revoke - Try to revoke previously granted permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions to grant * @seqno: policy sequence number * @out_retained: subset of @perms that are retained * * Try to revoke previously granted permissions, but * only if they are not retained as migrated permissions. * Return the subset of permissions that are retained via @out_retained. */ int avc_ss_try_revoke(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, access_vector_t * out_retained) { return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, out_retained); } /** * avc_ss_revoke - Revoke previously granted permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions to grant * @seqno: policy sequence number * * Revoke previously granted permissions, even if * they are retained as migrated permissions. */ int avc_ss_revoke(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno) { return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); } /** * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions. * @seqno: policy sequence number */ int avc_ss_reset(uint32_t seqno) { int rc; rc = avc_reset(); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif) avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno; avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } /** * avc_ss_set_auditallow - Enable or disable auditing of granted permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions to grant * @seqno: policy sequence number * @enable: enable flag. */ int avc_ss_set_auditallow(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, uint32_t enable) { if (enable) return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); else return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); } /** * avc_ss_set_auditdeny - Enable or disable auditing of denied permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions to grant * @seqno: policy sequence number * @enable: enable flag. */ int avc_ss_set_auditdeny(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, uint32_t enable) { if (enable) return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); else return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); } libselinux-2.2.2/src/avc_internal.c000066400000000000000000000135701226034601700173020ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Callbacks for user-supplied memory allocation, supplemental * auditing, and locking routines. * * Author : Eamon Walsh * * Netlink code derived in part from sample code by * James Morris . */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "selinux_netlink.h" #include "avc_internal.h" #ifndef NETLINK_SELINUX #define NETLINK_SELINUX 7 #endif /* callback pointers */ void *(*avc_func_malloc) (size_t) = NULL; void (*avc_func_free) (void *) = NULL; void (*avc_func_log) (const char *, ...) = NULL; void (*avc_func_audit) (void *, security_class_t, char *, size_t) = NULL; int avc_using_threads = 0; int avc_app_main_loop = 0; void *(*avc_func_create_thread) (void (*)(void)) = NULL; void (*avc_func_stop_thread) (void *) = NULL; void *(*avc_func_alloc_lock) (void) = NULL; void (*avc_func_get_lock) (void *) = NULL; void (*avc_func_release_lock) (void *) = NULL; void (*avc_func_free_lock) (void *) = NULL; /* message prefix string and avc enforcing mode */ char avc_prefix[AVC_PREFIX_SIZE] = "uavc"; int avc_running = 0; int avc_enforcing = 1; int avc_setenforce = 0; int avc_netlink_trouble = 0; /* netlink socket code */ static int fd = -1; int avc_netlink_open(int blocking) { int len, rc = 0; struct sockaddr_nl addr; fd = socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW | SOCK_CLOEXEC, NETLINK_SELINUX); if (fd < 0) { rc = fd; goto out; } if (!blocking && fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK)) { close(fd); fd = -1; rc = -1; goto out; } len = sizeof(addr); memset(&addr, 0, len); addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK; addr.nl_groups = SELNL_GRP_AVC; if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len) < 0) { close(fd); fd = -1; rc = -1; goto out; } out: return rc; } void avc_netlink_close(void) { if (fd >= 0) close(fd); fd = -1; } static int avc_netlink_receive(char *buf, unsigned buflen, int blocking) { int rc; struct pollfd pfd = { fd, POLLIN | POLLPRI, 0 }; struct sockaddr_nl nladdr; socklen_t nladdrlen = sizeof nladdr; struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)buf; do { rc = poll(&pfd, 1, (blocking ? -1 : 0)); } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR); if (rc == 0 && !blocking) { errno = EWOULDBLOCK; return -1; } else if (rc < 1) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: netlink poll: error %d\n", avc_prefix, errno); return rc; } rc = recvfrom(fd, buf, buflen, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&nladdr, &nladdrlen); if (rc < 0) return rc; if (nladdrlen != sizeof nladdr) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: netlink address truncated, len %d?\n", avc_prefix, nladdrlen); return -1; } if (nladdr.nl_pid) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: received spoofed netlink packet from: %d\n", avc_prefix, nladdr.nl_pid); return -1; } if (rc == 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: received EOF on netlink socket\n", avc_prefix); errno = EBADFD; return -1; } if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & MSG_TRUNC || nlh->nlmsg_len > (unsigned)rc) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: incomplete netlink message\n", avc_prefix); return -1; } return 0; } static int avc_netlink_process(char *buf) { int rc; struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)buf; switch (nlh->nlmsg_type) { case NLMSG_ERROR:{ struct nlmsgerr *err = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); /* Netlink ack */ if (err->error == 0) break; errno = -err->error; avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: netlink error: %d\n", avc_prefix, errno); return -1; } case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE:{ struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); avc_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%s: received setenforce notice (enforcing=%d)\n", avc_prefix, msg->val); if (avc_setenforce) break; avc_enforcing = msg->val; if (avc_enforcing && (rc = avc_ss_reset(0)) < 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: cache reset returned %d (errno %d)\n", avc_prefix, rc, errno); return rc; } rc = selinux_netlink_setenforce(msg->val); if (rc < 0) return rc; break; } case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD:{ struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); avc_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%s: received policyload notice (seqno=%d)\n", avc_prefix, msg->seqno); rc = avc_ss_reset(msg->seqno); if (rc < 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: cache reset returned %d (errno %d)\n", avc_prefix, rc, errno); return rc; } rc = selinux_netlink_policyload(msg->seqno); if (rc < 0) return rc; break; } default: avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: unknown netlink message %d\n", avc_prefix, nlh->nlmsg_type); } return 0; } int avc_netlink_check_nb(void) { int rc; char buf[1024] __attribute__ ((aligned)); while (1) { errno = 0; rc = avc_netlink_receive(buf, sizeof(buf), 0); if (rc < 0) { if (errno == EWOULDBLOCK) return 0; if (errno == 0 || errno == EINTR) continue; else { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: netlink recvfrom: error %d\n", avc_prefix, errno); return rc; } } (void)avc_netlink_process(buf); } return 0; } /* run routine for the netlink listening thread */ void avc_netlink_loop(void) { int rc; char buf[1024] __attribute__ ((aligned)); while (1) { errno = 0; rc = avc_netlink_receive(buf, sizeof(buf), 1); if (rc < 0) { if (errno == 0 || errno == EINTR) continue; else { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: netlink recvfrom: error %d\n", avc_prefix, errno); break; } } rc = avc_netlink_process(buf); if (rc < 0) break; } close(fd); fd = -1; avc_netlink_trouble = 1; avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: netlink thread: errors encountered, terminating\n", avc_prefix); } int avc_netlink_acquire_fd(void) { avc_app_main_loop = 1; return fd; } void avc_netlink_release_fd(void) { avc_app_main_loop = 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/avc_internal.h000066400000000000000000000117531226034601700173100ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * This file describes the internal interface used by the AVC * for calling the user-supplied memory allocation, supplemental * auditing, and locking routine, as well as incrementing the * statistics fields. * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_INTERNAL_H_ #define _SELINUX_AVC_INTERNAL_H_ #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "dso.h" /* callback pointers */ extern void *(*avc_func_malloc) (size_t) hidden; extern void (*avc_func_free) (void *)hidden; extern void (*avc_func_log) (const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__(printf,1,2))) hidden; extern void (*avc_func_audit) (void *, security_class_t, char *, size_t)hidden; extern int avc_using_threads hidden; extern int avc_app_main_loop hidden; extern void *(*avc_func_create_thread) (void (*)(void))hidden; extern void (*avc_func_stop_thread) (void *)hidden; extern void *(*avc_func_alloc_lock) (void)hidden; extern void (*avc_func_get_lock) (void *)hidden; extern void (*avc_func_release_lock) (void *)hidden; extern void (*avc_func_free_lock) (void *)hidden; static inline void set_callbacks(const struct avc_memory_callback *mem_cb, const struct avc_log_callback *log_cb, const struct avc_thread_callback *thread_cb, const struct avc_lock_callback *lock_cb) { if (mem_cb) { avc_func_malloc = mem_cb->func_malloc; avc_func_free = mem_cb->func_free; } if (log_cb) { avc_func_log = log_cb->func_log; avc_func_audit = log_cb->func_audit; } if (thread_cb) { avc_using_threads = 1; avc_func_create_thread = thread_cb->func_create_thread; avc_func_stop_thread = thread_cb->func_stop_thread; } if (lock_cb) { avc_func_alloc_lock = lock_cb->func_alloc_lock; avc_func_get_lock = lock_cb->func_get_lock; avc_func_release_lock = lock_cb->func_release_lock; avc_func_free_lock = lock_cb->func_free_lock; } } /* message prefix and enforcing mode*/ #define AVC_PREFIX_SIZE 16 extern char avc_prefix[AVC_PREFIX_SIZE] hidden; extern int avc_running hidden; extern int avc_enforcing hidden; extern int avc_setenforce hidden; /* user-supplied callback interface for avc */ static inline void *avc_malloc(size_t size) { return avc_func_malloc ? avc_func_malloc(size) : malloc(size); } static inline void avc_free(void *ptr) { if (avc_func_free) avc_func_free(ptr); else free(ptr); } /* this is a macro in order to use the variadic capability. */ #define avc_log(type, format...) \ if (avc_func_log) \ avc_func_log(format); \ else \ selinux_log(type, format); static inline void avc_suppl_audit(void *ptr, security_class_t class, char *buf, size_t len) { if (avc_func_audit) avc_func_audit(ptr, class, buf, len); else selinux_audit(ptr, class, buf, len); } static inline void *avc_create_thread(void (*run) (void)) { return avc_func_create_thread ? avc_func_create_thread(run) : NULL; } static inline void avc_stop_thread(void *thread) { if (avc_func_stop_thread) avc_func_stop_thread(thread); } static inline void *avc_alloc_lock(void) { return avc_func_alloc_lock ? avc_func_alloc_lock() : NULL; } static inline void avc_get_lock(void *lock) { if (avc_func_get_lock) avc_func_get_lock(lock); } static inline void avc_release_lock(void *lock) { if (avc_func_release_lock) avc_func_release_lock(lock); } static inline void avc_free_lock(void *lock) { if (avc_func_free_lock) avc_func_free_lock(lock); } /* statistics helper routines */ #ifdef AVC_CACHE_STATS #define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) \ cache_stats.field ++; #define avc_cache_stats_add(field, num) \ cache_stats.field += num; #else #define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) #define avc_cache_stats_add(field, num) #endif /* logging helper routines */ #define AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE 1024 /* again, we need the variadic capability here */ #define log_append(buf,format...) \ snprintf(buf+strlen(buf), AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE-strlen(buf), format) /* internal callbacks */ int avc_ss_grant(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno) hidden; int avc_ss_try_revoke(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, access_vector_t * out_retained) hidden; int avc_ss_revoke(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno) hidden; int avc_ss_reset(uint32_t seqno) hidden; int avc_ss_set_auditallow(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, uint32_t enable) hidden; int avc_ss_set_auditdeny(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, uint32_t enable) hidden; /* netlink kernel message code */ extern int avc_netlink_trouble hidden; hidden_proto(avc_av_stats) hidden_proto(avc_cleanup) hidden_proto(avc_reset) hidden_proto(avc_audit) hidden_proto(avc_has_perm_noaudit) #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_INTERNAL_H_ */ libselinux-2.2.2/src/avc_sidtab.c000066400000000000000000000056041226034601700167330ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Implementation of the userspace SID hashtable. * * Author : Eamon Walsh, */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include "avc_sidtab.h" #include "avc_internal.h" static inline unsigned sidtab_hash(security_context_t key) { char *p, *keyp; unsigned int size; unsigned int val; val = 0; keyp = (char *)key; size = strlen(keyp); for (p = keyp; (unsigned int)(p - keyp) < size; p++) val = (val << 4 | (val >> (8 * sizeof(unsigned int) - 4))) ^ (*p); return val & (SIDTAB_SIZE - 1); } int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s) { int i, rc = 0; s->htable = (struct sidtab_node **)avc_malloc (sizeof(struct sidtab_node *) * SIDTAB_SIZE); if (!s->htable) { rc = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) s->htable[i] = NULL; s->nel = 0; out: return rc; } int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, const security_context_t ctx) { int hvalue, rc = 0; struct sidtab_node *newnode; security_context_t newctx; newnode = (struct sidtab_node *)avc_malloc(sizeof(*newnode)); if (!newnode) { rc = -1; goto out; } newctx = (security_context_t) strdup(ctx); if (!newctx) { rc = -1; avc_free(newnode); goto out; } hvalue = sidtab_hash(newctx); newnode->next = s->htable[hvalue]; newnode->sid_s.ctx = newctx; newnode->sid_s.refcnt = 1; /* unused */ s->htable[hvalue] = newnode; s->nel++; out: return rc; } int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, const security_context_t ctx, security_id_t * sid) { int hvalue, rc = 0; struct sidtab_node *cur; *sid = NULL; hvalue = sidtab_hash(ctx); loop: cur = s->htable[hvalue]; while (cur != NULL && strcmp(cur->sid_s.ctx, ctx)) cur = cur->next; if (cur == NULL) { /* need to make a new entry */ rc = sidtab_insert(s, ctx); if (rc) goto out; goto loop; /* find the newly inserted node */ } *sid = &cur->sid_s; out: return rc; } void sidtab_sid_stats(struct sidtab *h, char *buf, int buflen) { int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len; struct sidtab_node *cur; slots_used = 0; max_chain_len = 0; for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) { cur = h->htable[i]; if (cur) { slots_used++; chain_len = 0; while (cur) { chain_len++; cur = cur->next; } if (chain_len > max_chain_len) max_chain_len = chain_len; } } snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s: %d SID entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest " "chain length %d\n", avc_prefix, h->nel, slots_used, SIDTAB_SIZE, max_chain_len); } void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s) { int i; struct sidtab_node *cur, *temp; if (!s) return; for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) { cur = s->htable[i]; while (cur != NULL) { temp = cur; cur = cur->next; freecon(temp->sid_s.ctx); avc_free(temp); } s->htable[i] = NULL; } avc_free(s->htable); s->htable = NULL; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/avc_sidtab.h000066400000000000000000000016521226034601700167370ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table * of security context structures indexed by SID value. */ #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_SIDTAB_H_ #define _SELINUX_AVC_SIDTAB_H_ #include #include #include "dso.h" struct sidtab_node { struct security_id sid_s; struct sidtab_node *next; }; #define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS 7 #define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS) #define SIDTAB_HASH_MASK (SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1) #define SIDTAB_SIZE SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS struct sidtab { struct sidtab_node **htable; unsigned nel; }; int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s) hidden; int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, security_context_t ctx) hidden; int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, security_context_t ctx, security_id_t * sid) hidden; void sidtab_sid_stats(struct sidtab *s, char *buf, int buflen) hidden; void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s) hidden; #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SIDTAB_H_ */ libselinux-2.2.2/src/booleans.c000066400000000000000000000243431226034601700164370ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Author: Karl MacMillan * * Modified: * Dan Walsh - Added security_load_booleans(). */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #define SELINUX_BOOL_DIR "/booleans/" static int filename_select(const struct dirent *d) { if (d->d_name[0] == '.' && (d->d_name[1] == '\0' || (d->d_name[1] == '.' && d->d_name[2] == '\0'))) return 0; return 1; } int security_get_boolean_names(char ***names, int *len) { char path[PATH_MAX]; int i, rc; struct dirent **namelist; char **n; if (!len || names == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s%s", selinux_mnt, SELINUX_BOOL_DIR); *len = scandir(path, &namelist, &filename_select, alphasort); if (*len <= 0) { return -1; } n = (char **)malloc(sizeof(char *) * *len); if (!n) { rc = -1; goto bad; } for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) { n[i] = (char *)malloc(_D_ALLOC_NAMLEN(namelist[i])); if (!n[i]) { rc = -1; goto bad_freen; } strcpy(n[i], namelist[i]->d_name); } rc = 0; *names = n; out: for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) { free(namelist[i]); } free(namelist); return rc; bad_freen: for (--i; i >= 0; --i) free(n[i]); free(n); bad: goto out; } hidden_def(security_get_boolean_names) char *selinux_boolean_sub(const char *name) { char *sub = NULL; char *line_buf = NULL; size_t line_len; FILE *cfg; if (!name) return NULL; cfg = fopen(selinux_booleans_subs_path(), "r"); if (!cfg) goto out; while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, cfg) != -1) { char *ptr; char *src = line_buf; char *dst; while (*src && isspace(*src)) src++; if (!*src) continue; if (src[0] == '#') continue; ptr = src; while (*ptr && !isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; *ptr++ = '\0'; if (strcmp(src, name) != 0) continue; dst = ptr; while (*dst && isspace(*dst)) dst++; if (!*dst) continue; ptr=dst; while (*ptr && !isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; *ptr='\0'; sub = strdup(dst); break; } free(line_buf); fclose(cfg); out: if (!sub) sub = strdup(name); return sub; } hidden_def(selinux_boolean_sub) static int bool_open(const char *name, int flag) { char *fname = NULL; char *alt_name = NULL; int len; int fd = -1; int ret; char *ptr; if (!name) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } /* note the 'sizeof' gets us enough room for the '\0' */ len = strlen(name) + strlen(selinux_mnt) + sizeof(SELINUX_BOOL_DIR); fname = malloc(sizeof(char) * len); if (!fname) return -1; ret = snprintf(fname, len, "%s%s%s", selinux_mnt, SELINUX_BOOL_DIR, name); if (ret < 0) goto out; assert(ret < len); fd = open(fname, flag); if (fd >= 0 || errno != ENOENT) goto out; alt_name = selinux_boolean_sub(name); if (!alt_name) goto out; /* note the 'sizeof' gets us enough room for the '\0' */ len = strlen(alt_name) + strlen(selinux_mnt) + sizeof(SELINUX_BOOL_DIR); ptr = realloc(fname, len); if (!ptr) goto out; fname = ptr; ret = snprintf(fname, len, "%s%s%s", selinux_mnt, SELINUX_BOOL_DIR, alt_name); if (ret < 0) goto out; assert(ret < len); fd = open(fname, flag); out: free(fname); free(alt_name); return fd; } #define STRBUF_SIZE 3 static int get_bool_value(const char *name, char **buf) { int fd, len; int errno_tmp; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } *buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (STRBUF_SIZE + 1)); if (!*buf) return -1; (*buf)[STRBUF_SIZE] = 0; fd = bool_open(name, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) goto out_err; len = read(fd, *buf, STRBUF_SIZE); errno_tmp = errno; close(fd); errno = errno_tmp; if (len != STRBUF_SIZE) goto out_err; return 0; out_err: free(*buf); return -1; } int security_get_boolean_pending(const char *name) { char *buf; int val; if (get_bool_value(name, &buf)) return -1; if (atoi(&buf[1])) val = 1; else val = 0; free(buf); return val; } int security_get_boolean_active(const char *name) { char *buf; int val; if (get_bool_value(name, &buf)) return -1; buf[1] = '\0'; if (atoi(buf)) val = 1; else val = 0; free(buf); return val; } hidden_def(security_get_boolean_active) int security_set_boolean(const char *name, int value) { int fd, ret; char buf[2]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } if (value < 0 || value > 1) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } fd = bool_open(name, O_WRONLY); if (fd < 0) return -1; if (value) buf[0] = '1'; else buf[0] = '0'; buf[1] = '\0'; ret = write(fd, buf, 2); close(fd); if (ret > 0) return 0; else return -1; } hidden_def(security_set_boolean) int security_commit_booleans(void) { int fd, ret; char buf[2]; char path[PATH_MAX]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/commit_pending_bools", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); if (fd < 0) return -1; buf[0] = '1'; buf[1] = '\0'; ret = write(fd, buf, 2); close(fd); if (ret > 0) return 0; else return -1; } hidden_def(security_commit_booleans) static char *strtrim(char *dest, char *source, int size) { int i = 0; char *ptr = source; i = 0; while (isspace(*ptr) && i < size) { ptr++; i++; } strncpy(dest, ptr, size); for (i = strlen(dest) - 1; i > 0; i--) { if (!isspace(dest[i])) break; } dest[i + 1] = '\0'; return dest; } static int process_boolean(char *buffer, char *name, int namesize, int *val) { char name1[BUFSIZ]; char *ptr = NULL; char *tok = strtok_r(buffer, "=", &ptr); if (tok) { strncpy(name1, tok, BUFSIZ - 1); strtrim(name, name1, namesize - 1); if (name[0] == '#') return 0; tok = strtok_r(NULL, "\0", &ptr); if (tok) { while (isspace(*tok)) tok++; *val = -1; if (isdigit(tok[0])) *val = atoi(tok); else if (!strncasecmp(tok, "true", sizeof("true") - 1)) *val = 1; else if (!strncasecmp (tok, "false", sizeof("false") - 1)) *val = 0; if (*val != 0 && *val != 1) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } } } return 1; } static int save_booleans(size_t boolcnt, SELboolean * boollist) { ssize_t len; size_t i; char outbuf[BUFSIZ]; char *inbuf = NULL; /* Open file */ const char *bool_file = selinux_booleans_path(); char local_bool_file[PATH_MAX]; char tmp_bool_file[PATH_MAX]; FILE *boolf; int fd; int *used = (int *)malloc(sizeof(int) * boolcnt); if (!used) { return -1; } /* zero out used field */ for (i = 0; i < boolcnt; i++) used[i] = 0; snprintf(tmp_bool_file, sizeof(tmp_bool_file), "%s.XXXXXX", bool_file); fd = mkstemp(tmp_bool_file); if (fd < 0) { free(used); return -1; } snprintf(local_bool_file, sizeof(local_bool_file), "%s.local", bool_file); boolf = fopen(local_bool_file, "r"); if (boolf != NULL) { ssize_t ret; size_t size = 0; int val; char boolname[BUFSIZ]; char *buffer; inbuf = NULL; __fsetlocking(boolf, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while ((len = getline(&inbuf, &size, boolf)) > 0) { buffer = strdup(inbuf); if (!buffer) goto close_remove_fail; ret = process_boolean(inbuf, boolname, sizeof(boolname), &val); if (ret != 1) { ret = write(fd, buffer, len); free(buffer); if (ret != len) goto close_remove_fail; } else { free(buffer); for (i = 0; i < boolcnt; i++) { if (strcmp(boollist[i].name, boolname) == 0) { snprintf(outbuf, sizeof(outbuf), "%s=%d\n", boolname, boollist[i].value); len = strlen(outbuf); used[i] = 1; if (write(fd, outbuf, len) != len) goto close_remove_fail; else break; } } if (i == boolcnt) { snprintf(outbuf, sizeof(outbuf), "%s=%d\n", boolname, val); len = strlen(outbuf); if (write(fd, outbuf, len) != len) goto close_remove_fail; } } free(inbuf); inbuf = NULL; } fclose(boolf); } for (i = 0; i < boolcnt; i++) { if (used[i] == 0) { snprintf(outbuf, sizeof(outbuf), "%s=%d\n", boollist[i].name, boollist[i].value); len = strlen(outbuf); if (write(fd, outbuf, len) != len) { close_remove_fail: free(inbuf); close(fd); remove_fail: unlink(tmp_bool_file); free(used); return -1; } } } if (fchmod(fd, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) != 0) goto close_remove_fail; close(fd); if (rename(tmp_bool_file, local_bool_file) != 0) goto remove_fail; free(used); return 0; } static void rollback(SELboolean * boollist, int end) { int i; for (i = 0; i < end; i++) security_set_boolean(boollist[i].name, security_get_boolean_active(boollist[i]. name)); } int security_set_boolean_list(size_t boolcnt, SELboolean * boollist, int permanent) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < boolcnt; i++) { if (security_set_boolean(boollist[i].name, boollist[i].value)) { rollback(boollist, i); return -1; } } /* OK, let's do the commit */ if (security_commit_booleans()) { return -1; } if (permanent) return save_booleans(boolcnt, boollist); return 0; } int security_load_booleans(char *path) { FILE *boolf; char *inbuf; char localbools[BUFSIZ]; size_t len = 0, errors = 0; int val; char name[BUFSIZ]; boolf = fopen(path ? path : selinux_booleans_path(), "r"); if (boolf == NULL) goto localbool; __fsetlocking(boolf, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while (getline(&inbuf, &len, boolf) > 0) { int ret = process_boolean(inbuf, name, sizeof(name), &val); if (ret == -1) errors++; if (ret == 1) if (security_set_boolean(name, val) < 0) { errors++; } } fclose(boolf); localbool: snprintf(localbools, sizeof(localbools), "%s.local", (path ? path : selinux_booleans_path())); boolf = fopen(localbools, "r"); if (boolf != NULL) { int ret; __fsetlocking(boolf, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while (getline(&inbuf, &len, boolf) > 0) { ret = process_boolean(inbuf, name, sizeof(name), &val); if (ret == -1) errors++; if (ret == 1) if (security_set_boolean(name, val) < 0) { errors++; } } fclose(boolf); } if (security_commit_booleans() < 0) return -1; if (errors) errno = EINVAL; return errors ? -1 : 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/callbacks.c000066400000000000000000000050501226034601700165460ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * User-supplied callbacks and default implementations. * Class and permission mappings. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" /* default implementations */ static int __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))) default_selinux_log(int type __attribute__((unused)), const char *fmt, ...) { int rc; va_list ap; if (is_selinux_enabled() == 0) return 0; va_start(ap, fmt); rc = vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return rc; } static int default_selinux_audit(void *ptr __attribute__((unused)), security_class_t cls __attribute__((unused)), char *buf __attribute__((unused)), size_t len __attribute__((unused))) { return 0; } static int default_selinux_validate(security_context_t *ctx) { return security_check_context(*ctx); } static int default_selinux_setenforce(int enforcing __attribute__((unused))) { return 0; } static int default_selinux_policyload(int seqno __attribute__((unused))) { return 0; } /* callback pointers */ int __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))) (*selinux_log)(int, const char *, ...) = default_selinux_log; int (*selinux_audit) (void *, security_class_t, char *, size_t) = default_selinux_audit; int (*selinux_validate)(security_context_t *ctx) = default_selinux_validate; int (*selinux_netlink_setenforce) (int enforcing) = default_selinux_setenforce; int (*selinux_netlink_policyload) (int seqno) = default_selinux_policyload; /* callback setting function */ void selinux_set_callback(int type, union selinux_callback cb) { switch (type) { case SELINUX_CB_LOG: selinux_log = cb.func_log; break; case SELINUX_CB_AUDIT: selinux_audit = cb.func_audit; break; case SELINUX_CB_VALIDATE: selinux_validate = cb.func_validate; break; case SELINUX_CB_SETENFORCE: selinux_netlink_setenforce = cb.func_setenforce; break; case SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD: selinux_netlink_policyload = cb.func_policyload; break; } } /* callback getting function */ union selinux_callback selinux_get_callback(int type) { union selinux_callback cb; switch (type) { case SELINUX_CB_LOG: cb.func_log = selinux_log; break; case SELINUX_CB_AUDIT: cb.func_audit = selinux_audit; break; case SELINUX_CB_VALIDATE: cb.func_validate = selinux_validate; break; case SELINUX_CB_SETENFORCE: cb.func_setenforce = selinux_netlink_setenforce; break; case SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD: cb.func_policyload = selinux_netlink_policyload; break; default: memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb)); errno = EINVAL; break; } return cb; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/callbacks.h000066400000000000000000000013731226034601700165570ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * This file describes the callbacks passed to selinux_init() and available * for use from the library code. They all have default implementations. */ #ifndef _SELINUX_CALLBACKS_H_ #define _SELINUX_CALLBACKS_H_ #include #include #include #include #include "dso.h" /* callback pointers */ extern int __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))) (*selinux_log) (int type, const char *, ...) hidden; extern int (*selinux_audit) (void *, security_class_t, char *, size_t) hidden; extern int (*selinux_validate)(security_context_t *ctx) hidden; extern int (*selinux_netlink_setenforce) (int enforcing) hidden; extern int (*selinux_netlink_policyload) (int seqno) hidden; #endif /* _SELINUX_CALLBACKS_H_ */ libselinux-2.2.2/src/canonicalize_context.c000066400000000000000000000031221226034601700210300ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include int security_canonicalize_context_raw(const security_context_t con, security_context_t * canoncon) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t size; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/context", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } strncpy(buf, con, size); ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf) + 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0 && errno == EINVAL) { /* Fall back to the original context for kernels that do not support the extended interface. */ strncpy(buf, con, size); } *canoncon = strdup(buf); if (!(*canoncon)) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } hidden_def(security_canonicalize_context_raw) int security_canonicalize_context(const security_context_t con, security_context_t * canoncon) { int ret; security_context_t rcon; security_context_t rcanoncon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(con, &rcon)) return -1; ret = security_canonicalize_context_raw(rcon, &rcanoncon); freecon(rcon); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcanoncon, canoncon); freecon(rcanoncon); } return ret; } hidden_def(security_canonicalize_context) libselinux-2.2.2/src/checkAccess.c000066400000000000000000000041731226034601700170330ustar00rootroot00000000000000/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include #include static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static void avc_init_once(void) { avc_open(NULL, 0); } int selinux_check_access(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, const char *class, const char *perm, void *aux) { int rc; security_id_t scon_id; security_id_t tcon_id; security_class_t sclass; access_vector_t av; if (is_selinux_enabled() == 0) return 0; __selinux_once(once, avc_init_once); rc = avc_context_to_sid(scon, &scon_id); if (rc < 0) return rc; rc = avc_context_to_sid(tcon, &tcon_id); if (rc < 0) return rc; sclass = string_to_security_class(class); if (sclass == 0) { rc = errno; if (security_deny_unknown() == 0) return 0; errno = rc; return -1; } av = string_to_av_perm(sclass, perm); if (av == 0) { rc = errno; if (security_deny_unknown() == 0) return 0; errno = rc; return -1; } return avc_has_perm (scon_id, tcon_id, sclass, av, NULL, aux); } int selinux_check_passwd_access(access_vector_t requested) { int status = -1; security_context_t user_context; if (is_selinux_enabled() == 0) return 0; if (getprevcon_raw(&user_context) == 0) { security_class_t passwd_class; struct av_decision avd; int retval; passwd_class = string_to_security_class("passwd"); if (passwd_class == 0) return 0; retval = security_compute_av_raw(user_context, user_context, passwd_class, requested, &avd); if ((retval == 0) && ((requested & avd.allowed) == requested)) { status = 0; } freecon(user_context); } if (status != 0 && security_getenforce() == 0) status = 0; return status; } hidden_def(selinux_check_passwd_access) int checkPasswdAccess(access_vector_t requested) { return selinux_check_passwd_access(requested); } libselinux-2.2.2/src/check_context.c000066400000000000000000000015551226034601700174560ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include int security_check_context_raw(const security_context_t con) { char path[PATH_MAX]; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/context", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) return -1; ret = write(fd, con, strlen(con) + 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; return 0; } hidden_def(security_check_context_raw) int security_check_context(const security_context_t con) { int ret; security_context_t rcon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(con, &rcon)) return -1; ret = security_check_context_raw(rcon); freecon(rcon); return ret; } hidden_def(security_check_context) libselinux-2.2.2/src/class_to_string.h000066400000000000000000000031771226034601700200410ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ /* * Security object class definitions */ S_("null") S_("security") S_("process") S_("system") S_("capability") S_("filesystem") S_("file") S_("dir") S_("fd") S_("lnk_file") S_("chr_file") S_("blk_file") S_("sock_file") S_("fifo_file") S_("socket") S_("tcp_socket") S_("udp_socket") S_("rawip_socket") S_("node") S_("netif") S_("netlink_socket") S_("packet_socket") S_("key_socket") S_("unix_stream_socket") S_("unix_dgram_socket") S_("sem") S_("msg") S_("msgq") S_("shm") S_("ipc") S_("passwd") S_("x_drawable") S_("x_screen") S_("x_gc") S_("x_font") S_("x_colormap") S_("x_property") S_("x_selection") S_("x_cursor") S_("x_client") S_("x_device") S_("x_server") S_("x_extension") S_("netlink_route_socket") S_("netlink_firewall_socket") S_("netlink_tcpdiag_socket") S_("netlink_nflog_socket") S_("netlink_xfrm_socket") S_("netlink_selinux_socket") S_("netlink_audit_socket") S_("netlink_ip6fw_socket") S_("netlink_dnrt_socket") S_("dbus") S_("nscd") S_("association") S_("netlink_kobject_uevent_socket") S_("appletalk_socket") S_("packet") S_("key") S_("context") S_("dccp_socket") S_("memprotect") S_("db_database") S_("db_table") S_("db_procedure") S_("db_column") S_("db_tuple") S_("db_blob") S_("peer") S_("capability2") S_("x_resource") S_("x_event") S_("x_synthetic_event") S_("x_application_data") libselinux-2.2.2/src/common_perm_to_string.h000066400000000000000000000024031226034601700212360ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ TB_(common_file_perm_to_string) S_("ioctl") S_("read") S_("write") S_("create") S_("getattr") S_("setattr") S_("lock") S_("relabelfrom") S_("relabelto") S_("append") S_("unlink") S_("link") S_("rename") S_("execute") S_("swapon") S_("quotaon") S_("mounton") TE_(common_file_perm_to_string) TB_(common_socket_perm_to_string) S_("ioctl") S_("read") S_("write") S_("create") S_("getattr") S_("setattr") S_("lock") S_("relabelfrom") S_("relabelto") S_("append") S_("bind") S_("connect") S_("listen") S_("accept") S_("getopt") S_("setopt") S_("shutdown") S_("recvfrom") S_("sendto") S_("recv_msg") S_("send_msg") S_("name_bind") TE_(common_socket_perm_to_string) TB_(common_ipc_perm_to_string) S_("create") S_("destroy") S_("getattr") S_("setattr") S_("read") S_("write") S_("associate") S_("unix_read") S_("unix_write") TE_(common_ipc_perm_to_string) TB_(common_database_perm_to_string) S_("create") S_("drop") S_("getattr") S_("setattr") S_("relabelfrom") S_("relabelto") TE_(common_database_perm_to_string) libselinux-2.2.2/src/compute_av.c000066400000000000000000000064311226034601700167750ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" int security_compute_av_flags_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t len; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/access", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) return -1; len = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(len); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } snprintf(buf, len, "%s %s %hu %x", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass), unmap_perm(tclass, requested)); ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, len); ret = read(fd, buf, len - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; ret = sscanf(buf, "%x %x %x %x %u %x", &avd->allowed, &avd->decided, &avd->auditallow, &avd->auditdeny, &avd->seqno, &avd->flags); if (ret < 5) { ret = -1; goto out2; } else if (ret < 6) avd->flags = 0; /* If tclass invalid, kernel sets avd according to deny_unknown flag */ if (tclass != 0) map_decision(tclass, avd); ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } hidden_def(security_compute_av_flags_raw) int security_compute_av_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd) { struct av_decision lavd; int ret; ret = security_compute_av_flags_raw(scon, tcon, tclass, requested, &lavd); if (ret == 0) { avd->allowed = lavd.allowed; avd->decided = lavd.decided; avd->auditallow = lavd.auditallow; avd->auditdeny = lavd.auditdeny; avd->seqno = lavd.seqno; /* NOTE: * We should not return avd->flags via the interface * due to the binary compatibility. */ } return ret; } hidden_def(security_compute_av_raw) int security_compute_av_flags(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd) { security_context_t rscon; security_context_t rtcon; int ret; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) return -1; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(tcon, &rtcon)) { freecon(rscon); return -1; } ret = security_compute_av_flags_raw(rscon, rtcon, tclass, requested, avd); freecon(rscon); freecon(rtcon); return ret; } hidden_def(security_compute_av_flags) int security_compute_av(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd) { struct av_decision lavd; int ret; ret = security_compute_av_flags(scon, tcon, tclass, requested, &lavd); if (ret == 0) { avd->allowed = lavd.allowed; avd->decided = lavd.decided; avd->auditallow = lavd.auditallow; avd->auditdeny = lavd.auditdeny; avd->seqno = lavd.seqno; /* NOTE: * We should not return avd->flags via the interface * due to the binary compatibility. */ } return ret; } hidden_def(security_compute_av) libselinux-2.2.2/src/compute_create.c000066400000000000000000000064741226034601700176410ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" static int object_name_encode(const char *objname, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { int code; size_t offset = 0; if (buflen - offset < 1) return -1; buffer[offset++] = ' '; do { code = *objname++; if (isalnum(code) || code == '\0' || code == '-' || code == '.' || code == '_' || code == '~') { if (buflen - offset < 1) return -1; buffer[offset++] = code; } else if (code == ' ') { if (buflen - offset < 1) return -1; buffer[offset++] = '+'; } else { static const char *table = "0123456789ABCDEF"; int l = (code & 0x0f); int h = (code & 0xf0) >> 4; if (buflen - offset < 3) return -1; buffer[offset++] = '%'; buffer[offset++] = table[h]; buffer[offset++] = table[l]; } } while (code != '\0'); return 0; } int security_compute_create_name_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *objname, security_context_t * newcon) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t size; int fd, ret, len; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/create", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } len = snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass)); if (objname && object_name_encode(objname, buf + len, size - len) < 0) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; *newcon = strdup(buf); if (!(*newcon)) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } hidden_def(security_compute_create_name_raw) int security_compute_create_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon) { return security_compute_create_name_raw(scon, tcon, tclass, NULL, newcon); } hidden_def(security_compute_create_raw) int security_compute_create_name(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *objname, security_context_t * newcon) { int ret; security_context_t rscon; security_context_t rtcon; security_context_t rnewcon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) return -1; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(tcon, &rtcon)) { freecon(rscon); return -1; } ret = security_compute_create_name_raw(rscon, rtcon, tclass, objname, &rnewcon); freecon(rscon); freecon(rtcon); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rnewcon, newcon); freecon(rnewcon); } return ret; } hidden_def(security_compute_create_name) int security_compute_create(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon) { return security_compute_create_name(scon, tcon, tclass, NULL, newcon); } hidden_def(security_compute_create) libselinux-2.2.2/src/compute_member.c000066400000000000000000000033461226034601700176400ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" int security_compute_member_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t size; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/member", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass)); ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; *newcon = strdup(buf); if (!(*newcon)) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } hidden_def(security_compute_member_raw) int security_compute_member(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon) { int ret; security_context_t rscon; security_context_t rtcon; security_context_t rnewcon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) return -1; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(tcon, &rtcon)) { freecon(rscon); return -1; } ret = security_compute_member_raw(rscon, rtcon, tclass, &rnewcon); freecon(rscon); freecon(rtcon); if (!ret) { if (selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rnewcon, newcon)) { *newcon = NULL; ret = -1; } freecon(rnewcon); } return ret; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/compute_relabel.c000066400000000000000000000033131226034601700177710ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" int security_compute_relabel_raw(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t size; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/relabel", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass)); ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; *newcon = strdup(buf); if (!*newcon) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } hidden_def(security_compute_relabel_raw) int security_compute_relabel(const security_context_t scon, const security_context_t tcon, security_class_t tclass, security_context_t * newcon) { int ret; security_context_t rscon; security_context_t rtcon; security_context_t rnewcon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) return -1; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(tcon, &rtcon)) { freecon(rscon); return -1; } ret = security_compute_relabel_raw(rscon, rtcon, tclass, &rnewcon); freecon(rscon); freecon(rtcon); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rnewcon, newcon); freecon(rnewcon); } return ret; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/compute_user.c000066400000000000000000000035751226034601700173530ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include int security_compute_user_raw(const security_context_t scon, const char *user, security_context_t ** con) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char **ary; char *buf, *ptr; size_t size; int fd, ret; unsigned int i, nel; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/user", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s", scon, user); ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; if (sscanf(buf, "%u", &nel) != 1) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ary = malloc((nel + 1) * sizeof(char *)); if (!ary) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ptr = buf + strlen(buf) + 1; for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { ary[i] = strdup(ptr); if (!ary[i]) { freeconary(ary); ret = -1; goto out2; } ptr += strlen(ptr) + 1; } ary[nel] = NULL; *con = ary; ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } hidden_def(security_compute_user_raw) int security_compute_user(const security_context_t scon, const char *user, security_context_t ** con) { int ret; security_context_t rscon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) return -1; ret = security_compute_user_raw(rscon, user, con); freecon(rscon); if (!ret) { security_context_t *ptr, tmpcon; for (ptr = *con; *ptr; ptr++) { if (selinux_raw_to_trans_context(*ptr, &tmpcon)) { freeconary(*con); *con = NULL; return -1; } freecon(*ptr); *ptr = tmpcon; } } return ret; } hidden_def(security_compute_user) libselinux-2.2.2/src/context.c000066400000000000000000000077571226034601700163330ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include "context_internal.h" #include #include #include #include #define COMP_USER 0 #define COMP_ROLE 1 #define COMP_TYPE 2 #define COMP_RANGE 3 typedef struct { char *current_str; /* This is made up-to-date only when needed */ char *(component[4]); } context_private_t; /* * Allocate a new context, initialized from str. There must be 3 or * 4 colon-separated components and no whitespace in any component other * than the MLS component. */ context_t context_new(const char *str) { int i, count; errno = 0; context_private_t *n = (context_private_t *) malloc(sizeof(context_private_t)); context_t result = (context_t) malloc(sizeof(context_s_t)); const char *p, *tok; if (result) result->ptr = n; else free(n); if (n == 0 || result == 0) { goto err; } n->current_str = n->component[0] = n->component[1] = n->component[2] = n->component[3] = 0; for (i = count = 0, p = str; *p; p++) { switch (*p) { case ':': count++; break; case '\n': case '\t': case '\r': goto err; /* sanity check */ case ' ': if (count < 3) goto err; /* sanity check */ } } /* * Could be anywhere from 2 - 5 * e.g user:role:type to user:role:type:sens1:cata-sens2:catb */ if (count < 2 || count > 5) { /* might not have a range */ goto err; } n->component[3] = 0; for (i = 0, tok = str; *tok; i++) { if (i < 3) for (p = tok; *p && *p != ':'; p++) { /* empty */ } else { /* MLS range is one component */ for (p = tok; *p; p++) { /* empty */ } } n->component[i] = (char *)malloc(p - tok + 1); if (n->component[i] == 0) goto err; strncpy(n->component[i], tok, p - tok); n->component[i][p - tok] = '\0'; tok = *p ? p + 1 : p; } return result; err: if (errno == 0) errno = EINVAL; context_free(result); return 0; } hidden_def(context_new) static void conditional_free(char **v) { if (*v) { free(*v); } *v = 0; } /* * free all storage used by a context. Safe to call with * null pointer. */ void context_free(context_t context) { context_private_t *n; int i; if (context) { n = context->ptr; if (n) { conditional_free(&n->current_str); for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { conditional_free(&n->component[i]); } free(n); } free(context); } } hidden_def(context_free) /* * Return a pointer to the string value of the context. */ char *context_str(context_t context) { context_private_t *n = context->ptr; int i; size_t total = 0; conditional_free(&n->current_str); for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { if (n->component[i]) { total += strlen(n->component[i]) + 1; } } n->current_str = malloc(total); if (n->current_str != 0) { char *cp = n->current_str; cp = stpcpy(cp, n->component[0]); for (i = 1; i < 4; i++) { if (n->component[i]) { *cp++ = ':'; cp = stpcpy(cp, n->component[i]); } } } return n->current_str; } hidden_def(context_str) /* Returns nonzero iff failed */ static int set_comp(context_private_t * n, int idx, const char *str) { char *t = NULL; const char *p; if (str) { t = (char *)malloc(strlen(str) + 1); if (!t) { return 1; } for (p = str; *p; p++) { if (*p == '\t' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r' || ((*p == ':' || *p == ' ') && idx != COMP_RANGE)) { free(t); errno = EINVAL; return 1; } } strcpy(t, str); } conditional_free(&n->component[idx]); n->component[idx] = t; return 0; } #define def_get(name,tag) \ const char * context_ ## name ## _get(context_t context) \ { \ context_private_t *n = context->ptr; \ return n->component[tag]; \ } \ hidden_def(context_ ## name ## _get) def_get(type, COMP_TYPE) def_get(user, COMP_USER) def_get(range, COMP_RANGE) def_get(role, COMP_ROLE) #define def_set(name,tag) \ int context_ ## name ## _set(context_t context, const char* str) \ { \ return set_comp(context->ptr,tag,str);\ } \ hidden_def(context_ ## name ## _set) def_set(type, COMP_TYPE) def_set(role, COMP_ROLE) def_set(user, COMP_USER) def_set(range, COMP_RANGE) libselinux-2.2.2/src/context_internal.h000066400000000000000000000006401226034601700202140ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include "dso.h" hidden_proto(context_new) hidden_proto(context_free) hidden_proto(context_str) hidden_proto(context_type_set) hidden_proto(context_type_get) hidden_proto(context_role_set) hidden_proto(context_role_get) hidden_proto(context_user_set) hidden_proto(context_user_get) hidden_proto(context_range_set) hidden_proto(context_range_get) libselinux-2.2.2/src/deny_unknown.c000066400000000000000000000013141226034601700173440ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include int security_deny_unknown(void) { int fd, ret, deny_unknown = 0; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/deny_unknown", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return -1; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (sscanf(buf, "%d", &deny_unknown) != 1) return -1; return deny_unknown; } hidden_def(security_deny_unknown); libselinux-2.2.2/src/disable.c000066400000000000000000000011421226034601700162300ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include int security_disable(void) { int fd, ret; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/disable", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); if (fd < 0) return -1; buf[0] = '1'; buf[1] = '\0'; ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; return 0; } hidden_def(security_disable) libselinux-2.2.2/src/dso.h000066400000000000000000000012101226034601700154130ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _SELINUX_DSO_H #define _SELINUX_DSO_H 1 #ifdef SHARED # define hidden __attribute__ ((visibility ("hidden"))) # define hidden_proto(fct) __hidden_proto (fct, fct##_internal) # define __hidden_proto(fct, internal) \ extern __typeof (fct) internal; \ extern __typeof (fct) fct __asm (#internal) hidden; # if defined(__alpha__) || defined(__mips__) # define hidden_def(fct) \ asm (".globl " #fct "\n" #fct " = " #fct "_internal"); # else # define hidden_def(fct) \ asm (".globl " #fct "\n.set " #fct ", " #fct "_internal"); #endif #else # define hidden # define hidden_proto(fct) # define hidden_def(fct) #endif #endif libselinux-2.2.2/src/enabled.c000066400000000000000000000025751226034601700162320ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "policy.h" int is_selinux_enabled(void) { int enabled = 0; security_context_t con; /* init_selinuxmnt() gets called before this function. We * will assume that if a selinux file system is mounted, then * selinux is enabled. */ if (selinux_mnt) { /* Since a file system is mounted, we consider selinux * enabled. If getcon_raw fails, selinux is still enabled. * We only consider it disabled if no policy is loaded. */ enabled = 1; if (getcon_raw(&con) == 0) { if (!strcmp(con, "kernel")) enabled = 0; freecon(con); } } return enabled; } hidden_def(is_selinux_enabled) /* * Function: is_selinux_mls_enabled() * Return: 1 on success * 0 on failure */ int is_selinux_mls_enabled(void) { char buf[20], path[PATH_MAX]; int fd, ret, enabled = 0; if (!selinux_mnt) return enabled; snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/mls", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return enabled; memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf); do { ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf - 1); } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return enabled; if (!strcmp(buf, "1")) enabled = 1; return enabled; } hidden_def(is_selinux_mls_enabled) libselinux-2.2.2/src/exception.sh000077500000000000000000000006151226034601700170220ustar00rootroot00000000000000function except() { case $1 in selinux_file_context_cmp) # ignore ;; *) echo " %exception $1 { \$action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); return NULL; } } " ;; esac } gcc -x c -c -I../include - -aux-info temp.aux < ../include/selinux/selinux.h for i in `awk '/.*extern int/ { print $6 }' temp.aux`; do except $i ; done rm -f -- temp.aux -.o libselinux-2.2.2/src/fgetfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000023651226034601700171220ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" int fgetfilecon_raw(int fd, security_context_t * context) { char *buf; ssize_t size; ssize_t ret; size = INITCONTEXTLEN + 1; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) return -1; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = fgetxattr(fd, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0 && errno == ERANGE) { char *newbuf; size = fgetxattr(fd, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (size < 0) goto out; size++; newbuf = realloc(buf, size); if (!newbuf) goto out; buf = newbuf; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = fgetxattr(fd, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); } out: if (ret == 0) { /* Re-map empty attribute values to errors. */ errno = ENOTSUP; ret = -1; } if (ret < 0) free(buf); else *context = buf; return ret; } hidden_def(fgetfilecon_raw) int fgetfilecon(int fd, security_context_t * context) { security_context_t rcontext; int ret; *context = NULL; ret = fgetfilecon_raw(fd, &rcontext); if (ret > 0) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcontext, context); freecon(rcontext); } if (ret >= 0 && *context) return strlen(*context) + 1; return ret; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/file_path_suffixes.h000066400000000000000000000027061226034601700205100ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* File name suffixes. */ S_(BINPOLICY, "/policy/policy") S_(CONTEXTS_DIR, "/contexts") S_(FILE_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/files/file_contexts") S_(HOMEDIR_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/files/homedir_template") S_(DEFAULT_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/default_contexts") S_(USER_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/users/") S_(FAILSAFE_CONTEXT, "/contexts/failsafe_context") S_(DEFAULT_TYPE, "/contexts/default_type") S_(SECURETTY_TYPES, "/contexts/securetty_types") S_(BOOLEANS, "/booleans") S_(MEDIA_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/files/media") S_(REMOVABLE_CONTEXT, "/contexts/removable_context") S_(CUSTOMIZABLE_TYPES, "/contexts/customizable_types") S_(USERS_DIR, "/users/") S_(SEUSERS, "/seusers") S_(TRANSLATIONS, "/setrans.conf") S_(NETFILTER_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/netfilter_contexts") S_(FILE_CONTEXTS_HOMEDIR, "/contexts/files/file_contexts.homedirs") S_(FILE_CONTEXTS_LOCAL, "/contexts/files/file_contexts.local") S_(X_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/x_contexts") S_(COLORS, "/secolor.conf") S_(VIRTUAL_DOMAIN, "/contexts/virtual_domain_context") S_(VIRTUAL_IMAGE, "/contexts/virtual_image_context") S_(LXC_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/lxc_contexts") S_(SYSTEMD_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/systemd_contexts") S_(FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS, "/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs") S_(FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS_DIST, "/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs_dist") S_(SEPGSQL_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/sepgsql_contexts") S_(BOOLEAN_SUBS, "/booleans.subs_dist") libselinux-2.2.2/src/freecon.c000066400000000000000000000002441226034601700162500ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include void freecon(security_context_t con) { free(con); } hidden_def(freecon) libselinux-2.2.2/src/freeconary.c000066400000000000000000000004011226034601700167570ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include void freeconary(security_context_t * con) { char **ptr; if (!con) return; for (ptr = con; *ptr; ptr++) { free(*ptr); } free(con); } hidden_def(freeconary) libselinux-2.2.2/src/fsetfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000015251226034601700171330ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" int fsetfilecon_raw(int fd, const security_context_t context) { int rc = fsetxattr(fd, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, strlen(context) + 1, 0); if (rc < 0 && errno == ENOTSUP) { security_context_t ccontext = NULL; int err = errno; if ((fgetfilecon_raw(fd, &ccontext) >= 0) && (strcmp(context,ccontext) == 0)) { rc = 0; } else { errno = err; } freecon(ccontext); } return rc; } hidden_def(fsetfilecon_raw) int fsetfilecon(int fd, const security_context_t context) { int ret; security_context_t rcontext; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context, &rcontext)) return -1; ret = fsetfilecon_raw(fd, rcontext); freecon(rcontext); return ret; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/get_context_list.c000066400000000000000000000252461226034601700202160ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "context_internal.h" #include "get_context_list_internal.h" int get_default_context_with_role(const char *user, const char *role, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t * newcon) { security_context_t *conary; char **ptr; context_t con; const char *role2; int rc; rc = get_ordered_context_list(user, fromcon, &conary); if (rc <= 0) return -1; for (ptr = conary; *ptr; ptr++) { con = context_new(*ptr); if (!con) continue; role2 = context_role_get(con); if (role2 && !strcmp(role, role2)) { context_free(con); break; } context_free(con); } rc = -1; if (!(*ptr)) { errno = EINVAL; goto out; } *newcon = strdup(*ptr); if (!(*newcon)) goto out; rc = 0; out: freeconary(conary); return rc; } hidden_def(get_default_context_with_role) int get_default_context_with_rolelevel(const char *user, const char *role, const char *level, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t * newcon) { int rc = 0; int freefrom = 0; context_t con; char *newfromcon; if (!level) return get_default_context_with_role(user, role, fromcon, newcon); if (!fromcon) { rc = getcon(&fromcon); if (rc < 0) return rc; freefrom = 1; } rc = -1; con = context_new(fromcon); if (!con) goto out; if (context_range_set(con, level)) goto out; newfromcon = context_str(con); if (!newfromcon) goto out; rc = get_default_context_with_role(user, role, newfromcon, newcon); out: context_free(con); if (freefrom) freecon(fromcon); return rc; } int get_default_context(const char *user, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t * newcon) { security_context_t *conary; int rc; rc = get_ordered_context_list(user, fromcon, &conary); if (rc <= 0) return -1; *newcon = strdup(conary[0]); freeconary(conary); if (!(*newcon)) return -1; return 0; } static int find_partialcon(security_context_t * list, unsigned int nreach, char *part) { const char *conrole, *contype; char *partrole, *parttype, *ptr; context_t con; unsigned int i; partrole = part; ptr = part; while (*ptr && !isspace(*ptr) && *ptr != ':') ptr++; if (*ptr != ':') return -1; *ptr++ = 0; parttype = ptr; while (*ptr && !isspace(*ptr) && *ptr != ':') ptr++; *ptr = 0; for (i = 0; i < nreach; i++) { con = context_new(list[i]); if (!con) return -1; conrole = context_role_get(con); contype = context_type_get(con); if (!conrole || !contype) { context_free(con); return -1; } if (!strcmp(conrole, partrole) && !strcmp(contype, parttype)) { context_free(con); return i; } context_free(con); } return -1; } static int get_context_order(FILE * fp, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t * reachable, unsigned int nreach, unsigned int *ordering, unsigned int *nordered) { char *start, *end = NULL; char *line = NULL; size_t line_len = 0; ssize_t len; int found = 0; const char *fromrole, *fromtype; char *linerole, *linetype; unsigned int i; context_t con; int rc; errno = -EINVAL; /* Extract the role and type of the fromcon for matching. User identity and MLS range can be variable. */ con = context_new(fromcon); if (!con) return -1; fromrole = context_role_get(con); fromtype = context_type_get(con); if (!fromrole || !fromtype) { context_free(con); return -1; } while ((len = getline(&line, &line_len, fp)) > 0) { if (line[len - 1] == '\n') line[len - 1] = 0; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ start = line; while (*start && isspace(*start)) start++; if (!(*start)) continue; /* Find the end of the (partial) fromcon in the line. */ end = start; while (*end && !isspace(*end)) end++; if (!(*end)) continue; /* Check for a match. */ linerole = start; while (*start && !isspace(*start) && *start != ':') start++; if (*start != ':') continue; *start = 0; linetype = ++start; while (*start && !isspace(*start) && *start != ':') start++; if (!(*start)) continue; *start = 0; if (!strcmp(fromrole, linerole) && !strcmp(fromtype, linetype)) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { errno = ENOENT; rc = -1; goto out; } start = ++end; while (*start) { /* Skip leading whitespace */ while (*start && isspace(*start)) start++; if (!(*start)) break; /* Find the end of this partial context. */ end = start; while (*end && !isspace(*end)) end++; if (*end) *end++ = 0; /* Check for a match in the reachable list. */ rc = find_partialcon(reachable, nreach, start); if (rc < 0) { /* No match, skip it. */ start = end; continue; } /* If a match is found and the entry is not already ordered (e.g. due to prior match in prior config file), then set the ordering for it. */ i = rc; if (ordering[i] == nreach) ordering[i] = (*nordered)++; start = end; } rc = 0; out: context_free(con); free(line); return rc; } static int get_failsafe_context(const char *user, security_context_t * newcon) { FILE *fp; char buf[255], *ptr; size_t plen, nlen; int rc; fp = fopen(selinux_failsafe_context_path(), "r"); if (!fp) return -1; ptr = fgets_unlocked(buf, sizeof buf, fp); fclose(fp); if (!ptr) return -1; plen = strlen(ptr); if (buf[plen - 1] == '\n') buf[plen - 1] = 0; nlen = strlen(user) + 1 + plen + 1; *newcon = malloc(nlen); if (!(*newcon)) return -1; rc = snprintf(*newcon, nlen, "%s:%s", user, ptr); if (rc < 0 || (size_t) rc >= nlen) { free(*newcon); *newcon = 0; return -1; } /* If possible, check the context to catch errors early rather than waiting until the caller tries to use setexeccon on the context. But this may not always be possible, e.g. if selinuxfs isn't mounted. */ if (security_check_context(*newcon) && errno != ENOENT) { free(*newcon); *newcon = 0; return -1; } return 0; } struct context_order { security_context_t con; unsigned int order; }; static int order_compare(const void *A, const void *B) { const struct context_order *c1 = A, *c2 = B; if (c1->order < c2->order) return -1; else if (c1->order > c2->order) return 1; return strcmp(c1->con, c2->con); } int get_ordered_context_list_with_level(const char *user, const char *level, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t ** list) { int rc; int freefrom = 0; context_t con; char *newfromcon; if (!level) return get_ordered_context_list(user, fromcon, list); if (!fromcon) { rc = getcon(&fromcon); if (rc < 0) return rc; freefrom = 1; } rc = -1; con = context_new(fromcon); if (!con) goto out; if (context_range_set(con, level)) goto out; newfromcon = context_str(con); if (!newfromcon) goto out; rc = get_ordered_context_list(user, newfromcon, list); out: context_free(con); if (freefrom) freecon(fromcon); return rc; } hidden_def(get_ordered_context_list_with_level) int get_default_context_with_level(const char *user, const char *level, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t * newcon) { security_context_t *conary; int rc; rc = get_ordered_context_list_with_level(user, level, fromcon, &conary); if (rc <= 0) return -1; *newcon = strdup(conary[0]); freeconary(conary); if (!(*newcon)) return -1; return 0; } int get_ordered_context_list(const char *user, security_context_t fromcon, security_context_t ** list) { security_context_t *reachable = NULL; unsigned int *ordering = NULL; struct context_order *co = NULL; char **ptr; int rc = 0; unsigned int nreach = 0, nordered = 0, freefrom = 0, i; FILE *fp; char *fname = NULL; size_t fname_len; const char *user_contexts_path = selinux_user_contexts_path(); if (!fromcon) { /* Get the current context and use it for the starting context */ rc = getcon(&fromcon); if (rc < 0) return rc; freefrom = 1; } /* Determine the set of reachable contexts for the user. */ rc = security_compute_user(fromcon, user, &reachable); if (rc < 0) goto failsafe; nreach = 0; for (ptr = reachable; *ptr; ptr++) nreach++; if (!nreach) goto failsafe; /* Initialize ordering array. */ ordering = malloc(nreach * sizeof(unsigned int)); if (!ordering) goto failsafe; for (i = 0; i < nreach; i++) ordering[i] = nreach; /* Determine the ordering to apply from the optional per-user config and from the global config. */ fname_len = strlen(user_contexts_path) + strlen(user) + 2; fname = malloc(fname_len); if (!fname) goto failsafe; snprintf(fname, fname_len, "%s%s", user_contexts_path, user); fp = fopen(fname, "r"); if (fp) { __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); rc = get_context_order(fp, fromcon, reachable, nreach, ordering, &nordered); fclose(fp); if (rc < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: error in processing configuration file %s\n", __FUNCTION__, fname); /* Fall through, try global config */ } } free(fname); fp = fopen(selinux_default_context_path(), "r"); if (fp) { __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); rc = get_context_order(fp, fromcon, reachable, nreach, ordering, &nordered); fclose(fp); if (rc < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: error in processing configuration file %s\n", __FUNCTION__, selinux_default_context_path()); /* Fall through */ } rc = 0; } if (!nordered) goto failsafe; /* Apply the ordering. */ co = malloc(nreach * sizeof(struct context_order)); if (!co) goto failsafe; for (i = 0; i < nreach; i++) { co[i].con = reachable[i]; co[i].order = ordering[i]; } qsort(co, nreach, sizeof(struct context_order), order_compare); for (i = 0; i < nreach; i++) reachable[i] = co[i].con; free(co); /* Only report the ordered entries to the caller. */ if (nordered <= nreach) { for (i = nordered; i < nreach; i++) free(reachable[i]); reachable[nordered] = NULL; rc = nordered; } out: if (rc > 0) *list = reachable; else freeconary(reachable); free(ordering); if (freefrom) freecon(fromcon); return rc; failsafe: /* Unable to determine a reachable context list, try to fall back to the "failsafe" context to at least permit root login for emergency recovery if possible. */ freeconary(reachable); reachable = malloc(2 * sizeof(security_context_t)); if (!reachable) { rc = -1; goto out; } reachable[0] = reachable[1] = 0; rc = get_failsafe_context(user, &reachable[0]); if (rc < 0) { freeconary(reachable); reachable = NULL; goto out; } rc = 1; /* one context in the list */ goto out; } hidden_def(get_ordered_context_list) libselinux-2.2.2/src/get_context_list_internal.h000066400000000000000000000003051226034601700221040ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include "dso.h" hidden_proto(get_ordered_context_list) hidden_proto(get_ordered_context_list_with_level) hidden_proto(get_default_context_with_role) libselinux-2.2.2/src/get_default_type.c000066400000000000000000000022221226034601700201510ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include "get_default_type_internal.h" #include static int find_default_type(FILE * fp, const char *role, char **type); int get_default_type(const char *role, char **type) { FILE *fp = NULL; fp = fopen(selinux_default_type_path(), "r"); if (!fp) return -1; if (find_default_type(fp, role, type) < 0) { fclose(fp); return -1; } fclose(fp); return 0; } static int find_default_type(FILE * fp, const char *role, char **type) { char buf[250]; const char *ptr = "", *end; char *t; size_t len; int found = 0; len = strlen(role); while (!feof_unlocked(fp)) { if (!fgets_unlocked(buf, sizeof buf, fp)) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1]) buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = 0; ptr = buf; while (*ptr && isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; if (!(*ptr)) continue; if (!strncmp(role, ptr, len)) { end = ptr + len; if (*end == ':') { found = 1; ptr = ++end; break; } } } if (!found) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } t = malloc(strlen(buf) - len); if (!t) return -1; strcpy(t, ptr); *type = t; return 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/get_default_type_internal.h000066400000000000000000000001401226034601700220470ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include "dso.h" hidden_proto(selinux_default_type_path) libselinux-2.2.2/src/get_initial_context.c000066400000000000000000000023651226034601700206710ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #define SELINUX_INITCON_DIR "/initial_contexts/" int security_get_initial_context_raw(const char * name, security_context_t * con) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t size; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s%s%s", selinux_mnt, SELINUX_INITCON_DIR, name); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; *con = strdup(buf); if (!(*con)) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } hidden_def(security_get_initial_context_raw) int security_get_initial_context(const char * name, security_context_t * con) { int ret; security_context_t rcon; ret = security_get_initial_context_raw(name, &rcon); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcon, con); freecon(rcon); } return ret; } hidden_def(security_get_initial_context) libselinux-2.2.2/src/getenforce.c000066400000000000000000000012601226034601700167470ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include int security_getenforce(void) { int fd, ret, enforce = 0; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/enforce", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return -1; memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (sscanf(buf, "%d", &enforce) != 1) return -1; return enforce; } hidden_def(security_getenforce) libselinux-2.2.2/src/getfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000024411226034601700167470ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include #include #include "policy.h" int getfilecon_raw(const char *path, security_context_t * context) { char *buf; ssize_t size; ssize_t ret; size = INITCONTEXTLEN + 1; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) return -1; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = getxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0 && errno == ERANGE) { char *newbuf; size = getxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (size < 0) goto out; size++; newbuf = realloc(buf, size); if (!newbuf) goto out; buf = newbuf; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = getxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); } out: if (ret == 0) { /* Re-map empty attribute values to errors. */ errno = ENOTSUP; ret = -1; } if (ret < 0) free(buf); else *context = buf; return ret; } hidden_def(getfilecon_raw) int getfilecon(const char *path, security_context_t * context) { int ret; security_context_t rcontext; *context = NULL; ret = getfilecon_raw(path, &rcontext); if (ret > 0) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcontext, context); freecon(rcontext); } if (ret >= 0 && *context) return strlen(*context) + 1; return ret; } hidden_def(getfilecon) libselinux-2.2.2/src/getpeercon.c000066400000000000000000000020271226034601700167630ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #ifndef SO_PEERSEC #define SO_PEERSEC 31 #endif int getpeercon_raw(int fd, security_context_t * context) { char *buf; socklen_t size; ssize_t ret; size = INITCONTEXTLEN + 1; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) return -1; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, buf, &size); if (ret < 0 && errno == ERANGE) { char *newbuf; newbuf = realloc(buf, size); if (!newbuf) goto out; buf = newbuf; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, buf, &size); } out: if (ret < 0) free(buf); else *context = buf; return ret; } hidden_def(getpeercon_raw) int getpeercon(int fd, security_context_t * context) { int ret; security_context_t rcontext; ret = getpeercon_raw(fd, &rcontext); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcontext, context); freecon(rcontext); } return ret; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/init.c000066400000000000000000000055541226034601700156030ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "dso.h" #include "policy.h" #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "setrans_internal.h" char *selinux_mnt = NULL; int selinux_page_size = 0; int obj_class_compat = 1; /* Verify the mount point for selinux file system has a selinuxfs. If the file system: * Exist, * Is mounted with an selinux file system, * The file system is read/write * then set this as the default file system. */ static int verify_selinuxmnt(const char *mnt) { struct statfs sfbuf; int rc; do { rc = statfs(mnt, &sfbuf); } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR); if (rc == 0) { if ((uint32_t)sfbuf.f_type == (uint32_t)SELINUX_MAGIC) { struct statvfs vfsbuf; rc = statvfs(mnt, &vfsbuf); if (rc == 0) { if (!(vfsbuf.f_flag & ST_RDONLY)) { set_selinuxmnt(mnt); } return 0; } } } return -1; } int selinuxfs_exists(void) { int exists = 0; FILE *fp = NULL; char *buf = NULL; size_t len; ssize_t num; fp = fopen("/proc/filesystems", "r"); if (!fp) return 1; /* Fail as if it exists */ __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); num = getline(&buf, &len, fp); while (num != -1) { if (strstr(buf, SELINUXFS)) { exists = 1; break; } num = getline(&buf, &len, fp); } free(buf); fclose(fp); return exists; } hidden_def(selinuxfs_exists) static void init_selinuxmnt(void) { char *buf=NULL, *p; FILE *fp=NULL; size_t len; ssize_t num; if (selinux_mnt) return; if (verify_selinuxmnt(SELINUXMNT) == 0) return; if (verify_selinuxmnt(OLDSELINUXMNT) == 0) return; /* Drop back to detecting it the long way. */ if (!selinuxfs_exists()) goto out; /* At this point, the usual spot doesn't have an selinuxfs so * we look around for it */ fp = fopen("/proc/mounts", "r"); if (!fp) goto out; __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while ((num = getline(&buf, &len, fp)) != -1) { char *tmp; p = strchr(buf, ' '); if (!p) goto out; p++; tmp = strchr(p, ' '); if (!tmp) goto out; if (!strncmp(tmp + 1, SELINUXFS" ", strlen(SELINUXFS)+1)) { *tmp = '\0'; break; } } /* If we found something, dup it */ if (num > 0) verify_selinuxmnt(p); out: free(buf); if (fp) fclose(fp); return; } void fini_selinuxmnt(void) { free(selinux_mnt); selinux_mnt = NULL; } hidden_def(fini_selinuxmnt) void set_selinuxmnt(const char *mnt) { selinux_mnt = strdup(mnt); } hidden_def(set_selinuxmnt) static void init_lib(void) __attribute__ ((constructor)); static void init_lib(void) { selinux_page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); init_selinuxmnt(); } static void fini_lib(void) __attribute__ ((destructor)); static void fini_lib(void) { fini_selinuxmnt(); } libselinux-2.2.2/src/is_customizable_type.c000066400000000000000000000032531226034601700210670ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "context_internal.h" static int get_customizable_type_list(security_context_t ** retlist) { FILE *fp; char *buf; unsigned int ctr = 0, i; security_context_t *list = NULL; fp = fopen(selinux_customizable_types_path(), "r"); if (!fp) return -1; buf = malloc(selinux_page_size); if (!buf) { fclose(fp); return -1; } while (fgets_unlocked(buf, selinux_page_size, fp) && ctr < UINT_MAX) { ctr++; } rewind(fp); if (ctr) { list = (security_context_t *) calloc(sizeof(security_context_t), ctr + 1); if (list) { i = 0; while (fgets_unlocked(buf, selinux_page_size, fp) && i < ctr) { buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = 0; list[i] = (security_context_t) strdup(buf); if (!list[i]) { unsigned int j; for (j = 0; j < i; j++) free(list[j]); free(list); list = NULL; break; } i++; } } } fclose(fp); free(buf); if (!list) return -1; *retlist = list; return 0; } static security_context_t *customizable_list = NULL; int is_context_customizable(const security_context_t scontext) { int i; const char *type; context_t c; if (!customizable_list) { if (get_customizable_type_list(&customizable_list) != 0) return -1; } c = context_new(scontext); if (!c) return -1; type = context_type_get(c); if (!type) { context_free(c); return -1; } for (i = 0; customizable_list[i]; i++) { if (strcmp(customizable_list[i], type) == 0) { context_free(c); return 1; } } context_free(c); return 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/label.c000066400000000000000000000115561226034601700157160ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Generalized labeling frontend for userspace object managers. * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0])) typedef int (*selabel_initfunc)(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts); static selabel_initfunc initfuncs[] = { &selabel_file_init, &selabel_media_init, &selabel_x_init, &selabel_db_init, &selabel_property_init, }; static void selabel_subs_fini(struct selabel_sub *ptr) { struct selabel_sub *next; while (ptr) { next = ptr->next; free(ptr->src); free(ptr->dst); free(ptr); ptr = next; } } static char *selabel_sub(struct selabel_sub *ptr, const char *src) { char *dst = NULL; int len; while (ptr) { if (strncmp(src, ptr->src, ptr->slen) == 0 ) { if (src[ptr->slen] == '/' || src[ptr->slen] == 0) { if ((src[ptr->slen] == '/') && (strcmp(ptr->dst, "/") == 0)) len = ptr->slen + 1; else len = ptr->slen; if (asprintf(&dst, "%s%s", ptr->dst, &src[len]) < 0) return NULL; return dst; } } ptr = ptr->next; } return NULL; } struct selabel_sub *selabel_subs_init(const char *path, struct selabel_sub *list) { char buf[1024]; FILE *cfg = fopen(path, "r"); struct selabel_sub *sub; if (!cfg) return list; while (fgets_unlocked(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, cfg)) { char *ptr = NULL; char *src = buf; char *dst = NULL; while (*src && isspace(*src)) src++; if (src[0] == '#') continue; ptr = src; while (*ptr && ! isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; *ptr++ = '\0'; if (! *src) continue; dst = ptr; while (*dst && isspace(*dst)) dst++; ptr=dst; while (*ptr && ! isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; *ptr='\0'; if (! *dst) continue; sub = malloc(sizeof(*sub)); if (! sub) goto err; memset(sub, 0, sizeof(*sub)); sub->src=strdup(src); if (! sub->src) goto err; sub->dst=strdup(dst); if (! sub->dst) goto err; sub->slen = strlen(src); sub->next = list; list = sub; } out: fclose(cfg); return list; err: if (sub) free(sub->src); free(sub); goto out; } /* * Validation functions */ static inline int selabel_is_validate_set(struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n) { while (n--) if (opts[n].type == SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE) return !!opts[n].value; return 0; } int selabel_validate(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selabel_lookup_rec *contexts) { int rc = 0; if (!rec->validating || contexts->validated) goto out; rc = selinux_validate(&contexts->ctx_raw); if (rc < 0) goto out; contexts->validated = 1; out: return rc; } /* * Public API */ struct selabel_handle *selabel_open(unsigned int backend, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct selabel_handle *rec = NULL; if (backend >= ARRAY_SIZE(initfuncs)) { errno = EINVAL; goto out; } rec = (struct selabel_handle *)malloc(sizeof(*rec)); if (!rec) goto out; memset(rec, 0, sizeof(*rec)); rec->backend = backend; rec->validating = selabel_is_validate_set(opts, nopts); rec->subs = NULL; rec->dist_subs = NULL; if ((*initfuncs[backend])(rec, opts, nopts)) { free(rec); rec = NULL; } out: return rec; } static struct selabel_lookup_rec * selabel_lookup_common(struct selabel_handle *rec, int translating, const char *key, int type) { struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr; char *ptr = NULL; char *dptr = NULL; if (key == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return NULL; } ptr = selabel_sub(rec->subs, key); if (ptr) { dptr = selabel_sub(rec->dist_subs, ptr); if (dptr) { free(ptr); ptr = dptr; } } else { ptr = selabel_sub(rec->dist_subs, key); } if (ptr) { lr = rec->func_lookup(rec, ptr, type); free(ptr); } else { lr = rec->func_lookup(rec, key, type); } if (!lr) return NULL; if (compat_validate(rec, lr, rec->spec_file, 0)) return NULL; if (translating && !lr->ctx_trans && selinux_raw_to_trans_context(lr->ctx_raw, &lr->ctx_trans)) return NULL; return lr; } int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, security_context_t *con, const char *key, int type) { struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr; lr = selabel_lookup_common(rec, 1, key, type); if (!lr) return -1; *con = strdup(lr->ctx_trans); return *con ? 0 : -1; } int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *rec, security_context_t *con, const char *key, int type) { struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr; lr = selabel_lookup_common(rec, 0, key, type); if (!lr) return -1; *con = strdup(lr->ctx_raw); return *con ? 0 : -1; } void selabel_close(struct selabel_handle *rec) { selabel_subs_fini(rec->subs); selabel_subs_fini(rec->dist_subs); rec->func_close(rec); free(rec->spec_file); free(rec); } void selabel_stats(struct selabel_handle *rec) { rec->func_stats(rec); } libselinux-2.2.2/src/label_android_property.c000066400000000000000000000150021226034601700213500ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Property Service contexts backend for labeling Android * property keys */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" /* A property security context specification. */ typedef struct spec { struct selabel_lookup_rec lr; /* holds contexts for lookup result */ char *property_key; /* property key string */ } spec_t; /* Our stored configuration */ struct saved_data { /* * The array of specifications is sorted for longest * prefix match */ spec_t *spec_arr; unsigned int nspec; /* total number of specifications */ }; static int cmp(const void *A, const void *B) { const struct spec *sp1 = A, *sp2 = B; if (strncmp(sp1->property_key, "*", 1) == 0) return 1; if (strncmp(sp2->property_key, "*", 1) == 0) return -1; size_t L1 = strlen(sp1->property_key); size_t L2 = strlen(sp2->property_key); return (L1 < L2) - (L1 > L2); } /* * Warn about duplicate specifications. */ static int nodups_specs(struct saved_data *data, const char *path) { int rc = 0; unsigned int ii, jj; struct spec *curr_spec, *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; for (ii = 0; ii < data->nspec; ii++) { curr_spec = &spec_arr[ii]; for (jj = ii + 1; jj < data->nspec; jj++) { if (!strcmp(spec_arr[jj].property_key, curr_spec->property_key)) { rc = -1; errno = EINVAL; if (strcmp(spec_arr[jj].lr.ctx_raw, curr_spec->lr.ctx_raw)) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Multiple different specifications for %s (%s and %s).\n", path, curr_spec->property_key, spec_arr[jj].lr.ctx_raw, curr_spec->lr.ctx_raw); } else { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Multiple same specifications for %s.\n", path, curr_spec->property_key); } } } } return rc; } static int process_line(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *path, char *line_buf, int pass, unsigned lineno) { int items, len; char buf1[BUFSIZ], buf2[BUFSIZ]; char *buf_p, *prop = buf1, *context = buf2; struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; spec_t *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int nspec = data->nspec; len = strlen(line_buf); if (line_buf[len - 1] == '\n') line_buf[len - 1] = 0; buf_p = line_buf; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; /* Skip comment lines and empty lines. */ if (*buf_p == '#' || *buf_p == 0) return 0; items = sscanf(line_buf, "%255s %255s", prop, context); if (items != 2) { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %d is missing fields, skipping\n", path, lineno); return 0; } if (pass == 1) { /* On the second pass, process and store the specification in spec. */ spec_arr[nspec].property_key = strdup(prop); if (!spec_arr[nspec].property_key) { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: out of memory at line %d on prop %s\n", path, lineno, prop); return -1; } spec_arr[nspec].lr.ctx_raw = strdup(context); if (!spec_arr[nspec].lr.ctx_raw) { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: out of memory at line %d on context %s\n", path, lineno, context); return -1; } } data->nspec = ++nspec; return 0; } static int init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; const char *path = NULL; FILE *fp; char line_buf[BUFSIZ]; unsigned int lineno = 0, maxnspec, pass; int status = -1; struct stat sb; /* Process arguments */ while (n--) switch (opts[n].type) { case SELABEL_OPT_PATH: path = opts[n].value; break; default: selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "Argument type (%d) not recognized. Skipping\n", opts[n].type); break; } if (!path) return -1; /* Open the specification file. */ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) return -1; if (fstat(fileno(fp), &sb) < 0) goto finish; errno = EINVAL; if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) goto finish; /* * Two passes of the specification file. First is to get the size. * After the first pass, the spec array is malloced to the appropriate * size. Second pass is to populate the spec array and check for * dups. */ maxnspec = UINT_MAX / sizeof(spec_t); for (pass = 0; pass < 2; pass++) { data->nspec = 0; while (fgets(line_buf, sizeof line_buf - 1, fp) && data->nspec < maxnspec) { if (process_line(rec, path, line_buf, pass, ++lineno) != 0) goto finish; } if (pass == 1) { status = nodups_specs(data, path); if (status) goto finish; } if (pass == 0) { if (data->nspec == 0) { status = 0; goto finish; } if (NULL == (data->spec_arr = malloc(sizeof(spec_t) * data->nspec))) goto finish; memset(data->spec_arr, 0, sizeof(spec_t) * data->nspec); maxnspec = data->nspec; rewind(fp); } } qsort(data->spec_arr, data->nspec, sizeof(struct spec), cmp); status = 0; finish: fclose(fp); return status; } /* * Backend interface routines */ static void closef(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct spec *spec; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { spec = &data->spec_arr[i]; free(spec->property_key); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); } if (data->spec_arr) free(data->spec_arr); free(data); } static struct selabel_lookup_rec *lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int __attribute__ ((unused)) type) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; spec_t *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; struct selabel_lookup_rec *ret = NULL; if (!data->nspec) { errno = ENOENT; goto finish; } for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { if (strncmp(spec_arr[i].property_key, key, strlen(spec_arr[i].property_key)) == 0) { break; } if (strncmp(spec_arr[i].property_key, "*", 1) == 0) break; } if (i >= data->nspec) { /* No matching specification. */ errno = ENOENT; goto finish; } ret = &spec_arr[i].lr; finish: return ret; } static void stats(struct selabel_handle __attribute__ ((unused)) * rec) { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "'stats' functionality not implemented.\n"); } int selabel_property_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct saved_data *data; data = (struct saved_data *)malloc(sizeof(*data)); if (!data) return -1; memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); rec->data = data; rec->func_close = &closef; rec->func_stats = &stats; rec->func_lookup = &lookup; return init(rec, opts, nopts); } libselinux-2.2.2/src/label_db.c000066400000000000000000000177131226034601700163640ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Media contexts backend for DB objects * * Author: KaiGai Kohei */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" /* * Regular database object's security context interface * * It provides applications a regular security context for the given * database objects. The pair of object's name and a security context * are described in the specfile. In the default, it shall be stored * in the /etc/selinux/$POLICYTYPE/contexts/sepgsql_contexts . * (It assumes SE-PostgreSQL in the default. For other RDBMS, use the * SELABEL_OPT_PATH option to specify different specfile.) * * Each line has the following format: * * * For example: * ---------------------------------------- * # * # It is an example specfile for database obejcts * # * db_database template1 system_u:object_r:sepgsql_db_t:s0 * * db_schema *.pg_catalog system_u:object_r:sepgsql_sys_schema_t:s0 * * db_table *.pg_catalog.* system_u:object_r:sepgsql_sysobj_t:s0 * db_column *.pg_catalog.*.* system_u:object_r:sepgsql_sysobj_t:s0 * ---------------------------------------- * * All the characters after the '#' are dealt as comments. * * The first token is object class. SELABEL_DB_* declared in label.h are * corresponding to a certain database object. * * The object name/identifier is compared to the given key. * A database object can have its own namespace hierarchy. * In the case of SE-PgSQL, database is the top level object, and schema * is deployed just under a database. A schema can contains various kind * of objects, such as tables, procedures and so on. * Thus, when we lookup an expected security context for a table of * "pg_class", it is necessary to assume selabel_lookup() is called with * "postgres.pg_catalog.pg_class", not just a "pg_class". * * Wildcards ('*' or '?') are available on the patterns, so if you want * to match a table within any schema, you should set '*' on the upper * namespaces of the table. * * The structure of namespace depends on RDBMS. * For example, Trusted-RUBIX has an idea of "catalog" which performs * as a namespace between a database and individual schemas. In this * case, a table has upper three layers. */ /* * spec_t : It holds a pair of a key and an expected security context */ typedef struct spec { struct selabel_lookup_rec lr; char *key; int type; int matches; } spec_t; /* * catalog_t : An array of spec_t */ typedef struct catalog { unsigned int nspec; /* number of specs in use */ unsigned int limit; /* physical limitation of specs[] */ spec_t specs[0]; } catalog_t; /* * Helper function to parse a line read from the specfile */ static int process_line(const char *path, char *line_buf, unsigned int line_num, catalog_t *catalog) { spec_t *spec = &catalog->specs[catalog->nspec]; char *type, *key, *context, *temp; int items; /* Cut off comments */ temp = strchr(line_buf, '#'); if (temp) *temp = '\0'; /* * Every entry must have the following format * */ type = key = context = temp = NULL; items = sscanf(line_buf, "%as %as %as %as", &type, &key, &context, &temp); if (items != 3) { if (items > 0) selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %d has invalid format, skipped", path, line_num); goto skip; } /* * Set up individual spec entry */ memset(spec, 0, sizeof(spec_t)); if (!strcmp(type, "db_database")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_DATABASE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_schema")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_table")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_TABLE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_column")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_COLUMN; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_sequence")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_view")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_VIEW; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_procedure")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_blob")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_BLOB; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_tuple")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_TUPLE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_language")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_LANGUAGE; else { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %d has invalid object type %s\n", path, line_num, type); goto skip; } free(type); spec->key = key; spec->lr.ctx_raw = context; catalog->nspec++; return 0; skip: free(type); free(key); free(context); free(temp); return 0; } /* * selabel_close() handler */ static void db_close(struct selabel_handle *rec) { catalog_t *catalog = (catalog_t *)rec->data; spec_t *spec; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < catalog->nspec; i++) { spec = &catalog->specs[i]; free(spec->key); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); } free(catalog); } /* * selabel_lookup() handler */ static struct selabel_lookup_rec * db_lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int type) { catalog_t *catalog = (catalog_t *)rec->data; spec_t *spec; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < catalog->nspec; i++) { spec = &catalog->specs[i]; if (spec->type != type) continue; if (!fnmatch(spec->key, key, 0)) { spec->matches++; return &spec->lr; } } /* No found */ errno = ENOENT; return NULL; } /* * selabel_stats() handler */ static void db_stats(struct selabel_handle *rec) { catalog_t *catalog = (catalog_t *)rec->data; unsigned int i, total = 0; for (i = 0; i < catalog->nspec; i++) total += catalog->specs[i].matches; selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%u entries, %u matches made\n", catalog->nspec, total); } /* * selabel_open() handler */ static catalog_t * db_init(struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts, struct selabel_handle *rec) { catalog_t *catalog; FILE *filp; const char *path = NULL; char *line_buf = NULL; size_t line_len = 0; unsigned int line_num = 0; unsigned int i; /* * Initialize catalog data structure */ catalog = malloc(sizeof(catalog_t) + 32 * sizeof(spec_t)); if (!catalog) return NULL; catalog->limit = 32; catalog->nspec = 0; /* * Process arguments * * SELABEL_OPT_PATH: * It allows to specify an alternative specification file instead of * the default one. If RDBMS is not SE-PostgreSQL, it may need to * specify an explicit specfile for database objects. */ while (nopts--) { switch (opts[nopts].type) { case SELABEL_OPT_PATH: path = opts[nopts].value; break; } } /* * Open the specification file */ if (!path) path = selinux_sepgsql_context_path(); if ((filp = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { free(catalog); return NULL; } rec->spec_file = strdup(path); /* * Parse for each lines */ while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, filp) > 0) { /* * Expand catalog array, if necessary */ if (catalog->limit == catalog->nspec) { size_t length; unsigned int new_limit = 2 * catalog->limit; catalog_t *new_catalog; length = sizeof(catalog_t) + new_limit * sizeof(spec_t); new_catalog = realloc(catalog, length); if (!new_catalog) goto out_error; catalog = new_catalog; catalog->limit = new_limit; } /* * Parse a line */ if (process_line(path, line_buf, ++line_num, catalog) < 0) goto out_error; } free(line_buf); fclose(filp); return catalog; out_error: for (i = 0; i < catalog->nspec; i++) { spec_t *spec = &catalog->specs[i]; free(spec->key); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); } free(catalog); return NULL; } /* * Initialize selabel_handle and load the entries of specfile */ int selabel_db_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { rec->func_close = &db_close; rec->func_lookup = &db_lookup; rec->func_stats = &db_stats; rec->data = db_init(opts, nopts, rec); return !rec->data ? -1 : 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/label_file.c000066400000000000000000000402451226034601700167120ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * File contexts backend for labeling system * * Author : Eamon Walsh * Author : Stephen Smalley * * This library derived in part from setfiles and the setfiles.pl script * developed by Secure Computing Corporation. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" #include "label_file.h" /* * Internals, mostly moved over from matchpathcon.c */ /* return the length of the text that is the stem of a file name */ static int get_stem_from_file_name(const char *const buf) { const char *tmp = strchr(buf + 1, '/'); if (!tmp) return 0; return tmp - buf; } /* find the stem of a file name, returns the index into stem_arr (or -1 if * there is no match - IE for a file in the root directory or a regex that is * too complex for us). Makes buf point to the text AFTER the stem. */ static int find_stem_from_file(struct saved_data *data, const char **buf) { int i; int stem_len = get_stem_from_file_name(*buf); if (!stem_len) return -1; for (i = 0; i < data->num_stems; i++) { if (stem_len == data->stem_arr[i].len && !strncmp(*buf, data->stem_arr[i].buf, stem_len)) { *buf += stem_len; return i; } } return -1; } /* * Warn about duplicate specifications. */ static int nodups_specs(struct saved_data *data, const char *path) { int rc = 0; unsigned int ii, jj; struct spec *curr_spec, *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; for (ii = 0; ii < data->nspec; ii++) { curr_spec = &spec_arr[ii]; for (jj = ii + 1; jj < data->nspec; jj++) { if ((!strcmp(spec_arr[jj].regex_str, curr_spec->regex_str)) && (!spec_arr[jj].mode || !curr_spec->mode || spec_arr[jj].mode == curr_spec->mode)) { rc = -1; errno = EINVAL; if (strcmp(spec_arr[jj].lr.ctx_raw, curr_spec->lr.ctx_raw)) { COMPAT_LOG (SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Multiple different specifications for %s (%s and %s).\n", path, curr_spec->regex_str, spec_arr[jj].lr.ctx_raw, curr_spec->lr.ctx_raw); } else { COMPAT_LOG (SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Multiple same specifications for %s.\n", path, curr_spec->regex_str); } } } } return rc; } static int compile_regex(struct saved_data *data, struct spec *spec, const char **errbuf) { const char *tmperrbuf; char *reg_buf, *anchored_regex, *cp; struct stem *stem_arr = data->stem_arr; size_t len; int erroff; if (spec->regcomp) return 0; /* already done */ /* Skip the fixed stem. */ reg_buf = spec->regex_str; if (spec->stem_id >= 0) reg_buf += stem_arr[spec->stem_id].len; /* Anchor the regular expression. */ len = strlen(reg_buf); cp = anchored_regex = malloc(len + 3); if (!anchored_regex) return -1; /* Create ^...$ regexp. */ *cp++ = '^'; cp = mempcpy(cp, reg_buf, len); *cp++ = '$'; *cp = '\0'; /* Compile the regular expression. */ spec->regex = pcre_compile(anchored_regex, 0, &tmperrbuf, &erroff, NULL); free(anchored_regex); if (!spec->regex) { if (errbuf) *errbuf=tmperrbuf; return -1; } spec->sd = pcre_study(spec->regex, 0, &tmperrbuf); if (!spec->sd) { if (errbuf) *errbuf=tmperrbuf; return -1; } /* Done. */ spec->regcomp = 1; return 0; } static int process_line(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *path, const char *prefix, char *line_buf, unsigned lineno) { int items, len, rc; char *buf_p, *regex, *type, *context; struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct spec *spec_arr; unsigned int nspec = data->nspec; const char *errbuf = NULL; len = strlen(line_buf); if (line_buf[len - 1] == '\n') line_buf[len - 1] = 0; buf_p = line_buf; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; /* Skip comment lines and empty lines. */ if (*buf_p == '#' || *buf_p == 0) return 0; items = sscanf(line_buf, "%as %as %as", ®ex, &type, &context); if (items < 2) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %d is missing fields, skipping\n", path, lineno); if (items == 1) free(regex); return 0; } else if (items == 2) { /* The type field is optional. */ free(context); context = type; type = 0; } len = get_stem_from_spec(regex); if (len && prefix && strncmp(prefix, regex, len)) { /* Stem of regex does not match requested prefix, discard. */ free(regex); free(type); free(context); return 0; } rc = grow_specs(data); if (rc) return rc; spec_arr = data->spec_arr; /* process and store the specification in spec. */ spec_arr[nspec].stem_id = find_stem_from_spec(data, regex); spec_arr[nspec].regex_str = regex; if (rec->validating && compile_regex(data, &spec_arr[nspec], &errbuf)) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %d has invalid regex %s: %s\n", path, lineno, regex, (errbuf ? errbuf : "out of memory")); } /* Convert the type string to a mode format */ spec_arr[nspec].type_str = type; spec_arr[nspec].mode = 0; if (type) { mode_t mode = string_to_mode(type); if (mode == -1) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %d has invalid file type %s\n", path, lineno, type); mode = 0; } spec_arr[nspec].mode = mode; } spec_arr[nspec].lr.ctx_raw = context; /* Determine if specification has * any meta characters in the RE */ spec_hasMetaChars(&spec_arr[nspec]); if (strcmp(context, "<>") && rec->validating) compat_validate(rec, &spec_arr[nspec].lr, path, lineno); data->nspec = ++nspec; return 0; } static int load_mmap(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *path, struct stat *sb) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; char mmap_path[PATH_MAX + 1]; int mmapfd; int rc, i; struct stat mmap_stat; char *addr; size_t len; int stem_map_len, *stem_map; struct mmap_area *mmap_area; uint32_t *magic; uint32_t *section_len; uint32_t *plen; rc = snprintf(mmap_path, sizeof(mmap_path), "%s.bin", path); if (rc >= sizeof(mmap_path)) return -1; mmapfd = open(mmap_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (mmapfd < 0) return -1; rc = fstat(mmapfd, &mmap_stat); if (rc < 0) { close(mmapfd); return -1; } /* if mmap is old, ignore it */ if (mmap_stat.st_mtime < sb->st_mtime) { close(mmapfd); return -1; } if (mmap_stat.st_mtime == sb->st_mtime && mmap_stat.st_mtim.tv_nsec < sb->st_mtim.tv_nsec) { close(mmapfd); return -1; } /* ok, read it in... */ len = mmap_stat.st_size; len += (sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE) - 1); len &= ~(sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE) - 1); mmap_area = malloc(sizeof(*mmap_area)); if (!mmap_area) { close(mmapfd); return -1; } addr = mmap(NULL, len, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, mmapfd, 0); close(mmapfd); if (addr == MAP_FAILED) { free(mmap_area); perror("mmap"); return -1; } /* save where we mmap'd the file to cleanup on close() */ mmap_area->addr = addr; mmap_area->len = len; mmap_area->next = data->mmap_areas; data->mmap_areas = mmap_area; /* check if this looks like an fcontext file */ magic = (uint32_t *)addr; if (*magic != SELINUX_MAGIC_COMPILED_FCONTEXT) return -1; addr += sizeof(uint32_t); /* check if this version is higher than we understand */ section_len = (uint32_t *)addr; if (*section_len > SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_MAX_VERS) return -1; addr += sizeof(uint32_t); /* allocate the stems_data array */ section_len = (uint32_t *)addr; addr += sizeof(uint32_t); /* * map indexed by the stem # in the mmap file and contains the stem * number in the data stem_arr */ stem_map_len = *section_len; stem_map = calloc(stem_map_len, sizeof(*stem_map)); if (!stem_map) return -1; for (i = 0; i < *section_len; i++) { char *buf; uint32_t stem_len; int newid; /* the length does not inlude the nul */ plen = (uint32_t *)addr; addr += sizeof(uint32_t); stem_len = *plen; buf = (char *)addr; addr += (stem_len + 1); // +1 is the nul /* store the mapping between old and new */ newid = find_stem(data, buf, stem_len); if (newid < 0) { newid = store_stem(data, buf, stem_len); if (newid < 0) { rc = newid; goto err; } data->stem_arr[newid].from_mmap = 1; } stem_map[i] = newid; } /* allocate the regex array */ section_len = (uint32_t *)addr; addr += sizeof(*section_len); for (i = 0; i < *section_len; i++) { struct spec *spec; int32_t stem_id; rc = grow_specs(data); if (rc < 0) goto err; spec = &data->spec_arr[data->nspec]; spec->from_mmap = 1; spec->regcomp = 1; plen = (uint32_t *)addr; addr += sizeof(uint32_t); rc = -1; spec->lr.ctx_raw = strdup((char *)addr); if (!spec->lr.ctx_raw) goto err; addr += *plen; plen = (uint32_t *)addr; addr += sizeof(uint32_t); spec->regex_str = (char *)addr; addr += *plen; spec->mode = *(mode_t *)addr; addr += sizeof(mode_t); /* map the stem id from the mmap file to the data->stem_arr */ stem_id = *(int32_t *)addr; if (stem_id == -1 || stem_id >= stem_map_len) spec->stem_id = -1; else spec->stem_id = stem_map[stem_id]; addr += sizeof(int32_t); /* retrieve the hasMetaChars bit */ spec->hasMetaChars = *(uint32_t *)addr; addr += sizeof(uint32_t); plen = (uint32_t *)addr; addr += sizeof(uint32_t); spec->regex = (pcre *)addr; addr += *plen; plen = (uint32_t *)addr; addr += sizeof(uint32_t); spec->lsd.study_data = (void *)addr; spec->lsd.flags |= PCRE_EXTRA_STUDY_DATA; addr += *plen; data->nspec++; } /* win */ rc = 0; err: free(stem_map); return rc; } static int process_file(const char *path, const char *suffix, struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *prefix) { FILE *fp; struct stat sb; unsigned int lineno; size_t line_len; char *line_buf = NULL; int rc; char stack_path[PATH_MAX + 1]; /* append the path suffix if we have one */ if (suffix) { rc = snprintf(stack_path, sizeof(stack_path), "%s.%s", path, suffix); if (rc >= sizeof(stack_path)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return -1; } path = stack_path; } /* Open the specification file. */ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) return -1; __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); if (fstat(fileno(fp), &sb) < 0) return -1; if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } rc = load_mmap(rec, path, &sb); if (rc == 0) goto out; /* * The do detailed validation of the input and fill the spec array */ lineno = 0; while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, fp) > 0) { rc = process_line(rec, path, prefix, line_buf, ++lineno); if (rc) return rc; } out: free(line_buf); fclose(fp); return 0; } static int init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; const char *path = NULL; const char *prefix = NULL; char subs_file[PATH_MAX + 1]; int status = -1, baseonly = 0; /* Process arguments */ while (n--) switch(opts[n].type) { case SELABEL_OPT_PATH: path = opts[n].value; break; case SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET: prefix = opts[n].value; break; case SELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY: baseonly = !!opts[n].value; break; } /* Process local and distribution substitution files */ if (!path) { rec->dist_subs = selabel_subs_init(selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path(), rec->dist_subs); rec->subs = selabel_subs_init(selinux_file_context_subs_path(), rec->subs); path = selinux_file_context_path(); } else { snprintf(subs_file, sizeof(subs_file), "%s.subs_dist", path); rec->dist_subs = selabel_subs_init(subs_file, rec->dist_subs); snprintf(subs_file, sizeof(subs_file), "%s.subs", path); rec->subs = selabel_subs_init(subs_file, rec->subs); } rec->spec_file = strdup(path); /* * The do detailed validation of the input and fill the spec array */ status = process_file(path, NULL, rec, prefix); if (status) goto finish; if (rec->validating) { status = nodups_specs(data, path); if (status) goto finish; } if (!baseonly) { status = process_file(path, "homedirs", rec, prefix); if (status && errno != ENOENT) goto finish; status = process_file(path, "local", rec, prefix); if (status && errno != ENOENT) goto finish; } status = sort_specs(data); status = 0; finish: if (status) free(data->spec_arr); return status; } /* * Backend interface routines */ static void closef(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct mmap_area *area, *last_area; struct spec *spec; struct stem *stem; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { spec = &data->spec_arr[i]; free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); if (spec->from_mmap) continue; free(spec->regex_str); free(spec->type_str); if (spec->regcomp) { pcre_free(spec->regex); pcre_free_study(spec->sd); } } for (i = 0; i < (unsigned int)data->num_stems; i++) { stem = &data->stem_arr[i]; if (stem->from_mmap) continue; free(stem->buf); } if (data->spec_arr) free(data->spec_arr); if (data->stem_arr) free(data->stem_arr); area = data->mmap_areas; while (area) { munmap(area->addr, area->len); last_area = area; area = area->next; free(last_area); } free(data); } static struct selabel_lookup_rec *lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int type) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct spec *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; int i, rc, file_stem; mode_t mode = (mode_t)type; const char *buf; struct selabel_lookup_rec *ret = NULL; char *clean_key = NULL; const char *prev_slash, *next_slash; unsigned int sofar = 0; if (!data->nspec) { errno = ENOENT; goto finish; } /* Remove duplicate slashes */ if ((next_slash = strstr(key, "//"))) { clean_key = malloc(strlen(key) + 1); if (!clean_key) goto finish; prev_slash = key; while (next_slash) { memcpy(clean_key + sofar, prev_slash, next_slash - prev_slash); sofar += next_slash - prev_slash; prev_slash = next_slash + 1; next_slash = strstr(prev_slash, "//"); } strcpy(clean_key + sofar, prev_slash); key = clean_key; } buf = key; file_stem = find_stem_from_file(data, &buf); mode &= S_IFMT; /* * Check for matching specifications in reverse order, so that * the last matching specification is used. */ for (i = data->nspec - 1; i >= 0; i--) { struct spec *spec = &spec_arr[i]; /* if the spec in question matches no stem or has the same * stem as the file AND if the spec in question has no mode * specified or if the mode matches the file mode then we do * a regex check */ if ((spec->stem_id == -1 || spec->stem_id == file_stem) && (!mode || !spec->mode || mode == spec->mode)) { if (compile_regex(data, spec, NULL) < 0) goto finish; if (spec->stem_id == -1) rc = pcre_exec(spec->regex, get_pcre_extra(spec), key, strlen(key), 0, 0, NULL, 0); else rc = pcre_exec(spec->regex, get_pcre_extra(spec), buf, strlen(buf), 0, 0, NULL, 0); if (rc == 0) { spec->matches++; break; } else if (rc == PCRE_ERROR_NOMATCH) continue; errno = ENOENT; /* else it's an error */ goto finish; } } if (i < 0 || strcmp(spec_arr[i].lr.ctx_raw, "<>") == 0) { /* No matching specification. */ errno = ENOENT; goto finish; } errno = 0; ret = &spec_arr[i].lr; finish: free(clean_key); return ret; } static void stats(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; unsigned int i, nspec = data->nspec; struct spec *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; for (i = 0; i < nspec; i++) { if (spec_arr[i].matches == 0) { if (spec_arr[i].type_str) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "Warning! No matches for (%s, %s, %s)\n", spec_arr[i].regex_str, spec_arr[i].type_str, spec_arr[i].lr.ctx_raw); } else { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "Warning! No matches for (%s, %s)\n", spec_arr[i].regex_str, spec_arr[i].lr.ctx_raw); } } } } int selabel_file_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct saved_data *data; data = (struct saved_data *)malloc(sizeof(*data)); if (!data) return -1; memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); rec->data = data; rec->func_close = &closef; rec->func_stats = &stats; rec->func_lookup = &lookup; return init(rec, opts, nopts); } libselinux-2.2.2/src/label_file.h000066400000000000000000000146441226034601700167230ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _SELABEL_FILE_H_ #define _SELABEL_FILE_H_ #include #include "label_internal.h" #define SELINUX_MAGIC_COMPILED_FCONTEXT 0xf97cff8a #define SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_MAX_VERS 1 /* Prior to verison 8.20, libpcre did not have pcre_free_study() */ #if (PCRE_MAJOR < 8 || (PCRE_MAJOR == 8 && PCRE_MINOR < 20)) #define pcre_free_study pcre_free #endif /* A file security context specification. */ struct spec { struct selabel_lookup_rec lr; /* holds contexts for lookup result */ char *regex_str; /* regular expession string for diagnostics */ char *type_str; /* type string for diagnostic messages */ pcre *regex; /* compiled regular expression */ union { pcre_extra *sd; /* pointer to extra compiled stuff */ pcre_extra lsd; /* used to hold the mmap'd version */ }; mode_t mode; /* mode format value */ int matches; /* number of matching pathnames */ int stem_id; /* indicates which stem-compression item */ char hasMetaChars; /* regular expression has meta-chars */ char regcomp; /* regex_str has been compiled to regex */ char from_mmap; /* this spec is from an mmap of the data */ }; /* A regular expression stem */ struct stem { char *buf; int len; char from_mmap; }; /* Where we map the file in during selabel_open() */ struct mmap_area { void *addr; size_t len; struct mmap_area *next; }; /* Our stored configuration */ struct saved_data { /* * The array of specifications, initially in the same order as in * the specification file. Sorting occurs based on hasMetaChars. */ struct spec *spec_arr; unsigned int nspec; unsigned int alloc_specs; /* * The array of regular expression stems. */ struct stem *stem_arr; int num_stems; int alloc_stems; struct mmap_area *mmap_areas; }; static inline pcre_extra *get_pcre_extra(struct spec *spec) { if (spec->from_mmap) return &spec->lsd; else return spec->sd; } static inline mode_t string_to_mode(char *mode) { size_t len; if (!mode) return 0; len = strlen(mode); if (mode[0] != '-' || len != 2) return -1; switch (mode[1]) { case 'b': return S_IFBLK; case 'c': return S_IFCHR; case 'd': return S_IFDIR; case 'p': return S_IFIFO; case 'l': return S_IFLNK; case 's': return S_IFSOCK; case '-': return S_IFREG; default: return -1; } /* impossible to get here */ return 0; } static inline int grow_specs(struct saved_data *data) { struct spec *specs; size_t new_specs, total_specs; if (data->nspec < data->alloc_specs) return 0; new_specs = data->nspec + 16; total_specs = data->nspec + new_specs; specs = realloc(data->spec_arr, total_specs * sizeof(*specs)); if (!specs) { perror("realloc"); return -1; } /* blank the new entries */ memset(&specs[data->nspec], 0, new_specs * sizeof(*specs)); data->spec_arr = specs; data->alloc_specs = total_specs; return 0; } /* Determine if the regular expression specification has any meta characters. */ static inline void spec_hasMetaChars(struct spec *spec) { char *c; int len; char *end; c = spec->regex_str; len = strlen(spec->regex_str); end = c + len; spec->hasMetaChars = 0; /* Look at each character in the RE specification string for a * meta character. Return when any meta character reached. */ while (c < end) { switch (*c) { case '.': case '^': case '$': case '?': case '*': case '+': case '|': case '[': case '(': case '{': spec->hasMetaChars = 1; return; case '\\': /* skip the next character */ c++; break; default: break; } c++; } return; } /* Move exact pathname specifications to the end. */ static inline int sort_specs(struct saved_data *data) { struct spec *spec_copy; struct spec spec; int i; int front, back; size_t len = sizeof(*spec_copy); spec_copy = malloc(len * data->nspec); if (!spec_copy) return -1; /* first move the exact pathnames to the back */ front = 0; back = data->nspec - 1; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { if (data->spec_arr[i].hasMetaChars) memcpy(&spec_copy[front++], &data->spec_arr[i], len); else memcpy(&spec_copy[back--], &data->spec_arr[i], len); } /* * now the exact pathnames are at the end, but they are in the reverse order. * since 'front' is now the first of the 'exact' we can run that part of the * array switching the front and back element. */ back = data->nspec - 1; while (front < back) { /* save the front */ memcpy(&spec, &spec_copy[front], len); /* move the back to the front */ memcpy(&spec_copy[front], &spec_copy[back], len); /* put the old front in the back */ memcpy(&spec_copy[back], &spec, len); front++; back--; } free(data->spec_arr); data->spec_arr = spec_copy; return 0; } /* Return the length of the text that can be considered the stem, returns 0 * if there is no identifiable stem */ static inline int get_stem_from_spec(const char *const buf) { const char *tmp = strchr(buf + 1, '/'); const char *ind; if (!tmp) return 0; for (ind = buf; ind < tmp; ind++) { if (strchr(".^$?*+|[({", (int)*ind)) return 0; } return tmp - buf; } /* * return the stemid given a string and a length */ static inline int find_stem(struct saved_data *data, const char *buf, int stem_len) { int i; for (i = 0; i < data->num_stems; i++) { if (stem_len == data->stem_arr[i].len && !strncmp(buf, data->stem_arr[i].buf, stem_len)) return i; } return -1; } /* returns the index of the new stored object */ static inline int store_stem(struct saved_data *data, char *buf, int stem_len) { int num = data->num_stems; if (data->alloc_stems == num) { struct stem *tmp_arr; data->alloc_stems = data->alloc_stems * 2 + 16; tmp_arr = realloc(data->stem_arr, sizeof(*tmp_arr) * data->alloc_stems); if (!tmp_arr) return -1; data->stem_arr = tmp_arr; } data->stem_arr[num].len = stem_len; data->stem_arr[num].buf = buf; data->num_stems++; return num; } /* find the stem of a file spec, returns the index into stem_arr for a new * or existing stem, (or -1 if there is no possible stem - IE for a file in * the root directory or a regex that is too complex for us). */ static inline int find_stem_from_spec(struct saved_data *data, const char *buf) { int stem_len = get_stem_from_spec(buf); int stemid; char *stem; if (!stem_len) return -1; stemid = find_stem(data, buf, stem_len); if (stemid >= 0) return stemid; /* not found, allocate a new one */ stem = strndup(buf, stem_len); if (!stem) return -1; return store_stem(data, stem, stem_len); } #endif /* _SELABEL_FILE_H_ */ libselinux-2.2.2/src/label_internal.h000066400000000000000000000047351226034601700176200ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * This file describes the internal interface used by the labeler * for calling the user-supplied memory allocation, validation, * and locking routine. * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #ifndef _SELABEL_INTERNAL_H_ #define _SELABEL_INTERNAL_H_ #include #include #include #include #include "dso.h" /* * Installed backends */ int selabel_file_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) hidden; int selabel_media_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) hidden; int selabel_x_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) hidden; int selabel_db_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) hidden; int selabel_property_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) hidden; /* * Labeling internal structures */ struct selabel_sub { char *src; int slen; char *dst; struct selabel_sub *next; }; extern struct selabel_sub *selabel_subs_init(const char *path, struct selabel_sub *list); struct selabel_lookup_rec { security_context_t ctx_raw; security_context_t ctx_trans; int validated; }; struct selabel_handle { /* arguments that were passed to selabel_open */ unsigned int backend; int validating; /* labeling operations */ struct selabel_lookup_rec *(*func_lookup) (struct selabel_handle *h, const char *key, int type); void (*func_close) (struct selabel_handle *h); void (*func_stats) (struct selabel_handle *h); /* supports backend-specific state information */ void *data; /* * The main spec file used. Note for file contexts the local and/or * homedirs could also have been used to resolve a context. */ char *spec_file; /* substitution support */ struct selabel_sub *dist_subs; struct selabel_sub *subs; }; /* * Validation function */ extern int selabel_validate(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selabel_lookup_rec *contexts) hidden; /* * Compatibility support */ extern int myprintf_compat; extern void __attribute__ ((format(printf, 1, 2))) (*myprintf) (const char *fmt,...); #define COMPAT_LOG(type, fmt...) if (myprintf_compat) \ myprintf(fmt); \ else \ selinux_log(type, fmt); extern int compat_validate(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selabel_lookup_rec *contexts, const char *path, unsigned lineno) hidden; #endif /* _SELABEL_INTERNAL_H_ */ libselinux-2.2.2/src/label_media.c000066400000000000000000000112531226034601700170470ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Media contexts backend for labeling system * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" /* * Internals */ /* A context specification. */ typedef struct spec { struct selabel_lookup_rec lr; /* holds contexts for lookup result */ char *key; /* key string */ int matches; /* number of matches made during operation */ } spec_t; struct saved_data { unsigned int nspec; spec_t *spec_arr; }; static int process_line(const char *path, char *line_buf, int pass, unsigned lineno, struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; int items; char *buf_p; char *key, *context; buf_p = line_buf; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; /* Skip comment lines and empty lines. */ if (*buf_p == '#' || *buf_p == 0) return 0; items = sscanf(line_buf, "%as %as ", &key, &context); if (items < 2) { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %d is missing fields, skipping\n", path, lineno); if (items == 1) free(key); return 0; } if (pass == 1) { data->spec_arr[data->nspec].key = key; data->spec_arr[data->nspec].lr.ctx_raw = context; } data->nspec++; if (pass == 0) { free(key); free(context); } return 0; } static int init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n) { FILE *fp; struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; const char *path = NULL; char *line_buf = NULL; size_t line_len = 0; int status = -1; unsigned int lineno, pass, maxnspec; struct stat sb; /* Process arguments */ while (n--) switch(opts[n].type) { case SELABEL_OPT_PATH: path = opts[n].value; break; } /* Open the specification file. */ if (!path) path = selinux_media_context_path(); if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) return -1; __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); if (fstat(fileno(fp), &sb) < 0) return -1; if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } rec->spec_file = strdup(path); /* * Perform two passes over the specification file. * The first pass counts the number of specifications and * performs simple validation of the input. At the end * of the first pass, the spec array is allocated. * The second pass performs detailed validation of the input * and fills in the spec array. */ maxnspec = UINT_MAX / sizeof(spec_t); for (pass = 0; pass < 2; pass++) { lineno = 0; data->nspec = 0; while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, fp) > 0 && data->nspec < maxnspec) { if (process_line(path, line_buf, pass, ++lineno, rec)) goto finish; } lineno = 0; if (pass == 0) { if (data->nspec == 0) { status = 0; goto finish; } data->spec_arr = malloc(sizeof(spec_t)*data->nspec); if (data->spec_arr == NULL) goto finish; memset(data->spec_arr, 0, sizeof(spec_t)*data->nspec); maxnspec = data->nspec; rewind(fp); } } free(line_buf); status = 0; finish: fclose(fp); return status; } /* * Backend interface routines */ static void close(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct spec *spec, *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { spec = &spec_arr[i]; free(spec->key); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); } if (spec_arr) free(spec_arr); memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); } static struct selabel_lookup_rec *lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int type __attribute__((unused))) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; spec_t *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { if (!strncmp(spec_arr[i].key, key, strlen(key) + 1)) break; if (!strncmp(spec_arr[i].key, "*", 2)) break; } if (i >= data->nspec) { /* No matching specification. */ errno = ENOENT; return NULL; } spec_arr[i].matches++; return &spec_arr[i].lr; } static void stats(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; unsigned int i, total = 0; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) total += data->spec_arr[i].matches; selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%u entries, %u matches made\n", data->nspec, total); } int selabel_media_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct saved_data *data; data = (struct saved_data *)malloc(sizeof(*data)); if (!data) return -1; memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); rec->data = data; rec->func_close = &close; rec->func_lookup = &lookup; rec->func_stats = &stats; return init(rec, opts, nopts); } libselinux-2.2.2/src/label_x.c000066400000000000000000000131211226034601700162330ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Media contexts backend for X contexts * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" /* * Internals */ /* A context specification. */ typedef struct spec { struct selabel_lookup_rec lr; /* holds contexts for lookup result */ char *key; /* key string */ int type; /* type of record (prop, ext, client) */ int matches; /* number of matches made during operation */ } spec_t; struct saved_data { unsigned int nspec; spec_t *spec_arr; }; static int process_line(const char *path, char *line_buf, int pass, unsigned lineno, struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; int items; char *buf_p; char *type, *key, *context; buf_p = line_buf; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; /* Skip comment lines and empty lines. */ if (*buf_p == '#' || *buf_p == 0) return 0; items = sscanf(line_buf, "%as %as %as ", &type, &key, &context); if (items < 3) { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %d is missing fields, skipping\n", path, lineno); if (items > 0) free(type); if (items > 1) free(key); return 0; } if (pass == 1) { /* Convert the type string to a mode format */ if (!strcmp(type, "property")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_PROP; else if (!strcmp(type, "extension")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_EXT; else if (!strcmp(type, "client")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_CLIENT; else if (!strcmp(type, "event")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_EVENT; else if (!strcmp(type, "selection")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_SELN; else if (!strcmp(type, "poly_property")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_POLYPROP; else if (!strcmp(type, "poly_selection")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_POLYSELN; else { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %d has invalid object type %s\n", path, lineno, type); return 0; } data->spec_arr[data->nspec].key = key; data->spec_arr[data->nspec].lr.ctx_raw = context; free(type); } data->nspec++; if (pass == 0) { free(type); free(key); free(context); } return 0; } static int init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n) { FILE *fp; struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; const char *path = NULL; char *line_buf = NULL; size_t line_len = 0; int status = -1; unsigned int lineno, pass, maxnspec; struct stat sb; /* Process arguments */ while (n--) switch(opts[n].type) { case SELABEL_OPT_PATH: path = opts[n].value; break; } /* Open the specification file. */ if (!path) path = selinux_x_context_path(); if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) return -1; __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); if (fstat(fileno(fp), &sb) < 0) return -1; if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } rec->spec_file = strdup(path); /* * Perform two passes over the specification file. * The first pass counts the number of specifications and * performs simple validation of the input. At the end * of the first pass, the spec array is allocated. * The second pass performs detailed validation of the input * and fills in the spec array. */ maxnspec = UINT_MAX / sizeof(spec_t); for (pass = 0; pass < 2; pass++) { lineno = 0; data->nspec = 0; while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, fp) > 0 && data->nspec < maxnspec) { if (process_line(path, line_buf, pass, ++lineno, rec)) goto finish; } lineno = 0; if (pass == 0) { if (data->nspec == 0) { status = 0; goto finish; } data->spec_arr = malloc(sizeof(spec_t)*data->nspec); if (data->spec_arr == NULL) goto finish; memset(data->spec_arr, 0, sizeof(spec_t)*data->nspec); maxnspec = data->nspec; rewind(fp); } } free(line_buf); status = 0; finish: fclose(fp); return status; } /* * Backend interface routines */ static void close(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct spec *spec, *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { spec = &spec_arr[i]; free(spec->key); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); } if (spec_arr) free(spec_arr); memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); } static struct selabel_lookup_rec *lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int type) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; spec_t *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { if (spec_arr[i].type != type) continue; if (!fnmatch(spec_arr[i].key, key, 0)) break; } if (i >= data->nspec) { /* No matching specification. */ errno = ENOENT; return NULL; } spec_arr[i].matches++; return &spec_arr[i].lr; } static void stats(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; unsigned int i, total = 0; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) total += data->spec_arr[i].matches; selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%u entries, %u matches made\n", data->nspec, total); } int selabel_x_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct saved_data *data; data = (struct saved_data *)malloc(sizeof(*data)); if (!data) return -1; memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); rec->data = data; rec->func_close = &close; rec->func_lookup = &lookup; rec->func_stats = &stats; return init(rec, opts, nopts); } libselinux-2.2.2/src/lgetfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000024201226034601700171200ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" int lgetfilecon_raw(const char *path, security_context_t * context) { char *buf; ssize_t size; ssize_t ret; size = INITCONTEXTLEN + 1; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) return -1; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = lgetxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0 && errno == ERANGE) { char *newbuf; size = lgetxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (size < 0) goto out; size++; newbuf = realloc(buf, size); if (!newbuf) goto out; buf = newbuf; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = lgetxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); } out: if (ret == 0) { /* Re-map empty attribute values to errors. */ errno = ENOTSUP; ret = -1; } if (ret < 0) free(buf); else *context = buf; return ret; } hidden_def(lgetfilecon_raw) int lgetfilecon(const char *path, security_context_t * context) { int ret; security_context_t rcontext; *context = NULL; ret = lgetfilecon_raw(path, &rcontext); if (ret > 0) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcontext, context); freecon(rcontext); } if (ret >= 0 && *context) return strlen(*context) + 1; return ret; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/libselinux.pc.in000066400000000000000000000004501226034601700175710ustar00rootroot00000000000000prefix=@prefix@ exec_prefix=${prefix} libdir=${exec_prefix}/@libdir@ includedir=@includedir@ Name: libselinux Description: SELinux utility library Version: @VERSION@ URL: http://userspace.selinuxproject.org/ Requires.private: libsepol libpcre Libs: -L${libdir} -lselinux Cflags: -I${includedir} libselinux-2.2.2/src/load_policy.c000066400000000000000000000274271226034601700171410ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include #include #include "policy.h" #include int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) { char path[PATH_MAX]; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/load", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) return -1; ret = write(fd, data, len); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; return 0; } hidden_def(security_load_policy) int load_setlocaldefs hidden = 1; #undef max #define max(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) int selinux_mkload_policy(int preservebools) { int kernvers = security_policyvers(); int maxvers = kernvers, minvers = DEFAULT_POLICY_VERSION, vers; int setlocaldefs = load_setlocaldefs; char path[PATH_MAX]; struct stat sb; struct utsname uts; size_t size; void *map, *data; int fd, rc = -1, prot; sepol_policydb_t *policydb; sepol_policy_file_t *pf; int usesepol = 0; int (*vers_max)(void) = NULL; int (*vers_min)(void) = NULL; int (*policy_file_create)(sepol_policy_file_t **) = NULL; void (*policy_file_free)(sepol_policy_file_t *) = NULL; void (*policy_file_set_mem)(sepol_policy_file_t *, char*, size_t) = NULL; int (*policydb_create)(sepol_policydb_t **) = NULL; void (*policydb_free)(sepol_policydb_t *) = NULL; int (*policydb_read)(sepol_policydb_t *, sepol_policy_file_t *) = NULL; int (*policydb_set_vers)(sepol_policydb_t *, unsigned int) = NULL; int (*policydb_to_image)(sepol_handle_t *, sepol_policydb_t *, void **, size_t *) = NULL; int (*genbools_array)(void *data, size_t len, char **names, int *values, int nel) = NULL; int (*genusers)(void *data, size_t len, const char *usersdir, void **newdata, size_t * newlen) = NULL; int (*genbools)(void *data, size_t len, char *boolpath) = NULL; #ifdef SHARED char *errormsg = NULL; void *libsepolh = NULL; libsepolh = dlopen("libsepol.so.1", RTLD_NOW); if (libsepolh) { usesepol = 1; dlerror(); #define DLERR() if ((errormsg = dlerror())) goto dlclose; vers_max = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policy_kern_vers_max"); DLERR(); vers_min = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policy_kern_vers_min"); DLERR(); policy_file_create = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policy_file_create"); DLERR(); policy_file_free = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policy_file_free"); DLERR(); policy_file_set_mem = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policy_file_set_mem"); DLERR(); policydb_create = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policydb_create"); DLERR(); policydb_free = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policydb_free"); DLERR(); policydb_read = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policydb_read"); DLERR(); policydb_set_vers = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policydb_set_vers"); DLERR(); policydb_to_image = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policydb_to_image"); DLERR(); genbools_array = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_genbools_array"); DLERR(); genusers = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_genusers"); DLERR(); genbools = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_genbools"); DLERR(); #undef DLERR } #else usesepol = 1; vers_max = sepol_policy_kern_vers_max; vers_min = sepol_policy_kern_vers_min; policy_file_create = sepol_policy_file_create; policy_file_free = sepol_policy_file_free; policy_file_set_mem = sepol_policy_file_set_mem; policydb_create = sepol_policydb_create; policydb_free = sepol_policydb_free; policydb_read = sepol_policydb_read; policydb_set_vers = sepol_policydb_set_vers; policydb_to_image = sepol_policydb_to_image; genbools_array = sepol_genbools_array; genusers = sepol_genusers; genbools = sepol_genbools; #endif /* * Check whether we need to support local boolean and user definitions. */ if (setlocaldefs) { if (access(selinux_booleans_path(), F_OK) == 0) goto checkbool; snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s.local", selinux_booleans_path()); if (access(path, F_OK) == 0) goto checkbool; snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/local.users", selinux_users_path()); if (access(path, F_OK) == 0) goto checkbool; /* No local definition files, so disable setlocaldefs. */ setlocaldefs = 0; } checkbool: /* * As of Linux 2.6.22, the kernel preserves boolean * values across a reload, so we do not need to * preserve them in userspace. */ if (preservebools && uname(&uts) == 0 && strverscmp(uts.release, "2.6.22") >= 0) preservebools = 0; if (usesepol) { maxvers = vers_max(); minvers = vers_min(); if (!setlocaldefs && !preservebools) maxvers = max(kernvers, maxvers); } vers = maxvers; search: snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s.%d", selinux_binary_policy_path(), vers); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); while (fd < 0 && errno == ENOENT && --vers >= minvers) { /* Check prior versions to see if old policy is available */ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s.%d", selinux_binary_policy_path(), vers); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); } if (fd < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Could not open policy file <= %s.%d: %s\n", selinux_binary_policy_path(), maxvers, strerror(errno)); goto dlclose; } if (fstat(fd, &sb) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Could not stat policy file %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); goto close; } prot = PROT_READ; if (setlocaldefs || preservebools) prot |= PROT_WRITE; size = sb.st_size; data = map = mmap(NULL, size, prot, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); if (map == MAP_FAILED) { fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Could not map policy file %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); goto close; } if (vers > kernvers && usesepol) { /* Need to downgrade to kernel-supported version. */ if (policy_file_create(&pf)) goto unmap; if (policydb_create(&policydb)) { policy_file_free(pf); goto unmap; } policy_file_set_mem(pf, data, size); if (policydb_read(policydb, pf)) { policy_file_free(pf); policydb_free(policydb); goto unmap; } if (policydb_set_vers(policydb, kernvers) || policydb_to_image(NULL, policydb, &data, &size)) { /* Downgrade failed, keep searching. */ fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Could not downgrade policy file %s, searching for an older version.\n", path); policy_file_free(pf); policydb_free(policydb); munmap(map, sb.st_size); close(fd); vers--; goto search; } policy_file_free(pf); policydb_free(policydb); } if (usesepol) { if (setlocaldefs) { void *olddata = data; size_t oldsize = size; rc = genusers(olddata, oldsize, selinux_users_path(), &data, &size); if (rc < 0) { /* Fall back to the prior image if genusers failed. */ data = olddata; size = oldsize; rc = 0; } else { if (olddata != map) free(olddata); } } #ifndef DISABLE_BOOL if (preservebools) { int *values, len, i; char **names; rc = security_get_boolean_names(&names, &len); if (!rc) { values = malloc(sizeof(int) * len); if (!values) goto unmap; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) values[i] = security_get_boolean_active(names[i]); (void)genbools_array(data, size, names, values, len); free(values); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) free(names[i]); free(names); } } else if (setlocaldefs) { (void)genbools(data, size, (char *)selinux_booleans_path()); } #endif } rc = security_load_policy(data, size); if (rc) fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Could not load policy file %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); unmap: if (data != map) free(data); munmap(map, sb.st_size); close: close(fd); dlclose: #ifdef SHARED if (errormsg) fprintf(stderr, "libselinux: %s\n", errormsg); if (libsepolh) dlclose(libsepolh); #endif return rc; } hidden_def(selinux_mkload_policy) /* * Mount point for selinuxfs. * This definition is private to the function below. * Everything else uses the location determined during * libselinux startup via /proc/mounts (see init_selinuxmnt). * We only need the hardcoded definition for the initial mount * required for the initial policy load. */ int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce) { int rc = 0, orig_enforce = 0, seconfig = -2, secmdline = -1; FILE *cfg; char *buf; /* * Reread the selinux configuration in case it has changed. * Example: Caller has chroot'd and is now loading policy from * chroot'd environment. */ selinux_reset_config(); /* * Get desired mode (disabled, permissive, enforcing) from * /etc/selinux/config. */ selinux_getenforcemode(&seconfig); /* Check for an override of the mode via the kernel command line. */ rc = mount("proc", "/proc", "proc", 0, 0); cfg = fopen("/proc/cmdline", "r"); if (cfg) { char *tmp; buf = malloc(selinux_page_size); if (!buf) { fclose(cfg); return -1; } if (fgets(buf, selinux_page_size, cfg) && (tmp = strstr(buf, "enforcing="))) { if (tmp == buf || isspace(*(tmp - 1))) { secmdline = atoi(tmp + sizeof("enforcing=") - 1); } } fclose(cfg); free(buf); } #ifndef MNT_DETACH #define MNT_DETACH 2 #endif if (rc == 0) umount2("/proc", MNT_DETACH); /* * Determine the final desired mode. * Command line argument takes precedence, then config file. */ if (secmdline >= 0) *enforce = secmdline; else if (seconfig >= 0) *enforce = seconfig; else *enforce = 0; /* unspecified or disabled */ /* * Check for the existence of SELinux via selinuxfs, and * mount it if present for use in the calls below. */ const char *mntpoint = NULL; /* First make sure /sys is mounted */ if (mount("sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", 0, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) { if (mount(SELINUXFS, SELINUXMNT, SELINUXFS, 0, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) { mntpoint = SELINUXMNT; } else { /* check old mountpoint */ if (mount(SELINUXFS, OLDSELINUXMNT, SELINUXFS, 0, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) { mntpoint = OLDSELINUXMNT; } } } else { /* check old mountpoint */ if (mount(SELINUXFS, OLDSELINUXMNT, SELINUXFS, 0, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) { mntpoint = OLDSELINUXMNT; } } if (! mntpoint ) { if (errno == ENODEV || !selinuxfs_exists()) { /* * SELinux was disabled in the kernel, either * omitted entirely or disabled at boot via selinux=0. * This takes precedence over any config or * commandline enforcing setting. */ *enforce = 0; } else { /* Only emit this error if selinux was not disabled */ fprintf(stderr, "Mount failed for selinuxfs on %s: %s\n", SELINUXMNT, strerror(errno)); } goto noload; } set_selinuxmnt(mntpoint); /* * Note: The following code depends on having selinuxfs * already mounted and selinuxmnt set above. */ if (seconfig == -1) { /* Runtime disable of SELinux. */ rc = security_disable(); if (rc == 0) { /* Successfully disabled, so umount selinuxfs too. */ umount(selinux_mnt); fini_selinuxmnt(); } /* * If we failed to disable, SELinux will still be * effectively permissive, because no policy is loaded. * No need to call security_setenforce(0) here. */ goto noload; } /* * If necessary, change the kernel enforcing status to match * the desired mode. */ orig_enforce = rc = security_getenforce(); if (rc < 0) goto noload; if (orig_enforce != *enforce) { rc = security_setenforce(*enforce); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Unable to switch to %s mode: %s\n", (*enforce ? "enforcing" : "permissive"), strerror(errno)); if (*enforce) goto noload; } } /* Load the policy. */ return selinux_mkload_policy(0); noload: /* * Only return 0 on a successful completion of policy load. * In any other case, we want to return an error so that init * knows not to proceed with the re-exec for the domain transition. * Depending on the *enforce setting, init will halt (> 0) or proceed * normally (otherwise). */ return -1; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/lsetfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000015571226034601700171460ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" int lsetfilecon_raw(const char *path, const security_context_t context) { int rc = lsetxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, strlen(context) + 1, 0); if (rc < 0 && errno == ENOTSUP) { security_context_t ccontext = NULL; int err = errno; if ((lgetfilecon_raw(path, &ccontext) >= 0) && (strcmp(context,ccontext) == 0)) { rc = 0; } else { errno = err; } freecon(ccontext); } return rc; } hidden_def(lsetfilecon_raw) int lsetfilecon(const char *path, const security_context_t context) { int ret; security_context_t rcontext; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context, &rcontext)) return -1; ret = lsetfilecon_raw(path, rcontext); freecon(rcontext); return ret; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/mapping.c000066400000000000000000000104131226034601700162610ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Class and permission mappings. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "mapping.h" /* * Class and permission mappings */ struct selinux_mapping { security_class_t value; /* real, kernel value */ unsigned num_perms; access_vector_t perms[sizeof(access_vector_t) * 8]; }; static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping = NULL; static security_class_t current_mapping_size = 0; /* * Mapping setting function */ int selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *map) { size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping); security_class_t i, j; unsigned k; free(current_mapping); current_mapping = NULL; current_mapping_size = 0; if (avc_reset() < 0) goto err; /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */ if (!map) { errno = EINVAL; goto err; } i = 0; while (map[i].name) i++; /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */ current_mapping = (struct selinux_mapping *)calloc(++i, size); if (!current_mapping) goto err; /* Store the raw class and permission values */ j = 0; while (map[j].name) { struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++); struct selinux_mapping *p_out = current_mapping + j; p_out->value = string_to_security_class(p_in->name); if (!p_out->value) goto err2; k = 0; while (p_in->perms[k]) { /* An empty permission string skips ahead */ if (!*p_in->perms[k]) { k++; continue; } p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(p_out->value, p_in->perms[k]); if (!p_out->perms[k]) goto err2; k++; } p_out->num_perms = k; } /* Set the mapping size here so the above lookups are "raw" */ current_mapping_size = i; return 0; err2: free(current_mapping); current_mapping = NULL; current_mapping_size = 0; err: return -1; } /* * Get real, kernel values from mapped values */ security_class_t unmap_class(security_class_t tclass) { if (tclass < current_mapping_size) return current_mapping[tclass].value; /* If here no mapping set or the class requested is not valid. */ if (current_mapping_size != 0) { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } else return tclass; } access_vector_t unmap_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t tperm) { if (tclass < current_mapping_size) { unsigned i; access_vector_t kperm = 0; for (i=0; iallowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) result |= 1<allowed = result; for (i=0, result=0; idecided & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) result |= 1<decided = result; for (i=0, result=0; iauditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) result |= 1<auditallow = result; for (i=0, result=0; iauditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) result |= 1<auditdeny = result; } } libselinux-2.2.2/src/mapping.h000066400000000000000000000016651226034601700162770ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * This file describes the class and permission mappings used to * hide the kernel numbers from userspace by allowing userspace object * managers to specify a list of classes and permissions. */ #ifndef _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_ #define _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_ #include /* * Get real, kernel values from mapped values */ extern security_class_t unmap_class(security_class_t tclass); extern access_vector_t unmap_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t tperm); /* * Get mapped values from real, kernel values */ extern security_class_t map_class(security_class_t kclass); extern access_vector_t map_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t kperm); extern void map_decision(security_class_t tclass, struct av_decision *avd); /*mapping is not used for embedded build*/ #ifdef DISABLE_AVC #define unmap_perm(x,y) y #define unmap_class(x) x #define map_decision(x,y) #endif #endif /* _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_ */ libselinux-2.2.2/src/matchmediacon.c000066400000000000000000000024531226034601700174270ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include int matchmediacon(const char *media, security_context_t * con) { const char *path = selinux_media_context_path(); FILE *infile; char *ptr, *ptr2 = NULL; int found = 0; char current_line[PATH_MAX]; if ((infile = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) return -1; while (!feof_unlocked(infile)) { if (!fgets_unlocked(current_line, sizeof(current_line), infile)) { return -1; } if (current_line[strlen(current_line) - 1]) current_line[strlen(current_line) - 1] = 0; /* Skip leading whitespace before the partial context. */ ptr = current_line; while (*ptr && isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; if (!(*ptr)) continue; /* Find the end of the media context. */ ptr2 = ptr; while (*ptr2 && !isspace(*ptr2)) ptr2++; if (!(*ptr2)) continue; *ptr2++ = 0; if (strcmp(media, ptr) == 0) { found = 1; break; } } fclose(infile); if (!found) return -1; /* Skip whitespace. */ while (*ptr2 && isspace(*ptr2)) ptr2++; if (!(*ptr2)) { return -1; } if (selinux_raw_to_trans_context(ptr2, con)) { *con = NULL; return -1; } return 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/matchpathcon.c000066400000000000000000000301241226034601700173000ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "label_internal.h" #include "callbacks.h" #include static __thread struct selabel_handle *hnd; /* * An array for mapping integers to contexts */ static __thread char **con_array; static __thread int con_array_size; static __thread int con_array_used; static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static pthread_key_t destructor_key; static int destructor_key_initialized = 0; static int add_array_elt(char *con) { if (con_array_size) { while (con_array_used >= con_array_size) { con_array_size *= 2; con_array = (char **)realloc(con_array, sizeof(char*) * con_array_size); if (!con_array) { con_array_size = con_array_used = 0; return -1; } } } else { con_array_size = 1000; con_array = (char **)malloc(sizeof(char*) * con_array_size); if (!con_array) { con_array_size = con_array_used = 0; return -1; } } con_array[con_array_used] = strdup(con); if (!con_array[con_array_used]) return -1; return con_array_used++; } static void free_array_elts(void) { con_array_size = con_array_used = 0; free(con_array); con_array = NULL; } static void #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((format(printf, 1, 2))) #endif default_printf(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); } void #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((format(printf, 1, 2))) #endif (*myprintf) (const char *fmt,...) = &default_printf; int myprintf_compat = 0; void set_matchpathcon_printf(void (*f) (const char *fmt, ...)) { myprintf = f ? f : &default_printf; myprintf_compat = 1; } static int (*myinvalidcon) (const char *p, unsigned l, char *c) = NULL; void set_matchpathcon_invalidcon(int (*f) (const char *p, unsigned l, char *c)) { myinvalidcon = f; } static int default_canoncon(const char *path, unsigned lineno, char **context) { char *tmpcon; if (security_canonicalize_context_raw(*context, &tmpcon) < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; if (lineno) myprintf("%s: line %u has invalid context %s\n", path, lineno, *context); else myprintf("%s: invalid context %s\n", path, *context); return 1; } free(*context); *context = tmpcon; return 0; } static int (*mycanoncon) (const char *p, unsigned l, char **c) = NULL; void set_matchpathcon_canoncon(int (*f) (const char *p, unsigned l, char **c)) { if (f) mycanoncon = f; else mycanoncon = &default_canoncon; } static __thread struct selinux_opt options[SELABEL_NOPT]; static __thread int notrans; void set_matchpathcon_flags(unsigned int flags) { int i; memset(options, 0, sizeof(options)); i = SELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY; options[i].type = i; options[i].value = (flags & MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY) ? (char*)1 : NULL; i = SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE; options[i].type = i; options[i].value = (flags & MATCHPATHCON_VALIDATE) ? (char*)1 : NULL; notrans = flags & MATCHPATHCON_NOTRANS; } /* * An association between an inode and a * specification. */ typedef struct file_spec { ino_t ino; /* inode number */ int specind; /* index of specification in spec */ char *file; /* full pathname for diagnostic messages about conflicts */ struct file_spec *next; /* next association in hash bucket chain */ } file_spec_t; /* * The hash table of associations, hashed by inode number. * Chaining is used for collisions, with elements ordered * by inode number in each bucket. Each hash bucket has a dummy * header. */ #define HASH_BITS 16 #define HASH_BUCKETS (1 << HASH_BITS) #define HASH_MASK (HASH_BUCKETS-1) static file_spec_t *fl_head; /* * Try to add an association between an inode and * a specification. If there is already an association * for the inode and it conflicts with this specification, * then use the specification that occurs later in the * specification array. */ int matchpathcon_filespec_add(ino_t ino, int specind, const char *file) { file_spec_t *prevfl, *fl; int h, ret; struct stat sb; if (!fl_head) { fl_head = malloc(sizeof(file_spec_t) * HASH_BUCKETS); if (!fl_head) goto oom; memset(fl_head, 0, sizeof(file_spec_t) * HASH_BUCKETS); } h = (ino + (ino >> HASH_BITS)) & HASH_MASK; for (prevfl = &fl_head[h], fl = fl_head[h].next; fl; prevfl = fl, fl = fl->next) { if (ino == fl->ino) { ret = lstat(fl->file, &sb); if (ret < 0 || sb.st_ino != ino) { fl->specind = specind; free(fl->file); fl->file = malloc(strlen(file) + 1); if (!fl->file) goto oom; strcpy(fl->file, file); return fl->specind; } if (!strcmp(con_array[fl->specind], con_array[specind])) return fl->specind; myprintf ("%s: conflicting specifications for %s and %s, using %s.\n", __FUNCTION__, file, fl->file, con_array[fl->specind]); free(fl->file); fl->file = malloc(strlen(file) + 1); if (!fl->file) goto oom; strcpy(fl->file, file); return fl->specind; } if (ino > fl->ino) break; } fl = malloc(sizeof(file_spec_t)); if (!fl) goto oom; fl->ino = ino; fl->specind = specind; fl->file = malloc(strlen(file) + 1); if (!fl->file) goto oom_freefl; strcpy(fl->file, file); fl->next = prevfl->next; prevfl->next = fl; return fl->specind; oom_freefl: free(fl); oom: myprintf("%s: insufficient memory for file label entry for %s\n", __FUNCTION__, file); return -1; } /* * Evaluate the association hash table distribution. */ void matchpathcon_filespec_eval(void) { file_spec_t *fl; int h, used, nel, len, longest; if (!fl_head) return; used = 0; longest = 0; nel = 0; for (h = 0; h < HASH_BUCKETS; h++) { len = 0; for (fl = fl_head[h].next; fl; fl = fl->next) { len++; } if (len) used++; if (len > longest) longest = len; nel += len; } myprintf ("%s: hash table stats: %d elements, %d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d\n", __FUNCTION__, nel, used, HASH_BUCKETS, longest); } /* * Destroy the association hash table. */ void matchpathcon_filespec_destroy(void) { file_spec_t *fl, *tmp; int h; free_array_elts(); if (!fl_head) return; for (h = 0; h < HASH_BUCKETS; h++) { fl = fl_head[h].next; while (fl) { tmp = fl; fl = fl->next; free(tmp->file); free(tmp); } fl_head[h].next = NULL; } free(fl_head); fl_head = NULL; } static void matchpathcon_thread_destructor(void __attribute__((unused)) *ptr) { matchpathcon_fini(); } void __attribute__((destructor)) matchpathcon_lib_destructor(void); void hidden __attribute__((destructor)) matchpathcon_lib_destructor(void) { if (destructor_key_initialized) __selinux_key_delete(destructor_key); } static void matchpathcon_init_once(void) { if (__selinux_key_create(&destructor_key, matchpathcon_thread_destructor) == 0) destructor_key_initialized = 1; } int matchpathcon_init_prefix(const char *path, const char *subset) { if (!mycanoncon) mycanoncon = default_canoncon; __selinux_once(once, matchpathcon_init_once); __selinux_setspecific(destructor_key, (void *)1); options[SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET].type = SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET; options[SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET].value = subset; options[SELABEL_OPT_PATH].type = SELABEL_OPT_PATH; options[SELABEL_OPT_PATH].value = path; hnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, options, SELABEL_NOPT); return hnd ? 0 : -1; } hidden_def(matchpathcon_init_prefix) int matchpathcon_init(const char *path) { return matchpathcon_init_prefix(path, NULL); } void matchpathcon_fini(void) { free_array_elts(); if (hnd) { selabel_close(hnd); hnd = NULL; } } /* * We do not want to resolve a symlink to a real path if it is the final * component of the name. Thus we split the pathname on the last "/" and * determine a real path component of the first portion. We then have to * copy the last part back on to get the final real path. Wheww. */ int realpath_not_final(const char *name, char *resolved_path) { char *last_component; char *tmp_path, *p; size_t len = 0; int rc = 0; tmp_path = strdup(name); if (!tmp_path) { myprintf("symlink_realpath(%s) strdup() failed: %s\n", name, strerror(errno)); rc = -1; goto out; } /* strip leading // */ while (tmp_path[len] && tmp_path[len] == '/' && tmp_path[len+1] && tmp_path[len+1] == '/') { tmp_path++; len++; } last_component = strrchr(tmp_path, '/'); if (last_component == tmp_path) { last_component++; p = strcpy(resolved_path, ""); } else if (last_component) { *last_component = '\0'; last_component++; p = realpath(tmp_path, resolved_path); } else { last_component = tmp_path; p = realpath("./", resolved_path); } if (!p) { myprintf("symlink_realpath(%s) realpath() failed: %s\n", name, strerror(errno)); rc = -1; goto out; } len = strlen(p); if (len + strlen(last_component) + 2 > PATH_MAX) { myprintf("symlink_realpath(%s) failed: Filename too long \n", name); errno=ENAMETOOLONG; rc = -1; goto out; } resolved_path += len; strcpy(resolved_path, "/"); resolved_path += 1; strcpy(resolved_path, last_component); out: free(tmp_path); return rc; } int matchpathcon(const char *path, mode_t mode, security_context_t * con) { char stackpath[PATH_MAX + 1]; char *p = NULL; if (!hnd && (matchpathcon_init_prefix(NULL, NULL) < 0)) return -1; if (S_ISLNK(mode)) { if (!realpath_not_final(path, stackpath)) path = stackpath; } else { p = realpath(path, stackpath); if (p) path = p; } return notrans ? selabel_lookup_raw(hnd, con, path, mode) : selabel_lookup(hnd, con, path, mode); } int matchpathcon_index(const char *name, mode_t mode, security_context_t * con) { int i = matchpathcon(name, mode, con); if (i < 0) return -1; return add_array_elt(*con); } void matchpathcon_checkmatches(char *str __attribute__((unused))) { selabel_stats(hnd); } /* Compare two contexts to see if their differences are "significant", * or whether the only difference is in the user. */ int selinux_file_context_cmp(const security_context_t a, const security_context_t b) { char *rest_a, *rest_b; /* Rest of the context after the user */ if (!a && !b) return 0; if (!a) return -1; if (!b) return 1; rest_a = strchr((char *)a, ':'); rest_b = strchr((char *)b, ':'); if (!rest_a && !rest_b) return 0; if (!rest_a) return -1; if (!rest_b) return 1; return strcmp(rest_a, rest_b); } int selinux_file_context_verify(const char *path, mode_t mode) { security_context_t con = NULL; security_context_t fcontext = NULL; int rc = 0; rc = lgetfilecon_raw(path, &con); if (rc == -1) { if (errno != ENOTSUP) return -1; else return 0; } if (!hnd && (matchpathcon_init_prefix(NULL, NULL) < 0)) return -1; if (selabel_lookup_raw(hnd, &fcontext, path, mode) != 0) { if (errno != ENOENT) rc = -1; else rc = 0; } else { /* * Need to set errno to 0 as it can be set to ENOENT if the * file_contexts.subs file does not exist (see selabel_open in * label.c), thus causing confusion if errno is checked on return. */ errno = 0; rc = (selinux_file_context_cmp(fcontext, con) == 0); } freecon(con); freecon(fcontext); return rc; } int selinux_lsetfilecon_default(const char *path) { struct stat st; int rc = -1; security_context_t scontext = NULL; if (lstat(path, &st) != 0) return rc; if (!hnd && (matchpathcon_init_prefix(NULL, NULL) < 0)) return -1; /* If there's an error determining the context, or it has none, return to allow default context */ if (selabel_lookup_raw(hnd, &scontext, path, st.st_mode)) { if (errno == ENOENT) rc = 0; } else { rc = lsetfilecon_raw(path, scontext); freecon(scontext); } return rc; } int compat_validate(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selabel_lookup_rec *contexts, const char *path, unsigned lineno) { int rc; char **ctx = &contexts->ctx_raw; if (myinvalidcon) rc = myinvalidcon(path, lineno, *ctx); else if (mycanoncon) rc = mycanoncon(path, lineno, ctx); else { rc = selabel_validate(rec, contexts); if (rc < 0) { if (lineno) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %d has invalid context %s\n", path, lineno, *ctx); } else { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: has invalid context %s\n", path, *ctx); } } } return rc ? -1 : 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/policy.h000066400000000000000000000012161226034601700161330ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _POLICY_H_ #define _POLICY_H_ /* Private definitions used internally by libselinux. */ /* xattr name for SELinux attributes. */ #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX "security.selinux" /* Initial length guess for getting contexts. */ #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 /* selinux file system type */ #define SELINUXFS "selinuxfs" /* selinuxfs magic number */ #define SELINUX_MAGIC 0xf97cff8c /* Preferred selinux mount location */ #define SELINUXMNT "/sys/fs/selinux" #define OLDSELINUXMNT "/selinux" /* selinuxfs mount point */ extern char *selinux_mnt; #define FILECONTEXTS "/etc/security/selinux/file_contexts" #define DEFAULT_POLICY_VERSION 15 #endif libselinux-2.2.2/src/policyvers.c000066400000000000000000000014151226034601700170270ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include "policy.h" #include "dso.h" #include int security_policyvers(void) { int fd, ret; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; unsigned vers = DEFAULT_POLICY_VERSION; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/policyvers", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) return vers; else return -1; } memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (sscanf(buf, "%u", &vers) != 1) return -1; return vers; } hidden_def(security_policyvers) libselinux-2.2.2/src/procattr.c000066400000000000000000000170061226034601700164710ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #define UNSET (const security_context_t) -1 static __thread pid_t cpid; static __thread pid_t tid; static __thread security_context_t prev_current = UNSET; static __thread security_context_t prev_exec = UNSET; static __thread security_context_t prev_fscreate = UNSET; static __thread security_context_t prev_keycreate = UNSET; static __thread security_context_t prev_sockcreate = UNSET; static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static pthread_key_t destructor_key; static int destructor_key_initialized = 0; static __thread char destructor_initialized; extern void *__dso_handle __attribute__ ((__weak__, __visibility__ ("hidden"))); extern int __register_atfork (void (*) (void), void (*) (void), void (*) (void), void *); static int __selinux_atfork (void (*prepare) (void), void (*parent) (void), void (*child) (void)) { return __register_atfork (prepare, parent, child, &__dso_handle == NULL ? NULL : __dso_handle); } static pid_t gettid(void) { return syscall(__NR_gettid); } static void procattr_thread_destructor(void __attribute__((unused)) *unused) { if (prev_current != UNSET) free(prev_current); if (prev_exec != UNSET) free(prev_exec); if (prev_fscreate != UNSET) free(prev_fscreate); if (prev_keycreate != UNSET) free(prev_keycreate); if (prev_sockcreate != UNSET) free(prev_sockcreate); } static void free_procattr(void) { procattr_thread_destructor(NULL); tid = 0; cpid = getpid(); prev_current = prev_exec = prev_fscreate = prev_keycreate = prev_sockcreate = UNSET; } void __attribute__((destructor)) procattr_destructor(void); void hidden __attribute__((destructor)) procattr_destructor(void) { if (destructor_key_initialized) __selinux_key_delete(destructor_key); } static inline void init_thread_destructor(void) { if (destructor_initialized == 0) { __selinux_setspecific(destructor_key, (void *)1); destructor_initialized = 1; } } static void init_procattr(void) { if (__selinux_key_create(&destructor_key, procattr_thread_destructor) == 0) { __selinux_atfork(NULL, NULL, free_procattr); destructor_key_initialized = 1; } } static int openattr(pid_t pid, const char *attr, int flags) { int fd, rc; char *path; if (cpid != getpid()) free_procattr(); if (pid > 0) rc = asprintf(&path, "/proc/%d/attr/%s", pid, attr); else { if (!tid) tid = gettid(); rc = asprintf(&path, "/proc/self/task/%d/attr/%s", tid, attr); } if (rc < 0) return -1; fd = open(path, flags | O_CLOEXEC); free(path); return fd; } static int getprocattrcon_raw(security_context_t * context, pid_t pid, const char *attr) { char *buf; size_t size; int fd; ssize_t ret; int errno_hold; security_context_t prev_context; __selinux_once(once, init_procattr); init_thread_destructor(); if (cpid != getpid()) free_procattr(); switch (attr[0]) { case 'c': prev_context = prev_current; break; case 'e': prev_context = prev_exec; break; case 'f': prev_context = prev_fscreate; break; case 'k': prev_context = prev_keycreate; break; case 's': prev_context = prev_sockcreate; break; case 'p': prev_context = NULL; break; default: errno = ENOENT; return -1; }; if (prev_context && prev_context != UNSET) { *context = strdup(prev_context); if (!(*context)) { return -1; } return 0; } fd = openattr(pid, attr, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } memset(buf, 0, size); do { ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR); if (ret < 0) goto out2; if (ret == 0) { *context = NULL; goto out2; } *context = strdup(buf); if (!(*context)) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: errno_hold = errno; close(fd); errno = errno_hold; return ret; } static int getprocattrcon(security_context_t * context, pid_t pid, const char *attr) { int ret; security_context_t rcontext; ret = getprocattrcon_raw(&rcontext, pid, attr); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcontext, context); freecon(rcontext); } return ret; } static int setprocattrcon_raw(security_context_t context, pid_t pid, const char *attr) { int fd; ssize_t ret; int errno_hold; security_context_t *prev_context; __selinux_once(once, init_procattr); init_thread_destructor(); if (cpid != getpid()) free_procattr(); switch (attr[0]) { case 'c': prev_context = &prev_current; break; case 'e': prev_context = &prev_exec; break; case 'f': prev_context = &prev_fscreate; break; case 'k': prev_context = &prev_keycreate; break; case 's': prev_context = &prev_sockcreate; break; default: errno = ENOENT; return -1; }; if (!context && !*prev_context) return 0; if (context && *prev_context && *prev_context != UNSET && !strcmp(context, *prev_context)) return 0; fd = openattr(pid, attr, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) return -1; if (context) { ret = -1; context = strdup(context); if (!context) goto out; do { ret = write(fd, context, strlen(context) + 1); } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR); } else { do { ret = write(fd, NULL, 0); /* clear */ } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR); } out: errno_hold = errno; close(fd); errno = errno_hold; if (ret < 0) { free(context); return -1; } else { if (*prev_context != UNSET) free(*prev_context); *prev_context = context; return 0; } } static int setprocattrcon(const security_context_t context, pid_t pid, const char *attr) { int ret; security_context_t rcontext; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context, &rcontext)) return -1; ret = setprocattrcon_raw(rcontext, pid, attr); freecon(rcontext); return ret; } #define getselfattr_def(fn, attr) \ int get##fn##_raw(security_context_t *c) \ { \ return getprocattrcon_raw(c, 0, #attr); \ } \ int get##fn(security_context_t *c) \ { \ return getprocattrcon(c, 0, #attr); \ } #define setselfattr_def(fn, attr) \ int set##fn##_raw(const security_context_t c) \ { \ return setprocattrcon_raw(c, 0, #attr); \ } \ int set##fn(const security_context_t c) \ { \ return setprocattrcon(c, 0, #attr); \ } #define all_selfattr_def(fn, attr) \ getselfattr_def(fn, attr) \ setselfattr_def(fn, attr) #define getpidattr_def(fn, attr) \ int get##fn##_raw(pid_t pid, security_context_t *c) \ { \ return getprocattrcon_raw(c, pid, #attr); \ } \ int get##fn(pid_t pid, security_context_t *c) \ { \ return getprocattrcon(c, pid, #attr); \ } all_selfattr_def(con, current) getpidattr_def(pidcon, current) getselfattr_def(prevcon, prev) all_selfattr_def(execcon, exec) all_selfattr_def(fscreatecon, fscreate) all_selfattr_def(sockcreatecon, sockcreate) all_selfattr_def(keycreatecon, keycreate) hidden_def(getcon_raw) hidden_def(getcon) hidden_def(getexeccon_raw) hidden_def(getfilecon_raw) hidden_def(getfilecon) hidden_def(getfscreatecon_raw) hidden_def(getkeycreatecon_raw) hidden_def(getpeercon_raw) hidden_def(getpidcon_raw) hidden_def(getprevcon_raw) hidden_def(getprevcon) hidden_def(getsockcreatecon_raw) hidden_def(setcon_raw) hidden_def(setexeccon_raw) hidden_def(setexeccon) hidden_def(setfilecon_raw) hidden_def(setfscreatecon_raw) hidden_def(setkeycreatecon_raw) hidden_def(setsockcreatecon_raw) libselinux-2.2.2/src/query_user_context.c000066400000000000000000000121061226034601700205760ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "context_internal.h" #include /* context_menu - given a list of contexts, presents a menu of security contexts * to the user. Returns the number (position in the list) of * the user selected context. */ static int context_menu(security_context_t * list) { int i; /* array index */ int choice = 0; /* index of the user's choice */ char response[10]; /* string to hold the user's response */ printf("\n\n"); for (i = 0; list[i]; i++) printf("[%d] %s\n", i + 1, list[i]); while ((choice < 1) || (choice > i)) { printf("Enter number of choice: "); fflush(stdin); if (fgets(response, sizeof(response), stdin) == NULL) continue; fflush(stdin); choice = strtol(response, NULL, 10); } return (choice - 1); } /* query_user_context - given a list of context, allow the user to choose one. The * default is the first context in the list. Returns 0 on * success, -1 on failure */ int query_user_context(security_context_t * list, security_context_t * usercon) { char response[10]; /* The user's response */ int choice; /* The index in the list of the sid chosen by the user */ if (!list[0]) return -1; printf("\nYour default context is %s.\n", list[0]); if (list[1]) { printf("Do you want to choose a different one? [n]"); fflush(stdin); if (fgets(response, sizeof(response), stdin) == NULL) return -1; fflush(stdin); if ((response[0] == 'y') || (response[0] == 'Y')) { choice = context_menu(list); *usercon = strdup(list[choice]); if (!(*usercon)) return -1; return 0; } *usercon = strdup(list[0]); if (!(*usercon)) return -1; } else { *usercon = strdup(list[0]); if (!(*usercon)) return -1; } return 0; } /* get_field - given fieldstr - the "name" of a field, query the user * and set the new value of the field */ static void get_field(const char *fieldstr, char *newfield, int newfieldlen) { int done = 0; /* true if a non-empty field has been obtained */ while (!done) { /* Keep going until we get a value for the field */ printf("\tEnter %s ", fieldstr); fflush(stdin); if (fgets(newfield, newfieldlen, stdin) == NULL) continue; fflush(stdin); if (newfield[strlen(newfield) - 1] == '\n') newfield[strlen(newfield) - 1] = '\0'; if (strlen(newfield) == 0) { printf("You must enter a %s\n", fieldstr); } else { done = 1; } } } /* manual_user_enter_context - provides a way for a user to manually enter a * context in case the policy doesn't allow a list * to be obtained. * given the userid, queries the user and places the * context chosen by the user into usercon. Returns 0 * on success. */ int manual_user_enter_context(const char *user, security_context_t * newcon) { char response[10]; /* Used to get yes or no answers from user */ char role[100]; /* The role requested by the user */ int rolelen = 100; char type[100]; /* The type requested by the user */ int typelen = 100; char level[100]; /* The level requested by the user */ int levellen = 100; int mls_enabled = is_selinux_mls_enabled(); context_t new_context; /* The new context chosen by the user */ char *user_context = NULL; /* String value of the user's context */ int done = 0; /* true if a valid sid has been obtained */ /* Initialize the context. How this is done depends on whether or not MLS is enabled */ if (mls_enabled) new_context = context_new("user:role:type:level"); else new_context = context_new("user:role:type"); if (!new_context) return -1; while (!done) { printf("Would you like to enter a security context? [y]"); if (fgets(response, sizeof(response), stdin) == NULL || (response[0] == 'n') || (response[0] == 'N')) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } /* Allow the user to enter each field of the context individually */ if (context_user_set(new_context, user)) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } get_field("role", role, rolelen); if (context_role_set(new_context, role)) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } get_field("type", type, typelen); if (context_type_set(new_context, type)) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } if (mls_enabled) { get_field("level", level, levellen); if (context_range_set(new_context, level)) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } } /* Get the string value of the context and see if it is valid. */ user_context = context_str(new_context); if (!user_context) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } if (!security_check_context(user_context)) done = 1; else printf("Not a valid security context\n"); } *newcon = strdup(user_context); context_free(new_context); if (!(*newcon)) return -1; return 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/rpm.c000066400000000000000000000022631226034601700154300ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "context_internal.h" int rpm_execcon(unsigned int verified __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]) { security_context_t mycon = NULL, fcon = NULL, newcon = NULL; context_t con = NULL; int rc = 0; if (is_selinux_enabled() < 1) return execve(filename, argv, envp); rc = getcon(&mycon); if (rc < 0) goto out; rc = getfilecon(filename, &fcon); if (rc < 0) goto out; rc = security_compute_create(mycon, fcon, SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newcon); if (rc < 0) goto out; if (!strcmp(mycon, newcon)) { /* No default transition, use rpm_script_t for now. */ rc = -1; con = context_new(mycon); if (!con) goto out; if (context_type_set(con, "rpm_script_t")) goto out; freecon(newcon); newcon = strdup(context_str(con)); if (!newcon) goto out; rc = 0; } rc = setexeccon(newcon); if (rc < 0) goto out; out: if (rc >= 0 || security_getenforce() < 1) rc = execve(filename, argv, envp); context_free(con); freecon(newcon); freecon(fcon); freecon(mycon); return rc < 0 ? rc : 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/selinux_check_securetty_context.c000066400000000000000000000020321226034601700233230ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "context_internal.h" int selinux_check_securetty_context(const security_context_t tty_context) { char *line = NULL; char *start, *end = NULL; size_t line_len = 0; ssize_t len; int found = -1; FILE *fp; fp = fopen(selinux_securetty_types_path(), "r"); if (fp) { context_t con = context_new(tty_context); if (con) { const char *type = context_type_get(con); while ((len = getline(&line, &line_len, fp)) != -1) { if (line[len - 1] == '\n') line[len - 1] = 0; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ start = line; while (*start && isspace(*start)) start++; if (!(*start)) continue; end = start; while (*end && !isspace(*end)) end++; if (*end) *end++ = 0; if (!strcmp(type, start)) { found = 0; break; } } free(line); context_free(con); } fclose(fp); } return found; } hidden_def(selinux_check_securetty_context) libselinux-2.2.2/src/selinux_config.c000066400000000000000000000252571226034601700176560ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "policy.h" #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "get_default_type_internal.h" #define SELINUXDIR "/etc/selinux/" #define SELINUXCONFIG SELINUXDIR "config" #define SELINUXDEFAULT "targeted" #define SELINUXTYPETAG "SELINUXTYPE=" #define SELINUXTAG "SELINUX=" #define SETLOCALDEFS "SETLOCALDEFS=" #define REQUIRESEUSERS "REQUIRESEUSERS=" /* Indices for file paths arrays. */ #define BINPOLICY 0 #define CONTEXTS_DIR 1 #define FILE_CONTEXTS 2 #define HOMEDIR_CONTEXTS 3 #define DEFAULT_CONTEXTS 4 #define USER_CONTEXTS 5 #define FAILSAFE_CONTEXT 6 #define DEFAULT_TYPE 7 #define BOOLEANS 8 #define MEDIA_CONTEXTS 9 #define REMOVABLE_CONTEXT 10 #define CUSTOMIZABLE_TYPES 11 #define USERS_DIR 12 #define SEUSERS 13 #define TRANSLATIONS 14 #define NETFILTER_CONTEXTS 15 #define FILE_CONTEXTS_HOMEDIR 16 #define FILE_CONTEXTS_LOCAL 17 #define SECURETTY_TYPES 18 #define X_CONTEXTS 19 #define COLORS 20 #define VIRTUAL_DOMAIN 21 #define VIRTUAL_IMAGE 22 #define FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS 23 #define SEPGSQL_CONTEXTS 24 #define FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS_DIST 25 #define LXC_CONTEXTS 26 #define BOOLEAN_SUBS 27 #define SYSTEMD_CONTEXTS 28 #define NEL 29 /* Part of one-time lazy init */ static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static void init_selinux_config(void); /* New layout is relative to SELINUXDIR/policytype. */ static char *file_paths[NEL]; #define L1(l) L2(l) #define L2(l)str##l static const union file_path_suffixes_data { struct { #define S_(n, s) char L1(__LINE__)[sizeof(s)]; #include "file_path_suffixes.h" #undef S_ }; char str[0]; } file_path_suffixes_data = { { #define S_(n, s) s, #include "file_path_suffixes.h" #undef S_ } }; static const uint16_t file_path_suffixes_idx[NEL] = { #define S_(n, s) [n] = offsetof(union file_path_suffixes_data, L1(__LINE__)), #include "file_path_suffixes.h" #undef S_ }; #undef L1 #undef L2 int selinux_getenforcemode(int *enforce) { int ret = -1; FILE *cfg = fopen(SELINUXCONFIG, "r"); if (cfg) { char *buf; int len = sizeof(SELINUXTAG) - 1; buf = malloc(selinux_page_size); if (!buf) { fclose(cfg); return -1; } while (fgets_unlocked(buf, selinux_page_size, cfg)) { if (strncmp(buf, SELINUXTAG, len)) continue; if (!strncasecmp (buf + len, "enforcing", sizeof("enforcing") - 1)) { *enforce = 1; ret = 0; break; } else if (!strncasecmp (buf + len, "permissive", sizeof("permissive") - 1)) { *enforce = 0; ret = 0; break; } else if (!strncasecmp (buf + len, "disabled", sizeof("disabled") - 1)) { *enforce = -1; ret = 0; break; } } fclose(cfg); free(buf); } return ret; } hidden_def(selinux_getenforcemode) static char *selinux_policytype; int selinux_getpolicytype(char **type) { __selinux_once(once, init_selinux_config); if (!selinux_policytype) return -1; *type = strdup(selinux_policytype); return *type ? 0 : -1; } hidden_def(selinux_getpolicytype) static int setpolicytype(const char *type) { free(selinux_policytype); selinux_policytype = strdup(type); return selinux_policytype ? 0 : -1; } static char *selinux_policyroot = NULL; static const char *selinux_rootpath = SELINUXDIR; static void init_selinux_config(void) { int i, *intptr; size_t line_len; ssize_t len; char *line_buf = NULL, *buf_p, *value, *type = NULL, *end; FILE *fp; if (selinux_policyroot) return; fp = fopen(SELINUXCONFIG, "r"); if (fp) { __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while ((len = getline(&line_buf, &line_len, fp)) > 0) { if (line_buf[len - 1] == '\n') line_buf[len - 1] = 0; buf_p = line_buf; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; if (*buf_p == '#' || *buf_p == 0) continue; if (!strncasecmp(buf_p, SELINUXTYPETAG, sizeof(SELINUXTYPETAG) - 1)) { selinux_policytype = type = strdup(buf_p + sizeof(SELINUXTYPETAG) - 1); if (!type) return; end = type + strlen(type) - 1; while ((end > type) && (isspace(*end) || iscntrl(*end))) { *end = 0; end--; } continue; } else if (!strncmp(buf_p, SETLOCALDEFS, sizeof(SETLOCALDEFS) - 1)) { value = buf_p + sizeof(SETLOCALDEFS) - 1; intptr = &load_setlocaldefs; } else if (!strncmp(buf_p, REQUIRESEUSERS, sizeof(REQUIRESEUSERS) - 1)) { value = buf_p + sizeof(REQUIRESEUSERS) - 1; intptr = &require_seusers; } else { continue; } if (isdigit(*value)) *intptr = atoi(value); else if (strncasecmp(value, "true", sizeof("true") - 1)) *intptr = 1; else if (strncasecmp (value, "false", sizeof("false") - 1)) *intptr = 0; } free(line_buf); fclose(fp); } if (!type) { selinux_policytype = type = strdup(SELINUXDEFAULT); if (!type) return; } if (asprintf(&selinux_policyroot, "%s%s", SELINUXDIR, type) == -1) return; for (i = 0; i < NEL; i++) if (asprintf(&file_paths[i], "%s%s", selinux_policyroot, file_path_suffixes_data.str + file_path_suffixes_idx[i]) == -1) return; } static void fini_selinux_policyroot(void) __attribute__ ((destructor)); static void fini_selinux_policyroot(void) { int i; free(selinux_policyroot); selinux_policyroot = NULL; for (i = 0; i < NEL; i++) { free(file_paths[i]); file_paths[i] = NULL; } free(selinux_policytype); selinux_policytype = NULL; } void selinux_reset_config(void) { fini_selinux_policyroot(); init_selinux_config(); } hidden_def(selinux_reset_config) static const char *get_path(int idx) { __selinux_once(once, init_selinux_config); return file_paths[idx]; } const char *selinux_default_type_path(void) { return get_path(DEFAULT_TYPE); } hidden_def(selinux_default_type_path) const char *selinux_policy_root(void) { __selinux_once(once, init_selinux_config); return selinux_policyroot; } int selinux_set_policy_root(const char *path) { int i; char *policy_type = strrchr(path, '/'); if (!policy_type) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } policy_type++; fini_selinuxmnt(); fini_selinux_policyroot(); selinux_policyroot = strdup(path); if (! selinux_policyroot) return -1; if (setpolicytype(policy_type) != 0) return -1; for (i = 0; i < NEL; i++) if (asprintf(&file_paths[i], "%s%s", selinux_policyroot, file_path_suffixes_data.str + file_path_suffixes_idx[i]) == -1) return -1; return 0; } const char *selinux_path(void) { return selinux_rootpath; } hidden_def(selinux_path) const char *selinux_default_context_path(void) { return get_path(DEFAULT_CONTEXTS); } hidden_def(selinux_default_context_path) const char *selinux_securetty_types_path(void) { return get_path(SECURETTY_TYPES); } hidden_def(selinux_securetty_types_path) const char *selinux_failsafe_context_path(void) { return get_path(FAILSAFE_CONTEXT); } hidden_def(selinux_failsafe_context_path) const char *selinux_removable_context_path(void) { return get_path(REMOVABLE_CONTEXT); } hidden_def(selinux_removable_context_path) const char *selinux_binary_policy_path(void) { return get_path(BINPOLICY); } hidden_def(selinux_binary_policy_path) const char *selinux_current_policy_path(void) { int rc = 0; int vers = 0; static char policy_path[PATH_MAX]; if (selinux_mnt) { snprintf(policy_path, sizeof(policy_path), "%s/policy", selinux_mnt); if (access(policy_path, F_OK) == 0 ) { return policy_path; } } vers = security_policyvers(); do { /* Check prior versions to see if old policy is available */ snprintf(policy_path, sizeof(policy_path), "%s.%d", selinux_binary_policy_path(), vers); } while ((rc = access(policy_path, F_OK)) && --vers > 0); if (rc) return NULL; return policy_path; } hidden_def(selinux_current_policy_path) const char *selinux_file_context_path(void) { return get_path(FILE_CONTEXTS); } hidden_def(selinux_file_context_path) const char *selinux_homedir_context_path(void) { return get_path(HOMEDIR_CONTEXTS); } hidden_def(selinux_homedir_context_path) const char *selinux_media_context_path(void) { return get_path(MEDIA_CONTEXTS); } hidden_def(selinux_media_context_path) const char *selinux_customizable_types_path(void) { return get_path(CUSTOMIZABLE_TYPES); } hidden_def(selinux_customizable_types_path) const char *selinux_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(CONTEXTS_DIR); } const char *selinux_user_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(USER_CONTEXTS); } hidden_def(selinux_user_contexts_path) const char *selinux_booleans_path(void) { return get_path(BOOLEANS); } hidden_def(selinux_booleans_path) const char *selinux_users_path(void) { return get_path(USERS_DIR); } hidden_def(selinux_users_path) const char *selinux_usersconf_path(void) { return get_path(SEUSERS); } hidden_def(selinux_usersconf_path) const char *selinux_translations_path(void) { return get_path(TRANSLATIONS); } hidden_def(selinux_translations_path) const char *selinux_colors_path(void) { return get_path(COLORS); } hidden_def(selinux_colors_path) const char *selinux_netfilter_context_path(void) { return get_path(NETFILTER_CONTEXTS); } hidden_def(selinux_netfilter_context_path) const char *selinux_file_context_homedir_path(void) { return get_path(FILE_CONTEXTS_HOMEDIR); } hidden_def(selinux_file_context_homedir_path) const char *selinux_file_context_local_path(void) { return get_path(FILE_CONTEXTS_LOCAL); } hidden_def(selinux_file_context_local_path) const char *selinux_x_context_path(void) { return get_path(X_CONTEXTS); } hidden_def(selinux_x_context_path) const char *selinux_virtual_domain_context_path(void) { return get_path(VIRTUAL_DOMAIN); } hidden_def(selinux_virtual_domain_context_path) const char *selinux_virtual_image_context_path(void) { return get_path(VIRTUAL_IMAGE); } hidden_def(selinux_virtual_image_context_path) const char *selinux_lxc_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(LXC_CONTEXTS); } hidden_def(selinux_lxc_contexts_path) const char *selinux_systemd_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(SYSTEMD_CONTEXTS); } hidden_def(selinux_systemd_contexts_path) const char * selinux_booleans_subs_path(void) { return get_path(BOOLEAN_SUBS); } hidden_def(selinux_booleans_subs_path) const char * selinux_file_context_subs_path(void) { return get_path(FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS); } hidden_def(selinux_file_context_subs_path) const char * selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path(void) { return get_path(FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS_DIST); } hidden_def(selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path) const char *selinux_sepgsql_context_path(void) { return get_path(SEPGSQL_CONTEXTS); } hidden_def(selinux_sepgsql_context_path) libselinux-2.2.2/src/selinux_internal.h000066400000000000000000000117421226034601700202240ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include "dso.h" hidden_proto(selinux_mkload_policy) hidden_proto(fini_selinuxmnt) hidden_proto(set_selinuxmnt) hidden_proto(selinuxfs_exists) hidden_proto(security_disable) hidden_proto(security_policyvers) hidden_proto(security_load_policy) hidden_proto(security_get_boolean_active) hidden_proto(security_get_boolean_names) hidden_proto(security_set_boolean) hidden_proto(security_commit_booleans) hidden_proto(security_check_context) hidden_proto(security_check_context_raw) hidden_proto(security_canonicalize_context) hidden_proto(security_canonicalize_context_raw) hidden_proto(security_compute_av) hidden_proto(security_compute_av_raw) hidden_proto(security_compute_av_flags) hidden_proto(security_compute_av_flags_raw) hidden_proto(security_compute_user) hidden_proto(security_compute_user_raw) hidden_proto(security_compute_create) hidden_proto(security_compute_create_raw) hidden_proto(security_compute_create_name) hidden_proto(security_compute_create_name_raw) hidden_proto(security_compute_member_raw) hidden_proto(security_compute_relabel_raw) hidden_proto(is_selinux_enabled) hidden_proto(is_selinux_mls_enabled) hidden_proto(freecon) hidden_proto(freeconary) hidden_proto(getprevcon) hidden_proto(getprevcon_raw) hidden_proto(getcon) hidden_proto(getcon_raw) hidden_proto(setcon_raw) hidden_proto(getpeercon_raw) hidden_proto(getpidcon_raw) hidden_proto(getexeccon_raw) hidden_proto(getfilecon) hidden_proto(getfilecon_raw) hidden_proto(lgetfilecon_raw) hidden_proto(fgetfilecon_raw) hidden_proto(setfilecon_raw) hidden_proto(lsetfilecon_raw) hidden_proto(fsetfilecon_raw) hidden_proto(setexeccon) hidden_proto(setexeccon_raw) hidden_proto(getfscreatecon_raw) hidden_proto(getkeycreatecon_raw) hidden_proto(getsockcreatecon_raw) hidden_proto(setfscreatecon_raw) hidden_proto(setkeycreatecon_raw) hidden_proto(setsockcreatecon_raw) hidden_proto(security_getenforce) hidden_proto(security_setenforce) hidden_proto(security_deny_unknown) hidden_proto(selinux_boolean_sub) hidden_proto(selinux_current_policy_path) hidden_proto(selinux_binary_policy_path) hidden_proto(selinux_booleans_subs_path) hidden_proto(selinux_default_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_securetty_types_path) hidden_proto(selinux_failsafe_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_removable_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_virtual_domain_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_virtual_image_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_lxc_contexts_path) hidden_proto(selinux_file_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_file_context_homedir_path) hidden_proto(selinux_file_context_local_path) hidden_proto(selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path) hidden_proto(selinux_file_context_subs_path) hidden_proto(selinux_netfilter_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_homedir_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_user_contexts_path) hidden_proto(selinux_booleans_path) hidden_proto(selinux_customizable_types_path) hidden_proto(selinux_media_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_x_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_sepgsql_context_path) hidden_proto(selinux_systemd_contexts_path) hidden_proto(selinux_path) hidden_proto(selinux_check_passwd_access) hidden_proto(selinux_check_securetty_context) hidden_proto(matchpathcon_init_prefix) hidden_proto(selinux_users_path) hidden_proto(selinux_usersconf_path); hidden_proto(selinux_translations_path); hidden_proto(selinux_colors_path); hidden_proto(selinux_getenforcemode); hidden_proto(selinux_getpolicytype); hidden_proto(selinux_raw_to_trans_context); hidden_proto(selinux_trans_to_raw_context); hidden_proto(selinux_raw_context_to_color); hidden_proto(security_get_initial_context); hidden_proto(security_get_initial_context_raw); hidden_proto(selinux_reset_config); extern int load_setlocaldefs hidden; extern int require_seusers hidden; extern int selinux_page_size hidden; /* Make pthread_once optional */ #pragma weak pthread_once #pragma weak pthread_key_create #pragma weak pthread_key_delete #pragma weak pthread_setspecific /* Call handler iff the first call. */ #define __selinux_once(ONCE_CONTROL, INIT_FUNCTION) \ do { \ if (pthread_once != NULL) \ pthread_once (&(ONCE_CONTROL), (INIT_FUNCTION)); \ else if ((ONCE_CONTROL) == PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT) { \ INIT_FUNCTION (); \ (ONCE_CONTROL) = 2; \ } \ } while (0) /* Pthread key macros */ #define __selinux_key_create(KEY, DESTRUCTOR) \ (pthread_key_create != NULL ? pthread_key_create(KEY, DESTRUCTOR) : -1) #define __selinux_key_delete(KEY) \ do { \ if (pthread_key_delete != NULL) \ pthread_key_delete(KEY); \ } while (0) #define __selinux_setspecific(KEY, VALUE) \ do { \ if (pthread_setspecific != NULL) \ pthread_setspecific(KEY, VALUE); \ } while (0) libselinux-2.2.2/src/selinux_netlink.h000066400000000000000000000011541226034601700200500ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Netlink event notifications for SELinux. * * Author: James Morris */ #ifndef _LINUX_SELINUX_NETLINK_H #define _LINUX_SELINUX_NETLINK_H /* Message types. */ #define SELNL_MSG_BASE 0x10 enum { SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE = SELNL_MSG_BASE, SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD, SELNL_MSG_MAX }; /* Multicast groups */ #define SELNL_GRP_NONE 0x00000000 #define SELNL_GRP_AVC 0x00000001 /* AVC notifications */ #define SELNL_GRP_ALL 0xffffffff /* Message structures */ struct selnl_msg_setenforce { int32_t val; }; struct selnl_msg_policyload { uint32_t seqno; }; #endif /* _LINUX_SELINUX_NETLINK_H */ libselinux-2.2.2/src/selinuxswig.i000066400000000000000000000032721226034601700172220ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Authors: Dan Walsh * James Athey */ %module selinux %{ #include "../include/selinux/avc.h" #include "../include/selinux/av_permissions.h" #include "../include/selinux/context.h" #include "../include/selinux/flask.h" #include "../include/selinux/get_context_list.h" #include "../include/selinux/get_default_type.h" #include "../include/selinux/label.h" #include "../include/selinux/selinux.h" %} %apply int *OUTPUT { int *enforce }; %apply int *OUTPUT { size_t * }; %typedef unsigned mode_t; %typedef unsigned pid_t; %typemap(in, numinputs=0) (char ***names, int *len) (char **temp1, int temp2) { $1 = &temp1; $2 = &temp2; } %typemap(freearg) (char ***names, int *len) { int i; if (*$1) { for (i = 0; i < *$2; i++) { free((*$1)[i]); } free(*$1); } } %typemap(in, numinputs=0) (security_context_t **) (security_context_t *temp) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(freearg) (security_context_t **) { if (*$1) freeconary(*$1); } /* Ignore functions that don't make sense when wrapped */ %ignore freecon; %ignore freeconary; /* Ignore functions that take a function pointer as an argument */ %ignore set_matchpathcon_printf; %ignore set_matchpathcon_invalidcon; %ignore set_matchpathcon_canoncon; %ignore avc_add_callback; /* Ignore netlink stuff for now */ %ignore avc_netlink_acquire_fd; %ignore avc_netlink_release_fd; %ignore avc_netlink_check_nb; %include "../include/selinux/avc.h" %include "../include/selinux/av_permissions.h" %include "../include/selinux/context.h" %include "../include/selinux/flask.h" %include "../include/selinux/get_context_list.h" %include "../include/selinux/get_default_type.h" %include "../include/selinux/label.h" %include "../include/selinux/selinux.h" libselinux-2.2.2/src/selinuxswig_python.i000066400000000000000000000107341226034601700206240ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Author: James Athey */ %module selinux %{ #include "selinux/selinux.h" %} %pythoncode %{ import shutil, os, stat DISABLED = -1 PERMISSIVE = 0 ENFORCING = 1 def restorecon(path, recursive=False): """ Restore SELinux context on a given path """ try: mode = os.lstat(path)[stat.ST_MODE] status, context = matchpathcon(path, mode) except OSError: path = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(path)) mode = os.lstat(path)[stat.ST_MODE] status, context = matchpathcon(path, mode) if status == 0: status, oldcontext = lgetfilecon(path) if context != oldcontext: lsetfilecon(path, context) if recursive: os.path.walk(path, lambda arg, dirname, fnames: map(restorecon, [os.path.join(dirname, fname) for fname in fnames]), None) def chcon(path, context, recursive=False): """ Set the SELinux context on a given path """ lsetfilecon(path, context) if recursive: for root, dirs, files in os.walk(path): for name in files + dirs: lsetfilecon(os.path.join(root,name), context) def copytree(src, dest): """ An SELinux-friendly shutil.copytree method """ shutil.copytree(src, dest) restorecon(dest, recursive=True) def install(src, dest): """ An SELinux-friendly shutil.move method """ shutil.move(src, dest) restorecon(dest, recursive=True) %} /* security_get_boolean_names() typemap */ %typemap(argout) (char ***names, int *len) { PyObject* list = PyList_New(*$2); int i; for (i = 0; i < *$2; i++) { PyList_SetItem(list, i, PyBytes_FromString((*$1)[i])); } $result = SWIG_Python_AppendOutput($result, list); } /* return a sid along with the result */ %typemap(argout) (security_id_t * sid) { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_NewPointerObj(*$1, $descriptor(security_id_t), 0)); } else { Py_INCREF(Py_None); %append_output(Py_None); } } %typemap(in,numinputs=0) security_id_t *(security_id_t temp) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(in, numinputs=0) void *(char *temp=NULL) { $1 = temp; } /* Makes security_compute_user() return a Python list of contexts */ %typemap(argout) (security_context_t **con) { PyObject* plist; int i, len = 0; if (*$1) { while((*$1)[len]) len++; plist = PyList_New(len); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { PyList_SetItem(plist, i, PyBytes_FromString((*$1)[i]) ); } } else { plist = PyList_New(0); } $result = SWIG_Python_AppendOutput($result, plist); } /* Makes functions in get_context_list.h return a Python list of contexts */ %typemap(argout) (security_context_t **list) { PyObject* plist; int i; if (*$1) { plist = PyList_New(result); for (i = 0; i < result; i++) { PyList_SetItem(plist, i, PyBytes_FromString((*$1)[i]) ); } } else { plist = PyList_New(0); } /* Only return the Python list, don't need to return the length anymore */ $result = plist; } %typemap(in,noblock=1,numinputs=0) security_context_t * (security_context_t temp = 0) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(freearg,match="in") security_context_t * ""; %typemap(argout,noblock=1) security_context_t * { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_FromCharPtr(*$1)); freecon(*$1); } else { Py_INCREF(Py_None); %append_output(Py_None); } } %typemap(in,noblock=1,numinputs=0) char ** (char * temp = 0) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(freearg,match="in") char ** ""; %typemap(argout,noblock=1) char ** { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_FromCharPtr(*$1)); free(*$1); } else { Py_INCREF(Py_None); %append_output(Py_None); } } %typemap(in) char * const [] { int i, size; PyObject * s; if (!PySequence_Check($input)) { PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError, "Expected a sequence"); return NULL; } size = PySequence_Size($input); $1 = (char**) malloc(size + 1); for(i = 0; i < size; i++) { if (!PyBytes_Check(PySequence_GetItem($input, i))) { PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError, "Sequence must contain only bytes"); return NULL; } } for(i = 0; i < size; i++) { s = PySequence_GetItem($input, i); $1[i] = (char*) malloc(PyBytes_Size(s) + 1); strcpy($1[i], PyBytes_AsString(s)); } $1[size] = NULL; } %typemap(freearg,match="in") char * const [] { int i = 0; while($1[i]) { free($1[i]); i++; } free($1); } %include "selinuxswig_python_exception.i" %include "selinuxswig.i" libselinux-2.2.2/src/selinuxswig_ruby.i000066400000000000000000000020251226034601700202560ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Author: Dan Walsh Based on selinuxswig_python.i by James Athey */ %module selinux %{ #include "selinux/selinux.h" %} /* return a sid along with the result */ %typemap(argout) (security_id_t * sid) { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_NewPointerObj(*$1, $descriptor(security_id_t), 0)); } } %typemap(in,numinputs=0) security_id_t *(security_id_t temp) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(in,noblock=1,numinputs=0) security_context_t * (security_context_t temp = 0) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(freearg,match="in") security_context_t * ""; %typemap(argout,noblock=1) security_context_t * { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_FromCharPtr(*$1)); freecon(*$1); } } %typemap(in,noblock=1,numinputs=0) char ** (char * temp = 0) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(freearg,match="in") char ** ""; %typemap(argout,noblock=1) char ** { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_FromCharPtr(*$1)); free(*$1); } } %typemap(freearg,match="in") char * const [] { int i = 0; while($1[i]) { free($1[i]); i++; } free($1); } %include "selinuxswig.i" libselinux-2.2.2/src/sestatus.c000066400000000000000000000171101226034601700165020ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * sestatus.c * * APIs to reference SELinux kernel status page (/selinux/status) * * Author: KaiGai Kohei * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "avc_internal.h" #include "policy.h" /* * copied from the selinux/include/security.h */ struct selinux_status_t { uint32_t version; /* version number of thie structure */ uint32_t sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */ uint32_t enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */ uint32_t policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */ uint32_t deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */ /* version > 0 support above status */ } __attribute((packed)); /* * `selinux_status' * * NULL : not initialized yet * MAP_FAILED : opened, but fallback-mode * Valid Pointer : opened and mapped correctly */ static struct selinux_status_t *selinux_status = NULL; static int selinux_status_fd; static uint32_t last_seqno; static uint32_t fallback_sequence; static int fallback_enforcing; static int fallback_policyload; /* * read_sequence * * A utility routine to reference kernel status page according to * seqlock logic. Since selinux_status->sequence is an odd value during * the kernel status page being updated, we try to synchronize completion * of this updating, but we assume it is rare. * The sequence is almost even number. * * __sync_synchronize is a portable memory barrier for various kind * of architecture that is supported by GCC. */ static inline uint32_t read_sequence(struct selinux_status_t *status) { uint32_t seqno = 0; do { /* * No need for sched_yield() in the first trial of * this loop. */ if (seqno & 0x0001) sched_yield(); seqno = status->sequence; __sync_synchronize(); } while (seqno & 0x0001); return seqno; } /* * selinux_status_updated * * It returns whether something has been happened since the last call. * Because `selinux_status->sequence' shall be always incremented on * both of setenforce/policyreload events, so differences from the last * value informs us something has been happened. */ int selinux_status_updated(void) { uint32_t curr_seqno; int result = 0; if (selinux_status == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) { if (avc_netlink_check_nb() < 0) return -1; curr_seqno = fallback_sequence; } else { curr_seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status); } /* * `curr_seqno' is always even-number, so it does not match with * `last_seqno' being initialized to odd-number in the first call. * We never return 'something was updated' in the first call, * because this function focuses on status-updating since the last * invocation. */ if (last_seqno & 0x0001) last_seqno = curr_seqno; if (last_seqno != curr_seqno) { last_seqno = curr_seqno; result = 1; } return result; } /* * selinux_status_getenforce * * It returns the current performing mode of SELinux. * 1 means currently we run in enforcing mode, or 0 means permissive mode. */ int selinux_status_getenforce(void) { uint32_t seqno; uint32_t enforcing; if (selinux_status == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) { if (avc_netlink_check_nb() < 0) return -1; return fallback_enforcing; } /* sequence must not be changed during references */ do { seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status); enforcing = selinux_status->enforcing; } while (seqno != read_sequence(selinux_status)); return enforcing ? 1 : 0; } /* * selinux_status_policyload * * It returns times of policy reloaded on the running system. * Note that it is not a reliable value on fallback-mode until it receives * the first event message via netlink socket, so, a correct usage of this * value is to compare it with the previous value to detect policy reloaded * event. */ int selinux_status_policyload(void) { uint32_t seqno; uint32_t policyload; if (selinux_status == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) { if (avc_netlink_check_nb() < 0) return -1; return fallback_policyload; } /* sequence must not be changed during references */ do { seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status); policyload = selinux_status->policyload; } while (seqno != read_sequence(selinux_status)); return policyload; } /* * selinux_status_deny_unknown * * It returns a guideline to handle undefined object classes or permissions. * 0 means SELinux treats policy queries on undefined stuff being allowed, * however, 1 means such queries are denied. */ int selinux_status_deny_unknown(void) { uint32_t seqno; uint32_t deny_unknown; if (selinux_status == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) return security_deny_unknown(); /* sequence must not be changed during references */ do { seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status); deny_unknown = selinux_status->deny_unknown; } while (seqno != read_sequence(selinux_status)); return deny_unknown ? 1 : 0; } /* * callback routines for fallback case using netlink socket */ static int fallback_cb_setenforce(int enforcing) { fallback_sequence += 2; fallback_enforcing = enforcing; return 0; } static int fallback_cb_policyload(int policyload) { fallback_sequence += 2; fallback_policyload = policyload; return 0; } /* * selinux_status_open * * It tries to open and mmap kernel status page (/selinux/status). * Since Linux 2.6.37 or later supports this feature, we may run * fallback routine using a netlink socket on older kernels, if * the supplied `fallback' is not zero. * It returns 0 on success, or -1 on error. */ int selinux_status_open(int fallback) { int fd; char path[PATH_MAX]; long pagesize; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); if (pagesize < 0) return -1; snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/status", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) goto error; selinux_status = mmap(NULL, pagesize, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) { close(fd); goto error; } selinux_status_fd = fd; last_seqno = (uint32_t)(-1); return 0; error: /* * If caller wants fallback routine, we try to provide * an equivalent functionality using existing netlink * socket, although it needs system call invocation to * receive event notification. */ if (fallback && avc_netlink_open(0) == 0) { union selinux_callback cb; /* register my callbacks */ cb.func_setenforce = fallback_cb_setenforce; selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_SETENFORCE, cb); cb.func_policyload = fallback_cb_policyload; selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD, cb); /* mark as fallback mode */ selinux_status = MAP_FAILED; selinux_status_fd = avc_netlink_acquire_fd(); last_seqno = (uint32_t)(-1); fallback_sequence = 0; fallback_enforcing = security_getenforce(); fallback_policyload = 0; return 1; } selinux_status = NULL; return -1; } /* * selinux_status_close * * It unmap and close the kernel status page, or close netlink socket * if fallback mode. */ void selinux_status_close(void) { long pagesize; /* not opened */ if (selinux_status == NULL) return; /* fallback-mode */ if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) { avc_netlink_release_fd(); avc_netlink_close(); selinux_status = NULL; return; } pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); /* not much we can do other than leak memory */ if (pagesize > 0) munmap(selinux_status, pagesize); selinux_status = NULL; close(selinux_status_fd); selinux_status_fd = -1; last_seqno = (uint32_t)(-1); } libselinux-2.2.2/src/setenforce.c000066400000000000000000000011651226034601700167670ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include int security_setenforce(int value) { int fd, ret; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/enforce", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) return -1; snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d", value); ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; return 0; } hidden_def(security_setenforce) libselinux-2.2.2/src/setfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000015501226034601700167630ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" int setfilecon_raw(const char *path, const security_context_t context) { int rc = setxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, strlen(context) + 1, 0); if (rc < 0 && errno == ENOTSUP) { security_context_t ccontext = NULL; int err = errno; if ((getfilecon_raw(path, &ccontext) >= 0) && (strcmp(context,ccontext) == 0)) { rc = 0; } else { errno = err; } freecon(ccontext); } return rc; } hidden_def(setfilecon_raw) int setfilecon(const char *path, const security_context_t context) { int ret; security_context_t rcontext; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context, &rcontext)) return -1; ret = setfilecon_raw(path, rcontext); freecon(rcontext); return ret; } libselinux-2.2.2/src/setrans_client.c000066400000000000000000000215551226034601700176540ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Author: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * * Modified: * Yuichi Nakamura - Stubs are used when DISABLE_SETRANS is defined, it is to reduce size for such as embedded devices. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "dso.h" #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "setrans_internal.h" #ifndef DISABLE_SETRANS static int mls_enabled = -1; // Simple cache static __thread security_context_t prev_t2r_trans = NULL; static __thread security_context_t prev_t2r_raw = NULL; static __thread security_context_t prev_r2t_trans = NULL; static __thread security_context_t prev_r2t_raw = NULL; static __thread char *prev_r2c_trans = NULL; static __thread security_context_t prev_r2c_raw = NULL; static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static pthread_key_t destructor_key; static int destructor_key_initialized = 0; static __thread char destructor_initialized; /* * setransd_open * * This function opens a socket to the setransd. * Returns: on success, a file descriptor ( >= 0 ) to the socket * on error, a negative value */ static int setransd_open(void) { struct sockaddr_un addr; int fd; #ifdef SOCK_CLOEXEC fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); if (fd < 0 && errno == EINVAL) #endif { fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (fd >= 0) if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC)) { close(fd); return -1; } } if (fd < 0) return -1; memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strncpy(addr.sun_path, SETRANS_UNIX_SOCKET, sizeof(addr.sun_path)); if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) { close(fd); return -1; } return fd; } /* Returns: 0 on success, <0 on failure */ static int send_request(int fd, uint32_t function, const char *data1, const char *data2) { struct msghdr msgh; struct iovec iov[5]; uint32_t data1_size; uint32_t data2_size; ssize_t count, expected; unsigned int i; if (fd < 0) return -1; if (!data1) data1 = ""; if (!data2) data2 = ""; data1_size = strlen(data1) + 1; data2_size = strlen(data2) + 1; iov[0].iov_base = &function; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(function); iov[1].iov_base = &data1_size; iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(data1_size); iov[2].iov_base = &data2_size; iov[2].iov_len = sizeof(data2_size); iov[3].iov_base = (char *)data1; iov[3].iov_len = data1_size; iov[4].iov_base = (char *)data2; iov[4].iov_len = data2_size; memset(&msgh, 0, sizeof(msgh)); msgh.msg_iov = iov; msgh.msg_iovlen = sizeof(iov) / sizeof(iov[0]); expected = 0; for (i = 0; i < sizeof(iov) / sizeof(iov[0]); i++) expected += iov[i].iov_len; while (((count = sendmsg(fd, &msgh, MSG_NOSIGNAL)) < 0) && (errno == EINTR)) ; if (count < 0 || count != expected) return -1; return 0; } /* Returns: 0 on success, <0 on failure */ static int receive_response(int fd, uint32_t function, char **outdata, int32_t * ret_val) { struct iovec resp_hdr[3]; uint32_t func; uint32_t data_size; char *data; struct iovec resp_data; ssize_t count; if (fd < 0) return -1; resp_hdr[0].iov_base = &func; resp_hdr[0].iov_len = sizeof(func); resp_hdr[1].iov_base = &data_size; resp_hdr[1].iov_len = sizeof(data_size); resp_hdr[2].iov_base = ret_val; resp_hdr[2].iov_len = sizeof(*ret_val); while (((count = readv(fd, resp_hdr, 3)) < 0) && (errno == EINTR)) ; if (count != (sizeof(func) + sizeof(data_size) + sizeof(*ret_val))) { return -1; } if (func != function || !data_size || data_size > MAX_DATA_BUF) { return -1; } data = malloc(data_size); if (!data) return -1; /* coveriety doesn't realize that data will be initialized in readv */ memset(data, 0, data_size); resp_data.iov_base = data; resp_data.iov_len = data_size; while (((count = readv(fd, &resp_data, 1))) < 0 && (errno == EINTR)) ; if (count < 0 || (uint32_t) count != data_size || data[data_size - 1] != '\0') { free(data); return -1; } *outdata = data; return 0; } static int raw_to_trans_context(const char *raw, char **transp) { int ret; int32_t ret_val; int fd; *transp = NULL; fd = setransd_open(); if (fd < 0) return fd; ret = send_request(fd, RAW_TO_TRANS_CONTEXT, raw, NULL); if (ret) goto out; ret = receive_response(fd, RAW_TO_TRANS_CONTEXT, transp, &ret_val); if (ret) goto out; ret = ret_val; out: close(fd); return ret; } static int trans_to_raw_context(const char *trans, char **rawp) { int ret; int32_t ret_val; int fd; *rawp = NULL; fd = setransd_open(); if (fd < 0) return fd; ret = send_request(fd, TRANS_TO_RAW_CONTEXT, trans, NULL); if (ret) goto out; ret = receive_response(fd, TRANS_TO_RAW_CONTEXT, rawp, &ret_val); if (ret) goto out; ret = ret_val; out: close(fd); return ret; } static int raw_context_to_color(const char *raw, char **colors) { int ret; int32_t ret_val; int fd; fd = setransd_open(); if (fd < 0) return fd; ret = send_request(fd, RAW_CONTEXT_TO_COLOR, raw, NULL); if (ret) goto out; ret = receive_response(fd, RAW_CONTEXT_TO_COLOR, colors, &ret_val); if (ret) goto out; ret = ret_val; out: close(fd); return ret; } static void setrans_thread_destructor(void __attribute__((unused)) *unused) { free(prev_t2r_trans); free(prev_t2r_raw); free(prev_r2t_trans); free(prev_r2t_raw); free(prev_r2c_trans); free(prev_r2c_raw); } void __attribute__((destructor)) setrans_lib_destructor(void); void hidden __attribute__((destructor)) setrans_lib_destructor(void) { if (destructor_key_initialized) __selinux_key_delete(destructor_key); } static inline void init_thread_destructor(void) { if (destructor_initialized == 0) { __selinux_setspecific(destructor_key, (void *)1); destructor_initialized = 1; } } static void init_context_translations(void) { if (__selinux_key_create(&destructor_key, setrans_thread_destructor) == 0) destructor_key_initialized = 1; mls_enabled = is_selinux_mls_enabled(); } int selinux_trans_to_raw_context(const security_context_t trans, security_context_t * rawp) { if (!trans) { *rawp = NULL; return 0; } __selinux_once(once, init_context_translations); init_thread_destructor(); if (!mls_enabled) { *rawp = strdup(trans); goto out; } if (prev_t2r_trans && strcmp(prev_t2r_trans, trans) == 0) { *rawp = strdup(prev_t2r_raw); } else { free(prev_t2r_trans); prev_t2r_trans = NULL; free(prev_t2r_raw); prev_t2r_raw = NULL; if (trans_to_raw_context(trans, rawp)) *rawp = strdup(trans); if (*rawp) { prev_t2r_trans = strdup(trans); if (!prev_t2r_trans) goto out; prev_t2r_raw = strdup(*rawp); if (!prev_t2r_raw) { free(prev_t2r_trans); prev_t2r_trans = NULL; } } } out: return *rawp ? 0 : -1; } hidden_def(selinux_trans_to_raw_context) int selinux_raw_to_trans_context(const security_context_t raw, security_context_t * transp) { if (!raw) { *transp = NULL; return 0; } __selinux_once(once, init_context_translations); init_thread_destructor(); if (!mls_enabled) { *transp = strdup(raw); goto out; } if (prev_r2t_raw && strcmp(prev_r2t_raw, raw) == 0) { *transp = strdup(prev_r2t_trans); } else { free(prev_r2t_raw); prev_r2t_raw = NULL; free(prev_r2t_trans); prev_r2t_trans = NULL; if (raw_to_trans_context(raw, transp)) *transp = strdup(raw); if (*transp) { prev_r2t_raw = strdup(raw); if (!prev_r2t_raw) goto out; prev_r2t_trans = strdup(*transp); if (!prev_r2t_trans) { free(prev_r2t_raw); prev_r2t_raw = NULL; } } } out: return *transp ? 0 : -1; } hidden_def(selinux_raw_to_trans_context) int selinux_raw_context_to_color(const security_context_t raw, char **transp) { if (!raw) { *transp = NULL; return -1; } __selinux_once(once, init_context_translations); init_thread_destructor(); if (prev_r2c_raw && strcmp(prev_r2c_raw, raw) == 0) { *transp = strdup(prev_r2c_trans); } else { free(prev_r2c_raw); prev_r2c_raw = NULL; free(prev_r2c_trans); prev_r2c_trans = NULL; if (raw_context_to_color(raw, transp)) return -1; if (*transp) { prev_r2c_raw = strdup(raw); if (!prev_r2c_raw) goto out; prev_r2c_trans = strdup(*transp); if (!prev_r2c_trans) { free(prev_r2c_raw); prev_r2c_raw = NULL; } } } out: return *transp ? 0 : -1; } hidden_def(selinux_raw_context_to_color) #else /*DISABLE_SETRANS*/ int selinux_trans_to_raw_context(const security_context_t trans, security_context_t * rawp) { if (!trans) { *rawp = NULL; return 0; } *rawp = strdup(trans); return *rawp ? 0 : -1; } hidden_def(selinux_trans_to_raw_context) int selinux_raw_to_trans_context(const security_context_t raw, security_context_t * transp) { if (!raw) { *transp = NULL; return 0; } *transp = strdup(raw); return *transp ? 0 : -1; } hidden_def(selinux_raw_to_trans_context) #endif /*DISABLE_SETRANS*/ libselinux-2.2.2/src/setrans_internal.h000066400000000000000000000004121226034601700202040ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Author: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. */ #include #define SETRANS_UNIX_SOCKET SELINUX_TRANS_DIR "/.setrans-unix" #define RAW_TO_TRANS_CONTEXT 2 #define TRANS_TO_RAW_CONTEXT 3 #define RAW_CONTEXT_TO_COLOR 4 #define MAX_DATA_BUF 8192 libselinux-2.2.2/src/seusers.c000066400000000000000000000143261226034601700163260ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" /* Process line from seusers.conf and split into its fields. Returns 0 on success, -1 on comments, and -2 on error. */ static int process_seusers(const char *buffer, char **luserp, char **seuserp, char **levelp, int mls_enabled) { char *newbuf = strdup(buffer); char *luser = NULL, *seuser = NULL, *level = NULL; char *start, *end; int mls_found = 1; if (!newbuf) goto err; start = newbuf; while (isspace(*start)) start++; if (*start == '#' || *start == 0) { free(newbuf); return -1; /* Comment or empty line, skip over */ } end = strchr(start, ':'); if (!end) goto err; *end = 0; luser = strdup(start); if (!luser) goto err; start = end + 1; end = strchr(start, ':'); if (!end) { mls_found = 0; end = start; while (*end && !isspace(*end)) end++; } *end = 0; seuser = strdup(start); if (!seuser) goto err; if (!strcmp(seuser, "")) goto err; /* Skip MLS if disabled, or missing. */ if (!mls_enabled || !mls_found) goto out; start = ++end; while (*end && !isspace(*end)) end++; *end = 0; level = strdup(start); if (!level) goto err; if (!strcmp(level, "")) goto err; out: free(newbuf); *luserp = luser; *seuserp = seuser; *levelp = level; return 0; err: free(newbuf); free(luser); free(seuser); free(level); return -2; /* error */ } int require_seusers hidden = 0; #include #include static gid_t get_default_gid(const char *name) { struct passwd pwstorage, *pwent = NULL; gid_t gid = -1; /* Allocate space for the getpwnam_r buffer */ long rbuflen = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX); if (rbuflen <= 0) return -1; char *rbuf = malloc(rbuflen); if (rbuf == NULL) return -1; int retval = getpwnam_r(name, &pwstorage, rbuf, rbuflen, &pwent); if (retval == 0 && pwent) { gid = pwent->pw_gid; } free(rbuf); return gid; } static int check_group(const char *group, const char *name, const gid_t gid) { int match = 0; int i, ng = 0; gid_t *groups = NULL; struct group gbuf, *grent = NULL; long rbuflen = sysconf(_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX); if (rbuflen <= 0) return 0; char *rbuf; while(1) { rbuf = malloc(rbuflen); if (rbuf == NULL) return 0; int retval = getgrnam_r(group, &gbuf, rbuf, rbuflen, &grent); if ( retval == ERANGE ) { free(rbuf); rbuflen = rbuflen * 2; } else if ( retval != 0 || grent == NULL ) { goto done; } else { break; } } if (getgrouplist(name, gid, NULL, &ng) < 0) { if (ng == 0) goto done; groups = calloc(ng, sizeof(*groups)); if (!groups) goto done; if (getgrouplist(name, gid, groups, &ng) < 0) goto done; } else { /* WTF? ng was 0 and we didn't fail? Are we in 0 groups? */ goto done; } for (i = 0; i < ng; i++) { if (grent->gr_gid == groups[i]) { match = 1; goto done; } } done: free(groups); free(rbuf); return match; } int getseuserbyname(const char *name, char **r_seuser, char **r_level) { FILE *cfg = NULL; size_t size = 0; char *buffer = NULL; int rc; unsigned long lineno = 0; int mls_enabled = is_selinux_mls_enabled(); char *username = NULL; char *seuser = NULL; char *level = NULL; char *groupseuser = NULL; char *grouplevel = NULL; char *defaultseuser = NULL; char *defaultlevel = NULL; gid_t gid = get_default_gid(name); cfg = fopen(selinux_usersconf_path(), "r"); if (!cfg) goto nomatch; __fsetlocking(cfg, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while (getline(&buffer, &size, cfg) > 0) { ++lineno; rc = process_seusers(buffer, &username, &seuser, &level, mls_enabled); if (rc == -1) continue; /* comment, skip */ if (rc == -2) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: error on line %lu, skipping...\n", selinux_usersconf_path(), lineno); continue; } if (!strcmp(username, name)) break; if (username[0] == '%' && !groupseuser && check_group(&username[1], name, gid)) { groupseuser = seuser; grouplevel = level; } else { if (!defaultseuser && !strcmp(username, "__default__")) { defaultseuser = seuser; defaultlevel = level; } else { free(seuser); free(level); } } free(username); username = NULL; seuser = NULL; } free(buffer); fclose(cfg); if (seuser) { free(username); free(defaultseuser); free(defaultlevel); free(groupseuser); free(grouplevel); *r_seuser = seuser; *r_level = level; return 0; } if (groupseuser) { free(defaultseuser); free(defaultlevel); *r_seuser = groupseuser; *r_level = grouplevel; return 0; } if (defaultseuser) { *r_seuser = defaultseuser; *r_level = defaultlevel; return 0; } nomatch: if (require_seusers) return -1; /* Fall back to the Linux username and no level. */ *r_seuser = strdup(name); if (!(*r_seuser)) return -1; *r_level = NULL; return 0; } int getseuser(const char *username, const char *service, char **r_seuser, char **r_level) { int ret = -1; int len = 0; char *seuser = NULL; char *level = NULL; char *buffer = NULL; size_t size = 0; char *rec = NULL; char *path=NULL; FILE *fp = NULL; if (asprintf(&path,"%s/logins/%s", selinux_policy_root(), username) < 0) goto err; fp = fopen(path, "r"); free(path); if (fp == NULL) goto err; __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while (getline(&buffer, &size, fp) > 0) { if (strncmp(buffer, "*:", 2) == 0) { free(rec); rec = strdup(buffer); continue; } if (!service) continue; len = strlen(service); if ((strncmp(buffer, service, len) == 0) && (buffer[len] == ':')) { free(rec); rec = strdup(buffer); break; } } if (! rec) goto err; seuser = strchr(rec, ':'); if (! seuser) goto err; seuser++; level = strchr(seuser, ':'); if (! level) goto err; *level = 0; level++; *r_seuser = strdup(seuser); if (! *r_seuser) goto err; len = strlen(level); if (len && level[len-1] == '\n') level[len-1] = 0; *r_level = strdup(level); if (! *r_level) { free(*r_seuser); goto err; } ret = 0; err: free(buffer); if (fp) fclose(fp); free(rec); return (ret ? getseuserbyname(username, r_seuser, r_level) : ret); } libselinux-2.2.2/src/stringrep.c000066400000000000000000000305521226034601700166510ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * String representation support for classes and permissions. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0])) /* The following code looks complicated, but it really is not. What it does is to generate two variables. The first is basically a struct of arrays. The second is the real array of structures which would have used string pointers. But instead it now uses an offset value into the first structure. Strings are accessed indirectly by an explicit addition of the string index and the base address of the structure with the strings (all type safe). The advantage is that there are no relocations necessary in the array with the data as it would be the case with string pointers. This has advantages at load time, the data section is smaller, and it is read-only. */ #define L1(line) L2(line) #define L2(line) str##line static const union av_perm_to_string_data { struct { #define S_(c, v, s) char L1(__LINE__)[sizeof(s)]; #include "av_perm_to_string.h" #undef S_ }; char str[0]; } av_perm_to_string_data = { { #define S_(c, v, s) s, #include "av_perm_to_string.h" #undef S_ } }; static const struct av_perm_to_string { uint16_t tclass; uint16_t nameidx; uint32_t value; } av_perm_to_string[] = { #define S_(c, v, s) { c, offsetof(union av_perm_to_string_data, L1(__LINE__)), v }, #include "av_perm_to_string.h" #undef S_ }; #undef L1 #undef L2 #define L1(line) L2(line) #define L2(line) str##line static const union class_to_string_data { struct { #define S_(s) char L1(__LINE__)[sizeof(s)]; #include "class_to_string.h" #undef S_ }; char str[0]; } class_to_string_data = { { #define S_(s) s, #include "class_to_string.h" #undef S_ } }; static const uint16_t class_to_string[] = { #define S_(s) offsetof(union class_to_string_data, L1(__LINE__)), #include "class_to_string.h" #undef S_ }; #undef L1 #undef L2 static const union common_perm_to_string_data { struct { #define L1(line) L2(line) #define L2(line) str##line #define S_(s) char L1(__LINE__)[sizeof(s)]; #define TB_(s) #define TE_(s) #include "common_perm_to_string.h" #undef S_ #undef L1 #undef L2 }; char str[0]; } common_perm_to_string_data = { { #define S_(s) s, #include "common_perm_to_string.h" #undef S_ #undef TB_ #undef TE_ } }; static const union common_perm_to_string { struct { #define TB_(s) struct { #define TE_(s) } s##_part; #define S_(s) uint16_t L1(__LINE__) #define L1(l) L2(l) #define L2(l) field_##l; #include "common_perm_to_string.h" #undef TB_ #undef TE_ #undef S_ #undef L1 #undef L2 }; uint16_t data[0]; } common_perm_to_string = { { #define TB_(s) { #define TE_(s) }, #define S_(s) offsetof(union common_perm_to_string_data, L1(__LINE__)), #define L1(line) L2(line) #define L2(line) str##line #include "common_perm_to_string.h" #undef TB_ #undef TE_ #undef S_ #undef L1 #undef L2 } }; static const struct av_inherit { uint16_t tclass; uint16_t common_pts_idx; uint32_t common_base; } av_inherit[] = { #define S_(c, i, b) { c, offsetof(union common_perm_to_string, common_##i##_perm_to_string_part)/sizeof(uint16_t), b }, #include "av_inherit.h" #undef S_ }; #define NCLASSES ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string) #define NVECTORS ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string) #define MAXVECTORS 8*sizeof(access_vector_t) static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static int obj_class_compat; static void init_obj_class_compat(void) { char path[PATH_MAX]; struct stat s; if (!selinux_mnt) return; snprintf(path,PATH_MAX,"%s/class",selinux_mnt); if (stat(path,&s) < 0) return; if (S_ISDIR(s.st_mode)) obj_class_compat = 0; } struct discover_class_node { char *name; security_class_t value; char **perms; struct discover_class_node *next; }; static struct discover_class_node *discover_class_cache = NULL; static struct discover_class_node * get_class_cache_entry_name(const char *s) { struct discover_class_node *node = discover_class_cache; for (; node != NULL && strcmp(s,node->name) != 0; node = node->next); return node; } static struct discover_class_node * get_class_cache_entry_value(security_class_t c) { struct discover_class_node *node = discover_class_cache; for (; node != NULL && c != node->value; node = node->next); return node; } static struct discover_class_node * discover_class(const char *s) { int fd, ret; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; DIR *dir; struct dirent *dentry; size_t i; struct discover_class_node *node; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return NULL; } /* allocate a node */ node = malloc(sizeof(struct discover_class_node)); if (node == NULL) return NULL; /* allocate array for perms */ node->perms = calloc(NVECTORS,sizeof(char*)); if (node->perms == NULL) goto err1; /* load up the name */ node->name = strdup(s); if (node->name == NULL) goto err2; /* load up class index */ snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/class/%s/index", selinux_mnt,s); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) goto err3; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) goto err3; if (sscanf(buf, "%hu", &node->value) != 1) goto err3; /* load up permission indicies */ snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/class/%s/perms",selinux_mnt,s); dir = opendir(path); if (dir == NULL) goto err3; dentry = readdir(dir); while (dentry != NULL) { unsigned int value; struct stat m; snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/class/%s/perms/%s", selinux_mnt,s,dentry->d_name); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) goto err4; if (fstat(fd, &m) < 0) { close(fd); goto err4; } if (m.st_mode & S_IFDIR) { close(fd); dentry = readdir(dir); continue; } memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) goto err4; if (sscanf(buf, "%u", &value) != 1) goto err4; if (value == 0 || value > NVECTORS) goto err4; node->perms[value-1] = strdup(dentry->d_name); if (node->perms[value-1] == NULL) goto err4; dentry = readdir(dir); } closedir(dir); node->next = discover_class_cache; discover_class_cache = node; return node; err4: closedir(dir); for (i=0; iperms[i]); err3: free(node->name); err2: free(node->perms); err1: free(node); return NULL; } static security_class_t string_to_security_class_compat(const char *s) { unsigned int val; if (isdigit(s[0])) { val = atoi(s); if (val > 0 && val < NCLASSES) return map_class(val); } else { for (val = 0; val < NCLASSES; val++) { if (strcmp(s, (class_to_string_data.str + class_to_string[val])) == 0) return map_class(val); } } errno = EINVAL; return 0; } static access_vector_t string_to_av_perm_compat(security_class_t kclass, const char *s) { const uint16_t *common_pts_idx = 0; access_vector_t perm, common_base = 0; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit); i++) { if (av_inherit[i].tclass == kclass) { common_pts_idx = &common_perm_to_string.data[av_inherit[i]. common_pts_idx]; common_base = av_inherit[i].common_base; break; } } i = 0; perm = 1; while (perm < common_base) { if (strcmp (s, common_perm_to_string_data.str + common_pts_idx[i]) == 0) return perm; perm <<= 1; i++; } for (i = 0; i < NVECTORS; i++) { if ((av_perm_to_string[i].tclass == kclass) && (strcmp(s, (av_perm_to_string_data.str + av_perm_to_string[i].nameidx)) == 0)) return av_perm_to_string[i].value; } errno = EINVAL; return 0; } static const char *security_class_to_string_compat(security_class_t tclass) { if (tclass > 0 && tclass < NCLASSES) return class_to_string_data.str + class_to_string[tclass]; errno = EINVAL; return NULL; } static const char *security_av_perm_to_string_compat(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av) { const uint16_t *common_pts_idx = 0; access_vector_t common_base = 0; unsigned int i; if (!av) { errno = EINVAL; return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit); i++) { if (av_inherit[i].tclass == tclass) { common_pts_idx = &common_perm_to_string.data[av_inherit[i]. common_pts_idx]; common_base = av_inherit[i].common_base; break; } } if (av < common_base) { i = 0; while (!(av & 1)) { av >>= 1; i++; } return common_perm_to_string_data.str + common_pts_idx[i]; } for (i = 0; i < NVECTORS; i++) { if (av_perm_to_string[i].tclass == tclass && av_perm_to_string[i].value == av) return av_perm_to_string_data.str + av_perm_to_string[i].nameidx; } errno = EINVAL; return NULL; } security_class_t string_to_security_class(const char *s) { struct discover_class_node *node; __selinux_once(once, init_obj_class_compat); if (obj_class_compat) return string_to_security_class_compat(s); node = get_class_cache_entry_name(s); if (node == NULL) { node = discover_class(s); if (node == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } } return map_class(node->value); } security_class_t mode_to_security_class(mode_t m) { if (S_ISREG(m)) return string_to_security_class("file"); if (S_ISDIR(m)) return string_to_security_class("dir"); if (S_ISCHR(m)) return string_to_security_class("chr_file"); if (S_ISBLK(m)) return string_to_security_class("blk_file"); if (S_ISFIFO(m)) return string_to_security_class("fifo_file"); if (S_ISLNK(m)) return string_to_security_class("lnk_file"); if (S_ISSOCK(m)) return string_to_security_class("sock_file"); errno=EINVAL; return 0; } access_vector_t string_to_av_perm(security_class_t tclass, const char *s) { struct discover_class_node *node; security_class_t kclass = unmap_class(tclass); __selinux_once(once, init_obj_class_compat); if (obj_class_compat) return map_perm(tclass, string_to_av_perm_compat(kclass, s)); node = get_class_cache_entry_value(kclass); if (node != NULL) { size_t i; for (i=0; iperms[i] != NULL; i++) if (strcmp(node->perms[i],s) == 0) return map_perm(tclass, 1<name; } const char *security_av_perm_to_string(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av) { struct discover_class_node *node; size_t i; av = unmap_perm(tclass, av); tclass = unmap_class(tclass); __selinux_once(once, init_obj_class_compat); if (obj_class_compat) return security_av_perm_to_string_compat(tclass,av); node = get_class_cache_entry_value(tclass); if (av && node) for (i = 0; iperms[i]; return security_av_perm_to_string_compat(tclass,av); } int security_av_string(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av, char **res) { unsigned int i = 0; size_t len = 5; access_vector_t tmp = av; int rc = 0; const char *str; char *ptr; /* first pass computes the required length */ while (tmp) { if (tmp & 1) { str = security_av_perm_to_string(tclass, av & (1<>= 1; i++; } *res = malloc(len); if (!*res) { rc = -1; goto out; } /* second pass constructs the string */ i = 0; tmp = av; ptr = *res; if (!av) { sprintf(ptr, "null"); goto out; } ptr += sprintf(ptr, "{ "); while (tmp) { if (tmp & 1) ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%s ", security_av_perm_to_string( tclass, av & (1<>= 1; i++; } sprintf(ptr, "}"); out: return rc; } void print_access_vector(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av) { const char *permstr; access_vector_t bit = 1; if (av == 0) { printf(" null"); return; } printf(" {"); while (av) { if (av & bit) { permstr = security_av_perm_to_string(tclass, bit); if (!permstr) break; printf(" %s", permstr); av &= ~bit; } bit <<= 1; } if (av) printf(" 0x%x", av); printf(" }"); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/000077500000000000000000000000001226034601700150345ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-2.2.2/utils/.gitignore000066400000000000000000000004471226034601700170310ustar00rootroot00000000000000avcstat compute_av compute_create compute_member compute_relabel compute_user getconlist getdefaultcon getenforce getfilecon getpidcon getsebool getseuser matchpathcon policyvers sefcontext_compile selinux_check_securetty_context selinuxenabled selinuxexeccon setenforce setfilecon togglesebool libselinux-2.2.2/utils/Makefile000066400000000000000000000044431226034601700165010ustar00rootroot00000000000000# Installation directories. PREFIX ?= $(DESTDIR)/usr LIBDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/lib USRBINDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/sbin SBINDIR ?= $(DESTDIR)/sbin MAX_STACK_SIZE=8192 CFLAGS ?= -O -Wall -W -Wundef -Wformat-y2k -Wformat-security -Winit-self -Wmissing-include-dirs \ -Wunused -Wunknown-pragmas -Wstrict-aliasing -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith \ -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wwrite-strings -Wlogical-op -Waggregate-return \ -Wstrict-prototypes -Wold-style-definition -Wmissing-prototypes \ -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-noreturn -Wmissing-format-attribute \ -Wredundant-decls -Wnested-externs -Winline -Winvalid-pch -Wvolatile-register-var \ -Wdisabled-optimization -Wbuiltin-macro-redefined -Wmudflap -Wpacked-bitfield-compat \ -Wsync-nand -Wattributes -Wcoverage-mismatch -Wmultichar -Wcpp \ -Wdeprecated-declarations -Wdiv-by-zero -Wdouble-promotion -Wendif-labels -Wextra \ -Wformat-contains-nul -Wformat-extra-args -Wformat-zero-length -Wformat=2 -Wmultichar \ -Wnormalized=nfc -Woverflow -Wpointer-to-int-cast -Wpragmas -Wsuggest-attribute=const \ -Wsuggest-attribute=noreturn -Wsuggest-attribute=pure -Wtrampolines \ -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-sign-compare -Wjump-misses-init \ -Wno-format-nonliteral -Wframe-larger-than=$(MAX_STACK_SIZE) -Wp,-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 \ -fstack-protector-all --param=ssp-buffer-size=4 -fexceptions \ -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -fdiagnostics-show-option -funit-at-a-time \ -fipa-pure-const -Wno-suggest-attribute=pure -Wno-suggest-attribute=const \ -Werror -Wno-aggregate-return -Wno-redundant-decls override CFLAGS += -I../include -D_GNU_SOURCE $(EMFLAGS) LDLIBS += -L../src -lselinux -L$(LIBDIR) TARGETS=$(patsubst %.c,%,$(wildcard *.c)) sefcontext_compile: LDLIBS += -lpcre ifeq ($(DISABLE_AVC),y) UNUSED_TARGETS+=compute_av compute_create compute_member compute_relabel endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_BOOL),y) UNUSED_TARGETS+=getsebool togglesebool endif TARGETS:= $(filter-out $(UNUSED_TARGETS), $(TARGETS)) all: $(TARGETS) install: all -mkdir -p $(USRBINDIR) install -m 755 $(TARGETS) $(USRBINDIR) -mkdir -p $(SBINDIR) clean: rm -f $(TARGETS) *.o *~ distclean: clean indent: ../../scripts/Lindent $(wildcard *.[ch]) relabel: libselinux-2.2.2/utils/avcstat.c000066400000000000000000000123731226034601700166530ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * avcstat - Display SELinux avc statistics. * * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, * as published by the Free Software Foundation. * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define DEF_STAT_FILE "/avc/cache_stats" #define DEF_BUF_SIZE 8192 #define HEADERS "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees" struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned long long lookups; unsigned long long hits; unsigned long long misses; unsigned long long allocations; unsigned long long reclaims; unsigned long long frees; }; static int interval; static int rows; static char *progname; static char buf[DEF_BUF_SIZE]; /* selinuxfs mount point */ extern char *selinux_mnt; static __attribute__((__format__(printf,1,2))) void die(const char *msg, ...) { va_list args; fputs("ERROR: ", stderr); va_start(args, msg); vfprintf(stderr, msg, args); va_end(args); if (errno) fprintf(stderr, ": %s", strerror(errno)); fputc('\n', stderr); exit(1); } static void usage(void) { printf("\nUsage: %s [-c] [-f status_file] [interval]\n\n", progname); printf ("Display SELinux AVC statistics. If the interval parameter is specified, the\n"); printf ("program will loop, displaying updated statistics every \'interval\' seconds.\n"); printf ("Relative values are displayed by default. Use the -c option to specify the\n"); printf ("display of cumulative values. The -f option specifies the location of the\n"); printf("AVC statistics file, defaulting to \'%s%s\'.\n\n", selinux_mnt, DEF_STAT_FILE); } static void set_window_rows(void) { int ret; struct winsize ws; ret = ioctl(fileno(stdout), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws); if (ret < 0 || ws.ws_row < 3) ws.ws_row = 24; rows = ws.ws_row; } static void sighandler(int num) { if (num == SIGWINCH) set_window_rows(); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct avc_cache_stats tot, rel, last; int fd, i, cumulative = 0; struct sigaction sa; char avcstatfile[PATH_MAX]; snprintf(avcstatfile, sizeof avcstatfile, "%s%s", selinux_mnt, DEF_STAT_FILE); progname = basename(argv[0]); memset(&last, 0, sizeof(last)); while ((i = getopt(argc, argv, "cf:h?-")) != -1) { switch (i) { case 'c': cumulative = 1; break; case 'f': strncpy(avcstatfile, optarg, sizeof avcstatfile); break; case 'h': case '-': usage(); exit(0); default: usage(); die("unrecognized parameter '%c'", i); } } if (optind < argc) { char *arg = argv[optind]; unsigned int n = strtoul(arg, NULL, 10); if (errno == ERANGE) { usage(); die("invalid interval \'%s\'", arg); } if (n == 0) { usage(); exit(0); } interval = n; } sa.sa_handler = sighandler; sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); i = sigaction(SIGWINCH, &sa, NULL); if (i < 0) die("sigaction"); set_window_rows(); fd = open(avcstatfile, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) die("open: \'%s\'", avcstatfile); for (i = 0;; i++) { char *line; ssize_t ret, parsed = 0; memset(buf, 0, DEF_BUF_SIZE); ret = read(fd, buf, DEF_BUF_SIZE-1); if (ret < 0) die("read"); if (ret == 0) die("read: \'%s\': unexpected end of file", avcstatfile); line = strtok(buf, "\n"); if (!line) die("unable to parse \'%s\': end of line not found", avcstatfile); if (strcmp(line, HEADERS)) die("unable to parse \'%s\': invalid headers", avcstatfile); if (!i || !(i % (rows - 2))) printf("%10s %10s %10s %10s %10s %10s\n", "lookups", "hits", "misses", "allocs", "reclaims", "frees"); memset(&tot, 0, sizeof(tot)); while ((line = strtok(NULL, "\n"))) { struct avc_cache_stats tmp; ret = sscanf(line, "%llu %llu %llu %llu %llu %llu", &tmp.lookups, &tmp.hits, &tmp.misses, &tmp.allocations, &tmp.reclaims, &tmp.frees); if (ret != 6) die("unable to parse \'%s\': scan error", avcstatfile); tot.lookups += tmp.lookups; tot.hits += tmp.hits; tot.misses += tmp.misses; tot.allocations += tmp.allocations; tot.reclaims += tmp.reclaims; tot.frees += tmp.frees; parsed = 1; } if (!parsed) die("unable to parse \'%s\': no data", avcstatfile); if (cumulative || (!cumulative && !i)) printf("%10Lu %10Lu %10Lu %10Lu %10Lu %10Lu\n", tot.lookups, tot.hits, tot.misses, tot.allocations, tot.reclaims, tot.frees); else { rel.lookups = tot.lookups - last.lookups; rel.hits = tot.hits - last.hits; rel.misses = tot.misses - last.misses; rel.allocations = tot.allocations - last.allocations; rel.reclaims = tot.reclaims - last.reclaims; rel.frees = tot.frees - last.frees; printf("%10Lu %10Lu %10Lu %10Lu %10Lu %10Lu\n", rel.lookups, rel.hits, rel.misses, rel.allocations, rel.reclaims, rel.frees); } if (!interval) break; memcpy(&last, &tot, sizeof(last)); sleep(interval); ret = lseek(fd, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) die("lseek"); } close(fd); return 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/compute_av.c000066400000000000000000000020571226034601700173460ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct av_decision avd; security_class_t tclass; int ret; if (argc != 4) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s scontext tcontext tclass\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } tclass = string_to_security_class(argv[3]); if (!tclass) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid class '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[3]); exit(2); } ret = security_compute_av(argv[1], argv[2], tclass, 1, &avd); if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_compute_av failed\n", argv[0]); exit(3); } printf("allowed="); print_access_vector(tclass, avd.allowed); printf("\n"); if (avd.decided != ~0U) { printf("decided="); print_access_vector(tclass, avd.decided); printf("\n"); } if (avd.auditallow) { printf("auditallow="); print_access_vector(tclass, avd.auditallow); printf("\n"); } if (avd.auditdeny != ~0U) { printf("auditdeny"); print_access_vector(tclass, avd.auditdeny); printf("\n"); } exit(0); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/compute_create.c000066400000000000000000000012271226034601700202010ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *buf; security_class_t tclass; int ret; if (argc != 4) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s scontext tcontext tclass\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } tclass = string_to_security_class(argv[3]); if (!tclass) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid class '%s'\n", argv[3]); exit(2); } ret = security_compute_create(argv[1], argv[2], tclass, &buf); if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_compute_create failed\n", argv[0]); exit(3); } printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); exit(0); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/compute_member.c000066400000000000000000000012271226034601700202050ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *buf; security_class_t tclass; int ret; if (argc != 4) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s scontext tcontext tclass\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } tclass = string_to_security_class(argv[3]); if (!tclass) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid class '%s'\n", argv[3]); exit(2); } ret = security_compute_member(argv[1], argv[2], tclass, &buf); if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_compute_member failed\n", argv[0]); exit(3); } printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); exit(0); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/compute_relabel.c000066400000000000000000000012471226034601700203460ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *buf; security_class_t tclass; int ret; if (argc != 4) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s scontext tcontext tclass\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } tclass = string_to_security_class(argv[3]); if (!tclass) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid class '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[3]); exit(2); } ret = security_compute_relabel(argv[1], argv[2], tclass, &buf); if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_compute_relabel failed\n", argv[0]); exit(3); } printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); exit(0); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/compute_user.c000066400000000000000000000012301226034601700177060ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char **buf, **ptr; int ret; if (argc != 3) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s context user\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } ret = security_compute_user(argv[1], argv[2], &buf); if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_compute_user(%s,%s) failed\n", argv[0], argv[1], argv[2]); exit(2); } if (!buf[0]) { printf("none\n"); exit(0); } for (ptr = buf; *ptr; ptr++) { printf("%s\n", *ptr); } freeconary(buf); exit(0); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/getconlist.c000066400000000000000000000031131226034601700173510ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static void usage(const char *name, const char *detail, int rc) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-l level] user [context]\n", name); if (detail) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s\n", name, detail); exit(rc); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { security_context_t *list, usercon = NULL, cur_context = NULL; char *user = NULL, *level = NULL; int ret, i, opt; while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "l:")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'l': level = strdup(optarg); break; default: usage(argv[0], "invalid option", 1); } } if (((argc - optind) < 1) || ((argc - optind) > 2)) usage(argv[0], "invalid number of arguments", 2); /* If selinux isn't available, bail out. */ if (!is_selinux_enabled()) { fprintf(stderr, "getconlist may be used only on a SELinux kernel.\n"); return 1; } user = argv[optind]; /* If a context wasn't passed, use the current context. */ if (((argc - optind) < 2)) { if (getcon(&cur_context) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't get current context.\n"); return 2; } } else cur_context = argv[optind + 1]; /* Get the list and print it */ if (level) ret = get_ordered_context_list_with_level(user, level, cur_context, &list); else ret = get_ordered_context_list(user, cur_context, &list); if (ret != -1) { for (i = 0; list[i]; i++) puts(list[i]); freeconary(list); } free(usercon); return 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/getdefaultcon.c000066400000000000000000000041321226034601700200240ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static void usage(const char *name, const char *detail, int rc) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-l level] [-s service] user [fromcon]\n", name); if (detail) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s\n", name, detail); exit(rc); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { security_context_t usercon = NULL, cur_context = NULL; char *user = NULL, *level = NULL, *role=NULL, *seuser=NULL, *dlevel=NULL; char *service = NULL; int ret, opt; int verbose = 0; while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "l:r:s:v")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'l': level = strdup(optarg); break; case 'r': role = strdup(optarg); break; case 's': service = strdup(optarg); break; case 'v': verbose = 1; break; default: usage(argv[0], "invalid option", 1); } } if (((argc - optind) < 1) || ((argc - optind) > 2)) usage(argv[0], "invalid number of arguments", 2); /* If selinux isn't available, bail out. */ if (!is_selinux_enabled()) { fprintf(stderr, "%s may be used only on a SELinux kernel.\n", argv[0]); return 1; } user = argv[optind]; /* If a context wasn't passed, use the current context. */ if (((argc - optind) < 2)) { if (getcon(&cur_context) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't get current context.\n"); return 2; } } else cur_context = argv[optind + 1]; if ((ret = getseuser(user, service, &seuser, &dlevel)) == 0) { if (! level) level=dlevel; if (role != NULL && role[0]) ret=get_default_context_with_rolelevel(seuser, role, level,cur_context,&usercon); else ret=get_default_context_with_level(seuser, level, cur_context,&usercon); } if (ret < 0) perror(argv[0]); else { if (verbose) { printf("%s: %s from %s %s %s %s -> %s\n", argv[0], user, cur_context, seuser, role, level, usercon); } else { printf("%s\n", usercon); } } free(role); free(seuser); if (level != dlevel) free(level); free(dlevel); free(usercon); return ret >= 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/getenforce.c000066400000000000000000000010431226034601700173170ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include int main(int argc __attribute__ ((unused)), char **argv __attribute__ ((unused))) { int rc; rc = is_selinux_enabled(); if (rc < 0) { fputs("getenforce: is_selinux_enabled() failed", stderr); return 2; } if (rc == 1) { rc = security_getenforce(); if (rc < 0) { fputs("getenforce: getenforce() failed", stderr); return 2; } if (rc) puts("Enforcing"); else puts("Permissive"); } else { puts("Disabled"); } return 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/getfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000007251226034601700173230ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *buf; int rc, i; if (argc < 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s path...\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { rc = getfilecon(argv[i], &buf); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: getfilecon(%s) failed\n", argv[0], argv[i]); exit(2); } printf("%s\t%s\n", argv[i], buf); freecon(buf); } exit(0); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/getpidcon.c000066400000000000000000000010101226034601700171440ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { pid_t pid; char *buf; int rc; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s pid\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } if (sscanf(argv[1], "%d", &pid) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid pid %s\n", argv[0], argv[1]); exit(2); } rc = getpidcon(pid, &buf); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: getpidcon() failed\n", argv[0]); exit(3); } printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); exit(0); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/getsebool.c000066400000000000000000000044051226034601700171660ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include static void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -a or %s boolean...\n", progname, progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int i, get_all = 0, rc = 0, active, pending, len = 0, opt; char **names; while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "a")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'a': if (argc > 2) usage(argv[0]); if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: SELinux is disabled\n", argv[0]); return 1; } errno = 0; rc = security_get_boolean_names(&names, &len); if (rc) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to get boolean names: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); return 1; } if (!len) { printf("No booleans\n"); return 0; } get_all = 1; break; default: usage(argv[0]); } } if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: SELinux is disabled\n", argv[0]); return 1; } if (!len) { if (argc < 2) usage(argv[0]); len = argc - 1; names = malloc(sizeof(char *) * len); if (!names) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: out of memory\n", argv[0]); return 2; } for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { names[i] = strdup(argv[i + 1]); if (!names[i]) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: out of memory\n", argv[0]); return 2; } } } for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { active = security_get_boolean_active(names[i]); if (active < 0) { if (get_all && errno == EACCES) continue; fprintf(stderr, "Error getting active value for %s\n", names[i]); rc = -1; goto out; } pending = security_get_boolean_pending(names[i]); if (pending < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error getting pending value for %s\n", names[i]); rc = -1; goto out; } char *alt_name = selinux_boolean_sub(names[i]); if (! alt_name) { perror("Out of memory\n"); rc = -1; goto out; } if (pending != active) { printf("%s --> %s pending: %s\n", alt_name, (active ? "on" : "off"), (pending ? "on" : "off")); } else { printf("%s --> %s\n", alt_name, (active ? "on" : "off")); } free(alt_name); } out: for (i = 0; i < len; i++) free(names[i]); free(names); return rc; } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/getseuser.c000066400000000000000000000016161226034601700172120ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *seuser = NULL, *level = NULL; security_context_t *contextlist; int rc, n, i; if (argc != 3) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s linuxuser fromcon\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } rc = getseuserbyname(argv[1], &seuser, &level); if (rc) { fprintf(stderr, "getseuserbyname failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(2); } printf("seuser: %s, level %s\n", seuser, level); n = get_ordered_context_list_with_level(seuser, level, argv[2], &contextlist); if (n <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "get_ordered_context_list_with_level failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(3); } free(seuser); free(level); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) printf("Context %d\t%s\n", i, contextlist[i]); freeconary(contextlist); exit(0); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/matchpathcon.c000066400000000000000000000073641226034601700176630ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-N] [-n] [-f file_contexts] [ -P policy_root_path ] [-p prefix] [-Vq] path...\n", progname); exit(1); } static int printmatchpathcon(const char *path, int header, int mode) { char *buf; int rc = matchpathcon(path, mode, &buf); if (rc < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) { buf=strdup("<>"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "matchpathcon(%s) failed: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); return 1; } } if (header) printf("%s\t%s\n", path, buf); else printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); return 0; } static mode_t string_to_mode(char *s) { switch (s[0]) { case 'b': return S_IFBLK; case 'c': return S_IFCHR; case 'd': return S_IFDIR; case 'p': return S_IFIFO; case 'l': return S_IFLNK; case 's': return S_IFSOCK; case 'f': return S_IFREG; default: return -1; }; return -1; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int i, init = 0, force_mode = 0; int header = 1, opt; int verify = 0; int notrans = 0; int error = 0; int quiet = 0; if (argc < 2) usage(argv[0]); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "m:Nnf:P:p:Vq")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'n': header = 0; break; case 'm': force_mode = string_to_mode(optarg); if (force_mode < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: mode %s is invalid\n", argv[0], optarg); exit(1); } break; case 'V': verify = 1; break; case 'N': notrans = 1; set_matchpathcon_flags(MATCHPATHCON_NOTRANS); break; case 'f': if (init) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: -f and -p are exclusive\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } init = 1; if (matchpathcon_init(optarg)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error while processing %s: %s\n", optarg, errno ? strerror(errno) : "invalid"); exit(1); } break; case 'P': if (selinux_set_policy_root(optarg) < 0 ) { fprintf(stderr, "Error setting policy root %s: %s\n", optarg, errno ? strerror(errno) : "invalid"); exit(1); } break; case 'p': if (init) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: -f and -p are exclusive\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } init = 1; if (matchpathcon_init_prefix(NULL, optarg)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error while processing %s: %s\n", optarg, errno ? strerror(errno) : "invalid"); exit(1); } break; case 'q': quiet = 1; break; default: usage(argv[0]); } } for (i = optind; i < argc; i++) { int rc, mode = 0; struct stat buf; char *path = argv[i]; int len = strlen(path); if (len > 1 && path[len - 1 ] == '/') path[len - 1 ] = '\0'; if (lstat(path, &buf) == 0) mode = buf.st_mode; if (force_mode) mode = force_mode; if (verify) { rc = selinux_file_context_verify(path, mode); if (quiet) { if (rc == 1) continue; else exit(1); } if (rc == -1) { printf("%s error: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); exit(1); } else if (rc == 1) { printf("%s verified.\n", path); } else { security_context_t con; error = 1; if (notrans) rc = lgetfilecon_raw(path, &con); else rc = lgetfilecon(path, &con); if (rc >= 0) { printf("%s has context %s, should be ", path, con); printmatchpathcon(path, 0, mode); freecon(con); } else { printf ("actual context unknown: %s, should be ", strerror(errno)); printmatchpathcon(path, 0, mode); } } } else { error |= printmatchpathcon(path, header, mode); } } matchpathcon_fini(); return error; } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/policyvers.c000066400000000000000000000004641226034601700174030ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include int main(int argc __attribute__ ((unused)), char **argv) { int rc; rc = security_policyvers(); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: policyvers() failed\n", argv[0]); exit(2); } printf("%d\n", rc); exit(0); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/sefcontext_compile.c000066400000000000000000000202171226034601700210740ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../src/label_file.h" static int process_file(struct saved_data *data, const char *filename) { struct spec *spec; unsigned int line_num; char *line_buf = NULL; size_t line_len; ssize_t len; FILE *context_file; context_file = fopen(filename, "r"); if (!context_file) { fprintf(stderr, "Error opening %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno)); return -1; } line_num = 0; while ((len = getline(&line_buf, &line_len, context_file)) != -1) { char *context; char *mode; char *regex; char *cp, *anchored_regex; char *buf_p; pcre *re; pcre_extra *sd; const char *err; int items, erroff, rc; size_t regex_len; int32_t stem_id; len = strlen(line_buf); if (line_buf[len - 1] == '\n') line_buf[len - 1] = 0; buf_p = line_buf; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; /* Skip comment lines and empty lines. */ if (*buf_p == '#' || *buf_p == 0) continue; items = sscanf(line_buf, "%ms %ms %ms", ®ex, &mode, &context); if (items < 2 || items > 3) { fprintf(stderr, "invalid entry, skipping:%s", line_buf); continue; } if (items == 2) { context = mode; mode = NULL; } rc = grow_specs(data); if (rc) { fprintf(stderr, "grow_specs failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return rc; } spec = &data->spec_arr[data->nspec]; spec->lr.ctx_raw = context; spec->mode = string_to_mode(mode); if (spec->mode == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: line %d has invalid file type %s\n", regex, line_num + 1, mode); spec->mode = 0; } free(mode); spec->regex_str = regex; stem_id = find_stem_from_spec(data, regex); spec->stem_id = stem_id; /* skip past the fixed stem part */ if (stem_id != -1) regex += data->stem_arr[stem_id].len; regex_len = strlen(regex); cp = anchored_regex = malloc(regex_len + 3); if (!cp) { fprintf(stderr, "Malloc Failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return -1; } *cp++ = '^'; memcpy(cp, regex, regex_len); cp += regex_len; *cp++ = '$'; *cp = '\0'; spec_hasMetaChars(spec); re = pcre_compile(anchored_regex, 0, &err, &erroff, NULL); if (!re) { fprintf(stderr, "PCRE compilation failed for %s at offset %d: %s\n", anchored_regex, erroff, err); return -1; } spec->regex = re; sd = pcre_study(re, 0, &err); if (!sd) { fprintf(stderr, "PCRE study failed for %s: %s\n", anchored_regex, err); return -1; } free(anchored_regex); spec->sd = sd; line_num++; data->nspec++; } free(line_buf); fclose(context_file); return 0; } /* * File Format * * u32 - magic number * u32 - version * u32 - number of stems * ** Stems * u32 - length of stem EXCLUDING nul * char - stem char array INCLUDING nul * u32 - number of regexs * ** Regexes * u32 - length of upcoming context INCLUDING nul * char - char array of the raw context * u32 - length of the upcoming regex_str * char - char array of the original regex string including the stem. * mode_t - mode bits * s32 - stemid associated with the regex * u32 - spec has meta characters * u32 - data length of the pcre regex * char - a bufer holding the raw pcre regex info * u32 - data length of the pcre regex study daya * char - a buffer holding the raw pcre regex study data */ static int write_binary_file(struct saved_data *data, int fd) { struct spec *specs = data->spec_arr; FILE *bin_file; size_t len; uint32_t magic = SELINUX_MAGIC_COMPILED_FCONTEXT; uint32_t section_len; uint32_t i; int rc; bin_file = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (!bin_file) { perror("fopen output_file"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* write some magic number */ len = fwrite(&magic, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* write the version */ section_len = SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_MAX_VERS; len = fwrite(§ion_len, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* write the number of stems coming */ section_len = data->num_stems; len = fwrite(§ion_len, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; for (i = 0; i < section_len; i++) { char *stem = data->stem_arr[i].buf; uint32_t stem_len = data->stem_arr[i].len; /* write the strlen (aka no nul) */ len = fwrite(&stem_len, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* include the nul in the file */ stem_len += 1; len = fwrite(stem, sizeof(char), stem_len, bin_file); if (len != stem_len) goto err; } /* write the number of regexes coming */ section_len = data->nspec; len = fwrite(§ion_len, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; for (i = 0; i < section_len; i++) { char *context = specs[i].lr.ctx_raw; char *regex_str = specs[i].regex_str; mode_t mode = specs[i].mode; int32_t stem_id = specs[i].stem_id; pcre *re = specs[i].regex; pcre_extra *sd = get_pcre_extra(&specs[i]); uint32_t to_write; size_t size; /* length of the context string (including nul) */ to_write = strlen(context) + 1; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* original context strin (including nul) */ len = fwrite(context, sizeof(char), to_write, bin_file); if (len != to_write) goto err; /* length of the original regex string (including nul) */ to_write = strlen(regex_str) + 1; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* original regex string */ len = fwrite(regex_str, sizeof(char), to_write, bin_file); if (len != to_write) goto err; /* binary F_MODE bits */ len = fwrite(&mode, sizeof(mode), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* stem for this regex (could be -1) */ len = fwrite(&stem_id, sizeof(stem_id), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* does this spec have a metaChar? */ to_write = specs[i].hasMetaChars; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(to_write), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* determine the size of the pcre data in bytes */ rc = pcre_fullinfo(re, NULL, PCRE_INFO_SIZE, &size); if (rc < 0) goto err; /* write the number of bytes in the pcre data */ to_write = size; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* write the actual pcre data as a char array */ len = fwrite(re, 1, to_write, bin_file); if (len != to_write) goto err; /* determine the size of the pcre study info */ rc = pcre_fullinfo(re, sd, PCRE_INFO_STUDYSIZE, &size); if (rc < 0) goto err; /* write the number of bytes in the pcre study data */ to_write = size; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* write the actual pcre study data as a char array */ len = fwrite(sd->study_data, 1, to_write, bin_file); if (len != to_write) goto err; } rc = 0; out: fclose(bin_file); return rc; err: rc = -1; goto out; } static int free_specs(struct saved_data *data) { struct spec *specs = data->spec_arr; unsigned int num_entries = data->nspec; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) { free(specs[i].lr.ctx_raw); free(specs[i].lr.ctx_trans); free(specs[i].regex_str); pcre_free(specs[i].regex); pcre_free_study(specs[i].sd); } free(specs); num_entries = data->num_stems; for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) { free(data->stem_arr[i].buf); } free(data->stem_arr); memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { struct saved_data data; const char *path; char stack_path[PATH_MAX + 1]; int rc; char *tmp= NULL; int fd; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s input_file\n", argv[0]); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); path = argv[1]; rc = process_file(&data, path); if (rc < 0) return rc; rc = sort_specs(&data); if (rc) return rc; rc = snprintf(stack_path, sizeof(stack_path), "%s.bin", path); if (rc < 0 || rc >= sizeof(stack_path)) return rc; if (asprintf(&tmp, "%sXXXXXX", stack_path) < 0) return -1; fd = mkstemp(tmp); if (fd < 0) goto err; rc = write_binary_file(&data, fd); if (rc < 0) goto err; rename(tmp, stack_path); rc = free_specs(&data); if (rc < 0) goto err; rc = 0; out: free(tmp); return rc; err: rc = -1; goto out; } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/selinux_check_securetty_context.c000066400000000000000000000011711226034601700236770ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s tty_context...\n", progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int i; if (argc < 2) usage(argv[0]); for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { switch (selinux_check_securetty_context(argv[i])) { case 0: printf("%s securetty.\n", argv[i]); break; default: printf("%s not securetty.\n", argv[i]); break; } } return 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/selinuxenabled.c000066400000000000000000000002131226034601700201760ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include int main(void) { return !is_selinux_enabled(); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/selinuxexeccon.c000066400000000000000000000023401226034601700202330ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static void usage(const char *name, const char *detail, int rc) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s command [ fromcon ]\n", name); if (detail) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s\n", name, detail); exit(rc); } static security_context_t get_selinux_proc_context(const char *command, security_context_t execcon) { security_context_t fcon = NULL, newcon = NULL; int ret = getfilecon(command, &fcon); if (ret < 0) goto err; ret = security_compute_create(execcon, fcon, SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newcon); if (ret < 0) goto err; err: freecon(fcon); return newcon; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ret = -1; security_context_t proccon = NULL, con = NULL; if (argc < 2 || argc > 3) usage(argv[0], "Invalid number of arguments", -1); if (argc == 2) { if (getcon(&con) < 0) { perror(argv[0]); return -1; } } else { con = strdup(argv[2]); } proccon = get_selinux_proc_context(argv[1], con); if (proccon) { printf("%s\n", proccon); ret = 0; } else { perror(argv[0]); } free(proccon); free(con); return ret; } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/setenforce.c000066400000000000000000000016061226034601700173400ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include static void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [ Enforcing | Permissive | 1 | 0 ]\n", progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc = 0; if (argc != 2) { usage(argv[0]); } if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: SELinux is disabled\n", argv[0]); return 1; } if (strlen(argv[1]) == 1 && (argv[1][0] == '0' || argv[1][0] == '1')) { rc = security_setenforce(atoi(argv[1])); } else { if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "enforcing") == 0) { rc = security_setenforce(1); } else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "permissive") == 0) { rc = security_setenforce(0); } else usage(argv[0]); } if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: setenforce() failed\n", argv[0]); return 2; } return 0; } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/setfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000006541226034601700173400ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc, i; if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s context path...\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } for (i = 2; i < argc; i++) { rc = setfilecon(argv[i], argv[1]); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: setfilecon(%s,%s) failed\n", argv[0], argv[i], argv[1]); exit(2); } } exit(0); } libselinux-2.2.2/utils/togglesebool.c000066400000000000000000000041551226034601700176720ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* Attempt to rollback the transaction. No need to check error codes since this is rolling back something that blew up. */ static void rollback(int argc, char **argv) { int i; for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) security_set_boolean(argv[i], security_get_boolean_active(argv[i])); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc, i, commit = 0; if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: SELinux is disabled\n", argv[0]); return 1; } if (argc < 2) { printf("Usage: %s boolname1 [boolname2 ...]\n", basename(argv[0])); return 1; } for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { printf("%s: ", argv[i]); rc = security_get_boolean_active(argv[i]); switch (rc) { case 1: if (security_set_boolean(argv[i], 0) >= 0) { printf("inactive\n"); commit++; } else { printf("%s - rolling back all changes\n", strerror(errno)); rollback(i, argv); } break; case 0: if (security_set_boolean(argv[i], 1) >= 0) { printf("active\n"); commit++; } else { printf("%s - rolling back all changes\n", strerror(errno)); rollback(i, argv); } break; default: if (errno == ENOENT) printf ("Boolean does not exist - rolling back all changes.\n"); else printf("%s - rolling back all changes.\n", strerror(errno)); rollback(i, argv); break; /* Not reached. */ } } if (commit > 0) { if (security_commit_booleans() < 0) { printf("Commit failed. (%s) No change to booleans.\n", strerror(errno)); } else { /* syslog all the changes */ struct passwd *pwd = getpwuid(getuid()); for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { if (pwd && pwd->pw_name) syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "The %s policy boolean was toggled by %s", argv[i], pwd->pw_name); else syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "The %s policy boolean was toggled by uid:%d", argv[i], getuid()); } return 0; } } return 1; }