pax_global_header00006660000000000000000000000064143756634330014530gustar00rootroot0000000000000052 comment=d6e96c5929a3f1aa1dce93505edd9f0158757ac2 libselinux-3.5/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300135555ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/LICENSE000066400000000000000000000020121437566343300145550ustar00rootroot00000000000000This library (libselinux) is public domain software, i.e. not copyrighted. Warranty Exclusion ------------------ You agree that this software is a non-commercially developed program that may contain "bugs" (as that term is used in the industry) and that it may not function as intended. The software is licensed "as is". NSA makes no, and hereby expressly disclaims all, warranties, express, implied, statutory, or otherwise with respect to the software, including noninfringement and the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Limitation of Liability ----------------------- In no event will NSA be liable for any damages, including loss of data, lost profits, cost of cover, or other special, incidental, consequential, direct or indirect damages arising from the software or the use thereof, however caused and on any theory of liability. This limitation will apply even if NSA has been advised of the possibility of such damage. You acknowledge that this is a reasonable allocation of risk. libselinux-3.5/Makefile000066400000000000000000000026001437566343300152130ustar00rootroot00000000000000SUBDIRS = include src utils man PKG_CONFIG ?= pkg-config DISABLE_SETRANS ?= n DISABLE_RPM ?= n ANDROID_HOST ?= n LABEL_BACKEND_ANDROID ?= n ifeq ($(ANDROID_HOST),y) override DISABLE_SETRANS=y override DISABLE_BOOL=y endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_RPM),y) DISABLE_FLAGS+= -DDISABLE_RPM endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_SETRANS),y) DISABLE_FLAGS+= -DDISABLE_SETRANS endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_BOOL),y) DISABLE_FLAGS+= -DDISABLE_BOOL endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_X11),y) DISABLE_FLAGS+= -DNO_X_BACKEND endif export DISABLE_SETRANS DISABLE_RPM DISABLE_FLAGS ANDROID_HOST DISABLE_X11 LABEL_BACKEND_ANDROID USE_PCRE2 ?= y ifeq ($(USE_PCRE2),y) PCRE_MODULE := libpcre2-8 PCRE_CFLAGS := -DUSE_PCRE2 -DPCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=8 else PCRE_MODULE := libpcre endif PCRE_CFLAGS += $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags $(PCRE_MODULE)) PCRE_LDLIBS := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs $(PCRE_MODULE)) export PCRE_MODULE PCRE_CFLAGS PCRE_LDLIBS OS := $(shell uname) export OS ifeq ($(shell $(CC) -v 2>&1 | grep "clang"),) COMPILER := gcc else COMPILER := clang endif export COMPILER all install relabel clean distclean indent: @for subdir in $(SUBDIRS); do \ (cd $$subdir && $(MAKE) $@) || exit 1; \ done swigify: all $(MAKE) -C src $@ pywrap: $(MAKE) -C src $@ rubywrap: $(MAKE) -C src $@ install-pywrap: $(MAKE) -C src $@ install-rubywrap: $(MAKE) -C src $@ clean-pywrap: $(MAKE) -C src $@ clean-rubywrap: $(MAKE) -C src $@ test: libselinux-3.5/VERSION000066400000000000000000000000041437566343300146170ustar00rootroot000000000000003.5 libselinux-3.5/include/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300152005ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/include/Makefile000066400000000000000000000005141437566343300166400ustar00rootroot00000000000000# Installation directories. PREFIX ?= /usr INCDIR = $(PREFIX)/include/selinux all: install: all test -d $(DESTDIR)$(INCDIR) || install -m 755 -d $(DESTDIR)$(INCDIR) install -m 644 $(wildcard selinux/*.h) $(DESTDIR)$(INCDIR) relabel: indent: ../../scripts/Lindent $(wildcard selinux/*.h) distclean clean: -rm -f selinux/*~ libselinux-3.5/include/selinux/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300166675ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/include/selinux/avc.h000066400000000000000000000407601437566343300176200ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Access vector cache interface for object managers. * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_ #define _SELINUX_AVC_H_ #include #include #include #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * SID format and operations */ struct security_id { char * ctx; unsigned int refcnt; }; typedef struct security_id *security_id_t; #define SECSID_WILD ((security_id_t)NULL) /* unspecified SID */ /** * avc_sid_to_context - get copy of context corresponding to SID. * @sid: input SID * @ctx: pointer to context reference * * Return a copy of the security context corresponding to the input * @sid in the memory referenced by @ctx. The caller is expected to * free the context with freecon(). Return %0 on success, -%1 on * failure, with @errno set to %ENOMEM if insufficient memory was * available to make the copy, or %EINVAL if the input SID is invalid. */ extern int avc_sid_to_context(security_id_t sid, char ** ctx); extern int avc_sid_to_context_raw(security_id_t sid, char ** ctx); /** * avc_context_to_sid - get SID for context. * @ctx: input security context * @sid: pointer to SID reference * * Look up security context @ctx in SID table, making * a new entry if @ctx is not found. Increment the * reference counter for the SID. Store a pointer * to the SID structure into the memory referenced by @sid, * returning %0 on success or -%1 on error with @errno set. */ extern int avc_context_to_sid(const char * ctx, security_id_t * sid); extern int avc_context_to_sid_raw(const char * ctx, security_id_t * sid); /** * sidget - increment SID reference counter. * @sid: SID reference * * Increment the reference counter for @sid, indicating that * @sid is in use by an (additional) object. Return the * new reference count, or zero if @sid is invalid (has zero * reference count). Note that avc_context_to_sid() also * increments reference counts. */ extern int sidget(security_id_t sid) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated)) #endif ; /** * sidput - decrement SID reference counter. * @sid: SID reference * * Decrement the reference counter for @sid, indicating that * a reference to @sid is no longer in use. Return the * new reference count. When the reference count reaches * zero, the SID is invalid, and avc_context_to_sid() must * be called to obtain a new SID for the security context. */ extern int sidput(security_id_t sid) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated)) #endif ; /** * avc_get_initial_sid - get SID for an initial kernel security identifier * @name: input name of initial kernel security identifier * @sid: pointer to a SID reference * * Get the context for an initial kernel security identifier specified by * @name using security_get_initial_context() and then call * avc_context_to_sid() to get the corresponding SID. */ extern int avc_get_initial_sid(const char *name, security_id_t * sid); /* * AVC entry */ struct avc_entry; struct avc_entry_ref { struct avc_entry *ae; }; /** * avc_entry_ref_init - initialize an AVC entry reference. * @aeref: pointer to avc entry reference structure * * Use this macro to initialize an avc entry reference structure * before first use. These structures are passed to avc_has_perm(), * which stores cache entry references in them. They can increase * performance on repeated queries. */ #define avc_entry_ref_init(aeref) ((aeref)->ae = NULL) /* * User-provided callbacks for memory, auditing, and locking */ /* These structures are passed by reference to avc_init(). Passing * a NULL reference will cause the AVC to use a default. The default * memory callbacks are malloc() and free(). The default logging method * is to print on stderr. If no thread callbacks are passed, a separate * listening thread won't be started for kernel policy change messages. * If no locking callbacks are passed, no locking will take place. */ struct avc_memory_callback { /* malloc() equivalent. */ void *(*func_malloc) (size_t size); /* free() equivalent. */ void (*func_free) (void *ptr); /* Note that these functions should set errno on failure. If not, some avc routines may return -1 without errno set. */ }; struct avc_log_callback { /* log the printf-style format and arguments. */ void #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((format(printf, 1, 2))) #endif (*func_log) (const char *fmt, ...); /* store a string representation of auditdata (corresponding to the given security class) into msgbuf. */ void (*func_audit) (void *auditdata, security_class_t cls, char *msgbuf, size_t msgbufsize); }; struct avc_thread_callback { /* create and start a thread, returning an opaque pointer to it; the thread should run the given function. */ void *(*func_create_thread) (void (*run) (void)); /* cancel a given thread and free its resources. */ void (*func_stop_thread) (void *thread); }; struct avc_lock_callback { /* create a lock and return an opaque pointer to it. */ void *(*func_alloc_lock) (void); /* obtain a given lock, blocking if necessary. */ void (*func_get_lock) (void *lock); /* release a given lock. */ void (*func_release_lock) (void *lock); /* destroy a given lock (free memory, etc.) */ void (*func_free_lock) (void *lock); }; /* * Available options */ /* no-op option, useful for unused slots in an array of options */ #define AVC_OPT_UNUSED 0 /* override kernel enforcing mode (boolean value) */ #define AVC_OPT_SETENFORCE 1 /* * AVC operations */ /** * avc_init - Initialize the AVC. * @msgprefix: prefix for log messages * @mem_callbacks: user-supplied memory callbacks * @log_callbacks: user-supplied logging callbacks * @thread_callbacks: user-supplied threading callbacks * @lock_callbacks: user-supplied locking callbacks * * Initialize the access vector cache. Return %0 on * success or -%1 with @errno set on failure. * If @msgprefix is NULL, use "uavc". If any callback * structure references are NULL, use default methods * for those callbacks (see the definition of the callback * structures above). */ extern int avc_init(const char *msgprefix, const struct avc_memory_callback *mem_callbacks, const struct avc_log_callback *log_callbacks, const struct avc_thread_callback *thread_callbacks, const struct avc_lock_callback *lock_callbacks) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated("Use avc_open and selinux_set_callback"))) #endif ; /** * avc_open - Initialize the AVC. * @opts: array of selabel_opt structures specifying AVC options or NULL. * @nopts: number of elements in opts array or zero for no options. * * This function is identical to avc_init(), except the message prefix * is set to "avc" and any callbacks desired should be specified via * selinux_set_callback(). Available options are listed above. */ extern int avc_open(struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts); /** * avc_cleanup - Remove unused SIDs and AVC entries. * * Search the SID table for SID structures with zero * reference counts, and remove them along with all * AVC entries that reference them. This can be used * to return memory to the system. */ extern void avc_cleanup(void); /** * avc_reset - Flush the cache and reset statistics. * * Remove all entries from the cache and reset all access * statistics (as returned by avc_cache_stats()) to zero. * The SID mapping is not affected. Return %0 on success, * -%1 with @errno set on error. */ extern int avc_reset(void); /** * avc_destroy - Free all AVC structures. * * Destroy all AVC structures and free all allocated * memory. User-supplied locking, memory, and audit * callbacks will be retained, but security-event * callbacks will not. All SID's will be invalidated. * User must call avc_init() if further use of AVC is desired. */ extern void avc_destroy(void); /** * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass * @aeref: AVC entry reference * @avd: access vector decisions * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain * a new decision and add it to the cache. Update @aeref to refer to an AVC * entry with the resulting decisions, and return a copy of the decisions * in @avd. Return %0 if all @requested permissions are granted, -%1 with * @errno set to %EACCES if any permissions are denied, or to another value * upon other errors. This function is typically called by avc_has_perm(), * but may also be called directly to separate permission checking from * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but * should be released for the auditing. */ extern int avc_has_perm_noaudit(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref, struct av_decision *avd); /** * avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass * @aeref: AVC entry reference * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain * a new decision and add it to the cache. Update @aeref to refer to an AVC * entry with the resulting decisions. Audit the granting or denial of * permissions in accordance with the policy. Return %0 if all @requested * permissions are granted, -%1 with @errno set to %EACCES if any permissions * are denied or to another value upon other errors. */ extern int avc_has_perm(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref, void *auditdata); /** * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions * @avd: access vector decisions * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data * * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance * with the policy. This function is typically called by * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit() * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing. * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released * before calling the auditing code. */ extern void avc_audit(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd, int result, void *auditdata); /** * avc_compute_create - Compute SID for labeling a new object. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @newsid: pointer to SID reference * * Call the security server to obtain a context for labeling a * new object. Look up the context in the SID table, making * a new entry if not found. Increment the reference counter * for the SID. Store a pointer to the SID structure into the * memory referenced by @newsid, returning %0 on success or -%1 on * error with @errno set. */ extern int avc_compute_create(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, security_id_t * newsid); /** * avc_compute_member - Compute SID for polyinstantation. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @newsid: pointer to SID reference * * Call the security server to obtain a context for labeling an * object instance. Look up the context in the SID table, making * a new entry if not found. Increment the reference counter * for the SID. Store a pointer to the SID structure into the * memory referenced by @newsid, returning %0 on success or -%1 on * error with @errno set. */ extern int avc_compute_member(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, security_id_t * newsid); /* * security event callback facility */ /* security events */ #define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1 #define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE 2 #define AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE 4 #define AVC_CALLBACK_RESET 8 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE 16 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128 /** * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events. * @callback: callback function * @events: bitwise OR of desired security events * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions * * Register a callback function for events in the set @events * related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) and * and the permissions @perms, interpreting * @perms based on @tclass. Returns %0 on success or * -%1 if insufficient memory exists to add the callback. */ extern int avc_add_callback(int (*callback) (uint32_t event, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, access_vector_t * out_retained), uint32_t events, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms); /* * AVC statistics */ /* If set, cache statistics are tracked. This may * become a compile-time option in the future. */ #define AVC_CACHE_STATS 1 struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned entry_lookups; unsigned entry_hits; unsigned entry_misses; unsigned entry_discards; unsigned cav_lookups; unsigned cav_hits; unsigned cav_probes; unsigned cav_misses; }; /** * avc_cache_stats - get cache access statistics. * @stats: reference to statistics structure * * Fill the supplied structure with information about AVC * activity since the last call to avc_init() or * avc_reset(). See the structure definition for * details. */ extern void avc_cache_stats(struct avc_cache_stats *stats); /** * avc_av_stats - log av table statistics. * * Log a message with information about the size and * distribution of the access vector table. The audit * callback is used to print the message. */ extern void avc_av_stats(void); /** * avc_sid_stats - log SID table statistics. * * Log a message with information about the size and * distribution of the SID table. The audit callback * is used to print the message. */ extern void avc_sid_stats(void); /** * avc_netlink_open - Create a netlink socket and connect to the kernel. */ extern int avc_netlink_open(int blocking); /** * avc_netlink_loop - Wait for netlink messages from the kernel */ extern void avc_netlink_loop(void); /** * avc_netlink_close - Close the netlink socket */ extern void avc_netlink_close(void); /** * avc_netlink_acquire_fd - Acquire netlink socket fd. * * Allows the application to manage messages from the netlink socket in * its own main loop. */ extern int avc_netlink_acquire_fd(void); /** * avc_netlink_release_fd - Release netlink socket fd. * * Returns ownership of the netlink socket to the library. */ extern void avc_netlink_release_fd(void); /** * avc_netlink_check_nb - Check netlink socket for new messages. * * Called by the application when using avc_netlink_acquire_fd() to * process kernel netlink events. */ extern int avc_netlink_check_nb(void); /** * selinux_status_open - Open and map SELinux kernel status page * */ extern int selinux_status_open(int fallback); /** * selinux_status_close - Unmap and close SELinux kernel status page * */ extern void selinux_status_close(void); /** * selinux_status_updated - Inform us whether the kernel status has been updated * */ extern int selinux_status_updated(void); /** * selinux_status_getenforce - Get the enforce flag value * */ extern int selinux_status_getenforce(void); /** * selinux_status_policyload - Get the number of policy reloaded * */ extern int selinux_status_policyload(void); /** * selinux_status_deny_unknown - Get the behavior for undefined classes/permissions * */ extern int selinux_status_deny_unknown(void); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/include/selinux/context.h000066400000000000000000000023731437566343300205310ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _SELINUX_CONTEXT_H_ #define _SELINUX_CONTEXT_H_ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * Functions to deal with security contexts in user space. */ typedef struct { void *ptr; } context_s_t; typedef context_s_t *context_t; /* Return a new context initialized to a context string */ extern context_t context_new(const char *str); /* * Return a pointer to the string value of the context_t * Valid until the next call to context_str or context_free * for the same context_t* */ extern const char *context_str(context_t con); /* Free the storage used by a context */ extern void context_free(context_t con); /* Get a pointer to the string value of a context component */ extern const char *context_type_get(context_t con); extern const char *context_range_get(context_t con); extern const char *context_role_get(context_t con); extern const char *context_user_get(context_t con); /* Set a context component. Returns nonzero if unsuccessful */ extern int context_type_set(context_t con, const char *type); extern int context_range_set(context_t con, const char *range); extern int context_role_set(context_t con, const char *role); extern int context_user_set(context_t con, const char *user); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif libselinux-3.5/include/selinux/get_context_list.h000066400000000000000000000056701437566343300224260ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _SELINUX_GET_SID_LIST_H_ #define _SELINUX_GET_SID_LIST_H_ #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #define SELINUX_DEFAULTUSER "user_u" /* Get an ordered list of authorized security contexts for a user session for 'user' spawned by 'fromcon' and set *conary to refer to the NULL-terminated array of contexts. Every entry in the list will be authorized by the policy, but the ordering is subject to user customizable preferences. Returns number of entries in *conary. If 'fromcon' is NULL, defaults to current context. Caller must free via freeconary. */ extern int get_ordered_context_list(const char *user, const char *fromcon, char *** list); /* As above, but use the provided MLS level rather than the default level for the user. */ extern int get_ordered_context_list_with_level(const char *user, const char *level, const char *fromcon, char *** list); /* Get the default security context for a user session for 'user' spawned by 'fromcon' and set *newcon to refer to it. The context will be one of those authorized by the policy, but the selection of a default is subject to user customizable preferences. If 'fromcon' is NULL, defaults to current context. Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int get_default_context(const char *user, const char *fromcon, char ** newcon); /* As above, but use the provided MLS level rather than the default level for the user. */ extern int get_default_context_with_level(const char *user, const char *level, const char *fromcon, char ** newcon); /* Same as get_default_context, but only return a context that has the specified role. If no reachable context exists for the user with that role, then return -1. */ extern int get_default_context_with_role(const char *user, const char *role, const char *fromcon, char ** newcon); /* Same as get_default_context, but only return a context that has the specified role and level. If no reachable context exists for the user with that role, then return -1. */ extern int get_default_context_with_rolelevel(const char *user, const char *role, const char *level, const char *fromcon, char ** newcon); /* Given a list of authorized security contexts for the user, query the user to select one and set *newcon to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. */ extern int query_user_context(char ** list, char ** newcon); /* Allow the user to manually enter a context as a fallback if a list of authorized contexts could not be obtained. Caller must free via freecon. Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. */ extern int manual_user_enter_context(const char *user, char ** newcon); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif libselinux-3.5/include/selinux/get_default_type.h000066400000000000000000000012031437566343300223600ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* get_default_type.h - contains header information and function prototypes * for functions to get the default type for a role */ #ifndef _SELINUX_GET_DEFAULT_TYPE_H_ #define _SELINUX_GET_DEFAULT_TYPE_H_ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Return path to default type file. */ extern const char *selinux_default_type_path(void); /* Get the default type (domain) for 'role' and set 'type' to refer to it. Caller must free via free(). Return 0 on success or -1 otherwise. */ extern int get_default_type(const char *role, char **type); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ifndef _GET_DEFAULT_TYPE_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/include/selinux/label.h000066400000000000000000000143671437566343300201320ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Labeling interface for userspace object managers and others. * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #ifndef _SELABEL_H_ #define _SELABEL_H_ #include #include #include #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * Opaque type used for all label handles. */ struct selabel_handle; /* * Available backends. */ /* file contexts */ #define SELABEL_CTX_FILE 0 /* media contexts */ #define SELABEL_CTX_MEDIA 1 /* x contexts */ #define SELABEL_CTX_X 2 /* db objects */ #define SELABEL_CTX_DB 3 /* Android property service contexts */ #define SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_PROP 4 /* Android service contexts */ #define SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_SERVICE 5 /* * Available options */ /* no-op option, useful for unused slots in an array of options */ #define SELABEL_OPT_UNUSED 0 /* validate contexts before returning them (boolean value) */ #define SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE 1 /* don't use local customizations to backend data (boolean value) */ #define SELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY 2 /* specify an alternate path to use when loading backend data */ #define SELABEL_OPT_PATH 3 /* select a subset of the search space as an optimization (file backend) */ #define SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET 4 /* require a hash calculation on spec files */ #define SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST 5 /* total number of options */ #define SELABEL_NOPT 6 /* * Label operations */ /** * selabel_open - Create a labeling handle. * @backend: one of the constants specifying a supported labeling backend. * @opts: array of selabel_opt structures specifying label options or NULL. * @nopts: number of elements in opts array or zero for no options. * * Open a labeling backend for use. The available backend identifiers are * listed above. Options may be provided via the opts parameter; available * options are listed above. Not all options may be supported by every * backend. Return value is the created handle on success or NULL with * @errno set on failure. */ extern struct selabel_handle *selabel_open(unsigned int backend, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts); /** * selabel_close - Close a labeling handle. * @handle: specifies handle to close * * Destroy the specified handle, closing files, freeing allocated memory, * etc. The handle may not be further used after it has been closed. */ extern void selabel_close(struct selabel_handle *handle); /** * selabel_lookup - Perform labeling lookup operation. * @handle: specifies backend instance to query * @con: returns the appropriate context with which to label the object * @key: string input to lookup operation * @type: numeric input to the lookup operation * * Perform a labeling lookup operation. Return %0 on success, -%1 with * @errno set on failure. The key and type arguments are the inputs to the * lookup operation; appropriate values are dictated by the backend in use. * The result is returned in the memory pointed to by @con and must be freed * by the user with freecon(). */ extern int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *handle, char **con, const char *key, int type); extern int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *handle, char **con, const char *key, int type); extern bool selabel_partial_match(struct selabel_handle *handle, const char *key); extern bool selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, uint8_t **calculated_digest, uint8_t **xattr_digest, size_t *digest_len); extern bool selabel_hash_all_partial_matches(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, uint8_t* digest); extern int selabel_lookup_best_match(struct selabel_handle *rec, char **con, const char *key, const char **aliases, int type); extern int selabel_lookup_best_match_raw(struct selabel_handle *rec, char **con, const char *key, const char **aliases, int type); /** * selabel_digest - Retrieve the SHA1 digest and the list of specfiles used to * generate the digest. The SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST option must * be set in selabel_open() to initiate the digest generation. * @handle: specifies backend instance to query * @digest: returns a pointer to the SHA1 digest. * @digest_len: returns length of digest in bytes. * @specfiles: a list of specfiles used in the SHA1 digest generation. * The list is NULL terminated and will hold @num_specfiles entries. * @num_specfiles: number of specfiles in the list. * * Return %0 on success, -%1 with @errno set on failure. */ extern int selabel_digest(struct selabel_handle *rec, unsigned char **digest, size_t *digest_len, char ***specfiles, size_t *num_specfiles); enum selabel_cmp_result { SELABEL_SUBSET, SELABEL_EQUAL, SELABEL_SUPERSET, SELABEL_INCOMPARABLE }; /** * selabel_cmp - Compare two label configurations. * @h1: handle for the first label configuration * @h2: handle for the first label configuration * * Compare two label configurations. * Return %SELABEL_SUBSET if @h1 is a subset of @h2, %SELABEL_EQUAL * if @h1 is identical to @h2, %SELABEL_SUPERSET if @h1 is a superset * of @h2, and %SELABEL_INCOMPARABLE if @h1 and @h2 are incomparable. */ extern enum selabel_cmp_result selabel_cmp(struct selabel_handle *h1, struct selabel_handle *h2); /** * selabel_stats - log labeling operation statistics. * @handle: specifies backend instance to query * * Log a message with information about the number of queries performed, * number of unused matching entries, or other operational statistics. * Message is backend-specific, some backends may not output a message. */ extern void selabel_stats(struct selabel_handle *handle); /* * Type codes used by specific backends */ /* X backend */ #define SELABEL_X_PROP 1 #define SELABEL_X_EXT 2 #define SELABEL_X_CLIENT 3 #define SELABEL_X_EVENT 4 #define SELABEL_X_SELN 5 #define SELABEL_X_POLYPROP 6 #define SELABEL_X_POLYSELN 7 /* DB backend */ #define SELABEL_DB_DATABASE 1 #define SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA 2 #define SELABEL_DB_TABLE 3 #define SELABEL_DB_COLUMN 4 #define SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE 5 #define SELABEL_DB_VIEW 6 #define SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE 7 #define SELABEL_DB_BLOB 8 #define SELABEL_DB_TUPLE 9 #define SELABEL_DB_LANGUAGE 10 #define SELABEL_DB_EXCEPTION 11 #define SELABEL_DB_DATATYPE 12 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* _SELABEL_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/include/selinux/restorecon.h000066400000000000000000000164301437566343300212270ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _RESTORECON_H_ #define _RESTORECON_H_ #include #include #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * selinux_restorecon - Relabel files. * @pathname: specifies file/directory to relabel. * @restorecon_flags: specifies the actions to be performed when relabeling. * * selinux_restorecon(3) will automatically call * selinux_restorecon_default_handle(3) and selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle(3) * first time through to set the selabel_open(3) parameters to use the * currently loaded policy file_contexts and request their computed digest. * * Should other selabel_open(3) parameters be required see * selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle(3). */ extern int selinux_restorecon(const char *pathname, unsigned int restorecon_flags); /** * selinux_restorecon_parallel - Relabel files, optionally use more threads. * @pathname: specifies file/directory to relabel. * @restorecon_flags: specifies the actions to be performed when relabeling. * @nthreads: specifies the number of threads to use (0 = use number of CPUs * currently online) * * Same as selinux_restorecon(3), but allows to use multiple threads to do * the work. */ extern int selinux_restorecon_parallel(const char *pathname, unsigned int restorecon_flags, size_t nthreads); /* * restorecon_flags options */ /* * Force the checking of labels even if the stored SHA1 digest * matches the specfiles SHA1 digest (requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN). */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_DIGEST 0x00001 /* * Do not change file labels. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_NOCHANGE 0x00002 /* * If set, change file label to that in spec file. * If not, only change type component to that in spec file. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_SET_SPECFILE_CTX 0x00004 /* * Recursively descend directories. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_RECURSE 0x00008 /* * Log changes to selinux log. Note that if VERBOSE and * PROGRESS are set, then PROGRESS will take precedence. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_VERBOSE 0x00010 /* * If SELINUX_RESTORECON_PROGRESS is true and * SELINUX_RESTORECON_MASS_RELABEL is true, then output approx % complete, * else output the number of files in 1k blocks processed to stdout. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_PROGRESS 0x00020 /* * Convert passed-in pathname to canonical pathname. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_REALPATH 0x00040 /* * Prevent descending into directories that have a different * device number than the pathname from which the descent began. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_XDEV 0x00080 /* * Attempt to add an association between an inode and a specification. * If there is already an association for the inode and it conflicts * with the specification, then use the last matching specification. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_ADD_ASSOC 0x00100 /* * Abort on errors during the file tree walk. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_ABORT_ON_ERROR 0x00200 /* * Log any label changes to syslog. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_SYSLOG_CHANGES 0x00400 /* * Log what spec matched each file. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_LOG_MATCHES 0x00800 /* * Ignore files that do not exist. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_NOENTRY 0x01000 /* * Do not read /proc/mounts to obtain a list of non-seclabel * mounts to be excluded from relabeling checks. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_MOUNTS 0x02000 /* * Set if there is a mass relabel required. * See SELINUX_RESTORECON_PROGRESS flag for details. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_MASS_RELABEL 0x04000 /* * Set if no digest is to be read or written (as only processes * running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read/write digests). */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_SKIP_DIGEST 0x08000 /* * Set to treat conflicting specifications as errors. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_CONFLICT_ERROR 0x10000 /* * Count, but otherwise ignore, errors during the file tree walk. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_COUNT_ERRORS 0x20000 /** * selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle - Set the global fc handle. * @hndl: specifies handle to set as the global fc handle. * * Called by a process that has already called selabel_open(3) with its * required parameters, or if selinux_restorecon_default_handle(3) has been * called to set the default selabel_open(3) parameters. */ extern void selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle(struct selabel_handle *hndl); /** * selinux_restorecon_default_handle - Sets default selabel_open(3) parameters * to use the currently loaded policy and * file_contexts. * * Return value is the created handle on success or NULL with @errno set on * failure. */ extern struct selabel_handle *selinux_restorecon_default_handle(void); /** * selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list - Add a list of directories that are * to be excluded from relabeling. * @exclude_list: containing a NULL terminated list of one or more * directories not to be relabeled. */ extern void selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list(const char **exclude_list); /** * selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath - Use alternate rootpath. * @alt_rootpath: containing the alternate rootpath to be used. * * Return %0 on success, -%1 with @errno set on failure. */ extern int selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath(const char *alt_rootpath); /** * selinux_restorecon_xattr - Read/remove security.sehash xattr entries. * @pathname: specifies directory path to check. * @xattr_flags: specifies the actions to be performed. * @xattr_list: a linked list of struct dir_xattr structures containing * the directory, digest and result of the action on the * security.sehash entry. * * selinux_restorecon_xattr(3) will automatically call * selinux_restorecon_default_handle(3) and selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle(3) * first time through to set the selabel_open(3) parameters to use the * currently loaded policy file_contexts and request their computed digest. * * Should other selabel_open(3) parameters be required see * selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle(3), however note that a file_contexts * computed digest is required for selinux_restorecon_xattr(). */ enum digest_result { MATCH = 0, NOMATCH, DELETED_MATCH, DELETED_NOMATCH, ERROR }; struct dir_xattr { char *directory; char *digest; /* A hex encoded string that can be printed. */ enum digest_result result; struct dir_xattr *next; }; extern int selinux_restorecon_xattr(const char *pathname, unsigned int xattr_flags, struct dir_xattr ***xattr_list); /* * xattr_flags options */ /* Recursively descend directories. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_RECURSE 0x0001 /* Delete non-matching digests from each directory in pathname. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_DELETE_NONMATCH_DIGESTS 0x0002 /* Delete all digests found in pathname. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_DELETE_ALL_DIGESTS 0x0004 /* Do not read /proc/mounts. */ #define SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_IGNORE_MOUNTS 0x0008 /* selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors - Get the number of errors ignored * during re-labeling. * * If SELINUX_RESTORECON_COUNT_ERRORS was passed to selinux_restorecon(3) or * selinux_restorecon_parallel(3), and that function returned successfully * (i.e., with a zero return value), then this function returns the number of * errors ignored during the file tree walk. */ extern long unsigned selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors(void); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif libselinux-3.5/include/selinux/selinux.h000066400000000000000000000707431437566343300205420ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _SELINUX_H_ #define _SELINUX_H_ #include #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Return 1 if we are running on a SELinux kernel, or 0 otherwise. */ extern int is_selinux_enabled(void); /* Return 1 if we are running on a SELinux MLS kernel, or 0 otherwise. */ extern int is_selinux_mls_enabled(void); /* No longer used; here for compatibility with legacy callers. */ typedef char *security_context_t #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated)) #endif ; /* Free the memory allocated for a context by any of the below get* calls. */ extern void freecon(char * con); /* Free the memory allocated for a context array by security_compute_user. */ extern void freeconary(char ** con); /* Wrappers for the /proc/pid/attr API. */ /* Get current context, and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getcon(char ** con); extern int getcon_raw(char ** con); /* Set the current security context to con. Note that use of this function requires that the entire application be trusted to maintain any desired separation between the old and new security contexts, unlike exec-based transitions performed via setexeccon. When possible, decompose your application and use setexeccon()+execve() instead. Note that the application may lose access to its open descriptors as a result of a setcon() unless policy allows it to use descriptors opened by the old context. */ extern int setcon(const char * con); extern int setcon_raw(const char * con); /* Get context of process identified by pid, and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getpidcon(pid_t pid, char ** con); extern int getpidcon_raw(pid_t pid, char ** con); /* Get previous context (prior to last exec), and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getprevcon(char ** con); extern int getprevcon_raw(char ** con); /* Get previous context (prior to last exec) of process identified by pid, and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getpidprevcon(pid_t pid, char ** con); extern int getpidprevcon_raw(pid_t pid, char ** con); /* Get exec context, and set *con to refer to it. Sets *con to NULL if no exec context has been set, i.e. using default. If non-NULL, caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getexeccon(char ** con); extern int getexeccon_raw(char ** con); /* Set exec security context for the next execve. Call with NULL if you want to reset to the default. */ extern int setexeccon(const char * con); extern int setexeccon_raw(const char * con); /* Get fscreate context, and set *con to refer to it. Sets *con to NULL if no fs create context has been set, i.e. using default. If non-NULL, caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getfscreatecon(char ** con); extern int getfscreatecon_raw(char ** con); /* Set the fscreate security context for subsequent file creations. Call with NULL if you want to reset to the default. */ extern int setfscreatecon(const char * context); extern int setfscreatecon_raw(const char * context); /* Get keycreate context, and set *con to refer to it. Sets *con to NULL if no key create context has been set, i.e. using default. If non-NULL, caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getkeycreatecon(char ** con); extern int getkeycreatecon_raw(char ** con); /* Set the keycreate security context for subsequent key creations. Call with NULL if you want to reset to the default. */ extern int setkeycreatecon(const char * context); extern int setkeycreatecon_raw(const char * context); /* Get sockcreate context, and set *con to refer to it. Sets *con to NULL if no socket create context has been set, i.e. using default. If non-NULL, caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getsockcreatecon(char ** con); extern int getsockcreatecon_raw(char ** con); /* Set the sockcreate security context for subsequent socket creations. Call with NULL if you want to reset to the default. */ extern int setsockcreatecon(const char * context); extern int setsockcreatecon_raw(const char * context); /* Wrappers for the xattr API. */ /* Get file context, and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getfilecon(const char *path, char ** con); extern int getfilecon_raw(const char *path, char ** con); extern int lgetfilecon(const char *path, char ** con); extern int lgetfilecon_raw(const char *path, char ** con); extern int fgetfilecon(int fd, char ** con); extern int fgetfilecon_raw(int fd, char ** con); /* Set file context */ extern int setfilecon(const char *path, const char * con); extern int setfilecon_raw(const char *path, const char * con); extern int lsetfilecon(const char *path, const char * con); extern int lsetfilecon_raw(const char *path, const char * con); extern int fsetfilecon(int fd, const char * con); extern int fsetfilecon_raw(int fd, const char * con); /* Wrappers for the socket API */ /* Get context of peer socket, and set *con to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int getpeercon(int fd, char ** con); extern int getpeercon_raw(int fd, char ** con); /* Wrappers for the selinuxfs (policy) API. */ typedef unsigned int access_vector_t; typedef unsigned short security_class_t; struct av_decision { access_vector_t allowed; access_vector_t decided; access_vector_t auditallow; access_vector_t auditdeny; unsigned int seqno; unsigned int flags; }; /* Definitions of av_decision.flags */ #define SELINUX_AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001 /* Structure for passing options, used by AVC and label subsystems */ struct selinux_opt { int type; const char *value; }; /* Callback facilities */ union selinux_callback { /* log the printf-style format and arguments, with the type code indicating the type of message */ int #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))) #endif (*func_log) (int type, const char *fmt, ...); /* store a string representation of auditdata (corresponding to the given security class) into msgbuf. */ int (*func_audit) (void *auditdata, security_class_t cls, char *msgbuf, size_t msgbufsize); /* validate the supplied context, modifying if necessary */ int (*func_validate) (char **ctx); /* netlink callback for setenforce message */ int (*func_setenforce) (int enforcing); /* netlink callback for policyload message */ int (*func_policyload) (int seqno); }; #define SELINUX_CB_LOG 0 #define SELINUX_CB_AUDIT 1 #define SELINUX_CB_VALIDATE 2 #define SELINUX_CB_SETENFORCE 3 #define SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD 4 extern union selinux_callback selinux_get_callback(int type); extern void selinux_set_callback(int type, union selinux_callback cb); /* Logging type codes, passed to the logging callback */ #define SELINUX_ERROR 0 #define SELINUX_WARNING 1 #define SELINUX_INFO 2 #define SELINUX_AVC 3 #define SELINUX_POLICYLOAD 4 #define SELINUX_SETENFORCE 5 #define SELINUX_TRANS_DIR "/var/run/setrans" /* Compute an access decision. */ extern int security_compute_av(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd); extern int security_compute_av_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd); extern int security_compute_av_flags(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd); extern int security_compute_av_flags_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd); /* Compute a labeling decision and set *newcon to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int security_compute_create(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon); extern int security_compute_create_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon); extern int security_compute_create_name(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *objname, char ** newcon); extern int security_compute_create_name_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *objname, char ** newcon); /* Compute a relabeling decision and set *newcon to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int security_compute_relabel(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon); extern int security_compute_relabel_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon); /* Compute a polyinstantiation member decision and set *newcon to refer to it. Caller must free via freecon. */ extern int security_compute_member(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon); extern int security_compute_member_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon); /* * Compute the set of reachable user contexts and set *con to refer to * the NULL-terminated array of contexts. Caller must free via freeconary. * These interfaces are deprecated. Use get_ordered_context_list() or * one of its variant interfaces instead. */ extern int security_compute_user(const char * scon, const char *username, char *** con); extern int security_compute_user_raw(const char * scon, const char *username, char *** con); /* Validate a transition. This determines whether a transition from scon to newcon using tcon as the target for object class tclass is valid in the loaded policy. This checks against the mlsvalidatetrans and validatetrans constraints in the loaded policy. Returns 0 if allowed and -1 if an error occurred with errno set */ extern int security_validatetrans(const char *scon, const char *tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *newcon); extern int security_validatetrans_raw(const char *scon, const char *tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *newcon); /* Load a policy configuration. */ extern int security_load_policy(const void *data, size_t len); /* Get the context of an initial kernel security identifier by name. Caller must free via freecon */ extern int security_get_initial_context(const char *name, char ** con); extern int security_get_initial_context_raw(const char *name, char ** con); /* * Make a policy image and load it. * This function provides a higher level interface for loading policy * than security_load_policy, internally determining the right policy * version, locating and opening the policy file, mapping it into memory, * manipulating it as needed for current boolean settings and/or local * definitions, and then calling security_load_policy to load it. * * 'preservebools' is no longer supported, set to 0. */ extern int selinux_mkload_policy(int preservebools); /* * Perform the initial policy load. * This function determines the desired enforcing mode, sets the * the *enforce argument accordingly for the caller to use, sets the * SELinux kernel enforcing status to match it, and loads the policy. * It also internally handles the initial selinuxfs mount required to * perform these actions. * * The function returns 0 if everything including the policy load succeeds. * In this case, init is expected to re-exec itself in order to transition * to the proper security context. * Otherwise, the function returns -1, and init must check *enforce to * determine how to proceed. If enforcing (*enforce > 0), then init should * halt the system. Otherwise, init may proceed normally without a re-exec. */ extern int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce); /* Translate boolean strict to name value pair. */ typedef struct { char *name; int value; } SELboolean; /* save a list of booleans in a single transaction. 'permanent' is no * longer supported, set to 0. */ extern int security_set_boolean_list(size_t boolcnt, SELboolean * boollist, int permanent); /* Load policy boolean settings. Deprecated as local policy booleans no * longer supported. Will always return -1. */ extern int security_load_booleans(char *path) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated)) #endif ; /* Check the validity of a security context. */ extern int security_check_context(const char * con); extern int security_check_context_raw(const char * con); /* Canonicalize a security context. */ extern int security_canonicalize_context(const char * con, char ** canoncon); extern int security_canonicalize_context_raw(const char * con, char ** canoncon); /* Get the enforce flag value. */ extern int security_getenforce(void); /* Set the enforce flag value. */ extern int security_setenforce(int value); /* Get the load-time behavior for undefined classes/permissions */ extern int security_reject_unknown(void); /* Get the runtime behavior for undefined classes/permissions */ extern int security_deny_unknown(void); /* Get the checkreqprot value */ extern int security_get_checkreqprot(void); /* Disable SELinux at runtime (must be done prior to initial policy load). */ extern int security_disable(void); /* Get the policy version number. */ extern int security_policyvers(void); /* Get the boolean names */ extern int security_get_boolean_names(char ***names, int *len); /* Get the pending value for the boolean */ extern int security_get_boolean_pending(const char *name); /* Get the active value for the boolean */ extern int security_get_boolean_active(const char *name); /* Set the pending value for the boolean */ extern int security_set_boolean(const char *name, int value); /* Commit the pending values for the booleans */ extern int security_commit_booleans(void); /* Userspace class mapping support */ struct security_class_mapping { const char *name; const char *perms[sizeof(access_vector_t) * 8 + 1]; }; /** * selinux_set_mapping - Enable dynamic mapping between integer offsets and security class names * @map: array of security_class_mapping structures * * The core avc_has_perm() API uses integers to represent security * classes; previous to the introduction of this function, it was * common for userspace object managers to be compiled using generated * offsets for a particular policy. However, that strongly ties the build of the userspace components to a particular policy. * * By using this function to map between integer offsets and security * class names, it's possible to replace a system policies that have * at least the same set of security class names as used by the * userspace object managers. * * To correctly use this function, you should override the generated * security class defines from the system policy in a local header, * starting at 1, and have one security_class_mapping structure entry * per define. */ extern int selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *map); /* Common helpers */ /* Convert between mode and security class values */ extern security_class_t mode_to_security_class(mode_t mode); /* Convert between security class values and string names */ extern security_class_t string_to_security_class(const char *name); extern const char *security_class_to_string(security_class_t cls); /* Convert between individual access vector permissions and string names */ extern const char *security_av_perm_to_string(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perm); extern access_vector_t string_to_av_perm(security_class_t tclass, const char *name); /* Returns an access vector in a string representation. User must free the * returned string via free(). */ extern int security_av_string(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av, char **result); /* Display an access vector in a string representation. */ extern void print_access_vector(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av); /* Flush the SELinux class cache, e.g. upon a policy reload. */ extern void selinux_flush_class_cache(void); /* Set the function used by matchpathcon_init when displaying errors about the file_contexts configuration. If not set, then this defaults to fprintf(stderr, fmt, ...). */ extern void set_matchpathcon_printf(void (*f) (const char *fmt, ...)); /* Set the function used by matchpathcon_init when checking the validity of a context in the file contexts configuration. If not set, then this defaults to a test based on security_check_context(). The function is also responsible for reporting any such error, and may include the 'path' and 'lineno' in such error messages. */ extern void set_matchpathcon_invalidcon(int (*f) (const char *path, unsigned lineno, char *context)); /* Same as above, but also allows canonicalization of the context, by changing *context to refer to the canonical form. If not set, and invalidcon is also not set, then this defaults to calling security_canonicalize_context(). */ extern void set_matchpathcon_canoncon(int (*f) (const char *path, unsigned lineno, char **context)); /* Set flags controlling operation of matchpathcon_init or matchpathcon. */ #define MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY 1 /* Only process the base file_contexts file. */ #define MATCHPATHCON_NOTRANS 2 /* Do not perform any context translation. */ #define MATCHPATHCON_VALIDATE 4 /* Validate/canonicalize contexts at init time. */ extern void set_matchpathcon_flags(unsigned int flags); /* Load the file contexts configuration specified by 'path' into memory for use by subsequent matchpathcon calls. If 'path' is NULL, then load the active file contexts configuration, i.e. the path returned by selinux_file_context_path(). Unless the MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY flag has been set, this function also checks for a 'path'.homedirs file and a 'path'.local file and loads additional specifications from them if present. */ extern int matchpathcon_init(const char *path) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated("Use selabel_open with backend SELABEL_CTX_FILE"))) #endif ; /* Same as matchpathcon_init, but only load entries with regexes that have stems that are prefixes of 'prefix'. */ extern int matchpathcon_init_prefix(const char *path, const char *prefix); /* Free the memory allocated by matchpathcon_init. */ extern void matchpathcon_fini(void) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated("Use selabel_close"))) #endif ; /* Resolve all of the symlinks and relative portions of a pathname, but NOT * the final component (same a realpath() unless the final component is a * symlink. Resolved path must be a path of size PATH_MAX + 1 */ extern int realpath_not_final(const char *name, char *resolved_path); /* Match the specified pathname and mode against the file contexts configuration and set *con to refer to the resulting context. 'mode' can be 0 to disable mode matching. Caller must free via freecon. If matchpathcon_init has not already been called, then this function will call it upon its first invocation with a NULL path. */ extern int matchpathcon(const char *path, mode_t mode, char ** con) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated("Use selabel_lookup instead"))) #endif ; /* Same as above, but return a specification index for later use in a matchpathcon_filespec_add() call - see below. */ extern int matchpathcon_index(const char *path, mode_t mode, char ** con); /* Maintain an association between an inode and a specification index, and check whether a conflicting specification is already associated with the same inode (e.g. due to multiple hard links). If so, then use the latter of the two specifications based on their order in the file contexts configuration. Return the used specification index. */ extern int matchpathcon_filespec_add(ino_t ino, int specind, const char *file); /* Destroy any inode associations that have been added, e.g. to restart for a new filesystem. */ extern void matchpathcon_filespec_destroy(void); /* Display statistics on the hash table usage for the associations. */ extern void matchpathcon_filespec_eval(void); /* Check to see whether any specifications had no matches and report them. The 'str' is used as a prefix for any warning messages. */ extern void matchpathcon_checkmatches(char *str); /* Match the specified media and against the media contexts configuration and set *con to refer to the resulting context. Caller must free con via freecon. */ extern int matchmediacon(const char *media, char ** con); /* selinux_getenforcemode reads the /etc/selinux/config file and determines whether the machine should be started in enforcing (1), permissive (0) or disabled (-1) mode. */ extern int selinux_getenforcemode(int *enforce); /* selinux_boolean_sub reads the /etc/selinux/TYPE/booleans.subs_dist file looking for a record with boolean_name. If a record exists selinux_boolean_sub returns the translated name otherwise it returns the original name. The returned value needs to be freed. On failure NULL will be returned. */ extern char *selinux_boolean_sub(const char *boolean_name); /* selinux_getpolicytype reads the /etc/selinux/config file and determines what the default policy for the machine is. Calling application must free policytype. */ extern int selinux_getpolicytype(char **policytype); /* selinux_policy_root reads the /etc/selinux/config file and returns the directory path under which the compiled policy file and context configuration files exist. */ extern const char *selinux_policy_root(void); /* selinux_set_policy_root sets an alternate policy root directory path under which the compiled policy file and context configuration files exist. */ extern int selinux_set_policy_root(const char *rootpath); /* These functions return the paths to specific files under the policy root directory. */ extern const char *selinux_current_policy_path(void); extern const char *selinux_binary_policy_path(void); extern const char *selinux_failsafe_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_removable_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_default_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_user_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_file_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_file_context_homedir_path(void); extern const char *selinux_file_context_local_path(void); extern const char *selinux_file_context_subs_path(void); extern const char *selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path(void); extern const char *selinux_homedir_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_media_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_virtual_domain_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_virtual_image_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_lxc_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_x_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_sepgsql_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_openrc_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_openssh_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_snapperd_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_systemd_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_contexts_path(void); extern const char *selinux_securetty_types_path(void); extern const char *selinux_booleans_subs_path(void); /* Deprecated as local policy booleans no longer supported. */ extern const char *selinux_booleans_path(void) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated)) #endif ; extern const char *selinux_customizable_types_path(void); /* Deprecated as policy ./users no longer supported. */ extern const char *selinux_users_path(void) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated)) #endif ; extern const char *selinux_usersconf_path(void); extern const char *selinux_translations_path(void); extern const char *selinux_colors_path(void); extern const char *selinux_netfilter_context_path(void); extern const char *selinux_path(void); /** * selinux_check_access - Check permissions and perform appropriate auditing. * @scon: source security context * @tcon: target security context * @tclass: target security class string * @perm: requested permissions string, interpreted based on @tclass * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @perm permissions are granted * for the SID pair (@scon, @tcon), interpreting the permissions * based on @tclass. * Return %0 if all @perm permissions are granted, -%1 with * @errno set to %EACCES if any permissions are denied or to another * value upon other errors. * If auditing or logging is configured the appropriate callbacks will be called * and passed the auditdata field */ extern int selinux_check_access(const char * scon, const char * tcon, const char *tclass, const char *perm, void *auditdata); /* Check a permission in the passwd class. Return 0 if granted or -1 otherwise. */ extern int selinux_check_passwd_access(access_vector_t requested) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated("Use selinux_check_access"))) #endif ; extern int checkPasswdAccess(access_vector_t requested) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((deprecated("Use selinux_check_access"))) #endif ; /* Check if the tty_context is defined as a securetty Return 0 if secure, < 0 otherwise. */ extern int selinux_check_securetty_context(const char * tty_context); /* Set the path to the selinuxfs mount point explicitly. Normally, this is determined automatically during libselinux initialization, but this is not always possible, e.g. for /sbin/init which performs the initial mount of selinuxfs. */ extern void set_selinuxmnt(const char *mnt); /* Check if selinuxfs exists as a kernel filesystem */ extern int selinuxfs_exists(void); /* clear selinuxmnt variable and free allocated memory */ extern void fini_selinuxmnt(void); /* Set an appropriate security context based on the filename of a helper * program, falling back to a new context with the specified type. */ extern int setexecfilecon(const char *filename, const char *fallback_type); #ifndef DISABLE_RPM /* Execute a helper for rpm in an appropriate security context. */ extern int rpm_execcon(unsigned int verified, const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]) #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__((deprecated("Use setexecfilecon and execve"))) #endif ; #endif /* Returns whether a file context is customizable, and should not be relabeled . */ extern int is_context_customizable(const char * scontext); /* Perform context translation between the human-readable format ("translated") and the internal system format ("raw"). Caller must free the resulting context via freecon. Returns -1 upon an error or 0 otherwise. If passed NULL, sets the returned context to NULL and returns 0. */ extern int selinux_trans_to_raw_context(const char * trans, char ** rawp); extern int selinux_raw_to_trans_context(const char * raw, char ** transp); /* Perform context translation between security contexts and display colors. Returns a space-separated list of ten ten hex RGB triples prefixed by hash marks, e.g. "#ff0000". Caller must free the resulting string via free. Returns -1 upon an error or 0 otherwise. */ extern int selinux_raw_context_to_color(const char * raw, char **color_str); /* Get the SELinux username and level to use for a given Linux username. These values may then be passed into the get_ordered_context_list* and get_default_context* functions to obtain a context for the user. Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. Caller must free the returned strings via free. */ extern int getseuserbyname(const char *linuxuser, char **seuser, char **level); /* Get the SELinux username and level to use for a given Linux username and service. These values may then be passed into the get_ordered_context_list* and get_default_context* functions to obtain a context for the user. Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. Caller must free the returned strings via free. */ extern int getseuser(const char *username, const char *service, char **r_seuser, char **r_level); /* Compare two file contexts, return 0 if equivalent. */ extern int selinux_file_context_cmp(const char * a, const char * b); /* * Verify the context of the file 'path' against policy. * Return 1 if match, 0 if not and -1 on error. */ extern int selinux_file_context_verify(const char *path, mode_t mode); /* This function sets the file context on to the system defaults returns 0 on success */ extern int selinux_lsetfilecon_default(const char *path); /* * Force a reset of the loaded configuration * WARNING: This is not thread safe. Be very sure that no other threads * are calling into libselinux when this is called. */ extern void selinux_reset_config(void); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif libselinux-3.5/man/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300143305ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/man/Makefile000066400000000000000000000021531437566343300157710ustar00rootroot00000000000000# Installation directories. LINGUAS ?= ru PREFIX ?= /usr MANDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/share/man MAN3SUBDIR ?= man3 MAN5SUBDIR ?= man5 MAN8SUBDIR ?= man8 MAN3DIR ?= $(MANDIR)/$(MAN3SUBDIR) MAN5DIR ?= $(MANDIR)/$(MAN5SUBDIR) MAN8DIR ?= $(MANDIR)/$(MAN8SUBDIR) all: install: all mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(MAN3DIR) mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(MAN5DIR) mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(MAN8DIR) install -m 644 man3/*.3 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN3DIR) install -m 644 man5/*.5 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN5DIR) install -m 644 man8/*.8 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN8DIR) for lang in $(LINGUAS) ; do \ if [ -e $${lang}/man3 ] ; then \ mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/$${lang}/$(MAN3SUBDIR) ; \ install -m 644 $${lang}/man3/*.3 $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/$${lang}/$(MAN3SUBDIR) ; \ fi ; \ if [ -e $${lang}/man5 ] ; then \ mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/$${lang}/$(MAN5SUBDIR) ; \ install -m 644 $${lang}/man5/*.5 $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/$${lang}/$(MAN5SUBDIR) ; \ fi ; \ if [ -e $${lang}/man8 ] ; then \ mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/$${lang}/$(MAN8SUBDIR) ; \ install -m 644 $${lang}/man8/*.8 $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/$${lang}/$(MAN8SUBDIR) ; \ fi ; \ done relabel: indent distclean clean: libselinux-3.5/man/man3/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300151665ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_add_callback.3000066400000000000000000000120121437566343300204430ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2004 .TH "avc_add_callback" "3" "9 June 2004" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_add_callback \- additional event notification for SELinux userspace object managers . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_add_callback(int (*" callback ")(uint32_t " event , .in +\w'int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)('u .BI "security_id_t " ssid , .br .BI "security_id_t " tsid , .br .BI "security_class_t " tclass , .br .BI "access_vector_t " perms , .br .BI "access_vector_t *" out_retained ")," .in .in +\w'int avc_add_callback('u .BI "uint32_t " events ", security_id_t " ssid , .br .BI "security_id_t " tsid ", security_class_t " tclass , .br .BI "access_vector_t " perms ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR avc_add_callback () is used to register callback functions on security events. The purpose of this functionality is to allow userspace object managers to take additional action when a policy change, usually a policy reload, causes permissions to be granted or revoked. .I events is the .RI bitwise- or of security events on which to register the callback; see .B SECURITY EVENTS below. .IR ssid , .IR tsid , .IR tclass , and .I perms specify the source and target SID's, target class, and specific permissions that the callback wishes to monitor. The special symbol .B SECSID_WILD may be passed as the .I source or .I target and will cause any SID to match. .I callback is the callback function provided by the userspace object manager. The .I event argument indicates the security event which occurred; the remaining arguments are interpreted according to the event as described below. The return value of the callback should be zero on success, \-1 on error with .I errno set appropriately (but see .B RETURN VALUE below). . .SH "SECURITY EVENTS" In all cases below, .I ssid and/or .I tsid may be set to .BR SECSID_WILD , indicating that the change applies to all source and/or target SID's. Unless otherwise indicated, the .I out_retained parameter is unused. . .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT Previously denied permissions are now granted for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .I perms indicates the permissions to grant. .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE Previously granted permissions are now conditionally revoked for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .I perms indicates the permissions to revoke. The callback should set .I out_retained to the subset of .I perms which are retained as migrated permissions. Note that .I out_retained is ignored if the callback returns \-1. .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE Previously granted permissions are now unconditionally revoked for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .I perms indicates the permissions to revoke. .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_RESET Indicates that the cache was flushed. The SID, class, and permission arguments are unused and are set to NULL. .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE The permissions given by .I perms should now be audited when granted for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE The permissions given by .I perms should no longer be audited when granted for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE The permissions given by .I perms should now be audited when denied for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . .TP .B AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE The permissions given by .I perms should no longer be audited when denied for .IR ssid , .I tsid with respect to .IR tclass . . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, .BR avc_add_callback () returns zero. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. A return value of \-1 from a callback is interpreted as a failed policy operation. If such a return value is encountered, all remaining callbacks registered on the event are called. In threaded mode, the netlink handler thread may then terminate and cause the userspace AVC to return .B EINVAL on all further permission checks until .BR avc_destroy (3) is called. In non-threaded mode, the permission check on which the error occurred will return \-1 and the value of .I errno encountered to the caller. In both cases, a log message is produced and the kernel may be notified of the error. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "NOTES" If the userspace AVC is running in threaded mode, callbacks registered via .BR avc_add_callback () may be executed in the context of the netlink handler thread. This will likely introduce synchronization issues requiring the use of locks. See .BR avc_init (3). Support for dynamic revocation and retained permissions is mostly unimplemented in the SELinux kernel module. The only security event that currently gets exercised is .BR AVC_CALLBACK_RESET . . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_has_perm (3), .BR avc_context_to_sid (3), .BR avc_cache_stats (3), .BR security_compute_av (3) .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_audit.3000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300172020ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_has_perm.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_av_stats.3000066400000000000000000000000331437566343300177230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_cache_stats.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_cache_stats.3000066400000000000000000000044271437566343300203730ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2004 .TH "avc_cache_stats" "3" "27 May 2004" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_cache_stats, avc_av_stats, avc_sid_stats \- obtain userspace SELinux AVC statistics . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "void avc_av_stats(void);" .sp .BI "void avc_sid_stats(void);" .sp .BI "void avc_cache_stats(struct avc_cache_stats *" stats ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The userspace AVC maintains two internal hash tables, one to store security ID's and one to cache access decisions. .BR avc_av_stats () and .BR avc_sid_stats () produce log messages indicating the status of the access decision and SID tables, respectively. The messages contain the number of entries in the table, number of hash buckets and number of buckets used, and maximum number of entries in a single bucket. .BR avc_cache_stats () populates a structure whose fields reflect cache activity: .RS .ta 4n 14n .nf struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned entry_lookups; unsigned entry_hits; unsigned entry_misses; unsigned entry_discards; unsigned cav_lookups; unsigned cav_hits; unsigned cav_probes; unsigned cav_misses; }; .fi .ta .RE .TP .I entry_lookups Number of queries made. .TP .I entry_hits Number of times a decision was found in the .I aeref argument. .TP .I entry_misses Number of times a decision was not found in the .I aeref argument. .TP .I entry_discards Number of times a decision was not found in the .I aeref argument and the .I aeref argument was non-NULL. .TP .I cav_lookups Number of cache lookups. .TP .I cav_hits Number of cache hits. .TP .I cav_misses Number of cache misses. .TP .I cav_probes Number of entries examined while searching the cache. . .SH "NOTES" When the cache is flushed as a result of a call to .BR avc_reset () or a policy change notification, the statistics returned by .BR avc_cache_stats () are reset to zero. The SID table, however, is left unchanged. When a policy change notification is received, a call to .BR avc_av_stats () is made before the cache is flushed. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_has_perm (3), .BR avc_context_to_sid (3), .BR avc_add_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_cleanup.3000066400000000000000000000000241437566343300175260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_open.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_compute_create.3000066400000000000000000000035101437566343300211010ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "avc_compute_create" "3" "30 Mar 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_compute_create, avc_compute_member \- obtain SELinux label for new object . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_compute_create(security_id_t " ssid ", security_id_t " tsid , .in +\w'int avc_compute_create('u .BI "security_class_t " tclass ", security_id_t *" newsid ");" .sp .in .BI "int avc_compute_member(security_id_t " ssid ", security_id_t " tsid , .in +\w'int avc_compute_member('u .BI "security_class_t " tclass ", security_id_t *" newsid ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR avc_compute_create () is used to compute a SID to use for labeling a new object in a particular class based on a SID pair. This call is identical to .BR security_compute_create (), but does not require converting from userspace SID's to contexts and back again. .BR avc_compute_member () is used to compute a SID to use for labeling a polyinstantiated object instance of a particular class based on a SID pair. This call is identical to .BR security_compute_member (), but does not require converting from userspace SID's to contexts and back again. These functions return a SID for the computed context in the memory referenced by .IR sid . . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B EINVAL The .I tclass and/or the security contexts referenced by .I ssid and .I tsid are not recognized by the currently loaded policy. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_context_to_sid (3), .BR security_compute_create (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_compute_member.3000066400000000000000000000000361437566343300211050ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_compute_create.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_context_to_sid.3000066400000000000000000000035101437566343300211270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2004 .TH "avc_context_to_sid" "3" "27 May 2004" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_context_to_sid, avc_sid_to_context, avc_get_initial_sid \- obtain and manipulate SELinux security ID's . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_context_to_sid(char *" ctx ", security_id_t *" sid ");" .sp .BI "int avc_sid_to_context(security_id_t " sid ", char **" ctx ");" .sp .BI "int avc_get_initial_sid(const char *" name ", security_id_t *" sid ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Security ID's (SID's) are opaque representations of security contexts, managed by the userspace AVC. .BR avc_context_to_sid () returns a SID for the given .I context in the memory referenced by .IR sid . .BR avc_sid_to_context () returns a copy of the context represented by .I sid in the memory referenced by .IR ctx . The user must free the copy with .BR freecon (3). .BR avc_get_initial_sid () returns a SID for the kernel initial security identifier specified by .IR name . . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR avc_context_to_sid () and .BR avc_sid_to_context () return zero on success. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. .SH "NOTES" As of libselinux version 2.0.86, SID's are no longer reference counted. A SID will be valid from the time it is first obtained until the next call to .BR avc_destroy (3). The .BR sidget (3) and .BR sidput (3) functions, formerly used to adjust the reference count, are no-ops and are deprecated. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_has_perm (3), .BR avc_cache_stats (3), .BR avc_add_callback (3), .BR getcon (3), .BR freecon (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_destroy.3000066400000000000000000000000241437566343300175700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_open.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_entry_ref_init.3000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300211140ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_has_perm.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_get_initial_context.3000066400000000000000000000000361437566343300221360ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_context_to_sid.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_get_initial_sid.3000066400000000000000000000000361437566343300212310ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_context_to_sid.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_has_perm.3000066400000000000000000000126051437566343300177050ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2004 .TH "avc_has_perm" "3" "27 May 2004" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_has_perm, avc_has_perm_noaudit, avc_audit, avc_entry_ref_init \- obtain and audit SELinux access decisions . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "void avc_entry_ref_init(struct avc_entry_ref *" aeref ");" .sp .BI "int avc_has_perm(security_id_t " ssid ", security_id_t " tsid , .in +\w'int avc_has_perm('u .BI "security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " requested , .br .BI "struct avc_entry_ref *" aeref ", void *" auditdata ");" .in .sp .BI "int avc_has_perm_noaudit(security_id_t " ssid ", security_id_t " tsid , .in +\w'int avc_has_perm('u .BI "security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " requested , .br .BI "struct avc_entry_ref *" aeref ", struct av_decision *" avd ");" .in .sp .BI "void avc_audit(security_id_t " ssid ", security_id_t " tsid , .in +\w'void avc_audit('u .BI "security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " requested , .br .BI "struct av_decision *" avd ", int " result ", void *" auditdata ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Direct use of these functions is generally discouraged in favor of the higher level interface .BR selinux_check_access(3) since the latter automatically handles the dynamic mapping of class and permission names to their policy values and proper handling of allow_unknown. When using any of the functions that take policy integer values for classes or permissions as inputs, use .BR string_to_security_class(3) and .BR string_to_av_perm(3) to map the class and permission names to their policy values. These values may change across a policy reload, so they should be re-acquired on every use or using a .B SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD callback set via .BR selinux_set_callback(3). An alternative approach is to use .BR selinux_set_mapping(3) to create a mapping from class and permission index values used by the application to the policy values, thereby allowing the application to pass its own fixed constants for the classes and permissions to these functions and internally mapping them on demand. However, this also requires setting up a callback as above to address policy reloads. .BR avc_entry_ref_init () initializes an .B avc_entry_ref structure; see .B ENTRY REFERENCES below. This function may be implemented as a macro. .BR avc_has_perm () checks whether the .I requested permissions are granted for subject SID .IR ssid and target SID .IR tsid , interpreting the permissions based on .I tclass and updating .IR aeref , if non-NULL, to refer to a cache entry with the resulting decision. The granting or denial of permissions is audited in accordance with the policy. The .I auditdata parameter is for supplemental auditing; see .BR avc_audit () below. .BR avc_has_perm_noaudit () behaves as .BR avc_has_perm () without producing an audit message. The access decision is returned in .I avd and can be passed to .BR avc_audit () explicitly. .BR avc_audit () produces an audit message for the access query represented by .IR ssid , .IR tsid , .IR tclass , and .IR requested , with a decision represented by .IR avd . Pass the value returned by .BR avc_has_perm_noaudit () as .IR result . The .I auditdata parameter is passed to the user-supplied .B func_audit callback and can be used to add supplemental information to the audit message; see .BR avc_init (3). . .SH "ENTRY REFERENCES" Entry references can be used to speed cache performance for repeated queries on the same subject and target. The userspace AVC will check the .I aeref argument, if supplied, before searching the cache on a permission query. After a query is performed, .I aeref will be updated to reference the cache entry for that query. A subsequent query on the same subject and target will then have the decision at hand without having to walk the cache. After declaring an .B avc_entry_ref structure, use .BR avc_entry_ref_init () to initialize it before passing it to .BR avc_has_perm () or .BR \%avc_has_perm_noaudit () for the first time. Using an uninitialized structure will produce undefined behavior. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" If requested permissions are granted, zero is returned. If requested permissions are denied or an error occurred, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. In permissive mode, zero will be returned and .I errno unchanged even if permissions were denied. .BR avc_has_perm () will still produce an audit message in this case. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B EACCES A requested permission was denied. .TP .B EINVAL The .I tclass and/or the security contexts referenced by .I ssid and .I tsid are not recognized by the currently loaded policy. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "NOTES" Internal errors encountered by the userspace AVC may cause certain values of .I errno to be returned unexpectedly. For example, netlink socket errors may produce .B EACCES or .BR EINVAL . Make sure that userspace object managers are granted appropriate access to netlink by the policy. . .SH "AUTHOR" Originally Eamon Walsh. Updated by Stephen Smalley . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux_check_access(3), .BR string_to_security_class(3), .BR string_to_av_perm(3), .BR selinux_set_callback(3), .BR selinux_set_mapping(3), .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_context_to_sid (3), .BR avc_cache_stats (3), .BR avc_add_callback (3), .BR security_compute_av (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_has_perm_noaudit.3000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300214150ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_has_perm.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_init.3000066400000000000000000000147501437566343300170550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2004 .TH "avc_init" "3" "27 May 2004" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_init \- legacy userspace SELinux AVC setup . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_init(const char *" msgprefix , .in +\w'int avc_init('u .BI "const struct avc_memory_callback *" mem_callbacks , .br .BI "const struct avc_log_callback *" log_callbacks , .br .BI "const struct avc_thread_callback *" thread_callbacks , .br .BI "const struct avc_lock_callback *" lock_callbacks ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR avc_init () is deprecated; please use .BR avc_open (3) in conjunction with .BR selinux_set_callback (3) in all new code. .BR avc_init () initializes the userspace AVC and must be called before any other AVC operation can be performed. A non-NULL .I msgprefix will be prepended to all audit messages produced by the userspace AVC. The default is `uavc'. The remaining arguments, if non-NULL, specify callbacks to be used by the userspace AVC. . .SH "CALLBACKS" The userspace AVC can be directed how to perform memory allocation, logging, thread creation, and locking via callback functions passed to .BR avc_init (). The purpose of this functionality is to allow the userspace AVC to be smoothly integrated into existing userspace object managers. Use an .B avc_memory_callback structure to specify alternate functions for dynamic memory allocation. .RS .ta 4n 10n 24n .nf struct avc_memory_callback { void *(*func_malloc)(size_t size); void (*func_free)(void *ptr); }; .fi .ta .RE The two fields of the structure should be pointers to functions which behave as .BR malloc (3) and .BR free (3), which are used by default. Use an .B avc_log_callback structure to specify alternate functions for logging. .RS .ta 4n 10n 24n .nf struct avc_log_callback { void (*func_log)(const char *fmt, ...); void (*func_audit)(void *auditdata, security_class_t class, char *msgbuf, size_t msgbufsize); }; .fi .ta .RE The .B func_log callback should accept a .BR printf (3) style format and arguments and log them as desired. The default behavior prints the message on the standard error. The .B func_audit callback should interpret the .I auditdata parameter for the given .IR class , printing a human-readable interpretation to .I msgbuf using no more than .I msgbufsize characters. The default behavior is to ignore .IR auditdata . Use an .B avc_thread_callback structure to specify functions for starting and manipulating threads. .RS .ta 4n 10n 24n .nf struct avc_thread_callback { void *(*func_create_thread)(void (*run)(void)); void (*func_stop_thread)(void *thread); }; .fi .ta .RE The .B func_create_thread callback should create a new thread and return a pointer which references it. The thread should execute the .I run argument, which does not return under normal conditions. The .B func_stop_thread callback should cancel the running thread referenced by .IR thread . By default, threading is not used; see .B KERNEL STATUS PAGE and .B NETLINK NOTIFICATION below. Use an .B avc_lock_callback structure to specify functions to create, obtain, and release locks for use by threads. .RS .ta 4n 10n 24n .nf struct avc_lock_callback { void *(*func_alloc_lock)(void); void (*func_get_lock)(void *lock); void (*func_release_lock)(void *lock); void (*func_free_lock)(void *lock); }; .fi .ta .RE The .B func_alloc_lock callback should create a new lock, returning a pointer which references it. The .B func_get_lock callback should obtain .IR lock , blocking if necessary. The .B func_release_lock callback should release .IR lock . The .B func_free_lock callback should destroy .IR lock , freeing any resources associated with it. The default behavior is not to perform any locking. Note that undefined behavior may result if threading is used without appropriate locking. . .SH "KERNEL STATUS PAGE" Linux kernel version 2.6.37 supports the SELinux kernel status page, enabling userspace applications to .BR mmap (2) SELinux status state in read-only mode to avoid system calls during the cache hit code path. .BR avc_init () calls .BR selinux_status_open (3) to initialize the selinux status state. If successfully initialized, the userspace AVC will default to single-threaded mode and ignore the .B func_create_thread and .B func_stop_thread callbacks. All callbacks set via .BR selinux_set_callback (3) will still be honored. .BR avc_has_perm (3) and .BR selinux_check_access (3) both check for status updates through calls to .BR selinux_status_updated (3) at the start of each permission query and take the appropriate action. Two status types are currently implemented. .B setenforce events will change the effective enforcing state used within the AVC, and .B policyload events will result in a cache flush. . .SH "NETLINK NOTIFICATION" In the event that the kernel status page is not successfully .BR mmap (2)'ed the AVC will default to the netlink fallback mechanism, which opens a netlink socket for receiving status updates. .B setenforce and .B policyload events will have the same results as for the status page implementation, but all status update checks will now require a system call. By default, .BR avc_open (3) does not set threading or locking callbacks. In the fallback case, the userspace AVC checks for new netlink messages at the start of each permission query. If threading and locking callbacks are passed to .BR avc_init (), a dedicated thread will be started to listen on the netlink socket. This may increase performance in the absence of the status page and will ensure that log messages are generated immediately rather than at the time of the next permission query. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Functions with a return value return zero on success. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "NOTES" The .I msgprefix argument to .BR avc_init () currently has a length limit of 15 characters and will be truncated if necessary. If a provided .B func_malloc callback does not set .I errno appropriately on error, userspace AVC calls may exhibit the same behavior. If a netlink thread has been created and an error occurs on the socket (such as an access error), the thread may terminate and cause the userspace AVC to return .B EINVAL on all further permission checks until .B avc_destroy is called. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR avc_open (3), .BR selinux_status_open (3), .BR selinux_status_updated (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_netlink_acquire_fd.3000066400000000000000000000000341437566343300217260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_netlink_loop.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_netlink_check_nb.3000066400000000000000000000000341437566343300213600ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_netlink_loop.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_netlink_close.3000066400000000000000000000000341437566343300207310ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_netlink_loop.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_netlink_loop.3000066400000000000000000000055551437566343300206120ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: KaiGai Kohei (kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com) 2009 .TH "avc_netlink_loop" "3" "30 Mar 2009" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_netlink_open, avc_netlink_close, avc_netlink_acquire_fd, avc_netlink_release_fd, avc_netlink_check_nb, avc_netlink_loop \- SELinux netlink processing . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_netlink_open(int " blocking ");" .sp .B void avc_netlink_close(void); .sp .B int avc_netlink_acquire_fd(void); .sp .B void avc_netlink_release_fd(void); .sp .B void avc_netlink_loop(void); .sp .B int avc_netlink_check_nb(void); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" These functions enable applications to handle notification of SELinux events via netlink. The userspace AVC normally checks for netlink messages on each call to .BR avc_has_perm (3). Applications may wish to override this behavior and check for notification separately, for example in a .BR select (2) loop. These functions also permit netlink monitoring without requiring a call to .BR avc_open (3). .BR avc_netlink_open () opens a netlink socket to receive SELinux notifications. The socket descriptor is stored internally; use .BR avc_netlink_acquire_fd (3) to take ownership of it in application code. The .I blocking argument controls whether the O_NONBLOCK flag is set on the socket descriptor. .BR avc_open (3) calls this function internally, specifying non-blocking behavior. .BR avc_netlink_close () closes the netlink socket. This function is called automatically by .BR avc_destroy (3). .BR avc_netlink_acquire_fd () returns the netlink socket descriptor number and informs the userspace AVC not to check the socket descriptor automatically on calls to .BR avc_has_perm (3). If no such socket descriptor exists, .BR avc_netlink_acquire_fd (3) will first call .BR avc_netlink_open (3) and then return the resulting fd. .BR avc_netlink_release_fd () returns control of the netlink socket to the userspace AVC, re-enabling automatic processing of notifications. .BR avc_netlink_check_nb () checks the netlink socket for pending messages and processes them. Callbacks for policyload and enforcing changes will be called; see .BR selinux_set_callback (3). This function does not block. .BR avc_netlink_loop () enters a loop blocking on the netlink socket and processing messages as they are received. This function will not return unless an error occurs on the socket, in which case the socket is closed. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR avc_netlink_acquire_fd () returns a non-negative file descriptor number on success. Other functions with a return value return zero on success. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "AUTHOR" Originally KaiGai Kohei. Updated by Mike Palmiotto . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR avc_open (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_netlink_open.3000066400000000000000000000000341437566343300205650ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_netlink_loop.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_netlink_release_fd.3000066400000000000000000000000341437566343300217150ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_netlink_loop.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_open.3000066400000000000000000000064401437566343300170500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2008 .TH "avc_open" "3" "12 Jun 2008" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" avc_open, avc_destroy, avc_reset, avc_cleanup \- userspace SELinux AVC setup and teardown . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int avc_open(struct selinux_opt *" options ", unsigned " nopt ");" .sp .BI "void avc_destroy(void);" .sp .BI "int avc_reset(void);" .sp .BI "void avc_cleanup(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR avc_open () initializes the userspace AVC and must be called before any other AVC operation can be performed. .BR avc_destroy () destroys the userspace AVC, freeing all internal memory structures. After this call has been made, .BR avc_open () must be called again before any AVC operations can be performed. .BR avc_destroy () also closes the SELinux status page, which might have been opened manually by .BR selinux_status_open (3). .BR avc_reset () flushes the userspace AVC, causing it to forget any cached access decisions. The userspace AVC normally calls this function automatically when needed, see .B NETLINK NOTIFICATION below. .BR avc_cleanup () attempts to free unused memory within the userspace AVC, but does not flush any cached access decisions. Under normal operation, calling this function should not be necessary. .SH "OPTIONS" The userspace AVC obeys callbacks set via .BR selinux_set_callback (3), in particular the logging and audit callbacks. The options which may be passed to .BR avc_open () include the following: .TP .B AVC_OPT_SETENFORCE This option forces the userspace AVC into enforcing mode if the option value is non-NULL; permissive mode otherwise. The system enforcing mode will be ignored. . .SH "KERNEL STATUS PAGE" Linux kernel version 2.6.37 supports the SELinux kernel status page, enabling userspace applications to .BR mmap (2) SELinux status state in read-only mode to avoid system calls during the cache hit code path. .BR avc_open () calls .BR selinux_status_open (3) to initialize the selinux status state. .BR avc_has_perm (3) and .BR selinux_check_access (3) both check for status updates through calls to .BR selinux_status_updated (3) at the start of each permission query and take the appropriate action. Two status types are currently implemented. .B setenforce events will change the effective enforcing state used within the AVC, and .B policyload events will result in a cache flush. . .SH "NETLINK NOTIFICATION" In the event that the kernel status page is not successfully .BR mmap (2)'ed the AVC will default to the netlink fallback mechanism, which opens a netlink socket for receiving status updates. .B setenforce and .B policyload events will have the same results as for the status page implementation, but all status update checks will now require a system call. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Functions with a return value return zero on success. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR selinux_check_access (3), .BR avc_has_perm (3), .BR avc_context_to_sid (3), .BR avc_cache_stats (3), .BR avc_add_callback (3), .BR selinux_status_open (3), .BR selinux_status_updated (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR security_compute_av (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_reset.3000066400000000000000000000000241437566343300172210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_open.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_sid_stats.3000066400000000000000000000000331437566343300200740ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_cache_stats.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/avc_sid_to_context.3000066400000000000000000000000361437566343300211270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_context_to_sid.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/checkPasswdAccess.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300206330ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_free.3000066400000000000000000000000271437566343300177360ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_new.3000066400000000000000000000042761437566343300176200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "context_new" "3" "20 December 2011" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" context_new, context_str, context_free, context_type_get, context_type_set, context_range_get, context_range_set,context_role_get, context_role_set, context_user_get, context_user_set \- Routines to manipulate SELinux security contexts . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "context_t context_new(const char *" context_str ); .sp .BI "const char * context_str(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "void context_free(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "const char * context_type_get(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "const char * context_range_get(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "const char * context_role_get(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "const char * context_user_get(context_t " con ); .sp .BI "int context_type_set(context_t " con ", const char *" type ); .sp .BI "int context_range_set(context_t " con ", const char *" range ); .sp .BI "int context_role_set(context_t " con ", const char *" role ); .sp .BI "int context_user_set(context_t " con ", const char *" user ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" These functions allow an application to manipulate the fields of a security context string without requiring it to know the format of the string. .BR context_new () returns a new context initialized to a context string. .BR context_str () returns a pointer to the string value of the .BR context_t , valid until the next call to .BR context_str () or .BR context_free () for the same .BR context_t* . .BR context_free () frees the storage used by a context. .BR context_type_get (), .BR context_range_get (), .BR context_role_get (), .BR \%context_user_get () get a pointer to the string value of a context component. .B Note: Values returned by the get functions are only valid until the next call to a set function or .BR context_free () for the same .B context_t structure. .BR context_type_set (), .BR context_range_set (), .BR context_role_set (), .BR \%context_user_set () set a context component. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On failure .BR context_*_set () functions return non-zero and 0 on success. The other functions return NULL on failure and non-NULL on success. On failure .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_range_get.3000066400000000000000000000000271437566343300207500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_range_set.3000066400000000000000000000000271437566343300207640ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_role_get.3000066400000000000000000000000271437566343300206150ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_role_set.3000066400000000000000000000000271437566343300206310ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_str.3000066400000000000000000000000271437566343300176250ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_type_get.3000066400000000000000000000000271437566343300206350ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_type_set.3000066400000000000000000000000271437566343300206510ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_user_get.3000066400000000000000000000000271437566343300206320ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/context_user_set.3000066400000000000000000000000271437566343300206460ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/context_new.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/fgetfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300175350ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfilecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/fgetfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300204060ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfilecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/fini_selinuxmnt.3000066400000000000000000000000331437566343300204610ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/init_selinuxmnt.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/freecon.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300166650ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/freeconary.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300174010ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/fsetfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300175510ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/setfilecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/fsetfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300204220ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/setfilecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/get_default_context.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300212770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/get_default_context_with_level.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300235210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/get_default_context_with_role.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300233530ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/get_default_context_with_rolelevel.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300244030ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/get_default_type.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300205740ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/get_ordered_context_list.3000066400000000000000000000104051437566343300223340ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "get_ordered_context_list" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux" .SH "NAME" get_ordered_context_list, get_ordered_context_list_with_level, get_default_context, get_default_context_with_level, get_default_context_with_role, get_default_context_with_rolelevel, query_user_context, manual_user_enter_context, get_default_role \- determine SELinux context(s) for user sessions . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int get_ordered_context_list(const char *" user ", const char *" fromcon ", char ***" list ); .sp .BI "int get_ordered_context_list_with_level(const char *" user ", const char *" level ", const char *" fromcon ", char ***" list ); .sp .BI "int get_default_context(const char *" user ", const char *" fromcon ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int get_default_context_with_level(const char *" user ", const char *" level ", const char *" fromcon ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int get_default_context_with_role(const char *" user ", const char *" role ", const char *" fromcon ", char **" newcon "); .sp .BI "int get_default_context_with_rolelevel(const char *" user ", const char *" role ", const char *" level ", const char *" fromcon ", char **" newcon "); .sp .BI "int query_user_context(char **" list ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int manual_user_enter_context(const char *" user ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int get_default_type(const char *" role ", char **" type ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This family of functions can be used to obtain either a prioritized list of all reachable security contexts for a given SELinux user or a single default (highest priority) context for a given SELinux user for use by login-like programs. These functions takes a SELinux user identity that must be defined in the SELinux policy as their input, not a Linux username. Most callers should typically first call .BR getseuserbyname(3) to look up the SELinux user identity and level for a given Linux username and then invoke one of .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level () or .BR get_default_context_with_level () with the returned SELinux user and level as inputs. .BR get_ordered_context_list () obtains the list of contexts for the specified SELinux .I user identity that are reachable from the specified .I fromcon context based on the global .I \%/etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/default_contexts file and the per-user .I \%/etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/users/ file if it exists. The .I fromcon parameter may be NULL to indicate that the current context should be used. The function returns the number of contexts in the list, or \-1 upon errors. The list must be freed using the .BR freeconary (3) function. .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level () invokes the .BR \%get_ordered_context_list () function and applies the specified level. .BR get_default_context () is the same as .BR get_ordered_context_list () but only returns a single context which has to be freed with .BR freecon (3). .BR get_default_context_with_level () invokes the .BR get_default_context () function and applies the specified level. .BR get_default_context_with_role () is the same as .BR get_default_context () but only returns a context with the specified role, returning \-1 if no such context is reachable for the user. .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel () invokes the .BR \%get_default_context_with_role () function and applies the specified level. .BR query_user_context () takes a list of contexts, queries the user via stdin/stdout as to which context they want, and returns a new context as selected by the user (which has to be freed with .BR freecon (3)). .BR manual_user_enter_context () allows the user to manually enter a context as a fallback if a list of authorized contexts could not be obtained. Caller must free via .BR freecon (3). .BR get_default_type () Get the default type (domain) for .I role and set .I type to refer to it, which has to be freed with free. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR get_ordered_context_list () and .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level () return the number of contexts in the list upon success or \-1 upon errors. The other functions return 0 for success or \-1 for errors. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux (8), .BR freeconary (3), .BR freecon (3), .BR security_compute_av (3), .BR getseuserbyname (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/get_ordered_context_list_with_level.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300245540ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getcon.3000066400000000000000000000103301437566343300165260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getcon" "3" "21 December 2011" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getcon, getprevcon, getpidcon \- get SELinux security context of a process freecon, freeconary \- free memory associated with SELinux security contexts getpeercon \- get security context of a peer socket setcon \- set current security context of a process .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getcon(char **" context ); .sp .BI "int getcon_raw(char **" context ); .sp .BI "int getprevcon(char **" context ); .sp .BI "int getprevcon_raw(char **" context ); .sp .BI "int getpidcon(pid_t " pid ", char **" context ); .sp .BI "int getpidcon_raw(pid_t " pid ", char **" context ); .sp .BI "int getpidprevcon(pid_t " pid ", char **" context ); .sp .BI "int getpidprevcon_raw(pid_t " pid ", char **" context ); .sp .BI "int getpeercon(int " fd ", char **" context ); .sp .BI "int getpeercon_raw(int " fd ", char **" context ); .sp .BI "void freecon(char *" con ); .sp .BI "void freeconary(char **" con ); .sp .BI "int setcon(const char *" context ); .sp .BI "int setcon_raw(const char *" context ); .SH "DESCRIPTION" .TP .BR getcon () retrieves the context of the current process, which must be free'd with .BR freecon (). .TP .BR getprevcon () same as getcon but gets the context before the last exec. .TP .BR getpidcon () returns the process context for the specified PID, which must be free'd with .BR freecon (). .TP .BR getpidprevcon () returns the process context before the last exec for the specified PID, which must be free'd with .BR freecon (). .TP .BR getpeercon () retrieves the context of the peer socket, which must be free'd with .BR freecon (). .TP .BR freecon () frees the memory allocated for a security context. If .I con is NULL, no operation is performed. .TP .BR freeconary () frees the memory allocated for a context array. If .I con is NULL, no operation is performed. .TP .BR setcon () sets the current security context of the process to a new value. Note that use of this function requires that the entire application be trusted to maintain any desired separation between the old and new security contexts, unlike exec-based transitions performed via .BR setexeccon (3). When possible, decompose your application and use .BR setexeccon (3) and .BR execve (3) instead. Since access to file descriptors is revalidated upon use by SELinux, the new context must be explicitly authorized in the policy to use the descriptors opened by the old context if that is desired. Otherwise, attempts by the process to use any existing descriptors (including .IR stdin , .IR stdout , and .IR stderr ) after performing the .BR setcon () will fail. A multi-threaded application can perform a .BR setcon () prior to creating any child threads, in which case all of the child threads will inherit the new context. However, prior to Linux 2.6.28, .BR setcon () would fail if there are any other threads running in the same process since this would yield an inconsistency among the security contexts of threads sharing the same memory space. Since Linux 2.6.28, .BR setcon() is permitted for threads within a multi-threaded process if the new security context is bounded by the old security context, where the bounded relation is defined through typebounds statements in the policy and guarantees that the new security context has a subset of the permissions of the old security context. If the process was being ptraced at the time of the .BR setcon () operation, ptrace permission will be revalidated against the new context and the .BR setcon () will fail if it is not allowed by policy. .TP .BR *_raw() .BR getcon_raw (), .BR getprevcon_raw (), .BR getpidcon_raw (), .BR getpidprevcon_raw (), .BR getpeercon_raw () and .BR setcon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error \-1 is returned with errno set. On success 0 is returned. .SH "NOTES" The retrieval functions might return success and set .I *context to NULL if and only if SELinux is not enabled. Querying a foreign process via its PID, e.g. \fBgetpidcon\fR() or \fBgetpidprevcon\fR(), is inherently racy and therefore should never be relied upon for security purposes. .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " setexeccon "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getcon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300173740ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getexeccon.3000066400000000000000000000055471437566343300174110ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getexeccon" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getexeccon, setexeccon \- get or set the SELinux security context used for executing a new process rpm_execcon \- run a helper for rpm in an appropriate security context . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getexeccon(char **" context ); .sp .BI "int getexeccon_raw(char **" context ); .sp .BI "int setexeccon(char *" context ); .sp .BI "int setexeccon_raw(char *" context ); .sp .BI "int setexecfilecon(const char *" filename ", const char *" fallback_type ); .sp .BI "int rpm_execcon(unsigned int " verified ", const char *" filename ", char *const " argv "[] , char *const " envp "[]); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getexeccon () retrieves the context used for executing a new process. This returned context should be freed with .BR freecon (3) if non-NULL. .BR getexeccon () sets .BI * context to NULL if no exec context has been explicitly set by the program (i.e. using the default policy behavior). .BR setexeccon () sets the context used for the next .BR execve (2) call. NULL can be passed to .BR setexeccon () to reset to the default policy behavior. The exec context is automatically reset after the next .BR execve (2), so a program doesn't need to explicitly sanitize it upon startup. .BR setexeccon () can be applied prior to library functions that internally perform an .BR execve (2), e.g. .BR execl *(3), .BR execv *(3), .BR popen (3), in order to set an exec context for that operation. .BR getexeccon_raw () and .BR setexeccon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .B Note: Signal handlers that perform an .BR execve (2) must take care to save, reset, and restore the exec context to avoid unexpected behavior. .BR setexecfilecon () sets the context used for the next .BR execve (2) call, based on the policy for the .IR filename , and falling back to a new context with a .I fallback_type in case there is no transition. .BR rpm_execcon () is deprecated; please use .BR setexecfilecon () in conjunction with .BR execve (2) in all new code. This function runs a helper for rpm in an appropriate security context. The verified parameter should contain the return code from the signature verification (0 == ok, 1 == notfound, 2 == verifyfail, 3 == nottrusted, 4 == nokey), although this information is not yet used by the function. The function determines the proper security context for the helper based on policy, sets the exec context accordingly, and then executes the specified filename with the provided argument and environment arrays. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error \-1 is returned. On success .BR getexeccon (), .BR setexeccon () and .BR setexecfilecon () return 0. .BR rpm_execcon () only returns upon errors, as it calls .BR execve (2). . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3), " getcon "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getexeccon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300202450ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getexeccon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000036331437566343300173760ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getfilecon" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getfilecon, fgetfilecon, lgetfilecon \- get SELinux security context of a file . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getfilecon(const char *" path ", char **" con ); .sp .BI "int getfilecon_raw(const char *" path ", char **" con ); .sp .BI "int lgetfilecon(const char *" path ", char **" con ); .sp .BI "int lgetfilecon_raw(const char *" path ", char **" con ); .sp .BI "int fgetfilecon(int "fd ", char **" con ); .sp .BI "int fgetfilecon_raw(int "fd ", char **" con ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getfilecon () retrieves the context associated with the given path in the file system, the length of the context is returned. .BR lgetfilecon () is identical to .BR getfilecon (), except in the case of a symbolic link, where the link itself is interrogated, not the file that it refers to. .BR fgetfilecon () is identical to .BR getfilecon (), only the open file pointed to by filedes (as returned by .BR open (2)) is interrogated in place of path. Since libselinux 3.4 a file opened via .I O_PATH is supported. .BR getfilecon_raw (), .BR lgetfilecon_raw () and .BR fgetfilecon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. The returned context should be freed with .BR freecon (3) if non-NULL. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, a positive number is returned indicating the size of the extended attribute value. On failure, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. If the context does not exist, or the process has no access to this attribute, .I errno is set to .BR ENODATA . If extended attributes are not supported by the filesystem, or are disabled, .I errno is set to .BR ENOTSUP . The errors documented for the .BR stat (2) system call are also applicable here. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3), " setfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300202400ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfilecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getfscreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000033331437566343300202500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getfscreatecon" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getfscreatecon, setfscreatecon \- get or set the SELinux security context used for creating a new file system object . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getfscreatecon(char **" con ); .sp .BI "int getfscreatecon_raw(char **" con ); .sp .BI "int setfscreatecon(char *" context ); .sp .BI "int setfscreatecon_raw(char *" context ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getfscreatecon () retrieves the context used for creating a new file system object. This returned context should be freed with .BR freecon (3) if non-NULL. .BR getfscreatecon () sets *con to NULL if no fscreate context has been explicitly set by the program (i.e. using the default policy behavior). .BR setfscreatecon () sets the context used for creating a new file system object. NULL can be passed to .BR setfscreatecon () to reset to the default policy behavior. The fscreate context is automatically reset after the next .BR execve (2), so a program doesn't need to explicitly sanitize it upon startup. .BR setfscreatecon () can be applied prior to library functions that internally perform an file creation, in order to set an file context on the objects. .BR getfscreatecon_raw () and .BR setfscreatecon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .B Note: Signal handlers that perform a .BR setfscreatecon () must take care to save, reset, and restore the fscreate context to avoid unexpected behavior. . .br .B Note: Contexts are thread specific. .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error \-1 is returned. On success 0 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3), " getcon "(3), " getexeccon "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getfscreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000321437566343300211120ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfscreatecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getkeycreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000033401437566343300204260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getkeycreatecon" "3" "9 September 2008" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getkeycreatecon, setkeycreatecon \- get or set the SELinux security context used for creating a new kernel keyrings . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getkeycreatecon(char **" con ); .sp .BI "int getkeycreatecon_raw(char **" con ); .sp .BI "int setkeycreatecon(char *" context ); .sp .BI "int setkeycreatecon_raw(char *" context ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getkeycreatecon () retrieves the context used for creating a new kernel keyring. This returned context should be freed with .BR freecon (3) if non-NULL. .BR getkeycreatecon () sets *con to NULL if no keycreate context has been explicitly set by the program (i.e. using the default policy behavior). .BR setkeycreatecon () sets the context used for creating a new kernel keyring. NULL can be passed to .BR setkeycreatecon () to reset to the default policy behavior. The keycreate context is automatically reset after the next .BR execve (2), so a program doesn't need to explicitly sanitize it upon startup. .BR setkeycreatecon () can be applied prior to library functions that internally perform an file creation, in order to set an file context on the objects. .BR getkeycreatecon_raw () and .BR setkeycreatecon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .B Note: Signal handlers that perform a .BR setkeycreatecon () must take care to save, reset, and restore the keycreate context to avoid unexpected behavior. .br .B Note: Contexts are thread specific. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error \-1 is returned. On success 0 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3), " getcon "(3), " getexeccon "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getkeycreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000331437566343300212730ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getkeycreatecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getpeercon.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300173770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getpeercon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300202500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getpidcon.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300172200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getpidcon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300200710ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getpidprevcon.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300201150ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getpidprevcon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300207660ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getprevcon.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300174200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getprevcon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300202710ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getseuserbyname.3000066400000000000000000000017101437566343300204530ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getseuserbyname" "3" "29 September 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getseuserbyname \- get SELinux username and level for a given Linux username . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getseuserbyname(const char *" linuxuser ", char **" selinuxuser ", char **" level "); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getseuserbyname () retrieves the SELinux username and security level associated with a given Linux username. The SELinux username and security level can then be passed to other libselinux functions such as .BR \%get_ordered_context_list_with_level (3) and .BR \%get_default_context_with_level (3). The returned SELinux username and level should be freed by the caller using free. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, 0 is returned. On failure, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. The errors documented for the .BR stat (2) system call are also applicable here. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getsockcreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000033601437566343300205770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getsockcreatecon" "3" "24 September 2008" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" getsockcreatecon, setsockcreatecon \- get or set the SELinux security context used for creating a new labeled sockets . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int getsockcreatecon(char **" con ); .sp .BI "int getsockcreatecon_raw(char **" con ); .sp .BI "int setsockcreatecon(char *" context ); .sp .BI "int setsockcreatecon_raw(char *" context ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR getsockcreatecon () retrieves the context used for creating a new labeled network socket. This returned context should be freed with .BR freecon (3) if non-NULL. .BR getsockcreatecon () sets *con to NULL if no sockcreate context has been explicitly set by the program (i.e. using the default policy behavior). .BR setsockcreatecon () sets the context used for creating a new labeled network sockets NULL can be passed to .BR setsockcreatecon () to reset to the default policy behavior. The sockcreate context is automatically reset after the next .BR execve (2), so a program doesn't need to explicitly sanitize it upon startup. .BR setsockcreatecon () can be applied prior to library functions that internally perform an file creation, in order to set an file context on the objects. .BR getsockcreatecon_raw () and .BR setsockcreatecon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .B Note: Signal handlers that perform a .BR setsockcreatecon () must take care to save, reset, and restore the sockcreate context to avoid unexpected behavior. . .br .B Note: Contexts are thread specific. .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error \-1 is returned. On success 0 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3), " getcon "(3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/getsockcreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000341437566343300214430ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getsockcreatecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/init_selinuxmnt.3000066400000000000000000000013221437566343300205010ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "init_selinuxmnt" "3" "21 Nov 2009" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" init_selinuxmnt \- initialize the global variable selinux_mnt . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .BI "static void init_selinuxmnt(void);" .sp .BI "static void fini_selinuxmnt(void);" .sp .BI "void set_selinuxmnt(char *" mnt ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR init_selinuxmnt () initializes the global variable .I selinux_mnt to the selinuxfs mountpoint. .BR fini_selinuxmnt () deinitializes the global variable .I selinux_mnt that stores the selinuxfs mountpoint. .BR set_selinuxmnt () changes the selinuxfs mountpoint to .IR mnt . . .SH "AUTHOR" This manual page has been written by Guido Trentalancia . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), libselinux-3.5/man/man3/is_context_customizable.3000066400000000000000000000015451437566343300222170ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "is_context_customizable" "3" "10 January 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" is_context_customizable \- check whether SELinux context type is customizable by the administrator . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int is_context_customizable(char *" scon ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This function checks whether the type of scon is in the .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/context/customizable_types file. A customizable type is a file context type that administrators set on files, usually to allow certain domains to share the file content. restorecon and setfiles, by default, leave these context in place. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns 1 if security context is customizable or 0 if it is not. Returns \-1 on error. . .SH "FILE" .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/context/customizable_types . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/is_selinux_enabled.3000066400000000000000000000012741437566343300211120ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "is_selinux_enabled" "3" "7 Mar 2010" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" is_selinux_enabled \- check whether SELinux is enabled . .SH "NAME" is_selinux_mls_enabled \- check whether SELinux is enabled for (Multi Level Security) MLS . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B int is_selinux_enabled(); .sp .B int is_selinux_mls_enabled(); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR is_selinux_enabled () returns 1 if SELinux is running or 0 if it is not. .BR is_selinux_mls_enabled () returns 1 if SELinux is capable of running in MLS mode or 0 if it is not. To determine the policy in use on the system, use .BR selinux_getpolicytype (3). . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/is_selinux_mls_enabled.3000066400000000000000000000000361437566343300217600ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/is_selinux_enabled.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/lgetfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300175430ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfilecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/lgetfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300204140ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfilecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/lsetfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300175570ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/setfilecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/lsetfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300204300ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/setfilecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/manual_user_enter_context.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300225240ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/matchmediacon.3000066400000000000000000000013711437566343300200500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "matchmediacon" "3" "15 November 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" matchmediacon \- get the default SELinux security context for the specified mediatype from the policy . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int matchmediacon(const char *" media ", char **" con ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR matchmediacon () matches the specified media type with the media contexts configuration and sets the security context .I con to refer to the resulting context. .sp .B Note: Caller must free returned security context .I con using .BR freecon (3). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns 0 on success or \-1 otherwise. . .SH Files .I /etc/selinux/{POLICYTYPE}/contexts/files/media . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " freecon "(3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/matchpathcon.3000066400000000000000000000070761437566343300177350ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "matchpathcon" "3" "21 November 2009" "sds@tycho.nsa.gov" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" matchpathcon, matchpathcon_index \- get the default SELinux security context for the specified path from the file contexts configuration . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int matchpathcon_init(const char *" path ");" .sp .BI "int matchpathcon_init_prefix(const char *" path ", const char *" prefix ");" .sp .BI "int matchpathcon_fini(void);" .sp .BI "int matchpathcon(const char *" path ", mode_t " mode ", char **" con "); .sp .BI "int matchpathcon_index(const char *" name ", mode_t " mode ", char **" con ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This family of functions is deprecated. For new code, please use .BR selabel_open (3) with the .B SELABEL_CTX_FILE backend in place of .BR matchpathcon_init (), use .BR selabel_close (3) in place of .BR matchpathcon_fini (), and use .BR selabel_lookup (3) in place of .BR matchpathcon (). The remaining description below is for the legacy interface. .BR matchpathcon_init () loads the file contexts configuration specified by .I path into memory for use by subsequent .BR matchpathcon () calls. If .I path is NULL, then the active file contexts configuration is loaded by default, i.e. the path returned by .BR selinux_file_context_path (3). Unless the .B MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY flag has been set via .BR \%set_matchpathcon_flags (3), files with the same path prefix but a .B \%.homedirs and .B .local suffix are also looked up and loaded if present. These files provide dynamically generated entries for user home directories and for local customizations. .BR matchpathcon_init_prefix () is the same as .BR matchpathcon_init () but only loads entries with regular expressions whose first pathname component is a prefix of .I \%prefix , e.g. pass "/dev" if you only intend to call .BR matchpathcon () with pathnames beginning with /dev. However, this optimization is no longer necessary due to the use of .I file_contexts.bin files with precompiled regular expressions, so use of this interface is deprecated. .BR matchpathcon_fini () frees the memory allocated by a prior call to .BR matchpathcon_init. () This function can be used to free and reset the internal state between multiple .BR matchpathcon_init () calls, or to free memory when finished using .BR matchpathcon (). .BR matchpathcon () matches the specified .I pathname, after transformation via .BR realpath (3) excepting any final symbolic link component if S_IFLNK was specified as the .I mode, and .I mode against the .I file contexts configuration and sets the security context .I con to refer to the resulting context. The caller must free the returned security context .I con using .BR freecon (3) when finished using it. .I mode can be 0 to disable mode matching, but should be provided whenever possible, as it may affect the matching. Only the file format bits (i.e. the file type) of the .I mode are used. If .BR matchpathcon_init () has not already been called, then this function will call it upon its first invocation with a NULL .I path, defaulting to the active file contexts configuration. .BR matchpathcon_index () is the same as .BR matchpathcon () but returns a specification index that can later be used in a .BR matchpathcon_filespec_add (3) call. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 otherwise. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " set_matchpathcon_flags "(3), " set_matchpathcon_invalidcon "(3), " set_matchpathcon_printf "(3), " matchpathcon_filespec_add "(3), " matchpathcon_checkmatches "(3), " freecon "(3), " setfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/matchpathcon_checkmatches.3000066400000000000000000000032731437566343300224320ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "matchpathcon_checkmatches" "3" "21 November 2009" "sds@tycho.nsa.gov" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" matchpathcon_checkmatches, matchpathcon_filespec_add, matchpathcon_filespec_destroy, matchpathcon_filespec_eval \- check and report whether any specification index has no matches with any inode. Maintenance and statistics on inode associations . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "void matchpathcon_checkmatches(char *" str ");" .sp .BI "int matchpathcon_filespec_add(ino_t " ino ", int " specind ", const char *" file ");" .sp .BI "void matchpathcon_filespec_destroy(void);" .sp .BI "void matchpathcon_filespec_eval(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR matchpathcon_checkmatches () checks whether any specification has no matches and reports them. The .I str argument is used as a prefix for any warning messages. .sp .BR matchpathcon_filespec_add () maintains an association between an inode .I ino and a specification index .IR specind , and checks whether a conflicting specification is already associated with the same inode (e.g. due to multiple hard links). If so, then it uses the latter of the two specifications based on their order in the .I file context configuration. Returns the specification index used or \-1 on error. .sp .BR matchpathcon_filespec_destroy () destroys any inode associations that have been added, e.g. to restart for a new filesystem. .sp .BR matchpathcon_filespec_eval () displays statistics on the hash table usage for the inode associations. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 otherwise. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " matchpathcon "(3), " matchpathcon_index "(3), " freecon "(3), " setfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/matchpathcon_filespec_add.3000066400000000000000000000000451437566343300224040ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon_checkmatches.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/matchpathcon_filespec_destroy.3000066400000000000000000000000451437566343300233450ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon_checkmatches.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/matchpathcon_filespec_eval.3000066400000000000000000000000451437566343300226030ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon_checkmatches.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/matchpathcon_fini.3000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300207210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/matchpathcon_index.3000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300211030ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/matchpathcon_init.3000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300207370ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/matchpathcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/mode_to_security_class.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300220120ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/print_access_vector.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300213070ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/query_user_context.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300212170ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/get_ordered_context_list.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/rpm_execcon.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300175520ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getexeccon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_av_perm_to_string.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300227200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_av_string.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300211730ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_check_context.3000066400000000000000000000012061437566343300220210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_check_context" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_check_context \- check the validity of a SELinux context . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int security_check_context(const char *" con ); .sp .BI "int security_check_context_raw(const char *" con ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_check_context () returns 0 if SELinux is running and the context is valid, otherwise it returns \-1. .BR security_check_context_raw () behaves identically to .BR \%security_check_context () but does not perform context translation. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_check_context_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000421437566343300226670ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_check_context.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_class_to_string.3000066400000000000000000000054421437566343300224030ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "security_class_to_string" "3" "30 Mar 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_class_to_string, security_av_perm_to_string, string_to_security_class, string_to_av_perm, security_av_string, mode_to_security_class \- convert between SELinux class and permission values and string names. . print_access_vector \- display an access vector in human-readable form. . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "const char *security_class_to_string(security_class_t " tclass ");" .sp .BI "const char *security_av_perm_to_string(security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " av ");" .sp .BI "int security_av_string(security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " av ", char **" result ");" .sp .BI "security_class_t string_to_security_class(const char *" name ");" .sp .BI "security_class_t mode_to_security_class(mode_t " mode ");" .sp .BI "access_vector_t string_to_av_perm(security_class_t " tclass ", const char *" name ");" .sp .BI "void print_access_vector(security_class_t " tclass ", access_vector_t " av ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_class_to_string () returns a string name for class .IR tclass , or NULL if the class is invalid. The returned string must not be modified or freed. .BR security_av_perm_to_string () returns a string name for the access vector bit .I av of class .IR tclass , or NULL if either argument is invalid. The returned string must not be modified or freed. .BR security_av_string () computes a full access vector string representation using .I tclass and .IR av , which may have multiple bits set. The string is returned in the memory pointed to by .IR result , and should be freed by the caller using .BR free (3). .BR string_to_security_class () returns the class value corresponding to the string name .IR name , or zero if no such class exists. .BR mode_to_security_class () returns the class value corresponding to the specified .IR mode , or zero if no such class exists. .BR string_to_av_perm () returns the access vector bit corresponding to the string name .I name and security class .IR tclass , or zero if no such value exists. .BR print_access_vector () displays an access vector in human-readable form on the standard output stream. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR security_av_string () returns zero on success or \-1 on error with .I errno set appropriately. .BR print_access_vector () does not return a value. All other functions return zero or NULL on error. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B EINVAL A class or access vector argument is not recognized by the currently loaded policy. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR getcon (3), .BR getfilecon (3) .BR stat (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_commit_booleans.3000066400000000000000000000000421437566343300223470ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_av.3000066400000000000000000000165311437566343300213510ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_compute_av" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_compute_av, security_compute_av_flags, security_compute_create, security_compute_create_name, security_compute_relabel, security_compute_member, security_compute_user, security_validatetrans, security_get_initial_context \- query the SELinux policy database in the kernel . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int security_compute_av(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", access_vector_t "requested ", struct av_decision *" avd ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_av_raw(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", access_vector_t "requested ", struct av_decision *" avd ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_av_flags(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", access_vector_t "requested ", struct av_decision *" avd ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_av_flags_raw(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", access_vector_t "requested ", struct av_decision *" avd ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_create(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_create_raw(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_create_name(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", const char *" objname ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_create_name_raw(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", const char *" objname ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_relabel(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_relabel_raw(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_member(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_member_raw(char *" scon ", char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", char **" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_user(char *" scon ", const char *" username ", char ***" con ); .sp .BI "int security_compute_user_raw(char *" scon ", const char *" username ", char ***" con ); .sp .BI "int security_validatetrans(char *" scon ", const char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", char *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_validatetrans_raw(char *" scon ", const char *" tcon ", security_class_t "tclass ", char *" newcon ); .sp .BI "int security_get_initial_context(const char *" name ", char **" con ); .sp .BI "int security_get_initial_context_raw(const char *" name ", char **" con ); .sp .BI "int selinux_check_access(const char *" scon ", const char *" tcon ", const char *" class ", const char *" perm ", void *" auditdata); .sp .BI "int selinux_check_passwd_access(access_vector_t " requested ); .sp .BI "int checkPasswdAccess(access_vector_t " requested ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This family of functions is used to obtain policy decisions from the SELinux kernel security server (policy engine). In general, direct use of .BR security_compute_av () and its variant interfaces is discouraged in favor of using .BR selinux_check_access () since the latter automatically handles the dynamic mapping of class and permission names to their policy values, initialization and use of the Access Vector Cache (AVC), and proper handling of per-domain and global permissive mode and allow_unknown. When using any of the functions that take policy integer values for classes or permissions as inputs, use .BR string_to_security_class(3) and .BR string_to_av_perm(3) to map the class and permission names to their policy values. These values may change across a policy reload, so they should be re-acquired on every use or using a .B SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD callback set via .BR selinux_set_callback(3). An alternative approach is to use .BR selinux_set_mapping(3) to create a mapping from class and permission index values used by the application to the policy values, thereby allowing the application to pass its own fixed constants for the classes and permissions to these functions and internally mapping them on demand. However, this also requires setting up a callback as above to address policy reloads. .BR security_compute_av () queries whether the policy permits the source context .I scon to access the target context .I tcon via class .I tclass with the .I requested access vector. The decision is returned in .IR avd . .BR security_compute_av_flags () is identical to .B security_compute_av but additionally sets the .I flags field of .IR avd . Currently one flag is supported: .BR SELINUX_AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE , which indicates the decision is computed on a permissive domain. .BR security_compute_create () is used to compute a context to use for labeling a new object in a particular class based on a SID pair. .BR security_compute_create_name () is identical to .BR \%security_compute_create () but also takes name of the new object in creation as an argument. When .B TYPE_TRANSITION rule on the given class and a SID pair has object name extension, we shall be able to obtain a correct .I newcon according to the security policy. Note that this interface is only supported on the linux 2.6.40 or later. In the older kernel, the object name will be simply ignored. .BR security_compute_relabel () is used to compute the new context to use when relabeling an object, it is used in the pam_selinux.so source and the newrole source to determine the correct label for the tty at login time, but can be used for other things. .BR security_compute_member () is used to compute the context to use when labeling a polyinstantiated object instance. .BR security_compute_user () is used to determine the set of user contexts that can be reached from a source context. This function is deprecated; use .BR get_ordered_context_list (3) instead. .BR security_validatetrans () is used to determine if a transition from scon to newcon using tcon as the object is valid for object class tclass. This checks against the mlsvalidatetrans and validatetrans constraints in the loaded policy. Returns 0 if allowed, and -1 if an error occurred with errno set. .BR security_get_initial_context () is used to get the context of a kernel initial security identifier specified by .I name .BR security_compute_av_raw (), .BR security_compute_av_flags_raw (), .BR \%security_compute_create_raw (), .BR \%security_compute_create_name_raw (), .BR \%security_compute_relabel_raw (), .BR \%security_compute_member_raw (), .BR \%security_compute_user_raw () .BR \%security_validatetrans_raw () and .BR \%security_get_initial_context_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. .BR selinux_check_access () is used to check if the source context has the access permission for the specified class on the target context. .BR selinux_check_passwd_access () is used to check for a permission in the .I passwd class. .BR selinux_check_passwd_access () uses .BR getprevcon(3) for the source and target security contexts. .BR checkPasswdAccess () is a deprecated alias of the .BR selinux_check_passwd_access () function. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 on error. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR string_to_security_class (3), .BR string_to_av_perm (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux_set_mapping (3), .BR getprevcon (3), .BR get_ordered_context_list (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_av_flags.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300225170ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_av_flags_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300233700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_av_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300222140ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_create.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300222000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_create_name.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300232000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_create_name_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300240510ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_create_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300230510ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_member.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300222040ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_member_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300230550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_relabel.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300223430ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_relabel_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300232140ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_user.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300217130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_compute_user_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300225640ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_deny_unknown.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300217170ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_getenforce.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_disable.3000066400000000000000000000015471437566343300206130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_disable" "3" "21 Nov 2009" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_disable \- disable the SELinux kernel code at runtime . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int security_disable(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_disable () disables the SELinux kernel code, unregisters selinuxfs from .IR /proc/filesystems , and then unmounts .IR /sys/fs/selinux . .sp This function can only be called at runtime and prior to the initial policy load. After the initial policy load, the SELinux kernel code cannot be disabled, but only placed in "permissive" mode by using .BR security_setenforce(3). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR security_disable () returns zero on success or \-1 on error. . .SH "AUTHOR" This manual page has been written by Guido Trentalancia . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), " setenforce "(8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_get_boolean_active.3000066400000000000000000000000421437566343300230060ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_get_boolean_names.3000066400000000000000000000000421437566343300226360ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_get_boolean_pending.3000066400000000000000000000000421437566343300231570ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_get_checkreqprot.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300225320ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_getenforce.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_get_initial_context.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300232350ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_get_initial_context_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300241060ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_getenforce.3000066400000000000000000000040321437566343300213210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_getenforce" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_getenforce, security_setenforce, security_deny_unknown, security_reject_unknown, security_get_checkreqprot \- get or set the enforcing state of SELinux . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B int security_getenforce(void); .sp .BI "int security_setenforce(int "value ); .sp .B int security_deny_unknown(void); .sp .B int security_reject_unknown(void); .sp .B int security_get_checkreqprot(void); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_getenforce () returns 0 if SELinux is running in permissive mode, 1 if it is running in enforcing mode, and \-1 on error. .BR security_setenforce () sets SELinux to enforcing mode if the value 1 is passed in, and sets it to permissive mode if 0 is passed in. On success 0 is returned, on error \-1 is returned. .BR security_deny_unknown () returns 0 if SELinux treats policy queries on undefined object classes or permissions as being allowed, 1 if such queries are denied, and \-1 on error. .BR security_reject_unknown () returns 1 if the current policy was built with handle-unknown=reject and SELinux would reject loading it, if it did not define all kernel object classes and permissions. In this state, when .BR selinux_set_mapping() and .BR selinux_check_access() are used with an undefined userspace class or permission, an error is returned and errno is set to EINVAL. It returns 0 if the current policy was built with handle-unknown=allow or handle-unknown=deny. In this state, policy queries are treated according to .BR security_deny_unknown(). \-1 is returned on error. .BR security_get_checkreqprot () can be used to determine whether SELinux is configured to check the protection requested by the application or the actual protection that will be applied by the kernel (including the effects of READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) on mmap and mprotect calls. It returns 0 if SELinux checks the actual protection, 1 if it checks the requested protection, and \-1 on error. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_load_booleans.3000066400000000000000000000040401437566343300220000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_get_boolean_names" "3" "15 November 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API Documentation" .SH "NAME" security_set_boolean, security_commit_booleans, security_get_boolean_names, security_get_boolean_active, security_get_boolean_pending \- routines for manipulating SELinux boolean values . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int security_get_boolean_names(char ***" names ", int *" len ");" .sp .BI "int security_get_boolean_pending(const char *" name ");" .sp .BI "int security_get_boolean_active(const char *" name ");" .sp .BI "int security_set_boolean(const char *" name ", int " value ");" .sp .BI "int security_set_boolean_list(size_t " boolcnt ", SELboolean *" boollist ", int " permanent ");" .sp .BI "int security_commit_booleans(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The SELinux policy can include conditional rules that are enabled or disabled based on the current values of a set of policy booleans. These policy booleans allow runtime modification of the security policy without having to load a new policy. The SELinux API allows for a transaction based update. So you can set several boolean values and then commit them all at once. .BR security_get_boolean_names () provides a list of boolean names, currently supported by the loaded policy. .BR security_get_boolean_pending () returns the pending value for boolean or \-1 on failure. .BR security_get_boolean_active () returns the active value for boolean or \-1 on failure. .BR security_set_boolean () sets the pending value for boolean .BR security_set_boolean_list () saves a list of booleans in a single transaction. Note that the .BI int " permanent " flag is deprecated and should be set to zero. .BR security_commit_booleans () commits all pending values for the booleans. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Where not otherwise stated, functions described in this manual page return zero on success or \-1 on error. . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR getsebool (8), .BR booleans (8), .BR togglesebool (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_load_policy.3000066400000000000000000000043041437566343300215000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_load_policy" "3" "3 November 2009" "guido@trentalancia.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_load_policy \- load a new SELinux policy . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int security_load_policy(const void *" data ", size_t "len ); .sp .BI "int selinux_mkload_policy(int " preservebools ");" .sp .BI "int selinux_init_load_policy(int *" enforce ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_load_policy () loads a new policy, returns 0 for success and \-1 for error. .BR selinux_mkload_policy () makes a policy image and loads it. This function provides a higher level interface for loading policy than .BR \%security_load_policy (), internally determining the right policy version, locating and opening the policy file, mapping it into memory, manipulating it as needed for current boolean settings and/or local definitions, and then calling security_load_policy to load it. .I preservebools is a boolean flag indicating whether current policy boolean values should be preserved into the new policy (if 1) or reset to the saved policy settings (if 0). The former case is the default for policy reloads, while the latter case is an option for policy reloads but is primarily used for the initial policy load. .BR selinux_init_load_policy () performs the initial policy load. This function determines the desired enforcing mode, sets the .I enforce argument accordingly for the caller to use, sets the SELinux kernel enforcing status to match it, and loads the policy. It also internally handles the initial selinuxfs mount required to perform these actions. .sp It should also be noted that after the initial policy load, the SELinux kernel code cannot anymore be disabled and the selinuxfs cannot be unmounted using a call to .BR security_disable (3). Therefore, after the initial policy load, the only operational changes are those permitted by .BR security_setenforce (3) (i.e. eventually setting the framework in permissive mode rather than in enforcing one). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 on error. . .SH "AUTHOR" This manual page has been written by Guido Trentalancia . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " security_disable "(3), " setenforce "(8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_mkload_policy.3000066400000000000000000000000401437566343300220210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_policy.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_policyvers.3000066400000000000000000000006411437566343300214010ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "security_policyvers" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" security_policyvers \- get the version of the SELinux policy .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B int security_policyvers(); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR security_policyvers () returns the version of the policy (a positive integer) on success, or \-1 on error. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_reject_unknown.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300222340ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_getenforce.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_set_boolean.3000066400000000000000000000000421437566343300214670ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_set_boolean_list.3000066400000000000000000000000421437566343300225220ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_booleans.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_setenforce.3000066400000000000000000000000321437566343300213310ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so security_getenforce.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_validatetrans.c000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300221220ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/security_validatetrans_raw.c000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300227730ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selabel_close.3000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300200370ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selabel_open.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selabel_digest.3000066400000000000000000000024571437566343300202300ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selabel_digest" "3" "16 Sept 2015" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_digest \- Return digest of specfiles and list of files used . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_digest(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_digest('u .BI "unsigned char **" digest , .BI "size_t *" digest_len , .br .BI "char ***" specfiles, .BI "size_t *" num_specfiles ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selabel_digest () performs an operation on the handle .IR hnd , returning the results of the SHA1 digest pointed to by .IR digest , whose length will be .IR digest_len . The list of specfiles used in the SHA1 digest calculation is returned in .I specfiles with the number of entries in .IR num_specfiles . .sp To enable .BR selabel_digest () to return this information the .B SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST option must be enable in .BR selabel_open (3). .sp The result of .BR selabel_digest () must not be used after .BR selabel_close (3). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B EINVAL No digest available (returned if .B SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST option not enabled). .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selabel_open (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches.3000066400000000000000000000032451437566343300253160ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches" "3" "14 April 2019" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches \- retrieve the partial matches digest and the xattr digest that applies to the supplied path \- Only supported on file backend. . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "bool selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches(" .in +\w'selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches('u .BI "struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .br .BI "const char *" key , .br .BI "uint8_t **" calculated_digest , .br .BI "uint8_t **" xattr_digest , .br .BI "size_t *" digest_len ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches () retrieves the file_contexts partial matches digest and the xattr digest that applies to the supplied path on the handle .IR hnd . .br The .IR key parameter is the path to retrieve the digests. .br The .IR calculated_digest is a pointer to the .IR key calculated file_contexts digest of all applicable partial matches, or NULL if none exist. The caller must .BR free (3) the buffer. .br The .IR xattr_digest is a pointer to the .IR key .BR xattr (7) stored digest, or NULL if it does not exist. The caller must .BR free (3) the buffer. .br The .IR digest_len is the length of the digests that will always be returned (even if both are NULL). Note that if both digests are returned, they will always be the same length. .sp .SH "RETURN VALUE" TRUE if the digests match or FALSE if they do not or either or both are missing. .sp .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux_restorecon (3), .BR selabel_partial_match (3), .BR selabel_open (3), .BR selinux (8), .BR selabel_file (5) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selabel_lookup.3000066400000000000000000000032331437566343300202530ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_lookup" "3" "18 Jun 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_lookup \- obtain SELinux security context from a string label . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" key ", int " type ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup_raw('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" key ", int " type ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selabel_lookup () performs a lookup operation on the handle .IR hnd , returning the result in the memory pointed to by .IR context , which must be freed by the caller using .BR freecon (3). The .I key and .I type parameters are the inputs to the lookup operation and are interpreted according to the specific backend that .I handle is open on. .BR selabel_lookup_raw () behaves identically to .BR selabel_lookup () but does not perform context translation. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B ENOENT No context corresponding to the input .I key and .I type was found. .TP .B EINVAL The .I key and/or .I type inputs are invalid, or the context being returned failed validation. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selabel_open (3), .BR selabel_stats (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selabel_lookup_best_match.3000066400000000000000000000051411437566343300224440ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selabel_lookup_best_match" "3" "05 May 2015" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_lookup_best_match \- obtain a best match SELinux security context \- Only supported on file backend. . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_best_match(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup_best_match('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" key , .br .BI "const char **" links , .br .BI "int " type ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_best_match_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup_best_match_raw('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" key , .br .BI "const char **" links , .br .BI "int " type ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selabel_lookup_best_match () performs a best match lookup operation on the handle .IR hnd , returning the result in the memory pointed to by .IR context , which must be freed by the caller using .BR freecon (3). The \fIkey\fR parameter is a file path to check for best match using zero or more \fIlink\fR (aliases) parameters. The order of precedence for best match is: .RS .IP "1." 4 An exact match for the real path (\fIkey\fR) or .IP "2." 4 An exact match for any of the \fIlink\fRs (aliases), or .IP "3." 4 The longest fixed prefix match. .RE .sp The \fItype\fR parameter is an optional file \fImode\fR argument that should be set to the mode bits of the file, as determined by \fBlstat\fR(2). \fImode\fR may be zero, however full matching may not occur. .BR selabel_lookup_best_match_raw () behaves identically to .BR selabel_lookup_best_match () but does not perform context translation. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B ENOENT No context corresponding to the input .I key and .I type was found. .TP .B EINVAL The .I key and/or .I type inputs are invalid, or the context being returned failed validation. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. .sp .SH "NOTES" Example usage - When a service creates a device node, it may also create one or more symlinks to the device node. These symlinks may be the only stable name for the device, e.g. if the partition is dynamically assigned. The file label backend supports this by looking up the "best match" for a device node based on its real path (\fIkey\fR) and any \fIlink\fRs to it (aliases). The order of precedence for best match is described above. .sp .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selabel_open (3), .BR selabel_stats (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8), .BR lstat (2), .BR selabel_file (5) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selabel_lookup_best_match_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000451437566343300233130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selabel_lookup_best_match.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selabel_lookup_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000321437566343300211160ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selabel_lookup.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selabel_open.3000066400000000000000000000055011437566343300177030ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_open" "3" "18 Jun 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_open, selabel_close \- userspace SELinux labeling interface . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "struct selabel_handle *selabel_open(unsigned int " backend , .in +\w'struct selabel_handle *selabel_open('u .BI "const struct selinux_opt *" options , .br .BI "unsigned " nopt ");" .in .sp .BI "void selabel_close(struct selabel_handle *" hnd ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selabel_open () is used to initialize a labeling handle to be used for lookup operations. The .I backend argument specifies which backend is to be opened; the list of current backends appears in .B BACKENDS below. The .I options argument should be NULL or a pointer to an array of .B selinux_opt structures of length .IR nopt : .RS .ta 4n 16n 24n .nf struct selinux_opt { int type; const char *value; }; .fi .ta .RE The available option types are described in .B GLOBAL OPTIONS below as well as in the documentation for each individual backend. The return value on success is a non-NULL value for use in subsequent label operations. .BR selabel_close () terminates use of a handle, freeing any internal resources associated with it. After this call has been made, the handle must not be used again. . .SH "GLOBAL OPTIONS" Global options which may be passed to .BR selabel_open () include the following: . .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_UNUSED The option with a type code of zero is a no-op. Thus an array of options may be initizalized to zero and any untouched elements will not cause an error. .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE A non-null value for this option enables context validation. By default, .BR security_check_context (3) is used; a custom validation function can be provided via .BR selinux_set_callback (3). Note that an invalid context may not be treated as an error unless it is actually encountered during a lookup operation. .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST A non-null value for this option enables the generation of an SHA1 digest of the spec files loaded as described in .BR selabel_digest (3) . .SH "BACKENDS" .TP .B SELABEL_CTX_FILE File contexts backend, described in .BR selabel_file (5). .TP .B SELABEL_CTX_MEDIA Media contexts backend, described in .BR selabel_media (5). .TP .B SELABEL_CTX_X X Windows contexts backend, described in .BR selabel_x (5). .TP .B SELABEL_CTX_DB Database objects contexts backend, described in .BR selabel_db (5). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" A non-NULL handle value is returned on success. On error, NULL is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selabel_lookup (3), .BR selabel_stats (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selabel_partial_match.3000066400000000000000000000016371437566343300215600ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selabel_partial_match" "3" "05 May 2015" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_partial_match \- determine whether a direct or partial match is possible on a file path \- Only supported on file backend. . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "bool selabel_partial_match(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_partial_match('u .BI "const char *" key ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selabel_partial_match () performs a partial match operation on the handle .IR hnd , returning TRUE or FALSE. The \fIkey\fR parameter is a file path to check for a direct or partial match. .sp .SH "RETURN VALUE" TRUE is returned if a direct or partial match is found, FALSE if not. .sp .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selabel_open (3), .BR selabel_stats (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8), .BR selabel_file (5) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selabel_stats.3000066400000000000000000000016561437566343300201070ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_stats" "3" "18 Jun 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_stats \- obtain SELinux labeling statistics . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "void selabel_stats(struct selabel_handle *" hnd ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selabel_stats () causes zero or more messages to be printed containing backend-specific information about number of queries performed, number of unused entries, or other operational information. The messages are printed to standard error by default; a custom logging function can be provided via .BR selinux_set_callback (3). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" None. . .SH "ERRORS" None. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selabel_open (3), .BR selabel_lookup (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3000066400000000000000000000065011437566343300227020ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_binary_policy_path" "3" "15 November 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API Documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_path, selinux_policy_root, selinux_binary_policy_path, selinux_current_policy_path, selinux_failsafe_context_path, selinux_removable_context_path, selinux_default_context_path, selinux_user_contexts_path, selinux_file_context_path, selinux_media_context_path, selinux_contexts_path \- These functions return the paths to the active SELinux policy configuration directories and files . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B const char *selinux_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_policy_root(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_binary_policy_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_current_policy_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_failsafe_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_removable_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_default_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_user_contexts_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_usersconf_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_x_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_sepgsql_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_file_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_media_context_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_securetty_types_path(void); .sp .B const char *selinux_contexts_path(void); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" These functions return the paths to the active policy configuration directories and files based on the settings in .IR /etc/selinux/config . .sp .BR selinux_path () returns the top-level SELinux configuration directory. .sp .BR selinux_policy_root () returns the top-level policy directory. .sp .BR selinux_binary_policy_path () returns the binary policy file loaded into kernel. .sp .BR selinux_current_policy_path () returns the currently loaded policy file from the kernel. .sp .BR selinux_default_type_path () returns the context file mapping roles to default types. .sp .BR selinux_failsafe_context_path () returns the failsafe context for emergency logins. .sp .BR selinux_removable_context_path () returns the filesystem context for removable media. .sp .BR selinux_default_context_path () returns the system-wide default contexts for user sessions. .sp .BR selinux_user_contexts_path () returns the directory containing per-user default contexts. .sp .BR selinux_usersconf_path () returns the file containing mapping between Linux Users and SELinux users. .sp .BR selinux_x_context_path () returns the file containing configuration for XSELinux extension. .sp .BR selinux_sepgsql_context_path () returns the file containing configuration for SE-PostgreSQL. .sp .BR selinux_netfilter_context_path () returns the default netfilter context. .sp .BR selinux_file_context_path () returns the default system file contexts configuration. .sp .BR selinux_file_context_local_path () returns the local customization file contexts configuration. .sp .BR selinux_file_context_homedir_path () returns the home directory file contexts configuration. .sp .BR selinux_media_context_path () returns the file contexts for media device nodes. .sp .BR selinux_contexts_path () returns the directory containing all of the context configuration files. .sp .BR selinux_securetty_types_path () returns the defines tty types for newrole securettys. . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_boolean_sub.3000066400000000000000000000015331437566343300213130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_boolean_sub" "3" "11 June 2012" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_boolean_sub \- Search the translated name for a boolean_name record . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "char *selinux_boolean_sub(const char *" boolean_name ");" .sp .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_boolean_sub () searches the .I \%/etc/selinux/{POLICYTYPE}/booleans.subs_dist file for a matching boolean_name record. If the record exists the boolean substitution name is returned. If not .BR \%selinux_boolean_sub () returns the original .IR \%boolean_name . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR selinux_boolean_sub () returns the .I boolean_name or the substituted name on success. The returned value must be freed with .BR free "(3)." .BR selinux_boolean_sub () returns NULL on error. .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR security_get_boolean_names (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_check_access.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300214170ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_check_passwd_access.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300230000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_compute_av.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_check_securetty_context.3000066400000000000000000000010041437566343300237440ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_check_securetty_context" "3" "1 January 2007" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_check_securetty_context \- check whether a SELinux tty security context is defined as a securetty context . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_check_securetty_context(char *" tty_context ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_check_securetty_context () returns 0 if tty_context is a securetty context, returns < 0 otherwise. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_colors_path.3000066400000000000000000000021231437566343300213340ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_colors_path" "3" "08 April 2011" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_colors_path \- Return a path to the active SELinux policy color configuration file . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B const char *selinux_colors_path(void); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_colors_path () returns the path to the active policy color configuration file. .sp The path is built from the path returned by .BR selinux_policy_root "(3)" with .I /secolor.conf appended. .sp This optional configuration file whose format is shown in .BR \%secolor.conf (5), controls the colors to be associated with the .I raw context components of the .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)" function when information is to be displayed by an SELinux color-aware application. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, the path to the active policy color configuration file is returned. If a path is not available NULL is returned. . .SH "ERRORS" None. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_policy_root "(3), " selinux_config "(5), " selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3), " secolor.conf "(5)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_contexts_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300217040ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_current_policy_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300230760ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_default_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300232250ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_default_type_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300225220ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_failsafe_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300233530ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_file_context_cmp.3000066400000000000000000000022721437566343300223460ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_file_context_cmp" "3" "08 March 2011" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_file_context_cmp \- Compare two SELinux security contexts excluding the 'user' component . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_file_context_cmp(const char *" a ", " .RS .BI "const char *" b ");" .RE . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_file_context_cmp () compares two context strings excluding the user component with .BR strcmp (3) as shown in the .B EXAMPLE section. .sp This is useful as for most object contexts, the user component is not relevant. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" The return values follow the .BR strcmp (3) function, where: .RS 0 if they are equal. .RE .RS 1 if .I a is greater than .I b .RE .RS \-1 if .I a is less than .I b .RE . .SH "ERRORS" None. . .SH "NOTES" The contexts being compared do not specifically need to be file contexts. . .SH "EXAMPLE" If context .I a is: .RS user_u:user_r:user_t:s0 .RE .sp and context .I b is: .RS root:user_r:user_t:s0 .RE .sp then the actual strings compared are: .RS :user_r:user_t:s0 and :user_r:user_t:s0 .RE .sp Therefore they will match and .BR selinux_file_context_cmp () will return zero. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_file_context_homedir_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300242270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_file_context_local_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300236720ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_file_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300225200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_file_context_verify.3000066400000000000000000000047211437566343300230740ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_file_context_verify" "3" "08 March 2011" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_file_context_verify \- Compare the SELinux security context on disk to the default security context required by the policy file contexts file . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_file_context_verify(const char *" path ", mode_t " mode ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_file_context_verify () compares the context of the specified .I path that is held on disk (in the extended attribute), to the system default entry held in the file contexts series of files. .sp The .I mode may be zero. .sp Note that the two contexts are compared for "significant" differences (i.e. the user component of the contexts are ignored) as shown in the .B EXAMPLE section. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" If the contexts significantly match, 1 (one) is returned. .sp If the contexts do not match 0 (zero) is returned and .I errno is set to either .B ENOENT or .B EINVAL for the reasons listed in the .B ERRORS section, or if .I errno = 0 then the contexts did not match. .sp On failure \-1 is returned and .I errno set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B ENOTSUP if extended attributes are not supported by the file system. .TP .B ENOENT if there is no entry in the file contexts series of files or .I path does not exist. .TP .B EINVAL if the entry in the file contexts series of files or .I path are invalid, or the returned context fails validation. .TP .B ENOMEM if attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "FILES" The following configuration files (the file contexts series of files) supporting the active policy will be used (should they exist) to determine the .I path default context: .sp .RS .I contexts/files/file_contexts - This file must exist. .sp .I contexts/files/file_contexts.local - If exists has local customizations. .sp .I contexts/files/file_contexts.homedirs - If exists has users home directory customizations. .sp .I contexts/files/file_contexts.subs - If exists has substitutions that are then applied to the 'in memory' version of the file contexts files. .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" If the files context is: .RS unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 .RE .sp and the default context defined in the file contexts file is: .RS system_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 .RE .sp then the actual strings compared are: .RS :object_r:admin_home_t:s0 and :object_r:admin_home_t:s0 .RE .sp Therefore they will match and .BR selinux_file_context_verify () will return 1. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_getenforcemode.3000066400000000000000000000014001437566343300220020ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_getenforcemode" "3" "25 May 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_getenforcemode \- get the enforcing state of SELinux . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_getenforcemode(int *" enforce ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_getenforcemode () Reads the contents of the .I /etc/selinux/config file to determine how the system was setup to run SELinux. Sets the value of .I enforce to 1 if SELinux should be run in enforcing mode. Sets the value of .I enforce to 0 if SELinux should be run in permissive mode. Sets the value of .I enforce to \-1 if SELinux should be disabled. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On failure, \-1 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_getpolicytype.3000066400000000000000000000011761437566343300217270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_getpolicytype" "3" "24 Sep 2008" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_getpolicytype \- get the type of SELinux policy running on the system . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_getpolicytype(char **" policytype ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_getpolicytype () Reads the contents of the .I /etc/selinux/config file to determine the SELinux policy used on the system, and sets .I \%policytype accordingly. Free .I \%policytype with .BR free (3). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On failure, \-1 is returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_homedir_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300232300ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_init_load_policy.3000066400000000000000000000000401437566343300223340ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_policy.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_lsetfilecon_default.3000066400000000000000000000012261437566343300230350ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_lsetfilecon_default" "3" "21 November 2009" "sds@tycho.nsa.gov" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_lsetfilecon_default \- set the file context to the system defaults . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_lsetfilecon_default(const char *" path ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_lsetfilecon_default () sets the file context to the system defaults. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 otherwise. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_file_context_cmp "(3), " selinux_file_context_verify "(3), " matchpathcon "(3), " freecon "(3), " setfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_media_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300226600ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_mkload_policy.3000066400000000000000000000000401437566343300216410ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_load_policy.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_netfilter_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300235750ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300177550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_policy_root.3000066400000000000000000000020551437566343300213650ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_policy_root" "3" "25 May 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_policy_root \- return the path of the SELinux policy files for this machine selinux_set_policy_root \- Set an alternate SELinux root path for the SELinux policy files for this machine. . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .B const char *selinux_policy_root(void); . .sp .B int selinux_set_policy_root(const char *policypath); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_policy_root () reads the contents of the .I /etc/selinux/config file to determine which policy files should be used for this machine. . .BR selinux_set_policy_root () sets up all policy paths based on the alternate root .I /etc/selinux/config file to determine which policy files should be used for this machine. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, selinux_policy_root returns a directory path containing the SELinux policy files. On failure, selinux_policy_root returns NULL. On success, selinux_set_policy_root returns 0 on success -1 on failure. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_raw_context_to_color.3000066400000000000000000000061761437566343300232700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_raw_context_to_color" "3" "08 April 2011" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_raw_context_to_color \- Return RGB color string for an SELinux security context . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_raw_context_to_color(char *" raw ", " .RS .BI "char **" color_str ");" .RE . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color () returns a .I color_str associated to the raw context .I raw provided that the .BR mcstransd "(8)" daemon is running, the policy is an MLS type policy (MCS or MLS) and there is a color configuration file .BR \%secolor.conf (5) (see the .B FILES section). .sp The .I color_str string is a space separated list of eight hexadecimal RGB triples, each prefixed by a hash character (#). These represent the user:role:type:range components of the foreground and background colors. An example string is shown in the .B EXAMPLE section. The returned .I color_str string must be freed with .BR free "(3)." If a color has not been configured for a specific user, role, type and/or range component of context .IR raw "," then .BR \%selinux_raw_context_to_color () will select the color returned in .I color_str in order of precedence as follows: .RS role, type, range .br user, type, range .br user, role, range .br user, role, type .br .RE If there are no entries in the .BR secolor.conf (5) file for any of the components of context .I raw (or the file is not present), then the default string returned in .I color_str is: .sp .RS ----- user ---- ---- role ---- ---- type ---- ---- range ---- .br #000000 #ffffff #000000 #ffffff #000000 #ffffff #000000 #ffffff .sp .RE . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. .br On failure, \-1 is returned with .I errno set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .B ENOENT If the .BR mcstransd "(8)" daemon is not running. . .SH "FILES" .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color () obtains the translated entry from the active policy .BR secolor.conf "(5)" file as returned by .BR \%selinux_colors_path (3). The file format is described in .BR \%secolor.conf (5). . .SH "NOTES" 1. The primary use of .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color () is to return a color that corresponds to a range, that can then be used to highlight information at different MLS levels. .sp 2. The .BR mcstransd "(8)" daemon process security level must dominate the .I raw security level passed to it by the .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color () function. If not, the range color selected will be as defined by the order of precedence. . .SH "EXAMPLE" .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color () returns the foreground and background colors of the context string components (user:role:type:range) as RGB triples as follows: .sp user : role : type : range .br fg bg : fg bg : fg bg : fg bg .br #000000 #ffffff #ffffff #000000 #d2b48c #ffa500 #000000 #008000 .br black white : white black : tan orange : black green .br . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_colors_path "(3), " mcstransd "(8), " secolor.conf "(5), " selinux_raw_to_trans_context "(3), " selinux_trans_to_raw_context "(3), " free "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_removable_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300235550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_restorecon.3000066400000000000000000000210201437566343300211770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_restorecon" "3" "20 Oct 2015" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_restorecon \- restore file(s) default SELinux security contexts . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_restorecon(const char *" pathname , .in +\w'int selinux_restorecon('u .br .BI "unsigned int " restorecon_flags ");" .in .sp .BI "int selinux_restorecon_parallel(const char *" pathname , .in +\w'int selinux_restorecon_parallel('u .br .BI "unsigned int " restorecon_flags "," .br .BI "size_t " nthreads ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_restorecon () restores file default security contexts on filesystems that support extended attributes (see .BR xattr (7)), based on: .sp .RS .IR pathname containing a directory or file to be relabeled. .br If this is a directory and the .IR restorecon_flags .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_RECURSE has been set (for descending through directories), then .BR selinux_restorecon () will write an SHA1 digest of specfile entries calculated by .BR selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches (3) to an extended attribute of .IR security.sehash once the relabeling has been completed successfully (see the .B NOTES section for details). .br These digests will be checked should .BR selinux_restorecon () be rerun with the .IR restorecon_flags .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_RECURSE flag set. If any of the specfile entries had been updated, the digest will also be updated. However if the digest is the same, no relabeling checks will take place. .br The .IR restorecon_flags that can be used to manage the usage of the SHA1 digest are: .RS .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_SKIP_DIGEST .br .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_DIGEST .RE .sp .IR restorecon_flags contains the labeling option/rules as follows: .sp .RS .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_SKIP_DIGEST Do not check or update any extended attribute .IR security.sehash entries. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_DIGEST force the checking of labels even if the stored SHA1 digest matches the specfile entries SHA1 digest. The specfile entries digest will be written to the .IR security.sehash extended attribute once relabeling has been completed successfully provided the .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_NOCHANGE flag has not been set, and no errors have been skipped during the file tree walk due to the .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_COUNT_ERRORS flag. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_NOCHANGE don't change any file labels (passive check) or update the digest in the .IR security.sehash extended attribute. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_SET_SPECFILE_CTX If set, reset the files label to match the default specfile context. If not set only reset the files "type" component of the context to match the default specfile context. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_RECURSE change file and directory labels recursively (descend directories) and if successful write an SHA1 digest of the specfile entries to an extended attribute as described in the .B NOTES section. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_VERBOSE log file label changes. .RS Note that if .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_VERBOSE and .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_PROGRESS flags are set, then .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_PROGRESS will take precedence. .RE .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_PROGRESS show progress by outputting the number of files in 1k blocks processed to stdout. If the .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_MASS_RELABEL flag is also set then the approximate percentage complete will be shown. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_MASS_RELABEL generally set when relabeling the entire OS, that will then show the approximate percentage complete. The .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_PROGRESS flag must also be set. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_REALPATH convert passed-in .I pathname to the canonical pathname using .BR realpath (3). .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_XDEV prevent descending into directories that have a different device number than the .I pathname entry from which the descent began. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_ADD_ASSOC attempt to add an association between an inode and a specification. If there is already an association for the inode and it conflicts with the specification, then use the last matching specification. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_ABORT_ON_ERROR abort on errors during the file tree walk. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_SYSLOG_CHANGES log any label changes to .BR syslog (3). .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_LOG_MATCHES log what specfile context matched each file. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_NOENTRY ignore files that do not exist. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_MOUNTS do not read .B /proc/mounts to obtain a list of non-seclabel mounts to be excluded from relabeling checks. .br Setting .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_MOUNTS is useful where there is a non-seclabel fs mounted with a seclabel fs mounted on a directory below this. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_CONFLICT_ERROR to treat conflicting specifications, such as where two hardlinks for the same inode have different contexts, as errors. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_COUNT_ERRORS Count, but otherwise ignore, errors during the file tree walk. Only makes a difference if the .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_ABORT_ON_ERROR flag is clear. Call .BR selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors (3) for fetching the ignored (skipped) error count after .BR selinux_restorecon (3) or .BR selinux_restorecon_parallel (3) completes with success. In case any errors were skipped during the file tree walk, the specfile entries SHA1 digest will not have been written to the .IR security.sehash extended attribute. .RE .sp The behavior regarding the checking and updating of the SHA1 digest described above is the default behavior. It is possible to change this by first calling .BR selabel_open (3) and not enabling the .B SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST option, then calling .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle (3) to set the handle to be used by .BR selinux_restorecon (3). .sp If the .I pathname is a directory path, then it is possible to set directories to be excluded from the path by calling .BR selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list (3) with a .B NULL terminated list before calling .BR selinux_restorecon (3). .sp By default .BR selinux_restorecon (3) reads .B /proc/mounts to obtain a list of non-seclabel mounts to be excluded from relabeling checks unless the .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_MOUNTS flag has been set. .RE .sp .BR selinux_restorecon_parallel() is similar to .BR selinux_restorecon (3), but accepts another parameter that allows to run relabeling over multiple threads: .sp .RS .IR nthreads specifies the number of threads to use during relabeling. When set to 1, the behavior is the same as calling .BR selinux_restorecon (3). When set to 0, the function will try to use as many threads as there are online CPU cores. When set to any other number, the function will try to use the given number of threads. .sp Note that to use the parallel relabeling capability, the calling process must be linked with the .B libpthread library (either at compile time or dynamically at run time). Otherwise the function will print a warning and fall back to the single threaded mode. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "NOTES" .IP "1." 4 To improve performance when relabeling file systems recursively (e.g. the .IR restorecon_flags .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_RECURSE flag is set) .BR selinux_restorecon () will write a calculated SHA1 digest of the specfile entries returned by .BR selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches (3) to an extended attribute named .IR security.sehash for each directory in the .IR pathname path. .IP "2." 4 To check the extended attribute entry use .BR getfattr (1) , for example: .sp .RS .RS getfattr -e hex -n security.sehash / .RE .RE .IP "3." 4 Should any of the specfile entries have changed, then when .BR selinux_restorecon () is run again with the .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_RECURSE flag set, new SHA1 digests will be calculated and all files automatically relabeled depending on the settings of the .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_SET_SPECFILE_CTX flag (provided .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_NOCHANGE is not set). .IP "4." 4 .B /sys and in-memory filesystems do not support the .IR security.sehash extended attribute and are automatically excluded from any relabeling checks. .IP "5." 4 By default .B stderr is used to log output messages and errors. This may be changed by calling .BR selinux_set_callback (3) with the .B SELINUX_CB_LOG .I type option. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_default_handle (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_xattr (3), .br .BR selinux_set_callback (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_restorecon_default_handle.3000066400000000000000000000031371437566343300242270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_restorecon_default_handle" "3" "20 Oct 2015" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_restorecon_default_handle \- sets default parameters for .BR selinux_restorecon (3) . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .B "struct selabel_handle *selinux_restorecon_default_handle(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_restorecon_default_handle () sets default parameters for .BR selinux_restorecon (3) by calling .BR selabel_open (3) with the .B SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST option only. This will enable a digest to be calculated on the currently loaded policy .BR file_contexts (5) set of files as described in the .B NOTES section of .BR selinux_restorecon (3). .sp Calling .BR selinux_restorecon_default_handle () is optional, however if used then .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle (3) should be called with the returned handle to set this for use by .BR selinux_restorecon (3). .sp .BR selinux_restorecon_default_handle () is optional as .BR selinux_restorecon (3) will automatically call this and .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle (3) provided a handle has not already been set, for example by .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle (3) to set customised .BR selabel_open (3) parameters. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" A non\-NULL handle value is returned on success. On error, NULL is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux_restorecon (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_xattr (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors.3000066400000000000000000000015231437566343300251570ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors" "3" "27 Apr 2022" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors \- get the number of errors ignored by .BR selinux_restorecon (3) or .BR selinux_restorecon_parallel (3) during the file tree walk . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "long unsigned selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors(void);" .in +\w'long unsigned selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors('u . .SH "DESCRIPTION" If .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_COUNT_ERRORS was passed to .BR selinux_restorecon (3) or .BR selinux_restorecon_parallel (3) and that function returned successfully (i.e., with a zero return value), then .BR selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors () returns the number of errors ignored during the file tree walk. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux_restorecon (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_restorecon_parallel.3000066400000000000000000000000361437566343300230570ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_restorecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath.3000066400000000000000000000017161437566343300246440ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath" "3" "29 May 2016" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath \- set an alternate rootpath. . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath(const char *" alt_rootpath ");" .in +\w'void selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath('u . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath () passes to .BR selinux_restorecon (3) a pointer containing an alternate rootpath .IR alt_rootpath . .sp .BR selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath () must be called prior to .BR selinux_restorecon (3). . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux_restorecon (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_default_handle (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_xattr (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list.3000066400000000000000000000016731437566343300246320ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list" "3" "20 Oct 2015" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list \- set list of directories to be excluded from relabeling. . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "void selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list(const char **" exclude_list ");" .in +\w'void selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list('u . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list () passes to .BR selinux_restorecon (3) a pointer containing a .B NULL terminated list of one or more directories that are not to be relabeled in .IR exclude_list . .sp .BR selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list () must be called prior to .BR selinux_restorecon (3). . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux_restorecon (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_default_handle (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_xattr (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle.3000066400000000000000000000017361437566343300237310ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle" "3" "20 Oct 2015" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle \- set a labeling handle for use by .BR selinux_restorecon (3) . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .br .B #include .sp .BI "void selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle(struct selabel_handle *" handle ");" .in +\w'void selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle('u . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle () sets the .I handle to be use by .BR selinux_restorecon (3) when relabeling files. .sp .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle () is generally used when customised .BR selabel_open (3) parameters are required to perform relabeling operations with .BR selinux_restorecon (3). . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux_restorecon (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_default_handle (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_xattr (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_restorecon_xattr.3000066400000000000000000000067701437566343300224400ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_restorecon_xattr" "3" "30 July 2016" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_restorecon_xattr \- manage default .I security.sehash extended attribute entries added by .BR selinux_restorecon (3), .BR setfiles (8) or .BR restorecon (8). .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_restorecon_xattr(const char *" pathname , .in +\w'int selinux_restorecon('u .br .BI "unsigned int " xattr_flags , .br .BI "struct dir_xattr ***" xattr_list ");" .in . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_restorecon_xattr () returns a linked list of .B dir_xattr structures containing information described below based on: .sp .RS .IR pathname containing a directory tree to be searched for .I security.sehash extended attribute entries. .sp .IR xattr_flags contains options as follows: .sp .RS .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_RECURSE recursively descend directories. .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_DELETE_NONMATCH_DIGESTS delete non-matching digests from each directory in .IR pathname . .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_DELETE_ALL_DIGESTS delete all digests from each directory in .IR pathname . .sp .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_IGNORE_MOUNTS do not read .B /proc/mounts to obtain a list of non-seclabel mounts to be excluded from the search. .br Setting .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_IGNORE_MOUNTS is useful where there is a non-seclabel fs mounted with a seclabel fs mounted on a directory below this. .RE .sp .I xattr_list is the returned pointer to a linked list of .B dir_xattr structures, each containing the following information: .sp .RS .ta 4n 16n 24n .nf struct dir_xattr { char *directory; char *digest; /* Printable hex encoded string */ enum digest_result result; struct dir_xattr *next; }; .fi .ta .RE .sp The .B result entry is enumerated as follows: .RS .ta 4n 16n 24n .nf enum digest_result { MATCH = 0, NOMATCH, DELETED_MATCH, DELETED_NOMATCH, ERROR }; .fi .ta .RE .sp .I xattr_list must be set to .B NULL before calling .BR selinux_restorecon_xattr (3). The caller is responsible for freeing the returned .I xattr_list entries in the linked list. .RE .sp See the .B NOTES section for more information. .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. .SH "NOTES" .IP "1." 4 By default .BR selinux_restorecon_xattr (3) will use the default set of specfiles described in .BR files_contexts (5) to calculate the SHA1 digests to be used for comparison. To change this default behavior .BR selabel_open (3) must be called specifying the required .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH and setting the .B SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST option to a non-NULL value. .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle (3) is then called to set the handle to be used by .BR selinux_restorecon_xattr (3). .IP "2." 4 By default .BR selinux_restorecon_xattr (3) reads .B /proc/mounts to obtain a list of non-seclabel mounts to be excluded from searches unless the .B SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_IGNORE_MOUNTS flag has been set. .IP "3." 4 .B RAMFS and .B TMPFS filesystems do not support the .IR security.sehash extended attribute and are automatically excluded from searches. .IP "4." 4 By default .B stderr is used to log output messages and errors. This may be changed by calling .BR selinux_set_callback (3) with the .B SELINUX_CB_LOG .I type option. .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux_restorecon (3) .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_default_handle (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list (3), .br .BR selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath (3), .br .BR selinux_set_callback (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_securetty_types_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300233100ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_sepgsql_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300232570ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_set_callback.3000066400000000000000000000062251437566343300214350ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selinux_set_callback" "3" "20 Jun 2007" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_set_callback \- userspace SELinux callback facilities . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "void selinux_set_callback(int " type ", union selinux_callback " callback ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_set_callback () sets the callback indicated by .I type to the value of .IR callback , which should be passed as a function pointer cast to type .B union .BR selinux_callback . All callback functions should return a negative value with .I errno set appropriately on error. The available values for .I type are: .TP .B SELINUX_CB_LOG .BI "int (*" func_log ") (int " type ", const char *" fmt ", ...);" This callback is used for logging and should process the .BR printf (3) style .I fmt string and arguments as appropriate. The .I type argument indicates the type of message and will be set to one of the following: .B SELINUX_ERROR .B SELINUX_WARNING .B SELINUX_INFO .B SELINUX_AVC .B SELINUX_POLICYLOAD .B SELINUX_SETENFORCE SELINUX_ERROR, SELINUX_WARNING, and SELINUX_INFO indicate standard log severity levels and are not auditable messages. The SELINUX_AVC, SELINUX_POLICYLOAD, and SELINUX_SETENFORCE message types can be audited with AUDIT_USER_AVC, AUDIT_USER_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, and AUDIT_USER_MAC_STATUS values from libaudit, respectively. If they are not audited, SELINUX_AVC should be considered equivalent to SELINUX_ERROR; similarly, SELINUX_POLICYLOAD and SELINUX_SETENFORCE should be considered equivalent to SELINUX_INFO. . .TP .B SELINUX_CB_AUDIT .BI "int (*" func_audit ") (void *" auditdata ", security_class_t " cls , .in +\w'int (*func_audit) ('u .BI "char *" msgbuf ", size_t " msgbufsize ");" .in This callback is used for supplemental auditing in AVC messages. The .I auditdata and .I cls arguments are the values passed to .BR avc_has_perm (3). A human-readable interpretation should be printed to .I msgbuf using no more than .I msgbufsize characters. . .TP .B SELINUX_CB_VALIDATE .BI "int (*" func_validate ") (char **" ctx ");" This callback is used for context validation. The callback may optionally modify the input context by setting the target of the .I ctx pointer to a new context. In this case, the old value should be freed with .BR freecon (3). The value of .I errno should be set to .B EINVAL to indicate an invalid context. . .TP .B SELINUX_CB_SETENFORCE .BI "int (*" func_setenforce ") (int " enforcing ");" This callback is invoked when the system enforcing state changes. The .I enforcing argument indicates the new value and is set to .I 1 for enforcing mode, and .I 0 for permissive mode. . .TP .B SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD .BI "int (*" func_policyload ") (int " seqno ");" This callback is invoked when the system security policy is reloaded. The .I seqno argument is the current sequential number of the policy generation in the system. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" None. . .SH "ERRORS" None. . .SH "AUTHOR" Eamon Walsh . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selabel_open (3), .BR avc_init (3), .BR avc_netlink_open (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_set_mapping.3000066400000000000000000000056561437566343300213430ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2008 .TH "selinux_set_mapping" "3" "12 Jun 2008" "" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_set_mapping \- establish dynamic object class and permission mapping . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .nf struct security_class_mapping { const char *name; const char *perms[]; }; .fi .sp .BI "int selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *" map ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR selinux_set_mapping () establishes a mapping from a user-provided ordering of object classes and permissions to the numbers actually used by the loaded system policy. If using this function, applications should also set a .B SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD callback via .BR selinux_set_callback(3) that calls this function again upon a policy reload to re-create the mapping in case the class or permission values change in the new policy. Generally it is preferred to instead use .BR selinux_check_access(3) instead of .BR avc_has_perm(3) or .BR security_compute_av(3) and not use this function at all. After the mapping is established, all libselinux functions that operate on class and permission values take the user-provided numbers, which are determined as follows: The .I map argument consists of an array of .B security_class_mapping structures, which must be terminated by a structure having a NULL name field. Except for this last structure, the .I name field should refer to the string name of an object class, and the corresponding .I perms field should refer to an array of permission bit names terminated by a NULL string. The object classes named in the mapping and the bit indexes of each set of permission bits named in the mapping are numbered in order starting from 1. These numbers are the values that should be passed to subsequent libselinux calls. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Zero is returned on success. On error, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" .TP .B EINVAL One of the class or permission names requested in the mapping is not present in the loaded policy. .TP .B ENOMEM An attempt to allocate memory failed. . .SH "EXAMPLE" .RS .ta 4n 10n .nf struct security_class_mapping map[] = { { "file", { "create", "unlink", "read", "write", NULL } }, { "socket", { "bind", NULL } }, { "process", { "signal", NULL } }, { NULL } }; if (selinux_set_mapping(map) < 0) exit(1); .fi .ta .RE In this example, after the call has succeeded, classes .BR file , .BR socket , and .B process will be identified by 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Permissions .IR create , .IR unlink , .IR read , and .I write (for the .B file class) will be identified by 1, 2, 4, and 8 respectively. Classes and permissions not listed in the mapping cannot be used. . .SH "AUTHOR" Originally Eamon Walsh. Updated by Stephen Smalley . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux_check_access (3), .BR selinux_set_callback (3), .BR avc_has_perm (3), .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_set_policy_root.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300222360ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_policy_root.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_status_close.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300215310ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_status_open.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_status_deny_unknown.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300231420ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_status_open.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_status_getenforce.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300225450ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_status_open.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_status_open.3000066400000000000000000000072501437566343300213710ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux_status_open" "3" "22 January 2011" "kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selinux_status_open, selinux_status_close, selinux_status_updated, selinux_status_getenforce, selinux_status_policyload and selinux_status_deny_unknown \- reference the SELinux kernel status without invocation of system calls . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selinux_status_open(int " fallback ");" .sp .BI "void selinux_status_close(void);" .sp .BI "int selinux_status_updated(void);" .sp .BI "int selinux_status_getenforce(void);" .sp .BI "int selinux_status_policyload(void);" .sp .BI "int selinux_status_deny_unknown(void);" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Linux 2.6.37 or later provides a SELinux kernel status page; being mostly placed on .I /sys/fs/selinux/status entry. It enables userspace applications to mmap this page with read-only mode, then it informs some status without system call invocations. .sp In some cases that a userspace application tries to apply heavy frequent access control; such as row-level security in databases, it will face unignorable cost to communicate with kernel space to check invalidation of userspace avc. .sp These functions provides applications a way to know some kernel events without system-call invocation or worker thread for monitoring. .sp .BR selinux_status_open () tries to .BR open (2) .I /sys/fs/selinux/status and .BR mmap (2) it in read-only mode. The file-descriptor and pointer to the page shall be stored internally; Don't touch them directly. Set 1 on the .I fallback argument to handle a case of older kernels without kernel status page support. In this case, this function tries to open a netlink socket using .BR avc_netlink_open (3) and overwrite corresponding callbacks (setenforce and policyload). Thus, we need to pay attention to the interaction with these interfaces, when fallback mode is enabled. .sp .BR selinux_status_close () unmap the kernel status page and close its file descriptor, or close the netlink socket if fallbacked. .sp .BR selinux_status_updated () processes status update events. There are two kinds of status updates. .B setenforce events will change the effective enforcing state used within the AVC, and .B policyload events will result in a cache flush. This function returns 0 if there have been no updates since the last call, 1 if there have been updates since the last call, or \-1 on error. .sp .BR selinux_status_getenforce () returns 0 if SELinux is running in permissive mode, 1 if enforcing mode, or \-1 on error. Same as .BR security_getenforce (3) except with or without system call invocation. .sp .BR selinux_status_policyload () returns times of policy reloaded on the running system, or \-1 on error. Note that it is not a reliable value on fallback-mode until it receive the first event message via netlink socket. Thus, don't use this value to know actual times of policy reloaded. .sp .BR selinux_status_deny_unknown () returns 0 if SELinux treats policy queries on undefined object classes or permissions as being allowed, 1 if such queries are denied, or \-1 on error. .sp Also note that these interfaces are not thread-safe, so you have to protect them from concurrent calls using exclusive locks when multiple threads are performing. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" .BR selinux_status_open () returns 0 or 1 on success. 1 means we are ready to use these interfaces, but netlink socket was opened as fallback instead of the kernel status page. On error, \-1 shall be returned. .sp Any other functions with a return value shall return its characteristic value as described above, or \-1 on errors. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR mmap (2), .BR avc_netlink_open (3), .BR security_getenforce (3), .BR security_deny_unknown (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_status_policyload.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300225630ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_status_open.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_status_updated.3000066400000000000000000000000371437566343300220520ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_status_open.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_user_contexts_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300227420ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_usersconf_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300220440ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/selinux_x_context_path.3000066400000000000000000000000461437566343300220500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/selinux_binary_policy_path.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/set_matchpathcon_flags.3000066400000000000000000000042141437566343300217530ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "set_matchpathcon_flags" "3" "21 November 2009" "sds@tycho.nsa.gov" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" set_matchpathcon_flags, set_matchpathcon_invalidcon, set_matchpathcon_printf \- set flags controlling the operation of matchpathcon or matchpathcon_index and configure the behaviour of validity checking and error displaying . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "void set_matchpathcon_flags(unsigned int " flags ");" .sp .BI "void set_matchpathcon_invalidcon(int (*" f ")(const char *" path ", unsigned " lineno ", char *" context "));" .sp .BI "void set_matchpathcon_printf(void (*" f ")(const char *" fmt ", ...));" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR set_matchpathcon_flags () sets the flags controlling the operation of .BR matchpathcon_init (3) and subsequently .BR matchpathcon_index (3) or .BR matchpathcon (3). If the .B MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY flag is set, then only the base file contexts configuration file will be processed, not any dynamically generated entries or local customizations. .sp .BR set_matchpathcon_invalidcon () sets the function used by .BR matchpathcon_init (3) when checking the validity of a context in the file contexts configuration. If not set, then this defaults to a test based on .BR security_check_context (3), which checks validity against the active policy on a SELinux system. This can be set to instead perform checking based on a binary policy file, e.g. using .BR sepol_check_context (3), as is done by .B setfiles \-c. The function is also responsible for reporting any such error, and may include the .I path and .I lineno in such error messages. .sp .BR set_matchpathcon_printf () sets the function used by .BR matchpathcon_init (3) when displaying errors about the file contexts configuration. If not set, then this defaults to fprintf(stderr, fmt, ...). This can be set to redirect error reporting to a different destination. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" Returns zero on success or \-1 otherwise. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " matchpathcon "(3), " matchpathcon_index "(3), " set_matchpathcon_invalidcon "(3), " set_matchpathcon_printf "(3), " freecon "(3), " setfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/set_matchpathcon_invalidcon.3000066400000000000000000000000421437566343300230000ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/set_matchpathcon_flags.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/set_matchpathcon_printf.3000066400000000000000000000000421437566343300221540ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/set_matchpathcon_flags.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/set_selinuxmnt.3000066400000000000000000000000331437566343300203270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/init_selinuxmnt.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setcon.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300165370ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setcon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000221437566343300174100ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getcon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setexeccon.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300174100ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getexeccon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setexeccon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300202610ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getexeccon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setexecfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300202500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getexeccon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setfilecon.3000066400000000000000000000034611437566343300174110ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "setfilecon" "3" "1 January 2004" "russell@coker.com.au" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" setfilecon, fsetfilecon, lsetfilecon \- set SELinux security context of a file . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int setfilecon(const char *" path ", const char *" con ); .sp .BI "int setfilecon_raw(const char *" path ", const char *" con ); .sp .BI "int lsetfilecon(const char *" path ", const char *" con ); .sp .BI "int lsetfilecon_raw(const char *" path ", const char *" con ); .sp .BI "int fsetfilecon(int "fd ", const char *" con ); .sp .BI "int fsetfilecon_raw(int "fd ", const char *" con ); . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR setfilecon () sets the security context of the file system object. .BR lsetfilecon () is identical to setfilecon, except in the case of a symbolic link, where the link itself has it's context set, not the file that it refers to. .BR fsetfilecon () is identical to setfilecon, only the open file pointed to by filedes (as returned by .BR open (2)) has it's context set in place of path. Since libselinux 3.4 a file opened via .I O_PATH is supported. .BR setfilecon_raw (), .BR lsetfilecon_raw (), and .BR fsetfilecon_raw () behave identically to their non-raw counterparts but do not perform context translation. . .SH "RETURN VALUE" On success, zero is returned. On failure, \-1 is returned and .I errno is set appropriately. . .SH "ERRORS" If there is insufficient space remaining to store the extended attribute, .I errno is set to either .BR ENOSPC , or .B EDQUOT if quota enforcement was the cause. If extended attributes are not supported by the filesystem, or are disabled, .I errno is set to .BR ENOTSUP . The errors documented for the .BR stat (2) system call are also applicable here. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(3), " freecon "(3), " getfilecon "(3), " setfscreatecon "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setfilecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300202540ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/setfilecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setfscreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000000321437566343300202550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfscreatecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setfscreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000321437566343300211260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getfscreatecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setkeycreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000000331437566343300204360ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getkeycreatecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setkeycreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000331437566343300213070ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getkeycreatecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setsockcreatecon.3000066400000000000000000000000341437566343300206060ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getsockcreatecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/setsockcreatecon_raw.3000066400000000000000000000000341437566343300214570ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/getsockcreatecon.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/sidget.3000066400000000000000000000000361437566343300165300ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_context_to_sid.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/sidput.3000066400000000000000000000000361437566343300165610ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/avc_context_to_sid.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/string_to_av_perm.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300207710ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man3/string_to_security_class.3000066400000000000000000000000441437566343300223740ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man3/security_class_to_string.3 libselinux-3.5/man/man5/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300151705ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/man/man5/customizable_types.5000066400000000000000000000033261437566343300212070ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "customizable_types" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" customizable_types \- The SELinux customizable types configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The \fIcustomizable_types\fR file contains a list of types that can be customised in some way by SELinux-aware applications. .sp Generally this is a file context type that is usually set on files that need to be shared among certain domains and where the administrator wants to manually manage the type. .sp The use of customizable types is deprecated as the preferred approach is to use .BR semanage (8) .BR fcontext (8) .BR ... (8). However, SELinux-aware applications such as .BR setfiles (8) will use this information to obtain a list of types relating to files that should not be relabeled. .sp .BR selinux_customizable_types_path (3) will return the active policy path to this file. The default customizable types file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/customizable_types .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR is_context_customizable (3) reads this file to determine if a context is customisable or not for the active policy. . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the file consists of the following: .RS .I type .RE .sp Where: .RS .I type .RS The type defined in the policy that can be customised. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/customizable_types .br mount_loopback_t .br public_content_rw_t .br public_content_t .br swapfile_t .br sysadm_untrusted_content_t . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_customizable_types_path "(3), " is_context_customizable "(3), " semanage "(8), " setfiles "(8), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/default_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000046741437566343300206440ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "default_contexts" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" default_contexts \- The SELinux default contexts configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The default contexts configuration file \fIdefault_contexts\fR contains entries that allow SELinux-aware login applications such as .BR PAM "(8) " .sp SELinux-aware login applications generally use one or more of the following libselinux functions that read these files from the active policy path: .RS .BR get_default_context "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_role "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3) " .br .BR query_user_context "(3) " .br .BR manual_user_enter_context "(3) " .RE .sp The default context configuration file path for the active policy is returned by \fBselinux_default_contexts_path\fR(3). The default, default contexts file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/default_contexts .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the default configuration file consists of the following: .RS .I login_process user_login_process [user_login_process] ... .RE .sp Where: .RS .I login_process .RS This consists of a \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] entry that represents the login process context that are defined in the policy. .RE .I user_login_process .RS This consists of one or more \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] entries that represent the user login process context defined in the policy. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/default_contexts .br system_r:crond_t:s0 system_r:system_crond_t:s0 .br system_r:local_login_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0 .br system_r:remote_login_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 .br system_r:sshd_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 .br system_r:sulogin_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 .br system_r:xdm_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_default_contexts_path "(3), " PAM "(8), " selinux_default_type_path "(3), " get_default_context "(3), " get_ordered_context_list "(3), " get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_role "(3), " get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3), " query_user_context "(3), " manual_user_enter_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/default_type.5000066400000000000000000000022511437566343300177430ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "default_type" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" default_type \- The SELinux default type configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The \fIdefault_type\fR file contains entries that allow SELinux-aware applications such as \fBnewrole\fR(1) to select a default type for a role if one is not supplied. .sp \fBselinux_default_type_path\fR(3) will return the active policy path to this file. The default, default type file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/default_type .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp \fBget_default_type\fR(3) reads this file to determine a type for the active policy. . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line within the \fIdefault_type\fR file is formatted with \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR entries where: .RS .I role .RS The SELinux role. .RE .I type .RS The domain type that is returned for this role. .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/default_type .br auditadm_r:auditadm_t .br user_r:user_t . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " get_default_type "(3), " newrole "(1), " selinux_default_type_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/failsafe_context.5000066400000000000000000000037331437566343300206020ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "failsafe_context" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" failsafe_context \- The SELinux fail safe context configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The .I failsafe_context file allows SELinux-aware applications such as .BR PAM "(8) " to obtain a known valid login context for an administrator if no valid default entries can be found elsewhere. .sp .BR selinux_failsafe_context_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default failsafe context file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/failsafe_context .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp The following functions read this file from the active policy path if they cannot obtain a default context: .br .RS .BR get_default_context "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_role "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3) " .br .BR query_user_context "(3) " .br .BR manual_user_enter_context "(3) " .RE . .SH "FILE FORMAT" The file consists of a single line entry as follows: .RS \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS .I role .I type .I range .RS A role, type and optional range (for MCS/MLS), separated by colons (:) to form a valid login process context for an administrator to access the system. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/failsafe_context .br unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_failsafe_context_path "(3), " PAM "(8), " selinux_default_type_path "(3), " get_default_context "(3), " get_ordered_context_list "(3), " get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_role "(3), " get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3), " query_user_context "(3), " manual_user_enter_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/file_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300201150ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-3.5/man/man5/file_contexts.homedirs.5000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300217260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-3.5/man/man5/file_contexts.local.5000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300212060ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-3.5/man/man5/file_contexts.subs.5000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300210700ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-3.5/man/man5/file_contexts.subs_dist.5000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300221130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-3.5/man/man5/media.5000066400000000000000000000000311437566343300163270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_media.5 libselinux-3.5/man/man5/removable_context.5000066400000000000000000000020711437566343300207760ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "removable_context" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" removable_context \- The SELinux removable devices context configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This file contains the default label that should be used for removable devices. .sp .BR selinux_removable_context_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default removable context file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/removable_context .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" The file consists of a single line entry as follows: .RS .IB user : role : type \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS .I user role type range .RS A user, role, type and optional range (for MCS/MLS) separated by colons (:) that will be applied to removable devices. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/removable_contexts .br system_u:object_r:removable_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_removable_context_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/secolor.conf.5000066400000000000000000000063211437566343300176520ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "secolor.conf" "5" "08 April 2011" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" secolor.conf \- The SELinux color configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This optional file controls the color to be associated to the context components associated to the .I raw context passed by .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)," when context related information is to be displayed in color by an SELinux-aware application. .sp .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)" obtains this color information from the active policy .B secolor.conf file as returned by .BR selinux_colors_path "(3)." . .SH "FILE FORMAT" The file format is as follows: .RS .B color .I color_name .BI "= #"color_mask .br [...] .sp .I context_component string .B = .I fg_color_name bg_color_name .br [...] .sp .RE Where: .br .B color .RS The color keyword. Each color entry is on a new line. .RE .I color_name .RS A single word name for the color (e.g. red). .RE .I color_mask .RS A color mask starting with a hash (#) that describes the hexadecimal RGB colors with black being #000000 and white being #ffffff. .RE .I context_component .RS The context component name that must be one of the following: .br .RS user, role, type or range .RE Each .IR context_component " " string " ..." entry is on a new line. .RE .I string .RS This is the .I context_component string that will be matched with the .I raw context component passed by .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)." .br A wildcard '*' may be used to match any undefined string for the user, role and type .I context_component entries only. .RE .I fg_color_name .RS The color_name string that will be used as the foreground color. A .I color_mask may also be used. .RE .I bg_color_name .RS The color_name string that will be used as the background color. A .I color_mask may also be used. .RE . .SH "EXAMPLES" Example 1 entries are: .RS color black = #000000 .br color green = #008000 .br color yellow = #ffff00 .br color blue = #0000ff .br color white = #ffffff .br color red = #ff0000 .br color orange = #ffa500 .br color tan = #D2B48C .sp user * = black white .br role * = white black .br type * = tan orange .br range s0\-s0:c0.c1023 = black green .br range s1\-s1:c0.c1023 = white green .br range s3\-s3:c0.c1023 = black tan .br range s5\-s5:c0.c1023 = white blue .br range s7\-s7:c0.c1023 = black red .br range s9\-s9:c0.c1023 = black orange .br range s15\-s15:c0.c1023 = black yellow .RE .sp Example 2 entries are: .RS color black = #000000 .br color green = #008000 .br color yellow = #ffff00 .br color blue = #0000ff .br color white = #ffffff .br color red = #ff0000 .br color orange = #ffa500 .br color tan = #d2b48c .sp user unconfined_u = #ff0000 green .br role unconfined_r = red #ffffff .br type unconfined_t = red orange .br user user_u = black green .br role user_r = white black .br type user_t = tan red .br user xguest_u = black yellow .br role xguest_r = black red .br type xguest_t = black green .br user sysadm_u = white black .br range s0-s0:c0.c1023 = black white .br user * = black white .br role * = black white .br type * = black white .RE . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3), " selinux_colors_path "(3)" libselinux-3.5/man/man5/securetty_types.5000066400000000000000000000025231437566343300205330ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "securetty_types" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" securetty_types \- The SELinux secure tty type configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The .I securetty_types file contains a list of types associated to secure tty type that are defined in the policy for use by SELinux-aware applications. .sp .BR selinux_securetty_types_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default securetty types file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/securetty_types .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR selinux_check_securetty_context "(3) reads this file to determine if a context is for a secure tty defined in the active policy. " .sp SELinux-aware applications such as .BR newrole "(1) use this information to check the status of a tty. " . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the file consists of the following entry: .sp .RS .I type .RS One or more type entries that are defined in the policy for secure tty devices. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/securetty_types .br sysadm_tty_device_t .br user_tty_device_t .br staff_tty_device_t . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_securetty_types_path "(3), " newrole "(1), " selinux_check_securetty_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/selabel_db.5000066400000000000000000000203761437566343300173420ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: KaiGai Kohei 2009 .TH "selabel_db" "5" "01 DEC 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_db \- userspace SELinux labeling interface and configuration file format for the RDBMS objects context backend . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The DB contexts backend maps from a pair of object name and class into security contexts. It is used to find the appropriate context for database objects when relabeling a certain database. The returned \fIcontext\fR must be freed using \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) describes the function with its return and error codes. .sp The \fIobject_name\fR should be a fully qualified name using the hierarchy of database objects. For example, the \fBpg_class\fR table in the \fBpostgres\fR database and \fBpg_catalog\fR schema should be qualified as: .RS .B Bpostgres.pg_catalog.pg_class .RE .sp The \fBNOTES\fR section has further information on database support for namespace hierarchies. .sp The \fIobject_type\fR argument should be set to one of the following values: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_DB_DATABASE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a database itself, such as "postgres". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a schema object, such as "postgres.public". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_TABLE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a table object, such as "postgres.public.my_table" .TP .B SELABEL_DB_COLUMN The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a column object, such as "postgres.public.my_table.user_id" .TP .B SELABEL_DB_TUPLE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a table object which contains the tuples to be relabeled, such as "postgresql.public.my_table". Note that we have no way to identify individual tuple objects, except for WHERE clause on DML statements, because it has no name. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a procedure object, such as "postgres.public.my_func". Note that we don't support lookup of individual security contexts for procedures which have the same name but different arguments. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a sequence object, such as "postgres.public.my_seq". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_BLOB The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a large object, such as "postgres.16308". Note that a large object does not have a name, so it is identified by its identifier value. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_VIEW The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a view object, such as "postgres.public.my_view". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_LANGUAGE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a language object, such as "postgres.public.tcl". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_EXCEPTION The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a exception object. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_DATATYPE The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a type or domain object, such as postgres.public.my_type. .RE .sp Any messages generated by \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) are sent to \fIstderr\fR by default, although this can be changed by \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .BR selabel_lookup_raw (3) behaves identically to \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) but does not perform context translation. .sp The \fBFILES\fR section details the configuration files used to determine the database object context. . .SH "OPTIONS" In addition to the global options described in \fBselabel_open\fR(3), this backend recognizes the following options: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH A non-null value for this option specifies a path to a file that will be opened in lieu of the standard DB contexts file. It tries to open the specfile designed for SE-PostgreSQL as default, so if another RDBMS uses this interface, it needs to give an explicit specfile designed for that RDBMS (see the \fBFILES\fR section for details). .RE . .SH "FILES" The database context file used to retrieve a context depends on the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR parameter passed to \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If \fINULL\fR, then the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value will default to the active policy database contexts location (as returned by \fBselinux_sepgsql_context_path\fR(3)), otherwise the actual \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value specified is used (this option must be used to support databases other than SE-PostgreSQL). .sp The default database object contexts file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/sepgsql_context .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp The entries within the database contexts file are shown in the \fBObject Name String Values\fR and \fBFILE FORMAT\fR sections. . .SH "Object Name String Values" The string name assigned to each \fIobject_type\fR argument that can be present in the database contexts file are: .TS center, allbox, tab(@); lI lB lB l . object_type@Text Name SELABEL_DB_DATABASE@db_database SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA@db_schema SELABEL_DB_VIEW@db_view SELABEL_DB_LANGUAGE@db_language SELABEL_DB_TABLE@db_table SELABEL_DB_COLUMN@db_column SELABEL_DB_TUPLE@db_tuple SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE@db_procedure SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE@db_sequence SELABEL_DB_BLOB@db_blob SELABEL_DB_EXCEPTION@db_exception SELABEL_DB_DATATYPE@db_datatype .TE . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line within the database contexts file is as follows: .RS .I object_type object_name context .RE .sp Where: .RS .I object_type .RS This is the string representation of the object type shown in the \fBObject Name String Values\fR section. .RE .I object_name .RS The key used to obtain the context based on the \fIobject_type\fR. .sp The entry can contain '*' for wildcard matching or '?' for substitution. .sp Note that if the '*' is used, then be aware that the order of entries in the file is important. The '*' on its own is used to ensure a default fallback context is assigned and should be the last entry in the \fIobject_type\fR block. .RE .I context .RS The security context that will be applied to the object. .RE .RE .sp The following example is for SE-PostgreSQL: .sp # ./contexts/sepgsql_contexts file .br # object_type object_name context .br db_database my_database system_u:object_r:sepgsql_db_t:s0 .br db_database * system_u:object_r:sepgsql_db_t:s0 .br db_schema *.* system_u:object_r:sepgsql_schema_t:s0 .br db_tuple row_low system_u:object_r:sepgsql_table_t:s0 .br db_tuple row_high system_u:object_r:sepgsql_table_t:s0:c1023 .br db_tuple *.*.* system_u:object_r:sepgsql_table_t:s0 . .SH "NOTES" .IP "1." 4 A suitable database contexts file needs to be written for the target RDBMS and the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR option must be used in \fBselabel_open\fR(3) to load it. .IP "2." 4 The hierarchy of the namespace for database objects depends on the RDBMS, however the \fIselabel*\fR interfaces do not have any specific support for a namespace hierarchy. .sp SE-PostgreSQL has a namespace hierarchy where a database is the top level object with the schema being the next level. Under the schema object there can be other types of objects such as tables and procedures. This hierarchy is supported as follows: .RS .RS .sp If a security context is required for "my_table" table in the "public" schema within the "postgres" database, then the \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) parameters for \fIobject_type\fR would be \fBSELABEL_DB_TABLE\fR and the \fIobject_name\fR would be "postgres.public.my_table", the security context (if available), would be returned in \fIcontext\fR. .RE .RE .IP "3." 4 If contexts are to be validated, then the global option \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR must be set before calling \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If this is not set, then it is possible for an invalid context to be returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_sepgsql_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/selabel_file.5000066400000000000000000000226411437566343300176710ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_file" "5" "01 Dec 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_file \- userspace SELinux labeling interface and configuration file format for the file contexts backend . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" path ", int " mode ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" path ", int " mode ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The file contexts backend maps from pathname/mode combinations into security contexts. It is used to find the appropriate context for each file when relabeling a file system. The returned \fIcontext\fR must be freed using \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) describes the function with its return and error codes, however the following \fIerrno\fR is clarified further for the file contexts backend: .RS .TP .B ENOENT No context corresponding to the \fIpath\fR and \fImode\fR was found - This will also be returned when the file contexts series of files have a context of \fB<>\fR against the \fIpath\fR (see the \fBFILE FORMAT\fR section). .RE .sp The \fIpath\fR argument should be set to the full pathname of the file whose assigned context is being checked. The \fImode\fR argument should be set to the mode bits of the file, as determined by \fBlstat\fR(2). \fImode\fR may be zero, however full matching may not occur. .sp Any messages generated by \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) are sent to \fIstderr\fR by default, although this can be changed by \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .BR selabel_lookup_raw (3) behaves identically to \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) but does not perform context translation. .sp The \fBFILES\fR section details the configuration files used to determine a file context. . .SH "OPTIONS" In addition to the global options described in .BR selabel_open (3), this backend recognizes the following options: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH A non-null value for this option specifies a path to a file that will be opened in lieu of the standard file contexts file. This value is also used as the base name for determining the names of local customization files. .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY A non-null value for this option indicates that any local customizations to the file contexts mapping should be ignored. .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET A non-null value for this option is interpreted as a path prefix, for example "/etc". Only file context specifications with starting with a first component that prefix matches the given prefix are loaded. This may increase lookup performance, however any attempt to look up a path not starting with the given prefix may fail. This optimization is no longer required due to the use of .I file_contexts.bin files and is deprecated. .RE . .SH "FILES" The file context files used to retrieve the default context depends on the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR parameter passed to \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If \fINULL\fR, then the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value will default to the active policy file contexts location (as returned by \fBselinux_file_context_path\fR(3)), otherwise the actual \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value specified is used. .sp If \fBSELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY\fR is set, then the following files will be processed: .RS .IP "1." 4 The mandatory file contexts file that is either the fully qualified file name from \fISELABEL_OPT_PATH.value\fR or if \fINULL\fR, then the path returned by \fBselinux_file_context_path\fR(3). .IP "2." 4 The optional local and distribution substitution files that perform path aliasing on the 'in memory' version of the file contexts file. .br These files have the same name as the mandatory file contexts file with the extensions \fI.subs\fR and \fI.subs_dist\fR added. .RE .sp If the \fBSELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY\fR is not set, then the following files will be processed: .RS .IP "1." 4 The mandatory file contexts file that is either the fully qualified file name from \fISELABEL_OPT_PATH.value\fR or if \fINULL\fR, then the path returned by \fBselinux_file_context_path\fR(3). .IP "2." 4 The optional local customizations file that has the same name as the mandatory file contexts file with the extension \fI.local\fR added. .br \fBselinux_file_context_local_path\fR(3) will return the default path to this file. .IP "3." 4 The optional user home directory customizations file that has the same name as the mandatory file contexts file with the extension \fI.homedirs\fR added. .br \fBselinux_file_context_homedir_path\fR(3) will return the default path to this file. .IP "4." 4 The optional local and distribution substitution files that perform any path aliasing on the 'in memory' version of the file contexts file (and the \fI.local\fR and/or \fI.homedirs\fR if present). These files have the same name as the mandatory file contexts file with the extensions \fI.subs\fR and \fI.subs_dist\fR added. .br \fBselinux_file_context_subs_path\fR(3) and \fBselinux_file_context_subs_dist_path\fR(3) will return the default paths to these files. .RE .sp The default file context series of files are: .RS 6 .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.local .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.homedirs .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs_dist .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp Only the \fIfile_contexts\fR file is mandatory, the remainder are optional. .sp The entries within the file contexts series of files are shown in the \fBFILE FORMAT\fR section. . .SH "FILE FORMAT" .sp .SH "File Contexts Format" .sp Each line within the \fIfile_contexts\fR and the two customization files (\fI.local\fR and \fI.homedirs\fR) is as follows: .sp .RS .I pathname [file_type] context .RE .sp Where: .br .RS .I pathname .RS An entry that defines the path to be labeled. May contain either a fully qualified path, or a Perl compatible regular expression (PCRE), describing fully qualified path(s). The only PCRE flag in use is PCRE2_DOTALL, which causes a wildcard '.' to match anything, including a new line. Strings representing paths are processed as bytes (as opposed to Unicode), meaning that non-ASCII characters are not matched by a single wildcard. .RE .I file_type .RS An optional file type consisting of: .RS \fI\-b\fR - Block Device \fI\-c\fR - Character Device .br \fI\-d\fR - Directory \fI\-p\fR - Named Pipe .br \fI\-l\fR - Symbolic Link \fI\-s\fR - Socket .br \fI\-\-\fR - Ordinary file .RE .RE .I context .RS This entry can be either: .RS .IP "a." 4 The security context that will be assigned to the file (i.e. returned as \fIcontext\fR). .IP "b." 4 A value of \fB<>\fR can be used to indicate that the matching files should not be re-labeled and causes \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) to return \-1 with \fIerrno\fR set to \fBENOENT\fR. .RE .RE .RE .sp Example: .RS # ./contexts/files/file_contexts .br # pathname file_type context .br /.* system_u:object_r:default_t:s0 .br /[^/]+ \-\- system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t:s0 .br /tmp/.* <> .RE .sp .SH "Substitution File Format" .sp Each line within the substitution files (\fI.subs\fR and \fI.subs_dist\fR) has the form: .RS .I subs_pathname pathname .RE .sp Where: .RS .I pathname .RS A path that matches an entry in one or more of the file contexts policy configuration file. .RE .I subs_pathname .RS The path that will be aliased (considered equivalent) with pathname by the look up process. .RE .RE .sp Example: .RS # ./contexts/files/file_contexts.subs .br # pathname subs_pathname .br /myweb /var/www .br /myspool /var/spool/mail .sp Using the above example, when \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) is passed a path of \fI/myweb/index.html\fR the function will substitute the \fI/myweb\fR component with \fI/var/www\fR, therefore the path used is: .sp .RS .I /var/www/index.html .RE .RE . .SH "NOTES" .IP "1." 4 If contexts are to be validated, then the global option \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR must be set before calling \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If this is not set, then it is possible for an invalid context to be returned. .IP "2." 4 If the size of file contexts series of files contain many entries, then \fBselabel_open\fR(3) may have a delay as it reads in the files, and if requested validates the entries. .IP "3." 4 Depending on the version of SELinux it is possible that a \fIfile_contexts.template\fR file may also be present, however this is now deprecated. .br The template file has the same format as the \fIfile_contexts\fR file and may also contain the keywords \fBHOME_ROOT\fR, \fBHOME_DIR\fR, \fBROLE\fR and \fBUSER\fR. This functionality has now been moved to the policy store and managed by \fBsemodule\fR(8) and \fBgenhomedircon\fR(8). . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_file_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5), " lstat "(2), "selinux_file_context_subs_path "(3), " selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path "(3), " selinux_file_context_homedir_path "(3), "selinux_file_context_local_path "(3), " semodule "(8), " genhomedircon "(8) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/selabel_media.5000066400000000000000000000064251437566343300200330ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_media" "5" "29 Nov 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_media \- userspace SELinux labeling interface and configuration file format for the media contexts backend . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" device_name ", int " unused ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" device_name ", int " unused ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The media contexts backend maps from media device names such as "cdrom" or "floppy" into security contexts. It is used to find the appropriate context for establishing context mounts on these devices. The returned \fIcontext\fR must be freed using \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) describes the function with its return and error codes. .sp The integer lookup argument is currently unused and should be set to zero. .sp Any messages generated by \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) are sent to \fIstderr\fR by default, although this can be changed by \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .BR selabel_lookup_raw (3) behaves identically to \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) but does not perform context translation. .sp The \fBFILES\fR section details the configuration files used to determine the media context. . .SH "OPTIONS" In addition to the global options described in \fBselabel_open\fR(3), this backend recognizes the following options: .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH A non-null value for this option specifies a path to a file that will be opened in lieu of the standard \fImedia\fR contexts file. . .SH "FILES" The media context file used to retrieve a default context depends on the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR parameter passed to \fBselabel_open\FR(3). If \fINULL\fR, then the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value will default to the active policy media contexts location (as returned by \fBselinux_media_context_path\fR(3)), otherwise the actual \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value specified is used. .sp The default media contexts file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/media .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line within the \fImedia\fR file is as follows: .RS .I device_name context .RE .sp Where: .RS .I device_name .RS The media identifier (e.g. cdrom, floppy, disk and usb). .RE .I context .RS The context to be used for labeling the device. .RE .RE .sp Example: .RS # contexts/files/media .br cdrom system_u:object_r:removable_device_t .br floppy system_u:object_r:removable_device_t .br disk system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t . .SH "NOTES" If contexts are to be validated, then the global option \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR must be set before calling \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If this is not set, then it is possible for an invalid context to be returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_media_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/selabel_x.5000066400000000000000000000150041437566343300172140ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_x" "5" "29 Nov 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux API documentation" .SH "NAME" selabel_x \- userspace SELinux labeling interface and configuration file format for the X Window System contexts backend. This backend is also used to determine the default context for labeling remotely connected X clients . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The X contexts backend maps from X Window System object names into security contexts. It is used to find the appropriate context for X Window System objects whose significance and/or usage semantics are determined primarily by name. The returned \fIcontext\fR must be freed using \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) describes the function with its return and error codes. .sp This backend is also used to determine the default context for labeling remotely connected X clients. .sp The \fIobject_type\fR argument should be set to one of the following values: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_X_PROP The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a window property, such as "WM_NAME". .TP .B SELABEL_X_SELN The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a selection, such as "PRIMARY". .TP .B SELABEL_X_EXT The .I object_name argument specifies the name of a protocol extension, such as "RENDER". .TP .B SELABEL_X_EVENT The .I object_name argument specifies the name of an event type, such as "X11:ButtonPress". .TP .B SELABEL_X_CLIENT The .I object_name argument is ignored, however it should be set to either \fI*\fR (an asterisk or 'wildcard' that will select the default entry) or a specific entry such as "remote" in the X contexts file as shown in the \fBEXAMPLE\fR section. The default context for labeling remote X clients is then returned. .TP .B SELABEL_X_POLYPROP Like .BR SELABEL_X_PROP , but checks if the property was marked as being polyinstantiated. See \fBNOTES\fR below. .TP .B SELABEL_X_POLYSELN Like .BR SELABEL_X_SELN , but checks if the selection was marked as being polyinstantiated. See \fBNOTES\fR below. .RE .sp Any messages generated by \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) are sent to \fIstderr\fR by default, although this can be changed by \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .B selabel_lookup_raw behaves identically to \fBselabel_lookup\fR but does not perform context translation. .sp The \fBFILES\fR section details the configuration files used to determine the X object context. . .SH "OPTIONS" In addition to the global options described in \fBselabel_open\fR(3), this backend recognizes the following options: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH A non-null value for this option specifies a path to a file that will be opened in lieu of the standard X contexts file (see the \fBFILES\fR section for details). .RE . .SH "FILES" The X context file used to retrieve a default context depends on the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR parameter passed to \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If \fINULL\fR, then the \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value will default to the active policy X contexts location (as returned by \fBselinux_x_context_path\fR(3)), otherwise the actual \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR value specified is used. .sp The default X object contexts file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/x_contexts .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp The entries within the X contexts file are shown in the \fBObject Name String Values\fR and \fBFILE FORMAT\fR sections. . .SH "Object Name String Values" The string name assigned to each \fIobject_type\fR argument that can be present in the X contexts file are: .TS center, allbox, tab(@); lI lB lB l . object_type@Text Name SELABEL_X_PROP@property SELABEL_X_SELN@selection SELABEL_X_EXT@extension SELABEL_X_EVENT@event SELABEL_X_CLIENT@client SELABEL_X_POLYPROP@poly_property SELABEL_X_POLYSELN@poly_selection .TE . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line within the X contexts file is as follows: .RS .I object_type object_name context .RE .sp Where: .RS .I object_type .RS This is the string representation of the object type shown in the \fBObject Name String Values\fR section. There can be multiple lines with the same \fIobject_type\fR string that will form a block of entries (each with a different \fIobject_name\fR entry). .RE .I object_name .RS These are the object names of the specific X-server resource such as \fBPRIMARY\fR, \fBCUT_BUFFER0\fR etc. They are generally defined in the X-server source code (\fIprotocol.txt\fR and \fIBuiltInAtoms\fR in the dix directory of the xorg\-server source package). The entry can contain '*' for wildcard matching or '?' for substitution. Note that if the '*' is used, then be aware that the order of entries in the file is important. The '*' on its own is used to ensure a default fallback context is assigned and should be the last entry in the \fIobject_type\fR block. .RE .I context .RS The security context that will be applied to the object. .RE .RE .sp Example 1: .sp .nf # object_type object_name context selection PRIMARY system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0 selection * system_u:object_r:xselection_t:s0 .fi .sp Example 2 - This example shows how a client entry can be configured to ensure an entry is always found: .sp .nf # object_type object_name context client * system_u:object_r:remote_t:s0 .fi . .SH "NOTES" .IP "1." 4 Properties and selections are marked as either polyinstantiated or not. For these name types, the "POLY" option searches only the names marked as being polyinstantiated, while the other option searches only the names marked as not being polyinstantiated. Users of the interface should check both mappings, optionally taking action based on the result (e.g. polyinstantiating the object). .IP "2." 4 If contexts are to be validated, then the global option \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR must be set before calling \fBselabel_open\fR(3). If this is not set, then it is possible for an invalid context to be returned. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_x_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/sepgsql_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300206610ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_db.5 libselinux-3.5/man/man5/service_seusers.5000066400000000000000000000032751437566343300204760ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "service_seusers" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" service_seusers \- The SELinux GNU/Linux user and service to SELinux user mapping configuration files . .SH "DESCRIPTION" These are optional files that allow services to define an SELinux user when authenticating via SELinux-aware login applications such as .BR PAM "(8). " .sp There is one file for each GNU/Linux user name that will be required to run a service with a specific SELinux user name. .sp The path for each configuration file is formed by the path returned by .BR selinux_policy_root "(3) with " .IR /logins/username appended (where \fIusername\fR is a file representing the GNU/Linux user name). The default services directory is located at: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/logins .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR getseuser "(3) reads this file to map services to an SELinux user. " . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line within the \fIusername\fR file is formatted as follows with each component separated by a colon: .RS .IB service : seuser \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS .I service .RS The service name used by the application. .RE .I seuser .RS The SELinux user name. .RE .I range .RS The range for MCS/MLS policies. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLES" Example 1 - for the 'root' user: .RS # ./logins/root .br ipa:user_u:s0 .br this_service:unconfined_u:s0 .RE .sp Example 2 - for GNU/Linux user 'rch': .RS # ./logins/rch .br ipa:unconfined_u:s0 .br that_service:unconfined_u:s0 .RE . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " PAM "(8), " selinux_policy_root "(3), " getseuser "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/seusers.5000066400000000000000000000030741437566343300167530ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "seusers" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" seusers \- The SELinux GNU/Linux user to SELinux user mapping configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The .I seusers file contains a list GNU/Linux user to SELinux user mapping for use by SELinux-aware login applications such as \fBPAM\fR(8). .sp .BR selinux_usersconf_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default SELinux users mapping file is located at: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/seusers .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR getseuserbyname "(3) reads this file to map a GNU/Linux user or group to an SELinux user. " . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line of the .I seusers configuration file consists of the following: .sp .RS \fR[\fB%\fIgroup_id\fR]|[\fIuser_id\fR]\fB:\fIseuser_id\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS \fIgroup_id\fR|\fIuser_id .RS \fRThe GNU/Linux user id, or if preceded by the percentage (\fB%\fR) symbol, then a GNU/Linux group id. .br An optional entry set to \fB__default__\fR can be provided as a fall back if required. .RE .I seuser_id .RS The SELinux user identity. .RE .I range .RS The optional level or range for an MLS/MCS policy. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./seusers .br system_u:system_u:s0\-s15:c0.c255 .br root:root:s0\-s15:c0.c255 .br fred:user_u:s0 .br __default__:user_u:s0 .br %user_group:user_u:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " PAM "(8), " selinux_usersconf_path "(3), " getseuserbyname "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/user_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000052101437566343300201610ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "user_contexts" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" user_contexts \- The SELinux user contexts configuration files . .SH "DESCRIPTION" These optional user context configuration files contain entries that allow SELinux-aware login applications such as .BR PAM (8) (running in their own process context), to determine the context that a users login session should run under. .sp SELinux-aware login applications generally use one or more of the following libselinux functions that read these files from the active policy path: .RS .BR get_default_context (3) .br .BR get_ordered_context_list (3) .br .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level (3) .br .BR get_default_context_with_level (3) .br .BR get_default_context_with_role (3) .br .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel (3) .br .BR query_user_context (3) .br .BR manual_user_enter_context (3) .RE .sp There can be one file for each SELinux user configured on the system. The file path is formed using the path returned by .BR \%selinux_user_contexts_path (3) for the active policy, with the SELinux user name appended, for example: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/users/unconfined_u .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/users/xguest_u .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp These files contain context information as described in the .B FILE FORMAT section. . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the user context configuration file consists of the following: .RS .I login_process user_login_process .RE .sp Where: .RS .I login_process .RS This consists of a \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] entry that represents the login process context. .RE .I user_login_process .RS This consists of a \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] entry that represents the user login process context. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # Example for xguest_u at /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/users/xguest_u .br system_r:crond_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:initrc_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:local_login_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:remote_login_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:sshd_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:xdm_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_user_contexts_path "(3), " PAM "(8), " get_ordered_context_list "(3), " get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_role "(3), " get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3), " query_user_context "(3), " manual_user_enter_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/virtual_domain_context.5000066400000000000000000000023261437566343300220420ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "virtual_domain_context" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" virtual_domain_context \- The SELinux virtual machine domain context configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The .I virtual_domain_context file contains a list of domain contexts that are available for use by the SELinux-aware virtualization API libvirt (see \fBlibvirtd\fR(8)). .sp .BR selinux_virtual_domain_context_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default virtual domain context file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/virtual_domain_context .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the file consists of an entry as follows: .RS .IB user : role : type \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS .I user role type range .RS A user, role, type and optional range (for MCS/MLS) separated by colons (:) that can be used as a virtual domain context. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/virtual_domain_context .br system_u:object_r:svirt_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " libvirtd "(8), " selinux_virtual_domain_context_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/virtual_image_context.5000066400000000000000000000023471437566343300216600ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "virtual_image_context" "5" "28-Nov-2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "NAME" virtual_image_context \- The SELinux virtual machine image context configuration file . .SH "DESCRIPTION" The .I virtual_image_context file contains a list of image contexts for use by the SELinux-aware virtualization API libvirt (see \fBlibvirtd\fR(8)). .sp .BR selinux_virtual_image_context_path "(3) " will return the active policy path to this file. The default virtual image context file is: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/virtual_image_context .RE .sp Where \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR is the entry from the selinux configuration file \fIconfig\fR (see \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "FILE FORMAT" Each line in the file consists of an entry as follows: .RS .IB user : role : type \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Where: .RS .I user role type range .RS A user, role, type and optional range (for MCS/MLS) separated by colons (:) that can be used as a virtual image context. .RE .RE . .SH "EXAMPLE" # ./contexts/virtual_image_context .br system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0 .br system_u:object_r:svirt_content_t:s0 . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " libvirtd "(8), " selinux_virtual_image_context_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " libselinux-3.5/man/man5/x_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000000251437566343300174510ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_x.5 libselinux-3.5/man/man8/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300151735ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/man/man8/avcstat.8000066400000000000000000000014231437566343300167310ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "avcstat" "8" "18 Nov 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" avcstat \- Display SELinux AVC statistics . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B avcstat .RB [ \-c ] .RB [ \-f .IR status_file ] .RI [ interval ] . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Display SELinux AVC statistics. If the .I interval parameter is specified, the program will loop, displaying updated statistics every .I interval seconds. Relative values are displayed by default. . .SH OPTIONS .TP .B \-c Display the cumulative values. .TP .B \-f Specifies the location of the AVC statistics file, defaulting to .IR /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats . . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . The program was written by James Morris . . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man8/booleans.8000066400000000000000000000035031437566343300170670ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "booleans" "8" "11 Aug 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" booleans \- Policy booleans enable runtime customization of SELinux policy . .SH "DESCRIPTION" This manual page describes SELinux policy booleans. .BR The SELinux policy can include conditional rules that are enabled or disabled based on the current values of a set of policy booleans. These policy booleans allow runtime modification of the security policy without having to load a new policy. For example, the boolean httpd_enable_cgi allows the httpd daemon to run cgi scripts if it is enabled. If the administrator does not want to allow execution of cgi scripts, he can simply disable this boolean value. The policy defines a default value for each boolean, typically false. These default values can be overridden via local settings created via the .BR setsebool (8) utility, using .B \-P to make the setting persistent across reboots. The .B system\-config\-securitylevel tool provides a graphical interface for altering the settings. The .BR load_policy (8) program will preserve current boolean settings upon a policy reload by default, or can optionally reset booleans to the boot-time defaults via the .B \-b option. Boolean values can be listed by using the .BR getsebool (8) utility and passing it the .B \-a option. Boolean values can also be changed at runtime via the .BR setsebool (8) utility or the .BR togglesebool (8) utility. By default, these utilities only change the current boolean value and do not affect the persistent settings, unless the .B \-P option is used to setsebool. . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . The SELinux conditional policy support was developed by Tresys Technology. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR getsebool (8), .BR setsebool (8), .BR selinux (8), .BR togglesebool (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man8/getenforce.8000066400000000000000000000006171437566343300174110ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getenforce" "8" "7 April 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" getenforce \- get the current mode of SELinux . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B getenforce . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .B getenforce reports whether SELinux is enforcing, permissive, or disabled. . .SH AUTHOR Dan Walsh, . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR setenforce (8), .BR selinuxenabled (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man8/getsebool.8000066400000000000000000000021451437566343300172510ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getsebool" "8" "11 Aug 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" getsebool \- get SELinux boolean value(s) . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B getsebool .RB [ \-a ] .RI [ boolean ] . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .B getsebool reports where a particular SELinux boolean or all SELinux booleans are on or off In certain situations a boolean can be in one state with a pending change to the other state. getsebool will report this as a pending change. The pending value indicates the value that will be applied upon the next boolean commit. The setting of boolean values occurs in two stages; first the pending value is changed, then the booleans are committed, causing their active values to become their pending values. This allows a group of booleans to be changed in a single transaction, by setting all of their pending values as desired and then committing once. . .SH OPTIONS .TP .B \-a Show all SELinux booleans. . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . The program was written by Tresys Technology. . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR setsebool (8), .BR booleans (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man8/matchpathcon.8000066400000000000000000000027401437566343300177400ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "matchpathcon" "8" "21 April 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" matchpathcon \- get the default SELinux security context for the specified path from the file contexts configuration . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B matchpathcon .RB [ \-V ] .RB [ \-N ] .RB [ \-n ] .RB [ \-m .IR type ] .RB [ \-f .IR file_contexts_file ] .RB [ \-p .IR prefix ] .RB [ \-P .IR policy_root_path ] .I filepath... . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .BR matchpathcon queries the system policy and outputs the default security context associated with the filepath. .B Note: Identical paths can have different security contexts, depending on the file type (regular file, directory, link file, char file ...). .B matchpathcon will also take the file type into consideration in determining the default security context if the file exists. If the file does not exist, no file type matching will occur. . .SH OPTIONS .TP .BI \-m " type" Force file type for the lookup. Valid types are .BR file ", " dir ", "pipe ", " chr_file ", " blk_file ", " .BR lnk_file ", " sock_file . .TP .B \-n Do not display path. .TP .B \-N Do not use translations. .TP .BI \-f " file_context_file" Use alternate file_context file .TP .BI \-p " prefix" Use prefix to speed translations .TP .BI \-P " policy_root_path" Use alternate policy root path .TP .B \-V Verify file context on disk matches defaults . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux "(8), " .BR matchpathcon (3) libselinux-3.5/man/man8/sefcontext_compile.8000066400000000000000000000030031437566343300211520ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "sefcontext_compile" "8" "12 Aug 2015" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" sefcontext_compile \- compile file context regular expression files . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B sefcontext_compile .RB [ \-o .IR outputfile ] .RB [ \-p .IR policyfile ] .I inputfile . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .B sefcontext_compile is used to compile file context regular expressions into .BR pcre (3) format. .sp The compiled file is used by libselinux file labeling functions. .sp By default .B sefcontext_compile writes the compiled pcre file with the .B .bin suffix appended (e.g. \fIinputfile\fB.bin\fR). .SH OPTIONS .TP .B \-o Specify an .I outputfile that must be a fully qualified file name as the .B .bin suffix is not automatically added. .TP .B \-p Specify a binary .I policyfile that will be used to validate the context entries in the .I inputfile .br If an invalid context is found the pcre formatted file will not be written and an error will be returned. .SH "RETURN VALUE" On error -1 is returned. On success 0 is returned. .SH "EXAMPLES" .B Example 1: .br sefcontext_compile /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts .sp Results in the following file being generated: .RS /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts.bin .RE .sp .B Example 2: .br sefcontext_compile -o new_fc.bin /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts .sp Results in the following file being generated in the cwd: .RS new_fc.bin .RE . .SH AUTHOR Dan Walsh, . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR semanage (8), libselinux-3.5/man/man8/selinux.8000066400000000000000000000125731437566343300167630ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux" "8" "29 Apr 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" SELinux \- NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) . .SH "DESCRIPTION" NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is an implementation of a flexible mandatory access control architecture in the Linux operating system. The SELinux architecture provides general support for the enforcement of many kinds of mandatory access control policies, including those based on the concepts of Type Enforcement®, Role- Based Access Control, and Multi-Level Security. Background information and technical documentation about SELinux can be found at https://github.com/SELinuxProject. The .I /etc/selinux/config configuration file controls whether SELinux is enabled or disabled, and if enabled, whether SELinux operates in permissive mode or enforcing mode. The .B SELINUX variable may be set to any one of \fIdisabled\fR, \fIpermissive\fR, or \fIenforcing\fR to select one of these options. The \fIdisabled\fR disables most of the SELinux kernel and application code, leaving the system running without any SELinux protection. The \fIpermissive\fR option enables the SELinux code, but causes it to operate in a mode where accesses that would be denied by policy are permitted but audited. The \fIenforcing\fR option enables the SELinux code and causes it to enforce access denials as well as auditing them. \fIpermissive\fR mode may yield a different set of denials than enforcing mode, both because enforcing mode will prevent an operation from proceeding past the first denial and because some application code will fall back to a less privileged mode of operation if denied access. .B NOTE: Disabling SELinux by setting .B SELINUX=disabled in .I /etc/selinux/config is deprecated and depending on kernel version and configuration it might not lead to SELinux being completely disabled. Specifically, the SELinux hooks will still be executed internally, but the SELinux policy will not be loaded and no operation will be denied. In such state, the system will act as if SELinux was disabled, although some operations might behave slightly differently. To properly disable SELinux, it is recommended to use the .B selinux=0 kernel boot option instead. In that case SELinux will be disabled regardless of what is set in the .I /etc/selinux/config file. The .I /etc/selinux/config configuration file also controls what policy is active on the system. SELinux allows for multiple policies to be installed on the system, but only one policy may be active at any given time. At present, multiple kinds of SELinux policy exist: targeted, mls for example. The targeted policy is designed as a policy where most user processes operate without restrictions, and only specific services are placed into distinct security domains that are confined by the policy. For example, the user would run in a completely unconfined domain while the named daemon or apache daemon would run in a specific domain tailored to its operation. The MLS (Multi-Level Security) policy is designed as a policy where all processes are partitioned into fine-grained security domains and confined by policy. MLS also supports the Bell And LaPadula model, where processes are not only confined by the type but also the level of the data. You can define which policy you will run by setting the .B SELINUXTYPE environment variable within .IR /etc/selinux/config . You must reboot and possibly relabel if you change the policy type to have it take effect on the system. The corresponding policy configuration for each such policy must be installed in the .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/ directories. A given SELinux policy can be customized further based on a set of compile-time tunable options and a set of runtime policy booleans. .B \%system\-config\-selinux allows customization of these booleans and tunables. Many domains that are protected by SELinux also include SELinux man pages explaining how to customize their policy. . .SH "FILE LABELING" All files, directories, devices ... have a security context/label associated with them. These context are stored in the extended attributes of the file system. Problems with SELinux often arise from the file system being mislabeled. This can be caused by booting the machine with a non SELinux kernel. If you see an error message containing file_t, that is usually a good indicator that you have a serious problem with file system labeling. The best way to relabel the file system is to create the flag file .I /.autorelabel and reboot. .BR system\-config\-selinux , also has this capability. The .BR restorecon / fixfiles commands are also available for relabeling files. Please note that using mount flag .I nosuid also disables SELinux domain transitions, unless permission .I nosuid_transition is used in the policy to allow this, which in turn needs also policy capability .IR nnp_nosuid_transition . . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . . .SH FILES .I /etc/selinux/config . .SH "SEE ALSO" .ad l .nh .BR booleans (8), .BR setsebool (8), .BR sepolicy (8), .BR system-config-selinux (8), .BR togglesebool (8), .BR restorecon (8), .BR fixfiles (8), .BR setfiles (8), .BR semanage (8), .BR sepolicy (8) Every confined service on the system has a man page in the following format: .br .BR _selinux (8) For example, httpd has the .BR httpd_selinux (8) man page. .B man -k selinux Will list all SELinux man pages. libselinux-3.5/man/man8/selinuxenabled.8000066400000000000000000000010011437566343300202560ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinuxenabled" "8" "7 April 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" selinuxenabled \- tool to be used within shell scripts to determine if selinux is enabled . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B selinuxenabled . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Indicates whether SELinux is enabled or disabled. . .SH "EXIT STATUS" It exits with status 0 if SELinux is enabled and 1 if it is not enabled. . .SH AUTHOR Dan Walsh, . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR setenforce (8), .BR getenforce (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man8/selinuxexeccon.8000066400000000000000000000012621437566343300203210ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinuxexeccon" "8" "14 May 2011" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" selinuxexeccon \- report SELinux context used for this executable . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B selinuxexeccon .I command .RI [ fromcon ] . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .B selinuxexeccon reports the SELinux process context for the specified command from the specified context or the current context. . .SH EXAMPLE .nf # selinuxexeccon /usr/bin/passwd staff_u:staff_r:passwd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 # selinuxexeccon /usr/sbin/sendmail system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 system_u:system_r:system_mail_t:s0 .fi . .SH AUTHOR This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR secon (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man8/setenforce.8000066400000000000000000000011551437566343300174230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "setenforce" "8" "7 April 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" setenforce \- modify the mode SELinux is running in . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B setenforce .RB [ Enforcing | Permissive | 1 | 0 ] . .SH "DESCRIPTION" Use .B Enforcing or .B 1 to put SELinux in enforcing mode. .br Use .B Permissive or .B 0 to put SELinux in permissive mode. If SELinux is disabled and you want to enable it, or SELinux is enabled and you want to disable it, please see .BR selinux (8). . .SH AUTHOR Dan Walsh, . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR getenforce (8), .BR selinuxenabled (8) libselinux-3.5/man/man8/togglesebool.8000066400000000000000000000011511437566343300177470ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "togglesebool" "8" "26 Oct 2004" "sgrubb@redhat.com" "SELinux Command Line documentation" .SH "NAME" togglesebool \- flip the current value of a SELinux boolean . .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B togglesebool .I boolean... . .SH "DESCRIPTION" .B togglesebool flips the current value of a list of booleans. If the value is currently a 1, then it will be changed to a 0 and vice versa. Only the "in memory" values are changed; the boot-time settings are unaffected. . .SH AUTHOR This man page was written by Steve Grubb . .SH "SEE ALSO" .BR selinux (8), .BR booleans (8), .BR getsebool (8), .BR setsebool (8) libselinux-3.5/man/ru/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300147565ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300156165ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/customizable_types.5000066400000000000000000000054531437566343300216400ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "customizable_types" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "SELinux configuration" .SH "ИМЯ" customizable_types \- файл конфигурации настраиваемых типов SELinux . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Файл \fIcustomizable_types\fR содержит список типов, которые можно каким-либо образом настраивать с помощью поддерживающих SELinux приложений. .sp Обычно это тип контекста файла, который устанавливается для файлов, к которым требуется предоставить общий доступ для определённых доменов, и когда администратору необходимо управлять этим типом вручную. .sp Возможность использования настраиваемых типов устарела. Рекомендуется использовать .BR semanage (8) .BR fcontext (8) .BR ... (8). Тем не менее, поддерживающие SELinux приложения, например, .BR setfiles (8), будут использовать эту информацию для получения списка типов, относящихся к файлам, для которых не следует повторно проставлять метки. .sp .BR selinux_customizable_types_path (3) вернёт путь активной политики к этому файлу. Файл настраиваемых типов по умолчанию: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/customizable_types .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR is_context_customizable (3) выполняет чтение этого файла, чтобы определить, является ли контекст настраиваемым для активной политики. . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка в файле состоит из следующих компонентов: .RS .I type .RE .sp Где: .RS .I type .RS Определённый в политике тип, который можно настроить. .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕР" # ./contexts/customizable_types .br mount_loopback_t .br public_content_rw_t .br public_content_t .br swapfile_t .br sysadm_untrusted_content_t . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_customizable_types_path "(3), " is_context_customizable "(3), " semanage "(8), " setfiles "(8), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/default_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000067501437566343300212670ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "default_contexts" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Конфигурация SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" default_contexts \- файл конфигурации контекстов SELinux по умолчанию . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Файл конфигурации контекстов по умолчанию \fIdefault_contexts\fR содержит записи, которые позволяют поддерживающим SELinux приложениям для входа, например, .BR PAM "(8), настроить контекст пользователя. " .sp Поддерживающие SELinux приложения для входа обычно используют одну или несколько из следующих функций libselinux, которые выполняют чтение этих файлов по пути активной политики: .RS .BR get_default_context "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_role "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3) " .br .BR query_user_context "(3) " .br .BR manual_user_enter_context "(3) " .RE .sp Путь к файлу конфигурации контекстов по умолчанию для активной политики возвращает \fBselinux_default_contexts_path\fR(3). По умолчанию файл контекстов по умолчанию находится по адресу: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/default_contexts .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка в файле конфигурации по умолчанию состоит из следующих компонентов: .RS .I login_process user_login_process [user_login_process] ... .RE .sp Где: .RS .I login_process .RS Состоит из записи \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR], которая представляет собой контекст процесса входа, определённый в политике. .RE .I user_login_process .RS Состоит из одной или нескольких записей \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR], которые представляют собой контекст процесса входа пользователя, определённый в политике. .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕР" # ./contexts/default_contexts .br system_r:crond_t:s0 system_r:system_crond_t:s0 .br system_r:local_login_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0 .br system_r:remote_login_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 .br system_r:sshd_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 .br system_r:sulogin_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 .br system_r:xdm_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_default_contexts_path "(3), " PAM "(8), " selinux_default_type_path "(3), " get_default_context "(3), " get_ordered_context_list "(3), " get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_role "(3), " get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3), " query_user_context "(3), " manual_user_enter_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/default_type.5000066400000000000000000000034441437566343300203760ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "default_type" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Конфигурация SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" default_type \- файл конфигурации типов SELinux по умолчанию . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Файл \fIdefault_type\fR содержит записи, которые позволяют поддерживающим SELinux приложениям, таким как \fBnewrole\fR(1), выбирать для роли тип по умолчанию, если не предоставлен другой тип. .sp \fBselinux_default_type_path\fR(3) возвращает путь активной политики к этому файлу. По умолчанию файл типов по умолчанию: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/default_type .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp \fBget_default_type\fR(3) выполняет чтение этого файла, чтобы определить тип для активной политики. . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка внутри файла \fIdefault_type\fR форматируется записями \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR, где: .RS .I role .RS Роль SELinux. .RE .I type .RS Тип домена, который возвращается для этой роли. .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕР" # ./contexts/default_type .br auditadm_r:auditadm_t .br user_r:user_t . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " get_default_type "(3), " newrole "(1), " selinux_default_type_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/failsafe_context.5000066400000000000000000000055221437566343300212260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "failsafe_context" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Конфигурация SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" failsafe_context \- файл конфигурации резервного контекста SELinux . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Файл .I failsafe_context позволяет поддерживающим SELinux приложениям, таким как .BR PAM "(8), " получать известный действительный контекст входа для администратора, если в других расположениях отсутствуют действительные записи по умолчанию. .sp .BR selinux_failsafe_context_path "(3) " возвращает путь активной политики к этому файлу. Файл резервного контекста по умолчанию: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/failsafe_context .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp Следующие функции выполняют чтение этого файла по пути активной политики, если им не удаётся получить контекст по умолчанию: .br .RS .BR get_default_context "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list "(3) " .br .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_level "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_role "(3) " .br .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3) " .br .BR query_user_context "(3) " .br .BR manual_user_enter_context "(3) " .RE . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Файл состоит из следующей однострочной записи: .RS \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Где: .RS .I role .I type .I range .RS Роль, тип и необязательный диапазон (для MCS/MLS), разделённые двоеточиями (:), которые формируют действительный контекст процесса входа для получения администратором доступа к системе. .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕР" # ./contexts/failsafe_context .br unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0 . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_failsafe_context_path "(3), " PAM "(8), " selinux_default_type_path "(3), " get_default_context "(3), " get_ordered_context_list "(3), " get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_role "(3), " get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3), " query_user_context "(3), " manual_user_enter_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/file_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300205430ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/file_contexts.homedirs.5000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300223540ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/file_contexts.local.5000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300216340ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/file_contexts.subs.5000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300215160ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/file_contexts.subs_dist.5000066400000000000000000000000301437566343300225410ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_file.5 libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/media.5000066400000000000000000000000311437566343300167550ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_media.5 libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/removable_context.5000066400000000000000000000032071437566343300214260ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "removable_context" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Конфигурация SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" removable_context \- файл конфигурации SELinux-контекста съёмных устройств . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Этот файл содержит метку по умолчанию, которую следует использовать для съёмных устройств. .sp .BR selinux_removable_context_path "(3) " вернёт путь активной политики к этому файлу. Файл контекста съёмных устройств по умолчанию: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/removable_context .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Файл состоит из следующей однострочной записи: .RS .IB user : role : type \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Где: .RS .I user role type range .RS Пользователь, роль, тип и необязательный диапазон (для MCS/MLS), разделённые двоеточиями (:), которые будут применены к съёмным устройствам. .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕР" # ./contexts/removable_contexts .br system_u:object_r:removable_t:s0 . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_removable_context_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/secolor.conf.5000066400000000000000000000107361437566343300203050ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "secolor.conf" "5" "08 апреля 2011" "Документация API SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" secolor.conf \- файл конфигурации цвета SELinux . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Этот необязательный файл управляет цветом, который назначается компонентам контекста, связанным с контекстом .I raw , который передаётся с помощью .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)," когда поддерживающее SELinux приложение должно показать сведения о контексте в цвете. .sp .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)" получает эту информацию о цвете из файла активной политики .B secolor.conf , возвращённого .BR selinux_colors_path "(3)." . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Формат файла: .RS .B color .I color_name .BI "= #"color_mask .br [...] .sp .I context_component string .B = .I fg_color_name bg_color_name .br [...] .sp .RE Где: .br .B color .RS Ключевое слово цвета (color). Каждая запись цвета находится на новой строке. .RE .I color_name .RS Название цвета из одного слова (например, red (красный)). .RE .I color_mask .RS Маска цвета, начинающаяся с хэша (#), который описывает шестнадцатиричные RGB-цвета, где black (чёрный) #000000 и white (белый) #ffffff. .RE .I context_component .RS Имя компонента контекста, должно быть одним из следующих: .br .RS пользователь, роль, тип или диапазон .RE Каждая запись .IR context_component " " string " ..." находится на новой строке. .RE .I string .RS Это строка .I context_component , которая будет сопоставляться с компонентом контекста .I raw , который передаётся .BR selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3)." .br Подстановочный знак '*' можно использовать для сопоставления какой-либо неопределённой строки только записям .I context_component пользователя, роли или типа. .RE .I fg_color_name .RS Строка color_name, которая будет использоваться как цвет переднего плана. Маска цвета .I color_mask также может использоваться. .RE .I bg_color_name .RS Строка color_name, которая будет использоваться как цвет фона. Маска цвета .I color_mask также может использоваться. .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕРЫ" Записи примера 1: .RS color black = #000000 .br color green = #008000 .br color yellow = #ffff00 .br color blue = #0000ff .br color white = #ffffff .br color red = #ff0000 .br color orange = #ffa500 .br color tan = #D2B48C .sp user * = black white .br role * = white black .br type * = tan orange .br range s0\-s0:c0.c1023 = black green .br range s1\-s1:c0.c1023 = white green .br range s3\-s3:c0.c1023 = black tan .br range s5\-s5:c0.c1023 = white blue .br range s7\-s7:c0.c1023 = black red .br range s9\-s9:c0.c1023 = black orange .br range s15\-s15:c0.c1023 = black yellow .RE .sp Записи примера 2: .RS color black = #000000 .br color green = #008000 .br color yellow = #ffff00 .br color blue = #0000ff .br color white = #ffffff .br color red = #ff0000 .br color orange = #ffa500 .br color tan = #d2b48c .sp user unconfined_u = #ff0000 green .br role unconfined_r = red #ffffff .br type unconfined_t = red orange .br user user_u = black green .br role user_r = white black .br type user_t = tan red .br user xguest_u = black yellow .br role xguest_r = black red .br type xguest_t = black green .br user sysadm_u = white black .br range s0\-s0:c0.c1023 = black white .br user * = black white .br role * = black white .br type * = black white .RE . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_raw_context_to_color "(3), " selinux_colors_path "(3)" .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/securetty_types.5000066400000000000000000000041431437566343300211610ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "securetty_types" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Конфигурация SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" securetty_types \- файл конфигурации типа безопасного терминала (tty) SELinux . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Файл .I securetty_types содержит список типов, связанных с типом безопасного tty, которые определены в политике для использования поддерживающими SELinux приложениями. .sp .BR selinux_securetty_types_path "(3) " вернёт путь активной политики к этому файлу. Файл типов securetty по умолчанию: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/securetty_types .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR selinux_check_securetty_context "(3) выполняет чтение этого файла, чтобы определить, установлен ли в активной политике контекст для безопасного tty. " .sp Поддерживающие SELinux приложения, такие как .BR newrole "(1), используют эту информацию для проверки состояния tty. " . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка в файле состоит из следующей записи: .sp .RS .I type .RS Одна или несколько записей типов, которые определены в политике для безопасных устройств tty. .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕР" # ./contexts/securetty_types .br sysadm_tty_device_t .br user_tty_device_t .br staff_tty_device_t . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_securetty_types_path "(3), " newrole "(1), " selinux_check_securetty_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/selabel_db.5000066400000000000000000000321411437566343300177610ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: KaiGai Kohei 2009 .TH "selabel_db" "5" "01 декабря 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Документация API SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" selabel_db \- интерфейс проставления меток SELinux в пространстве пользователя и формат файла конфигурации для внутренней службы контекстов объектов RDBMS (реляционная СУБД) . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Внутренняя служба контекста базы данных сопоставляет имя и класс объекта с контекстами безопасности. Это действие позволяет найти правильный контекст для объектов базы данных при повторном проставлении меток для определённой базы данных. Необходимо освободить возвращённый \fIcontext\fR с помощью \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) описывает функцию с её возвращаемыми значениями и кодами ошибок. .sp \fIobject_name\fR должно быть полным именем, которое использует иерархию объектов базы данных. Например, таблица \fBpg_class\fR в базе данных \fBpostgres\fR и схема \fBpg_catalog\fR должны быть указаны следующим образом: .RS .B postgres.pg_catalog.pg_class .RE .sp В разделе \fBПРИМЕЧАНИЯ\fR доступны более подробные сведения о поддержке баз данных для иерархий пространства имён. .sp Для аргумента \fIobject_type\fR должно быть установлено одно из следующих значений: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_DB_DATABASE Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя самой базы данных, например, "postgres". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя объекта схемы, например, "postgres.public". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_TABLE Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя объекта таблицы, например, "postgres.public.my_table" .TP .B SELABEL_DB_COLUMN Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя объекта столбца, например, "postgres.public.my_table.user_id" .TP .B SELABEL_DB_TUPLE Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя объекта таблицы, содержащей кортежи, для которых требуется повторно проставить метки, например, "postgresql.public.my_table". Следует учитывать, что нет способа идентифицировать отдельные объекты кортежа (за исключением условия WHERE для инструкций DML), потому что у них нет имён. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя объекта процедуры, например, "postgres.public.my_func". Следует учитывать, что поиск отдельных контекстов безопасности для процедур с одинаковыми именами, но разными аргументами не поддерживается. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя объекта последовательности, например, "postgres.public.my_seq". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_BLOB Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя большого объекта, например, "postgres.16308". Следует учитывать, что у большого объекта нет имени, поэтому он идентифицируется по значению соответствующего идентификатора. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_VIEW Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя объекта просмотра, например, "postgres.public.my_view". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_LANGUAGE Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя объекта языка, например, "postgres.public.tcl". .TP .B SELABEL_DB_EXCEPTION Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя объекта исключения. .TP .B SELABEL_DB_DATATYPE Аргумент .I object_name определяет имя объекта типа или домена, например, postgres.public.my_type. .RE .sp Все сообщения, созданные с помощью \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3), по умолчанию отправляются в \fIstderr\fR. Это поведение можно изменить с помощью \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .BR selabel_lookup_raw (3) работает аналогично \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3), но не выполняет преобразование контекста. .sp В разделе \fBФАЙЛЫ\fR приводится описание файлов конфигурации, которые используются для определения контекста объекта базы данных. . .SH "ПАРАМЕТРЫ" Помимо глобальных параметров, описание которых приведено в \fBselabel_open\fR(3), эта внутренняя служба распознаёт следующие параметры: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH Значение этого параметра, отличное от null, определяет путь к файлу, который будет открыт вместо стандартного файла контекста базы данных. По умолчанию параметр пытается открыть файл спецификации, предназначенный для SE-PostgreSQL; если этот интерфейс используется другой реляционной СУБД, параметр должен явно объявить файл спецификации, предназначенный для такой реляционной СУБД (подробные сведения см. в разделе \fBФАЙЛЫ\fR). .RE . .SH "ФАЙЛЫ" То, какой файл контекстов базы данных будет использоваться для получения контекста, зависит от параметра \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR, переданного в \fBselabel_open\fR(3). Если \fINULL\fR, то значением \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR по умолчанию станет расположение контекстов базы данных активной политики (возвращённое \fBselinux_sepgsql_context_path\fR(3)). В ином случае будет использоваться фактическое указанное значение \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR (этот вариант необходимо использовать для поддержки баз данных, отличных от SE-PostgreSQL). .sp Файл контекстов объекта базы данных по умолчанию: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/sepgsql_context .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp Записи внутри файла контекстов базы данных показаны в разделах \fBЗначения строки имени объекта\fR и \fBФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА\fR. . .SH "Значения строки имени объекта" Имена строк, назначенные аргументам \fIobject_type\fR, которые могут присутствовать в файле контекстов базы данных: .TS center, allbox, tab(@); lI lB lB l . object_type@Текстовое имя SELABEL_DB_DATABASE@db_database SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA@db_schema SELABEL_DB_VIEW@db_view SELABEL_DB_LANGUAGE@db_language SELABEL_DB_TABLE@db_table SELABEL_DB_COLUMN@db_column SELABEL_DB_TUPLE@db_tuple SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE@db_procedure SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE@db_sequence SELABEL_DB_BLOB@db_blob SELABEL_DB_EXCEPTION@db_exception SELABEL_DB_DATATYPE@db_datatype .TE . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка внутри файла контекстов базы данных имеет следующий вид: .RS .I object_type object_name context .RE .sp Где: .RS .I object_type .RS Строковое представление типа объекта, показанное в разделе \fBЗначения строки имени объекта\fR. .RE .I object_name .RS Ключ, который используется для получения контекста на основе \fIobject_type\fR. .sp Запись может содержать подстановочные знаки '*' или '?' для выполнения сопоставления с дополнением или подстановкой. .sp Следует учитывать, что при использовании '*' важен порядок записей в файле. '*' в отдельном виде используется для того, чтобы обеспечить назначение резервного контекста по умолчанию, это должна быть последняя запись в блоке \fIobject_type\fR. .RE .I context .RS К объекту будет применён этот контекст безопасности. .RE .RE .sp Далее приведён пример для SE-PostgreSQL: .sp # ./contexts/sepgsql_contexts file .br # object_type object_name context .br db_database my_database system_u:object_r:sepgsql_db_t:s0 .br db_database * system_u:object_r:sepgsql_db_t:s0 .br db_schema *.* system_u:object_r:sepgsql_schema_t:s0 .br db_tuple row_low system_u:object_r:sepgsql_table_t:s0 .br db_tuple row_high system_u:object_r:sepgsql_table_t:s0:c1023 .br db_tuple *.*.* system_u:object_r:sepgsql_table_t:s0 . .SH "ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ" .IP "1." 4 Для целевой реляционной СУБД необходимо записать подходящий файл контекстов базы данных и использовать для его загрузки параметр \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR в \fBselabel_open\fR(3). .IP "2." 4 Иерархия пространства имён для объектов базы данных зависит от реляционной СУБД, но интерфейсы \fIselabel*\fR не предусматривают какой-либо особой поддержки иерархии пространства имён. .sp В иерархии пространства имён SE-PostgreSQL объектом верхнего уровня является база данных, объектом следующего уровня - схема. На следующем после объекта схемы уровне могут находиться другие типы объектов, например, таблицы и процедуры. Эта иерархия поддерживается следующим образом: .RS .RS .sp Если для таблицы "my_table" в схеме "public" внутри базы данных "postgres" требуется контекст безопасности, то параметрами \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) для \fIobject_type\fR будет \fBSELABEL_DB_TABLE\fR, для \fIobject_name\fR - "postgres.public.my_table", контекст безопасности (если доступно) будет возвращён в \fIcontext\fR. .RE .RE .IP "3." 4 Если контексты должны быть проверены, необходимо указать глобальный параметр \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR перед вызовом \fBselabel_open\fR(3). Если этот параметр не указан, может быть возвращён недействительный контекст. . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_sepgsql_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/selabel_file.5000066400000000000000000000346641437566343300203270ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_file" "5" "01 декабря 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Документация API SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" selabel_file \- интерфейс проставления меток SELinux в пространстве пользователя и формат файла конфигурации для внутренней службы контекстов файлов . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" path ", int " mode ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" path ", int " mode ");" . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Внутренняя служба контекстов файлов сопоставляет сочетания 'путь/режим' с контекстами безопасности. Это действие служит для нахождения правильного контекста для каждого файла при повторном проставлении меток в файловой системе. Необходимо освободить возвращённый \fIcontext\fR с помощью \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) описывает функцию с её возвращаемыми значениями и кодами ошибок. Тем не менее, далее приводится более подробное описание следующих значений \fIerrno\fR для внутренней службы контекстов файлов: .RS .TP .B ENOENT Не найден контекст, соответствующий \fIpath\fR и \fImode\fR, - это сообщение будет возвращено и в том случае, если серия файлов контекстов файлов имеет контекст \fB<>\fR относительно \fIpath\fR (см. раздел \fBФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА\fR). .RE .sp Аргумент \fIpath\fR должен быть установлен в полный путь к файлу, назначенный контекст которого проверяется. Аргумент \fImode\fR должен быть установлен в биты режима файла, как определено \fBlstat\fR(2). Аргумент \fImode\fR может быть нулевым, но в этом случае, возможно, не удастся установить полное соответствие. .sp Все сообщения, созданные с помощью \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3), по умолчанию отправляются в \fIstderr\fR. Это поведение можно изменить с помощью \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .BR selabel_lookup_raw (3) работает аналогично \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3), но не выполняет преобразование контекста. .sp В разделе \fBФАЙЛЫ\fR приводится описание файлов конфигурации, которые используются для определения контекста файла. . .SH "ПАРАМЕТРЫ" Помимо глобальных параметров, описание которых приведено в .BR selabel_open (3), эта внутренняя служба распознаёт следующие параметры: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH Значение этого параметра, отличное от null, определяет путь к файлу, который будет открыт вместо стандартного файла контекстов файлов. Это значение также используется как базовое имя для определения имён локальных файлов настройки. .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY Отличное от null значение этого параметра означает, что любую локальную настройку сопоставления контекста файла следует игнорировать. .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET Отличное от null значение этого параметра интерпретируется как префикс пути, например, "/etc". Будут загружены только те спецификации контекстов файлов, первый компонент которых совпадает с указанным префиксом. Это может ускорить выполнение поиска, но, возможно, не удастся найти путь, который не начинается с указанного префикса. Данная оптимизация поиска больше не требуется (и устарела), вместо неё используется .I file_contexts.bin. .RE . .SH "ФАЙЛЫ" То, какие файлы контекстов файлов используются для получения контекста по умолчанию, зависит от параметра \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR, переданного в \fBselabel_open\fR(3). Если это \fINULL\fR, то \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR по умолчанию примет значение расположения контекстов файлов активной политики (которое возвращает \fBselinux_file_context_path\fR(3)), в ином случае будет использовано фактическое указанное значение \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR. .sp Если параметр \fBSELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY\fR задан, будут обрабатываться следующие файлы: .RS .IP "1." 4 Обязательный файл контекстов файлов - это либо полное имя файла из \fISELABEL_OPT_PATH.value\fR, либо (если \fINULL\fR) путь, который возвращает \fBselinux_file_context_path\fR(3). .IP "2." 4 Необязательные файлы для замены имён (файл для локального использования и файл для использования с дистрибутивами), которые присваивают псевдонимы пути для 'находящейся в памяти' версии файла контекстов файлов. .br Эти файлы имеют то же имя, что и у обязательного файла контекстов файлов, и расширения \fI.subs\fR и \fI.subs_dist\fR. .RE .sp Если параметр \fBSELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY\fR не задан, будут обработаны следующие файлы: .RS .IP "1." 4 Обязательный файл контекстов файлов, который является либо полным именем файла из \fISELABEL_OPT_PATH.value\fR, либо (если \fINULL\fR) путём, который возвращает \fBselinux_file_context_path\fR(3). .IP "2." 4 Необязательный файл локальной настройки, имеющий то же имя, что и обязательный файл контекстов файлов, и расширение \fI.local\fR. .br \fBselinux_file_context_local_path\fR(3) вернёт путь по умолчанию к этому файлу. .IP "3." 4 Необязательный файл настройки домашнего каталога пользователя, имеющий то же имя, что и обязательный файл контекстов файлов, и расширение \fI.homedirs\fR. .br \fBselinux_file_context_homedir_path\fR(3) вернёт путь по умолчанию к этому файлу. .IP "4." 4 Необязательные файлы для замены имён (файл для локального использования и файл для использования с дистрибутивами), которые присваивают псевдонимы пути для 'находящейся в памяти' версии файла контекстов файлов (и \fI.local\fR и/или \fI.homedirs\fR, если они имеются). Эти файлы имеют то же имя, что и обязательный файл контекстов файлов, и расширения \fI.subs\fR и \fI.subs_dist\fR. .br \fBselinux_file_context_subs_path\fR(3) и \fBselinux_file_context_subs_dist_path\fR(3) вернут пути по умолчанию к этим файлам. .RE .sp По умолчанию серия файлов контекстов файлов: .RS 6 .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.local .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.homedirs .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs_dist .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp Обязательным является только файл \fIfile_contexts\fR, все остальные являются необязательными. .sp Записи внутри серии файлов контекстов файлов показаны в разделе \fBФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА\fR. . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" .sp .SH "Формат контекстов файлов" .sp Каждая строка внутри \fIfile_contexts\fR и двух файлов настройки (\fI.local\fR и \fI.homedirs\fR) имеет следующий вид: .sp .RS .I pathname [file_type] context .RE .sp Где: .br .RS .I pathname .RS Определяющая имя пути запись, которая может быть в виде регулярного выражения. .RE .I file_type .RS Необязательный тип файла, который состоит из: .RS \fI\-b\fR - устройство блочного ввода-вывода \fI\-c\fR - устройство символьного ввода-вывода .br \fI\-d\fR - каталог \fI\-p\fR - именованный канал .br \fI\-l\fR - символическая ссылка \fI\-s\fR - сокет .br \fI\-\-\fR - обычный файл .RE .RE .I context .RS Запись может быть одним из следующих: .RS .IP "a." 4 Контекст безопасности, который будет назначен этому файлу (то есть возвращён как \fIcontext\fR). .IP "b." 4 Значение \fB<>\fR можно использовать, чтобы указать, что для соответствующих файлов не следует повторно проставлять метки, а также при этом значении \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) вернёт \-1 при установке \fIerrno\fR в \fBENOENT\fR. .RE .RE .RE .sp Пример: .RS # ./contexts/files/file_contexts .br # pathname file_type context .br /.* system_u:object_r:default_t:s0 .br /[^/]+ \-\- system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t:s0 .br /tmp/.* <> .RE .sp .SH "Формат файла подстановки" .sp Каждая строка внутри файлов подстановки (\fI.subs\fR и \fI.subs_dist\fR) имеет вид: .RS .I subs_pathname pathname .RE .sp Где: .RS .I pathname .RS Путь, который соответствует записи в одном или нескольких файлах конфигурации политики контекстов файлов. .RE .I subs_pathname .RS Путь, который станет псевдонимом имени пути (считается равнозначным при поиске). .RE .RE .sp Пример: .RS # ./contexts/files/file_contexts.subs .br # pathname subs_pathname .br /myweb /var/www .br /myspool /var/spool/mail .sp Пример выше: когда в \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) передаётся путь \fI/myweb/index.html\fR, функция заменяет компонент \fI/myweb\fR на \fI/var/www\fR, поэтому будет использоваться следующий путь: .sp .RS .I /var/www/index.html .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ" .IP "1." 4 Если контексты должны быть проверены, необходимо указать глобальный параметр \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR перед вызовом \fBselabel_open\fR(3). Если этот параметр не указан, может быть возвращён недействительный контекст. .IP "2." 4 Если серия файлов контекстов файлов содержит много записей, \fBselabel_open\fR(3) может медленно выполнять чтение в файлах и (если это запрошено) проверку записей. .IP "3." 4 В некоторых версиях SELinux также может присутствовать файл \fIfile_contexts.template\fR, но он устарел. .br Файл шаблона имеет тот же формат, что и файл \fIfile_contexts\fR, а также может содержать ключевые слова \fBHOME_ROOT\fR, \fBHOME_DIR\fR, \fBROLE\fR и \fBUSER\fR. Эта функциональность была перемещена в хранилище политик и управляется \fBsemodule\fR(8) и \fBgenhomedircon\fR(8). . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_file_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5), " lstat "(2), "selinux_file_context_subs_path "(3), " selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path "(3), " selinux_file_context_homedir_path "(3), "selinux_file_context_local_path "(3), " semodule "(8), " genhomedircon "(8) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/selabel_media.5000066400000000000000000000125711437566343300204600ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_media" "5" "29 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Документация API SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" selabel_media \- интерфейс проставления меток SELinux в пространстве пользователя и формат файла конфигурации для внутренней службы контекстов носителей . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" device_name ", int " unused ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" device_name ", int " unused ");" . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Внутренняя служба контекстов носителей сопоставляет имена устройств мультимедиа, например, "cdrom" или "floppy", с контекстами безопасности. Это действие служит для нахождения правильного контекста для установки контекстных подключений к этим устройствам. Необходимо освободить возвращённый \fIcontext\fR с помощью \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) описывает функцию с её возвращаемыми значениями и кодами ошибок. .sp Аргумент поиска целого числа в настоящее время не используется, для него следует указать равное нулю значение. .sp Все сообщения, созданные с помощью \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3), по умолчанию отправляются в \fIstderr\fR. Это поведение можно изменить с помощью \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .BR selabel_lookup_raw (3) работает аналогично \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3), но не выполняет преобразование контекста. .sp В разделе \fBФАЙЛЫ\fR приводится описание файлов конфигурации, которые используются для определения контекстов носителей. . .SH "ПАРАМЕТРЫ" Помимо глобальных параметров, описание которых приведено в \fBselabel_open\fR(3), эта внутренняя служба распознаёт следующие параметры: .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH Значение этого параметра, отличное от null, определяет путь к файлу, который будет открыт вместо стандартного файла контекстов носителей \fImedia\fR. . .SH "ФАЙЛЫ" То, какой файл контекстов носителей будет использоваться для получения контекста по умолчанию, зависит от параметра \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR, переданного в \fBselabel_open\FR(3). Если это \fINULL\fR, то значением \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR по умолчанию станет расположение контекстов носителей активной политики (возвращённое \fBselinux_media_context_path\fR(3)). В ином случае будет использовано фактическое указанное значение \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR. .sp Файл контекстов носителей по умолчанию: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/files/media .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка внутри файла \fImedia\fR имеет следующий вид: .RS .I device_name context .RE .sp Где: .RS .I device_name .RS Идентификатор носителя (например, cdrom, floppy, disk и usb). .RE .I context .RS Контекст, который следует использовать для проставления метки устройства. .RE .RE .sp Пример: .RS # contexts/files/media .br cdrom system_u:object_r:removable_device_t .br floppy system_u:object_r:removable_device_t .br disk system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t . .SH "ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ" Если контексты должны быть проверены, необходимо указать глобальный параметр \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR перед вызовом \fBselabel_open\fR(3). Если этот параметр не указан, может быть возвращён недействительный контекст. . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_media_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/selabel_x.5000066400000000000000000000252251437566343300176500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.\" Hey Emacs! This file is -*- nroff -*- source. .\" .\" Author: Eamon Walsh (ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov) 2007 .TH "selabel_x" "5" "29 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Документация API SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" selabel_x \- интерфейс проставления меток SELinux в пространстве пользователя и формат файла конфигурации для внутренней службы контекстов оконной системы X Window System. Эта внутренняя служба также используется для определения контекста по умолчанию, который следует присвоить подключённым удалённо клиентам X . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B #include .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" .in .sp .BI "int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *" hnd , .in +\w'int selabel_lookup('u .BI "char **" context , .br .BI "const char *" object_name ", int " object_type ");" . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Внутренняя служба контекстов X сопоставляет имена объектов X Window System с контекстами безопасности. Это действие служит для нахождения правильного контекста для объектов X Window System, значимость и/или семантика использования которых в основном определяются именем. Необходимо освободить возвращённый \fIcontext\fR с помощью \fBfreecon\fR(3). .br \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3) описывает функцию с её возвращаемыми значениями и кодами ошибок. .sp Эта внутренняя служба также используется для определения контекста по умолчанию, который следует назначить для подключённых удалённо клиентов X. .sp Для аргумента \fIobject_type\fR необходимо установить одно из следующих значений: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_X_PROP Аргумент .I object_name указывает имя свойства окна, например, "WM_NAME". .TP .B SELABEL_X_SELN Аргумент .I object_name указывает имя выделения, например, "PRIMARY". .TP .B SELABEL_X_EXT Аргумент .I object_name указывает имя расширения протокола, например, "RENDER". .TP .B SELABEL_X_EVENT Аргумент .I object_name указывает имя типа события, например, "X11:ButtonPress". .TP .B SELABEL_X_CLIENT Аргумент .I object_name игнорируется, но его значением необходимо установить либо \fI*\fR (звёздочка, 'подстановочный знак': будет выбрана запись по умолчанию), либо конкретную запись, такую как "remote" в файле контекстов X, как показано в разделе \fBПРИМЕР\fR. В этом случае будет возвращён контекст по умолчанию, который следует присвоить удалённым клиентам X. .TP .B SELABEL_X_POLYPROP Работает аналогично .BR SELABEL_X_PROP , но проверяет, было ли свойство отмечено как многоэкземплярное. См. \fBПРИМЕЧАНИЯ\fR далее. .TP .B SELABEL_X_POLYSELN Аналогично .BR SELABEL_X_SELN , но проверяет, было ли выделение отмечено как многоэкземплярное. См. \fBПРИМЕЧАНИЯ\fR далее. .RE .sp Все сообщения, созданные \fBselabel_lookup\fR(3), по умолчанию отправляются в \fIstderr\fR. Это поведение можно изменить с помощью \fBselinux_set_callback\fR(3). .sp .B selabel_lookup_raw работает аналогично \fBselabel_lookup\fR, но не выполняет преобразование контекста. .sp В разделе \fBФАЙЛЫ\fR приводится описание файлов конфигурации, которые используются для определения контекстов объектов Х. . .SH "ПАРАМЕТРЫ" Помимо глобальных параметров, описание которых приведено в \fBselabel_open\fR(3), эта внутренняя служба распознаёт следующие параметры: .RS .TP .B SELABEL_OPT_PATH Значение этого параметра, отличное от null, определяет путь к файлу, который будет открыт вместо стандартного файла контекстов Х (подробные сведения см. в разделе \fBФАЙЛЫ\fR). .RE . .SH "ФАЙЛЫ" То, какой файл контекста Х будет использоваться для получения контекста по умолчанию, зависит от параметра \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR, переданного в \fBselabel_open\fR(3). Если \fINULL\fR, то значением \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR по умолчанию станет расположение контекстов Х активной политики (возвращённое \fBselinux_x_context_path\fR(3)). В ином случае будет использовано фактическое указанное значение \fBSELABEL_OPT_PATH\fR. .sp Файл контекстов объектов Х по умолчанию: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/x_contexts .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp Записи, находящиеся внутри файла контекстов X, показаны в разделах \fBЗначения строки имени объекта\fR и \fBФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА\fR. . .SH "Значения строки имени объекта" Имена строк, назначенные аргументам \fIobject_type\fR, которые могут присутствовать в файле контекстов X: .TS center, allbox, tab(@); lI lB lB l . object_type@Текстовое имя SELABEL_X_PROP@property SELABEL_X_SELN@selection SELABEL_X_EXT@extension SELABEL_X_EVENT@event SELABEL_X_CLIENT@client SELABEL_X_POLYPROP@poly_property SELABEL_X_POLYSELN@poly_selection .TE . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка внутри файла контекстов X имеет следующий вид: .RS .I object_type object_name context .RE .sp Где: .RS .I object_type .RS Это строковое представление типа объекта, показанное в разделе \fBЗначения строки имени объекта\fR. Несколько строк с одной и той же строкой \fIobject_type\fR сформируют блок записей (каждая со своей строкой \fIobject_name\fR). .RE .I object_name .RS Это имена объектов конкретного ресурса сервера X, например, \fBPRIMARY\fR, \fBCUT_BUFFER0\fR и т.д. Обычно они определены в исходном коде сервера X (\fIprotocol.txt\fR и \fIBuiltInAtoms\fR в каталоге dix исходного пакета xorg\-server). Запись может содержать подстановочные знаки '*' или '?' для выполнения сопоставления с дополнением или подстановкой. Следует учитывать, что при использовании '*' важен порядок записей в файле. '*' в отдельном виде используется для того, чтобы обеспечить назначение резервного контекста по умолчанию, это должна быть последняя запись в блоке \fIobject_type\fR. .RE .I context .RS Контекст безопасности, который будет применён к объекту. .RE .RE .sp Пример 1: .sp .nf # object_type object_name context selection PRIMARY system_u:object_r:clipboard_xselection_t:s0 selection * system_u:object_r:xselection_t:s0 .fi .sp Пример 2 - этот пример показывает, как можно настроить запись клиента таким образом, чтобы она всегда находилась: .sp .nf # object_type object_name context client * system_u:object_r:remote_t:s0 .fi . .SH "ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ" .IP "1." 4 Свойства и выделения отмечаются как многоэкземплярные или нет. Для этих типов имён параметр "POLY" выполняет поиск только имён, которые отмечены как многоэкземплярные, в то время как другой параметр выполняет поиск только имён, которые отмечены как не многоэкземплярные. Пользователям этого интерфейса следует проверить оба сопоставления и затем (необязательно) действовать на основе полученного результата (например, сделать объект многоэкземплярным). .IP "2." 4 Если контексты должны быть проверены, необходимо указать глобальный параметр \fBSELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE\fR перед вызовом \fBselabel_open\fR(3). Если этот параметр не указан, может быть возвращён недействительный контекст. . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selabel_open "(3), " selabel_lookup "(3), " selabel_stats "(3), " selabel_close "(3), " selinux_set_callback "(3), " selinux_x_context_path "(3), " freecon "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/sepgsql_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000000261437566343300213070ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_db.5 libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/service_seusers.5000066400000000000000000000053621437566343300211230ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "service_seusers" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Конфигурация SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" service_seusers \- файлы конфигурации сопоставления пользователей и служб GNU/Linux с пользователями SELinux . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Это необязательные файлы, которые позволяют службам определять пользователя SELinux при аутентификации через поддерживающие SELinux приложения для входа, например, .BR PAM "(8). " .sp Для каждого имени пользователя GNU/Linux имеется один файл, который потребуется для запуска службы с определённым именем пользователя SELinux. .sp Путь к каждому файлу конфигурации формируется путём, который был возвращён .BR selinux_policy_root "(3), с добавлением " .IR /logins/username в конце (где \fIusername\fR - это файл, представляющий имя пользователя GNU/Linux). Каталог служб по умолчанию расположен по следующему адресу: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/logins .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR getseuser "(3) выполняет чтение этого файла для сопоставления служб с пользователем SELinux. " . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка внутри файла \fIusername\fR имеет следующий формат, каждый компонент отделяется двоеточием: .RS .IB service : seuser \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Где: .RS .I service .RS Имя службы, которая используется приложением. .RE .I seuser .RS Имя пользователя SELinux. .RE .I range .RS Диапазон для политики MCS/MLS. .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕРЫ" Пример 1 - для пользователя 'root': .RS # ./logins/root .br ipa:user_u:s0 .br this_service:unconfined_u:s0 .RE .sp Пример 2 - для пользователя GNU/Linux 'rch': .RS # ./logins/rch .br ipa:unconfined_u:s0 .br that_service:unconfined_u:s0 .RE . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " PAM "(8), " selinux_policy_root "(3), " getseuser "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/seusers.5000066400000000000000000000052051437566343300173770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "seusers" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Конфигурация SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" seusers \- файл конфигурации сопоставления пользователей GNU/Linux с пользователями SELinux . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Файл .I seusers содержит список сопоставления пользователей GNU/Linux с пользователями SELinux, который используется поддерживающими SELinux приложениями для входа, например, \fBPAM\fR(8). .sp .BR selinux_usersconf_path "(3) " вернёт путь активной политики к этому файлу. Файл сопоставления пользователей SELinux по умолчанию находится по следующему адресу: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/seusers .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp .BR getseuserbyname "(3) выполняет чтение этого файла для сопоставления пользователя или группы GNU/Linux с пользователем SELinux. " . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка файла конфигурации .I seusers состоит из следующих компонентов: .sp .RS \fR[\fB%\fIgroup_id\fR]|[\fIuser_id\fR]\fB:\fIseuser_id\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Где: .RS \fIgroup_id\fR|\fIuser_id .RS \fRИдентификатор пользователя GNU/Linux или (если предваряется символом процентного значения (\fB%\fR)) идентификатор группы GNU/Linux. .br При необходимости в качестве резервной записи можно предоставить необязательную запись, установленную в \fB__default__\fR. .RE .I seuser_id .RS Идентификатор пользователя SELinux. .RE .I range .RS Необязательный уровень или диапазон для политики MLS/MCS. .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕР" # ./seusers .br system_u:system_u:s0\-s15:c0.c255 .br root:root:s0\-s15:c0.c255 .br fred:user_u:s0 .br __default__:user_u:s0 .br %user_group:user_u:s0 . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " PAM "(8), " selinux_usersconf_path "(3), " getseuserbyname "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/user_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000075221437566343300206170ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "user_contexts" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Конфигурация SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" user_contexts \- файлы конфигурации SELinux-контекстов пользователей SELinux . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Эти необязательные файлы конфигурации контекстов пользователей содержат записи, которые позволяют поддерживающим SELinux приложениям для входа, например, .BR PAM (8) (запущенным в своих собственных контекстах процессов), определять контекст, в котором должен запускаться сеанс пользователя. .sp Обычно поддерживающие SELinux приложения для входа используют одну или несколько следующих функций libselinux, которые выполняют чтение этих файлов по пути активной политики: .RS .BR get_default_context (3) .br .BR get_ordered_context_list (3) .br .BR get_ordered_context_list_with_level (3) .br .BR get_default_context_with_level (3) .br .BR get_default_context_with_role (3) .br .BR get_default_context_with_rolelevel (3) .br .BR query_user_context (3) .br .BR manual_user_enter_context (3) .RE .sp Для каждого пользователя SELinux можно настроить только один файл. Путь к файлу формируется с помощью пути, возвращённого .BR \%selinux_user_contexts_path (3) для активной политики, с добавлением в конце имени пользователя SELinux, например: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/users/unconfined_u .br .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/users/xguest_u .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). .sp Эти файлы содержат информацию о контексте в соответствии с описанием в разделе .B ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА. . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка в файле конфигурации контекста пользователя состоит из следующих компонентов: .RS .I login_process user_login_process .RE .sp Где: .RS .I login_process .RS Состоит из записи \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR], которая представляет собой контекст процесса входа. .RE .I user_login_process .RS Состоит из записи \fIrole\fB:\fItype\fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR], которая представляет собой контекст процесса входа пользователя. .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕР" # Пример для xguest_u в /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/users/xguest_u .br system_r:crond_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:initrc_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:local_login_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:remote_login_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:sshd_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br system_r:xdm_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 .br xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 xguest_r:xguest_t:s0 . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " selinux_user_contexts_path "(3), " PAM "(8), " get_ordered_context_list "(3), " get_ordered_context_list_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_level "(3), " get_default_context_with_role "(3), " get_default_context_with_rolelevel "(3), " query_user_context "(3), " manual_user_enter_context "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/virtual_domain_context.5000066400000000000000000000035721437566343300224740ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "virtual_domain_context" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Конфигурация SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" virtual_domain_context \- файл конфигурации SELinux-контекста домена виртуальной машины . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Файл .I virtual_domain_context содержит список контекстов доменов, которые доступны для использования поддерживающему SELinux API виртуализации libvirt (см. \fBlibvirtd\fR(8)). .sp .BR selinux_virtual_domain_context_path "(3) " вернёт путь активной политики к этому файлу. Файл контекстов виртуальных доменов по умолчанию: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/virtual_domain_context .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка в файле состоит из записи следующего вида: .RS .IB user : role : type \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Где: .RS .I user role type range .RS Пользователь, роль, тип и необязательный диапазон (для MCS/MLS), разделённые двоеточиями (:), которые могут использоваться в качестве контекста виртуального домена. .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕР" # ./contexts/virtual_domain_context .br system_u:object_r:svirt_t:s0 . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " libvirtd "(8), " selinux_virtual_domain_context_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/virtual_image_context.5000066400000000000000000000035761437566343300223130ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "virtual_image_context" "5" "28 ноября 2011" "Security Enhanced Linux" "Конфигурация SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" virtual_image_context \- файл конфигурации SELinux-контекста образа виртуальной машины . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Файл .I virtual_image_context содержит список контекстов образов для использования поддерживающим SELinux API виртуализации libvirt (см. \fBlibvirtd\fR(8)). .sp .BR selinux_virtual_image_context_path "(3) " вернёт путь активной политики к этому файлу. Файл контекстов виртуальных образов по умолчанию: .RS .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/contexts/virtual_image_context .RE .sp Где \fI{SELINUXTYPE}\fR - запись из файла конфигурации selinux \fIconfig\fR (см. \fBselinux_config\fR(5)). . .SH "ФОРМАТ ФАЙЛА" Каждая строка в файле состоит из записи следующего вида: .RS .IB user : role : type \fR[\fB:\fIrange\fR] .RE .sp Где: .RS .I user role type range .RS Пользователь, роль, тип и необязательный диапазон (для MCS/MLS), разделённые двоеточиями (:), которые могут использоваться в качестве контекста виртуального образа. .RE .RE . .SH "ПРИМЕР" # ./contexts/virtual_image_context .br system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0 .br system_u:object_r:svirt_content_t:s0 . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR selinux "(8), " libvirtd "(8), " selinux_virtual_image_context_path "(3), " selinux_config "(5) " .SH АВТОРЫ Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man5/x_contexts.5000066400000000000000000000000251437566343300200770ustar00rootroot00000000000000.so man5/selabel_x.5 libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300156215ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/avcstat.8000066400000000000000000000025421437566343300173620ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "avcstat" "8" "18 ноября 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" avcstat \- показать статистику AVC (Access Vector Cache, кэш вектора доступа) SELinux . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B avcstat .RB [ \-c ] .RB [ \-f .IR status_file ] .RI [ interval ] . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Показать статистику AVC SELinux. Если указан параметр .I interval , программа будет выполняться циклами, показывая обновлённую статистику каждые .I interval секунд. По умолчанию показываются относительные значения. . .SH ПАРАМЕТРЫ .TP .B \-c Показать совокупные значения. .TP .B \-f Указывает расположение файла статистики AVC, по умолчанию это .IR /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats . . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR selinux (8) . .SH АВТОРЫ Эта страница руководства была написана Dan Walsh . Программа была написана James Morris . Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/booleans.8000066400000000000000000000073541437566343300175250ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "booleans" "8" "11 августа 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" booleans \- логические переключатели политики позволяют настраивать политику SELinux в среде выполнения . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Эта страница руководства описывает логические переключатели политики SELinux. .BR Политика SELinux может включать условные правила, которое включены или отключены в зависимости от текущих значений набора логических переключателей политики. Эти логические переключатели политики позволяют изменять политику безопасности в среде выполнения без загрузки новой политики. Например, логический переключатель httpd_enable_cgi (если он включён) позволяет управляющей программе httpd запускать сценарии cgi. Если администратору требуется запретить исполнение сценариев cgi, можно просто установить соответствующее значение этого переключателя. Политика определяет значение по умолчанию для каждого логического переключателя, обычно это false. Эти значения по умолчанию можно переопределить через локальные параметры, созданные с помощью утилиты .BR setsebool (8) , используя .B \-P для сохранения параметра после перезагрузок. Средство .B system\-config\-securitylevel предоставляет графический интерфейс для изменения параметров. Программа .BR load_policy (8) по умолчанию сохранит текущие параметры логических переключателей после перезагрузки политики по умолчанию. При необходимости также можно сбросить значения логических переключателей на их значения по умолчанию при загрузке, для этого используется параметр .B \-b. Для получения и вывода списка логических значений служит утилита .BR getsebool (8) с параметром .B \-a. Логические значения также можно изменить во время выполнения с помощью утилиты .BR setsebool (8) или утилиты .BR togglesebool (8). По умолчанию эти утилиты изменяют только текущее логическое значение и не влияют на постоянные параметры, если в setsebool не используется параметр .B \-P. . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR getsebool (8), .BR setsebool (8), .BR selinux (8), .BR togglesebool (8) . .SH АВТОРЫ Эта страница руководства была написана Dan Walsh . Поддержка условной политики SELinux была разработана Tresys Technology. Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/getenforce.8000066400000000000000000000013041437566343300200310ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getenforce" "8" "7 апреля 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" getenforce \- получить текущий режим SELinux . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B getenforce . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" .B getenforce сообщает, в каком режиме работает SELinux (принудительный, разрешительный, отключённый). . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR selinux (8), .BR setenforce (8), .BR selinuxenabled (8) . .SH АВТОРЫ Dan Walsh, . Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/getsebool.8000066400000000000000000000043011437566343300176730ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "getsebool" "8" "11 августа 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" getsebool \- получить логические значения SELinux . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B getsebool .RB [ \-a ] .RI [ boolean ] . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" .B getsebool сообщает, где включён или отключён конкретный логический переключатель или все логические переключатели SELinux. В некоторых ситуациях для логического переключателя может существовать ожидающее изменение (переход из одного состояние в другое) - getsebool сообщит об этом. Ожидающее значение - то значение, которое будет применено при следующей фиксации логического переключателя. Установка значений логических переключателей выполняется в два этапа; сначала изменяется ожидающее значение, а затем логические переключатели фиксируются, в результате чего их активные значения заменяются ожидающими значениями. Это позволяет изменить группу логических переключателей за одну транзацию, задав все необходимые ожидающие значения и затем одновременно зафиксировав их. . .SH ПАРАМЕТРЫ .TP .B \-a Показать все логические переключатели SELinux. . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR selinux (8), .BR setsebool (8), .BR booleans (8) . .SH АВТОРЫ Эта страница руководства была написана Dan Walsh . Программа была написана Tresys Technology. Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/matchpathcon.8000066400000000000000000000050571437566343300203720ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "matchpathcon" "8" "21 апреля 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" matchpathcon \- получить текущий контекст безопасности SELinux для указанного пути из конфигурации контекстов файлов . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B matchpathcon .RB [ \-V ] .RB [ \-N ] .RB [ \-n ] .RB [ \-m .IR type ] .RB [ \-f .IR file_contexts_file ] .RB [ \-p .IR prefix ] .RB [ \-P .IR policy_root_path ] .I filepath... . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" .BR matchpathcon опрашивает системную политику и выводит контекст безопасности по умолчанию, связанный с путём к файлу. .B Примечание: Одинаковые пути могут иметь разные контексты безопасности в зависимости от типа файла (обычный файл, каталог, файл связи, файл знаков ...). .B matchpathcon также будет учитывать тип файла при определении контекста безопасности по умолчанию (если файл существует). Если файл не существует, сопоставление по типу файла не будет выполнено. . .SH ПАРАМЕТРЫ .TP .BI \-m " type" Принудительно указать тип файла для поиска. Действительные типы: .BR file ", " dir ", "pipe ", " chr_file ", " blk_file ", " .BR lnk_file ", " sock_file . .TP .B \-n Не показывать путь. .TP .B \-N Не использовать преобразования. .TP .BI \-f " file_context_file" Использовать альтернативный файл file_context .TP .BI \-p " prefix" Использовать префикс для ускорения преобразований .TP .BI \-P " policy_root_path" Использовать альтернативный корневой путь к политике .TP .B \-V Проверить контекст файла на диске на соответствие параметрам по умолчанию . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR selinux "(8), " .BR matchpathcon (3) . .SH АВТОРЫ Эта страница руководства была написана Dan Walsh . Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/sefcontext_compile.8000066400000000000000000000046661437566343300216200ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "sefcontext_compile" "8" "12 августа 2015" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" sefcontext_compile \- скомпилировать файлы регулярных выражений контекстов файлов . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B sefcontext_compile .RB [ \-o .IR outputfile ] .RB [ \-p .IR policyfile ] .I inputfile . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" .B sefcontext_compile используется для компиляции регулярных выражений контекстов файлов в формат .BR pcre (3). .sp Скомпилированный файл используется функциями проставления меток файлов libselinux. .sp По умолчанию .B sefcontext_compile записывает скомпилированный файл pcre с суффиксом .B .bin в конце (например, \fIinputfile\fB.bin\fR). .SH ПАРАМЕТРЫ .TP .B \-o Указать .I outputfile - должно быть полным именем файла, так как суффикс .B .bin не добавляется автоматически. .TP .B \-p Указать двоичный .I policyfile для использования при проверке записей контекста в .I inputfile .br Если найден недействительный контекст, запись файла в формате pcre не будет выполнена и появится сообщение об ошибке. .SH "ВОЗВРАЩАЕМОЕ ЗНАЧЕНИЕ" При ошибке возвращается -1. При успешном завершении возвращается 0. .SH "ПРИМЕРЫ" .B Пример 1: .br sefcontext_compile /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts .sp В результате создаётся следующий файл: .RS /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts.bin .RE .sp .B Пример 2: .br sefcontext_compile -o new_fc.bin /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts .sp В результате в текущем рабочем каталоге создаётся следующий файл: .RS new_fc.bin .RE . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR selinux (8), .BR semanage (8) . .SH АВТОРЫ Dan Walsh, . Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/selinux.8000066400000000000000000000207751437566343300174140ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinux" "8" "29 апреля 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" SELinux \- Linux с улучшенной безопасностью от NSA (SELinux) . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Linux с улучшенной безопасностью от NSA - это реализация гибкой архитектуры мандатного управления доступом в операционной системе Linux. Архитектура SELinux предоставляет общую поддержку использования различных видов политик мандатного управления доступом, включая основанные на концепциях Type Enforcement® (принудительное присвоение типов), Role-Based Access Control (управление доступом на основе ролей) и Multi-Level Security (многоуровневая безопасность). Дополнительная информация и техническая документация по SELinux доступна по адресу https://github.com/SELinuxProject. Файл конфигурации .I /etc/selinux/config позволяет управлять включением и отключением SELinux и, если SELinux включён, устанавливать режим его работы - разрешительный или принудительный. Переменной .B SELINUX можно задать значение отключённой, разрешительной или принудительной, чтобы выбрать один из этих вариантов. Если выбрать отключение режима, код ядра и приложения SELinux будет полностью отключён, система будет работать без какой-либо защиты SELinux. При установке разрешительного режима код SELinux включён, но не выполняет отказы в доступе, а только журналирует те действия, которые были бы запрещены при принудительном режиме. При установке принудительного режима код SELinux включён, выполняет отказы в доступе и журналирует соответствующие попытки доступа. Набор отказов в доступе в разрешительном режиме может отличаться от этого набора в принудительном режиме как по причине того, что принудительный режим предотвращает дальнейшее выполнение операции после первого отказа, так и из-за того, что после получения отказа в доступе часть кода приложения вернётся к работе в менее привилегированном режиме. Файл конфигурации .I /etc/selinux/config также управляет тем, какая политика активна в системе. SELinux позволяет установить в системе несколько политик, но одновременно можно использовать только одну из них. В настоящее время имеется несколько видов политики SELinux, например, целевая политика (targeted), политика многоуровневой безопасности (mls). Целевая политика позволяет большинству процессов пользователя выполняться без ограничений, помещая в отдельные домены безопасности, ограниченные политикой, только отдельные службы. Например, процессы пользователя выполняются в никак не ограниченном домене, в то время как именованная управляющая программа или управляющая программа apache будет выполняться в отдельном специально настроенном домене. Если используется политика MLS (Multi-Level Security), все процессы будут разделены по детально настроенным доменам безопасности и ограничены политикой. MLS также поддерживает модель Белла — Лападулы, в которой процессы ограничиваются не только по типу, но и по уровню данных. Чтобы определить, какая политика будет выполняться, следует установить переменную среды .B SELINUXTYPE в .IR /etc/selinux/config . Чтобы применить к системе изменение типа политики, необходимо перезагрузить систему и, возможно, повторно проставить метки. В каталогах .I /etc/selinux/{SELINUXTYPE}/ необходимо установить для каждой такой политики соответствующую конфигурацию. Дальнейшую настройку отдельной политики SELinux можно выполнить с помощью набора настраиваемых при компиляции параметров и набора логических переключателей среды выполнения политики. .B \%system\-config\-selinux позволяет настроить эти логические переключатели и настраиваемые параметры. Многие домены, которые защищены SELinux, также содержат man-страницы SELinux с информацией о настройке соответствующей политики. . .SH "ПРОСТАВЛЕНИЕ МЕТОК ДЛЯ ФАЙЛОВ" Всем файлам, каталогам, устройствам ... назначены контексты безопасности/метки. Эти контексты хранятся в расширенных атрибутах файловой системы. Проблемы с SELinux часто возникают из-за неправильного проставления меток в файловой системе. Это может быть вызвано загрузкой компьютера с ядром, отличным от SELinux. Появление сообщения об ошибке, содержащего file_t, обычно означает серьёзную проблему с проставлением меток в файловой системе. Лучшим способом повторного проставления меток в файловой системе является создание файла флага .I /.autorelabel и последующая перезагрузка. .BR system\-config\-selinux также имеет эту функциональность. Кроме того, для повторного проставления меток для файлов можно использовать команды .BR restorecon / fixfiles. . .SH ФАЙЛЫ .I /etc/selinux/config . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .ad l .nh .BR booleans (8), .BR setsebool (8), .BR sepolicy (8), .BR system-config-selinux (8), .BR togglesebool (8), .BR restorecon (8), .BR fixfiles (8), .BR setfiles (8), .BR semanage (8), .BR sepolicy (8) Для каждой ограниченной службы в системе имеется man-cтраница следующего формата: .br .BR _selinux (8) Например, для службы httpd имеется страница .BR httpd_selinux (8). .B man -k selinux Выведет список всех man-страниц SELinux. .SH АВТОРЫ Эта страница руководства была написана Dan Walsh . Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/selinuxenabled.8000066400000000000000000000016011437566343300207120ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinuxenabled" "8" "7 апреля 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" selinuxenabled \- утилита для использования внутри сценариев оболочки, которая позволяет определить, включён ли selinux . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B selinuxenabled . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Показывает, включён или отключён SELinux. . .SH "СОСТОЯНИЕ ВЫХОДА" Выход с состоянием 0, если SELinux включён, и 1, если он отключён. . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR selinux (8), .BR setenforce (8), .BR getenforce (8) . .SH АВТОРЫ Dan Walsh, . Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/selinuxexeccon.8000066400000000000000000000020641437566343300207500ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "selinuxexeccon" "8" "14 мая 2011" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" selinuxexeccon \- сообщить контекст SELinux, который используется для этого исполняемого файла . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B selinuxexeccon .I command .RI [ fromcon ] . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" .B selinuxexeccon сообщает контекст SELinux для указанной команды из указанного контекста или текущего контекста. . .SH ПРИМЕР .nf # selinuxexeccon /usr/bin/passwd staff_u:staff_r:passwd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 # selinuxexeccon /usr/sbin/sendmail system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 system_u:system_r:system_mail_t:s0 .fi . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR secon (8) . .SH АВТОРЫ Эта страница руководства была написана Dan Walsh . Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/setenforce.8000066400000000000000000000021321437566343300200450ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "setenforce" "8" "7 апреля 2004" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" setenforce \- изменить режим, в котором выполняется SELinux . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B setenforce .RB [ Enforcing | Permissive | 1 | 0 ] . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" Используйте .B Enforcing или .B 1 для установки SELinux в принудительный режим. .br Используйте .B Permissive или .B 0 для установки SELinux в разрешительный режим. Если SELinux отключён и требуется его включить (или если SELinux включён и требуется его отключить), обратитесь к странице руководства .BR selinux (8). . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR selinux (8), .BR getenforce (8), .BR selinuxenabled (8) . .SH АВТОРЫ Dan Walsh, . Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/man/ru/man8/togglesebool.8000066400000000000000000000021471437566343300204030ustar00rootroot00000000000000.TH "togglesebool" "8" "26 октября 2004" "sgrubb@redhat.com" "Документация по командной строке SELinux" .SH "ИМЯ" togglesebool \- переключить текущее значение логического переключателя SELinux . .SH "ОБЗОР" .B togglesebool .I boolean... . .SH "ОПИСАНИЕ" .B togglesebool переключает текущее значение списка логических переключателей. Если текущее значение 1, то оно будет заменено на 0, и наоборот. Меняются только "находящиеся в памяти" значения; параметры загрузки остаются без изменений. . .SH "СМОТРИТЕ ТАКЖЕ" .BR selinux (8), .BR booleans (8), .BR getsebool (8), .BR setsebool (8) . .SH АВТОРЫ Эта страница руководства была написана Steve Grubb . Перевод на русский язык выполнила Герасименко Олеся . libselinux-3.5/src/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300143445ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/src/.gitignore000066400000000000000000000001171437566343300163330ustar00rootroot00000000000000selinux.py selinuxswig_python_wrap.c selinuxswig_ruby_wrap.c selinux.egg-info/ libselinux-3.5/src/Makefile000066400000000000000000000203441437566343300160070ustar00rootroot00000000000000# Support building the Python bindings multiple times, against various Python # runtimes (e.g. Python 2 vs Python 3) by optionally prefixing the build # targets with "PYPREFIX": PYTHON ?= python3 PYPREFIX ?= $(shell $(PYTHON) -c 'import sys;print("python-%d.%d" % sys.version_info[:2])') RUBY ?= ruby RUBYPREFIX ?= $(notdir $(RUBY)) PKG_CONFIG ?= pkg-config # Installation directories. PREFIX ?= /usr LIBDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/lib SHLIBDIR ?= /lib INCLUDEDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/include PYINC ?= $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags $(PYPREFIX)) PYLIBS ?= $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs $(PYPREFIX)) PYTHONLIBDIR ?= $(shell $(PYTHON) -c "import sysconfig; print(sysconfig.get_path('platlib', vars={'platbase': '$(PREFIX)', 'base': '$(PREFIX)'}))") PYCEXT ?= $(shell $(PYTHON) -c 'import importlib.machinery;print(importlib.machinery.EXTENSION_SUFFIXES[0])') RUBYINC ?= $(shell $(RUBY) -e 'puts "-I" + RbConfig::CONFIG["rubyarchhdrdir"] + " -I" + RbConfig::CONFIG["rubyhdrdir"]') RUBYLIBS ?= $(shell $(RUBY) -e 'puts "-L" + RbConfig::CONFIG["libdir"] + " -L" + RbConfig::CONFIG["archlibdir"] + " " + RbConfig::CONFIG["LIBRUBYARG_SHARED"]') RUBYINSTALL ?= $(shell $(RUBY) -e 'puts RbConfig::CONFIG["vendorarchdir"]') VERSION = $(shell cat ../VERSION) LIBVERSION = 1 OS ?= $(shell uname) ifeq ($(shell $(CC) -v 2>&1 | grep "clang"),) COMPILER ?= gcc else COMPILER ?= clang endif LIBA=libselinux.a TARGET=libselinux.so LIBPC=libselinux.pc SWIGIF= selinuxswig_python.i selinuxswig_python_exception.i SWIGRUBYIF= selinuxswig_ruby.i SWIGCOUT= selinuxswig_python_wrap.c SWIGPYOUT= selinux.py SWIGRUBYCOUT= selinuxswig_ruby_wrap.c SWIGLOBJ:= $(patsubst %.c,$(PYPREFIX)%.lo,$(SWIGCOUT)) SWIGRUBYLOBJ:= $(patsubst %.c,%.lo,$(SWIGRUBYCOUT)) SWIGSO=$(PYPREFIX)_selinux.so SWIGFILES=$(SWIGSO) $(SWIGPYOUT) SWIGRUBYSO=$(RUBYPREFIX)_selinux.so LIBSO=$(TARGET).$(LIBVERSION) AUDIT2WHYLOBJ=$(PYPREFIX)audit2why.lo AUDIT2WHYSO=$(PYPREFIX)audit2why.so # If no specific libsepol.a is specified, fall back on LDFLAGS search path # Otherwise, as $(LIBSEPOLA) already appears in the dependencies, there # is no need to define a value for LDLIBS_LIBSEPOLA ifeq ($(LIBSEPOLA),) LDLIBS_LIBSEPOLA := -l:libsepol.a endif GENERATED=$(SWIGCOUT) $(SWIGRUBYCOUT) $(SWIGCOUT) selinuxswig_python_exception.i SRCS= $(filter-out $(GENERATED) audit2why.c, $(sort $(wildcard *.c))) MAX_STACK_SIZE=32768 ifeq ($(COMPILER), gcc) EXTRA_CFLAGS = -fipa-pure-const -Wlogical-op -Wpacked-bitfield-compat -Wsync-nand \ -Wcoverage-mismatch -Wcpp -Wformat-contains-nul -Wnormalized=nfc -Wsuggest-attribute=const \ -Wsuggest-attribute=noreturn -Wsuggest-attribute=pure -Wtrampolines -Wjump-misses-init \ -Wno-suggest-attribute=pure -Wno-suggest-attribute=const -U_FORTIFY_SOURCE -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 \ -Wstrict-overflow=5 -fno-semantic-interposition else EXTRA_CFLAGS = -Wunused-command-line-argument endif OBJS= $(patsubst %.c,%.o,$(SRCS)) LOBJS= $(patsubst %.c,%.lo,$(SRCS)) CFLAGS ?= -O -Wall -W -Wundef -Wformat-y2k -Wformat-security -Winit-self -Wmissing-include-dirs \ -Wunused -Wunknown-pragmas -Wstrict-aliasing -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith \ -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wwrite-strings -Waggregate-return \ -Wstrict-prototypes -Wold-style-definition -Wmissing-prototypes \ -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-noreturn -Wmissing-format-attribute \ -Wredundant-decls -Wnested-externs -Winline -Winvalid-pch -Wvolatile-register-var \ -Wdisabled-optimization -Wbuiltin-macro-redefined \ -Wattributes -Wmultichar \ -Wdeprecated-declarations -Wdiv-by-zero -Wdouble-promotion -Wendif-labels -Wextra \ -Wformat-extra-args -Wformat-zero-length -Wformat=2 -Wmultichar \ -Woverflow -Wpointer-to-int-cast -Wpragmas \ -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-sign-compare \ -Wno-format-nonliteral -Wframe-larger-than=$(MAX_STACK_SIZE) \ -fstack-protector-all --param=ssp-buffer-size=4 -fexceptions \ -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -fdiagnostics-show-option \ -Werror -Wno-aggregate-return -Wno-redundant-decls \ $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) LD_SONAME_FLAGS=-soname,$(LIBSO),--version-script=libselinux.map,-z,defs,-z,relro ifeq ($(OS), Darwin) override CFLAGS += -I/opt/local/include override LDFLAGS += -L/opt/local/lib -undefined dynamic_lookup LD_SONAME_FLAGS=-install_name,$(LIBSO) endif # override with -lfts when building on Musl libc to use fts-standalone FTS_LDLIBS ?= override CFLAGS += -I../include -D_GNU_SOURCE $(DISABLE_FLAGS) $(PCRE_CFLAGS) # check for strlcpy(3) availability H := \# ifeq (yes,$(shell printf '${H}include \nint main(void){char*d,*s;strlcpy(d, s, 0);return 0;}' | $(CC) -x c -o /dev/null - >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo yes)) override CFLAGS += -DHAVE_STRLCPY endif SWIG_CFLAGS += -Wno-error -Wno-unused-variable -Wno-unused-but-set-variable -Wno-unused-parameter \ -Wno-shadow -Wno-uninitialized -Wno-missing-prototypes -Wno-missing-declarations \ -Wno-deprecated-declarations RANLIB ?= ranlib ARCH := $(patsubst i%86,i386,$(shell uname -m)) ifneq (,$(filter i386,$(ARCH))) TLSFLAGS += -mno-tls-direct-seg-refs endif ifeq ($(ANDROID_HOST),y) DISABLE_FLAGS+= -DNO_MEDIA_BACKEND -DNO_DB_BACKEND -DNO_X_BACKEND \ -DBUILD_HOST SRCS= callbacks.c freecon.c label.c label_file.c \ label_backends_android.c regex.c label_support.c \ matchpathcon.c setrans_client.c sha1.c booleans.c else LABEL_BACKEND_ANDROID=y endif ifneq ($(LABEL_BACKEND_ANDROIDT),y) SRCS:= $(filter-out label_backends_android.c, $(SRCS)) DISABLE_FLAGS+= -DNO_ANDROID_BACKEND endif ifeq ($(DISABLE_X11),y) SRCS:= $(filter-out label_x.c, $(SRCS)) endif SWIGRUBY = swig -Wall -ruby -o $(SWIGRUBYCOUT) -outdir ./ $(DISABLE_FLAGS) all: $(LIBA) $(LIBSO) $(LIBPC) pywrap: all selinuxswig_python_exception.i CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SWIG_CFLAGS)" $(PYTHON) setup.py build_ext rubywrap: all $(SWIGRUBYSO) $(SWIGRUBYLOBJ): $(SWIGRUBYCOUT) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SWIG_CFLAGS) $(RUBYINC) -fPIC -DSHARED -c -o $@ $< $(SWIGRUBYSO): $(SWIGRUBYLOBJ) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -L. -shared -o $@ $^ -lselinux $(RUBYLIBS) $(LIBA): $(OBJS) $(AR) rcs $@ $^ $(RANLIB) $@ $(LIBSO): $(LOBJS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -shared -o $@ $^ $(PCRE_LDLIBS) $(FTS_LDLIBS) -ldl -Wl,$(LD_SONAME_FLAGS) ln -sf $@ $(TARGET) $(LIBPC): $(LIBPC).in ../VERSION sed -e 's/@VERSION@/$(VERSION)/; s:@prefix@:$(PREFIX):; s:@libdir@:$(LIBDIR):; s:@includedir@:$(INCLUDEDIR):; s:@PCRE_MODULE@:$(PCRE_MODULE):' < $< > $@ selinuxswig_python_exception.i: exception.sh ../include/selinux/selinux.h bash -e exception.sh > $@ || (rm -f $@ ; false) %.o: %.c policy.h $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TLSFLAGS) -c -o $@ $< %.lo: %.c policy.h $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -fPIC -DSHARED -c -o $@ $< $(SWIGRUBYCOUT): $(SWIGRUBYIF) $(SWIGRUBY) $< install: all test -d $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) || install -m 755 -d $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) install -m 644 $(LIBA) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) test -d $(DESTDIR)$(SHLIBDIR) || install -m 755 -d $(DESTDIR)$(SHLIBDIR) install -m 755 $(LIBSO) $(DESTDIR)$(SHLIBDIR) test -d $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig || install -m 755 -d $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig install -m 644 $(LIBPC) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig ln -sf --relative $(DESTDIR)$(SHLIBDIR)/$(LIBSO) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/$(TARGET) install-pywrap: pywrap $(PYTHON) -m pip install --prefix=$(PREFIX) `test -n "$(DESTDIR)" && echo --root $(DESTDIR) --ignore-installed --no-deps` $(PYTHON_SETUP_ARGS) . install -m 644 $(SWIGPYOUT) $(DESTDIR)$(PYTHONLIBDIR)/selinux/__init__.py ln -sf --relative $(DESTDIR)$(PYTHONLIBDIR)/selinux/_selinux$(PYCEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(PYTHONLIBDIR)/_selinux$(PYCEXT) install-rubywrap: rubywrap test -d $(DESTDIR)$(RUBYINSTALL) || install -m 755 -d $(DESTDIR)$(RUBYINSTALL) install -m 755 $(SWIGRUBYSO) $(DESTDIR)$(RUBYINSTALL)/selinux.so relabel: /sbin/restorecon $(DESTDIR)$(SHLIBDIR)/$(LIBSO) clean-pywrap: -rm -f $(SWIGLOBJ) $(SWIGSO) $(AUDIT2WHYLOBJ) $(AUDIT2WHYSO) $(PYTHON) setup.py clean -rm -rf build *~ \#* *pyc .#* selinux.egg-info/ clean-rubywrap: -rm -f $(SWIGRUBYLOBJ) $(SWIGRUBYSO) clean: clean-pywrap clean-rubywrap -rm -f $(LIBPC) $(OBJS) $(LOBJS) $(LIBA) $(LIBSO) $(TARGET) *.o *.lo *~ distclean: clean rm -f $(GENERATED) $(SWIGFILES) indent: ../../scripts/Lindent $(filter-out $(GENERATED),$(wildcard *.[ch])) .PHONY: all clean clean-pywrap clean-rubywrap pywrap rubywrap swigify install install-pywrap install-rubywrap distclean libselinux-3.5/src/audit2why.c000066400000000000000000000271161437566343300164370ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Workaround for http://bugs.python.org/issue4835 */ #ifndef SIZEOF_SOCKET_T #define SIZEOF_SOCKET_T SIZEOF_INT #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define UNKNOWN -1 #define BADSCON -2 #define BADTCON -3 #define BADTCLASS -4 #define BADPERM -5 #define BADCOMPUTE -6 #define NOPOLICY -7 #define ALLOW 0 #define DONTAUDIT 1 #define TERULE 2 #define BOOLEAN 3 #define CONSTRAINT 4 #define RBAC 5 #define BOUNDS 6 struct boolean_t { char *name; int active; }; static struct boolean_t **boollist = NULL; static int boolcnt = 0; struct avc_t { sepol_handle_t *handle; sepol_policydb_t *policydb; sepol_security_id_t ssid; sepol_security_id_t tsid; sepol_security_class_t tclass; sepol_access_vector_t av; }; static struct avc_t *avc = NULL; static sidtab_t sidtab; static int load_booleans(const sepol_bool_t * boolean, void *arg __attribute__ ((__unused__))) { boollist[boolcnt] = malloc(sizeof(struct boolean_t)); boollist[boolcnt]->name = strdup(sepol_bool_get_name(boolean)); boollist[boolcnt]->active = sepol_bool_get_value(boolean); boolcnt++; return 0; } static int check_booleans(struct boolean_t **bools) { char errormsg[PATH_MAX]; struct sepol_av_decision avd; unsigned int reason; int rc; int i; sepol_bool_key_t *key = NULL; sepol_bool_t *boolean = NULL; int fcnt = 0; int *foundlist = calloc(boolcnt, sizeof(int)); if (!foundlist) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_MemoryError, "Out of memory\n"); return fcnt; } for (i = 0; i < boolcnt; i++) { char *name = boollist[i]->name; int active = boollist[i]->active; rc = sepol_bool_key_create(avc->handle, name, &key); if (rc < 0) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, "Could not create boolean key.\n"); break; } rc = sepol_bool_query(avc->handle, avc->policydb, key, &boolean); if (rc < 0) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "Could not find boolean %s.\n", name); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, errormsg); break; } sepol_bool_set_value(boolean, !active); rc = sepol_bool_set(avc->handle, avc->policydb, key, boolean); if (rc < 0) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "Could not set boolean data %s.\n", name); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, errormsg); break; } /* Reproduce the computation. */ rc = sepol_compute_av_reason(avc->ssid, avc->tsid, avc->tclass, avc->av, &avd, &reason); if (rc < 0) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "Error during access vector computation, skipping..."); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, errormsg); sepol_bool_free(boolean); break; } else { if (!reason) { foundlist[fcnt] = i; fcnt++; } sepol_bool_set_value(boolean, active); rc = sepol_bool_set(avc->handle, avc->policydb, key, boolean); if (rc < 0) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "Could not set boolean data %s.\n", name); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, errormsg); break; } } sepol_bool_free(boolean); sepol_bool_key_free(key); key = NULL; boolean = NULL; } if (key) sepol_bool_key_free(key); if (boolean) sepol_bool_free(boolean); if (fcnt > 0) { *bools = calloc(sizeof(struct boolean_t), fcnt + 1); struct boolean_t *b = *bools; for (i = 0; i < fcnt; i++) { int ctr = foundlist[i]; b[i].name = strdup(boollist[ctr]->name); b[i].active = !boollist[ctr]->active; } } free(foundlist); return fcnt; } static PyObject *finish(PyObject *self __attribute__((unused)), PyObject *args) { PyObject *result = 0; if (PyArg_ParseTuple(args,(char *)":finish")) { int i = 0; if (! avc) Py_RETURN_NONE; for (i = 0; i < boolcnt; i++) { free(boollist[i]->name); free(boollist[i]); } free(boollist); sepol_sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab); sepol_sidtab_destroy(&sidtab); sepol_policydb_free(avc->policydb); sepol_handle_destroy(avc->handle); free(avc); avc = NULL; boollist = NULL; boolcnt = 0; /* Boilerplate to return "None" */ Py_RETURN_NONE; } return result; } static int __policy_init(const char *init_path) { FILE *fp = NULL; const char *curpolicy; char errormsg[PATH_MAX+1024+20]; struct sepol_policy_file *pf = NULL; int rc; unsigned int cnt; if (init_path) { curpolicy = init_path; } else { curpolicy = selinux_current_policy_path(); if (!curpolicy) { /* SELinux disabled, must use -p option. */ snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "You must specify the -p option with the path to the policy file.\n"); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_ValueError, errormsg); return 1; } } fp = fopen(curpolicy, "re"); if (!fp) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "unable to open %s: %m\n", curpolicy); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_ValueError, errormsg); return 1; } avc = calloc(sizeof(struct avc_t), 1); if (!avc) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_MemoryError, "Out of memory\n"); fclose(fp); return 1; } /* Set up a policydb directly so that we can mutate it later for testing what booleans might have allowed the access. Otherwise, we'd just use sepol_set_policydb_from_file() here. */ if (sepol_policy_file_create(&pf) || sepol_policydb_create(&avc->policydb)) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "policydb_init failed: %m\n"); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, errormsg); goto err; } sepol_policy_file_set_fp(pf, fp); if (sepol_policydb_read(avc->policydb, pf)) { snprintf(errormsg, sizeof(errormsg), "invalid binary policy %s\n", curpolicy); PyErr_SetString( PyExc_ValueError, errormsg); goto err; } fclose(fp); fp = NULL; sepol_set_policydb(&avc->policydb->p); avc->handle = sepol_handle_create(); /* Turn off messages */ sepol_msg_set_callback(avc->handle, NULL, NULL); rc = sepol_bool_count(avc->handle, avc->policydb, &cnt); if (rc < 0) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, "unable to get bool count\n"); goto err; } boollist = calloc(cnt, sizeof(*boollist)); if (!boollist) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_MemoryError, "Out of memory\n"); goto err; } sepol_bool_iterate(avc->handle, avc->policydb, load_booleans, NULL); /* Initialize the sidtab for subsequent use by sepol_context_to_sid and sepol_compute_av_reason. */ rc = sepol_sidtab_init(&sidtab); if (rc < 0) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, "unable to init sidtab\n"); goto err; } sepol_set_sidtab(&sidtab); return 0; err: if (boollist) free(boollist); if (avc){ if (avc->handle) sepol_handle_destroy(avc->handle); if (avc->policydb) sepol_policydb_free(avc->policydb); free(avc); } if (pf) sepol_policy_file_free(pf); if (fp) fclose(fp); return 1; } static PyObject *init(PyObject *self __attribute__((unused)), PyObject *args) { int result; char *init_path = NULL; if (avc) { PyErr_SetString( PyExc_RuntimeError, "init called multiple times"); return NULL; } if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args,(char *)"|s:policy_init",&init_path)) return NULL; result = __policy_init(init_path); return Py_BuildValue("i", result); } #define RETURN(X) \ { \ return Py_BuildValue("iO", (X), Py_None); \ } static PyObject *analyze(PyObject *self __attribute__((unused)) , PyObject *args) { char *reason_buf = NULL; char * scon; char * tcon; char *tclassstr; PyObject *listObj; PyObject *strObj; int numlines; struct boolean_t *bools; unsigned int reason; sepol_security_id_t ssid, tsid; sepol_security_class_t tclass; sepol_access_vector_t perm, av; struct sepol_av_decision avd; int rc; int i = 0; if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args,(char *)"sssO!:audit2why",&scon,&tcon,&tclassstr,&PyList_Type, &listObj)) return NULL; /* get the number of lines passed to us */ numlines = PyList_Size(listObj); /* should raise an error here. */ if (numlines < 0) return NULL; /* Not a list */ if (!avc) RETURN(NOPOLICY) rc = sepol_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid); if (rc < 0) RETURN(BADSCON) rc = sepol_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid); if (rc < 0) RETURN(BADTCON) rc = sepol_string_to_security_class(tclassstr, &tclass); if (rc < 0) RETURN(BADTCLASS) /* Convert the permission list to an AV. */ av = 0; /* iterate over items of the list, grabbing strings, and parsing for numbers */ for (i = 0; i < numlines; i++){ const char *permstr; /* grab the string object from the next element of the list */ strObj = PyList_GetItem(listObj, i); /* Can't fail */ /* make it a string */ #if PY_MAJOR_VERSION >= 3 permstr = _PyUnicode_AsString( strObj ); #else permstr = PyString_AsString( strObj ); #endif rc = sepol_string_to_av_perm(tclass, permstr, &perm); if (rc < 0) RETURN(BADPERM) av |= perm; } /* Reproduce the computation. */ rc = sepol_compute_av_reason_buffer(ssid, tsid, tclass, av, &avd, &reason, &reason_buf, 0); if (rc < 0) RETURN(BADCOMPUTE) if (!reason) RETURN(ALLOW) if (reason & SEPOL_COMPUTEAV_TE) { avc->ssid = ssid; avc->tsid = tsid; avc->tclass = tclass; avc->av = av; if (check_booleans(&bools) == 0) { if (av & ~avd.auditdeny) { RETURN(DONTAUDIT) } else { RETURN(TERULE) } } else { PyObject *outboollist; struct boolean_t *b = bools; int len = 0; while (b->name) { len++; b++; } b = bools; outboollist = PyList_New(len); len = 0; while(b->name) { PyObject *bool_ = Py_BuildValue("(si)", b->name, b->active); PyList_SetItem(outboollist, len++, bool_); b++; } free(bools); /* 'N' steals the reference to outboollist */ return Py_BuildValue("iN", BOOLEAN, outboollist); } } if (reason & SEPOL_COMPUTEAV_CONS) { if (reason_buf) { PyObject *result = NULL; result = Py_BuildValue("is", CONSTRAINT, reason_buf); free(reason_buf); return result; } RETURN(CONSTRAINT) } if (reason & SEPOL_COMPUTEAV_RBAC) RETURN(RBAC) if (reason & SEPOL_COMPUTEAV_BOUNDS) RETURN(BOUNDS) RETURN(BADCOMPUTE) } static PyMethodDef audit2whyMethods[] = { {"init", init, METH_VARARGS, "Initialize policy database."}, {"analyze", analyze, METH_VARARGS, "Analyze AVC."}, {"finish", finish, METH_VARARGS, "Finish using policy, free memory."}, {NULL, NULL, 0, NULL} /* Sentinel */ }; #if PY_MAJOR_VERSION >= 3 /* Module-initialization logic specific to Python 3 */ static struct PyModuleDef moduledef = { PyModuleDef_HEAD_INIT, "audit2why", NULL, 0, audit2whyMethods, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; PyMODINIT_FUNC PyInit_audit2why(void); /* silence -Wmissing-prototypes */ PyMODINIT_FUNC PyInit_audit2why(void) #else PyMODINIT_FUNC initaudit2why(void); /* silence -Wmissing-prototypes */ PyMODINIT_FUNC initaudit2why(void) #endif { PyObject *m; #if PY_MAJOR_VERSION >= 3 m = PyModule_Create(&moduledef); if (m == NULL) { return NULL; } #else m = Py_InitModule("audit2why", audit2whyMethods); #endif PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"UNKNOWN", UNKNOWN); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"BADSCON", BADSCON); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"BADTCON", BADTCON); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"BADTCLASS", BADTCLASS); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"BADPERM", BADPERM); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"BADCOMPUTE", BADCOMPUTE); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"NOPOLICY", NOPOLICY); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"ALLOW", ALLOW); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"DONTAUDIT", DONTAUDIT); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"TERULE", TERULE); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"BOOLEAN", BOOLEAN); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"CONSTRAINT", CONSTRAINT); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"RBAC", RBAC); PyModule_AddIntConstant(m,"BOUNDS", BOUNDS); #if PY_MAJOR_VERSION >= 3 return m; #endif } libselinux-3.5/src/audit2why.map000066400000000000000000000001221437566343300167560ustar00rootroot00000000000000AUDIT2WHY_2.9 { global: initaudit2why; PyInit_audit2why; local: *; }; libselinux-3.5/src/avc.c000066400000000000000000000647671437566343300153050ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Implementation of the userspace access vector cache (AVC). * * Author : Eamon Walsh * * Derived from the kernel AVC implementation by * Stephen Smalley and * James Morris . */ #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include "avc_sidtab.h" #include "avc_internal.h" #define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512 #define AVC_CACHE_MAXNODES 410 struct avc_entry { security_id_t ssid; security_id_t tsid; security_class_t tclass; struct av_decision avd; security_id_t create_sid; int used; /* used recently */ }; struct avc_node { struct avc_entry ae; struct avc_node *next; }; struct avc_cache { struct avc_node *slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; uint32_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */ uint32_t active_nodes; uint32_t latest_notif; /* latest revocation notification */ }; struct avc_callback_node { int (*callback) (uint32_t event, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, access_vector_t * out_retained); uint32_t events; security_id_t ssid; security_id_t tsid; security_class_t tclass; access_vector_t perms; struct avc_callback_node *next; }; static void *avc_lock = NULL; static void *avc_log_lock = NULL; static struct avc_node *avc_node_freelist = NULL; static struct avc_cache avc_cache; static char *avc_audit_buf = NULL; static struct avc_cache_stats cache_stats; static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks = NULL; static struct sidtab avc_sidtab; static inline int avc_hash(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass) { return ((uintptr_t) ssid ^ ((uintptr_t) tsid << 2) ^ tclass) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1); } int avc_context_to_sid_raw(const char * ctx, security_id_t * sid) { int rc; /* avc_init needs to be called before this function */ assert(avc_running); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&avc_sidtab, ctx, sid); avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } int avc_context_to_sid(const char * ctx, security_id_t * sid) { int ret; char * rctx; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(ctx, &rctx)) return -1; ret = avc_context_to_sid_raw(rctx, sid); freecon(rctx); return ret; } int avc_sid_to_context_raw(security_id_t sid, char ** ctx) { int rc; *ctx = NULL; avc_get_lock(avc_lock); *ctx = strdup(sid->ctx); /* caller must free via freecon */ rc = *ctx ? 0 : -1; avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } int avc_sid_to_context(security_id_t sid, char ** ctx) { int ret; char * rctx; ret = avc_sid_to_context_raw(sid, &rctx); if (ret == 0) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rctx, ctx); freecon(rctx); } return ret; } int sidget(security_id_t sid __attribute__((unused))) { return 1; } int sidput(security_id_t sid __attribute__((unused))) { return 1; } int avc_get_initial_sid(const char * name, security_id_t * sid) { int rc; char * con; rc = security_get_initial_context_raw(name, &con); if (rc < 0) return rc; rc = avc_context_to_sid_raw(con, sid); freecon(con); return rc; } static int avc_init_internal(const char *prefix, const struct avc_memory_callback *mem_cb, const struct avc_log_callback *log_cb, const struct avc_thread_callback *thread_cb, const struct avc_lock_callback *lock_cb) { struct avc_node *new; int i, rc = 0; if (avc_running) return 0; if (prefix) strncpy(avc_prefix, prefix, AVC_PREFIX_SIZE - 1); set_callbacks(mem_cb, log_cb, thread_cb, lock_cb); avc_lock = avc_alloc_lock(); avc_log_lock = avc_alloc_lock(); memset(&cache_stats, 0, sizeof(cache_stats)); for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) avc_cache.slots[i] = 0; avc_cache.lru_hint = 0; avc_cache.active_nodes = 0; avc_cache.latest_notif = 0; rc = sidtab_init(&avc_sidtab); if (rc) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: unable to initialize SID table\n", avc_prefix); goto out; } avc_audit_buf = (char *)avc_malloc(AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE); if (!avc_audit_buf) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: unable to allocate audit buffer\n", avc_prefix); rc = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_MAXNODES; i++) { new = avc_malloc(sizeof(*new)); if (!new) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: only got %d av entries\n", avc_prefix, i); break; } memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new)); new->next = avc_node_freelist; avc_node_freelist = new; } if (!avc_setenforce) { rc = security_getenforce(); if (rc < 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: could not determine enforcing mode: %m\n", avc_prefix); goto out; } avc_enforcing = rc; } rc = selinux_status_open(0); if (rc < 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: could not open selinux status page: %d (%m)\n", avc_prefix, errno); goto out; } avc_running = 1; out: return rc; } int avc_open(struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { avc_setenforce = 0; while (nopts--) switch(opts[nopts].type) { case AVC_OPT_SETENFORCE: avc_setenforce = 1; avc_enforcing = !!opts[nopts].value; break; } return avc_init_internal("avc", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } int avc_init(const char *prefix, const struct avc_memory_callback *mem_cb, const struct avc_log_callback *log_cb, const struct avc_thread_callback *thread_cb, const struct avc_lock_callback *lock_cb) { return avc_init_internal(prefix, mem_cb, log_cb, thread_cb, lock_cb); } void avc_cache_stats(struct avc_cache_stats *p) { memcpy(p, &cache_stats, sizeof(cache_stats)); } void avc_sid_stats(void) { /* avc_init needs to be called before this function */ assert(avc_running); avc_get_lock(avc_log_lock); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); sidtab_sid_stats(&avc_sidtab, avc_audit_buf, AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE); avc_release_lock(avc_lock); avc_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%s", avc_audit_buf); avc_release_lock(avc_log_lock); } void avc_av_stats(void) { int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used; struct avc_node *node; avc_get_lock(avc_lock); slots_used = 0; max_chain_len = 0; for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { node = avc_cache.slots[i]; if (node) { slots_used++; chain_len = 0; while (node) { chain_len++; node = node->next; } if (chain_len > max_chain_len) max_chain_len = chain_len; } } avc_release_lock(avc_lock); avc_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%s: %u AV entries and %d/%d buckets used, " "longest chain length %d\n", avc_prefix, avc_cache.active_nodes, slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len); } static inline struct avc_node *avc_reclaim_node(void) { struct avc_node *prev, *cur; int try; uint32_t hvalue; hvalue = avc_cache.lru_hint; for (try = 0; try < 2; try++) { do { prev = NULL; cur = avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; while (cur) { if (!cur->ae.used) goto found; cur->ae.used = 0; prev = cur; cur = cur->next; } hvalue = (hvalue + 1) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1); } while (hvalue != avc_cache.lru_hint); } errno = ENOMEM; /* this was a panic in the kernel... */ return NULL; found: avc_cache.lru_hint = hvalue; if (prev == NULL) avc_cache.slots[hvalue] = cur->next; else prev->next = cur->next; return cur; } static inline void avc_clear_avc_entry(struct avc_entry *ae) { memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae)); } static inline struct avc_node *avc_claim_node(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass) { struct avc_node *new; int hvalue; if (!avc_node_freelist) avc_cleanup(); if (avc_node_freelist) { new = avc_node_freelist; avc_node_freelist = avc_node_freelist->next; avc_cache.active_nodes++; } else { new = avc_reclaim_node(); if (!new) goto out; } hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); avc_clear_avc_entry(&new->ae); new->ae.used = 1; new->ae.ssid = ssid; new->ae.tsid = tsid; new->ae.tclass = tclass; new->next = avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; avc_cache.slots[hvalue] = new; out: return new; } static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, int *probes) { struct avc_node *cur; int hvalue; int tprobes = 1; hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); cur = avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; while (cur != NULL && (ssid != cur->ae.ssid || tclass != cur->ae.tclass || tsid != cur->ae.tsid)) { tprobes++; cur = cur->next; } if (cur == NULL) { /* cache miss */ goto out; } /* cache hit */ if (probes) *probes = tprobes; cur->ae.used = 1; out: return cur; } /** * avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass * @aeref: AVC entry reference * * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the * @requested permissions between the SID pair * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions * based on @tclass. If a valid AVC entry exists, * then this function updates @aeref to refer to the * entry and returns %0. Otherwise, -1 is returned. */ static int avc_lookup(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref) { struct avc_node *node; int probes, rc = 0; avc_cache_stats_incr(cav_lookups); node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass, &probes); if (node && ((node->ae.avd.decided & requested) == requested)) { avc_cache_stats_incr(cav_hits); avc_cache_stats_add(cav_probes, probes); aeref->ae = &node->ae; goto out; } avc_cache_stats_incr(cav_misses); rc = -1; out: return rc; } /** * avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @ae: AVC entry * @aeref: AVC entry reference * * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass. * The access vectors and the sequence number are * normally provided by the security server in * response to a security_compute_av() call. If the * sequence number @ae->avd.seqno is not less than the latest * revocation notification, then the function copies * the access vectors into a cache entry, updates * @aeref to refer to the entry, and returns %0. * Otherwise, this function returns -%1 with @errno set to %EAGAIN. */ static int avc_insert(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, struct avc_entry *ae, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref) { struct avc_node *node; int rc = 0; if (ae->avd.seqno < avc_cache.latest_notif) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: seqno %u < latest_notif %u\n", avc_prefix, ae->avd.seqno, avc_cache.latest_notif); errno = EAGAIN; rc = -1; goto out; } node = avc_claim_node(ssid, tsid, tclass); if (!node) { rc = -1; goto out; } memcpy(&node->ae.avd, &ae->avd, sizeof(ae->avd)); aeref->ae = &node->ae; out: return rc; } void avc_cleanup(void) { } int avc_reset(void) { struct avc_callback_node *c; int i, ret, rc = 0, errsave = 0; struct avc_node *node, *tmp; errno = 0; if (!avc_running) return 0; avc_get_lock(avc_lock); for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { node = avc_cache.slots[i]; while (node) { tmp = node; node = node->next; avc_clear_avc_entry(&tmp->ae); tmp->next = avc_node_freelist; avc_node_freelist = tmp; avc_cache.active_nodes--; } avc_cache.slots[i] = 0; } avc_cache.lru_hint = 0; avc_release_lock(avc_lock); memset(&cache_stats, 0, sizeof(cache_stats)); for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) { if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { ret = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); if (ret && !rc) { rc = ret; errsave = errno; } } } errno = errsave; return rc; } void avc_destroy(void) { struct avc_callback_node *c; struct avc_node *node, *tmp; int i; /* avc_init needs to be called before this function */ assert(avc_running); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); selinux_status_close(); for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { node = avc_cache.slots[i]; while (node) { tmp = node; node = node->next; avc_free(tmp); } } while (avc_node_freelist) { tmp = avc_node_freelist; avc_node_freelist = tmp->next; avc_free(tmp); } avc_release_lock(avc_lock); while (avc_callbacks) { c = avc_callbacks; avc_callbacks = c->next; avc_free(c); } sidtab_destroy(&avc_sidtab); avc_free_lock(avc_lock); avc_free_lock(avc_log_lock); avc_free(avc_audit_buf); avc_running = 0; } /* ratelimit stuff put aside for now --EFW */ #if 0 /* * Copied from net/core/utils.c:net_ratelimit and modified for * use by the AVC audit facility. */ #define AVC_MSG_COST 5*HZ #define AVC_MSG_BURST 10*5*HZ /* * This enforces a rate limit: not more than one kernel message * every 5secs to make a denial-of-service attack impossible. */ static int avc_ratelimit(void) { static unsigned long toks = 10 * 5 * HZ; static unsigned long last_msg; static int missed, rc = 0; unsigned long now = jiffies; void *ratelimit_lock = avc_alloc_lock(); avc_get_lock(ratelimit_lock); toks += now - last_msg; last_msg = now; if (toks > AVC_MSG_BURST) toks = AVC_MSG_BURST; if (toks >= AVC_MSG_COST) { int lost = missed; missed = 0; toks -= AVC_MSG_COST; avc_release_lock(ratelimit_lock); if (lost) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: %d messages suppressed.\n", avc_prefix, lost); } rc = 1; goto out; } missed++; avc_release_lock(ratelimit_lock); out: avc_free_lock(ratelimit_lock); return rc; } static inline int check_avc_ratelimit(void) { if (avc_enforcing) return avc_ratelimit(); else { /* If permissive, then never suppress messages. */ return 1; } } #endif /* ratelimit stuff */ /** * avc_dump_av - Display an access vector in human-readable form. * @tclass: target security class * @av: access vector */ static void avc_dump_av(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av) { const char *permstr; access_vector_t bit = 1; if (av == 0) { log_append(avc_audit_buf, " null"); return; } log_append(avc_audit_buf, " {"); while (av) { if (av & bit) { permstr = security_av_perm_to_string(tclass, bit); if (!permstr) break; log_append(avc_audit_buf, " %s", permstr); av &= ~bit; } bit <<= 1; } if (av) log_append(avc_audit_buf, " 0x%x", av); log_append(avc_audit_buf, " }"); } /** * avc_dump_query - Display a SID pair and a class in human-readable form. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class */ static void avc_dump_query(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass) { avc_get_lock(avc_lock); log_append(avc_audit_buf, "scontext=%s tcontext=%s", ssid->ctx, tsid->ctx); avc_release_lock(avc_lock); log_append(avc_audit_buf, " tclass=%s", security_class_to_string(tclass)); } void avc_audit(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd, int result, void *a) { access_vector_t denied, audited; denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; if (denied) audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; else if (!requested || result) audited = denied = requested; else audited = requested & avd->auditallow; if (!audited) return; #if 0 if (!check_avc_ratelimit()) return; #endif /* prevent overlapping buffer writes */ avc_get_lock(avc_log_lock); snprintf(avc_audit_buf, AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE, "%s: %s ", avc_prefix, (denied || !requested) ? "denied" : "granted"); avc_dump_av(tclass, audited); log_append(avc_audit_buf, " for "); /* get any extra information printed by the callback */ avc_suppl_audit(a, tclass, avc_audit_buf + strlen(avc_audit_buf), AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE - strlen(avc_audit_buf)); log_append(avc_audit_buf, " "); avc_dump_query(ssid, tsid, tclass); if (denied) log_append(avc_audit_buf, " permissive=%u", result ? 0 : 1); avc_log(SELINUX_AVC, "%s", avc_audit_buf); avc_release_lock(avc_log_lock); } static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd) { avd->allowed = 0; avd->auditallow = 0; avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; avd->seqno = avc_cache.latest_notif; avd->flags = 0; } int avc_has_perm_noaudit(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref, struct av_decision *avd) { struct avc_entry *ae; int rc = 0; struct avc_entry entry; access_vector_t denied; struct avc_entry_ref ref; if (avd) avd_init(avd); if (!avc_using_threads && !avc_app_main_loop) { (void) selinux_status_updated(); } if (!aeref) { avc_entry_ref_init(&ref); aeref = &ref; } avc_get_lock(avc_lock); avc_cache_stats_incr(entry_lookups); ae = aeref->ae; if (ae) { if (ae->ssid == ssid && ae->tsid == tsid && ae->tclass == tclass && ((ae->avd.decided & requested) == requested)) { avc_cache_stats_incr(entry_hits); ae->used = 1; } else { avc_cache_stats_incr(entry_discards); ae = 0; } } if (!ae) { avc_cache_stats_incr(entry_misses); rc = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, aeref); if (rc) { rc = security_compute_av_flags_raw(ssid->ctx, tsid->ctx, tclass, requested, &entry.avd); if (rc && errno == EINVAL && !avc_enforcing) { rc = errno = 0; goto out; } if (rc) goto out; rc = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, &entry, aeref); if (rc) goto out; } ae = aeref->ae; } if (avd) memcpy(avd, &ae->avd, sizeof(*avd)); denied = requested & ~(ae->avd.allowed); if (!requested || denied) { if (!avc_enforcing || (ae->avd.flags & SELINUX_AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) ae->avd.allowed |= requested; else { errno = EACCES; rc = -1; } } out: avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } int avc_has_perm(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct avc_entry_ref *aeref, void *auditdata) { struct av_decision avd; int errsave, rc; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, aeref, &avd); errsave = errno; avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata); errno = errsave; return rc; } int avc_compute_create(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, security_id_t *newsid) { int rc; struct avc_entry_ref aeref; struct avc_entry entry; char * ctx; *newsid = NULL; avc_entry_ref_init(&aeref); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); /* check for a cached entry */ rc = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, 0, &aeref); if (rc) { /* need to make a cache entry for this tuple */ rc = security_compute_av_flags_raw(ssid->ctx, tsid->ctx, tclass, 0, &entry.avd); if (rc) goto out; rc = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, &entry, &aeref); if (rc) goto out; } /* check for a saved compute_create value */ if (!aeref.ae->create_sid) { /* need to query the kernel policy */ rc = security_compute_create_raw(ssid->ctx, tsid->ctx, tclass, &ctx); if (rc) goto out; rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&avc_sidtab, ctx, newsid); freecon(ctx); if (rc) goto out; aeref.ae->create_sid = *newsid; } else { /* found saved value */ *newsid = aeref.ae->create_sid; } rc = 0; out: avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } int avc_compute_member(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, security_id_t *newsid) { int rc; char * ctx = NULL; *newsid = NULL; /* avc_init needs to be called before this function */ assert(avc_running); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); rc = security_compute_member_raw(ssid->ctx, tsid->ctx, tclass, &ctx); if (rc) goto out; rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&avc_sidtab, ctx, newsid); freecon(ctx); out: avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } int avc_add_callback(int (*callback) (uint32_t event, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, access_vector_t * out_retained), uint32_t events, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms) { struct avc_callback_node *c; int rc = 0; c = avc_malloc(sizeof(*c)); if (!c) { rc = -1; goto out; } c->callback = callback; c->events = events; c->ssid = ssid; c->tsid = tsid; c->tclass = tclass; c->perms = perms; c->next = avc_callbacks; avc_callbacks = c; out: return rc; } static inline int avc_sidcmp(security_id_t x, security_id_t y) { return (x == y || x == SECSID_WILD || y == SECSID_WILD); } static inline void avc_update_node(uint32_t event, struct avc_node *node, access_vector_t perms) { switch (event) { case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT: node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms; break; case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE: case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE: node->ae.avd.allowed &= ~perms; break; case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE: node->ae.avd.auditallow |= perms; break; case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE: node->ae.avd.auditallow &= ~perms; break; case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE: node->ae.avd.auditdeny |= perms; break; case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE: node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms; break; } } static int avc_update_cache(uint32_t event, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms) { struct avc_node *node; int i; avc_get_lock(avc_lock); if (ssid == SECSID_WILD || tsid == SECSID_WILD) { /* apply to all matching nodes */ for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { for (node = avc_cache.slots[i]; node; node = node->next) { if (avc_sidcmp(ssid, node->ae.ssid) && avc_sidcmp(tsid, node->ae.tsid) && tclass == node->ae.tclass) { avc_update_node(event, node, perms); } } } } else { /* apply to one node */ node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass, 0); if (node) { avc_update_node(event, node, perms); } } avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return 0; } /* avc_control - update cache and call callbacks * * This should not be called directly; use the individual event * functions instead. */ static int avc_control(uint32_t event, security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, access_vector_t * out_retained) { struct avc_callback_node *c; access_vector_t tretained = 0, cretained = 0; int ret, rc = 0, errsave = 0; errno = 0; /* * try_revoke only removes permissions from the cache * state if they are not retained by the object manager. * Hence, try_revoke must wait until after the callbacks have * been invoked to update the cache state. */ if (event != AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE) avc_update_cache(event, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms); for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) { if ((c->events & event) && avc_sidcmp(c->ssid, ssid) && avc_sidcmp(c->tsid, tsid) && c->tclass == tclass && (c->perms & perms)) { cretained = 0; ret = c->callback(event, ssid, tsid, tclass, (c->perms & perms), &cretained); if (ret && !rc) { rc = ret; errsave = errno; } if (!ret) tretained |= cretained; } } if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE) { /* revoke any unretained permissions */ perms &= ~tretained; avc_update_cache(event, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms); *out_retained = tretained; } avc_get_lock(avc_lock); if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif) avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno; avc_release_lock(avc_lock); errno = errsave; return rc; } /** * avc_ss_grant - Grant previously denied permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions to grant * @seqno: policy sequence number */ int avc_ss_grant(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno) { return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); } /** * avc_ss_try_revoke - Try to revoke previously granted permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions to grant * @seqno: policy sequence number * @out_retained: subset of @perms that are retained * * Try to revoke previously granted permissions, but * only if they are not retained as migrated permissions. * Return the subset of permissions that are retained via @out_retained. */ int avc_ss_try_revoke(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, access_vector_t * out_retained) { return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, out_retained); } /** * avc_ss_revoke - Revoke previously granted permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions to grant * @seqno: policy sequence number * * Revoke previously granted permissions, even if * they are retained as migrated permissions. */ int avc_ss_revoke(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno) { return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); } /** * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions. * @seqno: policy sequence number */ int avc_ss_reset(uint32_t seqno) { int rc; rc = avc_reset(); avc_get_lock(avc_lock); if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif) avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno; avc_release_lock(avc_lock); return rc; } /** * avc_ss_set_auditallow - Enable or disable auditing of granted permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions to grant * @seqno: policy sequence number * @enable: enable flag. */ int avc_ss_set_auditallow(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, uint32_t enable) { if (enable) return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); else return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); } /** * avc_ss_set_auditdeny - Enable or disable auditing of denied permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD * @tclass: target security class * @perms: permissions to grant * @seqno: policy sequence number * @enable: enable flag. */ int avc_ss_set_auditdeny(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, uint32_t enable) { if (enable) return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); else return avc_control(AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE, ssid, tsid, tclass, perms, seqno, 0); } libselinux-3.5/src/avc_internal.c000066400000000000000000000145771437566343300171730ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Callbacks for user-supplied memory allocation, supplemental * auditing, and locking routines. * * Author : Eamon Walsh * * Netlink code derived in part from sample code by * James Morris . */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "selinux_netlink.h" #include "avc_internal.h" #include "selinux_internal.h" #ifndef NETLINK_SELINUX #define NETLINK_SELINUX 7 #endif /* callback pointers */ void *(*avc_func_malloc) (size_t) = NULL; void (*avc_func_free) (void *) = NULL; void (*avc_func_log) (const char *, ...) = NULL; void (*avc_func_audit) (void *, security_class_t, char *, size_t) = NULL; int avc_using_threads = 0; int avc_app_main_loop = 0; void *(*avc_func_create_thread) (void (*)(void)) = NULL; void (*avc_func_stop_thread) (void *) = NULL; void *(*avc_func_alloc_lock) (void) = NULL; void (*avc_func_get_lock) (void *) = NULL; void (*avc_func_release_lock) (void *) = NULL; void (*avc_func_free_lock) (void *) = NULL; /* message prefix string and avc enforcing mode */ char avc_prefix[AVC_PREFIX_SIZE] = "uavc"; int avc_running = 0; int avc_enforcing = 1; int avc_setenforce = 0; /* process setenforce events for netlink and sestatus */ int avc_process_setenforce(int enforcing) { int rc = 0; avc_log(SELINUX_SETENFORCE, "%s: op=setenforce lsm=selinux enforcing=%d res=1", avc_prefix, enforcing); if (avc_setenforce) goto out; avc_enforcing = enforcing; if (avc_enforcing && (rc = avc_ss_reset(0)) < 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: cache reset returned %d (errno %d)\n", avc_prefix, rc, errno); return rc; } out: return selinux_netlink_setenforce(enforcing); } /* process policyload events for netlink and sestatus */ int avc_process_policyload(uint32_t seqno) { int rc = 0; avc_log(SELINUX_POLICYLOAD, "%s: op=load_policy lsm=selinux seqno=%u res=1", avc_prefix, seqno); rc = avc_ss_reset(seqno); if (rc < 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: cache reset returned %d (errno %d)\n", avc_prefix, rc, errno); return rc; } selinux_flush_class_cache(); return selinux_netlink_policyload(seqno); } /* netlink socket code */ static int fd = -1; int avc_netlink_open(int blocking) { int len, rc = 0; struct sockaddr_nl addr; fd = socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW | SOCK_CLOEXEC, NETLINK_SELINUX); if (fd < 0) { rc = fd; goto out; } if (!blocking && fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK)) { close(fd); fd = -1; rc = -1; goto out; } len = sizeof(addr); memset(&addr, 0, len); addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK; addr.nl_groups = SELNL_GRP_AVC; if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len) < 0) { close(fd); fd = -1; rc = -1; goto out; } out: return rc; } void avc_netlink_close(void) { if (fd >= 0) close(fd); fd = -1; } static int avc_netlink_receive(void *buf, unsigned buflen, int blocking) { int rc; struct pollfd pfd = { fd, POLLIN | POLLPRI, 0 }; struct sockaddr_nl nladdr; socklen_t nladdrlen = sizeof nladdr; struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)buf; do { rc = poll(&pfd, 1, (blocking ? -1 : 0)); } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR); if (rc == 0 && !blocking) { errno = EWOULDBLOCK; return -1; } else if (rc < 1) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: netlink poll: error %d\n", avc_prefix, errno); return rc; } rc = recvfrom(fd, buf, buflen, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&nladdr, &nladdrlen); if (rc < 0) return rc; if (nladdrlen != sizeof nladdr) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: netlink address truncated, len %u?\n", avc_prefix, nladdrlen); return -1; } if (nladdr.nl_pid) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: received spoofed netlink packet from: %u\n", avc_prefix, nladdr.nl_pid); return -1; } if (rc == 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: received EOF on netlink socket\n", avc_prefix); errno = EBADFD; return -1; } if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & MSG_TRUNC || nlh->nlmsg_len > (unsigned)rc) { avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: incomplete netlink message\n", avc_prefix); return -1; } return 0; } static int avc_netlink_process(void *buf) { int rc; struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)buf; switch (nlh->nlmsg_type) { case NLMSG_ERROR:{ struct nlmsgerr *err = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); /* Netlink ack */ if (err->error == 0) break; errno = -err->error; avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: netlink error: %d\n", avc_prefix, errno); return -1; } case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE:{ struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); rc = avc_process_setenforce(!!msg->val); if (rc < 0) return rc; break; } case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD:{ struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); rc = avc_process_policyload(msg->seqno); if (rc < 0) return rc; break; } default: avc_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: warning: unknown netlink message %d\n", avc_prefix, nlh->nlmsg_type); } return 0; } int avc_netlink_check_nb(void) { int rc; char buf[1024] __attribute__ ((aligned)); while (1) { errno = 0; rc = avc_netlink_receive(buf, sizeof(buf), 0); if (rc < 0) { if (errno == EWOULDBLOCK) return 0; if (errno == 0 || errno == EINTR) continue; else { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: netlink recvfrom: error %d\n", avc_prefix, errno); return rc; } } (void)avc_netlink_process(buf); } return 0; } /* run routine for the netlink listening thread */ void avc_netlink_loop(void) { int rc; char buf[1024] __attribute__ ((aligned)); while (1) { errno = 0; rc = avc_netlink_receive(buf, sizeof(buf), 1); if (rc < 0) { if (errno == 0 || errno == EINTR) continue; else { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: netlink recvfrom: error %d\n", avc_prefix, errno); break; } } rc = avc_netlink_process(buf); if (rc < 0) break; } close(fd); fd = -1; avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: netlink thread: errors encountered, terminating\n", avc_prefix); } int avc_netlink_acquire_fd(void) { if (fd < 0) { int rc = 0; rc = avc_netlink_open(0); if (rc < 0) { avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: could not open netlink socket: %d (%m)\n", avc_prefix, errno); return rc; } } avc_app_main_loop = 1; return fd; } void avc_netlink_release_fd(void) { avc_app_main_loop = 0; } libselinux-3.5/src/avc_internal.h000066400000000000000000000116121437566343300171630ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * This file describes the internal interface used by the AVC * for calling the user-supplied memory allocation, supplemental * auditing, and locking routine, as well as incrementing the * statistics fields. * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_INTERNAL_H_ #define _SELINUX_AVC_INTERNAL_H_ #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" /* callback pointers */ extern void *(*avc_func_malloc) (size_t) ; extern void (*avc_func_free) (void *); extern void (*avc_func_log) (const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__(printf,1,2))) ; extern void (*avc_func_audit) (void *, security_class_t, char *, size_t); extern int avc_using_threads ; extern int avc_app_main_loop ; extern void *(*avc_func_create_thread) (void (*)(void)); extern void (*avc_func_stop_thread) (void *); extern void *(*avc_func_alloc_lock) (void); extern void (*avc_func_get_lock) (void *); extern void (*avc_func_release_lock) (void *); extern void (*avc_func_free_lock) (void *); /* selinux status processing for netlink and sestatus */ extern int avc_process_setenforce(int enforcing); extern int avc_process_policyload(uint32_t seqno); static inline void set_callbacks(const struct avc_memory_callback *mem_cb, const struct avc_log_callback *log_cb, const struct avc_thread_callback *thread_cb, const struct avc_lock_callback *lock_cb) { if (mem_cb) { avc_func_malloc = mem_cb->func_malloc; avc_func_free = mem_cb->func_free; } if (log_cb) { avc_func_log = log_cb->func_log; avc_func_audit = log_cb->func_audit; } if (thread_cb) { avc_using_threads = 1; avc_func_create_thread = thread_cb->func_create_thread; avc_func_stop_thread = thread_cb->func_stop_thread; } if (lock_cb) { avc_func_alloc_lock = lock_cb->func_alloc_lock; avc_func_get_lock = lock_cb->func_get_lock; avc_func_release_lock = lock_cb->func_release_lock; avc_func_free_lock = lock_cb->func_free_lock; } } /* message prefix and enforcing mode*/ #define AVC_PREFIX_SIZE 16 extern char avc_prefix[AVC_PREFIX_SIZE] ; extern int avc_running ; extern int avc_enforcing ; extern int avc_setenforce ; /* user-supplied callback interface for avc */ static inline void *avc_malloc(size_t size) { return avc_func_malloc ? avc_func_malloc(size) : malloc(size); } static inline void avc_free(void *ptr) { if (avc_func_free) avc_func_free(ptr); else free(ptr); } /* this is a macro in order to use the variadic capability. */ #define avc_log(type, format...) \ do { \ if (avc_func_log) \ avc_func_log(format); \ else \ selinux_log(type, format); \ } while (0) static inline void avc_suppl_audit(void *ptr, security_class_t class, char *buf, size_t len) { if (avc_func_audit) avc_func_audit(ptr, class, buf, len); else selinux_audit(ptr, class, buf, len); } static inline void *avc_create_thread(void (*run) (void)) { return avc_func_create_thread ? avc_func_create_thread(run) : NULL; } static inline void avc_stop_thread(void *thread) { if (avc_func_stop_thread) avc_func_stop_thread(thread); } static inline void *avc_alloc_lock(void) { return avc_func_alloc_lock ? avc_func_alloc_lock() : NULL; } static inline void avc_get_lock(void *lock) { if (avc_func_get_lock) avc_func_get_lock(lock); } static inline void avc_release_lock(void *lock) { if (avc_func_release_lock) avc_func_release_lock(lock); } static inline void avc_free_lock(void *lock) { if (avc_func_free_lock) avc_func_free_lock(lock); } /* statistics helper routines */ #ifdef AVC_CACHE_STATS #define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) \ do { \ cache_stats.field ++; \ } while (0) #define avc_cache_stats_add(field, num) \ do { \ cache_stats.field += num; \ } while (0) #else #define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) do {} while (0) #define avc_cache_stats_add(field, num) do {} while (0) #endif /* logging helper routines */ #define AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE 1024 /* again, we need the variadic capability here */ #define log_append(buf,format...) \ snprintf(buf+strlen(buf), AVC_AUDIT_BUFSIZE-strlen(buf), format) /* internal callbacks */ int avc_ss_grant(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno) ; int avc_ss_try_revoke(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, access_vector_t * out_retained) ; int avc_ss_revoke(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno) ; int avc_ss_reset(uint32_t seqno) ; int avc_ss_set_auditallow(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, uint32_t enable) ; int avc_ss_set_auditdeny(security_id_t ssid, security_id_t tsid, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t perms, uint32_t seqno, uint32_t enable) ; #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_INTERNAL_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/src/avc_sidtab.c000066400000000000000000000054541437566343300166170ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Implementation of the userspace SID hashtable. * * Author : Eamon Walsh, */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include "avc_sidtab.h" #include "avc_internal.h" static inline unsigned sidtab_hash(const char * key) { const char *p; unsigned int size; unsigned int val; val = 0; size = strlen(key); for (p = key; (unsigned int)(p - key) < size; p++) val = (val << 4 | (val >> (8 * sizeof(unsigned int) - 4))) ^ (*p); return val & (SIDTAB_SIZE - 1); } int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s) { int i, rc = 0; s->htable = (struct sidtab_node **)avc_malloc (sizeof(struct sidtab_node *) * SIDTAB_SIZE); if (!s->htable) { rc = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) s->htable[i] = NULL; s->nel = 0; out: return rc; } int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, const char * ctx) { int hvalue, rc = 0; struct sidtab_node *newnode; char * newctx; newnode = (struct sidtab_node *)avc_malloc(sizeof(*newnode)); if (!newnode) { rc = -1; goto out; } newctx = strdup(ctx); if (!newctx) { rc = -1; avc_free(newnode); goto out; } hvalue = sidtab_hash(newctx); newnode->next = s->htable[hvalue]; newnode->sid_s.ctx = newctx; newnode->sid_s.refcnt = 1; /* unused */ s->htable[hvalue] = newnode; s->nel++; out: return rc; } int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, const char * ctx, security_id_t * sid) { int hvalue, rc = 0; struct sidtab_node *cur; *sid = NULL; hvalue = sidtab_hash(ctx); loop: cur = s->htable[hvalue]; while (cur != NULL && strcmp(cur->sid_s.ctx, ctx)) cur = cur->next; if (cur == NULL) { /* need to make a new entry */ rc = sidtab_insert(s, ctx); if (rc) goto out; goto loop; /* find the newly inserted node */ } *sid = &cur->sid_s; out: return rc; } void sidtab_sid_stats(struct sidtab *s, char *buf, int buflen) { int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len; struct sidtab_node *cur; slots_used = 0; max_chain_len = 0; for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) { cur = s->htable[i]; if (cur) { slots_used++; chain_len = 0; while (cur) { chain_len++; cur = cur->next; } if (chain_len > max_chain_len) max_chain_len = chain_len; } } snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s: %u SID entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest " "chain length %d\n", avc_prefix, s->nel, slots_used, SIDTAB_SIZE, max_chain_len); } void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s) { int i; struct sidtab_node *cur, *temp; if (!s) return; for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) { cur = s->htable[i]; while (cur != NULL) { temp = cur; cur = cur->next; freecon(temp->sid_s.ctx); avc_free(temp); } s->htable[i] = NULL; } avc_free(s->htable); s->htable = NULL; } libselinux-3.5/src/avc_sidtab.h000066400000000000000000000015571437566343300166240ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table * of security context structures indexed by SID value. */ #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_SIDTAB_H_ #define _SELINUX_AVC_SIDTAB_H_ #include #include struct sidtab_node { struct security_id sid_s; struct sidtab_node *next; }; #define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS 7 #define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS) #define SIDTAB_HASH_MASK (SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1) #define SIDTAB_SIZE SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS struct sidtab { struct sidtab_node **htable; unsigned nel; }; int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s) ; int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, const char * ctx) ; int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, const char * ctx, security_id_t * sid) ; void sidtab_sid_stats(struct sidtab *s, char *buf, int buflen) ; void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s) ; #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SIDTAB_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/src/booleans.c000066400000000000000000000154061437566343300163200ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Author: Karl MacMillan * * Modified: * Dan Walsh - Added security_load_booleans(). */ #ifndef DISABLE_BOOL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #define SELINUX_BOOL_DIR "/booleans/" static int filename_select(const struct dirent *d) { if (d->d_name[0] == '.' && (d->d_name[1] == '\0' || (d->d_name[1] == '.' && d->d_name[2] == '\0'))) return 0; return 1; } int security_get_boolean_names(char ***names, int *len) { char path[PATH_MAX]; int i, rc; struct dirent **namelist; char **n; if (!len || names == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s%s", selinux_mnt, SELINUX_BOOL_DIR); *len = scandir(path, &namelist, &filename_select, alphasort); if (*len <= 0) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } n = (char **)malloc(sizeof(char *) * *len); if (!n) { rc = -1; goto bad; } for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) { n[i] = strdup(namelist[i]->d_name); if (!n[i]) { rc = -1; goto bad_freen; } } rc = 0; *names = n; out: for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) { free(namelist[i]); } free(namelist); return rc; bad_freen: if (i > 0) { while (i >= 1) free(n[--i]); } free(n); bad: goto out; } char *selinux_boolean_sub(const char *name) { char *sub = NULL; char *line_buf = NULL; size_t line_len; FILE *cfg; if (!name) return NULL; cfg = fopen(selinux_booleans_subs_path(), "re"); if (!cfg) goto out; while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, cfg) != -1) { char *ptr; char *src = line_buf; char *dst; while (*src && isspace(*src)) src++; if (!*src) continue; if (src[0] == '#') continue; ptr = src; while (*ptr && !isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; *ptr++ = '\0'; if (strcmp(src, name) != 0) continue; dst = ptr; while (*dst && isspace(*dst)) dst++; if (!*dst) continue; ptr = dst; while (*ptr && !isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; *ptr = '\0'; if (!strchr(dst, '/')) sub = strdup(dst); break; } free(line_buf); fclose(cfg); out: if (!sub) sub = strdup(name); return sub; } static int bool_open(const char *name, int flag) { char *fname = NULL; char *alt_name = NULL; size_t len; int fd = -1; int ret; char *ptr; if (!name || strchr(name, '/')) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } /* note the 'sizeof' gets us enough room for the '\0' */ len = strlen(name) + strlen(selinux_mnt) + sizeof(SELINUX_BOOL_DIR); fname = malloc(sizeof(char) * len); if (!fname) return -1; ret = snprintf(fname, len, "%s%s%s", selinux_mnt, SELINUX_BOOL_DIR, name); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= len) goto out; fd = open(fname, flag); if (fd >= 0 || errno != ENOENT) goto out; alt_name = selinux_boolean_sub(name); if (!alt_name) goto out; /* note the 'sizeof' gets us enough room for the '\0' */ len = strlen(alt_name) + strlen(selinux_mnt) + sizeof(SELINUX_BOOL_DIR); ptr = realloc(fname, len); if (!ptr) goto out; fname = ptr; ret = snprintf(fname, len, "%s%s%s", selinux_mnt, SELINUX_BOOL_DIR, alt_name); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= len) goto out; fd = open(fname, flag); out: free(fname); free(alt_name); return fd; } #define STRBUF_SIZE 3 static int get_bool_value(const char *name, char **buf) { int fd, len; int errno_tmp; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } *buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (STRBUF_SIZE + 1)); if (!*buf) return -1; (*buf)[STRBUF_SIZE] = 0; fd = bool_open(name, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) goto out_err; len = read(fd, *buf, STRBUF_SIZE); errno_tmp = errno; close(fd); errno = errno_tmp; if (len != STRBUF_SIZE) goto out_err; return 0; out_err: free(*buf); return -1; } int security_get_boolean_pending(const char *name) { char *buf; int val; if (get_bool_value(name, &buf)) return -1; if (atoi(&buf[1])) val = 1; else val = 0; free(buf); return val; } int security_get_boolean_active(const char *name) { char *buf; int val; if (get_bool_value(name, &buf)) return -1; buf[1] = '\0'; if (atoi(buf)) val = 1; else val = 0; free(buf); return val; } int security_set_boolean(const char *name, int value) { int fd, ret; char buf[2]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } if (value < 0 || value > 1) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } fd = bool_open(name, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; if (value) buf[0] = '1'; else buf[0] = '0'; buf[1] = '\0'; ret = write(fd, buf, 2); close(fd); if (ret > 0) return 0; else return -1; } int security_commit_booleans(void) { int fd, ret; char buf[2]; char path[PATH_MAX]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/commit_pending_bools", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; buf[0] = '1'; buf[1] = '\0'; ret = write(fd, buf, 2); close(fd); if (ret > 0) return 0; else return -1; } static void rollback(SELboolean * boollist, int end) { int i; for (i = 0; i < end; i++) security_set_boolean(boollist[i].name, security_get_boolean_active(boollist[i]. name)); } int security_set_boolean_list(size_t boolcnt, SELboolean * boollist, int permanent) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < boolcnt; i++) { boollist[i].value = !!boollist[i].value; if (security_set_boolean(boollist[i].name, boollist[i].value)) { rollback(boollist, i); return -1; } } /* OK, let's do the commit */ if (security_commit_booleans()) { return -1; } /* Return error as flag no longer used */ if (permanent) return -1; return 0; } /* This function is deprecated */ int security_load_booleans(char *path __attribute__((unused))) { return -1; } #else #include #include "selinux_internal.h" int security_set_boolean_list(size_t boolcnt __attribute__((unused)), SELboolean * boollist __attribute__((unused)), int permanent __attribute__((unused))) { return -1; } int security_load_booleans(char *path __attribute__((unused))) { return -1; } int security_get_boolean_names(char ***names __attribute__((unused)), int *len __attribute__((unused))) { return -1; } int security_get_boolean_pending(const char *name __attribute__((unused))) { return -1; } int security_get_boolean_active(const char *name __attribute__((unused))) { return -1; } int security_set_boolean(const char *name __attribute__((unused)), int value __attribute__((unused))) { return -1; } int security_commit_booleans(void) { return -1; } char *selinux_boolean_sub(const char *name __attribute__((unused))) { return NULL; } #endif libselinux-3.5/src/callbacks.c000066400000000000000000000051511437566343300164310ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * User-supplied callbacks and default implementations. * Class and permission mappings. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" pthread_mutex_t log_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; /* default implementations */ static int __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))) default_selinux_log(int type __attribute__((unused)), const char *fmt, ...) { int rc; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); rc = vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return rc; } static int default_selinux_audit(void *ptr __attribute__((unused)), security_class_t cls __attribute__((unused)), char *buf __attribute__((unused)), size_t len __attribute__((unused))) { return 0; } static int default_selinux_validate(char **ctx) { #ifndef BUILD_HOST return security_check_context(*ctx); #else (void) ctx; return 0; #endif } static int default_selinux_setenforce(int enforcing __attribute__((unused))) { return 0; } static int default_selinux_policyload(int seqno __attribute__((unused))) { return 0; } /* callback pointers */ int __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))) (*selinux_log_direct)(int, const char *, ...) = default_selinux_log; int (*selinux_audit) (void *, security_class_t, char *, size_t) = default_selinux_audit; int (*selinux_validate)(char **ctx) = default_selinux_validate; int (*selinux_netlink_setenforce) (int enforcing) = default_selinux_setenforce; int (*selinux_netlink_policyload) (int seqno) = default_selinux_policyload; /* callback setting function */ void selinux_set_callback(int type, union selinux_callback cb) { switch (type) { case SELINUX_CB_LOG: selinux_log_direct = cb.func_log; break; case SELINUX_CB_AUDIT: selinux_audit = cb.func_audit; break; case SELINUX_CB_VALIDATE: selinux_validate = cb.func_validate; break; case SELINUX_CB_SETENFORCE: selinux_netlink_setenforce = cb.func_setenforce; break; case SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD: selinux_netlink_policyload = cb.func_policyload; break; } } /* callback getting function */ union selinux_callback selinux_get_callback(int type) { union selinux_callback cb; switch (type) { case SELINUX_CB_LOG: cb.func_log = selinux_log_direct; break; case SELINUX_CB_AUDIT: cb.func_audit = selinux_audit; break; case SELINUX_CB_VALIDATE: cb.func_validate = selinux_validate; break; case SELINUX_CB_SETENFORCE: cb.func_setenforce = selinux_netlink_setenforce; break; case SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD: cb.func_policyload = selinux_netlink_policyload; break; default: memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb)); errno = EINVAL; break; } return cb; } libselinux-3.5/src/callbacks.h000066400000000000000000000020441437566343300164340ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * This file describes the callbacks passed to selinux_init() and available * for use from the library code. They all have default implementations. */ #ifndef _SELINUX_CALLBACKS_H_ #define _SELINUX_CALLBACKS_H_ #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" /* callback pointers */ extern int __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))) (*selinux_log_direct) (int type, const char *, ...) ; extern int (*selinux_audit) (void *, security_class_t, char *, size_t) ; extern int (*selinux_validate)(char **ctx) ; extern int (*selinux_netlink_setenforce) (int enforcing) ; extern int (*selinux_netlink_policyload) (int seqno) ; /* Thread-safe selinux_log() function */ extern pthread_mutex_t log_mutex; #define selinux_log(type, ...) do { \ int saved_errno__ = errno; \ __pthread_mutex_lock(&log_mutex); \ selinux_log_direct(type, __VA_ARGS__); \ __pthread_mutex_unlock(&log_mutex); \ errno = saved_errno__; \ } while(0) #endif /* _SELINUX_CALLBACKS_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/src/canonicalize_context.c000066400000000000000000000027771437566343300207300ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include int security_canonicalize_context_raw(const char * con, char ** canoncon) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t size; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/context", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } if (strlcpy(buf, con, size) >= size) { errno = EOVERFLOW; ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf) + 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0 && errno == EINVAL) { /* Fall back to the original context for kernels that do not support the extended interface. */ strncpy(buf, con, size); } *canoncon = strdup(buf); if (!(*canoncon)) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } int security_canonicalize_context(const char * con, char ** canoncon) { int ret; char * rcon; char * rcanoncon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(con, &rcon)) return -1; ret = security_canonicalize_context_raw(rcon, &rcanoncon); freecon(rcon); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcanoncon, canoncon); freecon(rcanoncon); } return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/checkAccess.c000066400000000000000000000047731437566343300167220ustar00rootroot00000000000000/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include "avc_internal.h" static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static int selinux_enabled; static void avc_init_once(void) { selinux_enabled = is_selinux_enabled(); if (selinux_enabled == 1) { if (avc_open(NULL, 0)) return; } } int selinux_check_access(const char *scon, const char *tcon, const char *class, const char *perm, void *aux) { int rc; security_id_t scon_id; security_id_t tcon_id; security_class_t sclass; access_vector_t av; __selinux_once(once, avc_init_once); if (selinux_enabled != 1) return 0; rc = avc_context_to_sid(scon, &scon_id); if (rc < 0) return rc; rc = avc_context_to_sid(tcon, &tcon_id); if (rc < 0) return rc; (void) selinux_status_updated(); sclass = string_to_security_class(class); if (sclass == 0) { rc = errno; avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Unknown class %s", class); if (security_deny_unknown() == 0) return 0; errno = rc; return -1; } av = string_to_av_perm(sclass, perm); if (av == 0) { rc = errno; avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Unknown permission %s for class %s", perm, class); if (security_deny_unknown() == 0) return 0; errno = rc; return -1; } return avc_has_perm (scon_id, tcon_id, sclass, av, NULL, aux); } static int selinux_check_passwd_access_internal(access_vector_t requested) { int status = -1; char *user_context; if (is_selinux_enabled() == 0) return 0; if (getprevcon_raw(&user_context) == 0) { security_class_t passwd_class; struct av_decision avd; int retval; passwd_class = string_to_security_class("passwd"); if (passwd_class == 0) { freecon(user_context); if (security_deny_unknown() == 0) return 0; return -1; } retval = security_compute_av_raw(user_context, user_context, passwd_class, requested, &avd); if ((retval == 0) && ((requested & avd.allowed) == requested)) { status = 0; } freecon(user_context); } if (status != 0 && security_getenforce() == 0) status = 0; return status; } int selinux_check_passwd_access(access_vector_t requested) { return selinux_check_passwd_access_internal(requested); } int checkPasswdAccess(access_vector_t requested) { return selinux_check_passwd_access_internal(requested); } libselinux-3.5/src/check_context.c000066400000000000000000000014131437566343300173300ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include int security_check_context_raw(const char * con) { char path[PATH_MAX]; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/context", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; ret = write(fd, con, strlen(con) + 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; return 0; } int security_check_context(const char * con) { int ret; char * rcon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(con, &rcon)) return -1; ret = security_check_context_raw(rcon); freecon(rcon); return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/checkreqprot.c000066400000000000000000000012711437566343300172030ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include int security_get_checkreqprot(void) { int fd, ret, checkreqprot = 0; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/checkreqprot", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (sscanf(buf, "%d", &checkreqprot) != 1) return -1; return checkreqprot; } libselinux-3.5/src/compute_av.c000066400000000000000000000066131437566343300166600ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" int security_compute_av_flags_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t len; int fd, ret; security_class_t kclass; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/access", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; len = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(len); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } kclass = unmap_class(tclass); ret = snprintf(buf, len, "%s %s %hu %x", scon, tcon, kclass, unmap_perm(tclass, requested)); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= len) { errno = EOVERFLOW; ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, len); ret = read(fd, buf, len - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; ret = sscanf(buf, "%x %x %x %x %u %x", &avd->allowed, &avd->decided, &avd->auditallow, &avd->auditdeny, &avd->seqno, &avd->flags); if (ret < 5) { ret = -1; goto out2; } else if (ret < 6) avd->flags = 0; /* * If the tclass could not be mapped to a kernel class at all, the * kernel will have already set avd according to the * handle_unknown flag and we do not need to do anything further. * Otherwise, we must map the permissions within the returned * avd to the userspace permission values. */ if (kclass != 0) map_decision(tclass, avd); ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } int security_compute_av_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd) { struct av_decision lavd; int ret; ret = security_compute_av_flags_raw(scon, tcon, tclass, requested, &lavd); if (ret == 0) { avd->allowed = lavd.allowed; avd->decided = lavd.decided; avd->auditallow = lavd.auditallow; avd->auditdeny = lavd.auditdeny; avd->seqno = lavd.seqno; /* NOTE: * We should not return avd->flags via the interface * due to the binary compatibility. */ } return ret; } int security_compute_av_flags(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd) { char * rscon; char * rtcon; int ret; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) return -1; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(tcon, &rtcon)) { freecon(rscon); return -1; } ret = security_compute_av_flags_raw(rscon, rtcon, tclass, requested, avd); freecon(rscon); freecon(rtcon); return ret; } int security_compute_av(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t requested, struct av_decision *avd) { struct av_decision lavd; int ret; ret = security_compute_av_flags(scon, tcon, tclass, requested, &lavd); if (ret == 0) { avd->allowed = lavd.allowed; avd->decided = lavd.decided; avd->auditallow = lavd.auditallow; avd->auditdeny = lavd.auditdeny; avd->seqno = lavd.seqno; /* NOTE: * We should not return avd->flags via the interface * due to the binary compatibility. */ } return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/compute_create.c000066400000000000000000000061021437566343300175060ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" static int object_name_encode(const char *objname, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { int code; size_t offset = 0; if (buflen - offset < 1) return -1; buffer[offset++] = ' '; do { code = *objname++; if (isalnum(code) || code == '\0' || code == '-' || code == '.' || code == '_' || code == '~') { if (buflen - offset < 1) return -1; buffer[offset++] = code; } else if (code == ' ') { if (buflen - offset < 1) return -1; buffer[offset++] = '+'; } else { static const char *table = "0123456789ABCDEF"; int l = (code & 0x0f); int h = (code & 0xf0) >> 4; if (buflen - offset < 3) return -1; buffer[offset++] = '%'; buffer[offset++] = table[h]; buffer[offset++] = table[l]; } } while (code != '\0'); return 0; } int security_compute_create_name_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *objname, char ** newcon) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t size; int fd, ret, len; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/create", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } len = snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass)); if (len < 0 || (size_t)len >= size) { errno = EOVERFLOW; ret = -1; goto out2; } if (objname && object_name_encode(objname, buf + len, size - len) < 0) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; *newcon = strdup(buf); if (!(*newcon)) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } int security_compute_create_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon) { return security_compute_create_name_raw(scon, tcon, tclass, NULL, newcon); } int security_compute_create_name(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *objname, char ** newcon) { int ret; char * rscon; char * rtcon; char * rnewcon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) return -1; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(tcon, &rtcon)) { freecon(rscon); return -1; } ret = security_compute_create_name_raw(rscon, rtcon, tclass, objname, &rnewcon); freecon(rscon); freecon(rtcon); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rnewcon, newcon); freecon(rnewcon); } return ret; } int security_compute_create(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon) { return security_compute_create_name(scon, tcon, tclass, NULL, newcon); } libselinux-3.5/src/compute_member.c000066400000000000000000000032731437566343300175200ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" int security_compute_member_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t size; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/member", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } ret = snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass)); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= size) { errno = EOVERFLOW; ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; *newcon = strdup(buf); if (!(*newcon)) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } int security_compute_member(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon) { int ret; char * rscon; char * rtcon; char * rnewcon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) return -1; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(tcon, &rtcon)) { freecon(rscon); return -1; } ret = security_compute_member_raw(rscon, rtcon, tclass, &rnewcon); freecon(rscon); freecon(rtcon); if (!ret) { if (selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rnewcon, newcon)) { *newcon = NULL; ret = -1; } freecon(rnewcon); } return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/compute_relabel.c000066400000000000000000000032371437566343300176570ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" int security_compute_relabel_raw(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t size; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/relabel", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } ret = snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass)); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= size) { errno = EOVERFLOW; ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; *newcon = strdup(buf); if (!*newcon) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } int security_compute_relabel(const char * scon, const char * tcon, security_class_t tclass, char ** newcon) { int ret; char * rscon; char * rtcon; char * rnewcon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) return -1; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(tcon, &rtcon)) { freecon(rscon); return -1; } ret = security_compute_relabel_raw(rscon, rtcon, tclass, &rnewcon); freecon(rscon); freecon(rtcon); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rnewcon, newcon); freecon(rnewcon); } return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/compute_user.c000066400000000000000000000037541437566343300172330ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include "callbacks.h" int security_compute_user_raw(const char * scon, const char *user, char *** con) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char **ary; char *buf, *ptr; size_t size; int fd, ret; unsigned int i, nel; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "Direct use of security_compute_user() is deprecated, switch to get_ordered_context_list()\n"); snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/user", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } ret = snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s", scon, user); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= size) { errno = EOVERFLOW; ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret < 0) goto out2; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; if (sscanf(buf, "%u", &nel) != 1) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ary = malloc((nel + 1) * sizeof(char *)); if (!ary) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ptr = buf + strlen(buf) + 1; for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { ary[i] = strdup(ptr); if (!ary[i]) { freeconary(ary); ret = -1; goto out2; } ptr += strlen(ptr) + 1; } ary[nel] = NULL; *con = ary; ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } int security_compute_user(const char * scon, const char *user, char *** con) { int ret; char * rscon; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) return -1; ret = security_compute_user_raw(rscon, user, con); freecon(rscon); if (!ret) { char **ptr, *tmpcon; for (ptr = *con; *ptr; ptr++) { if (selinux_raw_to_trans_context(*ptr, &tmpcon)) { freeconary(*con); *con = NULL; return -1; } freecon(*ptr); *ptr = tmpcon; } } return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/context.c000066400000000000000000000073271437566343300162050ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include "context_internal.h" #include #include #include #include #define COMP_USER 0 #define COMP_ROLE 1 #define COMP_TYPE 2 #define COMP_RANGE 3 typedef struct { char *current_str; /* This is made up-to-date only when needed */ char *(component[4]); } context_private_t; /* * Allocate a new context, initialized from str. There must be 3 or * 4 colon-separated components and no whitespace in any component other * than the MLS component. */ context_t context_new(const char *str) { int i, count; errno = 0; context_private_t *n = (context_private_t *) malloc(sizeof(context_private_t)); context_t result = (context_t) malloc(sizeof(context_s_t)); const char *p, *tok; if (result) result->ptr = n; else free(n); if (n == 0 || result == 0) { goto err; } n->current_str = n->component[0] = n->component[1] = n->component[2] = n->component[3] = 0; for (count = 0, p = str; *p; p++) { switch (*p) { case ':': count++; break; case '\n': case '\t': case '\r': goto err; /* sanity check */ case ' ': if (count < 3) goto err; /* sanity check */ } } /* * Could be anywhere from 2 - 5 * e.g user:role:type to user:role:type:sens1:cata-sens2:catb */ if (count < 2 || count > 5) { /* might not have a range */ goto err; } n->component[3] = 0; for (i = 0, tok = str; *tok; i++) { if (i < 3) for (p = tok; *p && *p != ':'; p++) { /* empty */ } else { /* MLS range is one component */ for (p = tok; *p; p++) { /* empty */ } } n->component[i] = strndup(tok, p - tok); if (n->component[i] == 0) goto err; tok = *p ? p + 1 : p; } return result; err: if (errno == 0) errno = EINVAL; context_free(result); return 0; } static void conditional_free(char **v) { if (*v) { free(*v); } *v = 0; } /* * free all storage used by a context. Safe to call with * null pointer. */ void context_free(context_t context) { context_private_t *n; int i; if (context) { n = context->ptr; if (n) { conditional_free(&n->current_str); for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { conditional_free(&n->component[i]); } free(n); } free(context); } } /* * Return a pointer to the string value of the context. */ const char *context_str(context_t context) { context_private_t *n = context->ptr; int i; size_t total = 0; conditional_free(&n->current_str); for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { if (n->component[i]) { total += strlen(n->component[i]) + 1; } } n->current_str = malloc(total); if (n->current_str != 0) { char *cp = n->current_str; cp = stpcpy(cp, n->component[0]); for (i = 1; i < 4; i++) { if (n->component[i]) { *cp++ = ':'; cp = stpcpy(cp, n->component[i]); } } } return n->current_str; } /* Returns nonzero iff failed */ static int set_comp(context_private_t * n, int idx, const char *str) { char *t = NULL; const char *p; if (str) { for (p = str; *p; p++) { if (*p == '\t' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r' || ((*p == ':' || *p == ' ') && idx != COMP_RANGE)) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } } t = strdup(str); if (!t) { return -1; } } conditional_free(&n->component[idx]); n->component[idx] = t; return 0; } #define def_get(name,tag) \ const char * context_ ## name ## _get(context_t context) \ { \ context_private_t *n = context->ptr; \ return n->component[tag]; \ } def_get(type, COMP_TYPE) def_get(user, COMP_USER) def_get(range, COMP_RANGE) def_get(role, COMP_ROLE) #define def_set(name,tag) \ int context_ ## name ## _set(context_t context, const char* str) \ { \ return set_comp(context->ptr,tag,str);\ } def_set(type, COMP_TYPE) def_set(role, COMP_ROLE) def_set(user, COMP_USER) def_set(range, COMP_RANGE) libselinux-3.5/src/context_internal.h000066400000000000000000000000361437566343300200740ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include libselinux-3.5/src/deny_unknown.c000066400000000000000000000012651437566343300172320ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include int security_deny_unknown(void) { int fd, ret, deny_unknown = 0; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/deny_unknown", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (sscanf(buf, "%d", &deny_unknown) != 1) return -1; return deny_unknown; } libselinux-3.5/src/disable.c000066400000000000000000000011211437566343300161060ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include int security_disable(void) { int fd, ret; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/disable", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; buf[0] = '1'; buf[1] = '\0'; ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; return 0; } libselinux-3.5/src/enabled.c000066400000000000000000000020251437566343300161010ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include #include #include #include "policy.h" int is_selinux_enabled(void) { /* init_selinuxmnt() gets called before this function. We * will assume that if a selinux file system is mounted, then * selinux is enabled. */ #ifdef ANDROID return (selinux_mnt ? 1 : 0); #else return (selinux_mnt && has_selinux_config); #endif } /* * Function: is_selinux_mls_enabled() * Return: 1 on success * 0 on failure */ int is_selinux_mls_enabled(void) { char buf[20], path[PATH_MAX]; int fd, ret, enabled = 0; if (!selinux_mnt) return enabled; snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/mls", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return enabled; memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf); do { ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf - 1); } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return enabled; if (!strcmp(buf, "1")) enabled = 1; return enabled; } libselinux-3.5/src/exception.sh000077500000000000000000000017271437566343300167100ustar00rootroot00000000000000#!/bin/bash function except() { case $1 in selinux_file_context_cmp) # ignore ;; *) echo " %exception $1 { \$action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } }" ;; esac } # Make sure that selinux.h is included first in order not to depend on the order # in which "#include " appears in other files. FILE_LIST=( ../include/selinux/selinux.h ../include/selinux/avc.h ../include/selinux/context.h ../include/selinux/get_context_list.h ../include/selinux/get_default_type.h ../include/selinux/label.h ../include/selinux/restorecon.h ) if ! cat "${FILE_LIST[@]}" | ${CC:-gcc} -x c -c -I../include -o temp.o - -aux-info temp.aux then # clang does not support -aux-info so fall back to gcc cat "${FILE_LIST[@]}" | gcc -x c -c -I../include -o temp.o - -aux-info temp.aux fi for i in `awk '/.*extern int/ { print $6 }' temp.aux`; do except $i ; done rm -f -- temp.aux temp.o libselinux-3.5/src/fgetfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000034351437566343300170020ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" static ssize_t fgetxattr_wrapper(int fd, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { char buf[40]; int fd_flag, saved_errno = errno; ssize_t ret; ret = fgetxattr(fd, name, value, size); if (ret != -1 || errno != EBADF) return ret; /* Emulate O_PATH support */ fd_flag = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL); if (fd_flag == -1 || (fd_flag & O_PATH) == 0) { errno = EBADF; return -1; } snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd); errno = saved_errno; ret = getxattr(buf, name, value, size); if (ret < 0 && errno == ENOENT) errno = EBADF; return ret; } int fgetfilecon_raw(int fd, char ** context) { char *buf; ssize_t size; ssize_t ret; size = INITCONTEXTLEN + 1; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) return -1; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = fgetxattr_wrapper(fd, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0 && errno == ERANGE) { char *newbuf; size = fgetxattr_wrapper(fd, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (size < 0) goto out; size++; newbuf = realloc(buf, size); if (!newbuf) goto out; buf = newbuf; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = fgetxattr_wrapper(fd, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); } out: if (ret == 0) { /* Re-map empty attribute values to errors. */ errno = ENOTSUP; ret = -1; } if (ret < 0) free(buf); else *context = buf; return ret; } int fgetfilecon(int fd, char ** context) { char * rcontext = NULL; int ret; *context = NULL; ret = fgetfilecon_raw(fd, &rcontext); if (ret > 0) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcontext, context); freecon(rcontext); } if (ret >= 0 && *context) return strlen(*context) + 1; return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/file_path_suffixes.h000066400000000000000000000032501437566343300203640ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* File name suffixes. */ S_(BINPOLICY, "/policy/policy") S_(CONTEXTS_DIR, "/contexts") S_(FILE_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/files/file_contexts") S_(HOMEDIR_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/files/homedir_template") S_(DEFAULT_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/default_contexts") S_(USER_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/users/") S_(FAILSAFE_CONTEXT, "/contexts/failsafe_context") S_(DEFAULT_TYPE, "/contexts/default_type") S_(SECURETTY_TYPES, "/contexts/securetty_types") /* BOOLEANS is deprecated */ S_(BOOLEANS, "/booleans") S_(MEDIA_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/files/media") S_(REMOVABLE_CONTEXT, "/contexts/removable_context") S_(CUSTOMIZABLE_TYPES, "/contexts/customizable_types") /* USERS_DIR is deprecated */ S_(USERS_DIR, "/users/") S_(SEUSERS, "/seusers") S_(TRANSLATIONS, "/setrans.conf") S_(NETFILTER_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/netfilter_contexts") S_(FILE_CONTEXTS_HOMEDIR, "/contexts/files/file_contexts.homedirs") S_(FILE_CONTEXTS_LOCAL, "/contexts/files/file_contexts.local") S_(X_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/x_contexts") S_(COLORS, "/secolor.conf") S_(VIRTUAL_DOMAIN, "/contexts/virtual_domain_context") S_(VIRTUAL_IMAGE, "/contexts/virtual_image_context") S_(LXC_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/lxc_contexts") S_(OPENRC_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/openrc_contexts") S_(OPENSSH_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/openssh_contexts") S_(SNAPPERD_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/snapperd_contexts") S_(SYSTEMD_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/systemd_contexts") S_(FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS, "/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs") S_(FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS_DIST, "/contexts/files/file_contexts.subs_dist") S_(SEPGSQL_CONTEXTS, "/contexts/sepgsql_contexts") S_(BOOLEAN_SUBS, "/booleans.subs_dist") libselinux-3.5/src/freecon.c000066400000000000000000000002041437566343300161250ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include void freecon(char * con) { free(con); } libselinux-3.5/src/freeconary.c000066400000000000000000000003351437566343300166460ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include void freeconary(char ** con) { char **ptr; if (!con) return; for (ptr = con; *ptr; ptr++) { free(*ptr); } free(con); } libselinux-3.5/src/fsetfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000025451437566343300170170ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" static int fsetxattr_wrapper(int fd, const char* name, const void* value, size_t size, int flags) { char buf[40]; int rc, fd_flag, saved_errno = errno; rc = fsetxattr(fd, name, value, size, flags); if (rc == 0 || errno != EBADF) return rc; /* Emulate O_PATH support */ fd_flag = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL); if (fd_flag == -1 || (fd_flag & O_PATH) == 0) { errno = EBADF; return -1; } snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd); errno = saved_errno; rc = setxattr(buf, name, value, size, flags); if (rc < 0 && errno == ENOENT) errno = EBADF; return rc; } int fsetfilecon_raw(int fd, const char * context) { int rc = fsetxattr_wrapper(fd, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, strlen(context) + 1, 0); if (rc < 0 && errno == ENOTSUP) { char * ccontext = NULL; int err = errno; if ((fgetfilecon_raw(fd, &ccontext) >= 0) && (strcmp(context,ccontext) == 0)) { rc = 0; } else { errno = err; } freecon(ccontext); } return rc; } int fsetfilecon(int fd, const char *context) { int ret; char * rcontext; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context, &rcontext)) return -1; ret = fsetfilecon_raw(fd, rcontext); freecon(rcontext); return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/get_context_list.c000066400000000000000000000236641437566343300201010ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "context_internal.h" #include "get_context_list_internal.h" int get_default_context_with_role(const char *user, const char *role, const char *fromcon, char ** newcon) { char **conary; char **ptr; context_t con; const char *role2; int rc; rc = get_ordered_context_list(user, fromcon, &conary); if (rc <= 0) return -1; for (ptr = conary; *ptr; ptr++) { con = context_new(*ptr); if (!con) continue; role2 = context_role_get(con); if (role2 && !strcmp(role, role2)) { context_free(con); break; } context_free(con); } rc = -1; if (!(*ptr)) { errno = EINVAL; goto out; } *newcon = strdup(*ptr); if (!(*newcon)) goto out; rc = 0; out: freeconary(conary); return rc; } int get_default_context_with_rolelevel(const char *user, const char *role, const char *level, const char *fromcon, char ** newcon) { int rc; char *backup_fromcon = NULL; context_t con; const char *newfromcon; if (!level) return get_default_context_with_role(user, role, fromcon, newcon); if (!fromcon) { rc = getcon(&backup_fromcon); if (rc < 0) return rc; fromcon = backup_fromcon; } rc = -1; con = context_new(fromcon); if (!con) goto out; if (context_range_set(con, level)) goto out; newfromcon = context_str(con); if (!newfromcon) goto out; rc = get_default_context_with_role(user, role, newfromcon, newcon); out: context_free(con); freecon(backup_fromcon); return rc; } int get_default_context(const char *user, const char *fromcon, char ** newcon) { char **conary; int rc; rc = get_ordered_context_list(user, fromcon, &conary); if (rc <= 0) return -1; *newcon = strdup(conary[0]); freeconary(conary); if (!(*newcon)) return -1; return 0; } static int is_in_reachable(char **reachable, const char *usercon_str) { if (!reachable) return 0; for (; *reachable != NULL; reachable++) { if (strcmp(*reachable, usercon_str) == 0) { return 1; } } return 0; } static int get_context_user(FILE * fp, const char * fromcon, const char * user, char ***reachable, unsigned int *nreachable) { char *start, *end = NULL; char *line = NULL; size_t line_len = 0, usercon_len; size_t user_len = strlen(user); ssize_t len; int found = 0; const char *fromrole, *fromtype, *fromlevel; char *linerole, *linetype; char **new_reachable = NULL; char *usercon_str; const char *usercon_str2; context_t con; context_t usercon; int rc; errno = EINVAL; /* Extract the role and type of the fromcon for matching. User identity and MLS range can be variable. */ con = context_new(fromcon); if (!con) return -1; fromrole = context_role_get(con); fromtype = context_type_get(con); fromlevel = context_range_get(con); if (!fromrole || !fromtype) { context_free(con); return -1; } while ((len = getline(&line, &line_len, fp)) > 0) { if (line[len - 1] == '\n') line[len - 1] = 0; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ start = line; while (*start && isspace(*start)) start++; if (!(*start)) continue; /* Find the end of the (partial) fromcon in the line. */ end = start; while (*end && !isspace(*end)) end++; if (!(*end)) continue; /* Check for a match. */ linerole = start; while (*start && !isspace(*start) && *start != ':') start++; if (*start != ':') continue; *start = 0; linetype = ++start; while (*start && !isspace(*start) && *start != ':') start++; if (!(*start)) continue; *start = 0; if (!strcmp(fromrole, linerole) && !strcmp(fromtype, linetype)) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { errno = ENOENT; rc = -1; goto out; } start = ++end; while (*start) { /* Skip leading whitespace */ while (*start && isspace(*start)) start++; if (!(*start)) break; /* Find the end of this partial context. */ end = start; while (*end && !isspace(*end)) end++; if (*end) *end++ = 0; /* Check whether a new context is valid */ if (SIZE_MAX - user_len < strlen(start) + 2) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: one of partial contexts is too big\n", __FUNCTION__); errno = EINVAL; rc = -1; goto out; } usercon_len = user_len + strlen(start) + 2; usercon_str = malloc(usercon_len); if (!usercon_str) { rc = -1; goto out; } /* set range from fromcon in the new usercon */ snprintf(usercon_str, usercon_len, "%s:%s", user, start); usercon = context_new(usercon_str); if (!usercon) { if (errno != EINVAL) { free(usercon_str); rc = -1; goto out; } fprintf(stderr, "%s: can't create a context from %s, skipping\n", __FUNCTION__, usercon_str); free(usercon_str); start = end; continue; } free(usercon_str); if (context_range_set(usercon, fromlevel) != 0) { context_free(usercon); rc = -1; goto out; } usercon_str2 = context_str(usercon); if (!usercon_str2) { context_free(usercon); rc = -1; goto out; } /* check whether usercon is already in reachable */ if (is_in_reachable(*reachable, usercon_str2)) { context_free(usercon); start = end; continue; } if (security_check_context(usercon_str2) == 0) { new_reachable = realloc(*reachable, (*nreachable + 2) * sizeof(char *)); if (!new_reachable) { context_free(usercon); rc = -1; goto out; } *reachable = new_reachable; new_reachable[*nreachable] = strdup(usercon_str2); if (new_reachable[*nreachable] == NULL) { context_free(usercon); rc = -1; goto out; } new_reachable[*nreachable + 1] = 0; *nreachable += 1; } context_free(usercon); start = end; } rc = 0; out: context_free(con); free(line); return rc; } static int get_failsafe_context(const char *user, char ** newcon) { FILE *fp; char buf[255], *ptr; size_t plen, nlen; int rc; fp = fopen(selinux_failsafe_context_path(), "re"); if (!fp) return -1; ptr = fgets_unlocked(buf, sizeof buf, fp); fclose(fp); if (!ptr) return -1; plen = strlen(ptr); if (buf[plen - 1] == '\n') buf[plen - 1] = 0; nlen = strlen(user) + 1 + plen + 1; *newcon = malloc(nlen); if (!(*newcon)) return -1; rc = snprintf(*newcon, nlen, "%s:%s", user, ptr); if (rc < 0 || (size_t) rc >= nlen) { free(*newcon); *newcon = 0; return -1; } /* If possible, check the context to catch errors early rather than waiting until the caller tries to use setexeccon on the context. But this may not always be possible, e.g. if selinuxfs isn't mounted. */ if (security_check_context(*newcon) && errno != ENOENT) { free(*newcon); *newcon = 0; return -1; } return 0; } int get_ordered_context_list_with_level(const char *user, const char *level, const char *fromcon, char *** list) { int rc; char *backup_fromcon = NULL; context_t con; const char *newfromcon; if (!level) return get_ordered_context_list(user, fromcon, list); if (!fromcon) { rc = getcon(&backup_fromcon); if (rc < 0) return rc; fromcon = backup_fromcon; } rc = -1; con = context_new(fromcon); if (!con) goto out; if (context_range_set(con, level)) goto out; newfromcon = context_str(con); if (!newfromcon) goto out; rc = get_ordered_context_list(user, newfromcon, list); out: context_free(con); freecon(backup_fromcon); return rc; } int get_default_context_with_level(const char *user, const char *level, const char *fromcon, char ** newcon) { char **conary; int rc; rc = get_ordered_context_list_with_level(user, level, fromcon, &conary); if (rc <= 0) return -1; *newcon = strdup(conary[0]); freeconary(conary); if (!(*newcon)) return -1; return 0; } int get_ordered_context_list(const char *user, const char *fromcon, char *** list) { char **reachable = NULL; int rc = 0; unsigned nreachable = 0; char *backup_fromcon = NULL; FILE *fp; char *fname = NULL; size_t fname_len; const char *user_contexts_path = selinux_user_contexts_path(); if (!fromcon) { /* Get the current context and use it for the starting context */ rc = getcon(&backup_fromcon); if (rc < 0) return rc; fromcon = backup_fromcon; } /* Determine the ordering to apply from the optional per-user config and from the global config. */ fname_len = strlen(user_contexts_path) + strlen(user) + 2; fname = malloc(fname_len); if (!fname) goto failsafe; snprintf(fname, fname_len, "%s%s", user_contexts_path, user); fp = fopen(fname, "re"); if (fp) { __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); rc = get_context_user(fp, fromcon, user, &reachable, &nreachable); fclose(fp); if (rc < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: error in processing configuration file %s\n", __FUNCTION__, fname); /* Fall through, try global config */ } } free(fname); fp = fopen(selinux_default_context_path(), "re"); if (fp) { __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); rc = get_context_user(fp, fromcon, user, &reachable, &nreachable); fclose(fp); if (rc < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: error in processing configuration file %s\n", __FUNCTION__, selinux_default_context_path()); /* Fall through */ } } if (!nreachable) goto failsafe; out: if (nreachable > 0) { *list = reachable; rc = nreachable; } else freeconary(reachable); freecon(backup_fromcon); return rc; failsafe: /* Unable to determine a reachable context list, try to fall back to the "failsafe" context to at least permit root login for emergency recovery if possible. */ freeconary(reachable); reachable = malloc(2 * sizeof(char *)); if (!reachable) { rc = -1; goto out; } reachable[0] = reachable[1] = 0; rc = get_failsafe_context(user, &reachable[0]); if (rc < 0) { freeconary(reachable); reachable = NULL; goto out; } nreachable = 1; /* one context in the list */ goto out; } libselinux-3.5/src/get_context_list_internal.h000066400000000000000000000000471437566343300217700ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include libselinux-3.5/src/get_default_type.c000066400000000000000000000022141437566343300200330ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include "get_default_type_internal.h" #include static int find_default_type(FILE * fp, const char *role, char **type); int get_default_type(const char *role, char **type) { FILE *fp = NULL; fp = fopen(selinux_default_type_path(), "re"); if (!fp) return -1; if (find_default_type(fp, role, type) < 0) { fclose(fp); return -1; } fclose(fp); return 0; } static int find_default_type(FILE * fp, const char *role, char **type) { char buf[250]; const char *ptr = "", *end; char *t; size_t len; int found = 0; len = strlen(role); while (!feof_unlocked(fp)) { if (!fgets_unlocked(buf, sizeof buf, fp)) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1]) buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = 0; ptr = buf; while (*ptr && isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; if (!(*ptr)) continue; if (!strncmp(role, ptr, len)) { end = ptr + len; if (*end == ':') { found = 1; ptr = ++end; break; } } } if (!found) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } t = strndup(ptr, strlen(buf) - len - 1); if (!t) return -1; *type = t; return 0; } libselinux-3.5/src/get_default_type_internal.h000066400000000000000000000000471437566343300217360ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include libselinux-3.5/src/get_initial_context.c000066400000000000000000000024301437566343300205430ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #define SELINUX_INITCON_DIR "/initial_contexts/" int security_get_initial_context_raw(const char * name, char ** con) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf; size_t size; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } if (strchr(name, '/')) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } ret = snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s%s%s", selinux_mnt, SELINUX_INITCON_DIR, name); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof path) { errno = EOVERFLOW; return -1; } fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } memset(buf, 0, size); ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0) goto out2; *con = strdup(buf); if (!(*con)) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: close(fd); return ret; } int security_get_initial_context(const char * name, char ** con) { int ret; char * rcon; ret = security_get_initial_context_raw(name, &rcon); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcon, con); freecon(rcon); } return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/getenforce.c000066400000000000000000000012361437566343300166330ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include int security_getenforce(void) { int fd, ret, enforce = 0; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/enforce", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (sscanf(buf, "%d", &enforce) != 1) return -1; return !!enforce; } libselinux-3.5/src/getfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000023201437566343300166240ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include #include #include "policy.h" int getfilecon_raw(const char *path, char ** context) { char *buf; ssize_t size; ssize_t ret; size = INITCONTEXTLEN + 1; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) return -1; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = getxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0 && errno == ERANGE) { char *newbuf; size = getxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (size < 0) goto out; size++; newbuf = realloc(buf, size); if (!newbuf) goto out; buf = newbuf; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = getxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); } out: if (ret == 0) { /* Re-map empty attribute values to errors. */ errno = ENOTSUP; ret = -1; } if (ret < 0) free(buf); else *context = buf; return ret; } int getfilecon(const char *path, char ** context) { int ret; char * rcontext = NULL; *context = NULL; ret = getfilecon_raw(path, &rcontext); if (ret > 0) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcontext, context); freecon(rcontext); } if (ret >= 0 && *context) return strlen(*context) + 1; return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/getpeercon.c000066400000000000000000000017261437566343300166510ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #ifndef SO_PEERSEC #define SO_PEERSEC 31 #endif int getpeercon_raw(int fd, char ** context) { char *buf; socklen_t size; ssize_t ret; size = INITCONTEXTLEN + 1; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) return -1; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, buf, &size); if (ret < 0 && errno == ERANGE) { char *newbuf; newbuf = realloc(buf, size); if (!newbuf) goto out; buf = newbuf; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, buf, &size); } out: if (ret < 0) free(buf); else *context = buf; return ret; } int getpeercon(int fd, char ** context) { int ret; char * rcontext; ret = getpeercon_raw(fd, &rcontext); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcontext, context); freecon(rcontext); } return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/init.c000066400000000000000000000055411437566343300154600ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "policy.h" #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "setrans_internal.h" char *selinux_mnt = NULL; int selinux_page_size = 0; int has_selinux_config = 0; /* Verify the mount point for selinux file system has a selinuxfs. If the file system: * Exist, * Is mounted with an selinux file system, * The file system is read/write * then set this as the default file system. */ static int verify_selinuxmnt(const char *mnt) { struct statfs sfbuf; int rc; do { rc = statfs(mnt, &sfbuf); } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR); if (rc == 0) { if ((uint32_t)sfbuf.f_type == (uint32_t)SELINUX_MAGIC) { struct statvfs vfsbuf; rc = statvfs(mnt, &vfsbuf); if (rc == 0) { if (!(vfsbuf.f_flag & ST_RDONLY)) { set_selinuxmnt(mnt); } return 0; } } } return -1; } int selinuxfs_exists(void) { int exists = 0; FILE *fp = NULL; char *buf = NULL; size_t len; ssize_t num; fp = fopen("/proc/filesystems", "re"); if (!fp) return 1; /* Fail as if it exists */ __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); num = getline(&buf, &len, fp); while (num != -1) { if (strstr(buf, SELINUXFS)) { exists = 1; break; } num = getline(&buf, &len, fp); } free(buf); fclose(fp); return exists; } static void init_selinuxmnt(void) { char *buf = NULL, *p; FILE *fp = NULL; size_t len; ssize_t num; if (selinux_mnt) return; if (verify_selinuxmnt(SELINUXMNT) == 0) return; if (verify_selinuxmnt(OLDSELINUXMNT) == 0) return; /* Drop back to detecting it the long way. */ if (!selinuxfs_exists()) goto out; /* At this point, the usual spot doesn't have an selinuxfs so * we look around for it */ fp = fopen("/proc/mounts", "re"); if (!fp) goto out; __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while ((num = getline(&buf, &len, fp)) != -1) { char *tmp; p = strchr(buf, ' '); if (!p) goto out; p++; tmp = strchr(p, ' '); if (!tmp) goto out; if (!strncmp(tmp + 1, SELINUXFS" ", strlen(SELINUXFS)+1)) { *tmp = '\0'; break; } } /* If we found something, dup it */ if (num > 0) verify_selinuxmnt(p); out: free(buf); if (fp) fclose(fp); return; } void fini_selinuxmnt(void) { free(selinux_mnt); selinux_mnt = NULL; } void set_selinuxmnt(const char *mnt) { selinux_mnt = strdup(mnt); } static void init_lib(void) __attribute__ ((constructor)); static void init_lib(void) { selinux_page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); init_selinuxmnt(); #ifndef ANDROID has_selinux_config = (access(SELINUXCONFIG, F_OK) == 0); #endif } static void fini_lib(void) __attribute__ ((destructor)); static void fini_lib(void) { fini_selinuxmnt(); } libselinux-3.5/src/is_customizable_type.c000066400000000000000000000031371437566343300207510ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "context_internal.h" static char **customizable_list = NULL; static pthread_once_t customizable_once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static void customizable_init(void) { FILE *fp; char *buf; unsigned int ctr = 0, i; char **list = NULL; fp = fopen(selinux_customizable_types_path(), "re"); if (!fp) return; buf = malloc(selinux_page_size); if (!buf) { fclose(fp); return; } while (fgets_unlocked(buf, selinux_page_size, fp) && ctr < UINT_MAX) { ctr++; } rewind(fp); if (ctr) { list = (char **) calloc(sizeof(char *), ctr + 1); if (list) { i = 0; while (fgets_unlocked(buf, selinux_page_size, fp) && i < ctr) { buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = 0; list[i] = strdup(buf); if (!list[i]) { unsigned int j; for (j = 0; j < i; j++) free(list[j]); free(list); list = NULL; break; } i++; } } } fclose(fp); free(buf); if (!list) return; customizable_list = list; } int is_context_customizable(const char * scontext) { int i; const char *type; context_t c; __selinux_once(customizable_once, customizable_init); if (!customizable_list) return -1; c = context_new(scontext); if (!c) return -1; type = context_type_get(c); if (!type) { context_free(c); return -1; } for (i = 0; customizable_list[i]; i++) { if (strcmp(customizable_list[i], type) == 0) { context_free(c); return 1; } } context_free(c); return 0; } libselinux-3.5/src/label.c000066400000000000000000000170721437566343300155760ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Generalized labeling frontend for userspace object managers. * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0])) #ifdef NO_MEDIA_BACKEND #define CONFIG_MEDIA_BACKEND(fnptr) NULL #else #define CONFIG_MEDIA_BACKEND(fnptr) &fnptr #endif #ifdef NO_X_BACKEND #define CONFIG_X_BACKEND(fnptr) NULL #else #define CONFIG_X_BACKEND(fnptr) &fnptr #endif #ifdef NO_DB_BACKEND #define CONFIG_DB_BACKEND(fnptr) NULL #else #define CONFIG_DB_BACKEND(fnptr) &fnptr #endif #ifdef NO_ANDROID_BACKEND #define CONFIG_ANDROID_BACKEND(fnptr) NULL #else #define CONFIG_ANDROID_BACKEND(fnptr) (&(fnptr)) #endif typedef int (*selabel_initfunc)(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts); static selabel_initfunc initfuncs[] = { &selabel_file_init, CONFIG_MEDIA_BACKEND(selabel_media_init), CONFIG_X_BACKEND(selabel_x_init), CONFIG_DB_BACKEND(selabel_db_init), CONFIG_ANDROID_BACKEND(selabel_property_init), CONFIG_ANDROID_BACKEND(selabel_service_init), }; static inline struct selabel_digest *selabel_is_digest_set (const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n, struct selabel_digest *entry) { struct selabel_digest *digest = NULL; while (n--) { if (opts[n].type == SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST && opts[n].value == (char *)1) { digest = calloc(1, sizeof(*digest)); if (!digest) goto err; digest->digest = calloc(1, DIGEST_SPECFILE_SIZE + 1); if (!digest->digest) goto err; digest->specfile_list = calloc(DIGEST_FILES_MAX, sizeof(char *)); if (!digest->specfile_list) goto err; entry = digest; return entry; } } return NULL; err: if (digest) { free(digest->digest); free(digest->specfile_list); free(digest); } return NULL; } static void selabel_digest_fini(struct selabel_digest *ptr) { int i; free(ptr->digest); free(ptr->hashbuf); if (ptr->specfile_list) { for (i = 0; ptr->specfile_list[i]; i++) free(ptr->specfile_list[i]); free(ptr->specfile_list); } free(ptr); } /* * Validation functions */ static inline int selabel_is_validate_set(const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n) { while (n--) if (opts[n].type == SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE) return !!opts[n].value; return 0; } int selabel_validate(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selabel_lookup_rec *contexts) { int rc = 0; if (!rec->validating || contexts->validated) goto out; rc = selinux_validate(&contexts->ctx_raw); if (rc < 0) goto out; contexts->validated = 1; out: return rc; } /* Public API helpers */ static int selabel_fini(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr, int translating) { if (compat_validate(rec, lr, rec->spec_file, lr->lineno)) return -1; if (translating && !lr->ctx_trans && selinux_raw_to_trans_context(lr->ctx_raw, &lr->ctx_trans)) return -1; return 0; } static struct selabel_lookup_rec * selabel_lookup_common(struct selabel_handle *rec, int translating, const char *key, int type) { struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr; if (key == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return NULL; } lr = rec->func_lookup(rec, key, type); if (!lr) return NULL; if (selabel_fini(rec, lr, translating)) return NULL; return lr; } static struct selabel_lookup_rec * selabel_lookup_bm_common(struct selabel_handle *rec, int translating, const char *key, int type, const char **aliases) { struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr; if (key == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return NULL; } lr = rec->func_lookup_best_match(rec, key, aliases, type); if (!lr) return NULL; if (selabel_fini(rec, lr, translating)) return NULL; return lr; } /* * Public API */ struct selabel_handle *selabel_open(unsigned int backend, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct selabel_handle *rec = NULL; if (backend >= ARRAY_SIZE(initfuncs)) { errno = EINVAL; goto out; } if (!initfuncs[backend]) { errno = ENOTSUP; goto out; } rec = (struct selabel_handle *)malloc(sizeof(*rec)); if (!rec) goto out; memset(rec, 0, sizeof(*rec)); rec->backend = backend; rec->validating = selabel_is_validate_set(opts, nopts); rec->digest = selabel_is_digest_set(opts, nopts, rec->digest); if ((*initfuncs[backend])(rec, opts, nopts)) { if (rec->digest) selabel_digest_fini(rec->digest); free(rec->spec_file); free(rec); rec = NULL; } out: return rec; } int selabel_lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, char **con, const char *key, int type) { struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr; lr = selabel_lookup_common(rec, 1, key, type); if (!lr) return -1; *con = strdup(lr->ctx_trans); return *con ? 0 : -1; } int selabel_lookup_raw(struct selabel_handle *rec, char **con, const char *key, int type) { struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr; lr = selabel_lookup_common(rec, 0, key, type); if (!lr) return -1; *con = strdup(lr->ctx_raw); return *con ? 0 : -1; } bool selabel_partial_match(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key) { if (!rec->func_partial_match) { /* * If the label backend does not support partial matching, * then assume a match is possible. */ return true; } return rec->func_partial_match(rec, key); } bool selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, uint8_t **calculated_digest, uint8_t **xattr_digest, size_t *digest_len) { if (!rec->func_get_digests_all_partial_matches) return false; return rec->func_get_digests_all_partial_matches(rec, key, calculated_digest, xattr_digest, digest_len); } bool selabel_hash_all_partial_matches(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, uint8_t *digest) { if (!rec->func_hash_all_partial_matches) { return false; } return rec->func_hash_all_partial_matches(rec, key, digest); } int selabel_lookup_best_match(struct selabel_handle *rec, char **con, const char *key, const char **aliases, int type) { struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr; if (!rec->func_lookup_best_match) { errno = ENOTSUP; return -1; } lr = selabel_lookup_bm_common(rec, 1, key, type, aliases); if (!lr) return -1; *con = strdup(lr->ctx_trans); return *con ? 0 : -1; } int selabel_lookup_best_match_raw(struct selabel_handle *rec, char **con, const char *key, const char **aliases, int type) { struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr; if (!rec->func_lookup_best_match) { errno = ENOTSUP; return -1; } lr = selabel_lookup_bm_common(rec, 0, key, type, aliases); if (!lr) return -1; *con = strdup(lr->ctx_raw); return *con ? 0 : -1; } enum selabel_cmp_result selabel_cmp(struct selabel_handle *h1, struct selabel_handle *h2) { if (!h1->func_cmp || h1->func_cmp != h2->func_cmp) return SELABEL_INCOMPARABLE; return h1->func_cmp(h1, h2); } int selabel_digest(struct selabel_handle *rec, unsigned char **digest, size_t *digest_len, char ***specfiles, size_t *num_specfiles) { if (!rec->digest) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } *digest = rec->digest->digest; *digest_len = DIGEST_SPECFILE_SIZE; *specfiles = rec->digest->specfile_list; *num_specfiles = rec->digest->specfile_cnt; return 0; } void selabel_close(struct selabel_handle *rec) { if (rec->digest) selabel_digest_fini(rec->digest); rec->func_close(rec); free(rec->spec_file); free(rec); } void selabel_stats(struct selabel_handle *rec) { rec->func_stats(rec); } libselinux-3.5/src/label_backends_android.c000066400000000000000000000167451437566343300211360ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Property Service contexts backend for labeling Android * property keys */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" /* A property security context specification. */ typedef struct spec { struct selabel_lookup_rec lr; /* holds contexts for lookup result */ char *property_key; /* property key string */ } spec_t; /* Our stored configuration */ struct saved_data { /* * The array of specifications is sorted for longest * prefix match */ spec_t *spec_arr; unsigned int nspec; /* total number of specifications */ }; static int cmp(const void *A, const void *B) { const struct spec *sp1 = A, *sp2 = B; if (strncmp(sp1->property_key, "*", 1) == 0) return 1; if (strncmp(sp2->property_key, "*", 1) == 0) return -1; size_t L1 = strlen(sp1->property_key); size_t L2 = strlen(sp2->property_key); return (L1 < L2) - (L1 > L2); } /* * Warn about duplicate specifications. */ static int nodups_specs(struct saved_data *data, const char *path) { int rc = 0; unsigned int ii, jj; struct spec *curr_spec, *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; for (ii = 0; ii < data->nspec; ii++) { curr_spec = &spec_arr[ii]; for (jj = ii + 1; jj < data->nspec; jj++) { if (!strcmp(spec_arr[jj].property_key, curr_spec->property_key)) { rc = -1; errno = EINVAL; if (strcmp(spec_arr[jj].lr.ctx_raw, curr_spec->lr.ctx_raw)) { selinux_log (SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Multiple different specifications for %s (%s and %s).\n", path, curr_spec->property_key, spec_arr[jj].lr.ctx_raw, curr_spec->lr.ctx_raw); } else { selinux_log (SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Multiple same specifications for %s.\n", path, curr_spec->property_key); } } } } return rc; } static int process_line(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *path, char *line_buf, int pass, unsigned lineno) { int items; char *prop = NULL, *context = NULL; struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; spec_t *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int nspec = data->nspec; const char *errbuf = NULL; items = read_spec_entries(line_buf, &errbuf, 2, &prop, &context); if (items < 0) { if (errbuf) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: line %u error due to: %s\n", path, lineno, errbuf); } else { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: line %u error due to: %m\n", path, lineno); } return -1; } if (items == 0) return items; if (items != 2) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: line %u is missing fields\n", path, lineno); free(prop); errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (pass == 0) { free(prop); free(context); } else if (pass == 1) { /* On the second pass, process and store the specification in spec. */ spec_arr[nspec].property_key = prop; spec_arr[nspec].lr.ctx_raw = context; if (rec->validating) { if (selabel_validate(rec, &spec_arr[nspec].lr) < 0) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: line %u has invalid context %s\n", path, lineno, spec_arr[nspec].lr.ctx_raw); errno = EINVAL; return -1; } } } data->nspec = ++nspec; return 0; } static int init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; const char *path = NULL; FILE *fp; char line_buf[BUFSIZ]; unsigned int lineno, maxnspec, pass; int status = -1; struct stat sb; /* Process arguments */ while (n--) switch (opts[n].type) { case SELABEL_OPT_PATH: path = opts[n].value; break; } if (!path) return -1; /* Open the specification file. */ if ((fp = fopen(path, "re")) == NULL) return -1; if (fstat(fileno(fp), &sb) < 0) goto finish; errno = EINVAL; if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) goto finish; /* * Two passes of the specification file. First is to get the size. * After the first pass, the spec array is malloced to the appropriate * size. Second pass is to populate the spec array and check for * dups. */ maxnspec = UINT_MAX / sizeof(spec_t); for (pass = 0; pass < 2; pass++) { data->nspec = 0; lineno = 0; while (fgets(line_buf, sizeof(line_buf) - 1, fp) && data->nspec < maxnspec) { if (process_line(rec, path, line_buf, pass, ++lineno) != 0) goto finish; } if (pass == 1) { status = nodups_specs(data, path); if (status) goto finish; } if (pass == 0) { if (data->nspec == 0) { status = 0; goto finish; } if (NULL == (data->spec_arr = calloc(data->nspec, sizeof(spec_t)))) goto finish; maxnspec = data->nspec; rewind(fp); } } qsort(data->spec_arr, data->nspec, sizeof(struct spec), cmp); status = digest_add_specfile(rec->digest, fp, NULL, sb.st_size, path); if (status) goto finish; digest_gen_hash(rec->digest); finish: fclose(fp); return status; } /* * Backend interface routines */ static void closef(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct spec *spec; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { spec = &data->spec_arr[i]; free(spec->property_key); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); } if (data->spec_arr) free(data->spec_arr); free(data); } static struct selabel_lookup_rec *property_lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int __attribute__((unused)) type) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; spec_t *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; struct selabel_lookup_rec *ret = NULL; if (!data->nspec) { errno = ENOENT; goto finish; } for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { if (strncmp(spec_arr[i].property_key, key, strlen(spec_arr[i].property_key)) == 0) { break; } if (strncmp(spec_arr[i].property_key, "*", 1) == 0) break; } if (i >= data->nspec) { /* No matching specification. */ errno = ENOENT; goto finish; } ret = &spec_arr[i].lr; finish: return ret; } static struct selabel_lookup_rec *service_lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int __attribute__((unused)) type) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; spec_t *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; struct selabel_lookup_rec *ret = NULL; if (!data->nspec) { errno = ENOENT; goto finish; } for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { if (strcmp(spec_arr[i].property_key, key) == 0) break; if (strcmp(spec_arr[i].property_key, "*") == 0) break; } if (i >= data->nspec) { /* No matching specification. */ errno = ENOENT; goto finish; } ret = &spec_arr[i].lr; finish: return ret; } static void stats(struct selabel_handle __attribute__((unused)) *rec) { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "'stats' functionality not implemented.\n"); } int selabel_property_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct saved_data *data; data = (struct saved_data *)calloc(1, sizeof(*data)); if (!data) return -1; rec->data = data; rec->func_close = &closef; rec->func_stats = &stats; rec->func_lookup = &property_lookup; return init(rec, opts, nopts); } int selabel_service_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct saved_data *data; data = (struct saved_data *)calloc(1, sizeof(*data)); if (!data) return -1; rec->data = data; rec->func_close = &closef; rec->func_stats = &stats; rec->func_lookup = &service_lookup; return init(rec, opts, nopts); } libselinux-3.5/src/label_db.c000066400000000000000000000211241437566343300162340ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Media contexts backend for DB objects * * Author: KaiGai Kohei */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" /* * Regular database object's security context interface * * It provides applications a regular security context for the given * database objects. The pair of object's name and a security context * are described in the specfile. In the default, it shall be stored * in the /etc/selinux/$POLICYTYPE/contexts/sepgsql_contexts . * (It assumes SE-PostgreSQL in the default. For other RDBMS, use the * SELABEL_OPT_PATH option to specify different specfile.) * * Each line has the following format: * * * For example: * ---------------------------------------- * # * # It is an example specfile for database objects * # * db_database template1 system_u:object_r:sepgsql_db_t:s0 * * db_schema *.pg_catalog system_u:object_r:sepgsql_sys_schema_t:s0 * * db_table *.pg_catalog.* system_u:object_r:sepgsql_sysobj_t:s0 * db_column *.pg_catalog.*.* system_u:object_r:sepgsql_sysobj_t:s0 * ---------------------------------------- * * All the characters after the '#' are dealt as comments. * * The first token is object class. SELABEL_DB_* declared in label.h are * corresponding to a certain database object. * * The object name/identifier is compared to the given key. * A database object can have its own namespace hierarchy. * In the case of SE-PgSQL, database is the top level object, and schema * is deployed just under a database. A schema can contains various kind * of objects, such as tables, procedures and so on. * Thus, when we lookup an expected security context for a table of * "pg_class", it is necessary to assume selabel_lookup() is called with * "postgres.pg_catalog.pg_class", not just a "pg_class". * * Wildcards ('*' or '?') are available on the patterns, so if you want * to match a table within any schema, you should set '*' on the upper * namespaces of the table. * * The structure of namespace depends on RDBMS. * For example, Trusted-RUBIX has an idea of "catalog" which performs * as a namespace between a database and individual schemas. In this * case, a table has upper three layers. */ /* * spec_t : It holds a pair of a key and an expected security context */ typedef struct spec { struct selabel_lookup_rec lr; char *key; int type; int matches; } spec_t; /* * catalog_t : An array of spec_t */ typedef struct catalog { unsigned int nspec; /* number of specs in use */ unsigned int limit; /* physical limitation of specs[] */ spec_t specs[0]; } catalog_t; /* * Helper function to parse a line read from the specfile */ static int process_line(const char *path, char *line_buf, unsigned int line_num, catalog_t *catalog) { spec_t *spec = &catalog->specs[catalog->nspec]; char *type, *key, *context, *temp; int items; /* Cut off comments */ temp = strchr(line_buf, '#'); if (temp) *temp = '\0'; /* * Every entry must have the following format * */ type = key = context = temp = NULL; items = sscanf(line_buf, "%ms %ms %ms %ms", &type, &key, &context, &temp); if (items != 3) { if (items > 0) selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %u has invalid format, skipped", path, line_num); goto skip; } /* * Set up individual spec entry */ memset(spec, 0, sizeof(spec_t)); if (!strcmp(type, "db_database")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_DATABASE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_schema")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_table")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_TABLE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_column")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_COLUMN; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_sequence")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_view")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_VIEW; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_procedure")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_blob")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_BLOB; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_tuple")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_TUPLE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_language")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_LANGUAGE; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_exception")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_EXCEPTION; else if (!strcmp(type, "db_datatype")) spec->type = SELABEL_DB_DATATYPE; else { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %u has invalid object type %s\n", path, line_num, type); goto skip; } free(type); spec->key = key; spec->lr.ctx_raw = context; catalog->nspec++; return 0; skip: free(type); free(key); free(context); free(temp); return 0; } /* * selabel_close() handler */ static void db_close(struct selabel_handle *rec) { catalog_t *catalog = (catalog_t *)rec->data; spec_t *spec; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < catalog->nspec; i++) { spec = &catalog->specs[i]; free(spec->key); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); } free(catalog); } /* * selabel_lookup() handler */ static struct selabel_lookup_rec * db_lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int type) { catalog_t *catalog = (catalog_t *)rec->data; spec_t *spec; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < catalog->nspec; i++) { spec = &catalog->specs[i]; if (spec->type != type) continue; if (!fnmatch(spec->key, key, 0)) { spec->matches++; return &spec->lr; } } /* No found */ errno = ENOENT; return NULL; } /* * selabel_stats() handler */ static void db_stats(struct selabel_handle *rec) { catalog_t *catalog = (catalog_t *)rec->data; unsigned int i, total = 0; for (i = 0; i < catalog->nspec; i++) total += catalog->specs[i].matches; selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%u entries, %u matches made\n", catalog->nspec, total); } /* * selabel_open() handler */ static catalog_t * db_init(const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts, struct selabel_handle *rec) { catalog_t *catalog; FILE *filp; const char *path = NULL; char *line_buf = NULL; size_t line_len = 0; unsigned int line_num = 0; unsigned int i; struct stat sb; /* * Initialize catalog data structure */ catalog = malloc(sizeof(catalog_t) + 32 * sizeof(spec_t)); if (!catalog) return NULL; catalog->limit = 32; catalog->nspec = 0; /* * Process arguments * * SELABEL_OPT_PATH: * It allows to specify an alternative specification file instead of * the default one. If RDBMS is not SE-PostgreSQL, it may need to * specify an explicit specfile for database objects. */ while (nopts--) { switch (opts[nopts].type) { case SELABEL_OPT_PATH: path = opts[nopts].value; break; } } /* * Open the specification file */ if (!path) path = selinux_sepgsql_context_path(); if ((filp = fopen(path, "re")) == NULL) { free(catalog); return NULL; } if (fstat(fileno(filp), &sb) < 0) { free(catalog); fclose(filp); return NULL; } if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { free(catalog); fclose(filp); errno = EINVAL; return NULL; } rec->spec_file = strdup(path); if (!rec->spec_file) { free(catalog); fclose(filp); return NULL; } /* * Parse for each lines */ while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, filp) > 0) { /* * Expand catalog array, if necessary */ if (catalog->limit == catalog->nspec) { size_t length; unsigned int new_limit = 2 * catalog->limit; catalog_t *new_catalog; length = sizeof(catalog_t) + new_limit * sizeof(spec_t); new_catalog = realloc(catalog, length); if (!new_catalog) goto out_error; catalog = new_catalog; catalog->limit = new_limit; } /* * Parse a line */ if (process_line(path, line_buf, ++line_num, catalog) < 0) goto out_error; } if (digest_add_specfile(rec->digest, filp, NULL, sb.st_size, path) < 0) goto out_error; digest_gen_hash(rec->digest); free(line_buf); fclose(filp); return catalog; out_error: free(line_buf); for (i = 0; i < catalog->nspec; i++) { spec_t *spec = &catalog->specs[i]; free(spec->key); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); } free(catalog); fclose(filp); return NULL; } /* * Initialize selabel_handle and load the entries of specfile */ int selabel_db_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { rec->func_close = &db_close; rec->func_lookup = &db_lookup; rec->func_stats = &db_stats; rec->data = db_init(opts, nopts, rec); return !rec->data ? -1 : 0; } libselinux-3.5/src/label_file.c000066400000000000000000000730661437566343300166020ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * File contexts backend for labeling system * * Author : Eamon Walsh * Author : Stephen Smalley */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" #include "label_file.h" /* * Internals, mostly moved over from matchpathcon.c */ /* return the length of the text that is the stem of a file name */ static int get_stem_from_file_name(const char *const buf) { const char *tmp = strchr(buf + 1, '/'); if (!tmp) return 0; return tmp - buf; } /* find the stem of a file name, returns the index into stem_arr (or -1 if * there is no match - IE for a file in the root directory or a regex that is * too complex for us). */ static int find_stem_from_file(struct saved_data *data, const char *key) { int i; int stem_len = get_stem_from_file_name(key); if (!stem_len) return -1; for (i = 0; i < data->num_stems; i++) { if (stem_len == data->stem_arr[i].len && !strncmp(key, data->stem_arr[i].buf, stem_len)) { return i; } } return -1; } /* * Warn about duplicate specifications. */ static int nodups_specs(struct saved_data *data, const char *path) { int rc = 0; unsigned int ii, jj; struct spec *curr_spec, *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; for (ii = 0; ii < data->nspec; ii++) { curr_spec = &spec_arr[ii]; for (jj = ii + 1; jj < data->nspec; jj++) { if ((!strcmp(spec_arr[jj].regex_str, curr_spec->regex_str)) && (!spec_arr[jj].mode || !curr_spec->mode || spec_arr[jj].mode == curr_spec->mode)) { rc = -1; errno = EINVAL; if (strcmp(spec_arr[jj].lr.ctx_raw, curr_spec->lr.ctx_raw)) { COMPAT_LOG (SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Multiple different specifications for %s (%s and %s).\n", path, curr_spec->regex_str, spec_arr[jj].lr.ctx_raw, curr_spec->lr.ctx_raw); } else { COMPAT_LOG (SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Multiple same specifications for %s.\n", path, curr_spec->regex_str); } } } } return rc; } static int process_text_file(FILE *fp, const char *prefix, struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *path) { int rc; size_t line_len; unsigned int lineno = 0; char *line_buf = NULL; while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, fp) > 0) { rc = process_line(rec, path, prefix, line_buf, ++lineno); if (rc) goto out; } rc = 0; out: free(line_buf); return rc; } static int load_mmap(FILE *fp, size_t len, struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *path) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; int rc; char *addr, *str_buf; int *stem_map; struct mmap_area *mmap_area; uint32_t i, magic, version; uint32_t entry_len, stem_map_len, regex_array_len; const char *reg_version; const char *reg_arch; char reg_arch_matches = 0; mmap_area = malloc(sizeof(*mmap_area)); if (!mmap_area) { return -1; } addr = mmap(NULL, len, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fileno(fp), 0); if (addr == MAP_FAILED) { free(mmap_area); perror("mmap"); return -1; } /* save where we mmap'd the file to cleanup on close() */ mmap_area->addr = mmap_area->next_addr = addr; mmap_area->len = mmap_area->next_len = len; mmap_area->next = data->mmap_areas; data->mmap_areas = mmap_area; /* check if this looks like an fcontext file */ rc = next_entry(&magic, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0 || magic != SELINUX_MAGIC_COMPILED_FCONTEXT) return -1; /* check if this version is higher than we understand */ rc = next_entry(&version, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0 || version > SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_MAX_VERS) return -1; reg_version = regex_version(); if (!reg_version) return -1; reg_arch = regex_arch_string(); if (!reg_arch) return -1; if (version >= SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_PCRE_VERS) { len = strlen(reg_version); rc = next_entry(&entry_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0) return -1; /* Check version lengths */ if (len != entry_len) return -1; /* Check if regex version mismatch */ str_buf = malloc(entry_len + 1); if (!str_buf) return -1; rc = next_entry(str_buf, mmap_area, entry_len); if (rc < 0) { free(str_buf); return -1; } str_buf[entry_len] = '\0'; if ((strcmp(str_buf, reg_version) != 0)) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_ERROR, "Regex version mismatch, expected: %s actual: %s\n", reg_version, str_buf); free(str_buf); return -1; } free(str_buf); if (version >= SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_REGEX_ARCH) { len = strlen(reg_arch); rc = next_entry(&entry_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0) return -1; /* Check arch string lengths */ if (len != entry_len) { /* * Skip the entry and conclude that we have * a mismatch, which is not fatal. */ next_entry(NULL, mmap_area, entry_len); goto end_arch_check; } /* Check if arch string mismatch */ str_buf = malloc(entry_len + 1); if (!str_buf) return -1; rc = next_entry(str_buf, mmap_area, entry_len); if (rc < 0) { free(str_buf); return -1; } str_buf[entry_len] = '\0'; reg_arch_matches = strcmp(str_buf, reg_arch) == 0; free(str_buf); } } end_arch_check: /* allocate the stems_data array */ rc = next_entry(&stem_map_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0) return -1; /* * map indexed by the stem # in the mmap file and contains the stem * number in the data stem_arr */ stem_map = calloc(stem_map_len, sizeof(*stem_map)); if (!stem_map) return -1; for (i = 0; i < stem_map_len; i++) { char *buf; uint32_t stem_len; int newid; /* the length does not include the nul */ rc = next_entry(&stem_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0 || !stem_len) { rc = -1; goto out; } /* Check for stem_len wrap around. */ if (stem_len < UINT32_MAX) { buf = (char *)mmap_area->next_addr; /* Check if over-run before null check. */ rc = next_entry(NULL, mmap_area, (stem_len + 1)); if (rc < 0) goto out; if (buf[stem_len] != '\0') { rc = -1; goto out; } } else { rc = -1; goto out; } /* store the mapping between old and new */ newid = find_stem(data, buf, stem_len); if (newid < 0) { newid = store_stem(data, buf, stem_len); if (newid < 0) { rc = newid; goto out; } data->stem_arr[newid].from_mmap = 1; } stem_map[i] = newid; } /* allocate the regex array */ rc = next_entry(®ex_array_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0 || !regex_array_len) { rc = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < regex_array_len; i++) { struct spec *spec; int32_t stem_id, meta_chars; uint32_t mode = 0, prefix_len = 0; rc = grow_specs(data); if (rc < 0) goto out; spec = &data->spec_arr[data->nspec]; spec->from_mmap = 1; /* Process context */ rc = next_entry(&entry_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0 || !entry_len) { rc = -1; goto out; } str_buf = malloc(entry_len); if (!str_buf) { rc = -1; goto out; } rc = next_entry(str_buf, mmap_area, entry_len); if (rc < 0) { free(str_buf); goto out; } if (str_buf[entry_len - 1] != '\0') { free(str_buf); rc = -1; goto out; } spec->lr.ctx_raw = str_buf; if (strcmp(spec->lr.ctx_raw, "<>") && rec->validating) { if (selabel_validate(rec, &spec->lr) < 0) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: context %s is invalid\n", path, spec->lr.ctx_raw); goto out; } } /* Process regex string */ rc = next_entry(&entry_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0 || !entry_len) { rc = -1; goto out; } spec->regex_str = (char *)mmap_area->next_addr; rc = next_entry(NULL, mmap_area, entry_len); if (rc < 0) goto out; if (spec->regex_str[entry_len - 1] != '\0') { rc = -1; goto out; } /* Process mode */ if (version >= SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_MODE) rc = next_entry(&mode, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); else rc = next_entry(&mode, mmap_area, sizeof(mode_t)); if (rc < 0) goto out; spec->mode = mode; /* map the stem id from the mmap file to the data->stem_arr */ rc = next_entry(&stem_id, mmap_area, sizeof(int32_t)); if (rc < 0) goto out; if (stem_id < 0 || stem_id >= (int32_t)stem_map_len) spec->stem_id = -1; else spec->stem_id = stem_map[stem_id]; /* retrieve the hasMetaChars bit */ rc = next_entry(&meta_chars, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0) goto out; spec->hasMetaChars = meta_chars; /* and prefix length for use by selabel_lookup_best_match */ if (version >= SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_PREFIX_LEN) { rc = next_entry(&prefix_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0) goto out; spec->prefix_len = prefix_len; } rc = regex_load_mmap(mmap_area, &spec->regex, reg_arch_matches, &spec->regex_compiled); if (rc < 0) goto out; __pthread_mutex_init(&spec->regex_lock, NULL); data->nspec++; } rc = 0; out: free(stem_map); return rc; } struct file_details { const char *suffix; struct stat sb; }; static char *rolling_append(char *current, const char *suffix, size_t max) { size_t size; size_t suffix_size; size_t current_size; if (!suffix) return current; current_size = strlen(current); suffix_size = strlen(suffix); size = current_size + suffix_size; if (size < current_size || size < suffix_size) return NULL; /* ensure space for the '.' and the '\0' characters. */ if (size >= (SIZE_MAX - 2)) return NULL; size += 2; if (size > max) return NULL; /* Append any given suffix */ char *to = current + current_size; *to++ = '.'; strcpy(to, suffix); return current; } static bool fcontext_is_binary(FILE *fp) { uint32_t magic; size_t len = fread(&magic, sizeof(magic), 1, fp); rewind(fp); return (len && (magic == SELINUX_MAGIC_COMPILED_FCONTEXT)); } #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0])) static FILE *open_file(const char *path, const char *suffix, char *save_path, size_t len, struct stat *sb, bool open_oldest) { unsigned int i; int rc; char stack_path[len]; struct file_details *found = NULL; /* * Rolling append of suffix. Try to open with path.suffix then the * next as path.suffix.suffix and so forth. */ struct file_details fdetails[2] = { { .suffix = suffix }, { .suffix = "bin" } }; rc = snprintf(stack_path, sizeof(stack_path), "%s", path); if (rc >= (int) sizeof(stack_path)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fdetails); i++) { /* This handles the case if suffix is null */ path = rolling_append(stack_path, fdetails[i].suffix, sizeof(stack_path)); if (!path) return NULL; rc = stat(path, &fdetails[i].sb); if (rc) continue; /* first file thing found, just take it */ if (!found) { strcpy(save_path, path); found = &fdetails[i]; continue; } /* * Keep picking the newest file found. Where "newest" * includes equality. This provides a precedence on * secondary suffixes even when the timestamp is the * same. Ie choose file_contexts.bin over file_contexts * even if the time stamp is the same. Invert this logic * on open_oldest set to true. The idea is that if the * newest file failed to process, we can attempt to * process the oldest. The logic here is subtle and depends * on the array ordering in fdetails for the case when time * stamps are the same. */ if (open_oldest ^ (fdetails[i].sb.st_mtime >= found->sb.st_mtime)) { found = &fdetails[i]; strcpy(save_path, path); } } if (!found) { errno = ENOENT; return NULL; } memcpy(sb, &found->sb, sizeof(*sb)); return fopen(save_path, "re"); } static int process_file(const char *path, const char *suffix, struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *prefix, struct selabel_digest *digest) { int rc; unsigned int i; struct stat sb; FILE *fp = NULL; char found_path[PATH_MAX]; /* * On the first pass open the newest modified file. If it fails to * process, then the second pass shall open the oldest file. If both * passes fail, then it's a fatal error. */ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { fp = open_file(path, suffix, found_path, sizeof(found_path), &sb, i > 0); if (fp == NULL) return -1; rc = fcontext_is_binary(fp) ? load_mmap(fp, sb.st_size, rec, found_path) : process_text_file(fp, prefix, rec, found_path); if (!rc) rc = digest_add_specfile(digest, fp, NULL, sb.st_size, found_path); fclose(fp); if (!rc) return 0; } return -1; } static void selabel_subs_fini(struct selabel_sub *ptr) { struct selabel_sub *next; while (ptr) { next = ptr->next; free(ptr->src); free(ptr->dst); free(ptr); ptr = next; } } static char *selabel_sub(struct selabel_sub *ptr, const char *src) { char *dst = NULL; int len; while (ptr) { if (strncmp(src, ptr->src, ptr->slen) == 0 ) { if (src[ptr->slen] == '/' || src[ptr->slen] == 0) { if ((src[ptr->slen] == '/') && (strcmp(ptr->dst, "/") == 0)) len = ptr->slen + 1; else len = ptr->slen; if (asprintf(&dst, "%s%s", ptr->dst, &src[len]) < 0) return NULL; return dst; } } ptr = ptr->next; } return NULL; } static int selabel_subs_init(const char *path, struct selabel_digest *digest, struct selabel_sub **out_subs) { char buf[1024]; FILE *cfg = fopen(path, "re"); struct selabel_sub *list = NULL, *sub = NULL; struct stat sb; int status = -1; *out_subs = NULL; if (!cfg) { /* If the file does not exist, it is not fatal */ return (errno == ENOENT) ? 0 : -1; } if (fstat(fileno(cfg), &sb) < 0) goto out; while (fgets_unlocked(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, cfg)) { char *ptr = NULL; char *src = buf; char *dst = NULL; while (*src && isspace(*src)) src++; if (src[0] == '#') continue; ptr = src; while (*ptr && ! isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; *ptr++ = '\0'; if (! *src) continue; dst = ptr; while (*dst && isspace(*dst)) dst++; ptr = dst; while (*ptr && ! isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; *ptr = '\0'; if (! *dst) continue; sub = malloc(sizeof(*sub)); if (! sub) goto err; memset(sub, 0, sizeof(*sub)); sub->src = strdup(src); if (! sub->src) goto err; sub->dst = strdup(dst); if (! sub->dst) goto err; sub->slen = strlen(src); sub->next = list; list = sub; sub = NULL; } if (digest_add_specfile(digest, cfg, NULL, sb.st_size, path) < 0) goto err; *out_subs = list; status = 0; out: fclose(cfg); return status; err: if (sub) free(sub->src); free(sub); while (list) { sub = list->next; free(list->src); free(list->dst); free(list); list = sub; } goto out; } static char *selabel_sub_key(struct saved_data *data, const char *key) { char *ptr = NULL; char *dptr = NULL; ptr = selabel_sub(data->subs, key); if (ptr) { dptr = selabel_sub(data->dist_subs, ptr); if (dptr) { free(ptr); ptr = dptr; } } else { ptr = selabel_sub(data->dist_subs, key); } if (ptr) return ptr; return NULL; } static void closef(struct selabel_handle *rec); static int init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; const char *path = NULL; const char *prefix = NULL; int status = -1, baseonly = 0; /* Process arguments */ while (n--) switch(opts[n].type) { case SELABEL_OPT_PATH: path = opts[n].value; break; case SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET: prefix = opts[n].value; break; case SELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY: baseonly = !!opts[n].value; break; } #if !defined(BUILD_HOST) && !defined(ANDROID) char subs_file[PATH_MAX + 1]; /* Process local and distribution substitution files */ if (!path) { status = selabel_subs_init( selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path(), rec->digest, &data->dist_subs); if (status) goto finish; status = selabel_subs_init(selinux_file_context_subs_path(), rec->digest, &data->subs); if (status) goto finish; path = selinux_file_context_path(); } else { snprintf(subs_file, sizeof(subs_file), "%s.subs_dist", path); status = selabel_subs_init(subs_file, rec->digest, &data->dist_subs); if (status) goto finish; snprintf(subs_file, sizeof(subs_file), "%s.subs", path); status = selabel_subs_init(subs_file, rec->digest, &data->subs); if (status) goto finish; } #endif if (!path) goto finish; rec->spec_file = strdup(path); /* * The do detailed validation of the input and fill the spec array */ status = process_file(path, NULL, rec, prefix, rec->digest); if (status) goto finish; if (rec->validating) { status = nodups_specs(data, path); if (status) goto finish; } if (!baseonly) { status = process_file(path, "homedirs", rec, prefix, rec->digest); if (status && errno != ENOENT) goto finish; status = process_file(path, "local", rec, prefix, rec->digest); if (status && errno != ENOENT) goto finish; } digest_gen_hash(rec->digest); status = sort_specs(data); finish: if (status) closef(rec); return status; } /* * Backend interface routines */ static void closef(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct mmap_area *area, *last_area; struct spec *spec; struct stem *stem; unsigned int i; selabel_subs_fini(data->subs); selabel_subs_fini(data->dist_subs); for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { spec = &data->spec_arr[i]; free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); regex_data_free(spec->regex); __pthread_mutex_destroy(&spec->regex_lock); if (spec->from_mmap) continue; free(spec->regex_str); free(spec->type_str); } for (i = 0; i < (unsigned int)data->num_stems; i++) { stem = &data->stem_arr[i]; if (stem->from_mmap) continue; free(stem->buf); } if (data->spec_arr) free(data->spec_arr); if (data->stem_arr) free(data->stem_arr); area = data->mmap_areas; while (area) { munmap(area->addr, area->len); last_area = area; area = area->next; free(last_area); } free(data); } // Finds all the matches of |key| in the given context. Returns the result in // the allocated array and updates the match count. If match_count is NULL, // stops early once the 1st match is found. static struct spec **lookup_all(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int type, bool partial, size_t *match_count) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct spec *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; int i, rc, file_stem; size_t len; mode_t mode = (mode_t)type; char *clean_key = NULL; const char *prev_slash, *next_slash; unsigned int sofar = 0; char *sub = NULL; struct spec **result = NULL; if (match_count) { *match_count = 0; result = calloc(data->nspec, sizeof(struct spec*)); } else { result = calloc(1, sizeof(struct spec*)); } if (!result) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Failed to allocate %zu bytes of data\n", data->nspec * sizeof(struct spec*)); goto finish; } if (!data->nspec) { errno = ENOENT; goto finish; } /* Remove duplicate slashes */ if ((next_slash = strstr(key, "//"))) { clean_key = (char *) malloc(strlen(key) + 1); if (!clean_key) goto finish; prev_slash = key; while (next_slash) { memcpy(clean_key + sofar, prev_slash, next_slash - prev_slash); sofar += next_slash - prev_slash; prev_slash = next_slash + 1; next_slash = strstr(prev_slash, "//"); } strcpy(clean_key + sofar, prev_slash); key = clean_key; } /* remove trailing slash */ len = strlen(key); if (len == 0) { errno = EINVAL; goto finish; } if (len > 1 && key[len - 1] == '/') { /* reuse clean_key from above if available */ if (!clean_key) { clean_key = (char *) malloc(len); if (!clean_key) goto finish; memcpy(clean_key, key, len - 1); } clean_key[len - 1] = '\0'; key = clean_key; } sub = selabel_sub_key(data, key); if (sub) key = sub; file_stem = find_stem_from_file(data, key); mode &= S_IFMT; /* * Check for matching specifications in reverse order, so that * the last matching specification is used. */ for (i = data->nspec - 1; i >= 0; i--) { struct spec *spec = &spec_arr[i]; /* if the spec in question matches no stem or has the same * stem as the file AND if the spec in question has no mode * specified or if the mode matches the file mode then we do * a regex check */ bool stem_matches = spec->stem_id == -1 || spec->stem_id == file_stem; // Don't check the stem if we want to find partial matches. // Otherwise the case "/abc/efg/(/.*)?" will be considered //a miss for "/abc". if ((partial || stem_matches) && (!mode || !spec->mode || mode == spec->mode)) { if (compile_regex(spec, NULL) < 0) goto finish; rc = regex_match(spec->regex, key, partial); if (rc == REGEX_MATCH || (partial && rc == REGEX_MATCH_PARTIAL)) { if (rc == REGEX_MATCH) { #ifdef __ATOMIC_RELAXED __atomic_store_n(&spec->any_matches, true, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); #else #error "Please use a compiler that supports __atomic builtins" #endif } if (strcmp(spec_arr[i].lr.ctx_raw, "<>") == 0) { errno = ENOENT; goto finish; } if (match_count) { result[*match_count] = spec; *match_count += 1; // Continue to find all the matches. continue; } result[0] = spec; break; } if (rc == REGEX_NO_MATCH) continue; errno = ENOENT; /* else it's an error */ goto finish; } } if (!result[0]) errno = ENOENT; finish: free(clean_key); free(sub); if (result && !result[0]) { free(result); result = NULL; } return result; } static struct spec *lookup_common(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int type, bool partial) { struct spec **matches = lookup_all(rec, key, type, partial, NULL); if (!matches) { return NULL; } struct spec *result = matches[0]; free(matches); return result; } /* * Returns true if the digest of all partial matched contexts is the same as * the one saved by setxattr, otherwise returns false. The length of the SHA1 * digest will always be returned. The caller must free any returned digests. */ static bool get_digests_all_partial_matches(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *pathname, uint8_t **calculated_digest, uint8_t **xattr_digest, size_t *digest_len) { uint8_t read_digest[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; ssize_t read_size = getxattr(pathname, RESTORECON_PARTIAL_MATCH_DIGEST, read_digest, SHA1_HASH_SIZE #ifdef __APPLE__ , 0, 0 #endif /* __APPLE __ */ ); uint8_t hash_digest[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; bool status = selabel_hash_all_partial_matches(rec, pathname, hash_digest); *xattr_digest = NULL; *calculated_digest = NULL; *digest_len = SHA1_HASH_SIZE; if (read_size == SHA1_HASH_SIZE) { *xattr_digest = calloc(1, SHA1_HASH_SIZE + 1); if (!*xattr_digest) goto oom; memcpy(*xattr_digest, read_digest, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); } if (status) { *calculated_digest = calloc(1, SHA1_HASH_SIZE + 1); if (!*calculated_digest) goto oom; memcpy(*calculated_digest, hash_digest, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); } if (status && read_size == SHA1_HASH_SIZE && memcmp(read_digest, hash_digest, SHA1_HASH_SIZE) == 0) return true; return false; oom: selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "SELinux: %s: Out of memory\n", __func__); return false; } static bool hash_all_partial_matches(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, uint8_t *digest) { assert(digest); size_t total_matches; struct spec **matches = lookup_all(rec, key, 0, true, &total_matches); if (!matches) { return false; } Sha1Context context; Sha1Initialise(&context); size_t i; for (i = 0; i < total_matches; i++) { char* regex_str = matches[i]->regex_str; mode_t mode = matches[i]->mode; char* ctx_raw = matches[i]->lr.ctx_raw; Sha1Update(&context, regex_str, strlen(regex_str) + 1); Sha1Update(&context, &mode, sizeof(mode_t)); Sha1Update(&context, ctx_raw, strlen(ctx_raw) + 1); } SHA1_HASH sha1_hash; Sha1Finalise(&context, &sha1_hash); memcpy(digest, sha1_hash.bytes, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); free(matches); return true; } static struct selabel_lookup_rec *lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int type) { struct spec *spec; spec = lookup_common(rec, key, type, false); if (spec) return &spec->lr; return NULL; } static bool partial_match(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key) { return lookup_common(rec, key, 0, true) ? true : false; } static struct selabel_lookup_rec *lookup_best_match(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, const char **aliases, int type) { size_t n, i; int best = -1; struct spec **specs; size_t prefix_len = 0; struct selabel_lookup_rec *lr = NULL; if (!aliases || !aliases[0]) return lookup(rec, key, type); for (n = 0; aliases[n]; n++) ; specs = calloc(n+1, sizeof(struct spec *)); if (!specs) return NULL; specs[0] = lookup_common(rec, key, type, false); if (specs[0]) { if (!specs[0]->hasMetaChars) { /* exact match on key */ lr = &specs[0]->lr; goto out; } best = 0; prefix_len = specs[0]->prefix_len; } for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) { specs[i] = lookup_common(rec, aliases[i-1], type, false); if (specs[i]) { if (!specs[i]->hasMetaChars) { /* exact match on alias */ lr = &specs[i]->lr; goto out; } if (specs[i]->prefix_len > prefix_len) { best = i; prefix_len = specs[i]->prefix_len; } } } if (best >= 0) { /* longest fixed prefix match on key or alias */ lr = &specs[best]->lr; } else { errno = ENOENT; } out: free(specs); return lr; } static enum selabel_cmp_result incomp(struct spec *spec1, struct spec *spec2, const char *reason, int i, int j) { selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "selabel_cmp: mismatched %s on entry %d: (%s, %x, %s) vs entry %d: (%s, %x, %s)\n", reason, i, spec1->regex_str, spec1->mode, spec1->lr.ctx_raw, j, spec2->regex_str, spec2->mode, spec2->lr.ctx_raw); return SELABEL_INCOMPARABLE; } static enum selabel_cmp_result cmp(struct selabel_handle *h1, struct selabel_handle *h2) { struct saved_data *data1 = (struct saved_data *)h1->data; struct saved_data *data2 = (struct saved_data *)h2->data; unsigned int i, nspec1 = data1->nspec, j, nspec2 = data2->nspec; struct spec *spec_arr1 = data1->spec_arr, *spec_arr2 = data2->spec_arr; struct stem *stem_arr1 = data1->stem_arr, *stem_arr2 = data2->stem_arr; bool skipped1 = false, skipped2 = false; i = 0; j = 0; while (i < nspec1 && j < nspec2) { struct spec *spec1 = &spec_arr1[i]; struct spec *spec2 = &spec_arr2[j]; /* * Because sort_specs() moves exact pathnames to the * end, we might need to skip over additional regex * entries that only exist in one of the configurations. */ if (!spec1->hasMetaChars && spec2->hasMetaChars) { j++; skipped2 = true; continue; } if (spec1->hasMetaChars && !spec2->hasMetaChars) { i++; skipped1 = true; continue; } if (spec1->regex && spec2->regex) { if (regex_cmp(spec1->regex, spec2->regex) == SELABEL_INCOMPARABLE){ return incomp(spec1, spec2, "regex", i, j); } } else { if (strcmp(spec1->regex_str, spec2->regex_str)) return incomp(spec1, spec2, "regex_str", i, j); } if (spec1->mode != spec2->mode) return incomp(spec1, spec2, "mode", i, j); if (spec1->stem_id == -1 && spec2->stem_id != -1) return incomp(spec1, spec2, "stem_id", i, j); if (spec2->stem_id == -1 && spec1->stem_id != -1) return incomp(spec1, spec2, "stem_id", i, j); if (spec1->stem_id != -1 && spec2->stem_id != -1) { struct stem *stem1 = &stem_arr1[spec1->stem_id]; struct stem *stem2 = &stem_arr2[spec2->stem_id]; if (stem1->len != stem2->len || strncmp(stem1->buf, stem2->buf, stem1->len)) return incomp(spec1, spec2, "stem", i, j); } if (strcmp(spec1->lr.ctx_raw, spec2->lr.ctx_raw)) return incomp(spec1, spec2, "ctx_raw", i, j); i++; j++; } if ((skipped1 || i < nspec1) && !skipped2) return SELABEL_SUPERSET; if ((skipped2 || j < nspec2) && !skipped1) return SELABEL_SUBSET; if (skipped1 && skipped2) return SELABEL_INCOMPARABLE; return SELABEL_EQUAL; } static void stats(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; unsigned int i, nspec = data->nspec; struct spec *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; bool any_matches; for (i = 0; i < nspec; i++) { #ifdef __ATOMIC_RELAXED any_matches = __atomic_load_n(&spec_arr[i].any_matches, __ATOMIC_RELAXED); #else #error "Please use a compiler that supports __atomic builtins" #endif if (!any_matches) { if (spec_arr[i].type_str) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "Warning! No matches for (%s, %s, %s)\n", spec_arr[i].regex_str, spec_arr[i].type_str, spec_arr[i].lr.ctx_raw); } else { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "Warning! No matches for (%s, %s)\n", spec_arr[i].regex_str, spec_arr[i].lr.ctx_raw); } } } } int selabel_file_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct saved_data *data; data = (struct saved_data *)malloc(sizeof(*data)); if (!data) return -1; memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); rec->data = data; rec->func_close = &closef; rec->func_stats = &stats; rec->func_lookup = &lookup; rec->func_partial_match = &partial_match; rec->func_get_digests_all_partial_matches = &get_digests_all_partial_matches; rec->func_hash_all_partial_matches = &hash_all_partial_matches; rec->func_lookup_best_match = &lookup_best_match; rec->func_cmp = &cmp; return init(rec, opts, nopts); } libselinux-3.5/src/label_file.h000066400000000000000000000310551437566343300165770ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _SELABEL_FILE_H_ #define _SELABEL_FILE_H_ #include #include #include #include #include /* * regex.h/c were introduced to hold all dependencies on the regular * expression back-end when we started supporting PCRE2. regex.h defines a * minimal interface required by libselinux, so that the remaining code * can be agnostic about the underlying implementation. */ #include "regex.h" #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" #include "selinux_internal.h" #define SELINUX_MAGIC_COMPILED_FCONTEXT 0xf97cff8a /* Version specific changes */ #define SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_NOPCRE_VERS 1 #define SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_PCRE_VERS 2 #define SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_MODE 3 #define SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_PREFIX_LEN 4 #define SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_REGEX_ARCH 5 #define SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_MAX_VERS \ SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_REGEX_ARCH /* Required selinux_restorecon and selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches() */ #define RESTORECON_PARTIAL_MATCH_DIGEST "security.sehash" struct selabel_sub { char *src; int slen; char *dst; struct selabel_sub *next; }; /* A file security context specification. */ struct spec { struct selabel_lookup_rec lr; /* holds contexts for lookup result */ char *regex_str; /* regular expression string for diagnostics */ char *type_str; /* type string for diagnostic messages */ struct regex_data * regex; /* backend dependent regular expression data */ bool regex_compiled; /* bool to indicate if the regex is compiled */ pthread_mutex_t regex_lock; /* lock for lazy compilation of regex */ mode_t mode; /* mode format value */ bool any_matches; /* did any pathname match? */ int stem_id; /* indicates which stem-compression item */ char hasMetaChars; /* regular expression has meta-chars */ char from_mmap; /* this spec is from an mmap of the data */ size_t prefix_len; /* length of fixed path prefix */ }; /* A regular expression stem */ struct stem { char *buf; int len; char from_mmap; }; /* Where we map the file in during selabel_open() */ struct mmap_area { void *addr; /* Start addr + len used to release memory at close */ size_t len; void *next_addr; /* Incremented by next_entry() */ size_t next_len; /* Decremented by next_entry() */ struct mmap_area *next; }; /* Our stored configuration */ struct saved_data { /* * The array of specifications, initially in the same order as in * the specification file. Sorting occurs based on hasMetaChars. */ struct spec *spec_arr; unsigned int nspec; unsigned int alloc_specs; /* * The array of regular expression stems. */ struct stem *stem_arr; int num_stems; int alloc_stems; struct mmap_area *mmap_areas; /* substitution support */ struct selabel_sub *dist_subs; struct selabel_sub *subs; }; static inline mode_t string_to_mode(char *mode) { size_t len; if (!mode) return 0; len = strlen(mode); if (mode[0] != '-' || len != 2) return -1; switch (mode[1]) { case 'b': return S_IFBLK; case 'c': return S_IFCHR; case 'd': return S_IFDIR; case 'p': return S_IFIFO; case 'l': return S_IFLNK; case 's': return S_IFSOCK; case '-': return S_IFREG; default: return -1; } /* impossible to get here */ return 0; } static inline int grow_specs(struct saved_data *data) { struct spec *specs; size_t new_specs, total_specs; if (data->nspec < data->alloc_specs) return 0; new_specs = data->nspec + 16; total_specs = data->nspec + new_specs; specs = realloc(data->spec_arr, total_specs * sizeof(*specs)); if (!specs) { perror("realloc"); return -1; } /* blank the new entries */ memset(&specs[data->nspec], 0, new_specs * sizeof(*specs)); data->spec_arr = specs; data->alloc_specs = total_specs; return 0; } /* Determine if the regular expression specification has any meta characters. */ static inline void spec_hasMetaChars(struct spec *spec) { char *c; int len; char *end; c = spec->regex_str; len = strlen(spec->regex_str); end = c + len; spec->hasMetaChars = 0; spec->prefix_len = len; /* Look at each character in the RE specification string for a * meta character. Return when any meta character reached. */ while (c < end) { switch (*c) { case '.': case '^': case '$': case '?': case '*': case '+': case '|': case '[': case '(': case '{': spec->hasMetaChars = 1; spec->prefix_len = c - spec->regex_str; return; case '\\': /* skip the next character */ c++; break; default: break; } c++; } } /* Move exact pathname specifications to the end. */ static inline int sort_specs(struct saved_data *data) { struct spec *spec_copy; struct spec spec; unsigned int i; int front, back; size_t len = sizeof(*spec_copy); spec_copy = malloc(len * data->nspec); if (!spec_copy) return -1; /* first move the exact pathnames to the back */ front = 0; back = data->nspec - 1; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { if (data->spec_arr[i].hasMetaChars) memcpy(&spec_copy[front++], &data->spec_arr[i], len); else memcpy(&spec_copy[back--], &data->spec_arr[i], len); } /* * now the exact pathnames are at the end, but they are in the reverse * order. Since 'front' is now the first of the 'exact' we can run * that part of the array switching the front and back element. */ back = data->nspec - 1; while (front < back) { /* save the front */ memcpy(&spec, &spec_copy[front], len); /* move the back to the front */ memcpy(&spec_copy[front], &spec_copy[back], len); /* put the old front in the back */ memcpy(&spec_copy[back], &spec, len); front++; back--; } free(data->spec_arr); data->spec_arr = spec_copy; return 0; } /* Return the length of the text that can be considered the stem, returns 0 * if there is no identifiable stem */ static inline int get_stem_from_spec(const char *const buf) { const char *tmp = strchr(buf + 1, '/'); const char *ind; if (!tmp) return 0; for (ind = buf; ind < tmp; ind++) { if (strchr(".^$?*+|[({", (int)*ind)) return 0; } return tmp - buf; } /* * return the stemid given a string and a length */ static inline int find_stem(struct saved_data *data, const char *buf, int stem_len) { int i; for (i = 0; i < data->num_stems; i++) { if (stem_len == data->stem_arr[i].len && !strncmp(buf, data->stem_arr[i].buf, stem_len)) return i; } return -1; } /* returns the index of the new stored object */ static inline int store_stem(struct saved_data *data, char *buf, int stem_len) { int num = data->num_stems; if (data->alloc_stems == num) { struct stem *tmp_arr; int alloc_stems = data->alloc_stems * 2 + 16; tmp_arr = realloc(data->stem_arr, sizeof(*tmp_arr) * alloc_stems); if (!tmp_arr) { return -1; } data->alloc_stems = alloc_stems; data->stem_arr = tmp_arr; } data->stem_arr[num].len = stem_len; data->stem_arr[num].buf = buf; data->stem_arr[num].from_mmap = 0; data->num_stems++; return num; } /* find the stem of a file spec, returns the index into stem_arr for a new * or existing stem, (or -1 if there is no possible stem - IE for a file in * the root directory or a regex that is too complex for us). */ static inline int find_stem_from_spec(struct saved_data *data, const char *buf) { int stem_len = get_stem_from_spec(buf); int stemid; char *stem; int r; if (!stem_len) return -1; stemid = find_stem(data, buf, stem_len); if (stemid >= 0) return stemid; /* not found, allocate a new one */ stem = strndup(buf, stem_len); if (!stem) return -1; r = store_stem(data, stem, stem_len); if (r < 0) free(stem); return r; } /* This will always check for buffer over-runs and either read the next entry * if buf != NULL or skip over the entry (as these areas are mapped in the * current buffer). */ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct mmap_area *fp, size_t bytes) { if (bytes > fp->next_len) return -1; if (buf) memcpy(buf, fp->next_addr, bytes); fp->next_addr = (char *)fp->next_addr + bytes; fp->next_len -= bytes; return 0; } static inline int compile_regex(struct spec *spec, const char **errbuf) { char *reg_buf, *anchored_regex, *cp; struct regex_error_data error_data; static char regex_error_format_buffer[256]; size_t len; int rc; bool regex_compiled; /* We really want pthread_once() here, but since its * init_routine does not take a parameter, it's not possible * to use, so we generate the same effect with atomics and a * mutex */ #ifdef __ATOMIC_RELAXED regex_compiled = __atomic_load_n(&spec->regex_compiled, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE); #else /* GCC <4.7 */ __sync_synchronize(); regex_compiled = spec->regex_compiled; #endif if (regex_compiled) { return 0; /* already done */ } __pthread_mutex_lock(&spec->regex_lock); /* Check if another thread compiled the regex while we waited * on the mutex */ #ifdef __ATOMIC_RELAXED regex_compiled = __atomic_load_n(&spec->regex_compiled, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE); #else /* GCC <4.7 */ __sync_synchronize(); regex_compiled = spec->regex_compiled; #endif if (regex_compiled) { __pthread_mutex_unlock(&spec->regex_lock); return 0; } reg_buf = spec->regex_str; /* Anchor the regular expression. */ len = strlen(reg_buf); cp = anchored_regex = malloc(len + 3); if (!anchored_regex) { if (errbuf) *errbuf = "out of memory"; __pthread_mutex_unlock(&spec->regex_lock); return -1; } /* Create ^...$ regexp. */ *cp++ = '^'; memcpy(cp, reg_buf, len); cp += len; *cp++ = '$'; *cp = '\0'; /* Compile the regular expression. */ rc = regex_prepare_data(&spec->regex, anchored_regex, &error_data); free(anchored_regex); if (rc < 0) { if (errbuf) { regex_format_error(&error_data, regex_error_format_buffer, sizeof(regex_error_format_buffer)); *errbuf = ®ex_error_format_buffer[0]; } __pthread_mutex_unlock(&spec->regex_lock); return -1; } /* Done. */ #ifdef __ATOMIC_RELAXED __atomic_store_n(&spec->regex_compiled, true, __ATOMIC_RELEASE); #else /* GCC <4.7 */ spec->regex_compiled = true; __sync_synchronize(); #endif __pthread_mutex_unlock(&spec->regex_lock); return 0; } /* This service is used by label_file.c process_file() and * utils/sefcontext_compile.c */ static inline int process_line(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *path, const char *prefix, char *line_buf, unsigned lineno) { int items, len, rc; char *regex = NULL, *type = NULL, *context = NULL; struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct spec *spec_arr; unsigned int nspec = data->nspec; const char *errbuf = NULL; items = read_spec_entries(line_buf, &errbuf, 3, ®ex, &type, &context); if (items < 0) { if (errbuf) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: line %u error due to: %s\n", path, lineno, errbuf); } else { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: line %u error due to: %m\n", path, lineno); } return -1; } if (items == 0) return items; if (items < 2) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: line %u is missing fields\n", path, lineno); if (items == 1) free(regex); errno = EINVAL; return -1; } else if (items == 2) { /* The type field is optional. */ context = type; type = 0; } len = get_stem_from_spec(regex); if (len && prefix && strncmp(prefix, regex, len)) { /* Stem of regex does not match requested prefix, discard. */ free(regex); free(type); free(context); return 0; } rc = grow_specs(data); if (rc) return rc; spec_arr = data->spec_arr; /* process and store the specification in spec. */ spec_arr[nspec].stem_id = find_stem_from_spec(data, regex); spec_arr[nspec].regex_str = regex; __pthread_mutex_init(&spec_arr[nspec].regex_lock, NULL); spec_arr[nspec].regex_compiled = false; spec_arr[nspec].type_str = type; spec_arr[nspec].mode = 0; spec_arr[nspec].lr.ctx_raw = context; spec_arr[nspec].lr.lineno = lineno; /* * bump data->nspecs to cause closef() to cover it in its free * but do not bump nspec since it's used below. */ data->nspec++; if (rec->validating && compile_regex(&spec_arr[nspec], &errbuf)) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: line %u has invalid regex %s: %s\n", path, lineno, regex, errbuf); errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (type) { mode_t mode = string_to_mode(type); if (mode == (mode_t)-1) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: line %u has invalid file type %s\n", path, lineno, type); errno = EINVAL; return -1; } spec_arr[nspec].mode = mode; } /* Determine if specification has * any meta characters in the RE */ spec_hasMetaChars(&spec_arr[nspec]); if (strcmp(context, "<>") && rec->validating) return compat_validate(rec, &spec_arr[nspec].lr, path, lineno); return 0; } #endif /* _SELABEL_FILE_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/src/label_internal.h000066400000000000000000000105161437566343300174730ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * This file describes the internal interface used by the labeler * for calling the user-supplied memory allocation, validation, * and locking routine. * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #ifndef _SELABEL_INTERNAL_H_ #define _SELABEL_INTERNAL_H_ #include #include #include #include #include #include "sha1.h" #if defined(ANDROID) || defined(__APPLE__) // Android and Mac do not have fgets_unlocked() #define fgets_unlocked(buf, size, fp) fgets(buf, size, fp) #endif /* * Installed backends */ int selabel_file_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) ; int selabel_media_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) ; int selabel_x_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) ; int selabel_db_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) ; int selabel_property_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) ; int selabel_service_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) ; /* * Labeling internal structures */ /* * Calculate an SHA1 hash of all the files used to build the specs. * The hash value is held in rec->digest if SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST set. To * calculate the hash the hashbuf will hold a concatenation of all the files * used. This is released once the value has been calculated. */ #define DIGEST_SPECFILE_SIZE SHA1_HASH_SIZE #define DIGEST_FILES_MAX 8 struct selabel_digest { unsigned char *digest; /* SHA1 digest of specfiles */ unsigned char *hashbuf; /* buffer to hold specfiles */ size_t hashbuf_size; /* buffer size */ size_t specfile_cnt; /* how many specfiles processed */ char **specfile_list; /* and their names */ }; extern int digest_add_specfile(struct selabel_digest *digest, FILE *fp, char *from_addr, size_t buf_len, const char *path); extern void digest_gen_hash(struct selabel_digest *digest); struct selabel_lookup_rec { char * ctx_raw; char * ctx_trans; int validated; unsigned lineno; }; struct selabel_handle { /* arguments that were passed to selabel_open */ unsigned int backend; int validating; /* labeling operations */ struct selabel_lookup_rec *(*func_lookup) (struct selabel_handle *h, const char *key, int type); void (*func_close) (struct selabel_handle *h); void (*func_stats) (struct selabel_handle *h); bool (*func_partial_match) (struct selabel_handle *h, const char *key); bool (*func_get_digests_all_partial_matches) (struct selabel_handle *h, const char *key, uint8_t **calculated_digest, uint8_t **xattr_digest, size_t *digest_len); bool (*func_hash_all_partial_matches) (struct selabel_handle *h, const char *key, uint8_t *digest); struct selabel_lookup_rec *(*func_lookup_best_match) (struct selabel_handle *h, const char *key, const char **aliases, int type); enum selabel_cmp_result (*func_cmp)(struct selabel_handle *h1, struct selabel_handle *h2); /* supports backend-specific state information */ void *data; /* * The main spec file used. Note for file contexts the local and/or * homedirs could also have been used to resolve a context. */ char *spec_file; /* ptr to SHA1 hash information if SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST set */ struct selabel_digest *digest; }; /* * Validation function */ extern int selabel_validate(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selabel_lookup_rec *contexts) ; /* * Compatibility support */ extern int myprintf_compat; extern void __attribute__ ((format(printf, 1, 2))) (*myprintf) (const char *fmt, ...) ; #define COMPAT_LOG(type, fmt...) do { \ if (myprintf_compat) \ myprintf(fmt); \ else \ selinux_log(type, fmt); \ } while (0) extern int compat_validate(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selabel_lookup_rec *contexts, const char *path, unsigned lineno) ; /* * The read_spec_entries function may be used to * replace sscanf to read entries from spec files. */ extern int read_spec_entries(char *line_buf, const char **errbuf, int num_args, ...); #endif /* _SELABEL_INTERNAL_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/src/label_media.c000066400000000000000000000114311437566343300167260ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Media contexts backend for labeling system * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" /* * Internals */ /* A context specification. */ typedef struct spec { struct selabel_lookup_rec lr; /* holds contexts for lookup result */ char *key; /* key string */ int matches; /* number of matches made during operation */ } spec_t; struct saved_data { unsigned int nspec; spec_t *spec_arr; }; static int process_line(const char *path, char *line_buf, int pass, unsigned lineno, struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; int items; char *buf_p; char *key, *context; buf_p = line_buf; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; /* Skip comment lines and empty lines. */ if (*buf_p == '#' || *buf_p == 0) return 0; items = sscanf(line_buf, "%ms %ms ", &key, &context); if (items < 2) { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %u is missing fields, skipping\n", path, lineno); if (items == 1) free(key); return 0; } if (pass == 1) { data->spec_arr[data->nspec].key = key; data->spec_arr[data->nspec].lr.ctx_raw = context; } data->nspec++; if (pass == 0) { free(key); free(context); } return 0; } static int init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n) { FILE *fp; struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; const char *path = NULL; char *line_buf = NULL; size_t line_len = 0; int status = -1; unsigned int lineno, pass, maxnspec; struct stat sb; /* Process arguments */ while (n--) switch(opts[n].type) { case SELABEL_OPT_PATH: path = opts[n].value; break; } /* Open the specification file. */ if (!path) path = selinux_media_context_path(); if ((fp = fopen(path, "re")) == NULL) return -1; __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); if (fstat(fileno(fp), &sb) < 0) goto finish; if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { errno = EINVAL; goto finish; } rec->spec_file = strdup(path); /* * Perform two passes over the specification file. * The first pass counts the number of specifications and * performs simple validation of the input. At the end * of the first pass, the spec array is allocated. * The second pass performs detailed validation of the input * and fills in the spec array. */ maxnspec = UINT_MAX / sizeof(spec_t); for (pass = 0; pass < 2; pass++) { lineno = 0; data->nspec = 0; while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, fp) > 0 && data->nspec < maxnspec) { if (process_line(path, line_buf, pass, ++lineno, rec)) goto finish; } if (pass == 0) { if (data->nspec == 0) { status = 0; goto finish; } data->spec_arr = malloc(sizeof(spec_t)*data->nspec); if (data->spec_arr == NULL) goto finish; memset(data->spec_arr, 0, sizeof(spec_t)*data->nspec); maxnspec = data->nspec; rewind(fp); } } free(line_buf); status = digest_add_specfile(rec->digest, fp, NULL, sb.st_size, path); if (status) goto finish; digest_gen_hash(rec->digest); finish: fclose(fp); return status; } /* * Backend interface routines */ static void close(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct spec *spec, *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { spec = &spec_arr[i]; free(spec->key); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); } if (spec_arr) free(spec_arr); free(data); } static struct selabel_lookup_rec *lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int type __attribute__((unused))) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; spec_t *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { if (!strncmp(spec_arr[i].key, key, strlen(key) + 1)) break; if (!strncmp(spec_arr[i].key, "*", 2)) break; } if (i >= data->nspec) { /* No matching specification. */ errno = ENOENT; return NULL; } spec_arr[i].matches++; return &spec_arr[i].lr; } static void stats(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; unsigned int i, total = 0; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) total += data->spec_arr[i].matches; selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%u entries, %u matches made\n", data->nspec, total); } int selabel_media_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct saved_data *data; data = (struct saved_data *)malloc(sizeof(*data)); if (!data) return -1; memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); rec->data = data; rec->func_close = &close; rec->func_lookup = &lookup; rec->func_stats = &stats; return init(rec, opts, nopts); } libselinux-3.5/src/label_support.c000066400000000000000000000113641437566343300173700ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * This file contains helper functions for labeling support. * * Author : Richard Haines */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "label_internal.h" /* * Read an entry from a spec file (e.g. file_contexts) * entry - Buffer to allocate for the entry. * ptr - current location of the line to be processed. * returns - 0 on success and *entry is set to be a null * terminated value. On Error it returns -1 and * errno will be set. * */ static inline int read_spec_entry(char **entry, char **ptr, int *len, const char **errbuf) { *entry = NULL; char *tmp_buf = NULL; while (isspace(**ptr) && **ptr != '\0') (*ptr)++; tmp_buf = *ptr; *len = 0; while (!isspace(**ptr) && **ptr != '\0') { if (!isascii(**ptr)) { errno = EINVAL; *errbuf = "Non-ASCII characters found"; return -1; } (*ptr)++; (*len)++; } if (*len) { *entry = strndup(tmp_buf, *len); if (!*entry) return -1; } return 0; } /* * line_buf - Buffer containing the spec entries . * errbuf - Double pointer used for passing back specific error messages. * num_args - The number of spec parameter entries to process. * ... - A 'char **spec_entry' for each parameter. * returns - The number of items processed. On error, it returns -1 with errno * set and may set errbuf to a specific error message. * * This function calls read_spec_entry() to do the actual string processing. * As such, can return anything from that function as well. */ int read_spec_entries(char *line_buf, const char **errbuf, int num_args, ...) { char **spec_entry, *buf_p; int len, rc, items, entry_len = 0; va_list ap; *errbuf = NULL; len = strlen(line_buf); if (line_buf[len - 1] == '\n') line_buf[len - 1] = '\0'; else /* Handle case if line not \n terminated by bumping * the len for the check below (as the line is NUL * terminated by getline(3)) */ len++; buf_p = line_buf; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; /* Skip comment lines and empty lines. */ if (*buf_p == '#' || *buf_p == '\0') return 0; /* Process the spec file entries */ va_start(ap, num_args); items = 0; while (items < num_args) { spec_entry = va_arg(ap, char **); if (len - 1 == buf_p - line_buf) { va_end(ap); return items; } rc = read_spec_entry(spec_entry, &buf_p, &entry_len, errbuf); if (rc < 0) { va_end(ap); return rc; } if (entry_len) items++; } va_end(ap); return items; } /* Once all the specfiles are in the hash_buf, generate the hash. */ void digest_gen_hash(struct selabel_digest *digest) { Sha1Context context; size_t remaining_size; const unsigned char *ptr; /* If SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST not set then just return */ if (!digest) return; Sha1Initialise(&context); /* Process in blocks of UINT32_MAX bytes */ remaining_size = digest->hashbuf_size; ptr = digest->hashbuf; while (remaining_size > UINT32_MAX) { Sha1Update(&context, ptr, UINT32_MAX); remaining_size -= UINT32_MAX; ptr += UINT32_MAX; } Sha1Update(&context, ptr, remaining_size); Sha1Finalise(&context, (SHA1_HASH *)digest->digest); free(digest->hashbuf); digest->hashbuf = NULL; return; } /** * digest_add_specfile - Add a specfile to the hashbuf and if gen_hash true * then generate the hash. * @digest: pointer to the selabel_digest struct * @fp: file pointer for fread(3) or NULL if not. * @from_addr: pointer at start of buffer for memcpy or NULL if not (used for * mmap(3) files). * @buf_len: length of buffer to copy. * @path: pointer to the specfile. * * Return %0 on success, -%1 with @errno set on failure. */ int digest_add_specfile(struct selabel_digest *digest, FILE *fp, char *from_addr, size_t buf_len, const char *path) { unsigned char *tmp_buf; /* If SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST not set then just return */ if (!digest) return 0; if (digest->hashbuf_size + buf_len < digest->hashbuf_size) { errno = EOVERFLOW; return -1; } digest->hashbuf_size += buf_len; tmp_buf = realloc(digest->hashbuf, digest->hashbuf_size); if (!tmp_buf) return -1; digest->hashbuf = tmp_buf; if (fp) { rewind(fp); if (fread(digest->hashbuf + (digest->hashbuf_size - buf_len), 1, buf_len, fp) != buf_len) return -1; rewind(fp); } else if (from_addr) { tmp_buf = memcpy(digest->hashbuf + (digest->hashbuf_size - buf_len), from_addr, buf_len); if (!tmp_buf) return -1; } /* Now add path to list */ digest->specfile_list[digest->specfile_cnt] = strdup(path); if (!digest->specfile_list[digest->specfile_cnt]) return -1; digest->specfile_cnt++; if (digest->specfile_cnt > DIGEST_FILES_MAX) { errno = EOVERFLOW; return -1; } return 0; } libselinux-3.5/src/label_x.c000066400000000000000000000132701437566343300161210ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Media contexts backend for X contexts * * Author : Eamon Walsh */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "label_internal.h" /* * Internals */ /* A context specification. */ typedef struct spec { struct selabel_lookup_rec lr; /* holds contexts for lookup result */ char *key; /* key string */ int type; /* type of record (prop, ext, client) */ int matches; /* number of matches made during operation */ } spec_t; struct saved_data { unsigned int nspec; spec_t *spec_arr; }; static int process_line(const char *path, char *line_buf, int pass, unsigned lineno, struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; int items; char *buf_p; char *type, *key, *context; buf_p = line_buf; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; /* Skip comment lines and empty lines. */ if (*buf_p == '#' || *buf_p == 0) return 0; items = sscanf(line_buf, "%ms %ms %ms ", &type, &key, &context); if (items < 3) { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %u is missing fields, skipping\n", path, lineno); if (items > 0) free(type); if (items > 1) free(key); return 0; } if (pass == 1) { /* Convert the type string to a mode format */ if (!strcmp(type, "property")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_PROP; else if (!strcmp(type, "extension")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_EXT; else if (!strcmp(type, "client")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_CLIENT; else if (!strcmp(type, "event")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_EVENT; else if (!strcmp(type, "selection")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_SELN; else if (!strcmp(type, "poly_property")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_POLYPROP; else if (!strcmp(type, "poly_selection")) data->spec_arr[data->nspec].type = SELABEL_X_POLYSELN; else { selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %u has invalid object type %s\n", path, lineno, type); return 0; } data->spec_arr[data->nspec].key = key; data->spec_arr[data->nspec].lr.ctx_raw = context; free(type); } data->nspec++; if (pass == 0) { free(type); free(key); free(context); } return 0; } static int init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned n) { FILE *fp; struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; const char *path = NULL; char *line_buf = NULL; size_t line_len = 0; int status = -1; unsigned int lineno, pass, maxnspec; struct stat sb; /* Process arguments */ while (n--) switch(opts[n].type) { case SELABEL_OPT_PATH: path = opts[n].value; break; } /* Open the specification file. */ if (!path) path = selinux_x_context_path(); if ((fp = fopen(path, "re")) == NULL) return -1; __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); if (fstat(fileno(fp), &sb) < 0) goto finish; if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { errno = EINVAL; goto finish; } rec->spec_file = strdup(path); /* * Perform two passes over the specification file. * The first pass counts the number of specifications and * performs simple validation of the input. At the end * of the first pass, the spec array is allocated. * The second pass performs detailed validation of the input * and fills in the spec array. */ maxnspec = UINT_MAX / sizeof(spec_t); for (pass = 0; pass < 2; pass++) { lineno = 0; data->nspec = 0; while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, fp) > 0 && data->nspec < maxnspec) { if (process_line(path, line_buf, pass, ++lineno, rec)) goto finish; } if (pass == 0) { if (data->nspec == 0) { status = 0; goto finish; } data->spec_arr = malloc(sizeof(spec_t)*data->nspec); if (data->spec_arr == NULL) goto finish; memset(data->spec_arr, 0, sizeof(spec_t)*data->nspec); maxnspec = data->nspec; rewind(fp); } } free(line_buf); status = digest_add_specfile(rec->digest, fp, NULL, sb.st_size, path); if (status) goto finish; digest_gen_hash(rec->digest); finish: fclose(fp); return status; } /* * Backend interface routines */ static void close(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; struct spec *spec, *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { spec = &spec_arr[i]; free(spec->key); free(spec->lr.ctx_raw); free(spec->lr.ctx_trans); } if (spec_arr) free(spec_arr); free(data); } static struct selabel_lookup_rec *lookup(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *key, int type) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; spec_t *spec_arr = data->spec_arr; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) { if (spec_arr[i].type != type) continue; if (!fnmatch(spec_arr[i].key, key, 0)) break; } if (i >= data->nspec) { /* No matching specification. */ errno = ENOENT; return NULL; } spec_arr[i].matches++; return &spec_arr[i].lr; } static void stats(struct selabel_handle *rec) { struct saved_data *data = (struct saved_data *)rec->data; unsigned int i, total = 0; for (i = 0; i < data->nspec; i++) total += data->spec_arr[i].matches; selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%u entries, %u matches made\n", data->nspec, total); } int selabel_x_init(struct selabel_handle *rec, const struct selinux_opt *opts, unsigned nopts) { struct saved_data *data; data = (struct saved_data *)malloc(sizeof(*data)); if (!data) return -1; memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); rec->data = data; rec->func_close = &close; rec->func_lookup = &lookup; rec->func_stats = &stats; return init(rec, opts, nopts); } libselinux-3.5/src/lgetfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000023251437566343300170050ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" int lgetfilecon_raw(const char *path, char ** context) { char *buf; ssize_t size; ssize_t ret; size = INITCONTEXTLEN + 1; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) return -1; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = lgetxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); if (ret < 0 && errno == ERANGE) { char *newbuf; size = lgetxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (size < 0) goto out; size++; newbuf = realloc(buf, size); if (!newbuf) goto out; buf = newbuf; memset(buf, 0, size); ret = lgetxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, buf, size - 1); } out: if (ret == 0) { /* Re-map empty attribute values to errors. */ errno = ENOTSUP; ret = -1; } if (ret < 0) free(buf); else *context = buf; return ret; } int lgetfilecon(const char *path, char ** context) { int ret; char * rcontext = NULL; *context = NULL; ret = lgetfilecon_raw(path, &rcontext); if (ret > 0) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcontext, context); freecon(rcontext); } if (ret >= 0 && *context) return strlen(*context) + 1; return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/libselinux.map000066400000000000000000000145711437566343300172310ustar00rootroot00000000000000LIBSELINUX_1.0 { global: avc_add_callback; avc_audit; avc_av_stats; avc_cache_stats; avc_cleanup; avc_compute_create; avc_compute_member; avc_context_to_sid; avc_context_to_sid_raw; avc_destroy; avc_get_initial_sid; avc_has_perm; avc_has_perm_noaudit; avc_init; avc_netlink_acquire_fd; avc_netlink_check_nb; avc_netlink_close; avc_netlink_loop; avc_netlink_open; avc_netlink_release_fd; avc_open; avc_reset; avc_sid_stats; avc_sid_to_context; avc_sid_to_context_raw; checkPasswdAccess; context_free; context_new; context_range_get; context_range_set; context_role_get; context_role_set; context_str; context_type_get; context_type_set; context_user_get; context_user_set; fgetfilecon; fgetfilecon_raw; fini_selinuxmnt; freecon; freeconary; fsetfilecon; fsetfilecon_raw; getcon; getcon_raw; get_default_context; get_default_context_with_level; get_default_context_with_role; get_default_context_with_rolelevel; get_default_type; getexeccon; getexeccon_raw; getfilecon; getfilecon_raw; getfscreatecon; getfscreatecon_raw; getkeycreatecon; getkeycreatecon_raw; get_ordered_context_list; get_ordered_context_list_with_level; getpeercon; getpeercon_raw; getpidcon; getpidcon_raw; getprevcon; getprevcon_raw; getseuser; getseuserbyname; getsockcreatecon; getsockcreatecon_raw; is_context_customizable; is_selinux_enabled; is_selinux_mls_enabled; lgetfilecon; lgetfilecon_raw; lsetfilecon; lsetfilecon_raw; manual_user_enter_context; matchmediacon; matchpathcon; matchpathcon_checkmatches; matchpathcon_filespec_add; matchpathcon_filespec_destroy; matchpathcon_filespec_eval; matchpathcon_fini; matchpathcon_index; matchpathcon_init; matchpathcon_init_prefix; mode_to_security_class; print_access_vector; query_user_context; realpath_not_final; rpm_execcon; security_av_perm_to_string; security_av_string; security_canonicalize_context; security_canonicalize_context_raw; security_check_context; security_check_context_raw; security_class_to_string; security_commit_booleans; security_compute_av; security_compute_av_flags; security_compute_av_flags_raw; security_compute_av_raw; security_compute_create; security_compute_create_name; security_compute_create_name_raw; security_compute_create_raw; security_compute_member; security_compute_member_raw; security_compute_relabel; security_compute_relabel_raw; security_compute_user; security_compute_user_raw; security_deny_unknown; security_disable; security_get_boolean_active; security_get_boolean_names; security_get_boolean_pending; security_get_checkreqprot; security_getenforce; security_get_initial_context; security_get_initial_context_raw; security_load_booleans; security_load_policy; security_policyvers; security_reject_unknown; security_set_boolean; security_set_boolean_list; security_setenforce; security_validatetrans; security_validatetrans_raw; selabel_close; selabel_cmp; selabel_digest; selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches; selabel_hash_all_partial_matches; selabel_lookup; selabel_lookup_best_match; selabel_lookup_best_match_raw; selabel_lookup_raw; selabel_open; selabel_partial_match; selabel_stats; selinux_binary_policy_path; selinux_booleans_path; selinux_booleans_subs_path; selinux_boolean_sub; selinux_check_access; selinux_check_passwd_access; selinux_check_securetty_context; selinux_colors_path; selinux_contexts_path; selinux_current_policy_path; selinux_customizable_types_path; selinux_default_context_path; selinux_default_type_path; selinux_failsafe_context_path; selinux_file_context_cmp; selinux_file_context_homedir_path; selinux_file_context_local_path; selinux_file_context_path; selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path; selinux_file_context_subs_path; selinux_file_context_verify; selinux_flush_class_cache; selinuxfs_exists; selinux_get_callback; selinux_getenforcemode; selinux_getpolicytype; selinux_homedir_context_path; selinux_init_load_policy; selinux_lsetfilecon_default; selinux_lxc_contexts_path; selinux_media_context_path; selinux_mkload_policy; selinux_mnt; selinux_netfilter_context_path; selinux_openrc_contexts_path; selinux_openssh_contexts_path; selinux_path; selinux_policy_root; selinux_raw_context_to_color; selinux_raw_to_trans_context; selinux_removable_context_path; selinux_reset_config; selinux_restorecon; selinux_restorecon_default_handle; selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath; selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list; selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle; selinux_restorecon_xattr; selinux_securetty_types_path; selinux_sepgsql_context_path; selinux_set_callback; selinux_set_mapping; selinux_set_policy_root; selinux_snapperd_contexts_path; selinux_status_close; selinux_status_deny_unknown; selinux_status_getenforce; selinux_status_open; selinux_status_policyload; selinux_status_updated; selinux_systemd_contexts_path; selinux_translations_path; selinux_trans_to_raw_context; selinux_user_contexts_path; selinux_usersconf_path; selinux_users_path; selinux_virtual_domain_context_path; selinux_virtual_image_context_path; selinux_x_context_path; setcon; setcon_raw; setexeccon; setexeccon_raw; setexecfilecon; setfilecon; setfilecon_raw; setfscreatecon; setfscreatecon_raw; setkeycreatecon; setkeycreatecon_raw; set_matchpathcon_canoncon; set_matchpathcon_flags; set_matchpathcon_invalidcon; set_matchpathcon_printf; set_selinuxmnt; setsockcreatecon; setsockcreatecon_raw; sidget; sidput; string_to_av_perm; string_to_security_class; local: *; }; LIBSELINUX_3.4 { global: selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors; selinux_restorecon_parallel; } LIBSELINUX_1.0; LIBSELINUX_3.5 { global: getpidprevcon; getpidprevcon_raw; } LIBSELINUX_3.4; libselinux-3.5/src/libselinux.pc.in000066400000000000000000000004371437566343300174570ustar00rootroot00000000000000prefix=@prefix@ exec_prefix=${prefix} libdir=@libdir@ includedir=@includedir@ Name: libselinux Description: SELinux utility library Version: @VERSION@ URL: http://userspace.selinuxproject.org/ Requires.private: libsepol @PCRE_MODULE@ Libs: -L${libdir} -lselinux Cflags: -I${includedir} libselinux-3.5/src/load_policy.c000066400000000000000000000231041437566343300170060ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #ifndef ANDROID #include #include #endif #include #include "policy.h" #include #ifndef MNT_DETACH #define MNT_DETACH 2 #endif int security_load_policy(const void *data, size_t len) { char path[PATH_MAX]; int fd, ret; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/load", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; ret = write(fd, data, len); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; return 0; } #ifndef ANDROID #undef max #define max(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) int selinux_mkload_policy(int preservebools __attribute__((unused))) { int kernvers = security_policyvers(); int maxvers = kernvers, minvers = DEFAULT_POLICY_VERSION, vers; char path[PATH_MAX]; struct stat sb; size_t size; void *map, *data; int fd, rc = -1; sepol_policydb_t *policydb; sepol_policy_file_t *pf; int usesepol = 0; int (*vers_max)(void) = NULL; int (*vers_min)(void) = NULL; int (*policy_file_create)(sepol_policy_file_t **) = NULL; void (*policy_file_free)(sepol_policy_file_t *) = NULL; void (*policy_file_set_mem)(sepol_policy_file_t *, char*, size_t) = NULL; int (*policydb_create)(sepol_policydb_t **) = NULL; void (*policydb_free)(sepol_policydb_t *) = NULL; int (*policydb_read)(sepol_policydb_t *, sepol_policy_file_t *) = NULL; int (*policydb_set_vers)(sepol_policydb_t *, unsigned int) = NULL; int (*policydb_to_image)(sepol_handle_t *, sepol_policydb_t *, void **, size_t *) = NULL; #ifdef SHARED char *errormsg = NULL; void *libsepolh = NULL; libsepolh = dlopen("libsepol.so.2", RTLD_NOW); if (libsepolh) { usesepol = 1; dlerror(); #define DLERR() do { if ((errormsg = dlerror())) goto dlclose; } while (0) vers_max = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policy_kern_vers_max"); DLERR(); vers_min = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policy_kern_vers_min"); DLERR(); policy_file_create = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policy_file_create"); DLERR(); policy_file_free = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policy_file_free"); DLERR(); policy_file_set_mem = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policy_file_set_mem"); DLERR(); policydb_create = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policydb_create"); DLERR(); policydb_free = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policydb_free"); DLERR(); policydb_read = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policydb_read"); DLERR(); policydb_set_vers = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policydb_set_vers"); DLERR(); policydb_to_image = dlsym(libsepolh, "sepol_policydb_to_image"); DLERR(); #undef DLERR } #else usesepol = 1; vers_max = sepol_policy_kern_vers_max; vers_min = sepol_policy_kern_vers_min; policy_file_create = sepol_policy_file_create; policy_file_free = sepol_policy_file_free; policy_file_set_mem = sepol_policy_file_set_mem; policydb_create = sepol_policydb_create; policydb_free = sepol_policydb_free; policydb_read = sepol_policydb_read; policydb_set_vers = sepol_policydb_set_vers; policydb_to_image = sepol_policydb_to_image; #endif if (usesepol) { maxvers = max(kernvers, vers_max()); minvers = vers_min(); } vers = maxvers; search: snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s.%d", selinux_binary_policy_path(), vers); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); while (fd < 0 && errno == ENOENT && --vers >= minvers) { /* Check prior versions to see if old policy is available */ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s.%d", selinux_binary_policy_path(), vers); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); } if (fd < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Could not open policy file <= %s.%d: %m\n", selinux_binary_policy_path(), maxvers); goto dlclose; } if (fstat(fd, &sb) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Could not stat policy file %s: %m\n", path); goto close; } size = sb.st_size; data = map = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); if (map == MAP_FAILED) { fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Could not map policy file %s: %m\n", path); goto close; } if (vers > kernvers && usesepol) { /* Need to downgrade to kernel-supported version. */ if (policy_file_create(&pf)) goto unmap; if (policydb_create(&policydb)) { policy_file_free(pf); goto unmap; } policy_file_set_mem(pf, data, size); if (policydb_read(policydb, pf)) { policy_file_free(pf); policydb_free(policydb); goto unmap; } if (policydb_set_vers(policydb, kernvers) || policydb_to_image(NULL, policydb, &data, &size)) { /* Downgrade failed, keep searching. */ fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Could not downgrade policy file %s, searching for an older version.\n", path); policy_file_free(pf); policydb_free(policydb); munmap(map, sb.st_size); close(fd); vers--; goto search; } policy_file_free(pf); policydb_free(policydb); } rc = security_load_policy(data, size); if (rc) fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Could not load policy file %s: %m\n", path); unmap: if (data != map) free(data); munmap(map, sb.st_size); close: close(fd); dlclose: #ifdef SHARED if (errormsg) fprintf(stderr, "libselinux: %s\n", errormsg); if (libsepolh) dlclose(libsepolh); #endif return rc; } /* * Mount point for selinuxfs. * This definition is private to the function below. * Everything else uses the location determined during * libselinux startup via /proc/mounts (see init_selinuxmnt). * We only need the hardcoded definition for the initial mount * required for the initial policy load. */ int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce) { int rc = 0, orig_enforce = 0, seconfig = -2, secmdline = -1; FILE *cfg; char *buf; /* * Reread the selinux configuration in case it has changed. * Example: Caller has chroot'd and is now loading policy from * chroot'd environment. */ selinux_reset_config(); /* * Get desired mode (disabled, permissive, enforcing) from * /etc/selinux/config. */ selinux_getenforcemode(&seconfig); /* Check for an override of the mode via the kernel command line. */ rc = mount("proc", "/proc", "proc", 0, 0); cfg = fopen("/proc/cmdline", "re"); if (cfg) { char *tmp; buf = malloc(selinux_page_size); if (!buf) { fclose(cfg); return -1; } if (fgets(buf, selinux_page_size, cfg) && (tmp = strstr(buf, "enforcing="))) { if (tmp == buf || isspace(*(tmp - 1))) { secmdline = atoi(tmp + sizeof("enforcing=") - 1); } } fclose(cfg); free(buf); } /* * Determine the final desired mode. * Command line argument takes precedence, then config file. */ if (secmdline >= 0) *enforce = secmdline; else if (seconfig >= 0) *enforce = seconfig; else *enforce = 0; /* unspecified or disabled */ /* * Check for the existence of SELinux via selinuxfs, and * mount it if present for use in the calls below. */ const char *mntpoint = NULL; /* First make sure /sys is mounted */ if (mount("sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", 0, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) { /* MS_NODEV can't be set because of /sys/fs/selinux/null device, used by Android */ if (mount(SELINUXFS, SELINUXMNT, SELINUXFS, MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOSUID, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) { mntpoint = SELINUXMNT; } else { /* check old mountpoint */ if (mount(SELINUXFS, OLDSELINUXMNT, SELINUXFS, 0, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) { mntpoint = OLDSELINUXMNT; } } } else { /* check old mountpoint */ if (mount(SELINUXFS, OLDSELINUXMNT, SELINUXFS, 0, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) { mntpoint = OLDSELINUXMNT; } } if (! mntpoint ) { if (errno == ENODEV || !selinuxfs_exists()) { /* * SELinux was disabled in the kernel, either * omitted entirely or disabled at boot via selinux=0. * This takes precedence over any config or * commandline enforcing setting. */ *enforce = 0; } else { /* Only emit this error if selinux was not disabled */ fprintf(stderr, "Mount failed for selinuxfs on %s: %m\n", SELINUXMNT); } if (rc == 0) umount2("/proc", MNT_DETACH); goto noload; } set_selinuxmnt(mntpoint); if (rc == 0) umount2("/proc", MNT_DETACH); /* * Note: The following code depends on having selinuxfs * already mounted and selinuxmnt set above. */ if (seconfig == -1) { /* Runtime disable of SELinux. */ rc = security_disable(); if (rc == 0) { /* Successfully disabled, so umount selinuxfs too. */ umount(selinux_mnt); fini_selinuxmnt(); goto noload; } else { /* * It's possible that this failed because policy has * already been loaded. We can't disable SELinux now, * so the best we can do is force it to be permissive. */ *enforce = 0; } } /* * If necessary, change the kernel enforcing status to match * the desired mode. */ orig_enforce = rc = security_getenforce(); if (rc < 0) goto noload; if (orig_enforce != *enforce) { rc = security_setenforce(*enforce); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SELinux: Unable to switch to %s mode: %m\n", (*enforce ? "enforcing" : "permissive")); if (*enforce) goto noload; } } if (seconfig == -1) { umount(selinux_mnt); fini_selinuxmnt(); goto noload; } /* Load the policy. */ return selinux_mkload_policy(0); noload: /* * Only return 0 on a successful completion of policy load. * In any other case, we want to return an error so that init * knows not to proceed with the re-exec for the domain transition. * Depending on the *enforce setting, init will halt (> 0) or proceed * normally (otherwise). */ return -1; } #endif libselinux-3.5/src/lsetfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000014421437566343300170200ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" int lsetfilecon_raw(const char *path, const char * context) { int rc = lsetxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, strlen(context) + 1, 0); if (rc < 0 && errno == ENOTSUP) { char * ccontext = NULL; int err = errno; if ((lgetfilecon_raw(path, &ccontext) >= 0) && (strcmp(context,ccontext) == 0)) { rc = 0; } else { errno = err; } freecon(ccontext); } return rc; } int lsetfilecon(const char *path, const char *context) { int ret; char * rcontext; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context, &rcontext)) return -1; ret = lsetfilecon_raw(path, rcontext); freecon(rcontext); return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/mapping.c000066400000000000000000000130511437566343300161430ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Class and permission mappings. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "mapping.h" #include "selinux_internal.h" /* * Class and permission mappings */ struct selinux_mapping { security_class_t value; /* real, kernel value */ unsigned num_perms; access_vector_t perms[sizeof(access_vector_t) * 8]; }; static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping = NULL; static security_class_t current_mapping_size = 0; /* * Mapping setting function */ int selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *map) { size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping); security_class_t i, j; unsigned k; bool print_unknown_handle = false; bool reject = (security_reject_unknown() == 1); bool deny = (security_deny_unknown() == 1); free(current_mapping); current_mapping = NULL; current_mapping_size = 0; if (avc_reset() < 0) goto err; /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */ if (!map) { errno = EINVAL; goto err; } i = 0; while (map[i].name) i++; /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */ current_mapping = (struct selinux_mapping *)calloc(++i, size); if (!current_mapping) goto err; /* Store the raw class and permission values */ j = 0; while (map[j].name) { struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++); struct selinux_mapping *p_out = current_mapping + j; p_out->value = string_to_security_class(p_in->name); if (!p_out->value) { selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n", p_in->name); if (reject) goto err2; p_out->num_perms = 0; print_unknown_handle = true; continue; } k = 0; while (p_in->perms[k]) { /* An empty permission string skips ahead */ if (!*p_in->perms[k]) { k++; continue; } p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(p_out->value, p_in->perms[k]); if (!p_out->perms[k]) { selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n", p_in->perms[k], p_in->name); if (reject) goto err2; print_unknown_handle = true; } k++; } p_out->num_perms = k; } if (print_unknown_handle) selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n", deny ? "denied" : "allowed"); /* Set the mapping size here so the above lookups are "raw" */ current_mapping_size = i; return 0; err2: free(current_mapping); current_mapping = NULL; current_mapping_size = 0; err: return -1; } /* * Get real, kernel values from mapped values */ security_class_t unmap_class(security_class_t tclass) { if (tclass < current_mapping_size) return current_mapping[tclass].value; /* If here no mapping set or the class requested is not valid. */ if (current_mapping_size != 0) { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } else return tclass; } access_vector_t unmap_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t tperm) { if (tclass < current_mapping_size) { unsigned i; access_vector_t kperm = 0; for (i = 0; i < current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; i++) if (tperm & (UINT32_C(1)<num_perms; access_vector_t result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) { if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i]) result |= UINT32_C(1)<perms[i]) result |= UINT32_C(1)<allowed = result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) { if (avd->decided & mapping->perms[i]) result |= UINT32_C(1)<perms[i]) result |= UINT32_C(1)<decided = result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i]) result |= UINT32_C(1)<auditallow = result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) { if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i]) result |= UINT32_C(1)<perms[i]) result |= UINT32_C(1)<num_perms since this indicates * a bug in the object manager. */ for (; i < (sizeof(result)*8); i++) result |= UINT32_C(1)<auditdeny = result; } } libselinux-3.5/src/mapping.h000066400000000000000000000014401437566343300161470ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * This file describes the class and permission mappings used to * hide the kernel numbers from userspace by allowing userspace object * managers to specify a list of classes and permissions. */ #ifndef _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_ #define _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_ #include /* * Get real, kernel values from mapped values */ extern security_class_t unmap_class(security_class_t tclass); extern access_vector_t unmap_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t tperm); /* * Get mapped values from real, kernel values */ extern security_class_t map_class(security_class_t kclass); extern access_vector_t map_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t kperm); extern void map_decision(security_class_t tclass, struct av_decision *avd); #endif /* _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/src/matchmediacon.c000066400000000000000000000024621437566343300173100ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include int matchmediacon(const char *media, char ** con) { const char *path = selinux_media_context_path(); FILE *infile; char *ptr, *ptr2 = NULL; int found = 0; char current_line[PATH_MAX]; if ((infile = fopen(path, "re")) == NULL) return -1; while (!feof_unlocked(infile)) { if (!fgets_unlocked(current_line, sizeof(current_line), infile)) { fclose(infile); return -1; } if (current_line[strlen(current_line) - 1]) current_line[strlen(current_line) - 1] = 0; /* Skip leading whitespace before the partial context. */ ptr = current_line; while (*ptr && isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; if (!(*ptr)) continue; /* Find the end of the media context. */ ptr2 = ptr; while (*ptr2 && !isspace(*ptr2)) ptr2++; if (!(*ptr2)) continue; *ptr2++ = 0; if (strcmp(media, ptr) == 0) { found = 1; break; } } fclose(infile); if (!found) return -1; /* Skip whitespace. */ while (*ptr2 && isspace(*ptr2)) ptr2++; if (!(*ptr2)) { return -1; } if (selinux_raw_to_trans_context(ptr2, con)) { *con = NULL; return -1; } return 0; } libselinux-3.5/src/matchpathcon.c000066400000000000000000000303361437566343300171660ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "label_internal.h" #include "callbacks.h" #include static int (*myinvalidcon) (const char *p, unsigned l, char *c) = NULL; static int (*mycanoncon) (const char *p, unsigned l, char **c) = NULL; static void #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((format(printf, 1, 2))) #endif default_printf(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); } void #ifdef __GNUC__ __attribute__ ((format(printf, 1, 2))) #endif (*myprintf) (const char *fmt,...) = &default_printf; int myprintf_compat = 0; void set_matchpathcon_printf(void (*f) (const char *fmt, ...)) { myprintf = f ? f : &default_printf; myprintf_compat = 1; } int compat_validate(struct selabel_handle *rec, struct selabel_lookup_rec *contexts, const char *path, unsigned lineno) { int rc; char **ctx = &contexts->ctx_raw; if (myinvalidcon) rc = myinvalidcon(path, lineno, *ctx); else if (mycanoncon) rc = mycanoncon(path, lineno, ctx); else { rc = selabel_validate(rec, contexts); if (rc < 0) { if (lineno) { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: line %u has invalid context %s\n", path, lineno, *ctx); } else { COMPAT_LOG(SELINUX_WARNING, "%s: has invalid context %s\n", path, *ctx); } } } return rc ? -1 : 0; } #ifndef BUILD_HOST static __thread struct selabel_handle *hnd; /* * An array for mapping integers to contexts */ static __thread char **con_array; static __thread int con_array_size; static __thread int con_array_used; static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static pthread_key_t destructor_key; static int destructor_key_initialized = 0; static void free_array_elts(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < con_array_used; i++) free(con_array[i]); free(con_array); con_array_size = con_array_used = 0; con_array = NULL; } static int add_array_elt(char *con) { char **tmp; if (con_array_size) { while (con_array_used >= con_array_size) { con_array_size *= 2; tmp = (char **)realloc(con_array, sizeof(char*) * con_array_size); if (!tmp) { free_array_elts(); return -1; } con_array = tmp; } } else { con_array_size = 1000; con_array = (char **)malloc(sizeof(char*) * con_array_size); if (!con_array) { con_array_size = con_array_used = 0; return -1; } } con_array[con_array_used] = strdup(con); if (!con_array[con_array_used]) return -1; return con_array_used++; } void set_matchpathcon_invalidcon(int (*f) (const char *p, unsigned l, char *c)) { myinvalidcon = f; } static int default_canoncon(const char *path, unsigned lineno, char **context) { char *tmpcon; if (security_canonicalize_context_raw(*context, &tmpcon) < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; if (lineno) myprintf("%s: line %u has invalid context %s\n", path, lineno, *context); else myprintf("%s: invalid context %s\n", path, *context); return 1; } free(*context); *context = tmpcon; return 0; } void set_matchpathcon_canoncon(int (*f) (const char *p, unsigned l, char **c)) { if (f) mycanoncon = f; else mycanoncon = &default_canoncon; } static __thread struct selinux_opt options[SELABEL_NOPT]; static __thread int notrans; void set_matchpathcon_flags(unsigned int flags) { int i; memset(options, 0, sizeof(options)); i = SELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY; options[i].type = i; options[i].value = (flags & MATCHPATHCON_BASEONLY) ? (char*)1 : NULL; i = SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE; options[i].type = i; options[i].value = (flags & MATCHPATHCON_VALIDATE) ? (char*)1 : NULL; notrans = flags & MATCHPATHCON_NOTRANS; } /* * An association between an inode and a * specification. */ typedef struct file_spec { ino_t ino; /* inode number */ int specind; /* index of specification in spec */ char *file; /* full pathname for diagnostic messages about conflicts */ struct file_spec *next; /* next association in hash bucket chain */ } file_spec_t; /* * The hash table of associations, hashed by inode number. * Chaining is used for collisions, with elements ordered * by inode number in each bucket. Each hash bucket has a dummy * header. */ #define HASH_BITS 16 #define HASH_BUCKETS (1 << HASH_BITS) #define HASH_MASK (HASH_BUCKETS-1) static file_spec_t *fl_head; /* * Try to add an association between an inode and * a specification. If there is already an association * for the inode and it conflicts with this specification, * then use the specification that occurs later in the * specification array. */ int matchpathcon_filespec_add(ino_t ino, int specind, const char *file) { file_spec_t *prevfl, *fl; int h, ret; struct stat sb; if (!fl_head) { fl_head = malloc(sizeof(file_spec_t) * HASH_BUCKETS); if (!fl_head) goto oom; memset(fl_head, 0, sizeof(file_spec_t) * HASH_BUCKETS); } h = (ino + (ino >> HASH_BITS)) & HASH_MASK; for (prevfl = &fl_head[h], fl = fl_head[h].next; fl; prevfl = fl, fl = fl->next) { if (ino == fl->ino) { ret = lstat(fl->file, &sb); if (ret < 0 || sb.st_ino != ino) { fl->specind = specind; free(fl->file); fl->file = strdup(file); if (!fl->file) goto oom; return fl->specind; } if (!strcmp(con_array[fl->specind], con_array[specind])) return fl->specind; myprintf ("%s: conflicting specifications for %s and %s, using %s.\n", __FUNCTION__, file, fl->file, con_array[fl->specind]); free(fl->file); fl->file = strdup(file); if (!fl->file) goto oom; return fl->specind; } if (ino > fl->ino) break; } fl = malloc(sizeof(file_spec_t)); if (!fl) goto oom; fl->ino = ino; fl->specind = specind; fl->file = strdup(file); if (!fl->file) goto oom_freefl; fl->next = prevfl->next; prevfl->next = fl; return fl->specind; oom_freefl: free(fl); oom: myprintf("%s: insufficient memory for file label entry for %s\n", __FUNCTION__, file); return -1; } /* * Evaluate the association hash table distribution. */ void matchpathcon_filespec_eval(void) { file_spec_t *fl; int h, used, nel, len, longest; if (!fl_head) return; used = 0; longest = 0; nel = 0; for (h = 0; h < HASH_BUCKETS; h++) { len = 0; for (fl = fl_head[h].next; fl; fl = fl->next) { len++; } if (len) used++; if (len > longest) longest = len; nel += len; } myprintf ("%s: hash table stats: %d elements, %d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d\n", __FUNCTION__, nel, used, HASH_BUCKETS, longest); } /* * Destroy the association hash table. */ void matchpathcon_filespec_destroy(void) { file_spec_t *fl, *tmp; int h; free_array_elts(); if (!fl_head) return; for (h = 0; h < HASH_BUCKETS; h++) { fl = fl_head[h].next; while (fl) { tmp = fl; fl = fl->next; free(tmp->file); free(tmp); } fl_head[h].next = NULL; } free(fl_head); fl_head = NULL; } static void matchpathcon_fini_internal(void) { free_array_elts(); if (hnd) { selabel_close(hnd); hnd = NULL; } } static void matchpathcon_thread_destructor(void __attribute__((unused)) *ptr) { matchpathcon_fini_internal(); } void __attribute__((destructor)) matchpathcon_lib_destructor(void); void __attribute__((destructor)) matchpathcon_lib_destructor(void) { if (destructor_key_initialized) __selinux_key_delete(destructor_key); } static void matchpathcon_init_once(void) { if (__selinux_key_create(&destructor_key, matchpathcon_thread_destructor) == 0) destructor_key_initialized = 1; } int matchpathcon_init_prefix(const char *path, const char *subset) { if (!mycanoncon) mycanoncon = default_canoncon; __selinux_once(once, matchpathcon_init_once); __selinux_setspecific(destructor_key, /* some valid address to please GCC */ &selinux_page_size); options[SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET].type = SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET; options[SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET].value = subset; options[SELABEL_OPT_PATH].type = SELABEL_OPT_PATH; options[SELABEL_OPT_PATH].value = path; hnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, options, SELABEL_NOPT); return hnd ? 0 : -1; } int matchpathcon_init(const char *path) { return matchpathcon_init_prefix(path, NULL); } void matchpathcon_fini(void) { matchpathcon_fini_internal(); } /* * We do not want to resolve a symlink to a real path if it is the final * component of the name. Thus we split the pathname on the last "/" and * determine a real path component of the first portion. We then have to * copy the last part back on to get the final real path. Wheww. */ int realpath_not_final(const char *name, char *resolved_path) { char *last_component; char *tmp_path, *p; size_t len = 0; int rc = 0; tmp_path = strdup(name); if (!tmp_path) { myprintf("symlink_realpath(%s) strdup() failed: %m\n", name); rc = -1; goto out; } last_component = strrchr(tmp_path, '/'); if (last_component == tmp_path) { last_component++; p = strcpy(resolved_path, ""); } else if (last_component) { *last_component = '\0'; last_component++; p = realpath(tmp_path, resolved_path); } else { last_component = tmp_path; p = realpath("./", resolved_path); } if (!p) { myprintf("symlink_realpath(%s) realpath() failed: %m\n", name); rc = -1; goto out; } len = strlen(p); if (len + strlen(last_component) + 2 > PATH_MAX) { myprintf("symlink_realpath(%s) failed: Filename too long \n", name); errno = ENAMETOOLONG; rc = -1; goto out; } resolved_path += len; strcpy(resolved_path, "/"); resolved_path += 1; strcpy(resolved_path, last_component); out: free(tmp_path); return rc; } static int matchpathcon_internal(const char *path, mode_t mode, char ** con) { char stackpath[PATH_MAX + 1]; char *p = NULL; if (!hnd && (matchpathcon_init_prefix(NULL, NULL) < 0)) return -1; if (S_ISLNK(mode)) { if (!realpath_not_final(path, stackpath)) path = stackpath; } else { p = realpath(path, stackpath); if (p) path = p; } return notrans ? selabel_lookup_raw(hnd, con, path, mode) : selabel_lookup(hnd, con, path, mode); } int matchpathcon(const char *path, mode_t mode, char ** con) { return matchpathcon_internal(path, mode, con); } int matchpathcon_index(const char *name, mode_t mode, char ** con) { int i = matchpathcon_internal(name, mode, con); if (i < 0) return -1; return add_array_elt(*con); } void matchpathcon_checkmatches(char *str __attribute__((unused))) { selabel_stats(hnd); } /* Compare two contexts to see if their differences are "significant", * or whether the only difference is in the user. */ int selinux_file_context_cmp(const char * a, const char * b) { const char *rest_a, *rest_b; /* Rest of the context after the user */ if (!a && !b) return 0; if (!a) return -1; if (!b) return 1; rest_a = strchr(a, ':'); rest_b = strchr(b, ':'); if (!rest_a && !rest_b) return 0; if (!rest_a) return -1; if (!rest_b) return 1; return strcmp(rest_a, rest_b); } int selinux_file_context_verify(const char *path, mode_t mode) { char * con = NULL; char * fcontext = NULL; int rc = 0; char stackpath[PATH_MAX + 1]; char *p = NULL; if (S_ISLNK(mode)) { if (!realpath_not_final(path, stackpath)) path = stackpath; } else { p = realpath(path, stackpath); if (p) path = p; } rc = lgetfilecon_raw(path, &con); if (rc == -1) { if (errno != ENOTSUP) return -1; else return 0; } if (!hnd && (matchpathcon_init_prefix(NULL, NULL) < 0)) return -1; if (selabel_lookup_raw(hnd, &fcontext, path, mode) != 0) { if (errno != ENOENT) rc = -1; else rc = 0; } else { /* * Need to set errno to 0 as it can be set to ENOENT if the * file_contexts.subs file does not exist (see selabel_open in * label.c), thus causing confusion if errno is checked on return. */ errno = 0; rc = (selinux_file_context_cmp(fcontext, con) == 0); } freecon(con); freecon(fcontext); return rc; } int selinux_lsetfilecon_default(const char *path) { struct stat st; int rc = -1; char * scontext = NULL; if (lstat(path, &st) != 0) return rc; if (!hnd && (matchpathcon_init_prefix(NULL, NULL) < 0)) return -1; /* If there's an error determining the context, or it has none, return to allow default context */ if (selabel_lookup_raw(hnd, &scontext, path, st.st_mode)) { if (errno == ENOENT) rc = 0; } else { rc = lsetfilecon_raw(path, scontext); freecon(scontext); } return rc; } #endif libselinux-3.5/src/policy.h000066400000000000000000000013531437566343300160160ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef _POLICY_H_ #define _POLICY_H_ /* Private definitions used internally by libselinux. */ /* * xattr name for SELinux attributes. * This may have been exported via Kernel uapi header. */ #ifndef XATTR_NAME_SELINUX #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX "security.selinux" #endif /* Initial length guess for getting contexts. */ #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 /* selinux file system type */ #define SELINUXFS "selinuxfs" /* selinuxfs magic number */ #define SELINUX_MAGIC 0xf97cff8c /* Preferred selinux mount location */ #define SELINUXMNT "/sys/fs/selinux" #define OLDSELINUXMNT "/selinux" /* selinuxfs mount point */ extern char *selinux_mnt; #define FILECONTEXTS "/etc/security/selinux/file_contexts" #define DEFAULT_POLICY_VERSION 15 #endif libselinux-3.5/src/policyvers.c000066400000000000000000000013501437566343300167060ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include #include "policy.h" #include int security_policyvers(void) { int fd, ret; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; unsigned vers = DEFAULT_POLICY_VERSION; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/policyvers", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) return vers; else return -1; } memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (sscanf(buf, "%u", &vers) != 1) return -1; return vers; } libselinux-3.5/src/procattr.c000066400000000000000000000152121437566343300163470ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #define UNSET (char *) -1 /* Cached values so that when a thread calls set*con() then gen*con(), the value * which was set is directly returned. */ static __thread char *prev_current = UNSET; static __thread char *prev_exec = UNSET; static __thread char *prev_fscreate = UNSET; static __thread char *prev_keycreate = UNSET; static __thread char *prev_sockcreate = UNSET; static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static pthread_key_t destructor_key; static int destructor_key_initialized = 0; static __thread char destructor_initialized; /* Bionic and glibc >= 2.30 declare gettid() system call wrapper in unistd.h and * has a definition for it */ #ifdef __BIONIC__ #define HAVE_GETTID 1 #elif !defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) #define HAVE_GETTID 0 #elif !__GLIBC_PREREQ(2,30) #define HAVE_GETTID 0 #else #define HAVE_GETTID 1 #endif static pid_t selinux_gettid(void) { #if HAVE_GETTID return gettid(); #else return syscall(__NR_gettid); #endif } static void procattr_thread_destructor(void __attribute__((unused)) *unused) { if (prev_current != UNSET) free(prev_current); if (prev_exec != UNSET) free(prev_exec); if (prev_fscreate != UNSET) free(prev_fscreate); if (prev_keycreate != UNSET) free(prev_keycreate); if (prev_sockcreate != UNSET) free(prev_sockcreate); } void __attribute__((destructor)) procattr_destructor(void); void __attribute__((destructor)) procattr_destructor(void) { if (destructor_key_initialized) __selinux_key_delete(destructor_key); } static inline void init_thread_destructor(void) { if (destructor_initialized == 0) { __selinux_setspecific(destructor_key, /* some valid address to please GCC */ &selinux_page_size); destructor_initialized = 1; } } static void init_procattr(void) { if (__selinux_key_create(&destructor_key, procattr_thread_destructor) == 0) { destructor_key_initialized = 1; } } static int openattr(pid_t pid, const char *attr, int flags) { int fd, rc; char *path; pid_t tid; if (pid > 0) { rc = asprintf(&path, "/proc/%d/attr/%s", pid, attr); } else if (pid == 0) { rc = asprintf(&path, "/proc/thread-self/attr/%s", attr); if (rc < 0) return -1; fd = open(path, flags | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd >= 0 || errno != ENOENT) goto out; free(path); tid = selinux_gettid(); rc = asprintf(&path, "/proc/self/task/%d/attr/%s", tid, attr); } else { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (rc < 0) return -1; fd = open(path, flags | O_CLOEXEC); out: free(path); return fd; } static int getprocattrcon_raw(char **context, pid_t pid, const char *attr, const char *prev_context) { char *buf; size_t size; int fd; ssize_t ret; int errno_hold; __selinux_once(once, init_procattr); init_thread_destructor(); if (prev_context && prev_context != UNSET) { *context = strdup(prev_context); if (!(*context)) { return -1; } return 0; } fd = openattr(pid, attr, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { ret = -1; goto out; } memset(buf, 0, size); do { ret = read(fd, buf, size - 1); } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR); if (ret < 0) goto out2; if (ret == 0) { *context = NULL; goto out2; } *context = strdup(buf); if (!(*context)) { ret = -1; goto out2; } ret = 0; out2: free(buf); out: errno_hold = errno; close(fd); errno = errno_hold; return ret; } static int getprocattrcon(char **context, pid_t pid, const char *attr, const char *prev_context) { int ret; char * rcontext; ret = getprocattrcon_raw(&rcontext, pid, attr, prev_context); if (!ret) { ret = selinux_raw_to_trans_context(rcontext, context); freecon(rcontext); } return ret; } static int setprocattrcon_raw(const char *context, const char *attr, char **prev_context) { int fd; ssize_t ret; int errno_hold; char *context2 = NULL; __selinux_once(once, init_procattr); init_thread_destructor(); if (!context && !*prev_context) return 0; if (context && *prev_context && *prev_context != UNSET && !strcmp(context, *prev_context)) return 0; fd = openattr(0, attr, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; if (context) { ret = -1; context2 = strdup(context); if (!context2) goto out; do { ret = write(fd, context2, strlen(context2) + 1); } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR); } else { do { ret = write(fd, NULL, 0); /* clear */ } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR); } out: errno_hold = errno; close(fd); errno = errno_hold; if (ret < 0) { free(context2); return -1; } else { if (*prev_context != UNSET) free(*prev_context); *prev_context = context2; return 0; } } static int setprocattrcon(const char *context, const char *attr, char **prev_context) { int ret; char * rcontext; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context, &rcontext)) return -1; ret = setprocattrcon_raw(rcontext, attr, prev_context); freecon(rcontext); return ret; } #define getselfattr_def(fn, attr, prev_context) \ int get##fn##_raw(char **c) \ { \ return getprocattrcon_raw(c, 0, attr, prev_context); \ } \ int get##fn(char **c) \ { \ return getprocattrcon(c, 0, attr, prev_context); \ } #define setselfattr_def(fn, attr, prev_context) \ int set##fn##_raw(const char * c) \ { \ return setprocattrcon_raw(c, attr, &prev_context); \ } \ int set##fn(const char * c) \ { \ return setprocattrcon(c, attr, &prev_context); \ } #define all_selfattr_def(fn, attr, prev_context) \ getselfattr_def(fn, attr, prev_context) \ setselfattr_def(fn, attr, prev_context) all_selfattr_def(con, "current", prev_current) getselfattr_def(prevcon, "prev", NULL) all_selfattr_def(execcon, "exec", prev_exec) all_selfattr_def(fscreatecon, "fscreate", prev_fscreate) all_selfattr_def(sockcreatecon, "sockcreate", prev_sockcreate) all_selfattr_def(keycreatecon, "keycreate", prev_keycreate) int getpidcon_raw(pid_t pid, char **c) { if (pid <= 0) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } return getprocattrcon_raw(c, pid, "current", NULL); } int getpidcon(pid_t pid, char **c) { if (pid <= 0) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } return getprocattrcon(c, pid, "current", NULL); } int getpidprevcon_raw(pid_t pid, char **c) { if (pid <= 0) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } return getprocattrcon_raw(c, pid, "prev", NULL); } int getpidprevcon(pid_t pid, char **c) { if (pid <= 0) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } return getprocattrcon(c, pid, "prev", NULL); } libselinux-3.5/src/query_user_context.c000066400000000000000000000120301437566343300204530ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "context_internal.h" #include /* context_menu - given a list of contexts, presents a menu of security contexts * to the user. Returns the number (position in the list) of * the user selected context. */ static int context_menu(char ** list) { int i; /* array index */ int choice = 0; /* index of the user's choice */ char response[10]; /* string to hold the user's response */ printf("\n\n"); for (i = 0; list[i]; i++) printf("[%d] %s\n", i + 1, list[i]); while ((choice < 1) || (choice > i)) { printf("Enter number of choice: "); fflush(stdin); if (fgets(response, sizeof(response), stdin) == NULL) continue; fflush(stdin); choice = strtol(response, NULL, 10); } return (choice - 1); } /* query_user_context - given a list of context, allow the user to choose one. The * default is the first context in the list. Returns 0 on * success, -1 on failure */ int query_user_context(char ** list, char ** usercon) { char response[10]; /* The user's response */ int choice; /* The index in the list of the sid chosen by the user */ if (!list[0]) return -1; printf("\nYour default context is %s.\n", list[0]); if (list[1]) { printf("Do you want to choose a different one? [n]"); fflush(stdin); if (fgets(response, sizeof(response), stdin) == NULL) return -1; fflush(stdin); if ((response[0] == 'y') || (response[0] == 'Y')) { choice = context_menu(list); *usercon = strdup(list[choice]); if (!(*usercon)) return -1; return 0; } *usercon = strdup(list[0]); if (!(*usercon)) return -1; } else { *usercon = strdup(list[0]); if (!(*usercon)) return -1; } return 0; } /* get_field - given fieldstr - the "name" of a field, query the user * and set the new value of the field */ static void get_field(const char *fieldstr, char *newfield, int newfieldlen) { int done = 0; /* true if a non-empty field has been obtained */ while (!done) { /* Keep going until we get a value for the field */ printf("\tEnter %s ", fieldstr); fflush(stdin); if (fgets(newfield, newfieldlen, stdin) == NULL) continue; fflush(stdin); if (newfield[strlen(newfield) - 1] == '\n') newfield[strlen(newfield) - 1] = '\0'; if (strlen(newfield) == 0) { printf("You must enter a %s\n", fieldstr); } else { done = 1; } } } /* manual_user_enter_context - provides a way for a user to manually enter a * context in case the policy doesn't allow a list * to be obtained. * given the userid, queries the user and places the * context chosen by the user into usercon. Returns 0 * on success. */ int manual_user_enter_context(const char *user, char ** newcon) { char response[10]; /* Used to get yes or no answers from user */ char role[100]; /* The role requested by the user */ int rolelen = 100; char type[100]; /* The type requested by the user */ int typelen = 100; char level[100]; /* The level requested by the user */ int levellen = 100; int mls_enabled = is_selinux_mls_enabled(); context_t new_context; /* The new context chosen by the user */ const char *user_context = NULL; /* String value of the user's context */ int done = 0; /* true if a valid sid has been obtained */ /* Initialize the context. How this is done depends on whether or not MLS is enabled */ if (mls_enabled) new_context = context_new("user:role:type:level"); else new_context = context_new("user:role:type"); if (!new_context) return -1; while (!done) { printf("Would you like to enter a security context? [y]"); if (fgets(response, sizeof(response), stdin) == NULL || (response[0] == 'n') || (response[0] == 'N')) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } /* Allow the user to enter each field of the context individually */ if (context_user_set(new_context, user)) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } get_field("role", role, rolelen); if (context_role_set(new_context, role)) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } get_field("type", type, typelen); if (context_type_set(new_context, type)) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } if (mls_enabled) { get_field("level", level, levellen); if (context_range_set(new_context, level)) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } } /* Get the string value of the context and see if it is valid. */ user_context = context_str(new_context); if (!user_context) { context_free(new_context); return -1; } if (!security_check_context(user_context)) done = 1; else printf("Not a valid security context\n"); } *newcon = strdup(user_context); context_free(new_context); if (!(*newcon)) return -1; return 0; } libselinux-3.5/src/regex.c000066400000000000000000000342201437566343300156230ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include "regex.h" #include "label_file.h" #include "selinux_internal.h" #ifdef USE_PCRE2 #define REGEX_ARCH_SIZE_T PCRE2_SIZE #else #define REGEX_ARCH_SIZE_T size_t #endif #ifndef __BYTE_ORDER__ /* If the compiler doesn't define __BYTE_ORDER__, try to use the C * library header definitions. */ #include #ifndef __BYTE_ORDER #error Neither __BYTE_ORDER__ nor __BYTE_ORDER defined. Unable to determine endianness. #endif #define __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN __LITTLE_ENDIAN #define __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN __BIG_ENDIAN #define __BYTE_ORDER__ __BYTE_ORDER #endif #ifdef USE_PCRE2 char const *regex_arch_string(void) { static char arch_string_buffer[32]; static char const *arch_string = ""; char const *endianness = NULL; int rc; if (arch_string[0] == '\0') { if (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) endianness = "el"; else if (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) endianness = "eb"; if (!endianness) return NULL; rc = snprintf(arch_string_buffer, sizeof(arch_string_buffer), "%zu-%zu-%s", sizeof(void *), sizeof(REGEX_ARCH_SIZE_T), endianness); if (rc < 0) abort(); arch_string = &arch_string_buffer[0]; } return arch_string; } struct regex_data { pcre2_code *regex; /* compiled regular expression */ #ifndef AGGRESSIVE_FREE_AFTER_REGEX_MATCH /* * match data block required for the compiled * pattern in pcre2 */ pcre2_match_data *match_data; #endif pthread_mutex_t match_mutex; }; int regex_prepare_data(struct regex_data **regex, char const *pattern_string, struct regex_error_data *errordata) { memset(errordata, 0, sizeof(struct regex_error_data)); *regex = regex_data_create(); if (!(*regex)) return -1; (*regex)->regex = pcre2_compile( (PCRE2_SPTR)pattern_string, PCRE2_ZERO_TERMINATED, PCRE2_DOTALL, &errordata->error_code, &errordata->error_offset, NULL); if (!(*regex)->regex) { goto err; } #ifndef AGGRESSIVE_FREE_AFTER_REGEX_MATCH (*regex)->match_data = pcre2_match_data_create_from_pattern((*regex)->regex, NULL); if (!(*regex)->match_data) { goto err; } #endif return 0; err: regex_data_free(*regex); *regex = NULL; return -1; } char const *regex_version(void) { static char version_buf[256]; size_t len = pcre2_config(PCRE2_CONFIG_VERSION, NULL); if (len <= 0 || len > sizeof(version_buf)) return NULL; pcre2_config(PCRE2_CONFIG_VERSION, version_buf); return version_buf; } int regex_load_mmap(struct mmap_area *mmap_area, struct regex_data **regex, int do_load_precompregex, bool *regex_compiled) { int rc; uint32_t entry_len; *regex_compiled = false; rc = next_entry(&entry_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0) return -1; if (entry_len && do_load_precompregex) { /* * this should yield exactly one because we store one pattern at * a time */ rc = pcre2_serialize_get_number_of_codes(mmap_area->next_addr); if (rc != 1) return -1; *regex = regex_data_create(); if (!*regex) return -1; rc = pcre2_serialize_decode(&(*regex)->regex, 1, (PCRE2_SPTR)mmap_area->next_addr, NULL); if (rc != 1) goto err; #ifndef AGGRESSIVE_FREE_AFTER_REGEX_MATCH (*regex)->match_data = pcre2_match_data_create_from_pattern((*regex)->regex, NULL); if (!(*regex)->match_data) goto err; #endif *regex_compiled = true; } /* and skip the decoded bit */ rc = next_entry(NULL, mmap_area, entry_len); if (rc < 0) goto err; return 0; err: regex_data_free(*regex); *regex = NULL; return -1; } int regex_writef(struct regex_data *regex, FILE *fp, int do_write_precompregex) { int rc = 0; size_t len; PCRE2_SIZE serialized_size; uint32_t to_write = 0; PCRE2_UCHAR *bytes = NULL; if (do_write_precompregex) { /* encode the pattern for serialization */ rc = pcre2_serialize_encode((const pcre2_code **)®ex->regex, 1, &bytes, &serialized_size, NULL); if (rc != 1) { rc = -1; goto out; } to_write = serialized_size; } /* write serialized pattern's size */ len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp); if (len != 1) { rc = -1; goto out; } if (do_write_precompregex) { /* write serialized pattern */ len = fwrite(bytes, 1, to_write, fp); if (len != to_write) rc = -1; } out: if (bytes) pcre2_serialize_free(bytes); return rc; } void regex_data_free(struct regex_data *regex) { if (regex) { if (regex->regex) pcre2_code_free(regex->regex); #ifndef AGGRESSIVE_FREE_AFTER_REGEX_MATCH if (regex->match_data) pcre2_match_data_free(regex->match_data); #endif __pthread_mutex_destroy(®ex->match_mutex); free(regex); } } int regex_match(struct regex_data *regex, char const *subject, int partial) { int rc; pcre2_match_data *match_data; __pthread_mutex_lock(®ex->match_mutex); #ifdef AGGRESSIVE_FREE_AFTER_REGEX_MATCH match_data = pcre2_match_data_create_from_pattern( regex->regex, NULL); if (match_data == NULL) { __pthread_mutex_unlock(®ex->match_mutex); return REGEX_ERROR; } #else match_data = regex->match_data; #endif rc = pcre2_match( regex->regex, (PCRE2_SPTR)subject, PCRE2_ZERO_TERMINATED, 0, partial ? PCRE2_PARTIAL_SOFT : 0, match_data, NULL); #ifdef AGGRESSIVE_FREE_AFTER_REGEX_MATCH // pcre2_match allocates heap and it won't be freed until // pcre2_match_data_free, resulting in heap overhead. pcre2_match_data_free(match_data); #endif __pthread_mutex_unlock(®ex->match_mutex); if (rc > 0) return REGEX_MATCH; switch (rc) { case PCRE2_ERROR_PARTIAL: return REGEX_MATCH_PARTIAL; case PCRE2_ERROR_NOMATCH: return REGEX_NO_MATCH; default: return REGEX_ERROR; } } /* * TODO Replace this compare function with something that actually compares the * regular expressions. * This compare function basically just compares the binary representations of * the automatons, and because this representation contains pointers and * metadata, it can only return a match if regex1 == regex2. * Preferably, this function would be replaced with an algorithm that computes * the equivalence of the automatons systematically. */ int regex_cmp(struct regex_data *regex1, struct regex_data *regex2) { int rc; size_t len1, len2; rc = pcre2_pattern_info(regex1->regex, PCRE2_INFO_SIZE, &len1); assert(rc == 0); rc = pcre2_pattern_info(regex2->regex, PCRE2_INFO_SIZE, &len2); assert(rc == 0); if (len1 != len2 || memcmp(regex1->regex, regex2->regex, len1)) return SELABEL_INCOMPARABLE; return SELABEL_EQUAL; } struct regex_data *regex_data_create(void) { struct regex_data *regex_data = (struct regex_data *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct regex_data)); if (!regex_data) return NULL; __pthread_mutex_init(®ex_data->match_mutex, NULL); return regex_data; } #else // !USE_PCRE2 char const *regex_arch_string(void) { return "N/A"; } /* Prior to version 8.20, libpcre did not have pcre_free_study() */ #if (PCRE_MAJOR < 8 || (PCRE_MAJOR == 8 && PCRE_MINOR < 20)) #define pcre_free_study pcre_free #endif struct regex_data { int owned; /* * non zero if regex and pcre_extra is owned by this * structure and thus must be freed on destruction. */ pcre *regex; /* compiled regular expression */ union { pcre_extra *sd; /* pointer to extra compiled stuff */ pcre_extra lsd; /* used to hold the mmap'd version */ }; }; int regex_prepare_data(struct regex_data **regex, char const *pattern_string, struct regex_error_data *errordata) { memset(errordata, 0, sizeof(struct regex_error_data)); *regex = regex_data_create(); if (!(*regex)) return -1; (*regex)->regex = pcre_compile(pattern_string, PCRE_DOTALL, &errordata->error_buffer, &errordata->error_offset, NULL); if (!(*regex)->regex) goto err; (*regex)->owned = 1; (*regex)->sd = pcre_study((*regex)->regex, 0, &errordata->error_buffer); if (!(*regex)->sd && errordata->error_buffer) goto err; return 0; err: regex_data_free(*regex); *regex = NULL; return -1; } char const *regex_version(void) { return pcre_version(); } int regex_load_mmap(struct mmap_area *mmap_area, struct regex_data **regex, int do_load_precompregex __attribute__((unused)), bool *regex_compiled) { int rc; uint32_t entry_len; size_t info_len; rc = next_entry(&entry_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0 || !entry_len) return -1; *regex = regex_data_create(); if (!(*regex)) return -1; (*regex)->owned = 0; (*regex)->regex = (pcre *)mmap_area->next_addr; rc = next_entry(NULL, mmap_area, entry_len); if (rc < 0) goto err; /* * Check that regex lengths match. pcre_fullinfo() * also validates its magic number. */ rc = pcre_fullinfo((*regex)->regex, NULL, PCRE_INFO_SIZE, &info_len); if (rc < 0 || info_len != entry_len) goto err; rc = next_entry(&entry_len, mmap_area, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (rc < 0) goto err; if (entry_len) { (*regex)->lsd.study_data = (void *)mmap_area->next_addr; (*regex)->lsd.flags |= PCRE_EXTRA_STUDY_DATA; rc = next_entry(NULL, mmap_area, entry_len); if (rc < 0) goto err; /* Check that study data lengths match. */ rc = pcre_fullinfo((*regex)->regex, &(*regex)->lsd, PCRE_INFO_STUDYSIZE, &info_len); if (rc < 0 || info_len != entry_len) goto err; } *regex_compiled = true; return 0; err: regex_data_free(*regex); *regex = NULL; return -1; } static inline pcre_extra *get_pcre_extra(struct regex_data *regex) { if (!regex) return NULL; if (regex->owned) { return regex->sd; } else if (regex->lsd.study_data) { return ®ex->lsd; } else { return NULL; } } int regex_writef(struct regex_data *regex, FILE *fp, int do_write_precompregex __attribute__((unused))) { int rc; size_t len; uint32_t to_write; size_t size; pcre_extra *sd = get_pcre_extra(regex); /* determine the size of the pcre data in bytes */ rc = pcre_fullinfo(regex->regex, NULL, PCRE_INFO_SIZE, &size); if (rc < 0) return -1; /* write the number of bytes in the pcre data */ to_write = size; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp); if (len != 1) return -1; /* write the actual pcre data as a char array */ len = fwrite(regex->regex, 1, to_write, fp); if (len != to_write) return -1; if (sd) { /* determine the size of the pcre study info */ rc = pcre_fullinfo(regex->regex, sd, PCRE_INFO_STUDYSIZE, &size); if (rc < 0) return -1; } else size = 0; /* write the number of bytes in the pcre study data */ to_write = size; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp); if (len != 1) return -1; if (sd) { /* write the actual pcre study data as a char array */ len = fwrite(sd->study_data, 1, to_write, fp); if (len != to_write) return -1; } return 0; } void regex_data_free(struct regex_data *regex) { if (regex) { if (regex->owned) { if (regex->regex) pcre_free(regex->regex); if (regex->sd) pcre_free_study(regex->sd); } free(regex); } } int regex_match(struct regex_data *regex, char const *subject, int partial) { int rc; rc = pcre_exec(regex->regex, get_pcre_extra(regex), subject, strlen(subject), 0, partial ? PCRE_PARTIAL_SOFT : 0, NULL, 0); switch (rc) { case 0: return REGEX_MATCH; case PCRE_ERROR_PARTIAL: return REGEX_MATCH_PARTIAL; case PCRE_ERROR_NOMATCH: return REGEX_NO_MATCH; default: return REGEX_ERROR; } } /* * TODO Replace this compare function with something that actually compares the * regular expressions. * This compare function basically just compares the binary representations of * the automatons, and because this representation contains pointers and * metadata, it can only return a match if regex1 == regex2. * Preferably, this function would be replaced with an algorithm that computes * the equivalence of the automatons systematically. */ int regex_cmp(struct regex_data *regex1, struct regex_data *regex2) { int rc; size_t len1, len2; rc = pcre_fullinfo(regex1->regex, NULL, PCRE_INFO_SIZE, &len1); assert(rc == 0); rc = pcre_fullinfo(regex2->regex, NULL, PCRE_INFO_SIZE, &len2); assert(rc == 0); if (len1 != len2 || memcmp(regex1->regex, regex2->regex, len1)) return SELABEL_INCOMPARABLE; return SELABEL_EQUAL; } struct regex_data *regex_data_create(void) { return (struct regex_data *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct regex_data)); } #endif void regex_format_error(struct regex_error_data const *error_data, char *buffer, size_t buf_size) { unsigned the_end_length = buf_size > 4 ? 4 : buf_size; char *ptr = &buffer[buf_size - the_end_length]; int rc = 0; size_t pos = 0; if (!buffer || !buf_size) return; rc = snprintf(buffer, buf_size, "REGEX back-end error: "); if (rc < 0) /* * If snprintf fails it constitutes a logical error that needs * fixing. */ abort(); pos += rc; if (pos >= buf_size) goto truncated; /* Return early if there is no error to format */ #ifdef USE_PCRE2 if (!error_data->error_code) { rc = snprintf(buffer + pos, buf_size - pos, "no error code"); if (rc < 0) abort(); pos += rc; if (pos >= buf_size) goto truncated; return; } #else if (!error_data->error_buffer) { rc = snprintf(buffer + pos, buf_size - pos, "empty error"); if (rc < 0) abort(); pos += rc; if (pos >= buf_size) goto truncated; return; } #endif if (error_data->error_offset > 0) { #ifdef USE_PCRE2 rc = snprintf(buffer + pos, buf_size - pos, "At offset %zu: ", error_data->error_offset); #else rc = snprintf(buffer + pos, buf_size - pos, "At offset %d: ", error_data->error_offset); #endif if (rc < 0) abort(); pos += rc; if (pos >= buf_size) goto truncated; } #ifdef USE_PCRE2 rc = pcre2_get_error_message(error_data->error_code, (PCRE2_UCHAR *)(buffer + pos), buf_size - pos); if (rc == PCRE2_ERROR_NOMEMORY) goto truncated; #else rc = snprintf(buffer + pos, buf_size - pos, "%s", error_data->error_buffer); if (rc < 0) abort(); if ((size_t)rc < strlen(error_data->error_buffer)) goto truncated; #endif return; truncated: /* replace end of string with "..." to indicate that it was truncated */ switch (the_end_length) { /* no break statements, fall-through is intended */ case 4: *ptr++ = '.'; /* FALLTHRU */ case 3: *ptr++ = '.'; /* FALLTHRU */ case 2: *ptr++ = '.'; /* FALLTHRU */ case 1: *ptr++ = '\0'; /* FALLTHRU */ default: break; } return; } libselinux-3.5/src/regex.h000066400000000000000000000146071437566343300156370ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef SRC_REGEX_H_ #define SRC_REGEX_H_ #include #include #ifdef USE_PCRE2 #include #else #include #endif enum { REGEX_MATCH, REGEX_MATCH_PARTIAL, REGEX_NO_MATCH, REGEX_ERROR = -1, }; struct regex_data; #ifdef USE_PCRE2 struct regex_error_data { int error_code; PCRE2_SIZE error_offset; }; #else struct regex_error_data { char const *error_buffer; int error_offset; }; #endif struct mmap_area; /** * regex_arch_string return a string that represents the pointer width, the * width of what the backend considers a size type, and the endianness of the * system that this library was build for. (e.g. for x86_64: "8-8-el"). * This is required when loading stored regular espressions. PCRE2 regular * expressions are not portable across architectures that do not have a * matching arch-string. */ char const *regex_arch_string(void) ; /** * regex_version returns the version string of the underlying regular * regular expressions library. In the case of PCRE it just returns the * result of pcre_version(). In the case of PCRE2, the very first time this * function is called it allocates a buffer large enough to hold the version * string and reads the PCRE2_CONFIG_VERSION option to fill the buffer. * The allocated buffer will linger in memory until the calling process is being * reaped. * * It may return NULL on error. */ char const *regex_version(void) ; /** * This constructor function allocates a buffer for a regex_data structure. * The buffer is being initialized with zeroes. */ struct regex_data *regex_data_create(void) ; /** * This complementary destructor function frees the a given regex_data buffer. * It also frees any non NULL member pointers with the appropriate pcreX_X_free * function. For PCRE this function respects the extra_owned field and frees * the pcre_extra data conditionally. Calling this function on a NULL pointer is * save. */ void regex_data_free(struct regex_data *regex) ; /** * This function compiles the regular expression. Additionally, it prepares * data structures required by the different underlying engines. For PCRE * it calls pcre_study to generate optional data required for optimized * execution of the compiled pattern. In the case of PCRE2, it allocates * a pcre2_match_data structure of appropriate size to hold all possible * matches created by the pattern. * * @arg regex If successful, the structure returned through *regex was allocated * with regex_data_create and must be freed with regex_data_free. * @arg pattern_string The pattern string that is to be compiled. * @arg errordata A pointer to a regex_error_data structure must be passed * to this function. This structure depends on the underlying * implementation. It can be passed to regex_format_error * to generate a human readable error message. * @retval 0 on success * @retval -1 on error */ int regex_prepare_data(struct regex_data **regex, char const *pattern_string, struct regex_error_data *errordata) ; /** * This function loads a serialized precompiled pattern from a contiguous * data region given by map_area. * * @arg map_area Description of the memory region holding a serialized * representation of the precompiled pattern. * @arg regex If successful, the structure returned through *regex was allocated * with regex_data_create and must be freed with regex_data_free. * @arg do_load_precompregex If non-zero precompiled patterns get loaded from * the mmap region (ignored by PCRE1 back-end). * @arg regex_compiled Set to true if a precompiled pattern was loaded * into regex, otherwise set to false to indicate later * compilation must occur * * @retval 0 on success * @retval -1 on error */ int regex_load_mmap(struct mmap_area *map_area, struct regex_data **regex, int do_load_precompregex, bool *regex_compiled) ; /** * This function stores a precompiled regular expression to a file. * In the case of PCRE, it just dumps the binary representation of the * precomplied pattern into a file. In the case of PCRE2, it uses the * serialization function provided by the library. * * @arg regex The precomplied regular expression data. * @arg fp A file stream specifying the output file. * @arg do_write_precompregex If non-zero precompiled patterns are written to * the output file (ignored by PCRE1 back-end). */ int regex_writef(struct regex_data *regex, FILE *fp, int do_write_precompregex) ; /** * This function applies a precompiled pattern to a subject string and * returns whether or not a match was found. * * @arg regex The precompiled pattern. * @arg subject The subject string. * @arg partial Boolean indicating if partial matches are wanted. A nonzero * value is equivalent to specifying PCRE[2]_PARTIAL_SOFT as * option to pcre_exec of pcre2_match. * @retval REGEX_MATCH if a match was found * @retval REGEX_MATCH_PARTIAL if a partial match was found * @retval REGEX_NO_MATCH if no match was found * @retval REGEX_ERROR if an error was encountered during the execution of the * regular expression */ int regex_match(struct regex_data *regex, char const *subject, int partial) ; /** * This function compares two compiled regular expressions (regex1 and regex2). * It compares the binary representations of the compiled patterns. It is a very * crude approximation because the binary representation holds data like * reference counters, that has nothing to do with the actual state machine. * * @retval SELABEL_EQUAL if the pattern's binary representations are exactly * the same * @retval SELABEL_INCOMPARABLE otherwise */ int regex_cmp(struct regex_data *regex1, struct regex_data *regex2) ; /** * This function takes the error data returned by regex_prepare_data and turns * it in to a human readable error message. * If the buffer given to hold the error message is to small it truncates the * message and indicates the truncation with an ellipsis ("...") at the end of * the buffer. * * @arg error_data Error data as returned by regex_prepare_data. * @arg buffer String buffer to hold the formatted error string. * @arg buf_size Total size of the given buffer in bytes. */ void regex_format_error(struct regex_error_data const *error_data, char *buffer, size_t buf_size) ; #endif /* SRC_REGEX_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/src/reject_unknown.c000066400000000000000000000012771437566343300175520ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include int security_reject_unknown(void) { int fd, ret, reject_unknown = 0; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/reject_unknown", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (sscanf(buf, "%d", &reject_unknown) != 1) return -1; return reject_unknown; } libselinux-3.5/src/selinux_check_securetty_context.c000066400000000000000000000017431437566343300232140ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "context_internal.h" int selinux_check_securetty_context(const char * tty_context) { char *line = NULL; char *start, *end = NULL; size_t line_len = 0; ssize_t len; int found = -1; FILE *fp; fp = fopen(selinux_securetty_types_path(), "re"); if (fp) { context_t con = context_new(tty_context); if (con) { const char *type = context_type_get(con); while ((len = getline(&line, &line_len, fp)) != -1) { if (line[len - 1] == '\n') line[len - 1] = 0; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ start = line; while (*start && isspace(*start)) start++; if (!(*start)) continue; end = start; while (*end && !isspace(*end)) end++; if (*end) *end++ = 0; if (!strcmp(type, start)) { found = 0; break; } } free(line); context_free(con); } fclose(fp); } return found; } libselinux-3.5/src/selinux_config.c000066400000000000000000000236441437566343300175350ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "policy.h" #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "get_default_type_internal.h" #define SELINUXDEFAULT "targeted" #define SELINUXTYPETAG "SELINUXTYPE=" #define SELINUXTAG "SELINUX=" #define REQUIRESEUSERS "REQUIRESEUSERS=" /* Indices for file paths arrays. */ #define BINPOLICY 0 #define CONTEXTS_DIR 1 #define FILE_CONTEXTS 2 #define HOMEDIR_CONTEXTS 3 #define DEFAULT_CONTEXTS 4 #define USER_CONTEXTS 5 #define FAILSAFE_CONTEXT 6 #define DEFAULT_TYPE 7 /* BOOLEANS is deprecated */ #define BOOLEANS 8 #define MEDIA_CONTEXTS 9 #define REMOVABLE_CONTEXT 10 #define CUSTOMIZABLE_TYPES 11 /* USERS_DIR is deprecated */ #define USERS_DIR 12 #define SEUSERS 13 #define TRANSLATIONS 14 #define NETFILTER_CONTEXTS 15 #define FILE_CONTEXTS_HOMEDIR 16 #define FILE_CONTEXTS_LOCAL 17 #define SECURETTY_TYPES 18 #define X_CONTEXTS 19 #define COLORS 20 #define VIRTUAL_DOMAIN 21 #define VIRTUAL_IMAGE 22 #define FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS 23 #define SEPGSQL_CONTEXTS 24 #define FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS_DIST 25 #define LXC_CONTEXTS 26 #define BOOLEAN_SUBS 27 #define OPENSSH_CONTEXTS 28 #define SYSTEMD_CONTEXTS 29 #define SNAPPERD_CONTEXTS 30 #define OPENRC_CONTEXTS 31 #define NEL 32 /* Part of one-time lazy init */ static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static void init_selinux_config(void); /* New layout is relative to SELINUXDIR/policytype. */ static char *file_paths[NEL]; #define L1(l) L2(l) #define L2(l)str##l static const union file_path_suffixes_data { struct { #define S_(n, s) char L1(__LINE__)[sizeof(s)]; #include "file_path_suffixes.h" #undef S_ }; char str[0]; } file_path_suffixes_data = { { #define S_(n, s) s, #include "file_path_suffixes.h" #undef S_ } }; static const uint16_t file_path_suffixes_idx[NEL] = { #define S_(n, s) [n] = offsetof(union file_path_suffixes_data, L1(__LINE__)), #include "file_path_suffixes.h" #undef S_ }; #undef L1 #undef L2 int selinux_getenforcemode(int *enforce) { int ret = -1; FILE *cfg = fopen(SELINUXCONFIG, "re"); if (cfg) { char *buf; char *tag; int len = sizeof(SELINUXTAG) - 1; buf = malloc(selinux_page_size); if (!buf) { fclose(cfg); return -1; } while (fgets_unlocked(buf, selinux_page_size, cfg)) { if (strncmp(buf, SELINUXTAG, len)) continue; tag = buf+len; while (isspace(*tag)) tag++; if (!strncasecmp (tag, "enforcing", sizeof("enforcing") - 1)) { *enforce = 1; ret = 0; break; } else if (!strncasecmp (tag, "permissive", sizeof("permissive") - 1)) { *enforce = 0; ret = 0; break; } else if (!strncasecmp (tag, "disabled", sizeof("disabled") - 1)) { *enforce = -1; ret = 0; break; } } fclose(cfg); free(buf); } return ret; } static char *selinux_policytype; int selinux_getpolicytype(char **type) { __selinux_once(once, init_selinux_config); if (!selinux_policytype) return -1; *type = strdup(selinux_policytype); return *type ? 0 : -1; } static int setpolicytype(const char *type) { free(selinux_policytype); selinux_policytype = strdup(type); return selinux_policytype ? 0 : -1; } static char *selinux_policyroot = NULL; static const char *selinux_rootpath = SELINUXDIR; static void init_selinux_config(void) { int i, *intptr; size_t line_len; ssize_t len; char *line_buf = NULL, *buf_p, *value, *type = NULL, *end; FILE *fp; if (selinux_policyroot) return; fp = fopen(SELINUXCONFIG, "re"); if (fp) { __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while ((len = getline(&line_buf, &line_len, fp)) > 0) { if (line_buf[len - 1] == '\n') line_buf[len - 1] = 0; buf_p = line_buf; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; if (*buf_p == '#' || *buf_p == 0) continue; if (!strncasecmp(buf_p, SELINUXTYPETAG, sizeof(SELINUXTYPETAG) - 1)) { buf_p += sizeof(SELINUXTYPETAG) - 1; while (isspace(*buf_p)) buf_p++; type = strdup(buf_p); if (!type) { free(line_buf); fclose(fp); return; } end = type + strlen(type) - 1; while ((end > type) && (isspace(*end) || iscntrl(*end))) { *end = 0; end--; } if (setpolicytype(type) != 0) { free(type); free(line_buf); fclose(fp); return; } free(type); continue; } else if (!strncmp(buf_p, REQUIRESEUSERS, sizeof(REQUIRESEUSERS) - 1)) { value = buf_p + sizeof(REQUIRESEUSERS) - 1; while (isspace(*value)) value++; intptr = &require_seusers; } else { continue; } if (isdigit(*value)) *intptr = atoi(value); else if (strncasecmp(value, "true", sizeof("true") - 1)) *intptr = 1; else if (strncasecmp (value, "false", sizeof("false") - 1)) *intptr = 0; } free(line_buf); fclose(fp); } if (!selinux_policytype && setpolicytype(SELINUXDEFAULT) != 0) return; if (asprintf(&selinux_policyroot, "%s%s", SELINUXDIR, selinux_policytype) == -1) return; for (i = 0; i < NEL; i++) if (asprintf(&file_paths[i], "%s%s", selinux_policyroot, file_path_suffixes_data.str + file_path_suffixes_idx[i]) == -1) return; } static void fini_selinux_policyroot(void) __attribute__ ((destructor)); static void fini_selinux_policyroot(void) { int i; free(selinux_policyroot); selinux_policyroot = NULL; for (i = 0; i < NEL; i++) { free(file_paths[i]); file_paths[i] = NULL; } free(selinux_policytype); selinux_policytype = NULL; } void selinux_reset_config(void) { fini_selinux_policyroot(); init_selinux_config(); } static const char *get_path(int idx) { __selinux_once(once, init_selinux_config); return file_paths[idx]; } const char *selinux_default_type_path(void) { return get_path(DEFAULT_TYPE); } const char *selinux_policy_root(void) { __selinux_once(once, init_selinux_config); return selinux_policyroot; } int selinux_set_policy_root(const char *path) { int i; char *policy_type = strrchr(path, '/'); if (!policy_type) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } policy_type++; fini_selinux_policyroot(); selinux_policyroot = strdup(path); if (! selinux_policyroot) return -1; if (setpolicytype(policy_type) != 0) return -1; for (i = 0; i < NEL; i++) if (asprintf(&file_paths[i], "%s%s", selinux_policyroot, file_path_suffixes_data.str + file_path_suffixes_idx[i]) == -1) return -1; return 0; } const char *selinux_path(void) { return selinux_rootpath; } const char *selinux_default_context_path(void) { return get_path(DEFAULT_CONTEXTS); } const char *selinux_securetty_types_path(void) { return get_path(SECURETTY_TYPES); } const char *selinux_failsafe_context_path(void) { return get_path(FAILSAFE_CONTEXT); } const char *selinux_removable_context_path(void) { return get_path(REMOVABLE_CONTEXT); } const char *selinux_binary_policy_path(void) { return get_path(BINPOLICY); } const char *selinux_current_policy_path(void) { int rc = 0; int vers = 0; static char policy_path[PATH_MAX]; if (selinux_mnt) { snprintf(policy_path, sizeof(policy_path), "%s/policy", selinux_mnt); if (access(policy_path, F_OK) == 0 ) { return policy_path; } } vers = security_policyvers(); do { /* Check prior versions to see if old policy is available */ snprintf(policy_path, sizeof(policy_path), "%s.%d", selinux_binary_policy_path(), vers); } while ((rc = access(policy_path, F_OK)) && --vers > 0); if (rc) return NULL; return policy_path; } const char *selinux_file_context_path(void) { return get_path(FILE_CONTEXTS); } const char *selinux_homedir_context_path(void) { return get_path(HOMEDIR_CONTEXTS); } const char *selinux_media_context_path(void) { return get_path(MEDIA_CONTEXTS); } const char *selinux_customizable_types_path(void) { return get_path(CUSTOMIZABLE_TYPES); } const char *selinux_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(CONTEXTS_DIR); } const char *selinux_user_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(USER_CONTEXTS); } /* Deprecated as local policy booleans no longer supported. */ const char *selinux_booleans_path(void) { return get_path(BOOLEANS); } /* Deprecated as no longer supported. */ const char *selinux_users_path(void) { return get_path(USERS_DIR); } const char *selinux_usersconf_path(void) { return get_path(SEUSERS); } const char *selinux_translations_path(void) { return get_path(TRANSLATIONS); } const char *selinux_colors_path(void) { return get_path(COLORS); } const char *selinux_netfilter_context_path(void) { return get_path(NETFILTER_CONTEXTS); } const char *selinux_file_context_homedir_path(void) { return get_path(FILE_CONTEXTS_HOMEDIR); } const char *selinux_file_context_local_path(void) { return get_path(FILE_CONTEXTS_LOCAL); } const char *selinux_x_context_path(void) { return get_path(X_CONTEXTS); } const char *selinux_virtual_domain_context_path(void) { return get_path(VIRTUAL_DOMAIN); } const char *selinux_virtual_image_context_path(void) { return get_path(VIRTUAL_IMAGE); } const char *selinux_lxc_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(LXC_CONTEXTS); } const char *selinux_openrc_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(OPENRC_CONTEXTS); } const char *selinux_openssh_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(OPENSSH_CONTEXTS); } const char *selinux_snapperd_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(SNAPPERD_CONTEXTS); } const char *selinux_systemd_contexts_path(void) { return get_path(SYSTEMD_CONTEXTS); } const char * selinux_booleans_subs_path(void) { return get_path(BOOLEAN_SUBS); } const char * selinux_file_context_subs_path(void) { return get_path(FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS); } const char * selinux_file_context_subs_dist_path(void) { return get_path(FILE_CONTEXT_SUBS_DIST); } const char *selinux_sepgsql_context_path(void) { return get_path(SEPGSQL_CONTEXTS); } libselinux-3.5/src/selinux_internal.c000066400000000000000000000004671437566343300201020ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include "selinux_internal.h" #include #ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY size_t strlcpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t size) { size_t ret = strlen(src); if (size) { size_t len = (ret >= size) ? size - 1 : ret; memcpy(dest, src, len); dest[len] = '\0'; } return ret; } #endif /* HAVE_STRLCPY */ libselinux-3.5/src/selinux_internal.h000066400000000000000000000050071437566343300201020ustar00rootroot00000000000000#ifndef SELINUX_INTERNAL_H_ #define SELINUX_INTERNAL_H_ #include #include extern int require_seusers ; extern int selinux_page_size ; /* Make pthread_once optional */ #pragma weak pthread_once #pragma weak pthread_key_create #pragma weak pthread_key_delete #pragma weak pthread_setspecific /* Call handler iff the first call. */ #define __selinux_once(ONCE_CONTROL, INIT_FUNCTION) \ do { \ if (pthread_once != NULL) \ pthread_once (&(ONCE_CONTROL), (INIT_FUNCTION)); \ else if ((ONCE_CONTROL) == PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT) { \ INIT_FUNCTION (); \ (ONCE_CONTROL) = 2; \ } \ } while (0) /* Pthread key macros */ #define __selinux_key_create(KEY, DESTRUCTOR) \ (pthread_key_create != NULL ? pthread_key_create(KEY, DESTRUCTOR) : -1) #define __selinux_key_delete(KEY) \ do { \ if (pthread_key_delete != NULL) \ pthread_key_delete(KEY); \ } while (0) #define __selinux_setspecific(KEY, VALUE) \ do { \ if (pthread_setspecific != NULL) \ pthread_setspecific(KEY, VALUE); \ } while (0) /* selabel_lookup() is only thread safe if we're compiled with pthreads */ #pragma weak pthread_mutex_init #pragma weak pthread_mutex_destroy #pragma weak pthread_mutex_lock #pragma weak pthread_mutex_unlock #define __pthread_mutex_init(LOCK, ATTR) \ do { \ if (pthread_mutex_init != NULL) \ pthread_mutex_init(LOCK, ATTR); \ } while (0) #define __pthread_mutex_destroy(LOCK) \ do { \ if (pthread_mutex_destroy != NULL) \ pthread_mutex_destroy(LOCK); \ } while (0) #define __pthread_mutex_lock(LOCK) \ do { \ if (pthread_mutex_lock != NULL) \ pthread_mutex_lock(LOCK); \ } while (0) #define __pthread_mutex_unlock(LOCK) \ do { \ if (pthread_mutex_unlock != NULL) \ pthread_mutex_unlock(LOCK); \ } while (0) #pragma weak pthread_create #pragma weak pthread_join #pragma weak pthread_cond_init #pragma weak pthread_cond_signal #pragma weak pthread_cond_destroy #pragma weak pthread_cond_wait /* check if all functions needed to do parallel operations are available */ #define __pthread_supported ( \ pthread_create && \ pthread_join && \ pthread_cond_init && \ pthread_cond_destroy && \ pthread_cond_signal && \ pthread_cond_wait \ ) #define SELINUXDIR "/etc/selinux/" #define SELINUXCONFIG SELINUXDIR "config" extern int has_selinux_config ; #ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY size_t strlcpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t size); #endif #endif /* SELINUX_INTERNAL_H_ */ libselinux-3.5/src/selinux_netlink.h000066400000000000000000000011541437566343300177310ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * Netlink event notifications for SELinux. * * Author: James Morris */ #ifndef _LINUX_SELINUX_NETLINK_H #define _LINUX_SELINUX_NETLINK_H /* Message types. */ #define SELNL_MSG_BASE 0x10 enum { SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE = SELNL_MSG_BASE, SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD, SELNL_MSG_MAX }; /* Multicast groups */ #define SELNL_GRP_NONE 0x00000000 #define SELNL_GRP_AVC 0x00000001 /* AVC notifications */ #define SELNL_GRP_ALL 0xffffffff /* Message structures */ struct selnl_msg_setenforce { int32_t val; }; struct selnl_msg_policyload { uint32_t seqno; }; #endif /* _LINUX_SELINUX_NETLINK_H */ libselinux-3.5/src/selinux_restorecon.c000066400000000000000000001113351437566343300204460ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * The majority of this code is from Android's * external/libselinux/src/android.c and upstream * selinux/policycoreutils/setfiles/restore.c * * See selinux_restorecon(3) for details. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "callbacks.h" #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "label_file.h" #include "sha1.h" #define STAR_COUNT 1024 static struct selabel_handle *fc_sehandle = NULL; static bool selabel_no_digest; static char *rootpath = NULL; static size_t rootpathlen; /* Information on excluded fs and directories. */ struct edir { char *directory; size_t size; /* True if excluded by selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list(3). */ bool caller_excluded; }; #define CALLER_EXCLUDED true static bool ignore_mounts; static uint64_t exclude_non_seclabel_mounts(void); static int exclude_count = 0; static struct edir *exclude_lst = NULL; static uint64_t fc_count = 0; /* Number of files processed so far */ static uint64_t efile_count; /* Estimated total number of files */ static pthread_mutex_t progress_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; /* Store information on directories with xattr's. */ static struct dir_xattr *dir_xattr_list; static struct dir_xattr *dir_xattr_last; /* Number of errors ignored during the file tree walk. */ static long unsigned skipped_errors; /* restorecon_flags for passing to restorecon_sb() */ struct rest_flags { bool nochange; bool verbose; bool progress; bool mass_relabel; bool set_specctx; bool add_assoc; bool recurse; bool userealpath; bool set_xdev; bool abort_on_error; bool syslog_changes; bool log_matches; bool ignore_noent; bool warnonnomatch; bool conflicterror; bool count_errors; }; static void restorecon_init(void) { struct selabel_handle *sehandle = NULL; if (!fc_sehandle) { sehandle = selinux_restorecon_default_handle(); selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle(sehandle); } efile_count = 0; if (!ignore_mounts) efile_count = exclude_non_seclabel_mounts(); } static pthread_once_t fc_once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; /* * Manage excluded directories: * remove_exclude() - This removes any conflicting entries as there could be * a case where a non-seclabel fs is mounted on /foo and * then a seclabel fs is mounted on top of it. * However if an entry has been added via * selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list(3) do not remove. * * add_exclude() - Add a directory/fs to be excluded from labeling. If it * has already been added, then ignore. * * check_excluded() - Check if directory/fs is to be excluded when relabeling. * * file_system_count() - Calculates the number of files to be processed. * The count is only used if SELINUX_RESTORECON_PROGRESS * is set and a mass relabel is requested. * * exclude_non_seclabel_mounts() - Reads /proc/mounts to determine what * non-seclabel mounts to exclude from * relabeling. restorecon_init() will not * call this function if the * SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_MOUNTS * flag is set. * Setting SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_MOUNTS * is useful where there is a non-seclabel fs * mounted on /foo and then a seclabel fs is * mounted on a directory below this. */ static void remove_exclude(const char *directory) { int i; for (i = 0; i < exclude_count; i++) { if (strcmp(directory, exclude_lst[i].directory) == 0 && !exclude_lst[i].caller_excluded) { free(exclude_lst[i].directory); if (i != exclude_count - 1) exclude_lst[i] = exclude_lst[exclude_count - 1]; exclude_count--; return; } } } static int add_exclude(const char *directory, bool who) { struct edir *tmp_list, *current; size_t len = 0; int i; /* Check if already present. */ for (i = 0; i < exclude_count; i++) { if (strcmp(directory, exclude_lst[i].directory) == 0) return 0; } if (directory == NULL || directory[0] != '/') { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Full path required for exclude: %s.\n", directory); errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (exclude_count >= INT_MAX - 1) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Too many directory excludes: %d.\n", exclude_count); errno = EOVERFLOW; return -1; } tmp_list = realloc(exclude_lst, sizeof(struct edir) * (exclude_count + 1)); if (!tmp_list) goto oom; exclude_lst = tmp_list; len = strlen(directory); while (len > 1 && directory[len - 1] == '/') len--; current = (exclude_lst + exclude_count); current->directory = strndup(directory, len); if (!current->directory) goto oom; current->size = len; current->caller_excluded = who; exclude_count++; return 0; oom: selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Out of memory\n", __func__); return -1; } static int check_excluded(const char *file) { int i; for (i = 0; i < exclude_count; i++) { if (strncmp(file, exclude_lst[i].directory, exclude_lst[i].size) == 0) { if (file[exclude_lst[i].size] == 0 || file[exclude_lst[i].size] == '/') return 1; } } return 0; } static uint64_t file_system_count(const char *name) { struct statvfs statvfs_buf; uint64_t nfile = 0; memset(&statvfs_buf, 0, sizeof(statvfs_buf)); if (!statvfs(name, &statvfs_buf)) nfile = statvfs_buf.f_files - statvfs_buf.f_ffree; return nfile; } /* * This is called once when selinux_restorecon() is first called. * Searches /proc/mounts for all file systems that do not support extended * attributes and adds them to the exclude directory table. File systems * that support security labels have the seclabel option, return * approximate total file count. */ static uint64_t exclude_non_seclabel_mounts(void) { struct utsname uts; FILE *fp; size_t len; int index = 0, found = 0; uint64_t nfile = 0; char *mount_info[4]; char *buf = NULL, *item; /* Check to see if the kernel supports seclabel */ if (uname(&uts) == 0 && strverscmp(uts.release, "2.6.30") < 0) return 0; if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0) return 0; fp = fopen("/proc/mounts", "re"); if (!fp) return 0; while (getline(&buf, &len, fp) != -1) { found = 0; index = 0; item = strtok(buf, " "); while (item != NULL) { mount_info[index] = item; index++; if (index == 4) break; item = strtok(NULL, " "); } if (index < 4) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "/proc/mounts record \"%s\" has incorrect format.\n", buf); continue; } /* Remove pre-existing entry */ remove_exclude(mount_info[1]); item = strtok(mount_info[3], ","); while (item != NULL) { if (strcmp(item, "seclabel") == 0) { found = 1; nfile += file_system_count(mount_info[1]); break; } item = strtok(NULL, ","); } /* Exclude mount points without the seclabel option */ if (!found) { if (add_exclude(mount_info[1], !CALLER_EXCLUDED) && errno == ENOMEM) assert(0); } } free(buf); fclose(fp); /* return estimated #Files + 5% for directories and hard links */ return nfile * 1.05; } /* Called by selinux_restorecon_xattr(3) to build a linked list of entries. */ static int add_xattr_entry(const char *directory, bool delete_nonmatch, bool delete_all) { char *sha1_buf = NULL; size_t i, digest_len = 0; int rc; enum digest_result digest_result; bool match; struct dir_xattr *new_entry; uint8_t *xattr_digest = NULL; uint8_t *calculated_digest = NULL; if (!directory) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } match = selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches(fc_sehandle, directory, &calculated_digest, &xattr_digest, &digest_len); if (!xattr_digest || !digest_len) { free(calculated_digest); return 1; } /* Convert entry to a hex encoded string. */ sha1_buf = malloc(digest_len * 2 + 1); if (!sha1_buf) { free(xattr_digest); free(calculated_digest); goto oom; } for (i = 0; i < digest_len; i++) sprintf((&sha1_buf[i * 2]), "%02x", xattr_digest[i]); digest_result = match ? MATCH : NOMATCH; if ((delete_nonmatch && !match) || delete_all) { digest_result = match ? DELETED_MATCH : DELETED_NOMATCH; rc = removexattr(directory, RESTORECON_PARTIAL_MATCH_DIGEST); if (rc) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Error: %m removing xattr \"%s\" from: %s\n", RESTORECON_PARTIAL_MATCH_DIGEST, directory); digest_result = ERROR; } } free(xattr_digest); free(calculated_digest); /* Now add entries to link list. */ new_entry = malloc(sizeof(struct dir_xattr)); if (!new_entry) { free(sha1_buf); goto oom; } new_entry->next = NULL; new_entry->directory = strdup(directory); if (!new_entry->directory) { free(new_entry); free(sha1_buf); goto oom; } new_entry->digest = strdup(sha1_buf); if (!new_entry->digest) { free(new_entry->directory); free(new_entry); free(sha1_buf); goto oom; } new_entry->result = digest_result; if (!dir_xattr_list) { dir_xattr_list = new_entry; dir_xattr_last = new_entry; } else { dir_xattr_last->next = new_entry; dir_xattr_last = new_entry; } free(sha1_buf); return 0; oom: selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Out of memory\n", __func__); return -1; } /* * Support filespec services filespec_add(), filespec_eval() and * filespec_destroy(). * * selinux_restorecon(3) uses filespec services when the * SELINUX_RESTORECON_ADD_ASSOC flag is set for adding associations between * an inode and a specification. */ /* * The hash table of associations, hashed by inode number. Chaining is used * for collisions, with elements ordered by inode number in each bucket. * Each hash bucket has a dummy header. */ #define HASH_BITS 16 #define HASH_BUCKETS (1 << HASH_BITS) #define HASH_MASK (HASH_BUCKETS-1) /* * An association between an inode and a context. */ typedef struct file_spec { ino_t ino; /* inode number */ char *con; /* matched context */ char *file; /* full pathname */ struct file_spec *next; /* next association in hash bucket chain */ } file_spec_t; static file_spec_t *fl_head; static pthread_mutex_t fl_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; /* * Try to add an association between an inode and a context. If there is a * different context that matched the inode, then use the first context * that matched. */ static int filespec_add(ino_t ino, const char *con, const char *file, const struct rest_flags *flags) { file_spec_t *prevfl, *fl; uint32_t h; int ret; struct stat64 sb; __pthread_mutex_lock(&fl_mutex); if (!fl_head) { fl_head = calloc(HASH_BUCKETS, sizeof(file_spec_t)); if (!fl_head) goto oom; } h = (ino + (ino >> HASH_BITS)) & HASH_MASK; for (prevfl = &fl_head[h], fl = fl_head[h].next; fl; prevfl = fl, fl = fl->next) { if (ino == fl->ino) { ret = lstat64(fl->file, &sb); if (ret < 0 || sb.st_ino != ino) { freecon(fl->con); free(fl->file); fl->file = strdup(file); if (!fl->file) goto oom; fl->con = strdup(con); if (!fl->con) goto oom; goto unlock_1; } if (strcmp(fl->con, con) == 0) goto unlock_1; selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "conflicting specifications for %s and %s, using %s.\n", file, fl->file, fl->con); free(fl->file); fl->file = strdup(file); if (!fl->file) goto oom; __pthread_mutex_unlock(&fl_mutex); if (flags->conflicterror) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "treating conflicting specifications as an error.\n"); return -1; } return 1; } if (ino > fl->ino) break; } fl = malloc(sizeof(file_spec_t)); if (!fl) goto oom; fl->ino = ino; fl->con = strdup(con); if (!fl->con) goto oom_freefl; fl->file = strdup(file); if (!fl->file) goto oom_freeflcon; fl->next = prevfl->next; prevfl->next = fl; __pthread_mutex_unlock(&fl_mutex); return 0; oom_freeflcon: free(fl->con); oom_freefl: free(fl); oom: __pthread_mutex_unlock(&fl_mutex); selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Out of memory\n", __func__); return -1; unlock_1: __pthread_mutex_unlock(&fl_mutex); return 1; } /* * Evaluate the association hash table distribution. */ #ifdef DEBUG static void filespec_eval(void) { file_spec_t *fl; uint32_t h; size_t used, nel, len, longest; if (!fl_head) return; used = 0; longest = 0; nel = 0; for (h = 0; h < HASH_BUCKETS; h++) { len = 0; for (fl = fl_head[h].next; fl; fl = fl->next) len++; if (len) used++; if (len > longest) longest = len; nel += len; } selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "filespec hash table stats: %zu elements, %zu/%zu buckets used, longest chain length %zu\n", nel, used, HASH_BUCKETS, longest); } #else static void filespec_eval(void) { } #endif /* * Destroy the association hash table. */ static void filespec_destroy(void) { file_spec_t *fl, *tmp; uint32_t h; if (!fl_head) return; for (h = 0; h < HASH_BUCKETS; h++) { fl = fl_head[h].next; while (fl) { tmp = fl; fl = fl->next; freecon(tmp->con); free(tmp->file); free(tmp); } fl_head[h].next = NULL; } free(fl_head); fl_head = NULL; } /* * Called if SELINUX_RESTORECON_SET_SPECFILE_CTX is not set to check if * the type components differ, updating newtypecon if so. */ static int compare_types(const char *curcon, const char *newcon, char **newtypecon) { int types_differ = 0; context_t cona; context_t conb; int rc = 0; cona = context_new(curcon); if (!cona) { rc = -1; goto out; } conb = context_new(newcon); if (!conb) { context_free(cona); rc = -1; goto out; } types_differ = strcmp(context_type_get(cona), context_type_get(conb)); if (types_differ) { rc |= context_user_set(conb, context_user_get(cona)); rc |= context_role_set(conb, context_role_get(cona)); rc |= context_range_set(conb, context_range_get(cona)); if (!rc) { *newtypecon = strdup(context_str(conb)); if (!*newtypecon) { rc = -1; goto err; } } } err: context_free(cona); context_free(conb); out: return rc; } static int restorecon_sb(const char *pathname, const struct stat *sb, const struct rest_flags *flags, bool first) { char *newcon = NULL; char *curcon = NULL; char *newtypecon = NULL; int rc; const char *lookup_path = pathname; if (rootpath) { if (strncmp(rootpath, lookup_path, rootpathlen) != 0) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s is not located in alt_rootpath %s\n", lookup_path, rootpath); return -1; } lookup_path += rootpathlen; } if (rootpath != NULL && lookup_path[0] == '\0') /* this is actually the root dir of the alt root. */ rc = selabel_lookup_raw(fc_sehandle, &newcon, "/", sb->st_mode & S_IFMT); else rc = selabel_lookup_raw(fc_sehandle, &newcon, lookup_path, sb->st_mode & S_IFMT); if (rc < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) { if (flags->warnonnomatch && first) selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "Warning no default label for %s\n", lookup_path); return 0; /* no match, but not an error */ } return -1; } if (flags->progress) { __pthread_mutex_lock(&progress_mutex); fc_count++; if (fc_count % STAR_COUNT == 0) { if (flags->mass_relabel && efile_count > 0) { float pc = (fc_count < efile_count) ? (100.0 * fc_count / efile_count) : 100; fprintf(stdout, "\r%-.1f%%", (double)pc); } else { fprintf(stdout, "\r%" PRIu64 "k", fc_count / STAR_COUNT); } fflush(stdout); } __pthread_mutex_unlock(&progress_mutex); } if (flags->add_assoc) { rc = filespec_add(sb->st_ino, newcon, pathname, flags); if (rc < 0) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "filespec_add error: %s\n", pathname); freecon(newcon); return -1; } if (rc > 0) { /* Already an association and it took precedence. */ freecon(newcon); return 0; } } if (flags->log_matches) selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%s matched by %s\n", pathname, newcon); if (lgetfilecon_raw(pathname, &curcon) < 0) { if (errno != ENODATA) goto err; curcon = NULL; } if (curcon == NULL || strcmp(curcon, newcon) != 0) { bool updated = false; if (!flags->set_specctx && curcon && (is_context_customizable(curcon) > 0)) { if (flags->verbose) { selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%s not reset as customized by admin to %s\n", pathname, curcon); } goto out; } if (!flags->set_specctx && curcon) { /* If types different then update newcon. */ rc = compare_types(curcon, newcon, &newtypecon); if (rc) goto err; if (newtypecon) { freecon(newcon); newcon = newtypecon; } else { goto out; } } if (!flags->nochange) { if (lsetfilecon(pathname, newcon) < 0) goto err; updated = true; } if (flags->verbose) selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "%s %s from %s to %s\n", updated ? "Relabeled" : "Would relabel", pathname, curcon ? curcon : "", newcon); if (flags->syslog_changes && !flags->nochange) { if (curcon) syslog(LOG_INFO, "relabeling %s from %s to %s\n", pathname, curcon, newcon); else syslog(LOG_INFO, "labeling %s to %s\n", pathname, newcon); } } out: rc = 0; out1: freecon(curcon); freecon(newcon); return rc; err: selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Could not set context for %s: %m\n", pathname); rc = -1; goto out1; } struct dir_hash_node { char *path; uint8_t digest[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; struct dir_hash_node *next; }; /* * Returns true if the digest of all partial matched contexts is the same as * the one saved by setxattr. Otherwise returns false and constructs a * dir_hash_node with the newly calculated digest. */ static bool check_context_match_for_dir(const char *pathname, struct dir_hash_node **new_node, int error) { bool status; size_t digest_len = 0; uint8_t *read_digest = NULL; uint8_t *calculated_digest = NULL; if (!new_node) return false; *new_node = NULL; /* status = true if digests match, false otherwise. */ status = selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches(fc_sehandle, pathname, &calculated_digest, &read_digest, &digest_len); if (status) goto free; /* Save digest of all matched contexts for the current directory. */ if (!error && calculated_digest) { *new_node = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dir_hash_node)); if (!*new_node) goto oom; (*new_node)->path = strdup(pathname); if (!(*new_node)->path) { free(*new_node); *new_node = NULL; goto oom; } memcpy((*new_node)->digest, calculated_digest, digest_len); (*new_node)->next = NULL; } free: free(calculated_digest); free(read_digest); return status; oom: selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Out of memory\n", __func__); goto free; } struct rest_state { struct rest_flags flags; dev_t dev_num; struct statfs sfsb; bool ignore_digest; bool setrestorecondigest; bool parallel; FTS *fts; FTSENT *ftsent_first; struct dir_hash_node *head, *current; bool abort; int error; long unsigned skipped_errors; int saved_errno; pthread_mutex_t mutex; }; static void *selinux_restorecon_thread(void *arg) { struct rest_state *state = arg; FTS *fts = state->fts; FTSENT *ftsent; int error; char ent_path[PATH_MAX]; struct stat ent_st; bool first = false; if (state->parallel) pthread_mutex_lock(&state->mutex); if (state->ftsent_first) { ftsent = state->ftsent_first; state->ftsent_first = NULL; first = true; goto loop_body; } while (((void)(errno = 0), ftsent = fts_read(fts)) != NULL) { loop_body: /* If the FTS_XDEV flag is set and the device is different */ if (state->flags.set_xdev && ftsent->fts_statp->st_dev != state->dev_num) continue; switch (ftsent->fts_info) { case FTS_DC: selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Directory cycle on %s.\n", ftsent->fts_path); errno = ELOOP; state->error = -1; state->abort = true; goto finish; case FTS_DP: continue; case FTS_DNR: error = errno; errno = ftsent->fts_errno; selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Could not read %s: %m.\n", ftsent->fts_path); errno = error; fts_set(fts, ftsent, FTS_SKIP); continue; case FTS_NS: error = errno; errno = ftsent->fts_errno; selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Could not stat %s: %m.\n", ftsent->fts_path); errno = error; fts_set(fts, ftsent, FTS_SKIP); continue; case FTS_ERR: error = errno; errno = ftsent->fts_errno; selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Error on %s: %m.\n", ftsent->fts_path); errno = error; fts_set(fts, ftsent, FTS_SKIP); continue; case FTS_D: if (state->sfsb.f_type == SYSFS_MAGIC && !selabel_partial_match(fc_sehandle, ftsent->fts_path)) { fts_set(fts, ftsent, FTS_SKIP); continue; } if (check_excluded(ftsent->fts_path)) { fts_set(fts, ftsent, FTS_SKIP); continue; } if (state->setrestorecondigest) { struct dir_hash_node *new_node = NULL; if (check_context_match_for_dir(ftsent->fts_path, &new_node, state->error) && !state->ignore_digest) { selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO, "Skipping restorecon on directory(%s)\n", ftsent->fts_path); fts_set(fts, ftsent, FTS_SKIP); continue; } if (new_node && !state->error) { if (!state->current) { state->current = new_node; state->head = state->current; } else { state->current->next = new_node; state->current = new_node; } } } /* fall through */ default: if (strlcpy(ent_path, ftsent->fts_path, sizeof(ent_path)) >= sizeof(ent_path)) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Path name too long on %s.\n", ftsent->fts_path); errno = ENAMETOOLONG; state->error = -1; state->abort = true; goto finish; } ent_st = *ftsent->fts_statp; if (state->parallel) pthread_mutex_unlock(&state->mutex); error = restorecon_sb(ent_path, &ent_st, &state->flags, first); if (state->parallel) { pthread_mutex_lock(&state->mutex); if (state->abort) goto unlock; } first = false; if (error) { if (state->flags.abort_on_error) { state->error = error; state->abort = true; goto finish; } if (state->flags.count_errors) state->skipped_errors++; else state->error = error; } break; } } finish: if (!state->saved_errno) state->saved_errno = errno; unlock: if (state->parallel) pthread_mutex_unlock(&state->mutex); return NULL; } static int selinux_restorecon_common(const char *pathname_orig, unsigned int restorecon_flags, size_t nthreads) { struct rest_state state; state.flags.nochange = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_NOCHANGE) ? true : false; state.flags.verbose = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_VERBOSE) ? true : false; state.flags.progress = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_PROGRESS) ? true : false; state.flags.mass_relabel = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_MASS_RELABEL) ? true : false; state.flags.recurse = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_RECURSE) ? true : false; state.flags.set_specctx = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_SET_SPECFILE_CTX) ? true : false; state.flags.userealpath = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_REALPATH) ? true : false; state.flags.set_xdev = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_XDEV) ? true : false; state.flags.add_assoc = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_ADD_ASSOC) ? true : false; state.flags.abort_on_error = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_ABORT_ON_ERROR) ? true : false; state.flags.syslog_changes = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_SYSLOG_CHANGES) ? true : false; state.flags.log_matches = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_LOG_MATCHES) ? true : false; state.flags.ignore_noent = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_NOENTRY) ? true : false; state.flags.warnonnomatch = true; state.flags.conflicterror = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_CONFLICT_ERROR) ? true : false; ignore_mounts = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_MOUNTS) ? true : false; state.ignore_digest = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_DIGEST) ? true : false; state.flags.count_errors = (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_COUNT_ERRORS) ? true : false; state.setrestorecondigest = true; state.head = NULL; state.current = NULL; state.abort = false; state.error = 0; state.skipped_errors = 0; state.saved_errno = 0; struct stat sb; char *pathname = NULL, *pathdnamer = NULL, *pathdname, *pathbname; char *paths[2] = { NULL, NULL }; int fts_flags, error; struct dir_hash_node *current = NULL; if (state.flags.verbose && state.flags.progress) state.flags.verbose = false; __selinux_once(fc_once, restorecon_init); if (!fc_sehandle) return -1; /* * If selabel_no_digest = true then no digest has been requested by * an external selabel_open(3) call. */ if (selabel_no_digest || (restorecon_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_SKIP_DIGEST)) state.setrestorecondigest = false; if (!__pthread_supported) { if (nthreads != 1) { nthreads = 1; selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "Threading functionality not available, falling back to 1 thread."); } } else if (nthreads == 0) { long nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN); if (nproc > 0) { nthreads = nproc; } else { nthreads = 1; selinux_log(SELINUX_WARNING, "Unable to detect CPU count, falling back to 1 thread."); } } /* * Convert passed-in pathname to canonical pathname by resolving * realpath of containing dir, then appending last component name. */ if (state.flags.userealpath) { char *basename_cpy = strdup(pathname_orig); if (!basename_cpy) goto realpatherr; pathbname = basename(basename_cpy); if (!strcmp(pathbname, "/") || !strcmp(pathbname, ".") || !strcmp(pathbname, "..")) { pathname = realpath(pathname_orig, NULL); if (!pathname) { free(basename_cpy); /* missing parent directory */ if (state.flags.ignore_noent && errno == ENOENT) { return 0; } goto realpatherr; } } else { char *dirname_cpy = strdup(pathname_orig); if (!dirname_cpy) { free(basename_cpy); goto realpatherr; } pathdname = dirname(dirname_cpy); pathdnamer = realpath(pathdname, NULL); free(dirname_cpy); if (!pathdnamer) { free(basename_cpy); if (state.flags.ignore_noent && errno == ENOENT) { return 0; } goto realpatherr; } if (!strcmp(pathdnamer, "/")) error = asprintf(&pathname, "/%s", pathbname); else error = asprintf(&pathname, "%s/%s", pathdnamer, pathbname); if (error < 0) { free(basename_cpy); goto oom; } } free(basename_cpy); } else { pathname = strdup(pathname_orig); if (!pathname) goto oom; } paths[0] = pathname; if (lstat(pathname, &sb) < 0) { if (state.flags.ignore_noent && errno == ENOENT) { free(pathdnamer); free(pathname); return 0; } else { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "lstat(%s) failed: %m\n", pathname); error = -1; goto cleanup; } } /* Skip digest if not a directory */ if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) state.setrestorecondigest = false; if (!state.flags.recurse) { if (check_excluded(pathname)) { error = 0; goto cleanup; } error = restorecon_sb(pathname, &sb, &state.flags, true); goto cleanup; } /* Obtain fs type */ memset(&state.sfsb, 0, sizeof(state.sfsb)); if (!S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) && statfs(pathname, &state.sfsb) < 0) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "statfs(%s) failed: %m\n", pathname); error = -1; goto cleanup; } /* Skip digest on in-memory filesystems and /sys */ if (state.sfsb.f_type == RAMFS_MAGIC || state.sfsb.f_type == TMPFS_MAGIC || state.sfsb.f_type == SYSFS_MAGIC) state.setrestorecondigest = false; if (state.flags.set_xdev) fts_flags = FTS_PHYSICAL | FTS_NOCHDIR | FTS_XDEV; else fts_flags = FTS_PHYSICAL | FTS_NOCHDIR; state.fts = fts_open(paths, fts_flags, NULL); if (!state.fts) goto fts_err; state.ftsent_first = fts_read(state.fts); if (!state.ftsent_first) goto fts_err; /* * Keep the inode of the first device. This is because the FTS_XDEV * flag tells fts not to descend into directories with different * device numbers, but fts will still give back the actual directory. * By saving the device number of the directory that was passed to * selinux_restorecon() and then skipping all actions on any * directories with a different device number when the FTS_XDEV flag * is set (from http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=124688830500777&w=2). */ state.dev_num = state.ftsent_first->fts_statp->st_dev; if (nthreads == 1) { state.parallel = false; selinux_restorecon_thread(&state); } else { size_t i; pthread_t self = pthread_self(); pthread_t *threads = NULL; pthread_mutex_init(&state.mutex, NULL); threads = calloc(nthreads - 1, sizeof(*threads)); if (!threads) goto oom; state.parallel = true; /* * Start (nthreads - 1) threads - the main thread is going to * take part, too. */ for (i = 0; i < nthreads - 1; i++) { if (pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL, selinux_restorecon_thread, &state)) { /* * If any thread fails to be created, just mark * it as such and let the successfully created * threads do the job. In the worst case the * main thread will do everything, but that's * still better than to give up. */ threads[i] = self; } } /* Let's join in on the fun! */ selinux_restorecon_thread(&state); /* Now wait for all threads to finish. */ for (i = 0; i < nthreads - 1; i++) { /* Skip threads that failed to be created. */ if (pthread_equal(threads[i], self)) continue; pthread_join(threads[i], NULL); } free(threads); pthread_mutex_destroy(&state.mutex); } error = state.error; if (state.saved_errno) goto out; /* * Labeling successful. Write partial match digests for subdirectories. * TODO: Write digest upon FTS_DP if no error occurs in its descents. * Note: we can't ignore errors here that we've masked due to * SELINUX_RESTORECON_COUNT_ERRORS. */ if (state.setrestorecondigest && !state.flags.nochange && !error && state.skipped_errors == 0) { current = state.head; while (current != NULL) { if (setxattr(current->path, RESTORECON_PARTIAL_MATCH_DIGEST, current->digest, SHA1_HASH_SIZE, 0) < 0) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "setxattr failed: %s: %m\n", current->path); } current = current->next; } } skipped_errors = state.skipped_errors; out: if (state.flags.progress && state.flags.mass_relabel) fprintf(stdout, "\r%s 100.0%%\n", pathname); (void) fts_close(state.fts); errno = state.saved_errno; cleanup: if (state.flags.add_assoc) { if (state.flags.verbose) filespec_eval(); filespec_destroy(); } free(pathdnamer); free(pathname); current = state.head; while (current != NULL) { struct dir_hash_node *next = current->next; free(current->path); free(current); current = next; } return error; oom: selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Out of memory\n", __func__); error = -1; goto cleanup; realpatherr: selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "SELinux: Could not get canonical path for %s restorecon: %m.\n", pathname_orig); error = -1; goto cleanup; fts_err: selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "fts error while labeling %s: %m\n", paths[0]); error = -1; goto cleanup; } /* * Public API */ /* selinux_restorecon(3) - Main function that is responsible for labeling */ int selinux_restorecon(const char *pathname_orig, unsigned int restorecon_flags) { return selinux_restorecon_common(pathname_orig, restorecon_flags, 1); } /* selinux_restorecon_parallel(3) - Parallel version of selinux_restorecon(3) */ int selinux_restorecon_parallel(const char *pathname_orig, unsigned int restorecon_flags, size_t nthreads) { return selinux_restorecon_common(pathname_orig, restorecon_flags, nthreads); } /* selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle(3) is called to set the global fc handle */ void selinux_restorecon_set_sehandle(struct selabel_handle *hndl) { char **specfiles; unsigned char *fc_digest; size_t num_specfiles, fc_digest_len; fc_sehandle = hndl; if (!fc_sehandle) return; /* Check if digest requested in selabel_open(3), if so use it. */ if (selabel_digest(fc_sehandle, &fc_digest, &fc_digest_len, &specfiles, &num_specfiles) < 0) selabel_no_digest = true; else selabel_no_digest = false; } /* * selinux_restorecon_default_handle(3) is called to set the global restorecon * handle by a process if the default params are required. */ struct selabel_handle *selinux_restorecon_default_handle(void) { struct selabel_handle *sehandle; struct selinux_opt fc_opts[] = { { SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST, (char *)1 } }; sehandle = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, fc_opts, 1); if (!sehandle) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "Error obtaining file context handle: %m\n"); return NULL; } selabel_no_digest = false; return sehandle; } /* * selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list(3) is called to add additional entries * to be excluded from labeling checks. */ void selinux_restorecon_set_exclude_list(const char **exclude_list) { int i; struct stat sb; for (i = 0; exclude_list[i]; i++) { if (lstat(exclude_list[i], &sb) < 0 && errno != EACCES) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "lstat error on exclude path \"%s\", %m - ignoring.\n", exclude_list[i]); break; } if (add_exclude(exclude_list[i], CALLER_EXCLUDED) && errno == ENOMEM) assert(0); } } /* selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath(3) sets an alternate rootpath. */ int selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath(const char *alt_rootpath) { size_t len; /* This should be NULL on first use */ if (rootpath) free(rootpath); rootpath = strdup(alt_rootpath); if (!rootpath) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "%s: Out of memory\n", __func__); return -1; } /* trim trailing /, if present */ len = strlen(rootpath); while (len && (rootpath[len - 1] == '/')) rootpath[--len] = '\0'; rootpathlen = len; return 0; } /* selinux_restorecon_xattr(3) * Find RESTORECON_PARTIAL_MATCH_DIGEST entries. */ int selinux_restorecon_xattr(const char *pathname, unsigned int xattr_flags, struct dir_xattr ***xattr_list) { bool recurse = (xattr_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_RECURSE) ? true : false; bool delete_nonmatch = (xattr_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_DELETE_NONMATCH_DIGESTS) ? true : false; bool delete_all = (xattr_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_DELETE_ALL_DIGESTS) ? true : false; ignore_mounts = (xattr_flags & SELINUX_RESTORECON_XATTR_IGNORE_MOUNTS) ? true : false; int rc, fts_flags; struct stat sb; struct statfs sfsb; struct dir_xattr *current, *next; FTS *fts; FTSENT *ftsent; char *paths[2] = { NULL, NULL }; __selinux_once(fc_once, restorecon_init); if (!fc_sehandle) return -1; if (lstat(pathname, &sb) < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "lstat(%s) failed: %m\n", pathname); return -1; } if (!recurse) { if (statfs(pathname, &sfsb) == 0) { if (sfsb.f_type == RAMFS_MAGIC || sfsb.f_type == TMPFS_MAGIC) return 0; } if (check_excluded(pathname)) return 0; rc = add_xattr_entry(pathname, delete_nonmatch, delete_all); if (!rc && dir_xattr_list) *xattr_list = &dir_xattr_list; else if (rc == -1) return rc; return 0; } paths[0] = (char *)pathname; fts_flags = FTS_PHYSICAL | FTS_NOCHDIR; fts = fts_open(paths, fts_flags, NULL); if (!fts) { selinux_log(SELINUX_ERROR, "fts error on %s: %m\n", paths[0]); return -1; } while ((ftsent = fts_read(fts)) != NULL) { switch (ftsent->fts_info) { case FTS_DP: continue; case FTS_D: if (statfs(ftsent->fts_path, &sfsb) == 0) { if (sfsb.f_type == RAMFS_MAGIC || sfsb.f_type == TMPFS_MAGIC) continue; } if (check_excluded(ftsent->fts_path)) { fts_set(fts, ftsent, FTS_SKIP); continue; } rc = add_xattr_entry(ftsent->fts_path, delete_nonmatch, delete_all); if (rc == 1) continue; else if (rc == -1) goto cleanup; break; default: break; } } if (dir_xattr_list) *xattr_list = &dir_xattr_list; (void) fts_close(fts); return 0; cleanup: rc = errno; (void) fts_close(fts); errno = rc; if (dir_xattr_list) { /* Free any used memory */ current = dir_xattr_list; while (current) { next = current->next; free(current->directory); free(current->digest); free(current); current = next; } } return -1; } long unsigned selinux_restorecon_get_skipped_errors(void) { return skipped_errors; } libselinux-3.5/src/selinuxswig.i000066400000000000000000000031101437566343300170720ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Authors: Dan Walsh * James Athey */ %module selinux %{ #include "../include/selinux/avc.h" #include "../include/selinux/context.h" #include "../include/selinux/get_context_list.h" #include "../include/selinux/get_default_type.h" #include "../include/selinux/label.h" #include "../include/selinux/restorecon.h" #include "../include/selinux/selinux.h" %} %apply int *OUTPUT { int *enforce }; %apply int *OUTPUT { size_t * }; %typedef unsigned mode_t; %typedef unsigned pid_t; %typemap(in, numinputs=0) (char ***names, int *len) (char **temp1=NULL, int temp2) { $1 = &temp1; $2 = &temp2; } %typemap(freearg) (char ***names, int *len) { int i; if (*$1) { for (i = 0; i < *$2; i++) { free((*$1)[i]); } free(*$1); } } %typemap(in, numinputs=0) (char ***) (char **temp=NULL) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(freearg) (char ***) { if (*$1) freeconary(*$1); } /* Ignore functions that don't make sense when wrapped */ %ignore freecon; %ignore freeconary; /* Ignore functions that take a function pointer as an argument */ %ignore set_matchpathcon_printf; %ignore set_matchpathcon_invalidcon; %ignore set_matchpathcon_canoncon; %ignore avc_add_callback; /* Ignore netlink stuff for now */ %ignore avc_netlink_acquire_fd; %ignore avc_netlink_release_fd; %ignore avc_netlink_check_nb; %include "../include/selinux/avc.h" %include "../include/selinux/context.h" %include "../include/selinux/get_context_list.h" %include "../include/selinux/get_default_type.h" %include "../include/selinux/label.h" %include "../include/selinux/restorecon.h" %include "../include/selinux/selinux.h" libselinux-3.5/src/selinuxswig_python.i000066400000000000000000000077641437566343300205160ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Author: James Athey */ /* Never build rpm_execcon interface */ #ifndef DISABLE_RPM #define DISABLE_RPM #endif %module selinux %{ #include "selinux/selinux.h" %} %pythoncode %{ import shutil import os DISABLED = -1 PERMISSIVE = 0 ENFORCING = 1 def restorecon(path, recursive=False, verbose=False, force=False, nthreads=1): """ Restore SELinux context on a given path Arguments: path -- The pathname for the file or directory to be relabeled. Keyword arguments: recursive -- Change files and directories file labels recursively (default False) verbose -- Show changes in file labels (default False) force -- Force reset of context to match file_context for customizable files, and the default file context, changing the user, role, range portion as well as the type (default False) nthreads -- The number of threads to use during relabeling, or 0 to use as many threads as there are online CPU cores (default 1) """ restorecon_flags = SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_DIGEST | SELINUX_RESTORECON_REALPATH if recursive: restorecon_flags |= SELINUX_RESTORECON_RECURSE if verbose: restorecon_flags |= SELINUX_RESTORECON_VERBOSE if force: restorecon_flags |= SELINUX_RESTORECON_SET_SPECFILE_CTX selinux_restorecon_parallel(os.path.expanduser(path), restorecon_flags, nthreads) def chcon(path, context, recursive=False): """ Set the SELinux context on a given path """ lsetfilecon(path, context) if recursive: for root, dirs, files in os.walk(path): for name in files + dirs: lsetfilecon(os.path.join(root, name), context) def copytree(src, dest): """ An SELinux-friendly shutil.copytree method """ shutil.copytree(src, dest) restorecon(dest, recursive=True) def install(src, dest): """ An SELinux-friendly shutil.move method """ shutil.move(src, dest) restorecon(dest, recursive=True) %} /* security_get_boolean_names() typemap */ %typemap(argout) (char ***names, int *len) { PyObject* list = PyList_New(*$2); int i; for (i = 0; i < *$2; i++) { PyList_SetItem(list, i, PyString_FromString((*$1)[i])); } $result = SWIG_Python_AppendOutput($result, list); } /* return a sid along with the result */ %typemap(argout) (security_id_t * sid) { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_NewPointerObj(*$1, $descriptor(security_id_t), 0)); } else { Py_INCREF(Py_None); %append_output(Py_None); } } %typemap(in,numinputs=0) security_id_t *(security_id_t temp) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(in, numinputs=0) void *(char *temp=NULL) { $1 = temp; } /* Makes security_compute_user() return a Python list of contexts */ %typemap(argout) (char ***con) { PyObject* plist; int i, len = 0; if (*$1) { while((*$1)[len]) len++; plist = PyList_New(len); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { PyList_SetItem(plist, i, PyString_FromString((*$1)[i])); } } else { plist = PyList_New(0); } $result = SWIG_Python_AppendOutput($result, plist); } /* Makes functions in get_context_list.h return a Python list of contexts */ %typemap(argout) (char ***list) { PyObject* plist; int i; if (*$1) { plist = PyList_New(result); for (i = 0; i < result; i++) { PyList_SetItem(plist, i, PyString_FromString((*$1)[i])); } } else { plist = PyList_New(0); } /* Only return the Python list, don't need to return the length anymore */ $result = plist; } %typemap(in,noblock=1,numinputs=0) char ** (char * temp = 0) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(freearg,match="in") char ** ""; %typemap(argout,noblock=1) char ** { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_FromCharPtr(*$1)); freecon(*$1); } else { Py_INCREF(Py_None); %append_output(Py_None); } } %typemap(in,noblock=1,numinputs=0) char ** (char * temp = 0) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(freearg,match="in") char ** ""; %typemap(argout,noblock=1) char ** { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_FromCharPtr(*$1)); free(*$1); } else { Py_INCREF(Py_None); %append_output(Py_None); } } %include "selinuxswig_python_exception.i" %include "selinuxswig.i" libselinux-3.5/src/selinuxswig_python_exception.i000066400000000000000000000452341437566343300225660ustar00rootroot00000000000000 %exception is_selinux_enabled { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception is_selinux_mls_enabled { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getcon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getcon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setcon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setcon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getpidcon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getpidcon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getprevcon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getprevcon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getexeccon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getexeccon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setexeccon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setexeccon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getfscreatecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getfscreatecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setfscreatecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setfscreatecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getkeycreatecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getkeycreatecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setkeycreatecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setkeycreatecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getsockcreatecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getsockcreatecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setsockcreatecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setsockcreatecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getfilecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getfilecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception lgetfilecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception lgetfilecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception fgetfilecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception fgetfilecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setfilecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setfilecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception lsetfilecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception lsetfilecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception fsetfilecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception fsetfilecon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getpeercon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getpeercon_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_av { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_av_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_av_flags { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_av_flags_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_create { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_create_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_create_name { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_create_name_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_relabel { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_relabel_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_member { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_member_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_user { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_compute_user_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_validatetrans { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_validatetrans_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_load_policy { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_get_initial_context { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_get_initial_context_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_mkload_policy { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_init_load_policy { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_set_boolean_list { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_load_booleans { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_check_context { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_check_context_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_canonicalize_context { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_canonicalize_context_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_getenforce { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_setenforce { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_reject_unknown { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_deny_unknown { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_get_checkreqprot { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_disable { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_policyvers { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_get_boolean_names { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_get_boolean_pending { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_get_boolean_active { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_set_boolean { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_commit_booleans { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_set_mapping { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception security_av_string { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception matchpathcon_init { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception matchpathcon_init_prefix { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception realpath_not_final { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception matchpathcon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception matchpathcon_index { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception matchpathcon_filespec_add { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception matchmediacon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_getenforcemode { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_getpolicytype { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_set_policy_root { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_check_access { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_check_passwd_access { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception checkPasswdAccess { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_check_securetty_context { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinuxfs_exists { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception setexecfilecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception rpm_execcon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception is_context_customizable { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_trans_to_raw_context { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_raw_to_trans_context { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_raw_context_to_color { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getseuserbyname { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception getseuser { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_file_context_verify { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_lsetfilecon_default { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_sid_to_context { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_sid_to_context_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_context_to_sid { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_context_to_sid_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception sidget { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception sidput { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_get_initial_sid { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_init { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_open { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_reset { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_has_perm_noaudit { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_has_perm { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_compute_create { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_compute_member { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_add_callback { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_netlink_open { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_netlink_acquire_fd { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception avc_netlink_check_nb { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_status_open { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_status_updated { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_status_getenforce { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_status_policyload { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_status_deny_unknown { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception context_type_set { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception context_range_set { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception context_role_set { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception context_user_set { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception get_ordered_context_list { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception get_ordered_context_list_with_level { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception get_default_context { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception get_default_context_with_level { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception get_default_context_with_role { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception get_default_context_with_rolelevel { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception query_user_context { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception manual_user_enter_context { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception get_default_type { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selabel_lookup { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selabel_lookup_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selabel_lookup_best_match { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selabel_lookup_best_match_raw { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selabel_digest { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_restorecon { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_restorecon_parallel { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_restorecon_set_alt_rootpath { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } %exception selinux_restorecon_xattr { $action if (result < 0) { PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); SWIG_fail; } } libselinux-3.5/src/selinuxswig_ruby.i000066400000000000000000000017101437566343300201370ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Author: Dan Walsh Based on selinuxswig_python.i by James Athey */ /* Never build rpm_execcon interface */ #ifndef DISABLE_RPM #define DISABLE_RPM #endif %module selinux %{ #include "selinux/selinux.h" %} /* return a sid along with the result */ %typemap(argout) (security_id_t * sid) { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_NewPointerObj(*$1, $descriptor(security_id_t), 0)); } } %typemap(in,numinputs=0) security_id_t *(security_id_t temp) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(in,noblock=1,numinputs=0) char ** (char * temp = 0) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(freearg,match="in") char ** ""; %typemap(argout,noblock=1) char ** { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_FromCharPtr(*$1)); freecon(*$1); } } %typemap(in,noblock=1,numinputs=0) char ** (char * temp = 0) { $1 = &temp; } %typemap(freearg,match="in") char ** ""; %typemap(argout,noblock=1) char ** { if (*$1) { %append_output(SWIG_FromCharPtr(*$1)); free(*$1); } } %include "selinuxswig.i" libselinux-3.5/src/sestatus.c000066400000000000000000000213101437566343300163600ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * sestatus.c * * APIs to reference SELinux kernel status page (/selinux/status) * * Author: KaiGai Kohei * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "avc_internal.h" #include "policy.h" /* * copied from the selinux/include/security.h */ struct selinux_status_t { uint32_t version; /* version number of this structure */ uint32_t sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */ uint32_t enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */ uint32_t policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */ uint32_t deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */ /* version > 0 support above status */ } __attribute((packed)); /* * `selinux_status' * * NULL : not initialized yet * MAP_FAILED : opened, but fallback-mode * Valid Pointer : opened and mapped correctly */ static struct selinux_status_t *selinux_status = NULL; static uint32_t last_seqno; static uint32_t last_policyload; static uint32_t fallback_sequence; static int fallback_enforcing; static int fallback_policyload; static void *fallback_netlink_thread = NULL; /* * read_sequence * * A utility routine to reference kernel status page according to * seqlock logic. Since selinux_status->sequence is an odd value during * the kernel status page being updated, we try to synchronize completion * of this updating, but we assume it is rare. * The sequence is almost even number. * * __sync_synchronize is a portable memory barrier for various kind * of architecture that is supported by GCC. */ static inline uint32_t read_sequence(struct selinux_status_t *status) { uint32_t seqno = 0; do { /* * No need for sched_yield() in the first trial of * this loop. */ if (seqno & 0x0001) sched_yield(); seqno = status->sequence; __sync_synchronize(); } while (seqno & 0x0001); return seqno; } /* * selinux_status_updated * * It returns whether something has been happened since the last call. * Because `selinux_status->sequence' shall be always incremented on * both of setenforce/policyreload events, so differences from the last * value informs us something has been happened. */ int selinux_status_updated(void) { uint32_t curr_seqno; uint32_t tmp_seqno; uint32_t enforcing; uint32_t policyload; if (selinux_status == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) { if (avc_netlink_check_nb() < 0) return -1; curr_seqno = fallback_sequence; } else { curr_seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status); } /* * `curr_seqno' is always even-number, so it does not match with * `last_seqno' being initialized to odd-number in the first call. * We never return 'something was updated' in the first call, * because this function focuses on status-updating since the last * invocation. */ if (last_seqno & 0x0001) last_seqno = curr_seqno; if (last_seqno == curr_seqno) return 0; /* sequence must not be changed during references */ do { enforcing = selinux_status->enforcing; policyload = selinux_status->policyload; tmp_seqno = curr_seqno; curr_seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status); } while (tmp_seqno != curr_seqno); if (avc_enforcing != (int) enforcing) { if (avc_process_setenforce(enforcing) < 0) return -1; } if (last_policyload != policyload) { if (avc_process_policyload(policyload) < 0) return -1; last_policyload = policyload; } last_seqno = curr_seqno; return 1; } /* * selinux_status_getenforce * * It returns the current performing mode of SELinux. * 1 means currently we run in enforcing mode, or 0 means permissive mode. */ int selinux_status_getenforce(void) { uint32_t seqno; uint32_t enforcing; if (selinux_status == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) { if (avc_netlink_check_nb() < 0) return -1; return fallback_enforcing; } /* sequence must not be changed during references */ do { seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status); enforcing = selinux_status->enforcing; } while (seqno != read_sequence(selinux_status)); return enforcing ? 1 : 0; } /* * selinux_status_policyload * * It returns times of policy reloaded on the running system. * Note that it is not a reliable value on fallback-mode until it receives * the first event message via netlink socket, so, a correct usage of this * value is to compare it with the previous value to detect policy reloaded * event. */ int selinux_status_policyload(void) { uint32_t seqno; uint32_t policyload; if (selinux_status == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) { if (avc_netlink_check_nb() < 0) return -1; return fallback_policyload; } /* sequence must not be changed during references */ do { seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status); policyload = selinux_status->policyload; } while (seqno != read_sequence(selinux_status)); return policyload; } /* * selinux_status_deny_unknown * * It returns a guideline to handle undefined object classes or permissions. * 0 means SELinux treats policy queries on undefined stuff being allowed, * however, 1 means such queries are denied. */ int selinux_status_deny_unknown(void) { uint32_t seqno; uint32_t deny_unknown; if (selinux_status == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) return security_deny_unknown(); /* sequence must not be changed during references */ do { seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status); deny_unknown = selinux_status->deny_unknown; } while (seqno != read_sequence(selinux_status)); return deny_unknown ? 1 : 0; } /* * callback routines for fallback case using netlink socket */ static int fallback_cb_setenforce(int enforcing) { fallback_sequence += 2; fallback_enforcing = enforcing; return 0; } static int fallback_cb_policyload(int policyload) { fallback_sequence += 2; fallback_policyload = policyload; return 0; } /* * selinux_status_open * * It tries to open and mmap kernel status page (/selinux/status). * Since Linux 2.6.37 or later supports this feature, we may run * fallback routine using a netlink socket on older kernels, if * the supplied `fallback' is not zero. * It returns 0 on success, -1 on error or 1 when we are ready to * use these interfaces, but netlink socket was opened as fallback * instead of the kernel status page. */ int selinux_status_open(int fallback) { int fd; char path[PATH_MAX]; long pagesize; uint32_t seqno; if (selinux_status != NULL) { return (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) ? 1 : 0; } if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); if (pagesize < 0) return -1; snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/status", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) goto error; selinux_status = mmap(NULL, pagesize, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); close(fd); if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) { goto error; } last_seqno = (uint32_t)(-1); /* sequence must not be changed during references */ do { seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status); last_policyload = selinux_status->policyload; } while (seqno != read_sequence(selinux_status)); /* No need to use avc threads if the kernel status page is available */ avc_using_threads = 0; return 0; error: /* * If caller wants fallback routine, we try to provide * an equivalent functionality using existing netlink * socket, although it needs system call invocation to * receive event notification. */ if (fallback && avc_netlink_open(0) == 0) { union selinux_callback cb; /* register my callbacks */ cb.func_setenforce = fallback_cb_setenforce; selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_SETENFORCE, cb); cb.func_policyload = fallback_cb_policyload; selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_POLICYLOAD, cb); /* mark as fallback mode */ selinux_status = MAP_FAILED; last_seqno = (uint32_t)(-1); if (avc_using_threads) { fallback_netlink_thread = avc_create_thread(&avc_netlink_loop); } fallback_sequence = 0; fallback_enforcing = security_getenforce(); fallback_policyload = 0; return 1; } selinux_status = NULL; return -1; } /* * selinux_status_close * * It unmap and close the kernel status page, or close netlink socket * if fallback mode. */ void selinux_status_close(void) { long pagesize; /* not opened */ if (selinux_status == NULL) return; /* fallback-mode */ if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) { if (avc_using_threads) avc_stop_thread(fallback_netlink_thread); avc_netlink_release_fd(); avc_netlink_close(); selinux_status = NULL; return; } pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); /* not much we can do other than leak memory */ if (pagesize > 0) munmap(selinux_status, pagesize); selinux_status = NULL; last_seqno = (uint32_t)(-1); } libselinux-3.5/src/setenforce.c000066400000000000000000000011411437566343300166420ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include #include int security_setenforce(int value) { int fd, ret; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/enforce", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return -1; snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d", value); ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); close(fd); if (ret < 0) return -1; return 0; } libselinux-3.5/src/setexecfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000025001437566343300175050ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "context_internal.h" int setexecfilecon(const char *filename, const char *fallback_type) { char * mycon = NULL, *fcon = NULL, *newcon = NULL; context_t con = NULL; int rc = 0; if (is_selinux_enabled() < 1) return 0; rc = getcon(&mycon); if (rc < 0) goto out; rc = getfilecon(filename, &fcon); if (rc < 0) goto out; rc = security_compute_create(mycon, fcon, string_to_security_class("process"), &newcon); if (rc < 0) goto out; if (!strcmp(mycon, newcon)) { /* No default transition, use fallback_type for now. */ rc = -1; con = context_new(mycon); if (!con) goto out; if (context_type_set(con, fallback_type)) goto out; freecon(newcon); newcon = strdup(context_str(con)); if (!newcon) goto out; } rc = setexeccon(newcon); if (rc < 0) goto out; out: if (rc < 0 && security_getenforce() == 0) rc = 0; context_free(con); freecon(newcon); freecon(fcon); freecon(mycon); return rc < 0 ? rc : 0; } #ifndef DISABLE_RPM int rpm_execcon(unsigned int verified __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]) { int rc; rc = setexecfilecon(filename, "rpm_script_t"); if (rc < 0) return rc; return execve(filename, argv, envp); } #endif libselinux-3.5/src/setfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000014341437566343300166450ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" int setfilecon_raw(const char *path, const char * context) { int rc = setxattr(path, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, strlen(context) + 1, 0); if (rc < 0 && errno == ENOTSUP) { char * ccontext = NULL; int err = errno; if ((getfilecon_raw(path, &ccontext) >= 0) && (strcmp(context,ccontext) == 0)) { rc = 0; } else { errno = err; } freecon(ccontext); } return rc; } int setfilecon(const char *path, const char *context) { int ret; char * rcontext; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context, &rcontext)) return -1; ret = setfilecon_raw(path, rcontext); freecon(rcontext); return ret; } libselinux-3.5/src/setrans_client.c000066400000000000000000000214371437566343300175340ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Author: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * * Modified: * Yuichi Nakamura - Stubs are used when DISABLE_SETRANS is defined, it is to reduce size for such as embedded devices. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "setrans_internal.h" #ifndef DISABLE_SETRANS static unsigned char has_setrans; // Simple cache static __thread char * prev_t2r_trans = NULL; static __thread char * prev_t2r_raw = NULL; static __thread char * prev_r2t_trans = NULL; static __thread char * prev_r2t_raw = NULL; static __thread char *prev_r2c_trans = NULL; static __thread char * prev_r2c_raw = NULL; static pthread_once_t once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; static pthread_key_t destructor_key; static int destructor_key_initialized = 0; static __thread char destructor_initialized; /* * setransd_open * * This function opens a socket to the setransd. * Returns: on success, a file descriptor ( >= 0 ) to the socket * on error, a negative value */ static int setransd_open(void) { struct sockaddr_un addr; int fd; #ifdef SOCK_CLOEXEC fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); if (fd < 0 && errno == EINVAL) #endif { fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (fd >= 0) if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC)) { close(fd); return -1; } } if (fd < 0) return -1; memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, SETRANS_UNIX_SOCKET, sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) { close(fd); errno = EOVERFLOW; return -1; } if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) { close(fd); return -1; } return fd; } /* Returns: 0 on success, <0 on failure */ static int send_request(int fd, uint32_t function, const char *data1, const char *data2) { struct msghdr msgh; struct iovec iov[5]; uint32_t data1_size; uint32_t data2_size; ssize_t count, expected; unsigned int i; if (fd < 0) return -1; if (!data1) data1 = ""; if (!data2) data2 = ""; data1_size = strlen(data1) + 1; data2_size = strlen(data2) + 1; iov[0].iov_base = &function; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(function); iov[1].iov_base = &data1_size; iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(data1_size); iov[2].iov_base = &data2_size; iov[2].iov_len = sizeof(data2_size); iov[3].iov_base = (char *)data1; iov[3].iov_len = data1_size; iov[4].iov_base = (char *)data2; iov[4].iov_len = data2_size; memset(&msgh, 0, sizeof(msgh)); msgh.msg_iov = iov; msgh.msg_iovlen = sizeof(iov) / sizeof(iov[0]); expected = 0; for (i = 0; i < sizeof(iov) / sizeof(iov[0]); i++) expected += iov[i].iov_len; while (((count = sendmsg(fd, &msgh, MSG_NOSIGNAL)) < 0) && (errno == EINTR)) ; if (count < 0 || count != expected) return -1; return 0; } /* Returns: 0 on success, <0 on failure */ static int receive_response(int fd, uint32_t function, char **outdata, int32_t * ret_val) { struct iovec resp_hdr[3]; uint32_t func; uint32_t data_size; char *data; struct iovec resp_data; ssize_t count; if (fd < 0) return -1; resp_hdr[0].iov_base = &func; resp_hdr[0].iov_len = sizeof(func); resp_hdr[1].iov_base = &data_size; resp_hdr[1].iov_len = sizeof(data_size); resp_hdr[2].iov_base = ret_val; resp_hdr[2].iov_len = sizeof(*ret_val); while (((count = readv(fd, resp_hdr, 3)) < 0) && (errno == EINTR)) ; if (count != (sizeof(func) + sizeof(data_size) + sizeof(*ret_val))) { return -1; } if (func != function || !data_size || data_size > MAX_DATA_BUF) { return -1; } data = malloc(data_size); if (!data) return -1; /* coveriety doesn't realize that data will be initialized in readv */ memset(data, 0, data_size); resp_data.iov_base = data; resp_data.iov_len = data_size; while (((count = readv(fd, &resp_data, 1))) < 0 && (errno == EINTR)) ; if (count < 0 || (uint32_t) count != data_size || data[data_size - 1] != '\0') { free(data); return -1; } *outdata = data; return 0; } static int raw_to_trans_context(const char *raw, char **transp) { int ret; int32_t ret_val; int fd; *transp = NULL; fd = setransd_open(); if (fd < 0) return fd; ret = send_request(fd, RAW_TO_TRANS_CONTEXT, raw, NULL); if (ret) goto out; ret = receive_response(fd, RAW_TO_TRANS_CONTEXT, transp, &ret_val); if (ret) goto out; ret = ret_val; out: close(fd); return ret; } static int trans_to_raw_context(const char *trans, char **rawp) { int ret; int32_t ret_val; int fd; *rawp = NULL; fd = setransd_open(); if (fd < 0) return fd; ret = send_request(fd, TRANS_TO_RAW_CONTEXT, trans, NULL); if (ret) goto out; ret = receive_response(fd, TRANS_TO_RAW_CONTEXT, rawp, &ret_val); if (ret) goto out; ret = ret_val; out: close(fd); return ret; } static int raw_context_to_color(const char *raw, char **colors) { int ret; int32_t ret_val; int fd; fd = setransd_open(); if (fd < 0) return fd; ret = send_request(fd, RAW_CONTEXT_TO_COLOR, raw, NULL); if (ret) goto out; ret = receive_response(fd, RAW_CONTEXT_TO_COLOR, colors, &ret_val); if (ret) goto out; ret = ret_val; out: close(fd); return ret; } static void setrans_thread_destructor(void __attribute__((unused)) *unused) { free(prev_t2r_trans); free(prev_t2r_raw); free(prev_r2t_trans); free(prev_r2t_raw); free(prev_r2c_trans); free(prev_r2c_raw); } void __attribute__((destructor)) setrans_lib_destructor(void); void __attribute__((destructor)) setrans_lib_destructor(void) { if (!has_setrans) return; if (destructor_key_initialized) __selinux_key_delete(destructor_key); } static inline void init_thread_destructor(void) { if (!has_setrans) return; if (destructor_initialized == 0) { __selinux_setspecific(destructor_key, /* some valid address to please GCC */ &selinux_page_size); destructor_initialized = 1; } } static void init_context_translations(void) { has_setrans = (access(SETRANS_UNIX_SOCKET, F_OK) == 0); if (!has_setrans) return; if (__selinux_key_create(&destructor_key, setrans_thread_destructor) == 0) destructor_key_initialized = 1; } int selinux_trans_to_raw_context(const char * trans, char ** rawp) { if (!trans) { *rawp = NULL; return 0; } __selinux_once(once, init_context_translations); init_thread_destructor(); if (!has_setrans) { *rawp = strdup(trans); goto out; } if (prev_t2r_trans && strcmp(prev_t2r_trans, trans) == 0) { *rawp = strdup(prev_t2r_raw); } else { free(prev_t2r_trans); prev_t2r_trans = NULL; free(prev_t2r_raw); prev_t2r_raw = NULL; if (trans_to_raw_context(trans, rawp)) *rawp = strdup(trans); if (*rawp) { prev_t2r_trans = strdup(trans); if (!prev_t2r_trans) goto out; prev_t2r_raw = strdup(*rawp); if (!prev_t2r_raw) { free(prev_t2r_trans); prev_t2r_trans = NULL; } } } out: return *rawp ? 0 : -1; } int selinux_raw_to_trans_context(const char * raw, char ** transp) { if (!raw) { *transp = NULL; return 0; } __selinux_once(once, init_context_translations); init_thread_destructor(); if (!has_setrans) { *transp = strdup(raw); goto out; } if (prev_r2t_raw && strcmp(prev_r2t_raw, raw) == 0) { *transp = strdup(prev_r2t_trans); } else { free(prev_r2t_raw); prev_r2t_raw = NULL; free(prev_r2t_trans); prev_r2t_trans = NULL; if (raw_to_trans_context(raw, transp)) *transp = strdup(raw); if (*transp) { prev_r2t_raw = strdup(raw); if (!prev_r2t_raw) goto out; prev_r2t_trans = strdup(*transp); if (!prev_r2t_trans) { free(prev_r2t_raw); prev_r2t_raw = NULL; } } } out: return *transp ? 0 : -1; } int selinux_raw_context_to_color(const char * raw, char **transp) { if (!raw) { *transp = NULL; return -1; } __selinux_once(once, init_context_translations); init_thread_destructor(); if (!has_setrans) { *transp = strdup(raw); goto out; } if (prev_r2c_raw && strcmp(prev_r2c_raw, raw) == 0) { *transp = strdup(prev_r2c_trans); } else { free(prev_r2c_raw); prev_r2c_raw = NULL; free(prev_r2c_trans); prev_r2c_trans = NULL; if (raw_context_to_color(raw, transp)) return -1; if (*transp) { prev_r2c_raw = strdup(raw); if (!prev_r2c_raw) goto out; prev_r2c_trans = strdup(*transp); if (!prev_r2c_trans) { free(prev_r2c_raw); prev_r2c_raw = NULL; } } } out: return *transp ? 0 : -1; } #else /*DISABLE_SETRANS*/ int selinux_trans_to_raw_context(const char * trans, char ** rawp) { if (!trans) { *rawp = NULL; return 0; } *rawp = strdup(trans); return *rawp ? 0 : -1; } int selinux_raw_to_trans_context(const char * raw, char ** transp) { if (!raw) { *transp = NULL; return 0; } *transp = strdup(raw); return *transp ? 0 : -1; } #endif /*DISABLE_SETRANS*/ libselinux-3.5/src/setrans_internal.h000066400000000000000000000004121437566343300200650ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* Author: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. */ #include #define SETRANS_UNIX_SOCKET SELINUX_TRANS_DIR "/.setrans-unix" #define RAW_TO_TRANS_CONTEXT 2 #define TRANS_TO_RAW_CONTEXT 3 #define RAW_CONTEXT_TO_COLOR 4 #define MAX_DATA_BUF 8192 libselinux-3.5/src/setup.py000066400000000000000000000014011437566343300160520ustar00rootroot00000000000000#!/usr/bin/python3 from setuptools import Extension, setup setup( name="selinux", version="3.5", description="SELinux python 3 bindings", author="SELinux Project", author_email="selinux@vger.kernel.org", ext_modules=[ Extension('selinux._selinux', sources=['selinuxswig_python.i'], include_dirs=['../include'], library_dirs=['.'], libraries=['selinux']), Extension('selinux.audit2why', sources=['audit2why.c'], include_dirs=['../include'], library_dirs=['.'], libraries=['selinux'], extra_link_args=['-l:libsepol.a', '-Wl,--version-script=audit2why.map']) ], ) libselinux-3.5/src/seusers.c000066400000000000000000000143241437566343300162050ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" /* Process line from seusers.conf and split into its fields. Returns 0 on success, -1 on comments, and -2 on error. */ static int process_seusers(const char *buffer, char **luserp, char **seuserp, char **levelp, int mls_enabled) { char *newbuf = strdup(buffer); char *luser = NULL, *seuser = NULL, *level = NULL; char *start, *end; int mls_found = 1; if (!newbuf) goto err; start = newbuf; while (isspace(*start)) start++; if (*start == '#' || *start == 0) { free(newbuf); return -1; /* Comment or empty line, skip over */ } end = strchr(start, ':'); if (!end) goto err; *end = 0; luser = strdup(start); if (!luser) goto err; start = end + 1; end = strchr(start, ':'); if (!end) { mls_found = 0; end = start; while (*end && !isspace(*end)) end++; } *end = 0; seuser = strdup(start); if (!seuser) goto err; if (!strcmp(seuser, "")) goto err; /* Skip MLS if disabled, or missing. */ if (!mls_enabled || !mls_found) goto out; start = ++end; while (*end && !isspace(*end)) end++; *end = 0; level = strdup(start); if (!level) goto err; if (!strcmp(level, "")) goto err; out: free(newbuf); *luserp = luser; *seuserp = seuser; *levelp = level; return 0; err: free(newbuf); free(luser); free(seuser); free(level); return -2; /* error */ } int require_seusers = 0; #include #include static gid_t get_default_gid(const char *name) { struct passwd pwstorage, *pwent = NULL; gid_t gid = -1; /* Allocate space for the getpwnam_r buffer */ long rbuflen = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX); if (rbuflen <= 0) return -1; char *rbuf = malloc(rbuflen); if (rbuf == NULL) return -1; int retval = getpwnam_r(name, &pwstorage, rbuf, rbuflen, &pwent); if (retval == 0 && pwent) { gid = pwent->pw_gid; } free(rbuf); return gid; } static int check_group(const char *group, const char *name, const gid_t gid) { int match = 0; int i, ng = 0; gid_t *groups = NULL; struct group gbuf, *grent = NULL; long rbuflen = sysconf(_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX); if (rbuflen <= 0) return 0; char *rbuf; while(1) { rbuf = malloc(rbuflen); if (rbuf == NULL) return 0; int retval = getgrnam_r(group, &gbuf, rbuf, rbuflen, &grent); if ( retval == ERANGE ) { free(rbuf); rbuflen = rbuflen * 2; } else if ( retval != 0 || grent == NULL ) { goto done; } else { break; } } if (getgrouplist(name, gid, NULL, &ng) < 0) { if (ng == 0) goto done; groups = calloc(ng, sizeof(*groups)); if (!groups) goto done; if (getgrouplist(name, gid, groups, &ng) < 0) goto done; } else { /* WTF? ng was 0 and we didn't fail? Are we in 0 groups? */ goto done; } for (i = 0; i < ng; i++) { if (grent->gr_gid == groups[i]) { match = 1; goto done; } } done: free(groups); free(rbuf); return match; } int getseuserbyname(const char *name, char **r_seuser, char **r_level) { FILE *cfg = NULL; size_t size = 0; char *buffer = NULL; int rc; unsigned long lineno = 0; int mls_enabled = is_selinux_mls_enabled(); char *username = NULL; char *seuser = NULL; char *level = NULL; char *groupseuser = NULL; char *grouplevel = NULL; char *defaultseuser = NULL; char *defaultlevel = NULL; gid_t gid = get_default_gid(name); cfg = fopen(selinux_usersconf_path(), "re"); if (!cfg) goto nomatch; __fsetlocking(cfg, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while (getline(&buffer, &size, cfg) > 0) { ++lineno; rc = process_seusers(buffer, &username, &seuser, &level, mls_enabled); if (rc == -1) continue; /* comment, skip */ if (rc == -2) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: error on line %lu, skipping...\n", selinux_usersconf_path(), lineno); continue; } if (!strcmp(username, name)) break; if (username[0] == '%' && !groupseuser && check_group(&username[1], name, gid)) { groupseuser = seuser; grouplevel = level; } else { if (!defaultseuser && !strcmp(username, "__default__")) { defaultseuser = seuser; defaultlevel = level; } else { free(seuser); free(level); } } free(username); username = NULL; seuser = NULL; } free(buffer); fclose(cfg); if (seuser) { free(username); free(defaultseuser); free(defaultlevel); free(groupseuser); free(grouplevel); *r_seuser = seuser; *r_level = level; return 0; } if (groupseuser) { free(defaultseuser); free(defaultlevel); *r_seuser = groupseuser; *r_level = grouplevel; return 0; } if (defaultseuser) { *r_seuser = defaultseuser; *r_level = defaultlevel; return 0; } nomatch: if (require_seusers) return -1; /* Fall back to the Linux username and no level. */ *r_seuser = strdup(name); if (!(*r_seuser)) return -1; *r_level = NULL; return 0; } int getseuser(const char *username, const char *service, char **r_seuser, char **r_level) { int ret = -1; int len = 0; char *seuser = NULL; char *level = NULL; char *buffer = NULL; size_t size = 0; char *rec = NULL; char *path = NULL; FILE *fp = NULL; if (asprintf(&path,"%s/logins/%s", selinux_policy_root(), username) < 0) goto err; fp = fopen(path, "re"); free(path); if (fp == NULL) goto err; __fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER); while (getline(&buffer, &size, fp) > 0) { if (strncmp(buffer, "*:", 2) == 0) { free(rec); rec = strdup(buffer); continue; } if (!service) continue; len = strlen(service); if ((strncmp(buffer, service, len) == 0) && (buffer[len] == ':')) { free(rec); rec = strdup(buffer); break; } } if (! rec) goto err; seuser = strchr(rec, ':'); if (! seuser) goto err; seuser++; level = strchr(seuser, ':'); if (! level) goto err; *level = 0; level++; *r_seuser = strdup(seuser); if (! *r_seuser) goto err; len = strlen(level); if (len && level[len-1] == '\n') level[len-1] = 0; *r_level = strdup(level); if (! *r_level) { free(*r_seuser); goto err; } ret = 0; err: free(buffer); if (fp) fclose(fp); free(rec); return (ret ? getseuserbyname(username, r_seuser, r_level) : ret); } libselinux-3.5/src/sha1.c000066400000000000000000000220641437566343300153500ustar00rootroot00000000000000/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // LibSha1 // // Implementation of SHA1 hash function. // Original author: Steve Reid // Contributions by: James H. Brown , Saul Kravitz , // and Ralph Giles // Modified by WaterJuice retaining Public Domain license. // // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain - June 2013 waterjuice.org // Modified to: // - stop symbols being exported for libselinux shared library - October 2015 // Richard Haines // - Not cast the workspace from a byte array to a CHAR64LONG16 due to alignment issues. // Fixes: // sha1.c:73:33: error: cast from 'uint8_t *' (aka 'unsigned char *') to 'CHAR64LONG16 *' increases required alignment from 1 to 4 [-Werror,-Wcast-align] // CHAR64LONG16* block = (CHAR64LONG16*) workspace; // William Roberts // - Silence clang's -Wextra-semi-stmt warning - July 2021, Nicolas Iooss /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // IMPORTS /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// #include "sha1.h" #include /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // TYPES /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// typedef union { uint8_t c [64]; uint32_t l [16]; } CHAR64LONG16; /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // INTERNAL FUNCTIONS /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// #define rol(value, bits) (((value) << (bits)) | ((value) >> (32 - (bits)))) // blk0() and blk() perform the initial expand. #define blk0(i) (block->l[i] = (rol(block->l[i],24)&0xFF00FF00) \ |(rol(block->l[i],8)&0x00FF00FF)) #define blk(i) (block->l[i&15] = rol(block->l[(i+13)&15]^block->l[(i+8)&15] \ ^block->l[(i+2)&15]^block->l[i&15],1)) // (R0+R1), R2, R3, R4 are the different operations used in SHA1 #define R0(v,w,x,y,z,i) do { z += ((w&(x^y))^y) + blk0(i)+ 0x5A827999 + rol(v,5); w=rol(w,30); } while (0) #define R1(v,w,x,y,z,i) do { z += ((w&(x^y))^y) + blk(i) + 0x5A827999 + rol(v,5); w=rol(w,30); } while (0) #define R2(v,w,x,y,z,i) do { z += (w^x^y) + blk(i) + 0x6ED9EBA1 + rol(v,5); w=rol(w,30); } while (0) #define R3(v,w,x,y,z,i) do { z += (((w|x)&y)|(w&x)) + blk(i) + 0x8F1BBCDC + rol(v,5); w=rol(w,30); } while (0) #define R4(v,w,x,y,z,i) do { z += (w^x^y) + blk(i) + 0xCA62C1D6 + rol(v,5); w=rol(w,30); } while (0) /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // TransformFunction // // Hash a single 512-bit block. This is the core of the algorithm /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// static void TransformFunction ( uint32_t state[5], const uint8_t buffer[64] ) { uint32_t a; uint32_t b; uint32_t c; uint32_t d; uint32_t e; CHAR64LONG16 workspace; CHAR64LONG16* block = &workspace; memcpy(block, buffer, 64); // Copy context->state[] to working vars a = state[0]; b = state[1]; c = state[2]; d = state[3]; e = state[4]; // 4 rounds of 20 operations each. Loop unrolled. R0(a,b,c,d,e, 0); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 1); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 2); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 3); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 4); R0(a,b,c,d,e, 5); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 6); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 7); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 8); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 9); R0(a,b,c,d,e,10); R0(e,a,b,c,d,11); R0(d,e,a,b,c,12); R0(c,d,e,a,b,13); R0(b,c,d,e,a,14); R0(a,b,c,d,e,15); R1(e,a,b,c,d,16); R1(d,e,a,b,c,17); R1(c,d,e,a,b,18); R1(b,c,d,e,a,19); R2(a,b,c,d,e,20); R2(e,a,b,c,d,21); R2(d,e,a,b,c,22); R2(c,d,e,a,b,23); R2(b,c,d,e,a,24); R2(a,b,c,d,e,25); R2(e,a,b,c,d,26); R2(d,e,a,b,c,27); R2(c,d,e,a,b,28); R2(b,c,d,e,a,29); R2(a,b,c,d,e,30); R2(e,a,b,c,d,31); R2(d,e,a,b,c,32); R2(c,d,e,a,b,33); R2(b,c,d,e,a,34); R2(a,b,c,d,e,35); R2(e,a,b,c,d,36); R2(d,e,a,b,c,37); R2(c,d,e,a,b,38); R2(b,c,d,e,a,39); R3(a,b,c,d,e,40); R3(e,a,b,c,d,41); R3(d,e,a,b,c,42); R3(c,d,e,a,b,43); R3(b,c,d,e,a,44); R3(a,b,c,d,e,45); R3(e,a,b,c,d,46); R3(d,e,a,b,c,47); R3(c,d,e,a,b,48); R3(b,c,d,e,a,49); R3(a,b,c,d,e,50); R3(e,a,b,c,d,51); R3(d,e,a,b,c,52); R3(c,d,e,a,b,53); R3(b,c,d,e,a,54); R3(a,b,c,d,e,55); R3(e,a,b,c,d,56); R3(d,e,a,b,c,57); R3(c,d,e,a,b,58); R3(b,c,d,e,a,59); R4(a,b,c,d,e,60); R4(e,a,b,c,d,61); R4(d,e,a,b,c,62); R4(c,d,e,a,b,63); R4(b,c,d,e,a,64); R4(a,b,c,d,e,65); R4(e,a,b,c,d,66); R4(d,e,a,b,c,67); R4(c,d,e,a,b,68); R4(b,c,d,e,a,69); R4(a,b,c,d,e,70); R4(e,a,b,c,d,71); R4(d,e,a,b,c,72); R4(c,d,e,a,b,73); R4(b,c,d,e,a,74); R4(a,b,c,d,e,75); R4(e,a,b,c,d,76); R4(d,e,a,b,c,77); R4(c,d,e,a,b,78); R4(b,c,d,e,a,79); // Add the working vars back into context.state[] state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d; state[4] += e; } /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // PUBLIC FUNCTIONS /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Sha1Initialise // // Initialises an SHA1 Context. Use this to initialise/reset a context. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// void Sha1Initialise ( Sha1Context* Context ) { // SHA1 initialization constants Context->State[0] = 0x67452301; Context->State[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; Context->State[2] = 0x98BADCFE; Context->State[3] = 0x10325476; Context->State[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; Context->Count[0] = 0; Context->Count[1] = 0; } /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Sha1Update // // Adds data to the SHA1 context. This will process the data and update the internal state of the context. Keep on // calling this function until all the data has been added. Then call Sha1Finalise to calculate the hash. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// void Sha1Update ( Sha1Context* Context, const void* Buffer, uint32_t BufferSize ) { uint32_t i; uint32_t j; j = (Context->Count[0] >> 3) & 63; if ((Context->Count[0] += BufferSize << 3) < (BufferSize << 3)) { Context->Count[1]++; } Context->Count[1] += (BufferSize >> 29); if ((j + BufferSize) > 63) { i = 64 - j; memcpy(&Context->Buffer[j], Buffer, i); TransformFunction(Context->State, Context->Buffer); for (; i + 63 < BufferSize; i += 64) { TransformFunction(Context->State, (const uint8_t*)Buffer + i); } j = 0; } else { i = 0; } memcpy(&Context->Buffer[j], &((const uint8_t*)Buffer)[i], BufferSize - i); } /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Sha1Finalise // // Performs the final calculation of the hash and returns the digest (20 byte buffer containing 160bit hash). After // calling this, Sha1Initialised must be used to reuse the context. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// void Sha1Finalise ( Sha1Context* Context, SHA1_HASH* Digest ) { uint32_t i; uint8_t finalcount[8]; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { finalcount[i] = (unsigned char)((Context->Count[(i >= 4 ? 0 : 1)] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255); // Endian independent } Sha1Update(Context, (const uint8_t*)"\x80", 1); while ((Context->Count[0] & 504) != 448) { Sha1Update(Context, (const uint8_t*)"\0", 1); } Sha1Update(Context, finalcount, 8); // Should cause a Sha1TransformFunction() for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HASH_SIZE; i++) { Digest->bytes[i] = (uint8_t)((Context->State[i>>2] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255); } } libselinux-3.5/src/sha1.h000066400000000000000000000070431437566343300153550ustar00rootroot00000000000000/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // LibSha1 // // Implementation of SHA1 hash function. // Original author: Steve Reid // Contributions by: James H. Brown , Saul Kravitz , // and Ralph Giles // Modified by WaterJuice retaining Public Domain license. // // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain - June 2013 waterjuice.org /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// #ifndef _sha1_h_ #define _sha1_h_ /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // IMPORTS /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// #include #include /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // TYPES /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Sha1Context - This must be initialised using Sha1Initialised. Do not modify the contents of this structure directly. typedef struct { uint32_t State[5]; uint32_t Count[2]; uint8_t Buffer[64]; } Sha1Context; #define SHA1_HASH_SIZE ( 160 / 8 ) typedef struct { uint8_t bytes [SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; } SHA1_HASH; /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // PUBLIC FUNCTIONS /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Sha1Initialise // // Initialises an SHA1 Context. Use this to initialise/reset a context. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// void Sha1Initialise ( Sha1Context* Context ); /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Sha1Update // // Adds data to the SHA1 context. This will process the data and update the internal state of the context. Keep on // calling this function until all the data has been added. Then call Sha1Finalise to calculate the hash. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// void Sha1Update ( Sha1Context* Context, const void* Buffer, uint32_t BufferSize ); /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Sha1Finalise // // Performs the final calculation of the hash and returns the digest (20 byte buffer containing 160bit hash). After // calling this, Sha1Initialised must be used to reuse the context. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// void Sha1Finalise ( Sha1Context* Context, SHA1_HASH* Digest ); /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// #endif //_sha1_h_ libselinux-3.5/src/stringrep.c000066400000000000000000000152021437566343300165250ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * String representation support for classes and permissions. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" #define MAXVECTORS 8*sizeof(access_vector_t) struct discover_class_node { char *name; security_class_t value; char **perms; struct discover_class_node *next; }; static struct discover_class_node *discover_class_cache = NULL; static struct discover_class_node * get_class_cache_entry_name(const char *s) { struct discover_class_node *node = discover_class_cache; for (; node != NULL && strcmp(s,node->name) != 0; node = node->next); return node; } static struct discover_class_node * get_class_cache_entry_value(security_class_t c) { struct discover_class_node *node = discover_class_cache; for (; node != NULL && c != node->value; node = node->next); return node; } static struct discover_class_node * discover_class(const char *s) { int fd, ret; char path[PATH_MAX]; char buf[20]; DIR *dir; struct dirent *dentry; size_t i; struct discover_class_node *node; if (!selinux_mnt) { errno = ENOENT; return NULL; } if (strchr(s, '/') != NULL) return NULL; /* allocate a node */ node = malloc(sizeof(struct discover_class_node)); if (node == NULL) return NULL; /* allocate array for perms */ node->perms = calloc(MAXVECTORS,sizeof(char*)); if (node->perms == NULL) goto err1; /* load up the name */ node->name = strdup(s); if (node->name == NULL) goto err2; /* load up class index */ ret = snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/class/%s/index", selinux_mnt,s); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof path) goto err3; fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) goto err3; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) goto err3; if (sscanf(buf, "%hu", &node->value) != 1) goto err3; /* load up permission indices */ ret = snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/class/%s/perms",selinux_mnt,s); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof path) goto err3; dir = opendir(path); if (dir == NULL) goto err3; dentry = readdir(dir); while (dentry != NULL) { unsigned int value; struct stat m; ret = snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/class/%s/perms/%s", selinux_mnt,s,dentry->d_name); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof path) goto err4; fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) goto err4; if (fstat(fd, &m) < 0) { close(fd); goto err4; } if (m.st_mode & S_IFDIR) { close(fd); dentry = readdir(dir); continue; } memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); close(fd); if (ret < 0) goto err4; if (sscanf(buf, "%u", &value) != 1) goto err4; if (value == 0 || value > MAXVECTORS) goto err4; node->perms[value-1] = strdup(dentry->d_name); if (node->perms[value-1] == NULL) goto err4; dentry = readdir(dir); } closedir(dir); node->next = discover_class_cache; discover_class_cache = node; return node; err4: closedir(dir); for (i = 0; i < MAXVECTORS; i++) free(node->perms[i]); err3: free(node->name); err2: free(node->perms); err1: free(node); return NULL; } void selinux_flush_class_cache(void) { struct discover_class_node *cur = discover_class_cache, *prev = NULL; size_t i; while (cur != NULL) { free(cur->name); for (i = 0; i < MAXVECTORS; i++) free(cur->perms[i]); free(cur->perms); prev = cur; cur = cur->next; free(prev); } discover_class_cache = NULL; } security_class_t string_to_security_class(const char *s) { struct discover_class_node *node; node = get_class_cache_entry_name(s); if (node == NULL) { node = discover_class(s); if (node == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } } return map_class(node->value); } security_class_t mode_to_security_class(mode_t m) { if (S_ISREG(m)) return string_to_security_class("file"); if (S_ISDIR(m)) return string_to_security_class("dir"); if (S_ISCHR(m)) return string_to_security_class("chr_file"); if (S_ISBLK(m)) return string_to_security_class("blk_file"); if (S_ISFIFO(m)) return string_to_security_class("fifo_file"); if (S_ISLNK(m)) return string_to_security_class("lnk_file"); if (S_ISSOCK(m)) return string_to_security_class("sock_file"); errno = EINVAL; return 0; } access_vector_t string_to_av_perm(security_class_t tclass, const char *s) { struct discover_class_node *node; security_class_t kclass = unmap_class(tclass); node = get_class_cache_entry_value(kclass); if (node != NULL) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < MAXVECTORS && node->perms[i] != NULL; i++) if (strcmp(node->perms[i],s) == 0) return map_perm(tclass, UINT32_C(1)<name; } const char *security_av_perm_to_string(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av) { struct discover_class_node *node; size_t i; av = unmap_perm(tclass, av); tclass = unmap_class(tclass); node = get_class_cache_entry_value(tclass); if (av && node) for (i = 0; iperms[i]; return NULL; } int security_av_string(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t av, char **res) { unsigned int i; size_t len = 5; access_vector_t tmp = av; int rc = 0; const char *str; char *ptr; /* first pass computes the required length */ for (i = 0; tmp; tmp >>= 1, i++) { if (tmp & 1) { str = security_av_perm_to_string(tclass, av & (UINT32_C(1)<>= 1, i++) { if (tmp & 1) { str = security_av_perm_to_string(tclass, av & (UINT32_C(1)< #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "selinux_internal.h" #include "policy.h" #include "mapping.h" int security_validatetrans_raw(const char *scon, const char *tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *newcon) { char path[PATH_MAX]; char *buf = NULL; int size, bufsz; int fd, ret = -1; errno = ENOENT; if (!selinux_mnt) { return -1; } snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/validatetrans", selinux_mnt); fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) { return -1; } errno = EINVAL; size = selinux_page_size; buf = malloc(size); if (!buf) { goto out; } bufsz = snprintf(buf, size, "%s %s %hu %s", scon, tcon, unmap_class(tclass), newcon); if (bufsz >= size || bufsz < 0) { // It got truncated or there was an encoding error goto out; } // clear errno for write() errno = 0; ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); if (ret > 0) { // The kernel returns the bytes written on success, not 0 as noted in the commit message ret = 0; } out: free(buf); close(fd); return ret; } int security_validatetrans(const char *scon, const char *tcon, security_class_t tclass, const char *newcon) { int ret = -1; char *rscon = NULL; char *rtcon = NULL; char *rnewcon = NULL; if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(scon, &rscon)) { goto out; } if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(tcon, &rtcon)) { goto out; } if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(newcon, &rnewcon)) { goto out; } ret = security_validatetrans_raw(rscon, rtcon, tclass, rnewcon); out: freecon(rnewcon); freecon(rtcon); freecon(rscon); return ret; } libselinux-3.5/utils/000077500000000000000000000000001437566343300147155ustar00rootroot00000000000000libselinux-3.5/utils/.gitignore000066400000000000000000000007161437566343300167110ustar00rootroot00000000000000avcstat compute_av compute_create compute_member compute_relabel compute_user getconlist getdefaultcon getenforce getfilecon getpidcon getpidprevcon getsebool getseuser matchpathcon policyvers sefcontext_compile selabel_digest selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches selabel_lookup selabel_lookup_best_match selabel_partial_match selinux_check_securetty_context selinuxenabled selinuxexeccon setenforce setfilecon togglesebool selinux_check_access validatetrans libselinux-3.5/utils/Makefile000066400000000000000000000047401437566343300163620ustar00rootroot00000000000000# Installation directories. PREFIX ?= /usr SBINDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/sbin OS ?= $(shell uname) ifeq ($(shell $(CC) -v 2>&1 | grep "clang"),) COMPILER ?= gcc else COMPILER ?= clang endif ifeq ($(COMPILER), gcc) EXTRA_CFLAGS = -fipa-pure-const -Wpacked-bitfield-compat -Wsync-nand -Wcoverage-mismatch \ -Wcpp -Wformat-contains-nul -Wnormalized=nfc -Wsuggest-attribute=const \ -Wsuggest-attribute=noreturn -Wsuggest-attribute=pure -Wtrampolines -Wjump-misses-init \ -Wno-suggest-attribute=pure -Wno-suggest-attribute=const endif MAX_STACK_SIZE=8192 CFLAGS ?= -O -Wall -W -Wundef -Wformat-y2k -Wformat-security -Winit-self -Wmissing-include-dirs \ -Wunused -Wunknown-pragmas -Wstrict-aliasing -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith \ -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wwrite-strings -Waggregate-return \ -Wstrict-prototypes -Wold-style-definition -Wmissing-prototypes \ -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-noreturn -Wmissing-format-attribute \ -Wredundant-decls -Wnested-externs -Winline -Winvalid-pch -Wvolatile-register-var \ -Wdisabled-optimization -Wbuiltin-macro-redefined \ -Wattributes -Wmultichar \ -Wdeprecated-declarations -Wdiv-by-zero -Wdouble-promotion -Wendif-labels -Wextra \ -Wformat-extra-args -Wformat-zero-length -Wformat=2 -Wmultichar \ -Woverflow -Wpointer-to-int-cast -Wpragmas \ -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-sign-compare \ -Wno-format-nonliteral -Wframe-larger-than=$(MAX_STACK_SIZE) -U_FORTIFY_SOURCE -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 \ -fstack-protector-all --param=ssp-buffer-size=4 -fexceptions \ -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -fdiagnostics-show-option \ -Werror -Wno-aggregate-return -Wno-redundant-decls -Wstrict-overflow=5 \ $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) ifeq ($(OS), Darwin) override CFLAGS += -I/opt/local/include -I../../libsepol/include override LDFLAGS += -L../../libsepol/src -undefined dynamic_lookup endif override CFLAGS += -I../include -D_GNU_SOURCE $(DISABLE_FLAGS) $(PCRE_CFLAGS) override LDFLAGS += -L../src override LDLIBS += -lselinux $(FTS_LDLIBS) ifeq ($(ANDROID_HOST),y) TARGETS=sefcontext_compile else TARGETS=$(patsubst %.c,%,$(sort $(wildcard *.c))) endif sefcontext_compile: LDLIBS += ../src/libselinux.a $(PCRE_LDLIBS) -lsepol all: $(TARGETS) install: all -mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR) install -m 755 $(TARGETS) $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR) clean: rm -f $(TARGETS) *.o *~ distclean: clean indent: ../../scripts/Lindent $(wildcard *.[ch]) relabel: libselinux-3.5/utils/avcstat.c000066400000000000000000000125141437566343300165310ustar00rootroot00000000000000/* * avcstat - Display SELinux avc statistics. * * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, * as published by the Free Software Foundation. * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define DEF_STAT_FILE "/avc/cache_stats" #define DEF_BUF_SIZE 8192 #define HEADERS "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees" struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned long long lookups; unsigned long long hits; unsigned long long misses; unsigned long long allocations; unsigned long long reclaims; unsigned long long frees; }; static int interval; static int rows; static char *progname; static char buf[DEF_BUF_SIZE]; /* selinuxfs mount point */ extern char *selinux_mnt; static __attribute__((__format__(printf,1,2),__noreturn__)) void die(const char *msg, ...) { va_list args; fputs("ERROR: ", stderr); va_start(args, msg); vfprintf(stderr, msg, args); va_end(args); if (errno) fprintf(stderr, ": %s", strerror(errno)); fputc('\n', stderr); exit(1); } static void usage(void) { printf("\nUsage: %s [-c] [-f status_file] [interval]\n\n", progname); printf ("Display SELinux AVC statistics. If the interval parameter is specified, the\n"); printf ("program will loop, displaying updated statistics every \'interval\' seconds.\n"); printf ("Relative values are displayed by default. Use the -c option to specify the\n"); printf ("display of cumulative values. The -f option specifies the location of the\n"); printf("AVC statistics file, defaulting to \'%s%s\'.\n\n", selinux_mnt, DEF_STAT_FILE); } static void set_window_rows(void) { int ret; struct winsize ws; ret = ioctl(fileno(stdout), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws); if (ret < 0 || ws.ws_row < 3) ws.ws_row = 24; rows = ws.ws_row; } static void sighandler(int num) { if (num == SIGWINCH) set_window_rows(); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct avc_cache_stats tot, rel, last; int fd, i, cumulative = 0; struct sigaction sa; char avcstatfile[PATH_MAX]; snprintf(avcstatfile, sizeof avcstatfile, "%s%s", selinux_mnt, DEF_STAT_FILE); progname = basename(argv[0]); memset(&last, 0, sizeof(last)); while ((i = getopt(argc, argv, "cf:h?-")) != -1) { switch (i) { case 'c': cumulative = 1; break; case 'f': strncpy(avcstatfile, optarg, sizeof(avcstatfile) - 1); avcstatfile[sizeof(avcstatfile)-1] = '\0'; break; case 'h': case '-': usage(); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); default: usage(); die("unrecognized parameter '%c'", i); } } if (optind < argc) { char *arg = argv[optind]; unsigned int n = strtoul(arg, NULL, 10); if (errno == ERANGE) { usage(); die("invalid interval \'%s\'", arg); } if (n == 0) { usage(); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } interval = n; } sa.sa_handler = sighandler; sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); i = sigaction(SIGWINCH, &sa, NULL); if (i < 0) die("sigaction"); set_window_rows(); fd = open(avcstatfile, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) die("open: \'%s\'", avcstatfile); for (i = 0;; i++) { char *line; ssize_t ret, parsed = 0; memset(buf, 0, DEF_BUF_SIZE); ret = read(fd, buf, DEF_BUF_SIZE-1); if (ret < 0) die("read"); if (ret == 0) die("read: \'%s\': unexpected end of file", avcstatfile); line = strtok(buf, "\n"); if (!line) die("unable to parse \'%s\': end of line not found", avcstatfile); if (strcmp(line, HEADERS)) die("unable to parse \'%s\': invalid headers", avcstatfile); if (!i || !(i % (rows - 2))) printf("%10s %10s %10s %10s %10s %10s\n", "lookups", "hits", "misses", "allocs", "reclaims", "frees"); memset(&tot, 0, sizeof(tot)); while ((line = strtok(NULL, "\n"))) { struct avc_cache_stats tmp; ret = sscanf(line, "%llu %llu %llu %llu %llu %llu", &tmp.lookups, &tmp.hits, &tmp.misses, &tmp.allocations, &tmp.reclaims, &tmp.frees); if (ret != 6) die("unable to parse \'%s\': scan error", avcstatfile); tot.lookups += tmp.lookups; tot.hits += tmp.hits; tot.misses += tmp.misses; tot.allocations += tmp.allocations; tot.reclaims += tmp.reclaims; tot.frees += tmp.frees; parsed = 1; } if (!parsed) die("unable to parse \'%s\': no data", avcstatfile); if (cumulative || !i) printf("%10llu %10llu %10llu %10llu %10llu %10llu\n", tot.lookups, tot.hits, tot.misses, tot.allocations, tot.reclaims, tot.frees); else { rel.lookups = tot.lookups - last.lookups; rel.hits = tot.hits - last.hits; rel.misses = tot.misses - last.misses; rel.allocations = tot.allocations - last.allocations; rel.reclaims = tot.reclaims - last.reclaims; rel.frees = tot.frees - last.frees; printf("%10llu %10llu %10llu %10llu %10llu %10llu\n", rel.lookups, rel.hits, rel.misses, rel.allocations, rel.reclaims, rel.frees); } if (!interval) break; memcpy(&last, &tot, sizeof(last)); sleep(interval); ret = lseek(fd, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) die("lseek"); } close(fd); return 0; } libselinux-3.5/utils/compute_av.c000066400000000000000000000025501437566343300172250ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct av_decision avd; security_class_t tclass; int ret; if (argc != 4) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s scontext tcontext tclass\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } if (security_check_context(argv[1])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid source context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[1]); exit(4); } if (security_check_context(argv[2])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[2]); exit(5); } tclass = string_to_security_class(argv[3]); if (!tclass) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid class '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[3]); exit(2); } ret = security_compute_av(argv[1], argv[2], tclass, 1, &avd); if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_compute_av failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(3); } printf("allowed="); print_access_vector(tclass, avd.allowed); printf("\n"); if (avd.decided != ~0U) { printf("decided="); print_access_vector(tclass, avd.decided); printf("\n"); } if (avd.auditallow) { printf("auditallow="); print_access_vector(tclass, avd.auditallow); printf("\n"); } if (avd.auditdeny != ~0U) { printf("auditdeny"); print_access_vector(tclass, avd.auditdeny); printf("\n"); } exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } libselinux-3.5/utils/compute_create.c000066400000000000000000000021031437566343300200540ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *buf; security_class_t tclass; const char *objname; int ret; if (argc != 4 && argc != 5) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s scontext tcontext tclass [objname]\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } if (security_check_context(argv[1])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid source context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[1]); exit(4); } if (security_check_context(argv[2])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[2]); exit(5); } tclass = string_to_security_class(argv[3]); if (!tclass) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid class '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[3]); exit(2); } objname = (argc == 5) ? argv[4] : NULL; ret = security_compute_create_name(argv[1], argv[2], tclass, objname, &buf); if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_compute_create failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(3); } printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } libselinux-3.5/utils/compute_member.c000066400000000000000000000017361437566343300200730ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *buf; security_class_t tclass; int ret; if (argc != 4) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s scontext tcontext tclass\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } if (security_check_context(argv[1])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid source context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[1]); exit(4); } if (security_check_context(argv[2])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[2]); exit(5); } tclass = string_to_security_class(argv[3]); if (!tclass) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid class '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[3]); exit(2); } ret = security_compute_member(argv[1], argv[2], tclass, &buf); if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_compute_member failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(3); } printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } libselinux-3.5/utils/compute_relabel.c000066400000000000000000000017401437566343300202250ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *buf; security_class_t tclass; int ret; if (argc != 4) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s scontext tcontext tclass\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } if (security_check_context(argv[1])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid source context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[1]); exit(4); } if (security_check_context(argv[2])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[2]); exit(5); } tclass = string_to_security_class(argv[3]); if (!tclass) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid class '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[3]); exit(2); } ret = security_compute_relabel(argv[1], argv[2], tclass, &buf); if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_compute_relabel failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(3); } printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } libselinux-3.5/utils/getconlist.c000066400000000000000000000041111437566343300172310ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *name, const char *detail, int rc) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-l level] user [context]\n", name); if (detail) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s\n", name, detail); exit(rc); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { char **list, *cur_context = NULL; char *user = NULL, *level = NULL; int ret, i, opt; while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "l:")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'l': free(level); level = strdup(optarg); if (!level) { fprintf(stderr, "memory allocation failure: %d(%s)\n", errno, strerror(errno)); return 3; } break; default: usage(argv[0], "invalid option", 1); } } if (((argc - optind) < 1) || ((argc - optind) > 2)) usage(argv[0], "invalid number of arguments", 2); /* If selinux isn't available, bail out. */ if (!is_selinux_enabled()) { fprintf(stderr, "getconlist may be used only on a SELinux kernel.\n"); free(level); return 1; } user = argv[optind]; /* If a context wasn't passed, use the current context. */ if (((argc - optind) < 2)) { if (getcon(&cur_context) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't get current context: %s\n", strerror(errno)); free(level); return 2; } } else { cur_context = argv[optind + 1]; if (security_check_context(cur_context) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Given context '%s' is invalid.\n", cur_context); free(level); return 3; } } /* Get the list and print it */ if (level) ret = get_ordered_context_list_with_level(user, level, cur_context, &list); else ret = get_ordered_context_list(user, cur_context, &list); if (ret != -1) { for (i = 0; list[i]; i++) puts(list[i]); freeconary(list); } else { fprintf(stderr, "get_ordered_context_list%s failure: %d(%s)\n", level ? "_with_level" : "", errno, strerror(errno)); free(level); return 4; } free(level); return 0; } libselinux-3.5/utils/getdefaultcon.c000066400000000000000000000044751437566343300177170ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *name, const char *detail, int rc) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-l level] [-s service] user [fromcon]\n", name); if (detail) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s\n", name, detail); exit(rc); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { char * usercon = NULL, *cur_context = NULL; char *user = NULL, *level = NULL, *role=NULL, *seuser=NULL, *dlevel=NULL; char *service = NULL; int ret, opt; int verbose = 0; while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "l:r:s:v")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'l': free(level); level = strdup(optarg); break; case 'r': free(role); role = strdup(optarg); break; case 's': free(service); service = strdup(optarg); break; case 'v': verbose = 1; break; default: usage(argv[0], "invalid option", 1); } } if (((argc - optind) < 1) || ((argc - optind) > 2)) usage(argv[0], "invalid number of arguments", 2); /* If selinux isn't available, bail out. */ if (!is_selinux_enabled()) { fprintf(stderr, "%s may be used only on a SELinux kernel.\n", argv[0]); return 1; } user = argv[optind]; /* If a context wasn't passed, use the current context. */ if (((argc - optind) < 2)) { if (getcon(&cur_context) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't get current context: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return 2; } } else cur_context = argv[optind + 1]; if (security_check_context(cur_context)) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid from context '%s'\n", argv[0], cur_context); return 3; } if ((ret = getseuser(user, service, &seuser, &dlevel)) == 0) { if (! level) level=dlevel; if (role != NULL && role[0]) ret=get_default_context_with_rolelevel(seuser, role, level,cur_context,&usercon); else ret=get_default_context_with_level(seuser, level, cur_context,&usercon); } if (ret < 0) perror(argv[0]); else { if (verbose) { printf("%s: %s from %s %s %s %s -> %s\n", argv[0], user, cur_context, seuser, role, level, usercon); } else { printf("%s\n", usercon); } } free(role); free(seuser); if (level != dlevel) free(level); free(dlevel); free(usercon); return ret >= 0; } libselinux-3.5/utils/getenforce.c000066400000000000000000000011551437566343300172040ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc __attribute__ ((unused)), char **argv __attribute__ ((unused))) { int rc; rc = is_selinux_enabled(); if (rc < 0) { fputs("getenforce: is_selinux_enabled() failed", stderr); return 2; } if (rc == 1) { rc = security_getenforce(); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getenforce: security_getenforce() failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return 2; } if (rc) puts("Enforcing"); else puts("Permissive"); } else { puts("Disabled"); } return 0; } libselinux-3.5/utils/getfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000010351437566343300171770ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *buf; int rc, i; if (argc < 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s path...\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { rc = getfilecon(argv[i], &buf); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: getfilecon(%s) failed: %s\n", argv[0], argv[i], strerror(errno)); exit(2); } printf("%s\t%s\n", argv[i], buf); freecon(buf); } exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } libselinux-3.5/utils/getpidcon.c000066400000000000000000000011201437566343300170270ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { pid_t pid; char *buf; int rc; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s pid\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } if (sscanf(argv[1], "%d", &pid) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid pid %s\n", argv[0], argv[1]); exit(2); } rc = getpidcon(pid, &buf); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: getpidcon() failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(3); } printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } libselinux-3.5/utils/getpidprevcon.c000066400000000000000000000011301437566343300177250ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { pid_t pid; char *buf; int rc; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s pid\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } if (sscanf(argv[1], "%d", &pid) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid pid %s\n", argv[0], argv[1]); exit(2); } rc = getpidprevcon(pid, &buf); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: getpidprevcon() failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(3); } printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } libselinux-3.5/utils/getsebool.c000066400000000000000000000044661437566343300170560ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -a or %s boolean...\n", progname, progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int i, get_all = 0, rc = 0, active, pending, len = 0, opt; char **names = NULL; while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "a")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'a': if (argc > 2) usage(argv[0]); if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: SELinux is disabled\n", argv[0]); return 1; } errno = 0; rc = security_get_boolean_names(&names, &len); if (rc) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to get boolean names: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); return 1; } if (!len) { printf("No booleans\n"); return 0; } get_all = 1; break; default: usage(argv[0]); } } if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: SELinux is disabled\n", argv[0]); return 1; } if (!len) { if (argc < 2) usage(argv[0]); len = argc - 1; names = calloc(len, sizeof(char *)); if (!names) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: out of memory\n", argv[0]); return 2; } for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { names[i] = strdup(argv[i + 1]); if (!names[i]) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: out of memory\n", argv[0]); rc = 2; goto out; } } } for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { active = security_get_boolean_active(names[i]); if (active < 0) { if (get_all && errno == EACCES) continue; fprintf(stderr, "Error getting active value for %s\n", names[i]); rc = -1; goto out; } pending = security_get_boolean_pending(names[i]); if (pending < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error getting pending value for %s\n", names[i]); rc = -1; goto out; } char *alt_name = selinux_boolean_sub(names[i]); if (! alt_name) { perror("Out of memory\n"); rc = -1; goto out; } if (pending != active) { printf("%s --> %s pending: %s\n", alt_name, (active ? "on" : "off"), (pending ? "on" : "off")); } else { printf("%s --> %s\n", alt_name, (active ? "on" : "off")); } free(alt_name); } out: for (i = 0; i < len; i++) free(names[i]); free(names); return rc; } libselinux-3.5/utils/getseuser.c000066400000000000000000000023621437566343300170720ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *seuser = NULL, *level = NULL; char **contextlist; int rc, n, i; if (argc != 3) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s linuxuser fromcon\n", argv[0]); return 1; } if (!is_selinux_enabled()) { fprintf(stderr, "%s may be used only on a SELinux enabled kernel.\n", argv[0]); return 4; } rc = getseuserbyname(argv[1], &seuser, &level); if (rc) { fprintf(stderr, "getseuserbyname failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return 2; } printf("seuser: %s, level %s\n", seuser, level); rc = security_check_context(argv[2]); if (rc) { fprintf(stderr, "context '%s' is invalid\n", argv[2]); free(seuser); free(level); return 5; } n = get_ordered_context_list_with_level(seuser, level, argv[2], &contextlist); if (n < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "get_ordered_context_list_with_level failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); free(seuser); free(level); return 3; } free(seuser); free(level); if (n == 0) printf("no valid context found\n"); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) printf("Context %d\t%s\n", i, contextlist[i]); freeconary(contextlist); return EXIT_SUCCESS; } libselinux-3.5/utils/matchpathcon.c000066400000000000000000000077301437566343300175410ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-V] [-N] [-n] [-m type] [-f file_contexts_file] [-p prefix] [-P policy_root_path] filepath...\n", progname); exit(1); } static int printmatchpathcon(struct selabel_handle *hnd, const char *path, int header, int mode, int notrans) { char *buf = NULL; int rc; if (notrans) { rc = selabel_lookup_raw(hnd, &buf, path, mode); } else { rc = selabel_lookup(hnd, &buf, path, mode); } if (rc < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) { buf = strdup("<>"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "selabel_lookup(%s) failed: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); return 1; } } if (header) printf("%s\t%s\n", path, buf); else printf("%s\n", buf); freecon(buf); return 0; } static mode_t string_to_mode(char *s) { switch (s[0]) { case 'b': return S_IFBLK; case 'c': return S_IFCHR; case 'd': return S_IFDIR; case 'p': return S_IFIFO; case 'l': return S_IFLNK; case 's': return S_IFSOCK; case 'f': return S_IFREG; default: return -1; } return -1; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int i, force_mode = 0; int header = 1, opt; int verify = 0; int notrans = 0; int error = 0; int quiet = 0; struct selabel_handle *hnd; struct selinux_opt options[SELABEL_NOPT] = {}; if (argc < 2) usage(argv[0]); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "m:Nnf:P:p:Vq")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'n': header = 0; break; case 'm': force_mode = string_to_mode(optarg); if (force_mode < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: mode %s is invalid\n", argv[0], optarg); exit(1); } break; case 'V': verify = 1; break; case 'N': notrans = 1; break; case 'f': options[SELABEL_OPT_PATH].type = SELABEL_OPT_PATH; options[SELABEL_OPT_PATH].value = optarg; break; case 'P': if (selinux_set_policy_root(optarg) < 0 ) { fprintf(stderr, "Error setting policy root %s: %s\n", optarg, errno ? strerror(errno) : "invalid"); exit(1); } break; case 'p': // This option has been deprecated since libselinux 2.5 (2016): // https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/commit/26e05da0fc2d0a4bd274320968a88f8acbb3b6a6 fprintf(stderr, "Warning: using %s -p is deprecated\n", argv[0]); options[SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET].type = SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET; options[SELABEL_OPT_SUBSET].value = optarg; break; case 'q': quiet = 1; break; default: usage(argv[0]); } } hnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, options, SELABEL_NOPT); if (!hnd) { fprintf(stderr, "Error while opening file contexts database: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return -1; } for (i = optind; i < argc; i++) { int rc, mode = 0; struct stat buf; char *path = argv[i]; int len = strlen(path); if (len > 1 && path[len - 1 ] == '/') path[len - 1 ] = '\0'; if (lstat(path, &buf) == 0) mode = buf.st_mode; if (force_mode) mode = force_mode; if (verify) { rc = selinux_file_context_verify(path, mode); if (quiet) { if (rc == 1) continue; else exit(1); } if (rc == -1) { printf("%s error: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); exit(1); } else if (rc == 1) { printf("%s verified.\n", path); } else { char * con; error = 1; if (notrans) rc = lgetfilecon_raw(path, &con); else rc = lgetfilecon(path, &con); if (rc >= 0) { printf("%s has context %s, should be ", path, con); printmatchpathcon(hnd, path, 0, mode, notrans); freecon(con); } else { printf ("actual context unknown: %s, should be ", strerror(errno)); printmatchpathcon(hnd, path, 0, mode, notrans); } } } else { error |= printmatchpathcon(hnd, path, header, mode, notrans); } } selabel_close(hnd); return error; } libselinux-3.5/utils/policyvers.c000066400000000000000000000006051437566343300172610ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc __attribute__ ((unused)), char **argv) { int rc; rc = security_policyvers(); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_policyvers() failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(2); } printf("%d\n", rc); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } libselinux-3.5/utils/sefcontext_compile.c000066400000000000000000000271471437566343300207660ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../src/label_file.h" #include "../src/regex.h" static const char *policy_file; static int ctx_err; static int validate_context(char **ctxp) { char *ctx = *ctxp; if (policy_file && sepol_check_context(ctx) < 0) { ctx_err = -1; return ctx_err; } return 0; } static int process_file(struct selabel_handle *rec, const char *filename) { unsigned int line_num; int rc; char *line_buf = NULL; size_t line_len = 0; FILE *context_file; const char *prefix = NULL; context_file = fopen(filename, "r"); if (!context_file) { fprintf(stderr, "Error opening %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno)); return -1; } line_num = 0; rc = 0; while (getline(&line_buf, &line_len, context_file) > 0) { rc = process_line(rec, filename, prefix, line_buf, ++line_num); if (rc || ctx_err) { /* With -p option need to check and fail if ctx err as * process_line() context validation on Linux does not * return an error, but does print the error line to * stderr. Android will set both to error and print * the error line. */ rc = -1; goto out; } } out: free(line_buf); fclose(context_file); return rc; } /* * File Format * * u32 - magic number * u32 - version * u32 - length of pcre version EXCLUDING nul * char - pcre version string EXCLUDING nul * u32 - number of stems * ** Stems * u32 - length of stem EXCLUDING nul * char - stem char array INCLUDING nul * u32 - number of regexs * ** Regexes * u32 - length of upcoming context INCLUDING nul * char - char array of the raw context * u32 - length of the upcoming regex_str * char - char array of the original regex string including the stem. * u32 - mode bits for >= SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_MODE * mode_t for <= SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_PCRE_VERS * s32 - stemid associated with the regex * u32 - spec has meta characters * u32 - The specs prefix_len if >= SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_PREFIX_LEN * u32 - data length of the pcre regex * char - a buffer holding the raw pcre regex info * u32 - data length of the pcre regex study daya * char - a buffer holding the raw pcre regex study data */ static int write_binary_file(struct saved_data *data, int fd, int do_write_precompregex) { struct spec *specs = data->spec_arr; FILE *bin_file; size_t len; uint32_t magic = SELINUX_MAGIC_COMPILED_FCONTEXT; uint32_t section_len; uint32_t i; int rc; const char *reg_version; const char *reg_arch; bin_file = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (!bin_file) { perror("fopen output_file"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* write some magic number */ len = fwrite(&magic, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* write the version */ section_len = SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_MAX_VERS; len = fwrite(§ion_len, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* write version of the regex back-end */ reg_version = regex_version(); if (!reg_version) goto err; section_len = strlen(reg_version); len = fwrite(§ion_len, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; len = fwrite(reg_version, sizeof(char), section_len, bin_file); if (len != section_len) goto err; /* write regex arch string */ reg_arch = regex_arch_string(); if (!reg_arch) goto err; section_len = strlen(reg_arch); len = fwrite(§ion_len, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; len = fwrite(reg_arch, sizeof(char), section_len, bin_file); if (len != section_len) goto err; /* write the number of stems coming */ section_len = data->num_stems; len = fwrite(§ion_len, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; for (i = 0; i < section_len; i++) { char *stem = data->stem_arr[i].buf; uint32_t stem_len = data->stem_arr[i].len; /* write the strlen (aka no nul) */ len = fwrite(&stem_len, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* include the nul in the file */ stem_len += 1; len = fwrite(stem, sizeof(char), stem_len, bin_file); if (len != stem_len) goto err; } /* write the number of regexes coming */ section_len = data->nspec; len = fwrite(§ion_len, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; for (i = 0; i < section_len; i++) { char *context = specs[i].lr.ctx_raw; char *regex_str = specs[i].regex_str; mode_t mode = specs[i].mode; size_t prefix_len = specs[i].prefix_len; int32_t stem_id = specs[i].stem_id; struct regex_data *re = specs[i].regex; uint32_t to_write; /* length of the context string (including nul) */ to_write = strlen(context) + 1; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* original context strin (including nul) */ len = fwrite(context, sizeof(char), to_write, bin_file); if (len != to_write) goto err; /* length of the original regex string (including nul) */ to_write = strlen(regex_str) + 1; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* original regex string */ len = fwrite(regex_str, sizeof(char), to_write, bin_file); if (len != to_write) goto err; /* binary F_MODE bits */ to_write = mode; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* stem for this regex (could be -1) */ len = fwrite(&stem_id, sizeof(stem_id), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* does this spec have a metaChar? */ to_write = specs[i].hasMetaChars; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(to_write), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* For SELINUX_COMPILED_FCONTEXT_PREFIX_LEN */ to_write = prefix_len; len = fwrite(&to_write, sizeof(to_write), 1, bin_file); if (len != 1) goto err; /* Write regex related data */ rc = regex_writef(re, bin_file, do_write_precompregex); if (rc < 0) goto err; } rc = 0; out: fclose(bin_file); return rc; err: rc = -1; goto out; } static void free_specs(struct saved_data *data) { struct spec *specs = data->spec_arr; unsigned int num_entries = data->nspec; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) { free(specs[i].lr.ctx_raw); free(specs[i].lr.ctx_trans); free(specs[i].regex_str); free(specs[i].type_str); regex_data_free(specs[i].regex); } free(specs); num_entries = data->num_stems; for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) free(data->stem_arr[i].buf); free(data->stem_arr); memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); } static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-o out_file] [-p policy_file] fc_file\n" "Where:\n\t" "-o Optional file name of the PCRE formatted binary\n\t" " file to be output. If not specified the default\n\t" " will be fc_file with the .bin suffix appended.\n\t" "-p Optional binary policy file that will be used to\n\t" " validate contexts defined in the fc_file.\n\t" "-r Omit precompiled regular expressions from the output.\n\t" " (PCRE2 only. Compiled PCRE2 regular expressions are\n\t" " not portable across architectures. Use this flag\n\t" " if you know that you build for an incompatible\n\t" " architecture to save space. When linked against\n\t" " PCRE1 this flag is ignored.)\n\t" "-i Print regular expression info end exit. That is, back\n\t" " end version and architecture identifier.\n\t" " Arch identifier format (PCRE2):\n\t" " --, e.g.,\n\t" " \"8-8-el\" for x86_64.\n\t" "fc_file The text based file contexts file to be processed.\n", progname); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { const char *path = NULL; const char *out_file = NULL; int do_write_precompregex = 1; char stack_path[PATH_MAX + 1]; char *tmp = NULL; int fd, rc, opt; FILE *policy_fp = NULL; struct stat buf; struct selabel_handle *rec = NULL; struct saved_data *data = NULL; if (argc < 2) usage(argv[0]); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "io:p:r")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'o': out_file = optarg; break; case 'p': policy_file = optarg; break; case 'r': do_write_precompregex = 0; break; case 'i': printf("%s (%s)\n", regex_version(), regex_arch_string()); return 0; default: usage(argv[0]); } } if (optind >= argc) usage(argv[0]); path = argv[optind]; if (stat(path, &buf) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: could not stat: %s: %s\n", argv[0], path, strerror(errno)); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* Open binary policy if supplied. */ if (policy_file) { policy_fp = fopen(policy_file, "r"); if (!policy_fp) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to open %s: %s\n", argv[0], policy_file, strerror(errno)); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (sepol_set_policydb_from_file(policy_fp) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to load policy from %s\n", argv[0], policy_file); fclose(policy_fp); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } /* Generate dummy handle for process_line() function */ rec = (struct selabel_handle *)calloc(1, sizeof(*rec)); if (!rec) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: calloc failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); if (policy_fp) fclose(policy_fp); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } rec->backend = SELABEL_CTX_FILE; /* Need to set validation on to get the bin file generated by the * process_line function, however as the bin file being generated * may not be related to the currently loaded policy (that it * would be validated against), then set callback to ignore any * validation - unless the -p option is used in which case if an * error is detected, the process will be aborted. */ rec->validating = 1; selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_VALIDATE, (union selinux_callback)&validate_context); data = (struct saved_data *)calloc(1, sizeof(*data)); if (!data) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: calloc failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); free(rec); if (policy_fp) fclose(policy_fp); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } rec->data = data; rc = process_file(rec, path); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: process_file failed\n", argv[0]); goto err; } rc = sort_specs(data); if (rc) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: sort_specs failed\n", argv[0]); goto err; } if (out_file) rc = snprintf(stack_path, sizeof(stack_path), "%s", out_file); else rc = snprintf(stack_path, sizeof(stack_path), "%s.bin", path); if (rc < 0 || rc >= (int)sizeof(stack_path)) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: snprintf failed\n", argv[0]); goto err; } tmp = malloc(strlen(stack_path) + 7); if (!tmp) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: malloc failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); goto err; } rc = sprintf(tmp, "%sXXXXXX", stack_path); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: sprintf failed\n", argv[0]); goto err; } fd = mkstemp(tmp); if (fd < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: mkstemp %s failed: %s\n", argv[0], tmp, strerror(errno)); goto err; } rc = fchmod(fd, buf.st_mode); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: fchmod %s failed: %s\n", argv[0], tmp, strerror(errno)); goto err_unlink; } rc = write_binary_file(data, fd, do_write_precompregex); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: write_binary_file %s failed\n", argv[0], tmp); goto err_unlink; } rc = rename(tmp, stack_path); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: rename %s -> %s failed: %s\n", argv[0], tmp, stack_path, strerror(errno)); goto err_unlink; } rc = 0; out: if (policy_fp) fclose(policy_fp); free_specs(data); free(rec); free(data); free(tmp); return rc; err_unlink: unlink(tmp); err: rc = -1; goto out; } libselinux-3.5/utils/selabel_digest.c000066400000000000000000000105731437566343300200350ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include static size_t digest_len; static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -b backend [-d] [-v] [-B] [-i] [-f file]\n\n" "Where:\n\t" "-b The backend - \"file\", \"media\", \"x\", \"db\" or " "\"prop\"\n\t" "-v Run \"cat | openssl dgst -sha1 -hex\"\n\t" " on the list of specfiles to compare the SHA1 digests.\n\t" "-B Use base specfiles only (valid for \"-b file\" only).\n\t" "-i Do not request a digest.\n\t" "-f Optional file containing the specs (defaults to\n\t" " those used by loaded policy).\n\n", progname); exit(1); } static int run_check_digest(char *cmd, char *selabel_digest) { FILE *fp; char files_digest[128]; char *files_ptr; int rc = 0; fp = popen(cmd, "r"); if (!fp) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to run command '%s': %s\n", cmd, strerror(errno)); return -1; } /* Only expect one line "(stdin)= x.." so read and find first space */ while (fgets(files_digest, sizeof(files_digest) - 1, fp) != NULL) ; files_ptr = strstr(files_digest, " "); rc = strncmp(selabel_digest, files_ptr + 1, digest_len * 2); if (rc) { printf("Failed validation:\n\tselabel_digest: %s\n\t" "files_digest: %s\n", selabel_digest, files_ptr + 1); } else { printf("Passed validation - digest: %s\n", selabel_digest); } pclose(fp); return rc; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int backend = 0, rc, opt, validate = 0; char *baseonly = NULL, *file = NULL, *digest = (char *)1; char **specfiles = NULL; unsigned char *sha1_digest = NULL; size_t i, num_specfiles; char cmd_buf[4096]; char *cmd_ptr; char *sha1_buf; struct selabel_handle *hnd; struct selinux_opt selabel_option[] = { { SELABEL_OPT_PATH, file }, { SELABEL_OPT_BASEONLY, baseonly }, { SELABEL_OPT_DIGEST, digest } }; if (argc < 3) usage(argv[0]); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ib:Bvf:")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'b': if (!strcasecmp(optarg, "file")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_FILE; } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "media")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_MEDIA; } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "x")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_X; } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "db")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_DB; } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "prop")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_PROP; } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "service")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_SERVICE; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown backend: %s\n", optarg); usage(argv[0]); } break; case 'B': baseonly = (char *)1; break; case 'v': validate = 1; break; case 'i': digest = NULL; break; case 'f': file = optarg; break; default: usage(argv[0]); } } memset(cmd_buf, 0, sizeof(cmd_buf)); selabel_option[0].value = file; selabel_option[1].value = baseonly; selabel_option[2].value = digest; hnd = selabel_open(backend, selabel_option, 3); if (!hnd) { switch (errno) { case EOVERFLOW: fprintf(stderr, "ERROR Number of specfiles or specfile" " buffer caused an overflow.\n"); break; default: fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: selabel_open: %s\n", strerror(errno)); } return -1; } rc = selabel_digest(hnd, &sha1_digest, &digest_len, &specfiles, &num_specfiles); if (rc) { switch (errno) { case EINVAL: fprintf(stderr, "No digest available.\n"); break; default: fprintf(stderr, "selabel_digest ERROR: %s\n", strerror(errno)); } goto err; } sha1_buf = malloc(digest_len * 2 + 1); if (!sha1_buf) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not malloc buffer ERROR: %s\n", strerror(errno)); rc = -1; goto err; } printf("SHA1 digest: "); for (i = 0; i < digest_len; i++) sprintf(&(sha1_buf[i * 2]), "%02x", sha1_digest[i]); printf("%s\n", sha1_buf); printf("calculated using the following specfile(s):\n"); if (specfiles) { cmd_ptr = &cmd_buf[0]; sprintf(cmd_ptr, "/usr/bin/cat "); cmd_ptr = &cmd_buf[0] + strlen(cmd_buf); for (i = 0; i < num_specfiles; i++) { sprintf(cmd_ptr, "%s ", specfiles[i]); cmd_ptr += strlen(specfiles[i]) + 1; printf("%s\n", specfiles[i]); } sprintf(cmd_ptr, "| /usr/bin/openssl dgst -sha1 -hex"); if (validate) rc = run_check_digest(cmd_buf, sha1_buf); } free(sha1_buf); err: selabel_close(hnd); return rc; } libselinux-3.5/utils/selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches.c000066400000000000000000000076221437566343300251300ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../src/label_file.h" static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-vr] [-f file] path\n\n" "Where:\n\t" "-v Validate file_contxts entries against loaded policy.\n\t" "-r Recursively descend directories.\n\t" "-f Optional file_contexts file (defaults to current policy).\n\t" "path Path to check current SHA1 digest against file_contexts entries.\n\n" "This will check the directory selinux.sehash SHA1 digest for " " against\na newly generated digest based on the " "file_context entries for that node\n(using the regx, mode " "and path entries).\n", progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int opt, fts_flags; size_t i, digest_len; bool status, recurse = false; FTS *fts; FTSENT *ftsent; char *validate = NULL, *file = NULL; char *paths[2] = { NULL, NULL }; uint8_t *xattr_digest = NULL; uint8_t *calculated_digest = NULL; char *sha1_buf = NULL; struct selabel_handle *hnd; struct selinux_opt selabel_option[] = { { SELABEL_OPT_PATH, file }, { SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE, validate } }; if (argc < 2) usage(argv[0]); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "f:rv")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'f': file = optarg; break; case 'r': recurse = true; break; case 'v': validate = (char *)1; break; default: usage(argv[0]); } } if (optind >= argc) { fprintf(stderr, "No pathname specified\n"); exit(-1); } paths[0] = argv[optind]; selabel_option[0].value = file; selabel_option[1].value = validate; hnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, selabel_option, 2); if (!hnd) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: selabel_open - Could not obtain " "handle: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return -1; } fts_flags = FTS_PHYSICAL | FTS_NOCHDIR; fts = fts_open(paths, fts_flags, NULL); if (!fts) { printf("fts error on %s: %s\n", paths[0], strerror(errno)); return -1; } while ((ftsent = fts_read(fts)) != NULL) { switch (ftsent->fts_info) { case FTS_DP: continue; case FTS_D: { xattr_digest = NULL; calculated_digest = NULL; digest_len = 0; status = selabel_get_digests_all_partial_matches(hnd, ftsent->fts_path, &calculated_digest, &xattr_digest, &digest_len); sha1_buf = calloc(1, digest_len * 2 + 1); if (!sha1_buf) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not calloc buffer ERROR: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (status) { /* They match */ printf("xattr and file_contexts SHA1 digests match for: %s\n", ftsent->fts_path); if (calculated_digest) { for (i = 0; i < digest_len; i++) sprintf((&sha1_buf[i * 2]), "%02x", calculated_digest[i]); printf("SHA1 digest: %s\n", sha1_buf); } } else { if (!calculated_digest) { printf("No SHA1 digest available for: %s\n", ftsent->fts_path); printf("as file_context entry is \"<>\"\n"); goto cleanup; } printf("The file_context entries for: %s\n", ftsent->fts_path); for (i = 0; i < digest_len; i++) sprintf((&sha1_buf[i * 2]), "%02x", calculated_digest[i]); printf("generated SHA1 digest: %s\n", sha1_buf); if (!xattr_digest) { printf("however there is no selinux.sehash xattr entry.\n"); } else { printf("however it does NOT match the current entry of:\n"); for (i = 0; i < digest_len; i++) sprintf((&sha1_buf[i * 2]), "%02x", xattr_digest[i]); printf("%s\n", sha1_buf); } } cleanup: free(xattr_digest); free(calculated_digest); free(sha1_buf); break; } default: break; } if (!recurse) break; } (void) fts_close(fts); (void) selabel_close(hnd); return 0; } libselinux-3.5/utils/selabel_lookup.c000066400000000000000000000062051437566343300200640ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -b backend [-v] [-r] -k key [-t type] [-f file]\n\n" "Where:\n\t" "-b The backend - \"file\", \"media\", \"x\", \"db\" or " "\"prop\"\n\t" "-v Validate entries against loaded policy.\n\t" "-r Use \"raw\" function.\n\t" "-k Lookup key - Depends on backend.\n\t" "-t Lookup type - Optional as depends on backend.\n\t" "-f Optional file containing the specs (defaults to\n\t" " those used by loaded policy).\n\n" "Examples:\n\t" "%s -v -b file -k /run -t 0\n\t" " lookup with validation against the loaded policy, the\n\t" " \"file\" backend for path \"/run\" with mode = 0\n\t" "%s -r -b x -t 4 -k X11:ButtonPress\n\t" " lookup_raw the \"X\" backend for type SELABEL_X_EVENT\n\t" " using key \"X11:ButtonPress\"\n\n", progname, progname, progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int raw = 0, type = 0, backend = 0, rc, opt; char *validate = NULL, *key = NULL, *context = NULL, *file = NULL; struct selabel_handle *hnd; struct selinux_opt selabel_option[] = { { SELABEL_OPT_PATH, file }, { SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE, validate } }; if (argc < 3) usage(argv[0]); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "b:f:vrk:t:")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'b': if (!strcasecmp(optarg, "file")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_FILE; } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "media")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_MEDIA; } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "x")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_X; } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "db")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_DB; } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "prop")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_PROP; } else if (!strcmp(optarg, "service")) { backend = SELABEL_CTX_ANDROID_SERVICE; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown backend: %s\n", optarg); usage(argv[0]); } break; case 'f': file = optarg; break; case 'v': validate = (char *)1; break; case 'r': raw = 1; break; case 'k': key = optarg; break; case 't': type = atoi(optarg); break; default: usage(argv[0]); } } selabel_option[0].value = file; selabel_option[1].value = validate; hnd = selabel_open(backend, selabel_option, 2); if (!hnd) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: selabel_open - Could not obtain " "handle: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return -1; } switch (raw) { case 1: rc = selabel_lookup_raw(hnd, &context, key, type); break; default: rc = selabel_lookup(hnd, &context, key, type); } selabel_close(hnd); if (rc) { switch (errno) { case ENOENT: fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: selabel_lookup failed to " "find a valid context.\n"); break; case EINVAL: fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: selabel_lookup failed to " "validate context, or key / type are " "invalid.\n"); break; default: fprintf(stderr, "selabel_lookup ERROR: %s\n", strerror(errno)); } } else { printf("Default context: %s\n", context); freecon(context); } return rc; } libselinux-3.5/utils/selabel_lookup_best_match.c000066400000000000000000000071071437566343300222570ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v] [-r] -p path [-m mode] [-f file] [link...]\n\n" "Where:\n\t" "-v Validate file_contxts entries against loaded policy.\n\t" "-r Use \"raw\" function.\n\t" "-p Path to check for best match using the link(s) provided.\n\t" "-m Optional mode (b, c, d, p, l, s or f) Defaults to 0.\n\t" "-f Optional file containing the specs (defaults to\n\t" " those used by loaded policy).\n\t" "link Zero or more links to check against, the order of\n\t" " precedence for best match is:\n\t\t" " 1) An exact match for the real path (if no links), or\n\t\t" " 2) An exact match for any of the links (aliases), or\n\t\t" " 3) The longest fixed prefix match.\n\n" "Example:\n\t" "%s -p /dev/initctl /run/systemd/initctl/fifo\n\t" " Find best matching context for the specified path using one link.\n\n", progname, progname); exit(1); } static mode_t string_to_mode(const char *s) { switch (s[0]) { case 'b': return S_IFBLK; case 'c': return S_IFCHR; case 'd': return S_IFDIR; case 'p': return S_IFIFO; case 'l': return S_IFLNK; case 's': return S_IFSOCK; case 'f': return S_IFREG; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int raw = 0, mode = 0, rc, opt, i, num_links; char *validate = NULL, *path = NULL, *context = NULL, *file = NULL; char **links = NULL; struct selabel_handle *hnd; struct selinux_opt options[] = { { SELABEL_OPT_PATH, file }, { SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE, validate } }; if (argc < 3) usage(argv[0]); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "f:vrp:m:")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'f': file = optarg; break; case 'v': validate = (char *)1; break; case 'r': raw = 1; break; case 'p': path = optarg; break; case 'm': mode = string_to_mode(optarg); break; default: usage(argv[0]); } } /* Count links */ for (i = optind, num_links = 0; i < argc; i++, num_links++) ; if (num_links) { links = calloc(num_links + 1, sizeof(char *)); if (!links) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: calloc failed.\n"); exit(1); } for (i = optind, num_links = 0; i < argc; i++, num_links++) { links[num_links] = strdup(argv[i]); if (!links[num_links]) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: strdup failed.\n"); exit(1); } } } options[0].value = file; options[1].value = validate; hnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, options, 2); if (!hnd) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: selabel_open - Could not obtain " "handle: %s\n", strerror(errno)); rc = -1; goto out; } if (raw) rc = selabel_lookup_best_match_raw(hnd, &context, path, (const char **)links, mode); else rc = selabel_lookup_best_match(hnd, &context, path, (const char **)links, mode); selabel_close(hnd); if (rc) { switch (errno) { case ENOENT: fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: selabel_lookup_best_match " "failed to find a valid context.\n"); break; case EINVAL: fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: selabel_lookup_best_match " "failed to validate context, or path / mode " "are invalid.\n"); break; default: fprintf(stderr, "selabel_lookup_best_match ERROR: " "%s\n", strerror(errno)); } } else { printf("Best match context: %s\n", context); freecon(context); } out: if (links) { for (i = 0; links[i]; i++) free(links[i]); free(links); } return rc; } libselinux-3.5/utils/selabel_partial_match.c000066400000000000000000000034471437566343300213700ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v] -p [-f file]\n\n" "Where:\n\t" "-v Validate file_contxts entries against loaded policy.\n\t" "-p Path to check if a match or partial match is possible\n\t" " against a regex entry in the file_contexts file.\n\t" "-f Optional file_contexts file (defaults to current policy).\n\n" "Example:\n\t" "%s -p /sys/devices/system/cpu/online\n\t" " Check if a match or partial match is possible against\n\t" " the path \"/sys/devices/system/cpu/online\", returning\n\t" " TRUE or FALSE.\n\n", progname, progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int opt; bool partial_match; char *validate = NULL, *path = NULL, *file = NULL; struct selabel_handle *hnd; struct selinux_opt selabel_option[] = { { SELABEL_OPT_PATH, file }, { SELABEL_OPT_VALIDATE, validate } }; if (argc < 2) usage(argv[0]); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "f:vp:")) > 0) { switch (opt) { case 'f': file = optarg; break; case 'v': validate = (char *)1; break; case 'p': path = optarg; break; default: usage(argv[0]); } } selabel_option[0].value = file; selabel_option[1].value = validate; hnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, selabel_option, 2); if (!hnd) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: selabel_open - Could not obtain " "handle: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return -1; } partial_match = selabel_partial_match(hnd, path); printf("Match or Partial match: %s\n", partial_match == 1 ? "TRUE" : "FALSE"); selabel_close(hnd); return partial_match; } libselinux-3.5/utils/selinux_check_access.c000066400000000000000000000021151437566343300212250ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-a auditdata] scon tcon class perm\n" "\nWhere:\n\t" "-a Optional information added to audit message.\n", progname); exit(1); } static int cb_auditinfo(void *auditdata, __attribute__((unused))security_class_t class, char *msgbuf, size_t msgbufsize) { return snprintf(msgbuf, msgbufsize, "%s", (char *)auditdata); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int opt, rc; char *audit_msg = NULL; while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "a:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'a': audit_msg = optarg; break; default: usage(argv[0]); } } if ((argc - optind) != 4) usage(argv[0]); if (audit_msg) selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_AUDIT, (union selinux_callback)cb_auditinfo); rc = selinux_check_access(argv[optind], argv[optind + 1], argv[optind + 2], argv[optind + 3], audit_msg); if (rc < 0) perror("selinux_check_access"); return rc; } libselinux-3.5/utils/selinux_check_securetty_context.c000066400000000000000000000012241437566343300235570ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s tty_context...\n", progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int i; if (argc < 2) usage(argv[0]); for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { switch (selinux_check_securetty_context(argv[i])) { case 0: printf("%s securetty.\n", argv[i]); break; default: printf("%s not securetty.\n", argv[i]); break; } } return 0; } libselinux-3.5/utils/selinuxenabled.c000066400000000000000000000002131437566343300200570ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include int main(void) { return !is_selinux_enabled(); } libselinux-3.5/utils/selinuxexeccon.c000066400000000000000000000025141437566343300201170ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *name, const char *detail, int rc) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s command [ fromcon ]\n", name); if (detail) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s\n", name, detail); exit(rc); } static char * get_selinux_proc_context(const char *command, const char * execcon) { char * fcon = NULL, *newcon = NULL; int ret = getfilecon(command, &fcon); if (ret < 0) goto err; ret = security_compute_create(execcon, fcon, string_to_security_class("process"), &newcon); if (ret < 0) goto err; err: freecon(fcon); return newcon; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ret = -1; char * proccon = NULL, *con = NULL; if (argc < 2 || argc > 3) usage(argv[0], "Invalid number of arguments", -1); if (argc == 2) { if (getcon(&con) < 0) { perror(argv[0]); return -1; } } else { con = strdup(argv[2]); if (security_check_context(con)) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid from context '%s'\n", argv[0], con); return -1; } } proccon = get_selinux_proc_context(argv[1], con); if (proccon) { printf("%s\n", proccon); ret = 0; } else { perror(argv[0]); } free(proccon); free(con); return ret; } libselinux-3.5/utils/setenforce.c000066400000000000000000000017271437566343300172250ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void usage(const char *progname) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [ Enforcing | Permissive | 1 | 0 ]\n", progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc = 0; if (argc != 2) { usage(argv[0]); } if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: SELinux is disabled\n", argv[0]); return 1; } if (strlen(argv[1]) == 1 && (argv[1][0] == '0' || argv[1][0] == '1')) { rc = security_setenforce(atoi(argv[1])); } else { if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "enforcing") == 0) { rc = security_setenforce(1); } else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "permissive") == 0) { rc = security_setenforce(0); } else usage(argv[0]); } if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: security_setenforce() failed: %s\n", argv[0], strerror(errno)); return 2; } return 0; } libselinux-3.5/utils/setfilecon.c000066400000000000000000000007641437566343300172230ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc, i; if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s context path...\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } for (i = 2; i < argc; i++) { rc = setfilecon(argv[i], argv[1]); if (rc < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: setfilecon(%s,%s) failed: %s\n", argv[0], argv[i], argv[1], strerror(errno)); exit(2); } } exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } libselinux-3.5/utils/togglesebool.c000066400000000000000000000042141437566343300175470ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* Attempt to rollback the transaction. No need to check error codes since this is rolling back something that blew up. */ static __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) void rollback(int argc, char **argv) { int i; for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) security_set_boolean(argv[i], security_get_boolean_active(argv[i])); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc, i, commit = 0; if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: SELinux is disabled\n", argv[0]); return 1; } if (argc < 2) { printf("Usage: %s boolname1 [boolname2 ...]\n", basename(argv[0])); return 1; } for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { printf("%s: ", argv[i]); rc = security_get_boolean_active(argv[i]); switch (rc) { case 1: if (security_set_boolean(argv[i], 0) >= 0) { printf("inactive\n"); commit++; } else { printf("%s - rolling back all changes\n", strerror(errno)); rollback(i, argv); } break; case 0: if (security_set_boolean(argv[i], 1) >= 0) { printf("active\n"); commit++; } else { printf("%s - rolling back all changes\n", strerror(errno)); rollback(i, argv); } break; default: if (errno == ENOENT) printf ("Boolean does not exist - rolling back all changes.\n"); else printf("%s - rolling back all changes.\n", strerror(errno)); rollback(i, argv); break; /* Not reached. */ } } if (commit > 0) { if (security_commit_booleans() < 0) { printf("Commit failed. (%s) No change to booleans.\n", strerror(errno)); } else { /* syslog all the changes */ struct passwd *pwd = getpwuid(getuid()); for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { if (pwd && pwd->pw_name) syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "The %s policy boolean was toggled by %s", argv[i], pwd->pw_name); else syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "The %s policy boolean was toggled by uid:%u", argv[i], getuid()); } return 0; } } return 1; } libselinux-3.5/utils/validatetrans.c000066400000000000000000000020061437566343300177200ustar00rootroot00000000000000#include #include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { security_class_t tclass; int ret; if (argc != 5) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s scontext tcontext tclass newcontext\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } if (security_check_context(argv[1])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid source context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[1]); exit(4); } if (security_check_context(argv[2])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[2]); exit(5); } tclass = string_to_security_class(argv[3]); if (!tclass) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid class '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[3]); exit(2); } if (security_check_context(argv[4])) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid new context '%s'\n", argv[0], argv[4]); exit(6); } ret = security_validatetrans(argv[1], argv[2], tclass, argv[4]); printf("security_validatetrans returned %d errno: %s\n", ret, strerror(errno)); return ret; }