openssh-8.2p1004075500017500001750000000000001362136675600114155ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/.depend010064400017500001750000004074261362136673500127430ustar00djmdjm# DO NOT DELETE addrmatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h match.h log.h atomicio.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h audit-bsm.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h 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monitor_wrap.h authfd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h compat.h log.h atomicio.h misc.h ssherr.h authfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h ssh.h log.h authfile.h misc.h atomicio.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h krl.h bitmap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h bitmap.h canohost.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h canohost.h misc.h chacha.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h chacha.h channels.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h misc.h channels.h compat.h canohost.h sshkey.h authfd.h pathnames.h match.h cipher-aes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h cipher-aesctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h cipher-chachapoly.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-ctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h misc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h cleanup.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h 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openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h digest-openssl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h dispatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh2.h log.h dispatch.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h compat.h ssherr.h dns.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h 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openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fatal.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h fe25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h ge25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h sc25519.h ge25519.h ge25519_base.data groupaccess.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h groupaccess.h match.h log.h gss-genr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h gss-serv-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h gss-serv.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h hmac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h digest.h hmac.h hostfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h 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openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.h ssh2.h atomicio.h version.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h match.h kex.o: misc.h monitor.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h kexc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h 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openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h kexecdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h kexgen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h kexgex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h kexgexc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h 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openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h krl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h sshkey.h authfile.h 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openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h loginrec.h mac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h digest.h hmac.h umac.h mac.h misc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h match.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h misc.h md5crypt.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h log.h ssh.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h moduli.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h monitor.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h dh.h packet.h dispatch.h auth-options.h sshpty.h channels.h session.h sshlogin.h canohost.h log.h misc.h servconf.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h monitor_fdpass.h compat.h ssh2.h authfd.h match.h ssherr.h sk-api.h monitor.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h monitor_fdpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h monitor_fdpass.h monitor_wrap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h monitor_wrap.o: loginrec.h auth-options.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h atomicio.h monitor_fdpass.h misc.h channels.h session.h servconf.h ssherr.h msg.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h atomicio.h msg.h misc.h mux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h log.h ssh.h ssh2.h pathnames.h misc.h match.h sshbuf.h channels.h msg.h packet.h dispatch.h monitor_fdpass.h sshpty.h sshkey.h readconf.h clientloop.h ssherr.h nchan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h packet.h dispatch.h channels.h compat.h log.h packet.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h compat.h ssh2.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h digest.h log.h canohost.h misc.h channels.h ssh.h packet.o: packet.h dispatch.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h platform-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h platform-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h platform-tracing.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h platform.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h poly1305.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h poly1305.h progressmeter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h progressmeter.h atomicio.h misc.h utf8.h readconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssherr.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h pathnames.h log.h sshkey.h misc.h readconf.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h readconf.o: uidswap.h myproposal.h digest.h readpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h pathnames.h log.h ssh.h uidswap.h rijndael.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h rijndael.h sandbox-capsicum.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-darwin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-null.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-rlimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-seccomp-filter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-solaris.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-systrace.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sc25519.h crypto_api.h scp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h 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config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ssh-add.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h ssh-sk.h ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h compat.h log.h misc.h digest.h ssherr.h match.h msg.h pathnames.h ssh-pkcs11.h sk-api.h ssh-dss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh-ecdsa-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h sshkey.h ssh-ecdsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh-ed25519-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssherr.h ssh.h digest.h ssh-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssherr.h ssh.h ssh-keygen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h authfile.h sshbuf.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h match.h hostfile.h dns.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h ssh-pkcs11.h atomicio.h krl.h digest.h utf8.h authfd.h sshsig.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h ssh-keyscan.o: atomicio.h misc.h hostfile.h ssherr.h ssh_api.h ssh2.h dns.h ssh-keyscan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h compat.h myproposal.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h ssh-keysign.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h sshkey.h ssh.h ssh2.h misc.h sshbuf.h authfile.h msg.h canohost.h pathnames.h readconf.h uidswap.h ssherr.h ssh-pkcs11-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh-pkcs11-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sshkey.h authfd.h ssh-pkcs11.h ssherr.h ssh-pkcs11.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sshkey.h ssh-rsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh-sk-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h msg.h digest.h pathnames.h ssh-sk.h misc.h ssh-sk-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h sshkey.h authfd.h misc.h sshbuf.h msg.h uidswap.h ssherr.h ssh-sk.h ssh-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.o: channels.h sshkey.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h clientloop.h log.h misc.h readconf.h sshconnect.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h version.h ssherr.h myproposal.h utf8.h ssh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h canohost.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssh_api.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh_api.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h authfile.h misc.h ssh_api.o: version.h myproposal.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h sshbuf-getput-basic.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshbuf-getput-crypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf-io.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h atomicio.h sshbuf-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshbuf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h sshconnect.o: authfd.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshconnect.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h hostfile.h ssh.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h sshkey.h sshconnect.h log.h misc.h readconf.h atomicio.h dns.h monitor_fdpass.h ssh2.h version.h authfile.h ssherr.h sshconnect2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshconnect2.o: myproposal.h sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h ssherr.h utf8.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h sshd.o: cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h ssherr.h sk-api.h sshd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h match.h servconf.h uidswap.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h ssherr.o: ssherr.h sshkey-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ssh2.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h match.h ssh-sk.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h sshlogin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshlogin.h ssherr.h loginrec.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshpty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h log.h misc.h sshsig.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h authfd.h authfile.h log.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshsig.h ssherr.h sshkey.h match.h digest.h sshtty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h ttymodes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h ttymodes.h uidswap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h uidswap.h xmalloc.h umac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h umac128.o: umac.c includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h utf8.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h utf8.h verify.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h xmalloc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h xmss_commons.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmss_fast.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmss_hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmss_hash_address.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmss_wots.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openssh-8.2p1/.gitignore010064400017500001750000000006031362136622600134500ustar00djmdjmMakefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.h.in config.log config.status configure openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile openssh.xml opensshd.init survey.sh **/*.0 **/*.o **/*.lo **/*.so **/*.out **/*.a autom4te.cache/ scp sftp sftp-server ssh ssh-add ssh-agent ssh-keygen ssh-keyscan ssh-keysign ssh-pkcs11-helper ssh-sk-helper sshd !regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile tags openssh-8.2p1/.skipped-commit-ids010064400017500001750000000047541362136622600151760ustar00djmdjm5317f294d63a876bfc861e19773b1575f96f027d remove libssh from makefiles a337e886a49f96701ccbc4832bed086a68abfa85 Makefile changes f2c9feb26963615c4fece921906cf72e248b61ee more Makefile fa728823ba21c4b45212750e1d3a4b2086fd1a62 more Makefile refactoring 1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e moduli update 814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f remove redundant make defs 04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40 moduli update c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403 moduli update db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff moduli update 5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f uuencode.c Makefile accident 99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474 include sshbuf-misc.c 9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5 sshbuf-misc.c in regress 569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061 Makefile tweaks for !openssl 58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987 moduli update 4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf Makefile.inc 14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada Makefile.inc 8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e Makefile.inc d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0 Makefile.inc Old upstream tree: 321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35 Update DH groups d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca Remove 1k bit groups aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7 Remove intermediate moduli 8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120 put back SSH1 for 6.9 f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a Generate new moduli edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef Regen moduli 052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2 Switch to tame-based sandbox 7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660 Remove moduli <2k 180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae Update moduli f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee systrace is dead. 96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603 remove DEBUGLIBS from Makefile 6da9a37f74aef9f9cc639004345ad893cad582d8 Update moduli file 77bcb50e47b68c7209c7f0a5a020d73761e5143b unset REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY 38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384 Change COMPILER_VERSION tests 30c20180c87cbc99fa1020489fe7fd8245b6420c resync integrity.sh shell 1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308 integrity.sh reliability fe5b31f69a60d47171836911f144acff77810217 Makefile.inc bits 5781670c0578fe89663c9085ed3ba477cf7e7913 Delete sshconnect1.c ea80f445e819719ccdcb237022cacfac990fdc5c Makefile.inc warning flags b92c93266d8234d493857bb822260dacf4366157 moduli-gen.sh tweak b25bf747544265b39af74fe0716dc8d9f5b63b95 Updated moduli 1bd41cba06a7752de4df304305a8153ebfb6b0ac rsa.[ch] already removed e39b3902fe1d6c4a7ba6a3c58e072219f3c1e604 Makefile changes openssh-8.2p1/CREDITS010064400017500001750000000125661362136622600125130ustar00djmdjmTatu Ylonen - Creator of SSH Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH Ahsan Rashid - UnixWare long passwords Alain St-Denis - Irix fix Alexandre Oliva - AIX fixes Andre Lucas - new login code, many fixes Andreas Steinmetz - Shadow password expiry support Andrew McGill - SCO fixes Andrew Morgan - PAM bugfixes Andrew Stribblehill - Bugfixes Andy Sloane - bugfixes Aran Cox - SCO bugfixes Arkadiusz Miskiewicz - IPv6 compat fixes Ben Lindstrom - NeXT support Ben Taylor - Solaris debugging and fixes Bratislav ILICH - Configure fix Charles Levert - SunOS 4 & bug fixes Chip Salzenberg - Assorted patches Chris Adams - OSF SIA support Chris Saia - SuSE packaging Chris, the Young One - Password auth fixes Christos Zoulas - Autoconf fixes Chun-Chung Chen - RPM fixes Corinna Vinschen - Cygwin support Chad Mynhier - Solaris Process Contract support Dan Brosemer - Autoconf support, build fixes Darren Hall - AIX patches Darren Tucker - AIX BFF package scripts David Agraz - Build fixes David Del Piero - bug fixes David Hesprich - Configure fixes David Rankin - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes Dag-Erling Smørgrav - Challenge-Response PAM code. Dhiraj Gulati - UnixWare long passwords Ed Eden - configure fixes Garrick James - configure fixes Gary E. Miller - SCO support Ged Lodder - HPUX fixes and enhancements Gert Doering - bug and portability fixes HARUYAMA Seigo - Translations & doc fixes Hideaki YOSHIFUJI - IPv6 and bug fixes Hiroshi Takekawa - Configure fixes Holger Trapp - KRB4/AFS config patch IWAMURO Motonori - bugfixes Jani Hakala - Patches Jarno Huuskonen - Bugfixes Jim Knoble - Many patches Jonchen (email unknown) - the original author of PAM support of SSH Juergen Keil - scp bugfixing KAMAHARA Junzo - Configure fixes Kees Cook - scp fixes Kenji Miyake - Configure fixes Kevin Cawlfield - AIX fixes. Kevin O'Connor - RSAless operation Kevin Steves - HP support, bugfixes, improvements Kiyokazu SUTO - Bugfixes Larry Jones - Bugfixes Lutz Jaenicke - Bugfixes Marc G. Fournier - Solaris patches Mark D. Baushke - bug fixes Martin Johansson - Linux fixes Mark D. Roth - Features, bug fixes Mark Miller - Bugfixes Matt Richards - AIX patches Michael Steffens - HP-UX fixes Michael Stone - Irix enhancements Nakaji Hiroyuki - Sony News-OS patch Nalin Dahyabhai - PAM environment patch Nate Itkin - SunOS 4.1.x fixes Niels Kristian Bech Jensen - Assorted patches Pavel Kankovsky - Security fixes Pavel Troller - Bugfixes Pekka Savola - Bugfixes Peter Kocks - Makefile fixes Peter Stuge - mdoc2man.awk script Phil Hands - Debian scripts, assorted patches Phil Karn - Autoconf fixes Philippe WILLEM - Bugfixes Phill Camp - login code fix Rip Loomis - Solaris package support, fixes Robert Dahlem - Reliant Unix fixes Roumen Petrov - Compile & configure fixes SAKAI Kiyotaka - Multiple bugfixes Simon Wilkinson - PAM fixes, Compat with MIT KrbV Solar Designer - many patches and technical assistance Svante Signell - Bugfixes Thomas Neumann - Shadow passwords Tim Rice - Portability & SCO fixes Tobias Oetiker - Bugfixes Tom Bertelson's - AIX auth fixes Tor-Ake Fransson - AIX support Tudor Bosman - MD5 password support Udo Schweigert - ReliantUNIX support Wendy Palm - Cray support. Zack Weinberg - GNOME askpass enhancement Apologies to anyone I have missed. Damien Miller openssh-8.2p1/INSTALL010064400017500001750000000232461362136622600125210ustar00djmdjm1. Prerequisites ---------------- A C compiler. Any C89 or better compiler should work. Where supported, configure will attempt to enable the compiler's run-time integrity checking options. Some notes about specific compilers: - clang: -ftrapv and -sanitize=integer require the compiler-rt runtime (CC=clang LDFLAGS=--rtlib=compiler-rt ./configure) To support Privilege Separation (which is now required) you will need to create the user, group and directory used by sshd for privilege separation. See README.privsep for details. The remaining items are optional. A working installation of zlib: Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (earlier 1.2.x versions have problems): http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ libcrypto from either of LibreSSL or OpenSSL. Building without libcrypto is supported but severely restricts the avilable ciphers and algorithms. - LibreSSL (https://www.libressl.org/) - OpenSSL (https://www.openssl.org) with any of the following versions: - 1.0.x >= 1.0.1 or 1.1.0 >= 1.1.0g or any 1.1.1 Note that due to a bug in EVP_CipherInit OpenSSL 1.1 versions prior to 1.1.0g can't be used. LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library (i.e. -fPIC, eg by configuring OpenSSL as "./config [options] -fPIC" or LibreSSL as "CFLAGS=-fPIC ./configure") otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it. If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need to configure OpenSSH --without-pie. If you build either from source, running the OpenSSL self-test ("make tests") or the LibreSSL equivalent ("make check") and ensuring that all tests pass is strongly recommended. NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd. PRNGD: If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended. It requires that libcrypto be configured to support it. http://prngd.sourceforge.net/ EGD: The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) suppports the same interface as prngd. It also supported only if libcrypto is configured to support it. http://egd.sourceforge.net/ PAM: OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris, HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD, NetBSD and Mac OS X. Information about the various PAM implementations are available: Solaris PAM: http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/ Linux PAM: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ OpenPAM: http://www.openpam.org/ If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME libraries and headers. GNOME: http://www.gnome.org/ Alternatively, Jim Knoble has written an excellent X11 passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/ LibEdit: sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit. If your platform has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try these multi-platform ports: http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/ http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/ LDNS: LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC. http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/ Autoconf: If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked the code out of git yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.69 to rebuild the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf". Earlier versions may also work but this is not guaranteed. http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/ Basic Security Module (BSM): Native BSM support is known to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1, FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X. Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM implementation (http://www.openbsm.org). makedepend: https://www.x.org/archive/individual/util/ If you are making significant changes to the code you may need to rebuild the dependency (.depend) file using "make depend", which requires the "makedepend" tool from the X11 distribution. libfido2: libfido2 allows the use of hardware security keys over USB. libfido2 in turn depends on libcbor. https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2 https://github.com/pjk/libcbor 2. Building / Installation -------------------------- To install OpenSSH with default options: ./configure make make install This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure: ./configure --prefix=/opt make make install Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override specific paths, for example: ./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh make make install This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the configuration files in /etc/ssh. If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname, which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified. A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic", you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service name). There are a few other options to the configure script: --with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module. Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm" (Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported. --with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive). --with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks /dev/random. --with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks /dev/random. --with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file. ./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find it if lastlog is installed in a different place. --without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely. --with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable. --with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords. --with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for some platforms. --without-shadow disables shadow password support. --with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the $DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this. --with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely. --with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is created. --with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary --with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL libraries are installed. --with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support --with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux. If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure. For example: CC="/usr/foo/cc" CFLAGS="-O" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" ./configure 3. Configuration ---------------- The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default). The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements. To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so manually using the following commands: ssh-keygen -t [type] -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N "" for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsa) or ssh-keygen -A to generate keys for all supported types. Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory. (${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during configuration). If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is running and has collected some Entropy. For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent. 4. (Optional) Send survey ------------------------- $ make survey [check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information that you consider sensitive] $ make send-survey This will send configuration information for the currently configured host to a survey address. This will help determine which configurations are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options exist. The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however summary data may be published. 5. Problems? ------------ If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH. Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at https://www.openssh.com/ openssh-8.2p1/LICENCE010064400017500001750000000355301362136622600124540ustar00djmdjmThis file is part of the OpenSSH software. The licences which components of this software fall under are as follows. First, we will summarize and say that all components are under a BSD licence, or a licence more free than that. OpenSSH contains no GPL code. 1) * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". [Tatu continues] * However, I am not implying to give any licenses to any patents or * copyrights held by third parties, and the software includes parts that * are not under my direct control. As far as I know, all included * source code is used in accordance with the relevant license agreements * and can be used freely for any purpose (the GNU license being the most * restrictive); see below for details. [However, none of that term is relevant at this point in time. All of these restrictively licenced software components which he talks about have been removed from OpenSSH, i.e., - RSA is no longer included, found in the OpenSSL library - IDEA is no longer included, its use is deprecated - DES is now external, in the OpenSSL library - GMP is no longer used, and instead we call BN code from OpenSSL - Zlib is now external, in a library - The make-ssh-known-hosts script is no longer included - TSS has been removed - MD5 is now external, in the OpenSSL library - RC4 support has been replaced with ARC4 support from OpenSSL - Blowfish is now external, in the OpenSSL library [The licence continues] Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major bookstore, scientific library, and patent office worldwide. More information can be found e.g. at "http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto". The legal status of this program is some combination of all these permissions and restrictions. Use only at your own responsibility. You will be responsible for any legal consequences yourself; I am not making any claims whether possessing or using this is legal or not in your country, and I am not taking any responsibility on your behalf. NO WARRANTY BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. 3) ssh-keyscan was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style license. * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . * * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. 4) The Rijndael implementation by Vincent Rijmen, Antoon Bosselaers and Paulo Barreto is in the public domain and distributed with the following license: * @version 3.0 (December 2000) * * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) * * @author Vincent Rijmen * @author Antoon Bosselaers * @author Paulo Barreto * * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 5) One component of the ssh source code is under a 3-clause BSD license, held by the University of California, since we pulled these parts from original Berkeley code. * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. 6) Remaining components of the software are provided under a standard 2-term BSD licence with the following names as copyright holders: Markus Friedl Theo de Raadt Niels Provos Dug Song Aaron Campbell Damien Miller Kevin Steves Daniel Kouril Wesley Griffin Per Allansson Nils Nordman Simon Wilkinson Portable OpenSSH additionally includes code from the following copyright holders, also under the 2-term BSD license: Ben Lindstrom Tim Rice Andre Lucas Chris Adams Corinna Vinschen Cray Inc. Denis Parker Gert Doering Jakob Schlyter Jason Downs Juha Yrjölä Michael Stone Networks Associates Technology, Inc. Solar Designer Todd C. Miller Wayne Schroeder William Jones Darren Tucker Sun Microsystems The SCO Group Daniel Walsh Red Hat, Inc Simon Vallet / Genoscope * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 8) Portable OpenSSH contains the following additional licenses: a) md5crypt.c, md5crypt.h * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42): * wrote this file. As long as you retain this * notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet * some day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a * beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp b) snprintf replacement * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995 * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell * (papowell@astart.com) It may be used for any purpose as long as this * notice remains intact on all source code distributions c) Compatibility code (openbsd-compat) Apart from the previously mentioned licenses, various pieces of code in the openbsd-compat/ subdirectory are licensed as follows: Some code is licensed under a 3-term BSD license, to the following copyright holders: Todd C. Miller Theo de Raadt Damien Miller Eric P. Allman The Regents of the University of California Constantin S. Svintsoff * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. Some code is licensed under an ISC-style license, to the following copyright holders: Internet Software Consortium. Todd C. Miller Reyk Floeter Chad Mynhier * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND TODD C. MILLER DISCLAIMS ALL * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL TODD C. MILLER BE LIABLE * FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. Some code is licensed under a MIT-style license to the following copyright holders: Free Software Foundation, Inc. * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a * * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the * * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including * * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, * * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell * * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is * * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: * * * * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included * * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. * * * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS * * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF * * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. * * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, * * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR * * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR * * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. * * * * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright * * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the * * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written * * authorization. * ****************************************************************************/ ------ $OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.20 2017/04/30 23:26:16 djm Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/Makefile.in010064400017500001750000000666461362136622600135500ustar00djmdjm# uncomment if you run a non bourne compatible shell. Ie. csh #SHELL = @SH@ AUTORECONF=autoreconf prefix=@prefix@ exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@ bindir=@bindir@ sbindir=@sbindir@ libexecdir=@libexecdir@ datadir=@datadir@ datarootdir=@datarootdir@ mandir=@mandir@ mansubdir=@mansubdir@ sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ srcdir=@srcdir@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ DESTDIR= VPATH=@srcdir@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$(SSH_SK_HELPER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \ -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\" CC=@CC@ LD=@LD@ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@ LIBS=@LIBS@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@ SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@ LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@ AR=@AR@ AWK=@AWK@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@ SED=@SED@ ENT=@ENT@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ LDFLAGS_NOPIE=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS_NOPIE@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ MANFMT=@MANFMT@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@ .SUFFIXES: .lo TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) XMSS_OBJS=\ ssh-xmss.o \ sshkey-xmss.o \ xmss_commons.o \ xmss_fast.o \ xmss_hash.o \ xmss_hash_address.o \ xmss_wots.o LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\ ssh_api.o \ ssherr.o \ sshbuf.o \ sshkey.o \ sshbuf-getput-basic.o \ sshbuf-misc.o \ sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \ krl.o \ bitmap.o \ ${XMSS_OBJS} LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ authfd.o authfile.o \ canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \ cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \ compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \ readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o misc.o utf8.o \ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \ ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \ hmac.o sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \ sntrup4591761.o kexsntrup4591761x25519.o kexgen.o \ sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ sshbuf-io.o SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o $(SKOBJS) SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \ audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \ auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \ auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \ auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \ monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \ sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS) SCP_OBJS= scp.o progressmeter.o SSHADD_OBJS= ssh-add.o $(SKOBJS) SSHAGENT_OBJS= ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(SKOBJS) SSHKEYGEN_OBJS= ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o $(SKOBJS) SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS=ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS) P11HELPER_OBJS= ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(SKOBJS) SKHELPER_OBJS= ssh-sk-helper.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS=ssh-keyscan.o $(SKOBJS) SFTPSERVER_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o SFTP_OBJS= sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out ssh-sk-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ssh-sk-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli PATHSUBS = \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \ -e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \ -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \ -e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \ -e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \ -e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \ -e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \ -e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g' FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS) FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \ @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@ all: configure-check $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) $(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h $(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h $(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h configure-check: $(srcdir)/configure $(srcdir)/configure: configure.ac aclocal.m4 @echo "ERROR: configure is out of date; please run ${AUTORECONF} (and configure)" 1>&2 @exit 1 .c.o: $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a $(LIBCOMPAT): always (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE)) always: libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) $(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS) $(RANLIB) $@ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHAGENT_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHAGENT_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(P11HELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT) # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN) if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \ else \ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \ fi; \ if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \ $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \ else \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \ fi $(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN) conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@ # fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o" moduli: echo clean: regressclean rm -f *.o *.lo *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log rm -f *.out core survey rm -f regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean) distclean: regressclean rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~ rm -rf autom4te.cache rm -f regress/check-perm rm -f regress/mkdtemp rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT) (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean) if test -d pkg ; then \ rm -fr pkg ; \ fi veryclean: distclean rm -f configure config.h.in *.0 cleandir: veryclean mrproper: veryclean realclean: veryclean catman-do: @for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \ base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \ echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \ $(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \ >$$base.0 ; \ done depend: depend-rebuild rm -f .depend.bak depend-rebuild: rm -f config.h touch config.h makedepend -w1000 -Y. -f .depend *.c 2>/dev/null (head -2 .depend; tail +3 .depend | sort) >.depend.tmp mv .depend.tmp .depend rm -f config.h depend-check: depend-rebuild cmp .depend .depend.bak || (echo .depend stale && exit 1) distprep: catman-do depend-check $(AUTORECONF) -rm -rf autom4te.cache .depend.bak install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files check-config: -$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config install-files: $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5 $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) $(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-sk-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8 install-sysconf: $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \ if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \ echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ else \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \ fi ; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ ./ssh-keygen -A; \ fi host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh$(EXEEXT) ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" ./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" if ./ssh -Q key | grep ecdsa >/dev/null ; then \ ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ""; \ fi uninstallall: uninstall -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) uninstall: -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8 regress-prep: $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/match $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8 $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \ ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c $(REGRESSLIBS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(REGRESSLIBS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c $(REGRESSLIBS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \ regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS} $(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS) $(RANLIB) $@ UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o \ $(SKOBJS) regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o \ $(SKOBJS) regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \ regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o \ $(SKOBJS) regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/match/tests.o regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/utf8/tests.o regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS=\ regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.o \ $(SKOBJS) regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT): ${MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS} libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS) \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently. SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \ regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.lo \ ed25519.lo hash.lo ge25519.lo fe25519.lo sc25519.lo verify.lo .c.lo: Makefile.in config.h $(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so: $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -fPIC -shared -o $@ $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS) \ -L. -Lopenbsd-compat -lopenbsd-compat $(LDFLAGS_NOPIE) $(LIBS) regress-binaries: regress-prep $(LIBCOMPAT) \ regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \ regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \ regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \ regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \ regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) \ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \ regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT) tests: file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit echo all tests passed unit: regress-unit-binaries BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \ cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \ $(MAKE) \ .OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \ .CURDIR="`pwd`" \ $@ && echo $@ tests passed interop-tests t-exec file-tests: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS) BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \ TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \ TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHSKHELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-sk-helper"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan"; \ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp"; \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \ TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \ TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-sk-helper"; \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \ TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink"; \ TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen"; \ TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch"; \ TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" ; \ TEST_SSH_UTF8="@TEST_SSH_UTF8@" ; \ TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" ; \ cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \ $(MAKE) \ .OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \ .CURDIR="`pwd`" \ BUILDDIR="$${BUILDDIR}" \ OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \ PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \ TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \ TEST_SSH_SCP="$${TEST_SSH_SCP}" \ TEST_SSH_SSH="$${TEST_SSH_SSH}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" \ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" \ TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER}" \ TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER}" \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" \ TEST_SSH_PLINK="$${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" \ TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" \ TEST_SSH_CONCH="$${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" \ TEST_SSH_IPV6="$${TEST_SSH_IPV6}" \ TEST_SSH_UTF8="$${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" \ TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \ TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \ EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \ $@ && echo all $@ passed compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT) (cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE)) regressclean: if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \ (cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \ fi survey: survey.sh ssh @$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey @echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the' @echo 'current directory. Please review the file then send with' @echo '"make send-survey".' send-survey: survey mail portable-survey@mindrot.org Updated 17 Nov 1995. Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2 Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2 The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and make-ssh-known-hosts. The main program for each of these is in a .c file with the same name. There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of these programs. Buffer manipulation routines - These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended. Data can be consumed from either end. The code is used heavily throughout ssh. The buffer manipulation functions are in sshbuf*.c (header sshbuf.h). Compression Library - Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB). Encryption/Decryption - Ssh contains several encryption algorithms. These are all accessed through the cipher.h interface. The interface code is in cipher.c, and the implementations are either in libc or LibreSSL. Multiple Precision Integer Library - Uses the LibreSSL BIGNUM sublibrary. Random Numbers - Uses arc4random() and such. RSA key generation, encryption, decryption - Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl. RSA key files - RSA keys are stored in files with a special format. The code to read/write these files is in authfile.c. The files are normally encrypted with a passphrase. The functions to read passphrases are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords). Binary packet protocol - The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c. The code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt packets. - The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines (buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (zlib), and the encryption routines. X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding - Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c. The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication agent forwarding. The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c Authentication agent - Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c. Authentication methods - Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c (auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c). This code is linked into the server. The routines also manipulate known hosts files using code in hostfile.c. Code in canohost.c is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host. Code in match.c is used to match host names. - In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c. It reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c. It reads RSA key files with authfile.c. It communicates the authentication agent using authfd.c. The ssh client - The client main program is in ssh.c. It first parses arguments and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c). It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests. It may call code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes. Finally it calls client_loop in clientloop.c. This does the real work for the session. Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes - Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c. Code to encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c. Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.) - The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in login.c. This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp, and lastlog files. Some of the code is in sshd.c. Writing to the system log and terminal - The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error() in many places to write messages to system log or user's terminal. The implementation that logs to system log is in log-server.c; it is used in the server program. The other programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it is in log-client.c. The definitions are in ssh.h. The sshd server (daemon) - The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the configuration file (servconf.c). It then reads the host key, starts listening for connections, and generates the server key. The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm. - When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client. They first perform identification string exchange, then negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory operations, and finally the server enters the normal session mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c. This does the real work, calling functions in other modules. - The code for the server is in sshd.c. It contains a lot of stuff, including: - server main program - waiting for connections - processing new connection - authentication - preparatory operations - building up the execution environment for the user program - starting the user program. Auxiliary files - There are several other files in the distribution that contain various auxiliary routines: ssh.h the main header file for ssh (various definitions) uidswap.c uid-swapping xmalloc.c "safe" malloc routines $OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.15 2018/10/23 05:56:35 djm Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/PROTOCOL010064400017500001750000000440011362136622600126440ustar00djmdjmThis documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH protocol. Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH filexfer protocol described in: https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features are individually implemented as extensions described below. The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file PROTOCOL.agent 1. Transport protocol changes 1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com" This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm (rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented in: https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt 1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com" This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the start of compression until after authentication has completed. This avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users. The method is documented in: https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt 1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ssh-dsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys 1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or generated. 1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC 4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering, calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a "decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal session plaintext. Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be verified without decrypting unauthenticated data. As such, the MAC covers: mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet) where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet" contains: byte padding_length byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1 byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length 1.6 transport: AES-GCM OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647. Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows: AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms "aes128-gcm@openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" and never as an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be a matching MAC. 1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated encryption OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305 as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. 1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as described at: http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519 2. Connection protocol changes 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com" The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to the peer. This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file descriptor. OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows: byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST uint32 recipient channel string "eow@openssh.com" boolean FALSE On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor). As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume window space and may be sent even if no window space is available. NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message upon request. 2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack. When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session (i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it will send the following global request: byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" char want-reply On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the connection. Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients (that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack. NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message upon request. 2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com" OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com" channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are requested by the client with the following packet: byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN string "tun@openssh.com" uint32 sender channel uint32 initial window size uint32 maximum packet size uint32 tunnel mode uint32 remote unit number The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values: SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 1 /* layer 3 packets */ SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 2 /* layer 2 frames */ The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically chose an interface. A server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS. Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets: byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA uint32 recipient channel string data The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is: uint32 packet length uint32 address family byte[packet length - 4] packet data The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message. It may be one of: SSH_TUN_AF_INET 2 /* IPv4 */ SSH_TUN_AF_INET6 24 /* IPv6 */ The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself without any link layer header. The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is: uint32 packet length byte[packet length] frame The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including header. 2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding using the "streamlocal" extension. Forwarding is initiated as per TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port. Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket. byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN string "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com" uint32 sender channel uint32 initial window size uint32 maximum packet size string socket path string reserved uint32 reserved Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward GLOBAL_REQUEST. byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN string "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com" uint32 sender channel uint32 initial window size uint32 maximum packet size string socket path string reserved for future use The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the remote end. It is intended to be used in the future to pass information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode. The client currently sends the empty string for this field. Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket. byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" boolean TRUE string socket path Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket. byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" boolean FALSE string socket path 2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00@openssh.com" and "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com" OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication has completed. byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "hostkeys-00@openssh.com" string[] hostkeys Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the supplied host keys are present in known_hosts. Note that the server may send key types that the client does not support. The client should disgregard such keys if they are received. If the client identifies any keys that are not present for the host, it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message to request the server prove ownership of the private half of the key. byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com" char 1 /* want-reply */ string[] hostkeys When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature using each requested key over the following: string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com" string session identifier string hostkey These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching the hostkeys in the request: byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS string[] signatures When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that are no longer offered. These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation: a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before removing the deprecated key from those offered. 2.6. connection: SIGINFO support for "signal" channel request The SSH channels protocol (RFC4254 section 6.9) supports sending a signal to a session attached to a channel. OpenSSH supports one extension signal "INFO@openssh.com" that allows sending SIGINFO on BSD-derived systems. 3. SFTP protocol changes 3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately, the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows: uint32 id string targetpath string linkpath 3.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server hello packet: uint32 3 /* protocol version */ string ext1-name string ext1-version string ext2-name string ext2-version ... string extN-name string extN-version Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST check the version number before attempting to use the extension. 3.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com" This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format: uint32 id string "posix-rename@openssh.com" string oldpath string newpath On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "1". 3.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit pathname, and is formatted as follows: uint32 id string "statvfs@openssh.com" string path The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle: uint32 id string "fstatvfs@openssh.com" string handle These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply: uint32 id uint64 f_bsize /* file system block size */ uint64 f_frsize /* fundamental fs block size */ uint64 f_blocks /* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */ uint64 f_bfree /* free blocks in file system */ uint64 f_bavail /* free blocks for non-root */ uint64 f_files /* total file inodes */ uint64 f_ffree /* free file inodes */ uint64 f_favail /* free file inodes for to non-root */ uint64 f_fsid /* file system id */ uint64 f_flag /* bit mask of f_flag values */ uint64 f_namemax /* maximum filename length */ The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows: #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x1 /* read-only */ #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x2 /* no setuid */ Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2". 3.5. sftp: Extension request "hardlink@openssh.com" This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format: uint32 id string "hardlink@openssh.com" string oldpath string newpath On receiving this request the server will perform the operation link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "1". 3.6. sftp: Extension request "fsync@openssh.com" This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle. uint32 id string "fsync@openssh.com" string handle One receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "1". 4. Miscellaneous changes 4.1 Public key format OpenSSH public keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) and appearing in authorized_keys files, are formatted as a single line of text consisting of the public key algorithm name followed by a base64-encoded key blob. The public key blob (before base64 encoding) is the same format used for the encoding of public keys sent on the wire: as described in RFC4253 section 6.6 for RSA and DSA keys, RFC5656 section 3.1 for ECDSA keys and the "New public key formats" section of PROTOCOL.certkeys for the OpenSSH certificate formats. 4.2 Private key format OpenSSH private keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) use the format described in PROTOCOL.key by default. As a legacy option, PEM format (RFC7468) private keys are also supported for RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys and were the default format before OpenSSH 7.8. 4.3 KRL format OpenSSH supports a compact format for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). This format is described in the PROTOCOL.krl file. 4.4 Connection multiplexing OpenSSH's connection multiplexing uses messages as described in PROTOCOL.mux over a Unix domain socket for communications between a master instance and later clients. $OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.36 2018/10/02 12:51:58 djm Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/PROTOCOL.agent010064400017500001750000000003341362136622600137420ustar00djmdjmThis file used to contain a description of the SSH agent protocol implemented by OpenSSH. It has since been superseded by an Internet- draft that is available from: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-02 openssh-8.2p1/PROTOCOL.certkeys010064400017500001750000000305741362136622600145060ustar00djmdjmThis document describes a simple public-key certificate authentication system for use by SSH. Background ---------- The SSH protocol currently supports a simple public key authentication mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the use of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some benefits relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation of attack surface, but it does not support the important use-cases of centrally managed, passwordless authentication and centrally certified host keys. These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication. The certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with numerous options and complex encoding rules, but something rather more minimal: a key, some identity information and usage options that have been signed with some other trusted key. A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism to allow specification of certification authority keys in addition to raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification of acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts. All certificate types include certification information along with the public key that is used to sign challenges. In OpenSSH, ssh-keygen performs the CA signing operation. Certified keys are represented using new key types: ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com Two additional types exist for RSA certificates to force use of SHA-2 signatures (SHA-256 and SHA-512 respectively): rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com These RSA/SHA-2 types should not appear in keys at rest or transmitted on their wire, but do appear in a SSH_MSG_KEXINIT's host-key algorithms field or in the "public key algorithm name" field of a "publickey" SSH_USERAUTH_REQUEST to indicate that the signature will use the specified algorithm. Protocol extensions ------------------- The SSH wire protocol includes several extensibility mechanisms. These modifications shall take advantage of namespaced public key algorithm names to add support for certificate authentication without breaking the protocol - implementations that do not support the extensions will simply ignore them. Authentication using the new key formats described below proceeds using the existing SSH "publickey" authentication method described in RFC4252 section 7. New public key formats ---------------------- The certificate key types take a similar high-level format (note: data types and encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire encoding of these certificates is also used for storing them on disk. #define SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER 1 #define SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2 RSA certificate string "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" string nonce mpint e mpint n uint64 serial uint32 type string key id string valid principals uint64 valid after uint64 valid before string critical options string extensions string reserved string signature key string signature DSA certificate string "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" string nonce mpint p mpint q mpint g mpint y uint64 serial uint32 type string key id string valid principals uint64 valid after uint64 valid before string critical options string extensions string reserved string signature key string signature ECDSA certificate string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" | "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" | "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" string nonce string curve string public_key uint64 serial uint32 type string key id string valid principals uint64 valid after uint64 valid before string critical options string extensions string reserved string signature key string signature ED25519 certificate string "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" string nonce string pk uint64 serial uint32 type string key id string valid principals uint64 valid after uint64 valid before string critical options string extensions string reserved string signature key string signature The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length (but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible. e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively. p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2. curve and public key are respectively the ECDSA "[identifier]" and "Q" defined in section 3.1 of RFC5656. pk is the encoded Ed25519 public key as defined by draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03. serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA. If a CA does not wish to number its certificates it must set this field to zero. type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value. key id is a free-form text field that is filled in by the CA at the time of signing; the intention is that the contents of this field are used to identify the identity principal in log messages. "valid principals" is a string containing zero or more principals as strings packed inside it. These principals list the names for which this certificate is valid; hostnames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST certificates and usernames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER certificates. As a special case, a zero-length "valid principals" field means the certificate is valid for any principal of the specified type. "valid after" and "valid before" specify a validity period for the certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01 00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if: valid after <= current time < valid before critical options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option. extensions is a set of zero or more optional extensions. These extensions are not critical, and an implementation that encounters one that it does not recognise may safely ignore it. Generally, critical options are used to control features that restrict access where extensions are used to enable features that grant access. This ensures that certificates containing unknown restrictions do not inadvertently grant access while allowing new protocol features to be enabled via extensions without breaking certificates' backwards compatibility. The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of the protocol. The signature key field contains the CA key used to sign the certificate. The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa, ssh-dss, ssh-ed25519 and the ECDSA types ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained" certificates, where the signature key type is a certificate type itself are NOT supported. Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to be signed by a Ed25519 or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa. signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm (RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss, RFC5656 for the ECDSA types), and draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03 for Ed25519. Critical options ---------------- The critical options section of the certificate specifies zero or more options on the certificates validity. The format of this field is a sequence of zero or more tuples: string name string data Options must be lexically ordered by "name" if they appear in the sequence. Each named option may only appear once in a certificate. The name field identifies the option and the data field encodes option-specific information (see below). All options are "critical", if an implementation does not recognise a option then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate. Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com". No critical options are defined for host certificates at present. The supported user certificate options and the contents and structure of their data fields are: Name Format Description ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- force-command string Specifies a command that is executed (replacing any the user specified on the ssh command-line) whenever this key is used for authentication. source-address string Comma-separated list of source addresses from which this certificate is accepted for authentication. Addresses are specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn or hhhh::hhhh/nn). If this option is not present then certificates may be presented from any source address. Extensions ---------- The extensions section of the certificate specifies zero or more non-critical certificate extensions. The encoding and ordering of extensions in this field is identical to that of the critical options, as is the requirement that each name appear only once. If an implementation does not recognise an extension, then it should ignore it. Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com". No extensions are defined for host certificates at present. The supported user certificate extensions and the contents and structure of their data fields are: Name Format Description ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- no-presence-required empty Flag indicating that signatures made with this certificate need not assert user presence. This option only make sense for the U2F/FIDO security key types that support this feature in their signature formats. permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding should be permitted. X11 forwarding will be refused if this option is absent. permit-agent-forwarding empty Flag indicating that agent forwarding should be allowed. Agent forwarding must not be permitted unless this option is present. permit-port-forwarding empty Flag indicating that port-forwarding should be allowed. If this option is not present then no port forwarding will be allowed. permit-pty empty Flag indicating that PTY allocation should be permitted. In the absence of this option PTY allocation will be disabled. permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of ~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution of this script will not be permitted if this option is not present. $OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.17 2019/11/25 00:57:51 djm Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305010064400017500001750000000110221362136622600154260ustar00djmdjmThis document describes the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated encryption cipher supported by OpenSSH. Background ---------- ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by Daniel Bernstein and described in [1]. It operates by permuting 128 fixed bits, 128 or 256 bits of key, a 64 bit nonce and a 64 bit counter into 64 bytes of output. This output is used as a keystream, with any unused bytes simply discarded. Poly1305[2], also by Daniel Bernstein, is a one-time Carter-Wegman MAC that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use 256 bit secret key. The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com combines these two primitives into an authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encryption of the packet lengths. Negotiation ----------- The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com offers both encryption and authentication. As such, no separate MAC is required. If the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher is selected in key exchange, the offered MAC algorithms are ignored and no MAC is required to be negotiated. Detailed Construction --------------------- The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher requires 512 bits of key material as output from the SSH key exchange. This forms two 256 bit keys (K_1 and K_2), used by two separate instances of chacha20. The first 256 bits consitute K_2 and the second 256 bits become K_1. The instance keyed by K_1 is a stream cipher that is used only to encrypt the 4 byte packet length field. The second instance, keyed by K_2, is used in conjunction with poly1305 to build an AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) that is used to encrypt and authenticate the entire packet. Two separate cipher instances are used here so as to keep the packet lengths confidential but not create an oracle for the packet payload cipher by decrypting and using the packet length prior to checking the MAC. By using an independently-keyed cipher instance to encrypt the length, an active attacker seeking to exploit the packet input handling as a decryption oracle can learn nothing about the payload contents or its MAC (assuming key derivation, ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are secure). The AEAD is constructed as follows: for each packet, generate a Poly1305 key by taking the first 256 bits of ChaCha20 stream output generated using K_2, an IV consisting of the packet sequence number encoded as an uint64 under the SSH wire encoding rules and a ChaCha20 block counter of zero. The K_2 ChaCha20 block counter is then set to the little-endian encoding of 1 (i.e. {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}) and this instance is used for encryption of the packet payload. Packet Handling --------------- When receiving a packet, the length must be decrypted first. When 4 bytes of ciphertext length have been received, they may be decrypted using the K_1 key, a nonce consisting of the packet sequence number encoded as a uint64 under the usual SSH wire encoding and a zero block counter to obtain the plaintext length. Once the entire packet has been received, the MAC MUST be checked before decryption. A per-packet Poly1305 key is generated as described above and the MAC tag calculated using Poly1305 with this key over the ciphertext of the packet length and the payload together. The calculated MAC is then compared in constant time with the one appended to the packet and the packet decrypted using ChaCha20 as described above (with K_2, the packet sequence number as nonce and a starting block counter of 1). To send a packet, first encode the 4 byte length and encrypt it using K_1. Encrypt the packet payload (using K_2) and append it to the encrypted length. Finally, calculate a MAC tag and append it. Rekeying -------- ChaCha20 must never reuse a {key, nonce} for encryption nor may it be used to encrypt more than 2^70 bytes under the same {key, nonce}. The SSH Transport protocol (RFC4253) recommends a far more conservative rekeying every 1GB of data sent or received. If this recommendation is followed, then chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com requires no special handling in this area. References ---------- [1] "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", Daniel Bernstein http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf [2] "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code", Daniel Bernstein http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf [3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03 $OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.4 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/PROTOCOL.key010064400017500001750000000030031362136622600134300ustar00djmdjmThis document describes the private key format for OpenSSH. 1. Overall format The key consists of a header, a list of public keys, and an encrypted list of matching private keys. #define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1" byte[] AUTH_MAGIC string ciphername string kdfname string kdfoptions int number of keys N string publickey1 string publickey2 ... string publickeyN string encrypted, padded list of private keys 2. KDF options for kdfname "bcrypt" The options: string salt uint32 rounds are concatenated and represented as a string. 3. Unencrypted list of N private keys The list of privatekey/comment pairs is padded with the bytes 1, 2, 3, ... until the total length is a multiple of the cipher block size. uint32 checkint uint32 checkint string privatekey1 string comment1 string privatekey2 string comment2 ... string privatekeyN string commentN char 1 char 2 char 3 ... char padlen % 255 Before the key is encrypted, a random integer is assigned to both checkint fields so successful decryption can be quickly checked by verifying that both checkint fields hold the same value. 4. Encryption The KDF is used to derive a key, IV (and other values required by the cipher) from the passphrase. These values are then used to encrypt the unencrypted list of private keys. 5. No encryption For unencrypted keys the cipher "none" and the KDF "none" are used with empty passphrases. The options if the KDF "none" are the empty string. $OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.key,v 1.1 2013/12/06 13:34:54 markus Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/PROTOCOL.krl010064400017500001750000000122061362136622600134350ustar00djmdjmThis describes the key/certificate revocation list format for OpenSSH. 1. Overall format The KRL consists of a header and zero or more sections. The header is: #define KRL_MAGIC 0x5353484b524c0a00ULL /* "SSHKRL\n\0" */ #define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1 uint64 KRL_MAGIC uint32 KRL_FORMAT_VERSION uint64 krl_version uint64 generated_date uint64 flags string reserved string comment Where "krl_version" is a version number that increases each time the KRL is modified, "generated_date" is the time in seconds since 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC that the KRL was generated, "comment" is an optional comment and "reserved" an extension field whose contents are currently ignored. No "flags" are currently defined. Following the header are zero or more sections, each consisting of: byte section_type string section_data Where "section_type" indicates the type of the "section_data". An exception to this is the KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section, that has a slightly different format (see below). The available section types are: #define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1 #define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2 #define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3 #define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4 #define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256 5 2. Certificate section These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES to revoke certificates by serial number or key ID. The consist of the CA key that issued the certificates to be revoked and a reserved field whose contents is currently ignored. string ca_key string reserved Where "ca_key" is the standard SSH wire serialisation of the CA's public key. Alternately, "ca_key" may be an empty string to indicate the certificate section applies to all CAs (this is most useful when revoking key IDs). Followed by one or more sections: byte cert_section_type string cert_section_data The certificate section types are: #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23 2.1 Certificate serial list section This section is identified as KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST. It revokes certificates by listing their serial numbers. The cert_section_data in this case contains: uint64 revoked_cert_serial uint64 ... This section may appear multiple times. 2.2. Certificate serial range section These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE and hold a range of serial numbers of certificates: uint64 serial_min uint64 serial_max All certificates in the range serial_min <= serial <= serial_max are revoked. This section may appear multiple times. 2.3. Certificate serial bitmap section Bitmap sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP and revoke keys by listing their serial number in a bitmap. uint64 serial_offset mpint revoked_keys_bitmap A bit set at index N in the bitmap corresponds to revocation of a keys with serial number (serial_offset + N). This section may appear multiple times. 2.4. Revoked key ID sections KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID sections revoke particular certificate "key ID" strings. This may be useful in revoking all certificates associated with a particular identity, e.g. a host or a user. string key_id[0] ... This section must contain at least one "key_id". This section may appear multiple times. 3. Explicit key sections These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY, revoke keys (not certificates). They are less space efficient than serial numbers, but are able to revoke plain keys. string public_key_blob[0] .... This section must contain at least one "public_key_blob". The blob must be a raw key (i.e. not a certificate). This section may appear multiple times. 4. SHA1/SHA256 fingerprint sections These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 and KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256, revoke plain keys (i.e. not certificates) by listing their hashes: string public_key_hash[0] .... This section must contain at least one "public_key_hash". The hash blob is obtained by taking the SHA1 or SHA256 hash of the public key blob. Hashes in this section must appear in numeric order, treating each hash as a big-endian integer. This section may appear multiple times. 5. KRL signature sections The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the preceding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection. Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections: in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body" two string components instead of one. byte KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE string signature_key string signature The signature is calculated over the entire KRL from the KRL_MAGIC to this subsection's "signature_key", including both and using the signature generation rules appropriate for the type of "signature_key". This section must appear last in the KRL. If multiple signature sections appear, they must appear consecutively at the end of the KRL file. Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by trusted means. $OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.5 2018/09/12 01:21:34 djm Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/PROTOCOL.mux010064400017500001750000000215671362136622600134700ustar00djmdjmThis document describes the multiplexing protocol used by ssh(1)'s ControlMaster connection-sharing. Multiplexing starts with a ssh(1) configured to act as a multiplexing master. This will cause ssh(1) to listen on a Unix domain socket for requests from clients. Clients communicate over this socket using a simple packetised protocol, where each message is proceeded with a length and message type in SSH uint32 wire format: uint32 packet length uint32 packet type ... packet body Most messages from the client to the server contain a "request id" field. This field is returned in replies as "client request id" to facilitate matching of responses to requests. Many muliplexing (mux) client requests yield immediate responses from the mux process; requesting a forwarding, performing an alive check or requesting the master terminate itself fall in to this category. The most common use of multiplexing however is to maintain multiple concurrent sessions. These are supported via two separate modes: "Passenger" clients start by requesting a new session with a MUX_C_NEW_SESSION message and passing stdio file descriptors over the Unix domain control socket. The passenger client then waits until it is signaled or the mux server closes the session. This mode is so named as the client waits around while the mux server does all the driving. Stdio forwarding (requested using MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD) is another example of passenger mode; the client passes the stdio file descriptors and passively waits for something to happen. "Proxy" clients, requested using MUX_C_PROXY, work quite differently. In this mode, the mux client/server connection socket will stop speaking the multiplexing protocol and start proxying SSH connection protocol messages between the client and server. The client therefore must speak a significant subset of the SSH protocol, but in return is able to access basically the full suite of connection protocol features. Moreover, as no file descriptor passing is required, the connection supporting a proxy client may iteself be forwarded or relayed to another host if necessary. 1. Connection setup When a multiplexing connection is made to a ssh(1) operating as a ControlMaster from a client ssh(1), the first action of each is send a hello messages to its peer: uint32 MUX_MSG_HELLO uint32 protocol version string extension name [optional] string extension value [optional] ... The current version of the mux protocol is 4. A client should refuse to connect to a master that speaks an unsupported protocol version. Following the version identifier are zero or more extensions represented as a name/value pair. No extensions are currently defined. 2. Opening a passenger mode session To open a new multiplexed session in passenger mode, a client sends the following request: uint32 MUX_C_NEW_SESSION uint32 request id string reserved bool want tty flag bool want X11 forwarding flag bool want agent flag bool subsystem flag uint32 escape char string terminal type string command string environment string 0 [optional] ... To disable the use of an escape character, "escape char" may be set to 0xffffffff. "terminal type" is generally set to the value of $TERM. zero or more environment strings may follow the command. The client then sends its standard input, output and error file descriptors (in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages. The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored. If successful, the server will reply with MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED uint32 MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED uint32 client request id uint32 session id Otherwise it will reply with an error: MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or MUX_S_FAILURE. Once the server has received the fds, it will respond with MUX_S_OK indicating that the session is up. The client now waits for the session to end. When it does, the server will send an exit status message: uint32 MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE uint32 session id uint32 exit value The client should exit with this value to mimic the behaviour of a non-multiplexed ssh(1) connection. Two additional cases that the client must cope with are it receiving a signal itself and the server disconnecting without sending an exit message. A master may also send a MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL before MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE if remote TTY allocation was unsuccessful. The client may use this to return its local tty to "cooked" mode. uint32 MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL uint32 session id 3. Requesting passenger-mode stdio forwarding A client may request the master to establish a stdio forwarding: uint32 MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD uint32 request id string reserved string connect host string connect port The client then sends its standard input and output file descriptors (in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages. The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored. A server may reply with a MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE. 4. Health checks The client may request a health check/PID report from a server: uint32 MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK uint32 request id The server replies with: uint32 MUX_S_ALIVE uint32 client request id uint32 server pid 5. Remotely terminating a master A client may request that a master terminate immediately: uint32 MUX_C_TERMINATE uint32 request id The server will reply with one of MUX_S_OK or MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED. 6. Requesting establishment of port forwards A client may request the master to establish a port forward: uint32 MUX_C_OPEN_FWD uint32 request id uint32 forwarding type string listen host uint32 listen port string connect host uint32 connect port forwarding type may be MUX_FWD_LOCAL, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC. If listen port is (unsigned int) -2, then the listen host is treated as a unix socket path name. If connect port is (unsigned int) -2, then the connect host is treated as a unix socket path name. A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE. For dynamically allocated listen port the server replies with uint32 MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT uint32 client request id uint32 allocated remote listen port 7. Requesting closure of port forwards Note: currently unimplemented (server will always reply with MUX_S_FAILURE). A client may request the master to close a port forward: uint32 MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD uint32 request id uint32 forwarding type string listen host uint32 listen port string connect host uint32 connect port A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE. 8. Requesting shutdown of mux listener A client may request the master to stop accepting new multiplexing requests and remove its listener socket. uint32 MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING uint32 request id A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE. 9. Requesting proxy mode A client may request that the the control connection be placed in proxy mode: uint32 MUX_C_PROXY uint32 request id When a mux master receives this message, it will reply with a confirmation: uint32 MUX_S_PROXY uint32 request id And go into proxy mode. All subsequent data over the connection will be formatted as unencrypted, unpadded, SSH transport messages: uint32 packet length byte 0 (padding length) byte packet type byte[packet length - 2] ... The mux master will accept most connection messages and global requests, and will translate channel identifiers to ensure that the proxy client has globally unique channel numbers (i.e. a proxy client need not worry about collisions with other clients). 10. Status messages The MUX_S_OK message is empty: uint32 MUX_S_OK uint32 client request id The MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED and MUX_S_FAILURE include a reason: uint32 MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED uint32 client request id string reason uint32 MUX_S_FAILURE uint32 client request id string reason 11. Protocol numbers #define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001 #define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002 #define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004 #define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005 #define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006 #define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007 #define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008 #define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009 #define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001 #define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002 #define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003 #define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004 #define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005 #define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006 #define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007 #define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008 #define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1 #define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2 #define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3 XXX TODO XXX extended status (e.g. report open channels / forwards) XXX lock (maybe) XXX watch in/out traffic (pre/post crypto) XXX inject packet (what about replies) XXX server->client error/warning notifications XXX send signals via mux XXX ^Z support in passengers XXX extensions for multi-agent XXX extensions for multi-X11 XXX session inspection via master XXX signals via mux request XXX list active connections via mux $OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.11 2018/09/26 07:30:05 djm Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/PROTOCOL.sshsig010064400017500001750000000064431362136622600141530ustar00djmdjmThis document describes a lightweight SSH Signature format that is compatible with SSH keys and wire formats. At present, only detached and armored signatures are supported. 1. Armored format The Armored SSH signatures consist of a header, a base64 encoded blob, and a footer. The header is the string "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----" followed by a newline. The footer is the string "-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----" immediately after a newline. The header MUST be present at the start of every signature. Files containing the signature MUST start with the header. Likewise, the footer MUST be present at the end of every signature. The base64 encoded blob SHOULD be broken up by newlines every 76 characters. Example: -----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE----- U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgJKxoLBJBivUPNTUJUSslQTt2hD jozKvHarKeN8uYFqgAAAADZm9vAAAAAAAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAKNC4IEbt Tq0Fb56xhtuE1/lK9H9RZJfON4o6hE9R4ZGFX98gy0+fFJ/1d2/RxnZky0Y7GojwrZkrHT FgCqVWAQ== -----END SSH SIGNATURE----- 2. Blob format #define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG" #define SIG_VERSION 0x01 byte[6] MAGIC_PREAMBLE uint32 SIG_VERSION string publickey string namespace string reserved string hash_algorithm string signature The publickey field MUST contain the serialisation of the public key used to make the signature using the usual SSH encoding rules, i.e RFC4253, RFC5656, draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448, etc. Verifiers MUST reject signatures with versions greater than those they support. The purpose of the namespace value is to specify a unambiguous interpretation domain for the signature, e.g. file signing. This prevents cross-protocol attacks caused by signatures intended for one intended domain being accepted in another. The namespace value MUST NOT be the empty string. The reserved value is present to encode future information (e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore the reserved field if it is not empty. Data to be signed is first hashed with the specified hash_algorithm. This is done to limit the amount of data presented to the signature operation, which may be of concern if the signing key is held in limited or slow hardware or on a remote ssh-agent. The supported hash algorithms are "sha256" and "sha512". The signature itself is made using the SSH signature algorithm and encoding rules for the chosen key type. For RSA signatures, the signature algorithm must be "rsa-sha2-512" or "rsa-sha2-256" (i.e. not the legacy RSA-SHA1 "ssh-rsa"). This blob is encoded as a string using the RFC4243 encoding rules and base64 encoded to form the middle part of the armored signature. 3. Signed Data, of which the signature goes into the blob above #define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG" byte[6] MAGIC_PREAMBLE string namespace string reserved string hash_algorithm string H(message) The preamble is the six-byte sequence "SSHSIG". It is included to ensure that manual signatures can never be confused with any message signed during SSH user or host authentication. The reserved value is present to encode future information (e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore the reserved field if it is not empty. The data is concatenated and passed to the SSH signing function. openssh-8.2p1/PROTOCOL.u2f010064400017500001750000000260551362136622600133500ustar00djmdjmThis document describes OpenSSH's support for U2F/FIDO security keys. Background ---------- U2F is an open standard for two-factor authentication hardware, widely used for user authentication to websites. U2F tokens are ubiquitous, available from a number of manufacturers and are currently by far the cheapest way for users to achieve hardware-backed credential storage. The U2F protocol however cannot be trivially used as an SSH protocol key type as both the inputs to the signature operation and the resultant signature differ from those specified for SSH. For similar reasons, integration of U2F devices cannot be achieved via the PKCS#11 API. U2F also offers a number of features that are attractive in the context of SSH authentication. They can be configured to require indication of "user presence" for each signature operation (typically achieved by requiring the user touch the key). They also offer an attestation mechanism at key enrollment time that can be used to prove that a given key is backed by hardware. Finally the signature format includes a monotonic signature counter that can be used (at scale) to detect concurrent use of a private key, should it be extracted from hardware. U2F private keys are generated through an enrollment operation, which takes an application ID - a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" in this case, but a HTTP origin for the case of web authentication, and a challenge string (typically randomly generated). The enrollment operation returns a public key, a key handle that must be used to invoke the hardware-backed private key, some flags and signed attestation information that may be used to verify that a private key is hosted on a particular hardware instance. It is common for U2F hardware to derive private keys from the key handle in conjunction with a small per-device secret that is unique to the hardware, thus requiring little on-device storage for an effectively unlimited number of supported keys. This drives the requirement that the key handle be supplied for each signature operation. U2F tokens primarily use ECDSA signatures in the NIST-P256 field, though the FIDO2 standard specifies additional key types, including one based on Ed25519. SSH U2F Key formats ------------------- OpenSSH integrates U2F as new key and corresponding certificate types: sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com While each uses ecdsa-sha256-nistp256 as the underlying signature primitive, keys require extra information in the public and private keys, and in the signature object itself. As such they cannot be made compatible with the existing ecdsa-sha2-nistp* key types. The format of a sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com public key is: string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" string curve name ec_point Q string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:") The corresponding private key contains: string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" string curve name ec_point Q string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:") uint8 flags string key_handle string reserved The format of a sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com public key is: string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com" string public key string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:") With a private half consisting of: string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com" string public key string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:") uint8 flags string key_handle string reserved The certificate form for SSH U2F keys appends the usual certificate information to the public key: string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" string nonce string curve name ec_point Q string application uint64 serial uint32 type string key id string valid principals uint64 valid after uint64 valid before string critical options string extensions string reserved string signature key string signature and for security key ed25519 certificates: string "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" string nonce string public key string application uint64 serial uint32 type string key id string valid principals uint64 valid after uint64 valid before string critical options string extensions string reserved string signature key string signature Both security key certificates use the following encoding for private keys: string type (e.g. "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com") string pubkey (the above key/cert structure) string application uint8 flags string key_handle string reserved During key generation, the hardware also returns attestation information that may be used to cryptographically prove that a given key is hardware-backed. Unfortunately, the protocol required for this proof is not privacy-preserving and may be used to identify U2F tokens with at least manufacturer and batch number granularity. For this reason, we choose not to include this information in the public key or save it by default. Attestation information is useful for out-of-band key and certificate registration worksflows, e.g. proving to a CA that a key is backed by trusted hardware before it will issue a certificate. To support this case, OpenSSH optionally allows retaining the attestation information at the time of key generation. It will take the following format: string "ssh-sk-attest-v00" string attestation certificate string enrollment signature uint32 reserved flags string reserved string OpenSSH treats the attestation certificate and enrollment signatures as opaque objects and does no interpretation of them itself. SSH U2F signatures ------------------ In addition to the message to be signed, the U2F signature operation requires the key handle and a few additional parameters. The signature is signed over a blob that consists of: byte[32] SHA256(application) byte flags (including "user present", extensions present) uint32 counter byte[] extensions byte[32] SHA256(message) No extensons are yet defined for SSH use. If any are defined in the future, it will be possible to infer their presence from the contents of the "flags" value. The signature returned from U2F hardware takes the following format: byte flags (including "user present") uint32 counter byte[] ecdsa_signature (in X9.62 format). For use in the SSH protocol, we wish to avoid server-side parsing of ASN.1 format data in the pre-authentication attack surface. Therefore, the signature format used on the wire in SSH2_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets will be reformatted to better match the existing signature encoding: string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" string ecdsa_signature byte flags uint32 counter Where the "ecdsa_signature" field follows the RFC5656 ECDSA signature encoding: mpint r mpint s For Ed25519 keys the signature is encoded as: string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com" string signature byte flags uint32 counter ssh-agent protocol extensions ----------------------------- ssh-agent requires a protocol extension to support U2F keys. At present the closest analogue to Security Keys in ssh-agent are PKCS#11 tokens, insofar as they require a middleware library to communicate with the device that holds the keys. Unfortunately, the protocol message used to add PKCS#11 keys to ssh-agent does not include any way to send the key handle to the agent as U2F keys require. To avoid this, without having to add wholly new messages to the agent protocol, we will use the existing SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message with a new key constraint extension to encode a path to the middleware library for the key. The format of this constraint extension would be: byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION string sk-provider@openssh.com string middleware path This constraint-based approach does not present any compatibility problems. OpenSSH integration ------------------- U2F tokens may be attached via a number of means, including USB and NFC. The USB interface is standardised around a HID protocol, but we want to be able to support other transports as well as dummy implementations for regress testing. For this reason, OpenSSH shall support a dynamically- loaded middleware libraries to communicate with security keys, but offer support for the common case of USB HID security keys internally. The middleware library need only expose a handful of functions: #define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00040000 /* API version */ #define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK 0xffff0000 /* Flags */ #define SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD 0x01 #define SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD 0x04 #define SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY 0x20 /* Algs */ #define SSH_SK_ECDSA 0x00 #define SSH_SK_ED25519 0x01 /* Error codes */ #define SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL -1 #define SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED -2 #define SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED -3 #define SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -4 struct sk_enroll_response { uint8_t *public_key; size_t public_key_len; uint8_t *key_handle; size_t key_handle_len; uint8_t *signature; size_t signature_len; uint8_t *attestation_cert; size_t attestation_cert_len; }; struct sk_sign_response { uint8_t flags; uint32_t counter; uint8_t *sig_r; size_t sig_r_len; uint8_t *sig_s; size_t sig_s_len; }; struct sk_resident_key { uint32_t alg; size_t slot; char *application; struct sk_enroll_response key; }; struct sk_option { char *name; char *value; uint8_t important; }; /* Return the version of the middleware API */ uint32_t sk_api_version(void); /* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */ int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response); /* Sign a challenge */ int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_sign_response **sign_response); /* Enumerate all resident keys */ int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks); The SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR should be incremented for each incompatible API change. The options may be used to pass miscellaneous options to the middleware as a NULL-terminated array of pointers to struct sk_option. The middleware may ignore unsupported or unknown options unless the "important" flag is set, in which case it should return failure if an unsupported option is requested. At present the following options names are supported: "device" Specifies a specific FIDO device on which to perform the operation. The value in this field is interpreted by the middleware but it would be typical to specify a path to a /dev node for the device in question. "user" Specifies the FIDO2 username used when enrolling a key, overriding OpenSSH's default of using an all-zero username. In OpenSSH, the middleware will be invoked by using a similar mechanism to ssh-pkcs11-helper to provide address-space containment of the middleware from ssh-agent. openssh-8.2p1/README010064400017500001750000000040361362136622600123440ustar00djmdjmSee https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#8.2p1 for the release notes. Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or patch/pull-request management. This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other Unices. OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song. It has a homepage at https://www.openssh.com/ This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM support, EGD/PRNGD support and replacements for OpenBSD library functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris and UnixWare. This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository. The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for all logins, not just when using password authentication. There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please refer to https://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join. Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by unsubscribed users. Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD style guidelines[1]. Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on dependencies and how to install OpenSSH on your system. Damien Miller Miscellania - This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample implementation released by Tatu Ylonen. References - [0] https://www.openssh.com/ [1] https://man.openbsd.org/style.9 openssh-8.2p1/README.dns010064400017500001750000000031171362136622600131260ustar00djmdjmHow to verify host keys using OpenSSH and DNS --------------------------------------------- OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4255. The document contains very brief instructions on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the scope of this document. (1) Server: Generate and publish the DNS RR To create a DNS resource record (RR) containing a fingerprint of the public host key, use the following command: ssh-keygen -r hostname -f keyfile -g where "hostname" is your fully qualified hostname and "keyfile" is the file containing the public host key file. If you have multiple keys, you should generate one RR for each key. In the example above, ssh-keygen will print the fingerprint in a generic DNS RR format parsable by most modern name server implementations. If your nameserver has support for the SSHFP RR you can omit the -g flag and ssh-keygen will print a standard SSHFP RR. To publish the fingerprint using the DNS you must add the generated RR to your DNS zone file and sign your zone. (2) Client: Enable ssh to verify host keys using DNS To enable the ssh client to verify host keys using DNS, you have to add the following option to the ssh configuration file ($HOME/.ssh/config or /etc/ssh/ssh_config): VerifyHostKeyDNS yes Upon connection the client will try to look up the fingerprint RR using DNS. If the fingerprint received from the DNS server matches the remote host key, the user will be notified. Jakob Schlyter Wesley Griffin $OpenBSD: README.dns,v 1.2 2003/10/14 19:43:23 jakob Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/README.md010064400017500001750000000114161362136622600127430ustar00djmdjm# Portable OpenSSH [![Fuzzing Status](https://oss-fuzz-build-logs.storage.googleapis.com/badges/openssh.svg)](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?sort=-opened&can=1&q=proj:openssh) OpenSSH is a complete implementation of the SSH protocol (version 2) for secure remote login, command execution and file transfer. It includes a client ``ssh`` and server ``sshd``, file transfer utilities ``scp`` and ``sftp`` as well as tools for key generation (``ssh-keygen``), run-time key storage (``ssh-agent``) and a number of supporting programs. This is a port of OpenBSD's [OpenSSH](https://openssh.com) to most Unix-like operating systems, including Linux, OS X and Cygwin. Portable OpenSSH polyfills OpenBSD APIs that are not available elsewhere, adds sshd sandboxing for more operating systems and includes support for OS-native authentication and auditing (e.g. using PAM). ## Documentation The official documentation for OpenSSH are the man pages for each tool: * [ssh(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1) * [sshd(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8) * [ssh-keygen(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1) * [ssh-agent(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1) * [scp(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1) * [sftp(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp.1) * [ssh-keyscan(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keyscan.8) * [sftp-server(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp-server.8) ## Stable Releases Stable release tarballs are available from a number of [download mirrors](https://www.openssh.com/portable.html#downloads). We recommend the use of a stable release for most users. Please read the [release notes](https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html) for details of recent changes and potential incompatibilities. ## Building Portable OpenSSH ### Dependencies Portable OpenSSH is built using autoconf and make. It requires a working C compiler, standard library and headers, and [zlib](https://www.zlib.net/). ``libcrypto`` from either [LibreSSL](https://www.libressl.org/) or [OpenSSL](https://www.openssl.org) may also be used, but OpenSSH may be built without it supporting a subset of crypto algorithms. FIDO security token support need [libfido2](https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) and its dependencies. Also, certain platforms and build-time options may require additional dependencies, see README.platform for details. ### Building a release Releases include a pre-built copy of the ``configure`` script and may be built using: ``` tar zxvf openssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz cd openssh ./configure # [options] make && make tests ``` See the [Build-time Customisation](#build-time-customisation) section below for configure options. If you plan on installing OpenSSH to your system, then you will usually want to specify destination paths. ### Building from git If building from git, you'll need [autoconf](https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/) installed to build the ``configure`` script. The following commands will check out and build portable OpenSSH from git: ``` git clone https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable # or https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git cd openssh-portable autoreconf ./configure make && make tests ``` ### Build-time Customisation There are many build-time customisation options available. All Autoconf destination path flags (e.g. ``--prefix``) are supported (and are usually required if you want to install OpenSSH). For a full list of available flags, run ``configure --help`` but a few of the more frequently-used ones are described below. Some of these flags will require additional libraries and/or headers be installed. Flag | Meaning --- | --- ``--with-pam`` | Enable [PAM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluggable_authentication_module) support. [OpenPAM](https://www.openpam.org/), [Linux PAM](http://www.linux-pam.org/) and Solaris PAM are supported. ``--with-libedit`` | Enable [libedit](https://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/) support for sftp. ``--with-kerberos5`` | Enable Kerberos/GSSAPI support. Both [Heimdal](https://www.h5l.org/) and [MIT](https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/) Kerberos implementations are supported. ``--with-selinux`` | Enable [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) support. ``--with-security-key-builtin`` | Include built-in support for U2F/FIDO2 security keys. This requires [libfido2](https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) be installed. ## Development Portable OpenSSH development is discussed on the [openssh-unix-dev mailing list](https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev) ([archive mirror](https://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev)). Bugs and feature requests are tracked on our [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/). ## Reporting bugs _Non-security_ bugs may be reported to the developers via [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/) or via the mailing list above. Security bugs should be reported to [openssh@openssh.com](mailto:openssh.openssh.com). openssh-8.2p1/README.platform010064400017500001750000000077161362136622600141770ustar00djmdjmThis file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms. AIX --- As of OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will now honour an accounts password expiry settings, where previously it did not. Because of this, it's possible for sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to have accounts which have passwords expired longer than the inactive time (ie the "Weeks between password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT or the maxexpired chuser attribute). Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the administrator. As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8. As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it if found. This will enable IPv6 support. If for some reason configure gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour. IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5 IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4 If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \ --with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the "rlogin" attribute set. This check is not done for the root account, instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used. If you are using the IBM compiler you probably want to use CC=xlc rather than the default of cc. Cygwin ------ To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages: gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl, openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel. Darwin and MacOS X ------------------ Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X. Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode using a third party driver. More information is available at: http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/ Linux ----- Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent development packages. On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel, zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev. Solaris ------- If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4) for praudit(1m) to give sensible output. The following line needs to be added to /etc/security/audit_event: 32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is 32768 - 65535. Event number 32800 has been chosen for AUE_openssh. There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding. Platforms using PAM ------------------- As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when PAM is enabled. To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell sessions. Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still return the output from pam_nologin to the client. openssh-8.2p1/README.privsep010064400017500001750000000042501362136622600140310ustar00djmdjmPrivilege separation, or privsep, is method in OpenSSH by which operations that require root privilege are performed by a separate privileged monitor process. Its purpose is to prevent privilege escalation by containing corruption to an unprivileged process. More information is available at: http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html Privilege separation is now mandatory. During the pre-authentication phase sshd will chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the "sshd" user and its primary group. sshd is a pseudo-account that should not be used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a "nologin" or invalid shell. You should do something like the following to prepare the privsep preauth environment: # mkdir /var/empty # chown root:sys /var/empty # chmod 755 /var/empty # groupadd sshd # useradd -g sshd -c 'sshd privsep' -d /var/empty -s /bin/false sshd /var/empty should not contain any files. configure supports the following options to change the default privsep user and chroot directory: --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on AIX, FreeBSD, HP-UX (including Trusted Mode), Linux, NetBSD and Solaris. On Cygwin, Tru64 Unix and OpenServer only the pre-authentication part of privsep is supported. Post-authentication privsep is disabled automatically (so you won't see the additional process mentioned below). Note that for a normal interactive login with a shell, enabling privsep will require 1 additional process per login session. Given the following process listing (from HP-UX): UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME COMMAND root 1005 1 0 10:45:17 ? 0:08 /opt/openssh/sbin/sshd -u0 root 6917 1005 0 15:19:16 ? 0:00 sshd: stevesk [priv] stevesk 6919 6917 0 15:19:17 ? 0:03 sshd: stevesk@2 stevesk 6921 6919 0 15:19:17 pts/2 0:00 -bash process 1005 is the sshd process listening for new connections. process 6917 is the privileged monitor process, 6919 is the user owned sshd process and 6921 is the shell process. openssh-8.2p1/README.tun010064400017500001750000000114321362136622600131470ustar00djmdjmHow to use OpenSSH-based virtual private networks ------------------------------------------------- OpenSSH contains support for VPN tunneling using the tun(4) network tunnel pseudo-device which is available on most platforms, either for layer 2 or 3 traffic. The following brief instructions on how to use this feature use a network configuration specific to the OpenBSD operating system. (1) Server: Enable support for SSH tunneling To enable the ssh server to accept tunnel requests from the client, you have to add the following option to the ssh server configuration file (/etc/ssh/sshd_config): PermitTunnel yes Restart the server or send the hangup signal (SIGHUP) to let the server reread it's configuration. (2) Server: Restrict client access and assign the tunnel The OpenSSH server simply uses the file /root/.ssh/authorized_keys to restrict the client to connect to a specified tunnel and to automatically start the related interface configuration command. These settings are optional but recommended: tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... reyk@openbsd.org (3) Client: Configure the local network tunnel interface Use the hostname.if(5) interface-specific configuration file to set up the network tunnel configuration with OpenBSD. For example, use the following configuration in /etc/hostname.tun0 to set up the layer 3 tunnel on the client: inet 192.168.5.1 255.255.255.252 192.168.5.2 OpenBSD also supports layer 2 tunneling over the tun device by adding the link0 flag: inet 192.168.1.78 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.255 link0 Layer 2 tunnels can be used in combination with an Ethernet bridge(4) interface, like the following example for /etc/bridgename.bridge0: add tun0 add sis0 up (4) Client: Configure the OpenSSH client To establish tunnel forwarding for connections to a specified remote host by default, use the following ssh client configuration for the privileged user (in /root/.ssh/config): Host sshgateway Tunnel yes TunnelDevice 0:any PermitLocalCommand yes LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0 A more complicated configuration is possible to establish a tunnel to a remote host which is not directly accessible by the client. The following example describes a client configuration to connect to the remote host over two ssh hops in between. It uses the OpenSSH ProxyCommand in combination with the nc(1) program to forward the final ssh tunnel destination over multiple ssh sessions. Host access.somewhere.net User puffy Host dmzgw User puffy ProxyCommand ssh access.somewhere.net nc dmzgw 22 Host sshgateway Tunnel Ethernet TunnelDevice 0:any PermitLocalCommand yes LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0 ProxyCommand ssh dmzgw nc sshgateway 22 The following network plan illustrates the previous configuration in combination with layer 2 tunneling and Ethernet bridging. +--------+ ( ) +----------------------+ | Client |------( Internet )-----| access.somewhere.net | +--------+ ( ) +----------------------+ : 192.168.1.78 | :............................. +-------+ Forwarded ssh connection : | dmzgw | Layer 2 tunnel : +-------+ : | : | : +------------+ :......| sshgateway | | +------------+ --- real connection Bridge -> | +----------+ ... "virtual connection" [ X ]--------| somehost | [X] switch +----------+ 192.168.1.25 (5) Client: Connect to the server and establish the tunnel Finally connect to the OpenSSH server to establish the tunnel by using the following command: ssh sshgateway It is also possible to tell the client to fork into the background after the connection has been successfully established: ssh -f sshgateway true Without the ssh configuration done in step (4), it is also possible to use the following command lines: ssh -fw 0:1 sshgateway true ifconfig tun0 192.168.5.1 192.168.5.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 Using OpenSSH tunnel forwarding is a simple way to establish secure and ad hoc virtual private networks. Possible fields of application could be wireless networks or administrative VPN tunnels. Nevertheless, ssh tunneling requires some packet header overhead and runs on top of TCP. It is still suggested to use the IP Security Protocol (IPSec) for robust and permanent VPN connections and to interconnect corporate networks. Reyk Floeter $OpenBSD: README.tun,v 1.4 2006/03/28 00:12:31 deraadt Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/TODO010064400017500001750000000050501362136622600121510ustar00djmdjmDocumentation: - Update the docs - Update README - Update INSTALL - Merge INSTALL & README.privsep - Install FAQ? - General FAQ on S/Key, TIS, RSA, RSA2, DSA, etc and suggestions on when it would be best to use them. - Create a Documentation/ directory? Programming: - Grep for 'XXX' comments and fix - Link order is incorrect for some systems using Kerberos 4 and AFS. Result is multiple inclusion of DES symbols. Holger Trapp reports that changing the configure generated link order from: -lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl -lutil -lkafs -lkrb -ldes -lcrypto to: -lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl -lutil -lcrypto -lkafs -lkrb -ldes fixing the problem. - Write a test program that calls stat() to search for EGD/PRNGd socket rather than use the (non-portable) "test -S". - More platforms for for setproctitle() emulation (testing needed) - Improve PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication - Informational messages - Use different PAM service name for kbdint vs regular auth (suggest from Solar Designer) - Ability to select which ChallengeResponseAuthentications may be used and order to try them in e.g. "ChallengeResponseAuthentication pam" - Complete Tru64 SIA support - It looks like we could merge it into the password auth code to cut down on diff size. Maybe PAM password auth too? - Finish integrating kernel-level auditing code for IRIX and SOLARIS (Gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com) - 64-bit builds on HP-UX 11.X (stevesk@pobox.com): - utmp/wtmp get corrupted (something in loginrec?) - can't build with PAM (no 64-bit libpam yet) Clean up configure/makefiles: - Clean up configure.ac - There are a few double #defined variables left to do. HAVE_LOGIN is one of them. Consider NOT looking for information in wtmpx or utmpx or any of that stuff if it's not detected from the start - Replace the whole u_intXX_t evilness in acconfig.h with something better??? - Do it in configure.ac - Consider splitting the u_intXX_t test for sys/bitype.h into separate test to allow people to (right/wrongfully) link against Bind directly. - Consider splitting configure.ac into separate files which do logically similar tests. E.g move all the type detection stuff into one file, entropy related stuff into another. Packaging: - HP-UX: Provide DEPOT package scripts. (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com) PrivSep Issues: - PAM + See above PAM notes - AIX + usrinfo() does not set TTY, but only required for legacy systems. Works with PrivSep. - OSF + SIA is broken - Cygwin + Privsep for Pre-auth only (no fd passing) openssh-8.2p1/aclocal.m4010064400017500001750000000130771362136622600133310ustar00djmdjmdnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros dnl dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE(check_flag[, define_flag]) dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append dnl 'check_flag'. AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE], [{ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1" _define_flag="$2" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1" AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } ]])], [ if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ] ) }]) dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag]) dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append dnl 'check_flag'. AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK], [{ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1 and linking succeeds]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1" _define_flag="$2" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; long long int p = n * o; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p); exit(0); } ]])], [ if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ] ) }]) dnl OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag]) dnl Check that $LD accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append dnl 'define_flag' to $LDFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append dnl 'check_flag'. AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK], [{ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $LD supports link flag $1]) saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR $1" _define_flag="$2" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; long long p = n * o; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p); exit(0); } ]])], [ if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" else AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag" fi ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" ] ) }]) dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol) dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field' dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result. dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there AC_DEFUN(OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD, [ # look for field '$1' in header '$2' dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` dnl ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1 AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2) AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [ AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl ], [ dnl eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl ]) dnl ]) ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result) if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then AC_DEFINE($3, 1, [Define if you have $1 in $2]) fi else AC_MSG_RESULT(no) fi ]) dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc. So we dnl have to test to find something that will work. AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T], [ AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent]) AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv], [ # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv= for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do AC_TRY_COMPILE([ #include #include int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *); ],[ $t len; getpeername(0,0,&len); ],[ curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t" break ]) done done if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t]) fi ]) AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv, [type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])], [#include #include ]) ]) openssh-8.2p1/addrmatch.c010064400017500001750000000257421362136622600135660ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.14 2018/07/31 03:07:24 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "match.h" #include "log.h" struct xaddr { sa_family_t af; union { struct in_addr v4; struct in6_addr v6; u_int8_t addr8[16]; u_int32_t addr32[4]; } xa; /* 128-bit address */ u_int32_t scope_id; /* iface scope id for v6 */ #define v4 xa.v4 #define v6 xa.v6 #define addr8 xa.addr8 #define addr32 xa.addr32 }; static int addr_unicast_masklen(int af) { switch (af) { case AF_INET: return 32; case AF_INET6: return 128; default: return -1; } } static inline int masklen_valid(int af, u_int masklen) { switch (af) { case AF_INET: return masklen <= 32 ? 0 : -1; case AF_INET6: return masklen <= 128 ? 0 : -1; default: return -1; } } /* * Convert struct sockaddr to struct xaddr * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ static int addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa) { struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; memset(xa, '\0', sizeof(*xa)); switch (sa->sa_family) { case AF_INET: if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in4)) return -1; xa->af = AF_INET; memcpy(&xa->v4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(xa->v4)); break; case AF_INET6: if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in6)) return -1; xa->af = AF_INET6; memcpy(&xa->v6, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(xa->v6)); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID xa->scope_id = in6->sin6_scope_id; #endif break; default: return -1; } return 0; } /* * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and * store it in 'n'. * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ static int addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n) { int i; if (masklen_valid(af, l) != 0 || n == NULL) return -1; memset(n, '\0', sizeof(*n)); switch (af) { case AF_INET: n->af = AF_INET; if (l == 0) return 0; n->v4.s_addr = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff); return 0; case AF_INET6: n->af = AF_INET6; for (i = 0; i < 4 && l >= 32; i++, l -= 32) n->addr32[i] = 0xffffffffU; if (i < 4 && l != 0) n->addr32[i] = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff); return 0; default: return -1; } } /* * Perform logical AND of addresses 'a' and 'b', storing result in 'dst'. * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ static int addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b) { int i; if (dst == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL || a->af != b->af) return -1; memcpy(dst, a, sizeof(*dst)); switch (a->af) { case AF_INET: dst->v4.s_addr &= b->v4.s_addr; return 0; case AF_INET6: dst->scope_id = a->scope_id; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) dst->addr32[i] &= b->addr32[i]; return 0; default: return -1; } } /* * Compare addresses 'a' and 'b' * Return 0 if addresses are identical, -1 if (a < b) or 1 if (a > b) */ static int addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b) { int i; if (a->af != b->af) return a->af == AF_INET6 ? 1 : -1; switch (a->af) { case AF_INET: if (a->v4.s_addr == b->v4.s_addr) return 0; return ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) > ntohl(b->v4.s_addr) ? 1 : -1; case AF_INET6: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) if (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i] != 0) return a->addr8[i] > b->addr8[i] ? 1 : -1; if (a->scope_id == b->scope_id) return 0; return a->scope_id > b->scope_id ? 1 : -1; default: return -1; } } /* * Parse string address 'p' into 'n' * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ static int addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai = NULL; int ret = -1; memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0) goto out; if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) goto out; if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, n) == -1) goto out; /* success */ ret = 0; out: if (ai != NULL) freeaddrinfo(ai); return ret; } /* * Perform bitwise negation of address * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ static int addr_invert(struct xaddr *n) { int i; if (n == NULL) return (-1); switch (n->af) { case AF_INET: n->v4.s_addr = ~n->v4.s_addr; return (0); case AF_INET6: for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) n->addr32[i] = ~n->addr32[i]; return (0); default: return (-1); } } /* * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and * store it in 'n'. * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ static int addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n) { if (addr_netmask(af, l, n) == -1 || addr_invert(n) == -1) return (-1); return (0); } /* * Test whether address 'a' is all zeros (i.e. 0.0.0.0 or ::) * Returns 0 on if address is all-zeros, -1 if not all zeros or on failure. */ static int addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a) { int i; switch (a->af) { case AF_INET: return (a->v4.s_addr == 0 ? 0 : -1); case AF_INET6:; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) if (a->addr32[i] != 0) return (-1); return (0); default: return (-1); } } /* * Test whether host portion of address 'a', as determined by 'masklen' * is all zeros. * Returns 0 on if host portion of address is all-zeros, * -1 if not all zeros or on failure. */ static int addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen) { struct xaddr tmp_addr, tmp_mask, tmp_result; memcpy(&tmp_addr, a, sizeof(tmp_addr)); if (addr_hostmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1) return (-1); if (addr_and(&tmp_result, &tmp_addr, &tmp_mask) == -1) return (-1); return (addr_is_all0s(&tmp_result)); } /* * Parse a CIDR address (x.x.x.x/y or xxxx:yyyy::/z). * Return -1 on parse error, -2 on inconsistency or 0 on success. */ static int addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l) { struct xaddr tmp; long unsigned int masklen = 999; char addrbuf[64], *mp, *cp; /* Don't modify argument */ if (p == NULL || strlcpy(addrbuf, p, sizeof(addrbuf)) >= sizeof(addrbuf)) return -1; if ((mp = strchr(addrbuf, '/')) != NULL) { *mp = '\0'; mp++; masklen = strtoul(mp, &cp, 10); if (*mp == '\0' || *cp != '\0' || masklen > 128) return -1; } if (addr_pton(addrbuf, &tmp) == -1) return -1; if (mp == NULL) masklen = addr_unicast_masklen(tmp.af); if (masklen_valid(tmp.af, masklen) == -1) return -2; if (addr_host_is_all0s(&tmp, masklen) != 0) return -2; if (n != NULL) memcpy(n, &tmp, sizeof(*n)); if (l != NULL) *l = masklen; return 0; } static int addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net, u_int masklen) { struct xaddr tmp_mask, tmp_result; if (host->af != net->af) return -1; if (addr_netmask(host->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1) return -1; if (addr_and(&tmp_result, host, &tmp_mask) == -1) return -1; return addr_cmp(&tmp_result, net); } /* * Match "addr" against list pattern list "_list", which may contain a * mix of CIDR addresses and old-school wildcards. * * If addr is NULL, then no matching is performed, but _list is parsed * and checked for well-formedness. * * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL). * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL. * Returns -1 on negated match found (never returned when addr == NULL). * Returns -2 on invalid list entry. */ int addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list) { char *list, *cp, *o; struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr; u_int masklen, neg; int ret = 0, r; if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) { debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr); return 0; } if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL) return -1; while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) { neg = *cp == '!'; if (neg) cp++; if (*cp == '\0') { ret = -2; break; } /* Prefer CIDR address matching */ r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen); if (r == -2) { debug2("%s: inconsistent mask length for " "match network \"%.100s\"", __func__, cp); ret = -2; break; } else if (r == 0) { if (addr != NULL && addr_netmatch(&try_addr, &match_addr, masklen) == 0) { foundit: if (neg) { ret = -1; break; } ret = 1; } continue; } else { /* If CIDR parse failed, try wildcard string match */ if (addr != NULL && match_pattern(addr, cp) == 1) goto foundit; } } free(o); return ret; } /* * Match "addr" against list CIDR list "_list". Lexical wildcards and * negation are not supported. If "addr" == NULL, will verify structure * of "_list". * * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL). * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL. * Returns -1 on error */ int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *addr, const char *_list) { char *list, *cp, *o; struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr; u_int masklen; int ret = 0, r; if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) { debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr); return 0; } if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL) return -1; while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) { if (*cp == '\0') { error("%s: empty entry in list \"%.100s\"", __func__, o); ret = -1; break; } /* * NB. This function is called in pre-auth with untrusted data, * so be extra paranoid about junk reaching getaddrino (via * addr_pton_cidr). */ /* Stop junk from reaching getaddrinfo. +3 is for masklen */ if (strlen(cp) > INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 3) { error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" too long", __func__, cp); ret = -1; break; } #define VALID_CIDR_CHARS "0123456789abcdefABCDEF.:/" if (strspn(cp, VALID_CIDR_CHARS) != strlen(cp)) { error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" contains invalid " "characters", __func__, cp); ret = -1; } /* Prefer CIDR address matching */ r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen); if (r == -1) { error("Invalid network entry \"%.100s\"", cp); ret = -1; break; } else if (r == -2) { error("Inconsistent mask length for " "network \"%.100s\"", cp); ret = -1; break; } else if (r == 0 && addr != NULL) { if (addr_netmatch(&try_addr, &match_addr, masklen) == 0) ret = 1; continue; } } free(o); return ret; } openssh-8.2p1/atomicio.c010064400017500001750000000112631362136622600134340ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.30 2019/01/24 02:42:23 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" /* * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite */ size_t atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n, int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg) { char *s = _s; size_t pos = 0; ssize_t res; struct pollfd pfd; pfd.fd = fd; #ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT; #else pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLOUT; #endif while (n > pos) { res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos); switch (res) { case -1: if (errno == EINTR) { /* possible SIGALARM, update callback */ if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, 0) == -1) { errno = EINTR; return pos; } continue; } else if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) { (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); continue; } return 0; case 0: errno = EPIPE; return pos; default: pos += (size_t)res; if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) { errno = EINTR; return pos; } } } return pos; } size_t atomicio(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n) { return atomicio6(f, fd, _s, n, NULL, NULL); } /* * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev */ size_t atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd, const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt, int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg) { size_t pos = 0, rem; ssize_t res; struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array; struct pollfd pfd; if (iovcnt < 0 || iovcnt > IOV_MAX) { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } /* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */ memcpy(iov, _iov, (size_t)iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov)); pfd.fd = fd; #ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON pfd.events = f == readv ? POLLIN : POLLOUT; #else pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLOUT; #endif for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) { res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt); switch (res) { case -1: if (errno == EINTR) { /* possible SIGALARM, update callback */ if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, 0) == -1) { errno = EINTR; return pos; } continue; } else if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) { (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); continue; } return 0; case 0: errno = EPIPE; return pos; default: rem = (size_t)res; pos += rem; /* skip completed iov entries */ while (iovcnt > 0 && rem >= iov[0].iov_len) { rem -= iov[0].iov_len; iov++; iovcnt--; } /* This shouldn't happen... */ if (rem > 0 && (iovcnt <= 0 || rem > iov[0].iov_len)) { errno = EFAULT; return 0; } if (iovcnt == 0) break; /* update pointer in partially complete iov */ iov[0].iov_base = ((char *)iov[0].iov_base) + rem; iov[0].iov_len -= rem; } if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) { errno = EINTR; return pos; } } return pos; } size_t atomiciov(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd, const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt) { return atomiciov6(f, fd, _iov, iovcnt, NULL, NULL); } openssh-8.2p1/atomicio.h010064400017500001750000000042331362136622600134400ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.12 2018/12/27 03:25:25 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _ATOMICIO_H #define _ATOMICIO_H struct iovec; /* * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite */ size_t atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n, int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *); size_t atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t); #define vwrite (ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))write /* * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev */ size_t atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd, const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt, int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *); size_t atomiciov(ssize_t (*)(int, const struct iovec *, int), int, const struct iovec *, int); #endif /* _ATOMICIO_H */ openssh-8.2p1/audit-bsm.c010064400017500001750000000275261362136622600135260ustar00djmdjm/* * TODO * * - deal with overlap between this and sys_auth_allowed_user * sys_auth_record_login and record_failed_login. */ /* * Copyright 1988-2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ /* #pragma ident "@(#)bsmaudit.c 1.1 01/09/17 SMI" */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(USE_BSM_AUDIT) #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API #include #endif #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #ifndef AUE_openssh # define AUE_openssh 32800 #endif #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR) #define AuditInfoStruct auditinfo_addr #define AuditInfoTermID au_tid_addr_t #define SetAuditFunc(a,b) setaudit_addr((a),(b)) #define SetAuditFuncText "setaudit_addr" #define AUToSubjectFunc au_to_subject_ex #define AUToReturnFunc(a,b) au_to_return32((a), (int32_t)(b)) #else #define AuditInfoStruct auditinfo #define AuditInfoTermID au_tid_t #define SetAuditFunc(a,b) setaudit(a) #define SetAuditFuncText "setaudit" #define AUToSubjectFunc au_to_subject #define AUToReturnFunc(a,b) au_to_return((a), (u_int)(b)) #endif #ifndef cannot_audit extern int cannot_audit(int); #endif extern void aug_init(void); extern void aug_save_auid(au_id_t); extern void aug_save_uid(uid_t); extern void aug_save_euid(uid_t); extern void aug_save_gid(gid_t); extern void aug_save_egid(gid_t); extern void aug_save_pid(pid_t); extern void aug_save_asid(au_asid_t); extern void aug_save_tid(dev_t, unsigned int); extern void aug_save_tid_ex(dev_t, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t); extern int aug_save_me(void); extern int aug_save_namask(void); extern void aug_save_event(au_event_t); extern void aug_save_sorf(int); extern void aug_save_text(char *); extern void aug_save_text1(char *); extern void aug_save_text2(char *); extern void aug_save_na(int); extern void aug_save_user(char *); extern void aug_save_path(char *); extern int aug_save_policy(void); extern void aug_save_afunc(int (*)(int)); extern int aug_audit(void); extern int aug_na_selected(void); extern int aug_selected(void); extern int aug_daemon_session(void); #ifndef HAVE_GETTEXT # define gettext(a) (a) #endif extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; static AuditInfoTermID ssh_bsm_tid; #ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API /* For some reason this constant is no longer defined in Solaris 11. */ #define BSM_TEXTBUFSZ 256 #endif /* Below is the low-level BSM interface code */ /* * aug_get_machine is only required on IPv6 capable machines, we use a * different mechanism in audit_connection_from() for IPv4-only machines. * getaudit_addr() is only present on IPv6 capable machines. */ #if defined(HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR) extern int aug_get_machine(char *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *); #else static int aug_get_machine(char *host, u_int32_t *addr, u_int32_t *type) { struct addrinfo *ai; struct sockaddr_in *in4; struct sockaddr_in6 *in6; int ret = 0, r; if ((r = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, NULL, &ai)) != 0) { error("BSM audit: getaddrinfo failed for %.100s: %.100s", host, r == EAI_SYSTEM ? strerror(errno) : gai_strerror(r)); return -1; } switch (ai->ai_family) { case AF_INET: in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr; *type = AU_IPv4; memcpy(addr, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr)); break; #ifdef AU_IPv6 case AF_INET6: in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr; *type = AU_IPv6; memcpy(addr, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); break; #endif default: error("BSM audit: unknown address family for %.100s: %d", host, ai->ai_family); ret = -1; } freeaddrinfo(ai); return ret; } #endif #ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API /* In Solaris 11 the audit daemon has been moved to SMF. In the process they simply dropped getacna() from the API, since it read from a now non-existent config file. This function re-implements getacna() to read from the SMF repository instead. */ int getacna(char *auditstring, int len) { scf_handle_t *handle = NULL; scf_property_t *property = NULL; scf_value_t *value = NULL; int ret = 0; handle = scf_handle_create(SCF_VERSION); if (handle == NULL) return -2; /* The man page for getacna on Solaris 10 states we should return -2 in case of error and set errno to indicate the error. We don't bother with errno here, though, since the only use of this function below doesn't check for errors anyway. */ ret = scf_handle_bind(handle); if (ret == -1) return -2; property = scf_property_create(handle); if (property == NULL) return -2; ret = scf_handle_decode_fmri(handle, "svc:/system/auditd:default/:properties/preselection/naflags", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, property, 0); if (ret == -1) return -2; value = scf_value_create(handle); if (value == NULL) return -2; ret = scf_property_get_value(property, value); if (ret == -1) return -2; ret = scf_value_get_astring(value, auditstring, len); if (ret == -1) return -2; scf_value_destroy(value); scf_property_destroy(property); scf_handle_destroy(handle); return 0; } #endif /* * Check if the specified event is selected (enabled) for auditing. * Returns 1 if the event is selected, 0 if not and -1 on failure. */ static int selected(char *username, uid_t uid, au_event_t event, int sf) { int rc, sorf; char naflags[512]; struct au_mask mask; mask.am_success = mask.am_failure = 0; if (uid < 0) { /* get flags for non-attributable (to a real user) events */ rc = getacna(naflags, sizeof(naflags)); if (rc == 0) (void) getauditflagsbin(naflags, &mask); } else rc = au_user_mask(username, &mask); sorf = (sf == 0) ? AU_PRS_SUCCESS : AU_PRS_FAILURE; return(au_preselect(event, &mask, sorf, AU_PRS_REREAD)); } static void bsm_audit_record(int typ, char *string, au_event_t event_no) { int ad, rc, sel; uid_t uid = -1; gid_t gid = -1; pid_t pid = getpid(); AuditInfoTermID tid = ssh_bsm_tid; if (the_authctxt != NULL && the_authctxt->valid) { uid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid; gid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_gid; } rc = (typ == 0) ? 0 : -1; sel = selected(the_authctxt->user, uid, event_no, rc); debug3("BSM audit: typ %d rc %d \"%s\"", typ, rc, string); if (!sel) return; /* audit event does not match mask, do not write */ debug3("BSM audit: writing audit new record"); ad = au_open(); (void) au_write(ad, AUToSubjectFunc(uid, uid, gid, uid, gid, pid, pid, &tid)); (void) au_write(ad, au_to_text(string)); (void) au_write(ad, AUToReturnFunc(typ, rc)); #ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API /* The last argument is the event modifier flags. For some seemingly undocumented reason it was added in Solaris 11. */ rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no, 0); #else rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no); #endif if (rc < 0) error("BSM audit: %s failed to write \"%s\" record: %s", __func__, string, strerror(errno)); } static void bsm_audit_session_setup(void) { int rc; struct AuditInfoStruct info; au_mask_t mask; if (the_authctxt == NULL) { error("BSM audit: session setup internal error (NULL ctxt)"); return; } if (the_authctxt->valid) info.ai_auid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid; else info.ai_auid = -1; info.ai_asid = getpid(); mask.am_success = 0; mask.am_failure = 0; (void) au_user_mask(the_authctxt->user, &mask); info.ai_mask.am_success = mask.am_success; info.ai_mask.am_failure = mask.am_failure; info.ai_termid = ssh_bsm_tid; rc = SetAuditFunc(&info, sizeof(info)); if (rc < 0) error("BSM audit: %s: %s failed: %s", __func__, SetAuditFuncText, strerror(errno)); } static void bsm_audit_bad_login(const char *what) { char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ]; if (the_authctxt->valid) { (void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf), gettext("invalid %s for user %s"), what, the_authctxt->user); bsm_audit_record(4, textbuf, AUE_openssh); } else { (void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf), gettext("invalid user name \"%s\""), the_authctxt->user); bsm_audit_record(3, textbuf, AUE_openssh); } } /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ void audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) { AuditInfoTermID *tid = &ssh_bsm_tid; char buf[1024]; if (cannot_audit(0)) return; debug3("BSM audit: connection from %.100s port %d", host, port); /* populate our terminal id structure */ #if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR) tid->at_port = (dev_t)port; aug_get_machine((char *)host, &(tid->at_addr[0]), &(tid->at_type)); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x %08x %08x %08x", tid->at_addr[0], tid->at_addr[1], tid->at_addr[2], tid->at_addr[3]); debug3("BSM audit: iptype %d machine ID %s", (int)tid->at_type, buf); #else /* this is used on IPv4-only machines */ tid->port = (dev_t)port; tid->machine = inet_addr(host); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine); debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf); #endif } void audit_run_command(const char *command) { /* not implemented */ } void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) { /* not implemented */ } void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) { /* not implemented */ } void audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) { char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ]; static int logged_in = 0; const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)"; if (cannot_audit(0)) return; switch(event) { case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: logged_in = 1; bsm_audit_session_setup(); snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf), gettext("successful login %s"), user); bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_openssh); break; case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: /* * We can also get a close event if the user attempted auth * but never succeeded. */ if (logged_in) { snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf), gettext("sshd logout %s"), the_authctxt->user); bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_logout); } else { debug("%s: connection closed without authentication", __func__); } break; case SSH_NOLOGIN: bsm_audit_record(1, gettext("logins disabled by /etc/nologin"), AUE_openssh); break; case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf), gettext("too many tries for user %s"), the_authctxt->user); bsm_audit_record(1, textbuf, AUE_openssh); break; case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: bsm_audit_record(2, gettext("not_console"), AUE_openssh); break; case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: bsm_audit_bad_login("password"); break; case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry"); break; default: debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); } } #endif /* BSM */ openssh-8.2p1/audit-linux.c010064400017500001750000000066771362136622600141100ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT) #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "audit.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "packet.h" const char *audit_username(void); int linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) { int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) { if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ else return 0; /* Must prevent login */ } rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); saved_errno = errno; close(audit_fd); /* * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non * root user. */ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) rc = 0; errno = saved_errno; return rc >= 0; } /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ void audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) { /* not implemented */ } void audit_run_command(const char *command) { /* not implemented */ } void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) { if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL, li->line, 1) == 0) fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); } void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) { /* not implemented */ } void audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) { switch(event) { case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: case SSH_NOLOGIN: case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: break; case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: case SSH_INVALID_USER: linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0); break; default: debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); break; } } #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ openssh-8.2p1/audit.c010064400017500001750000000133241362136622600127360ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #include "audit.h" #include "log.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" /* * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using. */ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *method) { if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0) return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE; else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0) return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD; else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || strcmp(method, "rsa") == 0) return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY; else if (strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0) return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT; else if (strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || strcmp(method, "rhosts-rsa") == 0) return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED; else if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI; else return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; } /* helper to return supplied username */ const char * audit_username(void) { static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) return (unknownuser); if (!the_authctxt->valid) return (invaliduser); return (the_authctxt->user); } const char * audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) { int i; static struct event_lookup_struct { ssh_audit_event_t event; const char *name; } event_lookup[] = { {SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, "LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"}, {SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED, "LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"}, {SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS, "AUTH_SUCCESS"}, {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE, "AUTH_FAIL_NONE"}, {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD, "AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"}, {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT, "AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"}, {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY, "AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"}, {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED, "AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"}, {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI, "AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"}, {SSH_INVALID_USER, "INVALID_USER"}, {SSH_NOLOGIN, "NOLOGIN"}, {SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, "CONNECTION_CLOSE"}, {SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, "CONNECTION_ABANDON"}, {SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN, "AUDIT_UNKNOWN"} }; for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++) if (event_lookup[i].event == ev) break; return(event_lookup[i].name); } # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* * Null implementations of audit functions. * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled. */ /* * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication * has been attempted. */ void audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) { debug("audit connection from %s port %d euid %d", host, port, (int)geteuid()); } /* * Called when various events occur (see audit.h for a list of possible * events and what they mean). */ void audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) { debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(), audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event)); } /* * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. * * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used * within a single connection. */ void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) { const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)"; debug("audit session open euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(), audit_username(), t); } /* * Called when a user session is closed. Argument is the tty allocated to * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. * * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used * within a single connection. */ void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) { const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)"; debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(), audit_username(), t); } /* * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows * multiple sessions within a single connection. */ void audit_run_command(const char *command) { debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), audit_username(), command); } # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ openssh-8.2p1/audit.h010064400017500001750000000044611362136622600127450ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H # define _SSH_AUDIT_H #include "loginrec.h" struct ssh; enum ssh_audit_event_type { SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS, SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE, SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD, SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT, /* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */ SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY, /* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */ SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED, /* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */ SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI, SSH_INVALID_USER, SSH_NOLOGIN, /* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */ SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, /* closed after attempting auth or session */ SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */ SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN }; typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); void audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t); void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); void audit_run_command(const char *); ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ openssh-8.2p1/auth-bsdauth.c010064400017500001750000000072011362136622600142160ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.15 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef BSD_AUTH #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" static void * bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { return authctxt; } int bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; char *challenge = NULL; *infotxt = NULL; *numprompts = 0; *prompts = NULL; *echo_on = NULL; if (authctxt->as != NULL) { debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session"); challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE); if (challenge == NULL) { auth_close(authctxt->as); authctxt->as = NULL; } } if (challenge == NULL) { debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session"); debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge); if (authctxt->as == NULL) challenge = NULL; debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty"); } if (challenge == NULL) return -1; *name = xstrdup(""); *infotxt = xstrdup(""); *numprompts = 1; *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int)); (*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge); return 0; } int bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; int authok; if (!authctxt->valid) return -1; if (authctxt->as == NULL) error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session"); if (numresponses != 1) return -1; authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0); authctxt->as = NULL; debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok); return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0; } static void bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; if (authctxt && authctxt->as) { auth_close(authctxt->as); authctxt->as = NULL; } } KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = { "bsdauth", bsdauth_init_ctx, bsdauth_query, bsdauth_respond, bsdauth_free_ctx }; KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = { "bsdauth", bsdauth_init_ctx, mm_bsdauth_query, mm_bsdauth_respond, bsdauth_free_ctx }; #endif openssh-8.2p1/auth-krb5.c010064400017500001750000000156721362136622600134420ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.23 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */ /* * Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines. * * From: FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #ifdef KRB5 #include #include #include #include extern ServerOptions options; static int krb5_init(void *context) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context; krb5_error_code problem; if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) { problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx); if (problem) return (problem); } return (0); } int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { #ifndef HEIMDAL krb5_creds creds; krb5_principal server; #endif krb5_error_code problem; krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; int len; char *client, *platform_client; const char *errmsg; /* get platform-specific kerberos client principal name (if it exists) */ platform_client = platform_krb5_get_principal_name(authctxt->pw->pw_name); client = platform_client ? platform_client : authctxt->pw->pw_name; temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); problem = krb5_init(authctxt); if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, client, &authctxt->krb5_user); if (problem) goto out; #ifdef HEIMDAL # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx, krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache); # else problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache); # endif if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache, authctxt->krb5_user); if (problem) goto out; restore_uid(); problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, ccache, password, 1, NULL); temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); if (problem) goto out; # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx, krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); # else problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); # endif if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache); ccache = NULL; if (problem) goto out; #else problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL, KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); if (problem) goto out; restore_uid(); problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server, NULL, NULL, NULL); krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server); temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); if (problem) goto out; if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name)) { problem = -1; goto out; } problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, authctxt->krb5_user); if (problem) goto out; problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &creds); if (problem) goto out; #endif authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif out: restore_uid(); free(platform_client); if (problem) { if (ccache) krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache); if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem); debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, errmsg); } else debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d", problem); krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) return (-1); else return (0); } return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0); } void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) { debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called"); if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) { krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL; } if (authctxt->krb5_user) { krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user); authctxt->krb5_user = NULL; } if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) { krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx); authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL; } } #ifndef HEIMDAL krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { int tmpfd, ret, oerrno; char ccname[40]; mode_t old_umask; ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) return ENOMEM; old_umask = umask(0177); tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); oerrno = errno; umask(old_umask); if (tmpfd == -1) { logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); return oerrno; } if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) { oerrno = errno; logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); close(tmpfd); return oerrno; } close(tmpfd); return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); } #endif /* !HEIMDAL */ #endif /* KRB5 */ openssh-8.2p1/auth-options.c010064400017500001750000000551611362136622600142670ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.90 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "auth-options.h" static int dup_strings(char ***dstp, size_t *ndstp, char **src, size_t nsrc) { char **dst; size_t i, j; *dstp = NULL; *ndstp = 0; if (nsrc == 0) return 0; if ((dst = calloc(nsrc, sizeof(*src))) == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; i < nsrc; i++) { if ((dst[i] = strdup(src[i])) == NULL) { for (j = 0; j < i; j++) free(dst[j]); free(dst); return -1; } } /* success */ *dstp = dst; *ndstp = nsrc; return 0; } #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 static int cert_option_list(struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *oblob, u_int which, int crit) { char *command, *allowed; char *name = NULL; struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL; int r, ret = -1, found; if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__); goto out; } while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) { sshbuf_free(data); data = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto out; } debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu", name, sshbuf_len(data)); found = 0; if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) { if (strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0) { opts->no_require_user_presence = 1; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) { opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) { opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) { opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) { opts->permit_pty_flag = 1; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) { opts->permit_user_rc = 1; found = 1; } } if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) { if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command, NULL)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse \"%s\" " "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (opts->force_command != NULL) { error("Certificate has multiple " "force-command options"); free(command); goto out; } opts->force_command = command; found = 1; } if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed, NULL)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse \"%s\" " "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) { error("Certificate has multiple " "source-address options"); free(allowed); goto out; } /* Check syntax */ if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, allowed) == -1) { error("Certificate source-address " "contents invalid"); goto out; } opts->required_from_host_cert = allowed; found = 1; } } if (!found) { if (crit) { error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" " "is not supported", name); goto out; } else { logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" " "is not supported", name); } } else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) { error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt " "(extra data)", name); goto out; } free(name); name = NULL; } /* successfully parsed all options */ ret = 0; out: free(name); sshbuf_free(data); sshbuf_free(c); return ret; } struct sshauthopt * sshauthopt_new(void) { struct sshauthopt *ret; if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; ret->force_tun_device = -1; return ret; } void sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts) { size_t i; if (opts == NULL) return; free(opts->cert_principals); free(opts->force_command); free(opts->required_from_host_cert); free(opts->required_from_host_keys); for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) free(opts->env[i]); free(opts->env); for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) free(opts->permitopen[i]); free(opts->permitopen); for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) free(opts->permitlisten[i]); free(opts->permitlisten); explicit_bzero(opts, sizeof(*opts)); free(opts); } struct sshauthopt * sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void) { struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL; if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL) return NULL; /* Defaults for authorized_keys flags */ ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1; ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; ret->permit_pty_flag = 1; ret->permit_user_rc = 1; return ret; } /* * Parse and record a permitopen/permitlisten directive. * Return 0 on success. Return -1 on failure and sets *errstrp to error reason. */ static int handle_permit(const char **optsp, int allow_bare_port, char ***permitsp, size_t *npermitsp, const char **errstrp) { char *opt, *tmp, *cp, *host, **permits = *permitsp; size_t npermits = *npermitsp; const char *errstr = "unknown error"; if (npermits > SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX) { *errstrp = "too many permission directives"; return -1; } if ((opt = opt_dequote(optsp, &errstr)) == NULL) { return -1; } if (allow_bare_port && strchr(opt, ':') == NULL) { /* * Allow a bare port number in permitlisten to indicate a * listen_host wildcard. */ if (asprintf(&tmp, "*:%s", opt) == -1) { free(opt); *errstrp = "memory allocation failed"; return -1; } free(opt); opt = tmp; } if ((tmp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) { free(opt); *errstrp = "memory allocation failed"; return -1; } cp = tmp; /* validate syntax before recording it. */ host = hpdelim(&cp); if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { free(tmp); free(opt); *errstrp = "invalid permission hostname"; return -1; } /* * don't want to use permitopen_port to avoid * dependency on channels.[ch] here. */ if (cp == NULL || (strcmp(cp, "*") != 0 && a2port(cp) <= 0)) { free(tmp); free(opt); *errstrp = "invalid permission port"; return -1; } /* XXX - add streamlocal support */ free(tmp); /* Record it */ if ((permits = recallocarray(permits, npermits, npermits + 1, sizeof(*permits))) == NULL) { free(opt); /* NB. don't update *permitsp if alloc fails */ *errstrp = "memory allocation failed"; return -1; } permits[npermits++] = opt; *permitsp = permits; *npermitsp = npermits; return 0; } struct sshauthopt * sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const char **errstrp) { char **oarray, *opt, *cp, *tmp; int r; struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL; const char *errstr = "unknown error"; uint64_t valid_before; if (errstrp != NULL) *errstrp = NULL; if ((ret = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL) goto alloc_fail; if (opts == NULL) return ret; while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') { /* flag options */ if ((r = opt_flag("restrict", 0, &opts)) != -1) { ret->restricted = 1; ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0; ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; ret->permit_pty_flag = 0; ret->permit_user_rc = 0; } else if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) { ret->cert_authority = r; } else if ((r = opt_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) { ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = r == 1; } else if ((r = opt_flag("agent-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) { ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = r == 1; } else if ((r = opt_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) { ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = r == 1; } else if ((r = opt_flag("touch-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) { ret->no_require_user_presence = r != 1; /* NB. flip */ } else if ((r = opt_flag("pty", 1, &opts)) != -1) { ret->permit_pty_flag = r == 1; } else if ((r = opt_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts)) != -1) { ret->permit_user_rc = r == 1; } else if (opt_match(&opts, "command")) { if (ret->force_command != NULL) { errstr = "multiple \"command\" clauses"; goto fail; } ret->force_command = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr); if (ret->force_command == NULL) goto fail; } else if (opt_match(&opts, "principals")) { if (ret->cert_principals != NULL) { errstr = "multiple \"principals\" clauses"; goto fail; } ret->cert_principals = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr); if (ret->cert_principals == NULL) goto fail; } else if (opt_match(&opts, "from")) { if (ret->required_from_host_keys != NULL) { errstr = "multiple \"from\" clauses"; goto fail; } ret->required_from_host_keys = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr); if (ret->required_from_host_keys == NULL) goto fail; } else if (opt_match(&opts, "expiry-time")) { if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL) goto fail; if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &valid_before) != 0 || valid_before == 0) { free(opt); errstr = "invalid expires time"; goto fail; } free(opt); if (ret->valid_before == 0 || valid_before < ret->valid_before) ret->valid_before = valid_before; } else if (opt_match(&opts, "environment")) { if (ret->nenv > INT_MAX) { errstr = "too many environment strings"; goto fail; } if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL) goto fail; /* env name must be alphanumeric and followed by '=' */ if ((tmp = strchr(opt, '=')) == NULL) { free(opt); errstr = "invalid environment string"; goto fail; } if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) goto alloc_fail; cp[tmp - opt] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */ if (!valid_env_name(cp)) { free(cp); free(opt); errstr = "invalid environment string"; goto fail; } free(cp); /* Append it. */ oarray = ret->env; if ((ret->env = recallocarray(ret->env, ret->nenv, ret->nenv + 1, sizeof(*ret->env))) == NULL) { free(opt); ret->env = oarray; /* put it back for cleanup */ goto alloc_fail; } ret->env[ret->nenv++] = opt; } else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitopen")) { if (handle_permit(&opts, 0, &ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen, &errstr) != 0) goto fail; } else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitlisten")) { if (handle_permit(&opts, 1, &ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten, &errstr) != 0) goto fail; } else if (opt_match(&opts, "tunnel")) { if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL) goto fail; ret->force_tun_device = a2tun(opt, NULL); free(opt); if (ret->force_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { errstr = "invalid tun device"; goto fail; } } /* * Skip the comma, and move to the next option * (or break out if there are no more). */ if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t') break; /* End of options. */ /* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */ if (*opts != ',') { errstr = "unknown key option"; goto fail; } opts++; if (*opts == '\0') { errstr = "unexpected end-of-options"; goto fail; } } /* success */ if (errstrp != NULL) *errstrp = NULL; return ret; alloc_fail: errstr = "memory allocation failed"; fail: sshauthopt_free(ret); if (errstrp != NULL) *errstrp = errstr; return NULL; } struct sshauthopt * sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k) { struct sshauthopt *ret; if (k == NULL || !sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type) || k->cert == NULL || k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) return NULL; if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL) return NULL; /* Handle options and critical extensions separately */ if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1) == -1) { sshauthopt_free(ret); return NULL; } if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->extensions, OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0) == -1) { sshauthopt_free(ret); return NULL; } /* success */ return ret; } /* * Merges "additional" options to "primary" and returns the result. * NB. Some options from primary have primacy. */ struct sshauthopt * sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary, const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp) { struct sshauthopt *ret; const char *errstr = "internal error"; const char *tmp; if (errstrp != NULL) *errstrp = NULL; if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL) goto alloc_fail; /* cert_authority and cert_principals are cleared in result */ /* Prefer access lists from primary. */ /* XXX err is both set and mismatch? */ tmp = primary->required_from_host_cert; if (tmp == NULL) tmp = additional->required_from_host_cert; if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_cert = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) goto alloc_fail; tmp = primary->required_from_host_keys; if (tmp == NULL) tmp = additional->required_from_host_keys; if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_keys = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) goto alloc_fail; /* * force_tun_device, permitopen/permitlisten and environment all * prefer the primary. */ ret->force_tun_device = primary->force_tun_device; if (ret->force_tun_device == -1) ret->force_tun_device = additional->force_tun_device; if (primary->nenv > 0) { if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv, primary->env, primary->nenv) != 0) goto alloc_fail; } else if (additional->nenv) { if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv, additional->env, additional->nenv) != 0) goto alloc_fail; } if (primary->npermitopen > 0) { if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen, primary->permitopen, primary->npermitopen) != 0) goto alloc_fail; } else if (additional->npermitopen > 0) { if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen, additional->permitopen, additional->npermitopen) != 0) goto alloc_fail; } if (primary->npermitlisten > 0) { if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten, primary->permitlisten, primary->npermitlisten) != 0) goto alloc_fail; } else if (additional->npermitlisten > 0) { if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten, additional->permitlisten, additional->npermitlisten) != 0) goto alloc_fail; } #define OPTFLAG_AND(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1) /* Permissive flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both) */ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_port_forwarding_flag); OPTFLAG_AND(permit_agent_forwarding_flag); OPTFLAG_AND(permit_x11_forwarding_flag); OPTFLAG_AND(permit_pty_flag); OPTFLAG_AND(permit_user_rc); OPTFLAG_AND(no_require_user_presence); #undef OPTFLAG_AND /* Earliest expiry time should win */ if (primary->valid_before != 0) ret->valid_before = primary->valid_before; if (additional->valid_before != 0 && additional->valid_before < ret->valid_before) ret->valid_before = additional->valid_before; /* * When both multiple forced-command are specified, only * proceed if they are identical, otherwise fail. */ if (primary->force_command != NULL && additional->force_command != NULL) { if (strcmp(primary->force_command, additional->force_command) == 0) { /* ok */ ret->force_command = strdup(primary->force_command); if (ret->force_command == NULL) goto alloc_fail; } else { errstr = "forced command options do not match"; goto fail; } } else if (primary->force_command != NULL) { if ((ret->force_command = strdup( primary->force_command)) == NULL) goto alloc_fail; } else if (additional->force_command != NULL) { if ((ret->force_command = strdup( additional->force_command)) == NULL) goto alloc_fail; } /* success */ if (errstrp != NULL) *errstrp = NULL; return ret; alloc_fail: errstr = "memory allocation failed"; fail: if (errstrp != NULL) *errstrp = errstr; sshauthopt_free(ret); return NULL; } /* * Copy options */ struct sshauthopt * sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig) { struct sshauthopt *ret; if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL) return NULL; #define OPTSCALAR(x) ret->x = orig->x OPTSCALAR(permit_port_forwarding_flag); OPTSCALAR(permit_agent_forwarding_flag); OPTSCALAR(permit_x11_forwarding_flag); OPTSCALAR(permit_pty_flag); OPTSCALAR(permit_user_rc); OPTSCALAR(restricted); OPTSCALAR(cert_authority); OPTSCALAR(force_tun_device); OPTSCALAR(valid_before); OPTSCALAR(no_require_user_presence); #undef OPTSCALAR #define OPTSTRING(x) \ do { \ if (orig->x != NULL && (ret->x = strdup(orig->x)) == NULL) { \ sshauthopt_free(ret); \ return NULL; \ } \ } while (0) OPTSTRING(cert_principals); OPTSTRING(force_command); OPTSTRING(required_from_host_cert); OPTSTRING(required_from_host_keys); #undef OPTSTRING if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv, orig->env, orig->nenv) != 0 || dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen, orig->permitopen, orig->npermitopen) != 0 || dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten, orig->permitlisten, orig->npermitlisten) != 0) { sshauthopt_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } static int serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char **a, size_t n) { struct sshbuf *b; size_t i; int r; if (n > INT_MAX) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, a[i])) != 0) { sshbuf_free(b); return r; } } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0) { sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* success */ return 0; } static int deserialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char ***ap, size_t *np) { char **a = NULL; size_t i, n = 0; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_int tmp; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) goto out; if (tmp > INT_MAX) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } n = tmp; if (n > 0 && (a = calloc(n, sizeof(*a))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &a[i], NULL)) != 0) goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; *ap = a; a = NULL; *np = n; n = 0; out: for (i = 0; i < n; i++) free(a[i]); free(a); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } static int serialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, const char *s) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, s == NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int deserialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, char **sp) { int r; u_char flag; *sp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, flag ? NULL : sp, NULL)) != 0) return r; return 0; } int sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m, int untrusted) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Flag options */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_pty_flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_user_rc)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->restricted)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->cert_authority)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->no_require_user_presence)) != 0) return r; /* Simple integer options */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, opts->valid_before)) != 0) return r; /* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->force_tun_device == -1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, (opts->force_tun_device < 0) ? 0 : (u_int)opts->force_tun_device)) != 0) return r; /* String options; these may be NULL */ if ((r = serialise_nullable_string(m, untrusted ? "yes" : opts->cert_principals)) != 0 || (r = serialise_nullable_string(m, untrusted ? "true" : opts->force_command)) != 0 || (r = serialise_nullable_string(m, untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 || (r = serialise_nullable_string(m, untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0) return r; /* Array options */ if ((r = serialise_array(m, opts->env, untrusted ? 0 : opts->nenv)) != 0 || (r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitopen, untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitopen)) != 0 || (r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitlisten, untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitlisten)) != 0) return r; /* success */ return 0; } int sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **optsp) { struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_char f; u_int tmp; if ((opts = calloc(1, sizeof(*opts))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Flag options */ #define OPT_FLAG(x) \ do { \ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0) \ goto out; \ opts->x = f; \ } while (0) OPT_FLAG(permit_port_forwarding_flag); OPT_FLAG(permit_agent_forwarding_flag); OPT_FLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag); OPT_FLAG(permit_pty_flag); OPT_FLAG(permit_user_rc); OPT_FLAG(restricted); OPT_FLAG(cert_authority); OPT_FLAG(no_require_user_presence); #undef OPT_FLAG /* Simple integer options */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &opts->valid_before)) != 0) goto out; /* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0) goto out; opts->force_tun_device = f ? -1 : (int)tmp; /* String options may be NULL */ if ((r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->cert_principals)) != 0 || (r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->force_command)) != 0 || (r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 || (r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0) goto out; /* Array options */ if ((r = deserialise_array(m, &opts->env, &opts->nenv)) != 0 || (r = deserialise_array(m, &opts->permitopen, &opts->npermitopen)) != 0 || (r = deserialise_array(m, &opts->permitlisten, &opts->npermitlisten)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; *optsp = opts; opts = NULL; out: sshauthopt_free(opts); return r; } openssh-8.2p1/auth-options.h010064400017500001750000000056621362136622600142750ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.29 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H #define AUTH_OPTIONS_H struct passwd; struct sshkey; /* Maximum number of permitopen/permitlisten directives to accept */ #define SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX 4096 /* * sshauthopt represents key options parsed from authorized_keys or * from certificate extensions/options. */ struct sshauthopt { /* Feature flags */ int permit_port_forwarding_flag; int permit_agent_forwarding_flag; int permit_x11_forwarding_flag; int permit_pty_flag; int permit_user_rc; /* "restrict" keyword was invoked */ int restricted; /* key/principal expiry date */ uint64_t valid_before; /* Certificate-related options */ int cert_authority; char *cert_principals; int force_tun_device; char *force_command; /* Custom environment */ size_t nenv; char **env; /* Permitted port forwardings */ size_t npermitopen; char **permitopen; /* Permitted listens (remote forwarding) */ size_t npermitlisten; char **permitlisten; /* * Permitted host/addresses (comma-separated) * Caller must check source address matches both lists (if present). */ char *required_from_host_cert; char *required_from_host_keys; /* Key requires user presence asserted */ int no_require_user_presence; }; struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new(void); struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void); void sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts); struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig); int sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m, int); int sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **opts); /* * Parse authorized_keys options. Returns an options structure on success * or NULL on failure. Will set errstr on failure. */ struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_parse(const char *s, const char **errstr); /* * Parse certification options to a struct sshauthopt. * Returns options on success or NULL on failure. */ struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k); /* * Merge key options. */ struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary, const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp); #endif openssh-8.2p1/auth-pam.c010064400017500001750000001077621362136622600133560ustar00djmdjm/*- * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the * DARPA CHATS research program. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef USE_PAM #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) #include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) #include #endif #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) extern char *__progname; # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname #endif /* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */ #ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE # define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, SunOS */ #else # define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM, AIX */ #endif /* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */ #ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE # define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member) #else # define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member) #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "log.h" #include "msg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "misc.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" extern ServerOptions options; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern u_int utmp_len; /* so we don't silently change behaviour */ #ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS # error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK" #endif /* * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported * and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if * this breaks. */ #ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK #include /* * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with* * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h * (e.g. Linux) */ typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t; #else typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t; #define pthread_exit fake_pthread_exit #define pthread_create fake_pthread_create #define pthread_cancel fake_pthread_cancel #define pthread_join fake_pthread_join #endif struct pam_ctxt { sp_pthread_t pam_thread; int pam_psock; int pam_csock; int pam_done; }; static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *); static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt; #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* * Simulate threads with processes. */ static int sshpam_thread_status = -1; static sshsig_t sshpam_oldsig; static void sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig) { ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL) return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */ if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG) <= 0) { /* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */ kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM); while (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, 0) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; return; } } if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) && WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM) return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */ if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status)) sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly"); if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0) sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly"); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void pthread_exit(void *value) { _exit(0); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr, void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg) { pid_t pid; struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg; sshpam_thread_status = -1; switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno)); return errno; case 0: close(ctx->pam_psock); ctx->pam_psock = -1; thread_start(arg); _exit(1); default: *thread = pid; close(ctx->pam_csock); ctx->pam_csock = -1; sshpam_oldsig = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler); return (0); } } static int pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread) { ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); return (kill(thread, SIGTERM)); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value) { int status; if (sshpam_thread_status != -1) return (sshpam_thread_status); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } return (status); } #endif static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL; static int sshpam_err = 0; static int sshpam_authenticated = 0; static int sshpam_session_open = 0; static int sshpam_cred_established = 0; static int sshpam_account_status = -1; static int sshpam_maxtries_reached = 0; static char **sshpam_env = NULL; static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL; static const char *sshpam_password = NULL; static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL; static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL; static char *sshpam_conninfo = NULL; /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */ #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST static char ** pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh) { /* * XXX - If necessary, we can still support environment passing * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment. */ return NULL; } #endif #ifndef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV static int pam_putenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name_value) { return PAM_SUCCESS; } #endif /* HAVE_PAM_PUTENV */ /* * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root. * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do * the right thing. */ #ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID static int sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) { int result; if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized"); if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1) fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags); if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1) fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return result; } # define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b))) #endif static void sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd) { extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; static int saved_port, saved_agent, saved_x11; debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd); if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd; if (reqd) { saved_port = auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag; saved_agent = auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag; saved_x11 = auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag; auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0; auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; } else { if (saved_port) auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = saved_port; if (saved_agent) auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = saved_agent; if (saved_x11) auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = saved_x11; } } /* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */ static void import_environments(struct sshbuf *b) { char *env; u_int n, i, num_env; int r; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* Import variables set by do_pam_account */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (n > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: invalid PAM account status %u", __func__, n); sshpam_account_status = (int)n; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0); /* Import environment from subprocess */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (num_env > 1024) fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024", __func__, num_env); sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env)); debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env); for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(sshpam_env[i]), NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL; /* Import PAM environment from subprocess */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env); for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Errors are not fatal here */ if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) { error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r)); } /* XXX leak env? */ } #endif } /* * Conversation function for authentication thread. */ static int sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct sshbuf *buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; struct pam_response *reply; int r, i; u_char status; debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (data == NULL) { error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context"); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } ctxt = data; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return PAM_CONV_ERR; if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { free(reply); return PAM_CONV_ERR; } for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, buffer) == -1) goto fail; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (status != PAM_AUTHTOK) goto fail; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &reply[i].resp, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1) goto fail; break; default: goto fail; } sshbuf_reset(buffer); } sshbuf_free(buffer); *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); sshbuf_free(buffer); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } /* * Authentication thread. */ static void * sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; struct pam_conv sshpam_conv; int r, flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK extern char **environ; char **env_from_pam; u_int i; const char *pam_user; const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; char *tz = getenv("TZ"); sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; environ[0] = NULL; if (tz != NULL) if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1) error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s", strerror(errno)); if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) { setproctitle("%s [pam]", sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown"); } #endif sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv; sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt; if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&sshpam_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES) sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; if (!do_pam_account()) { sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; goto auth_fail; } if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) { sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; sshpam_password_change_required(0); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, "OK")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* Export variables set by do_pam_account */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Export any environment strings set in child */ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Count */ if (i > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: too many environment strings", __func__); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, environ[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */ env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle); for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Count */ if (i > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: too many PAM environment strings", __func__); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, env_from_pam[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } #endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */ /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer); sshbuf_free(buffer); pthread_exit(NULL); auth_fail: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer); else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached) ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer); else ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, buffer); sshbuf_free(buffer); pthread_exit(NULL); return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */ } void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) { pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread); pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL); close(ctxt->pam_psock); close(ctxt->pam_csock); memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt)); cleanup_ctxt = NULL; } } static int sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL }; static int sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct pam_response *reply; int r, i; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL }; void sshpam_cleanup(void) { if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor())) return; debug("PAM: cleanup"); pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv); if (sshpam_session_open) { debug("PAM: closing session"); pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT); sshpam_session_open = 0; } if (sshpam_cred_established) { debug("PAM: deleting credentials"); pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED); sshpam_cred_established = 0; } sshpam_authenticated = 0; pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; } static int sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { const char *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user; const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; if (sshpam_handle == NULL) { if (ssh == NULL) { fatal("%s: called initially with no " "packet context", __func__); } } if (sshpam_handle != NULL) { /* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */ sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0) return (0); pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; } debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user); sshpam_err = pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle); sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } if (ssh != NULL && sshpam_rhost == NULL) { /* * We need to cache these as we don't have packet context * during the kbdint flow. */ sshpam_rhost = xstrdup(auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns)); sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr( ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); xasprintf(&sshpam_conninfo, "SSH_CONNECTION=%.50s %d %.50s %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), sshpam_laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh)); } if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) { debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, sshpam_rhost); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } /* Put SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment too */ pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, sshpam_conninfo); } #ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE /* * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate. * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and * may not even set one (for tty-less connections) */ debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\""); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh"); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } #endif return (0); } static void expose_authinfo(const char *caller) { char *auth_info; /* * Expose authentication information to PAM. * The environment variable is versioned. Please increment the * version suffix if the format of session_info changes. */ if (sshpam_authctxt->session_info == NULL) auth_info = xstrdup(""); else if ((auth_info = sshbuf_dup_string( sshpam_authctxt->session_info)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); debug2("%s: auth information in SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", caller); do_pam_putenv("SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", auth_info); free(auth_info); } static void * sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; int result, socks[2]; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); /* * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account * has previously failed. */ if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0) return NULL; /* Initialize PAM */ if (sshpam_init(NULL, authctxt) == -1) { error("PAM: initialization failed"); return (NULL); } expose_authinfo(__func__); ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt); /* Start the authentication thread */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) { error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno)); free(ctxt); return (NULL); } ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0]; ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1]; result = pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt); if (result != 0) { error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s", strerror(result)); close(socks[0]); close(socks[1]); free(ctxt); return (NULL); } cleanup_ctxt = ctxt; return (ctxt); } static int sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { struct sshbuf *buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; size_t plen; u_char type; char *msg; size_t len, mlen; int r; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); *name = xstrdup(""); *info = xstrdup(""); *prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); **prompts = NULL; plen = 0; *echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int)); while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, buffer) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &msg, &mlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (type) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: *num = 1; len = plen + mlen + 1; **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; **echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON); free(msg); sshbuf_free(buffer); return (0); case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: /* accumulate messages */ len = plen + mlen + 2; **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen); plen++; free(msg); break; case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED: case PAM_MAXTRIES: if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) sshpam_account_status = 0; if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES) sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_AUTH_ERR: debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type)); if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) { *info = **prompts; **prompts = NULL; *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; ctxt->pam_done = -1; free(msg); sshbuf_free(buffer); return 0; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_SUCCESS: if (**prompts != NULL) { /* drain any accumulated messages */ debug("PAM: %s", **prompts); if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, **prompts, strlen(**prompts))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(**prompts); **prompts = NULL; } if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) { if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid || (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) fatal("Internal error: PAM auth " "succeeded when it should have " "failed"); import_environments(buffer); *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; ctxt->pam_done = 1; free(msg); sshbuf_free(buffer); return (0); } error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg, sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", sshpam_authctxt->user, sshpam_rhost); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; free(msg); ctxt->pam_done = -1; sshbuf_free(buffer); return (-1); } } sshbuf_free(buffer); return (-1); } /* * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied. * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that * vary processing time in proportion to password length. */ static char * fake_password(const char *wire_password) { const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT"; char *ret = NULL; size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0; if (l >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l); ret = malloc(l + 1); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < l; i++) ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)]; ret[i] = '\0'; return ret; } /* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */ static int sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) { struct sshbuf *buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; char *fake; int r; debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num); switch (ctxt->pam_done) { case 1: sshpam_authenticated = 1; return (0); case 0: break; default: return (-1); } if (num != 1) { error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num); return (-1); } if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (sshpam_authctxt->valid && (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 || options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, *resp)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { fake = fake_password(*resp); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, fake)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(fake); } if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, buffer) == -1) { sshbuf_free(buffer); return (-1); } sshbuf_free(buffer); return (1); } static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); sshpam_thread_cleanup(); free(ctxt); /* * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before * the server process terminates. */ } KbdintDevice sshpam_device = { "pam", sshpam_init_ctx, sshpam_query, sshpam_respond, sshpam_free_ctx }; KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = { "pam", mm_sshpam_init_ctx, mm_sshpam_query, mm_sshpam_respond, mm_sshpam_free_ctx }; /* * This replaces auth-pam.c */ void start_pam(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; if (!options.use_pam) fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no"); if (sshpam_init(ssh, authctxt) == -1) fatal("PAM: initialisation failed"); } void finish_pam(void) { sshpam_cleanup(); } u_int do_pam_account(void) { debug("%s: called", __func__); if (sshpam_account_status != -1) return (sshpam_account_status); expose_authinfo(__func__); sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0); debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { sshpam_account_status = 0; return (sshpam_account_status); } if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) sshpam_password_change_required(1); sshpam_account_status = 1; return (sshpam_account_status); } void do_pam_setcred(int init) { sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); if (init) { debug("PAM: establishing credentials"); sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED); } else { debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials"); sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); } if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) { sshpam_cred_established = 1; return; } if (sshpam_authenticated) fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); else debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } static int sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE]; struct pam_response *reply; int i; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: reply[i].resp = read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), RP_ALLOW_STDIN); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL) input[0] = '\0'; if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL }; /* * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't * support that */ void do_pam_chauthtok(void) { if (use_privsep) fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)"); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&tty_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); debug("PAM: changing password"); sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } void do_pam_session(struct ssh *ssh) { debug3("PAM: opening session"); expose_authinfo(__func__); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) sshpam_session_open = 1; else { sshpam_session_open = 0; auth_restrict_session(ssh); error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } } int is_pam_session_open(void) { return sshpam_session_open; } /* * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear * during the ssh authentication process. */ int do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) { int ret = 1; char *compound; size_t len; len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2; compound = xmalloc(len); snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value); ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound); free(compound); return (ret); } char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void) { return sshpam_env; } char ** fetch_pam_environment(void) { return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle)); } void free_pam_environment(char **env) { char **envp; if (env == NULL) return; for (envp = env; *envp; envp++) free(*envp); free(env); } /* * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later * display. */ static int sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct pam_response *reply; int r, i; size_t len; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: if (sshpam_password == NULL) goto fail; if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (len > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL }; /* * Attempt password authentication via PAM */ int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); char *fake = NULL; if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL) fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to " "initialise.", __func__); sshpam_password = password; sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; /* * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail). */ if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&passwd_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); sshpam_password = NULL; free(fake); if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES) sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) { debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s", authctxt->user); return 1; } else { debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s", authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); return 0; } } int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void) { return sshpam_maxtries_reached; } void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int reached) { if (reached == 0 || sshpam_maxtries_reached) return; sshpam_maxtries_reached = 1; options.password_authentication = 0; options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; } #endif /* USE_PAM */ openssh-8.2p1/auth-pam.h010064400017500001750000000036151362136622600133530ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef USE_PAM struct ssh; void start_pam(struct ssh *); void finish_pam(void); u_int do_pam_account(void); void do_pam_session(struct ssh *); void do_pam_setcred(int ); void do_pam_chauthtok(void); int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *); char ** fetch_pam_environment(void); char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void); void free_pam_environment(char **); void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void); void sshpam_cleanup(void); int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *); int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void); void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int); int is_pam_session_open(void); #endif /* USE_PAM */ openssh-8.2p1/auth-passwd.c010064400017500001750000000146621362136622600140760ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.47 2018/07/09 21:26:02 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Password authentication. This file contains the functions to check whether * the password is valid for the user. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern ServerOptions options; #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP extern login_cap_t *lc; #endif #define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */ #define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */ #define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024 /* * Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if * authentication succeeds. */ int auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; int result, ok = authctxt->valid; #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) static int expire_checked = 0; #endif if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN) return 0; #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES) ok = 0; #endif if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0) return 0; #ifdef KRB5 if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) { int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password); if (ret == 1 || ret == 0) return ret && ok; /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */ } #endif #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN { HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password); if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return 0; cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken); return ok; } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) return (sshpam_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok); #endif #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) if (!expire_checked) { expire_checked = 1; if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt)) authctxt->force_pwchange = 1; } #endif result = sys_auth_passwd(ssh, password); if (authctxt->force_pwchange) auth_restrict_session(ssh); return (result && ok); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH static void warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as) { int r; quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime; pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS; pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as); actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (authctxt->valid) { pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS, TWO_WEEKS); acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS, TWO_WEEKS); } #endif if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) { daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n", daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) { daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n", daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; auth_session_t *as; static int expire_checked = 0; as = auth_usercheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", (char *)password); if (as == NULL) return (0); if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) { auth_close(as); auth_restrict_session(ssh); authctxt->force_pwchange = 1; return (1); } else { if (!expire_checked) { expire_checked = 1; warn_expiry(authctxt, as); } return (auth_close(as)); } } #elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD) int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL; /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */ char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd; if (pw_password == NULL) return 0; /* Check for users with no password. */ if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0) return (1); /* * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a * NULL and let xcrypt pick one. */ if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) salt = pw_password; encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt); /* * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords * are identical. */ return encrypted_password != NULL && strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/auth-rhosts.c010064400017500001750000000216041362136622600141110ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.51 2019/10/02 00:42:30 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit * the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes * /etc/hosts.equiv. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern int use_privsep; /* * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or * /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise. */ static int check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname, const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user, const char *server_user) { FILE *f; #define RBUFLN 1024 char buf[RBUFLN];/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */ int fd; struct stat st; /* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) return 0; if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { close(fd); return 0; } if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { logit("User %s hosts file %s is not a regular file", server_user, filename); close(fd); return 0; } unset_nonblock(fd); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { close(fd); return 0; } while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { /* All three must have length >= buf to avoid overflows. */ char hostbuf[RBUFLN], userbuf[RBUFLN], dummy[RBUFLN]; char *host, *user, *cp; int negated; for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp) continue; /* * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we * don't ever support the plus syntax). */ if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0) continue; /* * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten. */ switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf, dummy)) { case 0: auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename); continue; case 1: /* Host name only. */ strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf)); break; case 2: /* Got both host and user name. */ break; case 3: auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename); continue; default: /* Weird... */ continue; } host = hostbuf; user = userbuf; negated = 0; /* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */ if (host[0] == '-') { negated = 1; host++; } else if (host[0] == '+') host++; if (user[0] == '-') { negated = 1; user++; } else if (user[0] == '+') user++; /* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */ if (!host[0] || !user[0]) { /* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */ auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names " "in %.100s.", filename); continue; } /* Verify that host name matches. */ if (host[0] == '@') { if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) && !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL)) continue; } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0) continue; /* Different hostname. */ /* Verify that user name matches. */ if (user[0] == '@') { if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL)) continue; } else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0) continue; /* Different username. */ /* Found the user and host. */ fclose(f); /* If the entry was negated, deny access. */ if (negated) { auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.", filename); return 0; } /* Accept authentication. */ return 1; } /* Authentication using this file denied. */ fclose(f); return 0; } /* * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns * true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored). */ int auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname, const char *ipaddr) { char buf[1024]; struct stat st; static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL}; u_int rhosts_file_index; debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s", client_user, hostname, ipaddr); /* Switch to the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); /* * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files and * no system hosts.equiv/shosts.equiv files exist then return * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name * servers. */ for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]; rhosts_file_index++) { /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) break; } /* Switch back to privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); /* * Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there * are no system-wide files. */ if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] && stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) == -1 && stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) == -1) { debug3("%s: no hosts access files exist", __func__); return 0; } /* * If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and * shosts.equiv. */ if (pw->pw_uid == 0) debug3("%s: root user, ignoring system hosts files", __func__); else { if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) { auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by " "/etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr); return 1; } if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) { auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by " "%.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV); return 1; } } /* * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is * not group or world writable. */ if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) == -1) { logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir); auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir); return 0; } if (options.strict_modes && ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name); auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name); return 0; } /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); /* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */ for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]; rhosts_file_index++) { /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); if (stat(buf, &st) == -1) continue; /* * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the * owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally * allowing access to their account by anyone. */ if (options.strict_modes && ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s", pw->pw_name, buf); auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf); continue; } /* * Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts * and .shosts files. */ if (options.ignore_rhosts) { auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to " "ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); continue; } /* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */ if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) { auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user " "%s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name); return 1; } } /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/auth-shadow.c010064400017500001750000000104021362136622600140460ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) #include #include #include #include #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #ifdef DAY # undef DAY #endif #define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */ extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; /* * For the account and password expiration functions, we assume the expiry * occurs the day after the day specified. */ /* * Check if specified account is expired. Returns 1 if account is expired, * 0 otherwise. */ int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *spw) { time_t today; int daysleft; int r; today = time(NULL) / DAY; daysleft = spw->sp_expire - today; debug3("%s: today %d sp_expire %d days left %d", __func__, (int)today, (int)spw->sp_expire, daysleft); if (spw->sp_expire == -1) { debug3("account expiration disabled"); } else if (daysleft < 0) { logit("Account %.100s has expired", spw->sp_namp); return 1; } else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) { debug3("account will expire in %d days", daysleft); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Your account will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } return 0; } /* * Checks password expiry for platforms that use shadow passwd files. * Returns: 1 = password expired, 0 = password not expired */ int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *ctxt) { struct spwd *spw = NULL; const char *user = ctxt->pw->pw_name; time_t today; int r, daysleft, disabled = 0; if ((spw = getspnam((char *)user)) == NULL) { error("Could not get shadow information for %.100s", user); return 0; } today = time(NULL) / DAY; debug3("%s: today %d sp_lstchg %d sp_max %d", __func__, (int)today, (int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max); #if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) if (iscomsec()) { struct pr_passwd *pr; pr = getprpwnam((char *)user); /* Test for Trusted Mode expiry disabled */ if (pr != NULL && pr->ufld.fd_min == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_lifetime == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_expire == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_pw_expire_warning == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_schange != 0) disabled = 1; } #endif /* TODO: check sp_inact */ daysleft = spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max - today; if (disabled) { debug3("password expiration disabled"); } else if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) { logit("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)", user); return 1; } else if (spw->sp_max == -1) { debug3("password expiration disabled"); } else if (daysleft < 0) { logit("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)", user); return 1; } else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) { debug3("password will expire in %d days", daysleft); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Your password will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } return 0; } #endif /* USE_SHADOW && HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ openssh-8.2p1/auth-sia.c010064400017500001750000000062321362136622600133430ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh_api.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-sia.h" #include "log.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "uidswap.h" extern ServerOptions options; extern int saved_argc; extern char **saved_argv; int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *pass) { int ret; SIAENTITY *ent = NULL; const char *host; Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); if (!authctxt->user || pass == NULL || pass[0] == '\0') return (0); if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, authctxt->user, NULL, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS) return (0); if ((ret = sia_ses_authent(NULL, pass, ent)) != SIASUCCESS) { error("Couldn't authenticate %s from %s", authctxt->user, host); if (ret & SIASTOP) sia_ses_release(&ent); return (0); } sia_ses_release(&ent); return (1); } void session_setup_sia(struct passwd *pw, char *tty) { SIAENTITY *ent = NULL; const char *host; host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, pw->pw_name, tty, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS) fatal("sia_ses_init failed"); if (sia_make_entity_pwd(pw, ent) != SIASUCCESS) { sia_ses_release(&ent); fatal("sia_make_entity_pwd failed"); } ent->authtype = SIA_A_NONE; if (sia_ses_estab(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS) fatal("Couldn't establish session for %s from %s", pw->pw_name, host); if (sia_ses_launch(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS) fatal("Couldn't launch session for %s from %s", pw->pw_name, host); sia_ses_release(&ent); setuid(0); permanently_set_uid(pw); } #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ openssh-8.2p1/auth-sia.h010064400017500001750000000026331362136622600133510ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA void session_setup_sia(struct passwd *, char *); #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ openssh-8.2p1/auth.c010064400017500001750000001006471362136622600125760ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.146 2020/01/31 22:42:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H #include #endif #ifdef USE_SHADOW #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "packet.h" #include "loginrec.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "authfile.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern struct include_list includes; extern int use_privsep; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* Debugging messages */ static struct sshbuf *auth_debug; /* * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't * listed there, false will be returned. * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. * Otherwise true is returned. */ int allowed_user(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw) { struct stat st; const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL; u_int i; int r; #ifdef USE_SHADOW struct spwd *spw = NULL; #endif /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) return 0; #ifdef USE_SHADOW if (!options.use_pam) spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw)) return 0; #endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ #endif /* USE_SHADOW */ /* grab passwd field for locked account check */ passwd = pw->pw_passwd; #ifdef USE_SHADOW if (spw != NULL) #ifdef USE_LIBIAF passwd = get_iaf_password(pw); #else passwd = spw->sp_pwdp; #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ #endif /* check for locked account */ if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) { int locked = 0; #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) locked = 1; #endif #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0) locked = 1; #endif #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR)) locked = 1; #endif #ifdef USE_LIBIAF free((void *) passwd); #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ if (locked) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked", pw->pw_name); return 0; } } /* * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we * are chrooting. */ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) { char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */ if (stat(shell, &st) == -1) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell); free(shell); return 0; } if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell); free(shell); return 0; } free(shell); } if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 || options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); } /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) { r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, options.deny_users[i]); if (r < 0) { fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"", options.deny_users[i]); } else if (r != 0) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because listed in DenyUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } } } /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) { r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, options.allow_users[i]); if (r < 0) { fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"", options.allow_users[i]); } else if (r == 1) break; } /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } } if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, options.num_deny_groups)) { ga_free(); logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because a group is listed in DenyGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } /* * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups * isn't listed there */ if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, options.num_allow_groups)) { ga_free(); logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because none of user's groups are listed " "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } ga_free(); } #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, loginmsg)) return 0; #endif /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ return 1; } /* * Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in * auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present. */ static char * format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt) { const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key; const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info; char *fp, *cafp, *ret = NULL; if (key == NULL) return NULL; if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), cafp == NULL ? "(null)" : cafp, methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ", methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo); free(fp); free(cafp); } else { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ", methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo); free(fp); } return ret; } void auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, int partial, const char *method, const char *submethod) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; int level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; const char *authmsg; char *extra = NULL; if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) return; /* Raise logging level */ if (authenticated == 1 || !authctxt->valid || authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 || strcmp(method, "password") == 0) level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (authctxt->postponed) authmsg = "Postponed"; else if (partial) authmsg = "Partial"; else authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) { if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info); } do_log2(level, "%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s", authmsg, method, submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), extra != NULL ? ": " : "", extra != NULL ? extra : ""); free(extra); #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 || strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)) record_failed_login(ssh, authctxt->user, auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); # ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE if (authenticated) sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user, auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh", loginmsg); # endif #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method)); #endif } void auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for " "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2", authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Too many authentication failures"); /* NOTREACHED */ } /* * Check whether root logins are disallowed. */ int auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) { switch (options.permit_root_login) { case PERMIT_YES: return 1; case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) return 1; break; case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) { logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); return 1; } break; } logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); return 0; } /* * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. * * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. */ char * expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) { char *file, uidstr[32], ret[PATH_MAX]; int i; snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); /* * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward * compatible and prepend the '%h/' */ if (path_absolute(file)) return (file); i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file); if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret)) fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); free(file); return (xstrdup(ret)); } char * authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw) { if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL) return NULL; return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw); } /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host, const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) { char *user_hostfile; struct stat st; HostStatus host_status; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; const struct hostkey_entry *found; hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile); if (userfile != NULL) { user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); if (options.strict_modes && (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad owner or modes for %.200s", pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes", user_hostfile); } else { temporarily_use_uid(pw); load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile); restore_uid(); } free(user_hostfile); } host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found); if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED) error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication", host); else if (host_status == HOST_OK) debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__, found->host, found->file, found->line); else debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host); free_hostkeys(hostkeys); return host_status; } static FILE * auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, int log_missing, char *file_type) { char line[1024]; struct stat st; int fd; FILE *f; if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) { if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT) debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { close(fd); return NULL; } if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file_type, file); close(fd); return NULL; } unset_nonblock(fd); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { close(fd); return NULL; } if (strict_modes && safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { fclose(f); logit("Authentication refused: %s", line); auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line); return NULL; } return f; } FILE * auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) { return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys"); } FILE * auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) { return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0, "authorized principals"); } struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP extern login_cap_t *lc; #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif #endif struct passwd *pw; struct connection_info *ci; ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns); ci->user = user; parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci); log_change_level(options.log_level); process_permitopen(ssh, &options); #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_setauthdb(user); #endif pw = getpwnam(user); #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_restoreauthdb(); #endif if (pw == NULL) { logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d", user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN record_failed_login(ssh, user, auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER); #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ return (NULL); } if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw)) return (NULL); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) { debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); return (NULL); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { debug("Approval failure for %s", user); pw = NULL; } if (as != NULL) auth_close(as); #endif #endif if (pw != NULL) return (pwcopy(pw)); return (NULL); } /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */ int auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key) { char *fp = NULL; int r; if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL) return 0; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file); switch (r) { case 0: break; /* not revoked */ case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s", sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file); goto out; default: error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in " "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* Success */ r = 0; out: free(fp); return r == 0 ? 0 : 1; } void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; int r; if (auth_debug == NULL) return; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(auth_debug, buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_cstring: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } void auth_debug_send(struct ssh *ssh) { char *msg; int r; if (auth_debug == NULL) return; while (sshbuf_len(auth_debug) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(auth_debug, &msg, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_get_cstring: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "%s", msg); free(msg); } } void auth_debug_reset(void) { if (auth_debug != NULL) sshbuf_reset(auth_debug); else if ((auth_debug = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); } struct passwd * fakepw(void) { static struct passwd fake; memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; fake.pw_passwd = "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK"; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; #endif fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid; fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS fake.pw_class = ""; #endif fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; return (&fake); } /* * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is * called. * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) */ static char * remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Get IP address of client. */ fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return xstrdup(ntop); } ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ return xstrdup(ntop); } /* * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", name, ntop); freeaddrinfo(ai); return xstrdup(ntop); } /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ lowercase(name); /* * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given * address actually is an address of this host. This is * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of * the domain). */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); return xstrdup(ntop); } /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ if (ai == NULL) { /* Address not found for the host name. */ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " "map back to the address.", ntop, name); return xstrdup(ntop); } return xstrdup(name); } /* * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this * several times. */ const char * auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) { static char *dnsname; if (!use_dns) return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); else if (dnsname != NULL) return dnsname; else { dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); return dnsname; } } /* * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment. * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure. * The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to * /dev/null depending on the contents of flags. * "tag" is prepended to log messages. * NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is * av[0]. */ pid_t subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command, int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags) { FILE *f = NULL; struct stat st; int fd, devnull, p[2], i; pid_t pid; char *cp, errmsg[512]; u_int envsize; char **child_env; if (child != NULL) *child = NULL; debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)", __func__, tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags); /* Check consistency */ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 && (flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) { error("%s: inconsistent flags", __func__); return 0; } if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) { error("%s: inconsistent flags/output", __func__); return 0; } /* * If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists * and appears safe-ish to execute */ if (!path_absolute(av[0])) { error("%s path is not absolute", tag); return 0; } temporarily_use_uid(pw); if (stat(av[0], &st) == -1) { error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); return 0; } if (safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg); restore_uid(); return 0; } /* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */ if (pipe(p) == -1) { error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); return 0; } restore_uid(); switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: /* error */ error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); close(p[0]); close(p[1]); return 0; case 0: /* child */ /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */ envsize = 5; child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize); child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL) child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp); for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) ssh_signal(i, SIG_DFL); if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) { error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } /* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */ fd = -1; if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) fd = p[1]; else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0) fd = devnull; if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) { error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1) { error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 && dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } execve(av[0], av, child_env); error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno)); _exit(127); default: /* parent */ break; } close(p[1]); if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) close(p[0]); else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); close(p[0]); /* Don't leave zombie child */ kill(pid, SIGTERM); while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ; return 0; } /* Success */ debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid); if (child != NULL) *child = f; return pid; } /* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */ /* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */ void auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote) { int do_env = options.permit_user_env && opts->nenv > 0; int do_permitopen = opts->npermitopen > 0 && (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0; int do_permitlisten = opts->npermitlisten > 0 && (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0; size_t i; char msg[1024], buf[64]; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device); /* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "", opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command", do_env ? " environment" : "", opts->valid_before == 0 ? "" : "expires", do_permitopen ? " permitopen" : "", do_permitlisten ? " permitlisten" : "", opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ? " port-forwarding" : "", opts->cert_principals == NULL ? "" : " principals", opts->permit_pty_flag ? " pty" : "", opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=", opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : buf, opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "", opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "", opts->no_require_user_presence ? " no-touch-required" : ""); debug("%s: %s", loc, msg); if (do_remote) auth_debug_add("%s: %s", loc, msg); if (options.permit_user_env) { for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) { debug("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]); if (do_remote) { auth_debug_add("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]); } } } /* Go into a little more details for the local logs. */ if (opts->valid_before != 0) { format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf)); debug("%s: expires at %s", loc, buf); } if (opts->cert_principals != NULL) { debug("%s: authorized principals: \"%s\"", loc, opts->cert_principals); } if (opts->force_command != NULL) debug("%s: forced command: \"%s\"", loc, opts->force_command); if (do_permitopen) { for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) { debug("%s: permitted open: %s", loc, opts->permitopen[i]); } } if (do_permitlisten) { for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) { debug("%s: permitted listen: %s", loc, opts->permitlisten[i]); } } } /* Activate a new set of key/cert options; merging with what is there. */ int auth_activate_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshauthopt *opts) { struct sshauthopt *old = auth_opts; const char *emsg = NULL; debug("%s: setting new authentication options", __func__); if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_merge(old, opts, &emsg)) == NULL) { error("Inconsistent authentication options: %s", emsg); return -1; } return 0; } /* Disable forwarding, etc for the session */ void auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshauthopt *restricted; debug("%s: restricting session", __func__); /* A blank sshauthopt defaults to permitting nothing */ restricted = sshauthopt_new(); restricted->permit_pty_flag = 1; restricted->restricted = 1; if (auth_activate_options(ssh, restricted) != 0) fatal("%s: failed to restrict session", __func__); sshauthopt_free(restricted); } int auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts, int allow_cert_authority, const char *loc) { const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); time_t now = time(NULL); char buf[64]; /* * Check keys/principals file expiry time. * NB. validity interval in certificate is handled elsewhere. */ if (opts->valid_before && now > 0 && opts->valid_before < (uint64_t)now) { format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf)); debug("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf); auth_debug_add("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf); return -1; } /* Consistency checks */ if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) { debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc); auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc); /* deny access */ return -1; } /* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */ if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) { debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc); auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc); /* deny access */ return -1; } /* Perform from= checks */ if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) { switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip, opts->required_from_host_keys )) { case 1: /* Host name matches. */ break; case -1: default: debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc); auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 0: logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with " "correct key but not from a permitted " "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip, opts->required_from_host_keys); auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not " "permitted to use this key for login.", loc, remote_host); /* deny access */ return -1; } } /* Check source-address restriction from certificate */ if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) { switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip, opts->required_from_host_cert)) { case 1: /* accepted */ break; case -1: default: /* invalid */ error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid", loc); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 0: logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid " "certificate but not from a permitted source " "address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip); auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not " "permitted to use this certificate for login.", loc, remote_ip); return -1; } } /* * * XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys * that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK * tests. */ auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1); return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/auth.h010064400017500001750000000177041362136622600126040ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.100 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #ifndef AUTH_H #define AUTH_H #include #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP #include #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH #include #endif #ifdef KRB5 #include #endif struct passwd; struct ssh; struct sshbuf; struct sshkey; struct sshauthopt; typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt; typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod; typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice; struct Authctxt { sig_atomic_t success; int authenticated; /* authenticated and alarms cancelled */ int postponed; /* authentication needs another step */ int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */ int attempt; int failures; int server_caused_failure; int force_pwchange; char *user; /* username sent by the client */ char *service; struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ char *style; /* Method lists for multiple authentication */ char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */ u_int num_auth_methods; /* Authentication method-specific data */ void *methoddata; void *kbdintctxt; #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif #ifdef KRB5 krb5_context krb5_ctx; krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache; krb5_principal krb5_user; char *krb5_ticket_file; char *krb5_ccname; #endif struct sshbuf *loginmsg; /* Authentication keys already used; these will be refused henceforth */ struct sshkey **prev_keys; u_int nprev_keys; /* Last used key and ancillary information from active auth method */ struct sshkey *auth_method_key; char *auth_method_info; /* Information exposed to session */ struct sshbuf *session_info; /* Auth info for environment */ }; /* * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by * the client. */ struct Authmethod { char *name; int (*userauth)(struct ssh *); int *enabled; }; /* * Keyboard interactive device: * init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success * query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure * respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction, * otherwise - failure */ struct KbdintDevice { const char *name; void* (*init_ctx)(Authctxt*); int (*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on); int (*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses); void (*free_ctx)(void *ctx); }; int auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *); int auth_password(struct ssh *, const char *); int hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *, char *, struct sshkey *); int user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int, struct sshauthopt **); int auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *, const struct sshkey *); /* * Handling auth method-specific information for logging and prevention * of key reuse during multiple authentication. */ void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *); void auth2_record_key(Authctxt *, int, const struct sshkey *); void auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); void auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); #ifdef KRB5 int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *); int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt); int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password); void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt); #endif /* KRB5 */ #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) #include int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *); int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *); #endif #include "auth-pam.h" #include "audit.h" void remove_kbdint_device(const char *); void do_authentication2(struct ssh *); void auth_log(struct ssh *, int, int, const char *, const char *); void auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *) __attribute__((noreturn)); void userauth_finish(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *); int auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *, const char *); char *auth2_read_banner(void); int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int); int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *); int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); void privsep_challenge_enable(void); int auth2_challenge(struct ssh *, char *); void auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *); int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); int allowed_user(struct ssh *, struct passwd *); struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *user); char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); int auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *); const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *, int); HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, const char *); /* hostkey handling */ struct sshkey *get_hostkey_by_index(int); struct sshkey *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *); /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */ const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *); int auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *); void auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *); int auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *, struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *, int, const char *); void auth_log_authopts(const char *, const struct sshauthopt *, int); /* debug messages during authentication */ void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void auth_debug_send(struct ssh *); void auth_debug_reset(void); struct passwd *fakepw(void); #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD (1) /* Discard stdout */ #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE (1<<1) /* Redirect stdout */ #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD (1<<2) /* Discard stderr */ pid_t subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags); int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *); #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *); #endif #endif /* AUTH_H */ openssh-8.2p1/auth2-chall.c010064400017500001750000000234521362136622600137370ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.52 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; static int auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *); static int send_userauth_info_request(struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); #ifdef BSD_AUTH extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device; #else #ifdef USE_PAM extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device; #endif #endif KbdintDevice *devices[] = { #ifdef BSD_AUTH &bsdauth_device, #else #ifdef USE_PAM &sshpam_device, #endif #endif NULL }; typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt; struct KbdintAuthctxt { char *devices; void *ctxt; KbdintDevice *device; u_int nreq; u_int devices_done; }; #ifdef USE_PAM void remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname) { int i, j; for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++) if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) { for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++) devices[j] = devices[j+1]; i--; } } #endif static KbdintAuthctxt * kbdint_alloc(const char *devs) { KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; struct sshbuf *b; int i, r; #ifdef USE_PAM if (!options.use_pam) remove_kbdint_device("pam"); #endif kbdintctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt)); if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) { if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", devices[i]->name)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((kbdintctxt->devices = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); sshbuf_free(b); } else { kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs); } debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices); kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL; kbdintctxt->device = NULL; kbdintctxt->nreq = 0; return kbdintctxt; } static void kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) { if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) { kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt); kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL; } kbdintctxt->device = NULL; } static void kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) { if (kbdintctxt->device) kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt); free(kbdintctxt->devices); explicit_bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt)); free(kbdintctxt); } /* get next device */ static int kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) { size_t len; char *t; int i; if (kbdintctxt->device) kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt); do { len = kbdintctxt->devices ? strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0; if (len == 0) break; for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) { if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 || !auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, "keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name)) continue; if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name, len) == 0) { kbdintctxt->device = devices[i]; kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i; } } t = kbdintctxt->devices; kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL; free(t); debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : ""); } while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device); return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0; } /* * try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to * wait for the response. */ int auth2_challenge(struct ssh *ssh, char *devs) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s", authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "", devs ? devs : ""); if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs) return 0; if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL) authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs); return auth2_challenge_start(ssh); } /* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */ void auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; /* unregister callback */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL); if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) { kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt); authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; } } /* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/ static int auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : ""); if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) { auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); return 0; } debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'", kbdintctxt->device->name); if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) { auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); return 0; } if (send_userauth_info_request(ssh) == 0) { auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); return 0; } ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, &input_userauth_info_response); authctxt->postponed = 1; return 0; } static int send_userauth_info_request(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; char *name, *instr, **prompts; u_int r, i, *echo_on; kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt, &name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on)) return 0; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, instr)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language not used */ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kbdintctxt->nreq)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, prompts[i])) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, echo_on[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) free(prompts[i]); free(prompts); free(echo_on); free(name); free(instr); return 1; } static int input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; int authenticated = 0, res; int r; u_int i, nresp; const char *devicename = NULL; char **response = NULL; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt"); kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt"); if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device"); authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nresp)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies"); if (nresp > 100) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies"); if (nresp > 0) { response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &response[i], NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response); for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) { explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i])); free(response[i]); } free(response); switch (res) { case 0: /* Success! */ authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0; break; case 1: /* Authentication needs further interaction */ if (send_userauth_info_request(ssh) == 1) authctxt->postponed = 1; break; default: /* Failure! */ break; } devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name; if (!authctxt->postponed) { if (authenticated) { auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); } else { /* start next device */ /* may set authctxt->postponed */ auth2_challenge_start(ssh); } } userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive", devicename); return 0; } void privsep_challenge_enable(void) { #if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM) int n = 0; #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device; #endif #ifdef USE_PAM extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device; #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device; #else #ifdef USE_PAM devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device; #endif #endif } openssh-8.2p1/auth2-gss.c010064400017500001750000000232111362136622600134410ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.29 2018/07/31 03:10:27 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "log.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" extern ServerOptions options; static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know * how to check local user kuserok and the like) */ static int userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL}; Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; int r, present; u_int mechs; OM_uint32 ms; size_t len; u_char *doid = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mechs)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (mechs == 0) { debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported"); return (0); } do { mechs--; free(doid); present = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &doid, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE && doid[1] == len - 2) { goid.elements = doid + 2; goid.length = len - 2; ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present); } else { logit("Badly formed OID received"); } } while (mechs > 0 && !present); if (!present) { free(doid); authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; return (0); } if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); free(doid); return (0); } if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) { if (ctxt != NULL) ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); free(doid); authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; return (0); } authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt; /* Return the OID that we received */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, doid, len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(doid); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); authctxt->postponed = 1; return (0); } static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags; u_char *p; size_t len; int r; if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); recv_tok.value = p; recv_tok.length = len; maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags)); free(p); if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { if (send_tok.length != 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } authctxt->postponed = 0; ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); } else { if (send_tok.length != 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, &input_gssapi_mic); else ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, &input_gssapi_exchange_complete); } } gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); return 0; } static int input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 maj_status; int r; u_char *p; size_t len; if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); recv_tok.value = p; recv_tok.length = len; /* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL)); free(recv_tok.value); /* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); /* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */ gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok); return 0; } /* * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication. * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above, * which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete. */ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; int r, authenticated; const char *displayname; if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); /* * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); authctxt->postponed = 0; ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); return 0; } static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; int r, authenticated = 0; struct sshbuf *b; gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; const char *displayname; u_char *p; size_t len; if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mic.value = p; mic.length = len; ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic"); if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__); gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); else logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); sshbuf_free(b); free(mic.value); if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); authctxt->postponed = 0; ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); return 0; } Authmethod method_gssapi = { "gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, &options.gss_authentication }; #endif /* GSSAPI */ openssh-8.2p1/auth2-hostbased.c010064400017500001750000000201331362136622600146210ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.42 2019/11/25 00:51:37 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "canohost.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "match.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost; u_char *pkblob, *sig; size_t alen, blen, slen; int r, pktype, authenticated = 0; /* XXX use sshkey_froms() */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet parsing: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("%s: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu", __func__, cuser, chost, pkalg, slen); #ifdef DEBUG_PK debug("signature:"); sshbuf_dump_data(sig, slen, stderr); #endif pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: key_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if (key == NULL) { error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key " "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype); goto done; } if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe " "signature format"); goto done; } if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) { logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) { logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__, (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ? "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); goto done; } if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* reconstruct packet */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif auth2_record_info(authctxt, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0) authenticated = 1; auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key); sshbuf_free(b); done: debug2("%s: authenticated %d", __func__, authenticated); sshkey_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); free(cuser); free(chost); free(sig); return authenticated; } /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ int hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, struct sshkey *key) { const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason; HostStatus host_status; int len; char *fp; if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) return 0; resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__, chost, resolvedname, ipaddr); if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') { debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost); chost[len - 1] = '\0'; } if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) { if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) { debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused " "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" (from packet)", __func__, cuser, chost); return 0; } lookup = chost; } else { if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0) logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: " "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s", chost, ipaddr, resolvedname); if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) { debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused " "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"", __func__, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr); return 0; } lookup = resolvedname; } debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__); if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) { error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); return 0; } host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); /* backward compat if no key has been found. */ if (host_status == HOST_NEW) { host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2, options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); } if (host_status == HOST_OK) { if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by " "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, cuser, lookup); } else { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s", sshkey_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup); } free(fp); } return (host_status == HOST_OK); } Authmethod method_hostbased = { "hostbased", userauth_hostbased, &options.hostbased_authentication }; openssh-8.2p1/auth2-kbdint.c010064400017500001750000000043661362136622600141320ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.11 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "ssherr.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; static int userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh) { int r, authenticated = 0; char *lang, *devs; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &devs, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs); if (options.challenge_response_authentication) authenticated = auth2_challenge(ssh, devs); free(devs); free(lang); return authenticated; } Authmethod method_kbdint = { "keyboard-interactive", userauth_kbdint, &options.kbd_interactive_authentication }; openssh-8.2p1/auth2-none.c010064400017500001750000000044471362136622600136160ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.22 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; /* "none" is allowed only one time */ static int none_enabled = 1; static int userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; none_enabled = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication) return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, ""))); return (0); } Authmethod method_none = { "none", userauth_none, &none_enabled }; openssh-8.2p1/auth2-passwd.c010064400017500001750000000046311362136622600141530ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.17 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; static int userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh) { char *password; int authenticated = 0, r; u_char change; size_t len; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &change)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &password, &len)) != 0 || (change && (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (change) logit("password change not supported"); else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, password)) == 1) authenticated = 1; explicit_bzero(password, len); free(password); return authenticated; } Authmethod method_passwd = { "password", userauth_passwd, &options.password_authentication }; openssh-8.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c010064400017500001750000000734721362136622600141620ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.99 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */ #include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */ #include "sk-api.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; static char * format_key(const struct sshkey *key) { char *ret, *fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp); free(fp); return ret; } static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL; u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig; size_t blen, slen; int r, pktype; int req_presence = 0, authenticated = 0; struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL; struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0) fatal("%s: parse request failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2) { char *keystring; struct sshbuf *pkbuf; if ((pkbuf = sshbuf_from(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); if ((keystring = sshbuf_dtob64_string(pkbuf, 0)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dtob64 failed", __func__); debug2("%s: %s user %s %s public key %s %s", __func__, authctxt->valid ? "valid" : "invalid", authctxt->user, have_sig ? "attempting" : "querying", pkalg, keystring); sshbuf_free(pkbuf); free(keystring); } pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ verbose("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if (key == NULL) { error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key " "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype); goto done; } if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe " "signature scheme"); goto done; } if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) { logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key)); goto done; } if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) { logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__, (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ? "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } key_s = format_key(key); if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key); if (have_sig) { debug3("%s: have %s signature for %s%s%s", __func__, pkalg, key_s, ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s); if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); goto done; } /* reconstruct packet */ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0) fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) && PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL, ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) { authenticated = 1; } if (authenticated == 1 && sig_details != NULL) { auth2_record_info(authctxt, "signature count = %u", sig_details->sk_counter); debug("%s: sk_counter = %u, sk_flags = 0x%02x", __func__, sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags); req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) || !authopts->no_require_user_presence; if (req_presence && (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) { error("public key %s signature for %s%s from " "%.128s port %d rejected: user presence " "(authenticator touch) requirement " "not met ", key_s, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); authenticated = 0; goto done; } } auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key); } else { debug("%s: test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s", __func__, pkalg, key_s, ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); goto done; } /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ /* * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an * issue? -markus */ if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); authctxt->postponed = 1; } } done: if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) { debug("%s: key options inconsistent with existing", __func__); authenticated = 0; } debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg); sshbuf_free(b); sshauthopt_free(authopts); sshkey_free(key); free(userstyle); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); free(key_s); free(ca_s); free(sig); sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details); return authenticated; } static int match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { char *result; u_int i; /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i], principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) { debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"", result); free(result); return 1; } } return 0; } /* * Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets * authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a * log preamble for file/line information. */ static int check_principals_line(struct ssh *ssh, char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { u_int i, found = 0; char *ep, *line_opts; const char *reason = NULL; struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; /* Trim trailing whitespace. */ ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1; while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t')) *ep-- = '\0'; /* * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has * key options. */ line_opts = NULL; if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL || (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) { for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++) ; line_opts = cp; cp = ep; } if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) { debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason); auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason); return -1; } /* Check principals in cert against those on line */ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0) continue; debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"", loc, cert->principals[i]); found = 1; } if (found && authoptsp != NULL) { *authoptsp = opts; opts = NULL; } sshauthopt_free(opts); return found ? 0 : -1; } static int process_principals(struct ssh *ssh, FILE *f, const char *file, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep; size_t linesize = 0; u_long linenum = 0; u_int found_principal = 0; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { linenum++; /* Always consume entire input */ if (found_principal) continue; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; /* Skip blank and comment lines. */ if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL) *ep = '\0'; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n') continue; snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum); if (check_principals_line(ssh, cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0) found_principal = 1; } free(line); return found_principal; } /* XXX remove pw args here and elsewhere once ssh->authctxt is guaranteed */ static int match_principals_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, char *file, struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { FILE *f; int success; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; temporarily_use_uid(pw); debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { restore_uid(); return 0; } success = process_principals(ssh, f, file, cert, authoptsp); fclose(f); restore_uid(); return success; } /* * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command. * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL; const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert; FILE *f = NULL; int r, ok, found_principal = 0; int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0; pid_t pid; char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL; char serial_s[32], uidstr[32]; void (*osigchld)(int); if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL) return 0; if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) { error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, " "skipping"); return 0; } /* * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. */ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); runas_pw = getpwnam(username); if (runas_pw == NULL) { error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", username, strerror(errno)); goto out; } /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains " "invalid quotes", options.authorized_principals_command); goto out; } if (ac == 0) { error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", options.authorized_principals_command); goto out; } if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu", (unsigned long long)cert->serial); snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid); for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { tmp = percent_expand(av[i], "U", uidstr, "u", user_pw->pw_name, "h", user_pw->pw_dir, "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), "T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key), "f", key_fp, "F", ca_fp, "k", keytext, "K", catext, "i", cert->key_id, "s", serial_s, (char *)NULL); if (tmp == NULL) fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); free(av[i]); av[i] = tmp; } /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ command = argv_assemble(ac, av); if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command, ac, av, &f, SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0) goto out; uid_swapped = 1; temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw); ok = process_principals(ssh, f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp); fclose(f); f = NULL; if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0) goto out; /* Read completed successfully */ found_principal = ok; out: if (f != NULL) fclose(f); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) free(av[i]); free(av); if (uid_swapped) restore_uid(); free(command); free(username); free(ca_fp); free(key_fp); free(catext); free(keytext); return found_principal; } /* * Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key * matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp * on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages. */ static int check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, char *cp, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type; struct sshkey *found = NULL; struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL; char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL; const char *reason = NULL; int ret = -1; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) { debug3("%s: keytype %d failed", __func__, want_keytype); goto out; } /* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */ if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { /* no key? check for options */ debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp); key_options = cp; if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) { reason = "invalid key option string"; goto fail_reason; } skip_space(&cp); if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { /* still no key? advance to next line*/ debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp); goto out; } } /* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */ if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) { debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason); auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason); goto out; } /* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { /* Certificate; check signature key against CA */ if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) || !keyopts->cert_authority) goto out; } else { /* Plain key: check it against key found in file */ if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority) goto out; } /* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__); debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc, sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp); if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, keyopts, sshkey_is_cert(key), loc) != 0) { reason = "Refused by key options"; goto fail_reason; } /* That's all we need for plain keys. */ if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s", sshkey_type(found), fp, loc); finalopts = keyopts; keyopts = NULL; goto success; } /* * Additional authorisation for certificates. */ /* Parse and check options present in certificate */ if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) { reason = "Invalid certificate options"; goto fail_reason; } if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, certopts, 0, loc) != 0) { reason = "Refused by certificate options"; goto fail_reason; } if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL) goto fail_reason; /* * If the user has specified a list of principals as * a key option, then prefer that list to matching * their username in the certificate principals list. */ if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL && !match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) { reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; goto fail_reason; } if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) " "signed by CA %s %s found at %s", key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, sshkey_type(found), fp, loc); success: if (finalopts == NULL) fatal("%s: internal error: missing options", __func__); if (authoptsp != NULL) { *authoptsp = finalopts; finalopts = NULL; } /* success */ ret = 0; goto out; fail_reason: error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); out: free(fp); sshauthopt_free(keyopts); sshauthopt_free(certopts); sshauthopt_free(finalopts); sshkey_free(found); return ret; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file, * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256]; size_t linesize = 0; int found_key = 0; u_long linenum = 0; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { linenum++; /* Always consume entire file */ if (found_key) continue; /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ cp = line; skip_space(&cp); if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') continue; snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum); if (check_authkey_line(ssh, pw, key, cp, loc, authoptsp) == 0) found_key = 1; } free(line); return found_key; } /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */ static int user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL; const char *reason; struct sshauthopt *principals_opts = NULL, *cert_opts = NULL; struct sshauthopt *final_opts = NULL; int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) return 0; if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) { debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s: %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate * principals against the names in that file rather than matching * against the username. */ if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) { if (match_principals_file(ssh, pw, principals_file, key->cert, &principals_opts)) found_principal = 1; } /* Try querying command if specified */ if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(ssh, pw, key, &principals_opts)) found_principal = 1; /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */ use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL || options.authorized_principals_command != NULL; if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) { reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; goto fail_reason; } if (use_authorized_principals && principals_opts == NULL) fatal("%s: internal error: missing principals_opts", __func__); if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; /* Check authority from options in key and from principals file/cmd */ if ((cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) { reason = "Invalid certificate options"; goto fail_reason; } if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, cert_opts, 0, "cert") != 0) { reason = "Refused by certificate options"; goto fail_reason; } if (principals_opts == NULL) { final_opts = cert_opts; cert_opts = NULL; } else { if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, principals_opts, 0, "principals") != 0) { reason = "Refused by certificate principals options"; goto fail_reason; } if ((final_opts = sshauthopt_merge(principals_opts, cert_opts, &reason)) == NULL) { fail_reason: error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); goto out; } } /* Success */ verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by " "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys); if (authoptsp != NULL) { *authoptsp = final_opts; final_opts = NULL; } ret = 1; out: sshauthopt_free(principals_opts); sshauthopt_free(cert_opts); sshauthopt_free(final_opts); free(principals_file); free(ca_fp); return ret; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in file. * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int user_key_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, char *file, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { FILE *f; int found_key = 0; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); debug("trying public key file %s", file); if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) { found_key = check_authkeys_file(ssh, pw, f, file, key, authoptsp); fclose(f); } restore_uid(); return found_key; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command. * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL; FILE *f = NULL; int r, ok, found_key = 0; int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0; pid_t pid; char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL; char uidstr[32], *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; void (*osigchld)(int); if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL) return 0; if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) { error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping"); return 0; } /* * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. */ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); runas_pw = getpwnam(username); if (runas_pw == NULL) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", username, strerror(errno)); goto out; } /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */ if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", command); goto out; } if (ac == 0) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", command); goto out; } snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid); for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { tmp = percent_expand(av[i], "U", uidstr, "u", user_pw->pw_name, "h", user_pw->pw_dir, "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), "f", key_fp, "k", keytext, (char *)NULL); if (tmp == NULL) fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); free(av[i]); av[i] = tmp; } /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ command = argv_assemble(ac, av); /* * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the * target username as a single argument. */ if (ac == 1) { av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av)); av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name); av[2] = NULL; /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */ free(command); xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]); } if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command, ac, av, &f, SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0) goto out; uid_swapped = 1; temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw); ok = check_authkeys_file(ssh, user_pw, f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, authoptsp); fclose(f); f = NULL; if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0) goto out; /* Read completed successfully */ found_key = ok; out: if (f != NULL) fclose(f); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) free(av[i]); free(av); if (uid_swapped) restore_uid(); free(command); free(username); free(key_fp); free(keytext); return found_key; } /* * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. */ int user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { u_int success = 0, i; char *file; struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) return 0; if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) return 0; for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0) continue; file = expand_authorized_keys( options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); success = user_key_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, file, &opts); free(file); if (!success) { sshauthopt_free(opts); opts = NULL; } } if (success) goto out; if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0) goto out; sshauthopt_free(opts); opts = NULL; if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0) goto out; sshauthopt_free(opts); opts = NULL; out: if (success && authoptsp != NULL) { *authoptsp = opts; opts = NULL; } sshauthopt_free(opts); return success; } Authmethod method_pubkey = { "publickey", userauth_pubkey, &options.pubkey_authentication }; openssh-8.2p1/auth2.c010064400017500001750000000545531362136622600126640ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.157 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "stdlib.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "digest.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; /* methods */ extern Authmethod method_none; extern Authmethod method_pubkey; extern Authmethod method_passwd; extern Authmethod method_kbdint; extern Authmethod method_hostbased; #ifdef GSSAPI extern Authmethod method_gssapi; #endif Authmethod *authmethods[] = { &method_none, &method_pubkey, #ifdef GSSAPI &method_gssapi, #endif &method_passwd, &method_kbdint, &method_hostbased, NULL }; /* protocol */ static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* helper */ static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *); static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt); #define MATCH_NONE 0 /* method or submethod mismatch */ #define MATCH_METHOD 1 /* method matches (no submethod specified) */ #define MATCH_BOTH 2 /* method and submethod match */ #define MATCH_PARTIAL 3 /* method matches, submethod can't be checked */ static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *); char * auth2_read_banner(void) { struct stat st; char *banner = NULL; size_t len, n; int fd; if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1) return (NULL); if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { close(fd); return (NULL); } if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) { close(fd); return (NULL); } len = (size_t)st.st_size; /* truncate */ banner = xmalloc(len + 1); n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len); close(fd); if (n != len) { free(banner); return (NULL); } banner[n] = '\0'; return (banner); } static void userauth_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *msg) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, msg)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language, unused */ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("%s: sent", __func__); } static void userauth_banner(struct ssh *ssh) { char *banner = NULL; if (options.banner == NULL) return; if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL) goto done; userauth_send_banner(ssh, banner); done: free(banner); } /* * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE */ void do_authentication2(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request); ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success); ssh->authctxt = NULL; } /*ARGSUSED*/ static int input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *service = NULL; int r, acceptit = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt"); if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) { if (!authctxt->success) { acceptit = 1; /* now we can handle user-auth requests */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request); } } /* XXX all other service requests are denied */ if (acceptit) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) goto out; } else { debug("bad service request %s", service); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "bad service request %s", service); } r = 0; out: free(service); return 0; } #define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005 static double user_specific_delay(const char *user) { char b[512]; size_t len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512); u_char *hash = xmalloc(len); double delay; (void)snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%llu%s", (unsigned long long)options.timing_secret, user); if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, b, strlen(b), hash, len) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_memory", __func__); /* 0-4.2 ms of delay */ delay = (double)PEEK_U32(hash) / 1000 / 1000 / 1000 / 1000; freezero(hash, len); debug3("%s: user specific delay %0.3lfms", __func__, delay/1000); return MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS + delay; } static void ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, double seconds) { struct timespec ts; double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain; /* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */ while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0) seconds *= 2; ts.tv_sec = remain; ts.tv_nsec = (remain - ts.tv_sec) * 1000000000; debug3("%s: elapsed %0.3lfms, delaying %0.3lfms (requested %0.3lfms)", __func__, elapsed*1000, remain*1000, req*1000); nanosleep(&ts, NULL); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static int input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Authmethod *m = NULL; char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL; int r, authenticated = 0; double tstart = monotime_double(); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &user, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &method, NULL)) != 0) goto out; debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) *style++ = 0; if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) { /* setup auth context */ authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user)); authctxt->user = xstrdup(user); if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) { authctxt->valid = 1; debug2("%s: setting up authctxt for %s", __func__, user); } else { /* Invalid user, fake password information */ authctxt->pw = fakepw(); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER)); #endif } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh)); #endif ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s", authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user); setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown", use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; if (use_privsep) mm_inform_authserv(service, style); userauth_banner(ssh); if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "no authentication methods enabled"); } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 || strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of username or service " "not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)", authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service); } /* reset state */ auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); #ifdef GSSAPI /* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); #endif auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt); authctxt->postponed = 0; authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0; /* try to authenticate user */ m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method); if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) { debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method); authenticated = m->userauth(ssh); } if (!authctxt->authenticated) ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart, user_specific_delay(authctxt->user)); userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL); r = 0; out: free(service); free(user); free(method); return r; } void userauth_finish(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, const char *method, const char *submethod) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *methods; int r, partial = 0; if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated) fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s", authctxt->user); if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed) fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed"); /* Special handling for root */ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(ssh, method)) { authenticated = 0; #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED)); #endif } if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) { authenticated = 0; partial = 1; } } /* Log before sending the reply */ auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial, method, submethod); /* Update information exposed to session */ if (authenticated || partial) auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, method, submethod); if (authctxt->postponed) return; #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam && authenticated) { int r; if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) { /* if PAM returned a message, send it to the user */ if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, "\0", 1)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); userauth_send_banner(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg)); if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send PAM banner", __func__); } } fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account " "configuration", authctxt->user); } } #endif if (authenticated == 1) { /* turn off userauth */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* now we can break out */ authctxt->success = 1; ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user); } else { /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */ if (!partial && !authctxt->server_caused_failure && (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)) authctxt->failures++; if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) { #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES)); #endif auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh); } methods = authmethods_get(authctxt); debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__, partial, methods); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, methods)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, partial)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(methods); } } /* * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured. * 0 otherwise. */ int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, const char *submethod) { u_int i; /* * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration. */ if (options.num_auth_methods == 0) return 1; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) { if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method, submethod) != MATCH_NONE) return 1; } return 0; } static char * authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct sshbuf *b; char *list; int i, r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0) continue; if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL || *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) continue; if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name, NULL)) continue; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", authmethods[i]->name)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); sshbuf_free(b); return list; } static Authmethod * authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name) { int i; if (name != NULL) for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL && *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 && strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 && auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name, NULL)) return authmethods[i]; debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL"); return NULL; } /* * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled. * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid. */ int auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable) { char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p; u_int i, found; int ret = -1; if (*_methods == '\0') { error("empty authentication method list"); return -1; } omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods); while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) { for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0) continue; if (need_enable) { if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL || *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) { error("Disabled method \"%s\" in " "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"", method, _methods); goto out; } } found = 1; break; } if (!found) { error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list", method); goto out; } } ret = 0; out: free(omethods); return ret; } /* * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly. */ int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt) { u_int i; /* First, normalise away the "any" pseudo-method */ if (options.num_auth_methods == 1 && strcmp(options.auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) { free(options.auth_methods[0]); options.auth_methods[0] = NULL; options.num_auth_methods = 0; } if (options.num_auth_methods == 0) return 0; debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__); authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods, sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods)); authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0; for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) { if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) { logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains " "disabled method, skipping", options.auth_methods[i]); continue; } debug("authentication methods list %d: %s", authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]); authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]); } if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) { error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating " "disabled methods"); return -1; } return 0; } static int list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method, const char *submethod) { size_t l = strlen(method); int match; const char *p; if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0) return MATCH_NONE; p = methods + l; match = MATCH_METHOD; if (*p == ':') { if (!submethod) return MATCH_PARTIAL; l = strlen(submethod); p += 1; if (strncmp(submethod, p, l)) return MATCH_NONE; p += l; match = MATCH_BOTH; } if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0') return MATCH_NONE; return match; } /* * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods. * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1 * if it did. */ static int remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod) { char *omethods = *methods, *p; size_t l = strlen(method); int match; match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod); if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH) return 0; p = omethods + l; if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH) p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */ if (*p == ',') p++; *methods = xstrdup(p); free(omethods); return 1; } /* * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful. * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise. */ int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, const char *submethod) { u_int i, found = 0; debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method); for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) { if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method, submethod)) continue; found = 1; if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') { debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i); return 1; } debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"", i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]); } /* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */ if (!found) fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__); return 0; } /* Reset method-specific information */ void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *authctxt) { sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key); free(authctxt->auth_method_info); authctxt->auth_method_key = NULL; authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL; } /* Record auth method-specific information for logs */ void auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int i; free(authctxt->auth_method_info); authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL; va_start(ap, fmt); i = vasprintf(&authctxt->auth_method_info, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (i == -1) fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__); } /* * Records a public key used in authentication. This is used for logging * and to ensure that the same key is not subsequently accepted again for * multiple authentication. */ void auth2_record_key(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const struct sshkey *key) { struct sshkey **tmp, *dup; int r; if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0) fatal("%s: copy key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key); authctxt->auth_method_key = dup; if (!authenticated) return; /* If authenticated, make sure we don't accept this key again */ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0) fatal("%s: copy key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (authctxt->nprev_keys >= INT_MAX || (tmp = recallocarray(authctxt->prev_keys, authctxt->nprev_keys, authctxt->nprev_keys + 1, sizeof(*authctxt->prev_keys))) == NULL) fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__); authctxt->prev_keys = tmp; authctxt->prev_keys[authctxt->nprev_keys] = dup; authctxt->nprev_keys++; } /* Checks whether a key has already been previously used for authentication */ int auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, const struct sshkey *key) { u_int i; char *fp; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_keys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_keys[i])) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(authctxt->prev_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3("%s: key already used: %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(authctxt->prev_keys[i]), fp == NULL ? "UNKNOWN" : fp); free(fp); return 1; } } return 0; } /* * Updates authctxt->session_info with details of authentication. Should be * whenever an authentication method succeeds. */ void auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, const char *submethod) { int r; if (authctxt->session_info == NULL) { if ((authctxt->session_info = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); } /* Append method[/submethod] */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s%s%s", method, submethod == NULL ? "" : "/", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod)) != 0) fatal("%s: append method: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Append key if present */ if (authctxt->auth_method_key != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 || (r = sshkey_format_text(authctxt->auth_method_key, authctxt->session_info)) != 0) fatal("%s: append key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) { /* Ensure no ambiguity here */ if (strchr(authctxt->auth_method_info, '\n') != NULL) fatal("%s: auth_method_info contains \\n", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s", authctxt->auth_method_info)) != 0) { fatal("%s: append method info: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, '\n')) != 0) fatal("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } openssh-8.2p1/authfd.c010064400017500001750000000376461362136622600131200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.121 2019/12/21 02:19:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation, * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES 2048 /* Max keys in agent reply */ #define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */ /* macro to check for "agent failure" message */ #define agent_failed(x) \ ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \ (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \ (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) /* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */ static int decode_reply(u_char type) { if (agent_failed(type)) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) return 0; else return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } /* * Opens an authentication socket at the provided path and stores the file * descriptor in fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure. */ int ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp) { int sock, oerrno; struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; /* close on exec */ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 || connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) { oerrno = errno; close(sock); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (fdp != NULL) *fdp = sock; else close(sock); return 0; } /* * Opens the default authentication socket and stores the file descriptor in * fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure. */ int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp) { const char *authsocket; if (fdp != NULL) *fdp = -1; authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); if (authsocket == NULL || *authsocket == '\0') return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT; return ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(authsocket, fdp); } /* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */ static int ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply) { int r; size_t l, len; char buf[1024]; /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */ len = sshbuf_len(request); POKE_U32(buf, len); /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 || atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(request), sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request)) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; /* * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the * response packet. */ if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */ len = PEEK_U32(buf); if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */ sshbuf_reset(reply); while (len > 0) { l = len; if (l > sizeof(buf)) l = sizeof(buf); if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0) return r; len -= l; } return 0; } /* * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was * obtained). The argument must have been returned by * ssh_get_authentication_socket(). */ void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock) { if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) close(sock); } /* Lock/unlock agent */ int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password) { int r; u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK; struct sshbuf *msg; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } static int deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r; char *comment = NULL; const u_char *blob; size_t blen; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0) goto out; if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } r = 0; out: free(comment); return r; } /* * Fetch list of identities held by the agent. */ int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp) { u_char type; u_int32_t num, i; struct sshbuf *msg; struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL; int r; /* * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the * identities it can represent. */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0) goto out; if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (num == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES; goto out; } /* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */ if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL || (idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL || (idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < num;) { if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) { /* Gracefully skip unknown key types */ num--; continue; } else goto out; } i++; } idl->nkeys = num; *idlp = idl; idl = NULL; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); if (idl != NULL) ssh_free_identitylist(idl); return r; } void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl) { size_t i; if (idl == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) { if (idl->keys != NULL) sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]); if (idl->comments != NULL) free(idl->comments[i]); } free(idl->keys); free(idl->comments); free(idl); } /* * Check if the ssh agent has a given key. * Returns 0 if found, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, struct sshkey *key) { int r, ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; size_t i; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL; if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(sock, &idlist)) < 0) { return r; } for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], key)) { ret = 0; break; } } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); return ret; } /* * Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent, * and waits for a response from the agent. * Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero * otherwise. */ /* encode signature algorithm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */ static u_int agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg) { if (alg != NULL && sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) { if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0 || strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256; if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0 || strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512; } return 0; } /* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */ int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char *sig = NULL, type = 0; size_t len = 0; u_int flags = 0; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, msg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &sig, &len)) != 0) goto out; /* Check what we actually got back from the agent. */ if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(sig, len, alg)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ *sigp = sig; *lenp = len; sig = NULL; len = 0; r = 0; out: freezero(sig, len); sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ static int encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign, const char *provider) { int r; if (life != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0) goto out; } if (confirm != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0) goto out; } if (maxsign != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, maxsign)) != 0) goto out; } if (provider != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "sk-provider@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, provider)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: return r; } /* * Adds an identity to the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign, const char *provider) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r, constrained = (life || confirm || maxsign || provider); u_char type; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: #endif case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: type = constrained ? SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED : SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(key, msg, maxsign, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, comment)) != 0) goto out; break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (constrained && (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, maxsign, provider)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Removes an identity from the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; u_char type, *blob = NULL; size_t blen; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) { if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0) goto out; } else { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: if (blob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(blob, blen); free(blob); } sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r, constrained = (life || confirm); u_char type; if (add) { type = constrained ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED : SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY; } else type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0) goto out; if (constrained && (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, 0, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Removes all identities from the agent. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. * * This supports the SSH protocol 1 message to because, when clearing all * keys from an agent, we generally want to clear both protocol v1 and v2 * keys. */ int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type = (version == 1) ? SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES : SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } openssh-8.2p1/authfd.h010064400017500001750000000063621362136622600131140ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.48 2019/12/21 02:19:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef AUTHFD_H #define AUTHFD_H /* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */ struct ssh_identitylist { size_t nkeys; struct sshkey **keys; char **comments; }; int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp); int ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp); void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock); int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password); int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp); void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl); int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign, const char *provider); int ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, struct sshkey *key); int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key); int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm); int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version); int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat); /* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */ #define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1 #define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2 #define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3 #define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4 #define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5 #define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6 #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7 #define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8 #define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9 /* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */ #define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11 #define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12 #define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13 #define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14 #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17 #define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18 #define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19 /* smartcard */ #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20 #define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21 /* lock/unlock the agent */ #define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22 #define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23 /* add key with constraints */ #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24 #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25 #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26 #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN 3 #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION 255 /* extended failure messages */ #define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30 /* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */ #define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE 102 #define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01 #define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 0x02 #define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 0x04 #endif /* AUTHFD_H */ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c010064400017500001750000000303501362136622600134270ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.137 2020/01/25 23:02:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cipher.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "misc.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "krl.h" #define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024) /* Save a key blob to a file */ static int sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename) { int r; mode_t omask; omask = umask(077); r = sshbuf_write_file(filename, keybuf); umask(omask); return r; } int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds) { struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL; int r; if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment, format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(keyblob); return r; } /* XXX remove error() calls from here? */ int sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) { struct stat st; if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; /* * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user, * then we don't care. */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_ntsec(filename)) #endif if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.", (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename); error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); error("This private key will be ignored."); return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; } return 0; } int sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int fd, r; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; r = sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename); if (r != 0) goto out; r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp); if (r == 0 && keyp && *keyp) r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename); out: close(fd); return r; } int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; int r; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(buffer); return r; } /* XXX this is almost identical to sshkey_load_private_type() */ int sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; int r, fd; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0) goto out; if (keyp && *keyp && (r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: close(fd); sshbuf_free(buffer); return r; } static int sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, char **commentp) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL, *cp; size_t linesize = 0; int r; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { cp = line; switch (*cp) { case '#': case '\n': case '\0': continue; } /* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */ if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 || strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0) break; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) ; if (*cp) { if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) { cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0'; if (commentp) { *commentp = strdup(*cp ? cp : filename); if (*commentp == NULL) r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } free(line); fclose(f); return r; } } } free(line); fclose(f); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } /* load public key from any pubkey file */ int sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshkey *pub = NULL; char *file = NULL; int r; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) { if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = pub; pub = NULL; } r = 0; goto out; } sshkey_free(pub); /* try .pub suffix */ if (asprintf(&file, "%s.pub", filename) == -1) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) { if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = pub; pub = NULL; } r = 0; } out: free(file); sshkey_free(pub); return r; } /* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */ int sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *pub = NULL; char *file = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = pub; pub = NULL; } r = 0; out: free(file); sshkey_free(pub); return r; } /* Load private key and certificate */ int sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL; int r; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename, passphrase, &key, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0) goto out; /* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */ if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = key; key = NULL; } out: sshkey_free(key); sshkey_free(cert); return r; } /* * Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename", * SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error. * If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly, * otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed. * If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is * also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found. */ int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type, int check_ca) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL, *cp; size_t linesize = 0; int r = 0; struct sshkey *pub = NULL; int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) = strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { sshkey_free(pub); pub = NULL; cp = line; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) ; /* Skip comments and empty lines */ switch (*cp) { case '#': case '\n': case '\0': continue; } if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } switch (r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH: continue; default: goto out; } if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) || (check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) && sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) { r = 0; goto out; } } r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; out: free(line); sshkey_free(pub); fclose(f); return r; } /* * Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not, * SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something * unexpected happened. * This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too. * "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. */ int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file) { int r; r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key); /* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */ if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC) return r; /* * If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to * parse the file as a flat list of keys. */ switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) { case 0: /* Key found => revoked */ return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: /* Key not found => not revoked */ return 0; default: /* Some other error occurred */ return r; } } /* * Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted * whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g. * unterminated quotes). */ int sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp) { char *cp = *cpp; int quoted = 0; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } *cpp = cp; /* return failure for unterminated quotes */ return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0; } /* Save a public key */ int sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path, const char *comment) { int fd, oerrno; FILE *f = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) != 0) goto fail; fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); if (ferror(f) || fclose(f) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; fail: oerrno = errno; if (f != NULL) fclose(f); else close(fd); errno = oerrno; return r; } return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/authfile.h010064400017500001750000000046501362136622600134400ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.25 2020/01/25 23:02:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef AUTHFILE_H #define AUTHFILE_H struct sshbuf; struct sshkey; /* XXX document these */ /* XXX some of these could probably be merged/retired */ int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int); int sshkey_load_cert(const char *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_load_public(const char *, struct sshkey **, char **); int sshkey_load_private(const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **); int sshkey_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **); int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); int sshkey_perm_ok(int, const char *); int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int, int); int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file); int sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp); int sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path, const char *comment); #endif openssh-8.2p1/bitmap.c010064400017500001750000000106761362136622600131130ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: bitmap.c,v 1.9 2017/10/20 01:56:39 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "bitmap.h" #define BITMAP_WTYPE u_int #define BITMAP_MAX (1<<24) #define BITMAP_BYTES (sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE)) #define BITMAP_BITS (sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE) * 8) #define BITMAP_WMASK ((BITMAP_WTYPE)BITMAP_BITS - 1) struct bitmap { BITMAP_WTYPE *d; size_t len; /* number of words allocated */ size_t top; /* index of top word allocated */ }; struct bitmap * bitmap_new(void) { struct bitmap *ret; if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; if ((ret->d = calloc(1, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret->len = 1; ret->top = 0; return ret; } void bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b) { if (b != NULL && b->d != NULL) { bitmap_zero(b); free(b->d); b->d = NULL; } free(b); } void bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b) { memset(b->d, 0, b->len * BITMAP_BYTES); b->top = 0; } int bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n) { if (b->top >= b->len) return 0; /* invalid */ if (b->len == 0 || (n / BITMAP_BITS) > b->top) return 0; return (b->d[n / BITMAP_BITS] >> (n & BITMAP_WMASK)) & 1; } static int reserve(struct bitmap *b, u_int n) { BITMAP_WTYPE *tmp; size_t nlen; if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX) return -1; /* invalid */ nlen = (n / BITMAP_BITS) + 1; if (b->len < nlen) { if ((tmp = recallocarray(b->d, b->len, nlen, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL) return -1; b->d = tmp; b->len = nlen; } return 0; } int bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n) { int r; size_t offset; if ((r = reserve(b, n)) != 0) return r; offset = n / BITMAP_BITS; if (offset > b->top) b->top = offset; b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK); return 0; } /* Resets b->top to point to the most significant bit set in b->d */ static void retop(struct bitmap *b) { if (b->top >= b->len) return; while (b->top > 0 && b->d[b->top] == 0) b->top--; } void bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n) { size_t offset; if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX) return; /* invalid */ offset = n / BITMAP_BITS; if (offset > b->top) return; b->d[offset] &= ~((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK)); /* The top may have changed as a result of the clear */ retop(b); } size_t bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b) { size_t bits; BITMAP_WTYPE w; retop(b); if (b->top >= b->len) return 0; /* invalid */ if (b->len == 0 || (b->top == 0 && b->d[0] == 0)) return 0; /* Find MSB set */ w = b->d[b->top]; bits = (b->top + 1) * BITMAP_BITS; while (!(w & ((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (BITMAP_BITS - 1)))) { w <<= 1; bits--; } return bits; } size_t bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b) { return (bitmap_nbits(b) + 7) / 8; } int bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l) { u_char *s = (u_char *)p; size_t i, j, k, need = bitmap_nbytes(b); if (l < need || b->top >= b->len) return -1; if (l > need) l = need; /* Put the bytes from LSB backwards */ for (i = k = 0; i < b->top + 1; i++) { for (j = 0; j < BITMAP_BYTES; j++) { if (k >= l) break; s[need - 1 - k++] = (b->d[i] >> (j * 8)) & 0xff; } } return 0; } int bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l) { int r; size_t i, offset, shift; const u_char *s = (const u_char *)p; if (l > BITMAP_MAX / 8) return -1; if ((r = reserve(b, l * 8)) != 0) return r; bitmap_zero(b); if (l == 0) return 0; b->top = offset = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) / BITMAP_BYTES) - 1; shift = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) % BITMAP_BYTES) * 8; for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)s[i] << shift; if (shift == 0) { offset--; shift = BITMAP_BITS - 8; } else shift -= 8; } retop(b); return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/bitmap.h010064400017500001750000000036311362136622600131110ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: bitmap.h,v 1.2 2017/10/20 01:56:39 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _BITMAP_H #define _BITMAP_H #include /* Simple bit vector routines */ struct bitmap; /* Allocate a new bitmap. Returns NULL on allocation failure. */ struct bitmap *bitmap_new(void); /* Free a bitmap */ void bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b); /* Zero an existing bitmap */ void bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b); /* Test whether a bit is set in a bitmap. */ int bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n); /* Set a bit in a bitmap. Returns 0 on success or -1 on error */ int bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n); /* Clear a bit in a bitmap */ void bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n); /* Return the number of bits in a bitmap (i.e. the position of the MSB) */ size_t bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b); /* Return the number of bytes needed to represent a bitmap */ size_t bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b); /* Convert a bitmap to a big endian byte string */ int bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l); /* Convert a big endian byte string to a bitmap */ int bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l); #endif /* _BITMAP_H */ openssh-8.2p1/buildpkg.sh.in010064400017500001750000000432161362136622600142310ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # # Fake Root Solaris/SVR4/SVR5 Build System - Prototype # # The following code has been provide under Public Domain License. I really # don't care what you use it for. Just as long as you don't complain to me # nor my employer if you break it. - Ben Lindstrom (mouring@eviladmin.org) # umask 022 # # Options for building the package # You can create a openssh-config.local with your customized options # REMOVE_FAKE_ROOT_WHEN_DONE=yes # # uncommenting TEST_DIR and using # configure --prefix=/var/tmp --with-privsep-path=/var/tmp/empty # and # PKGNAME=tOpenSSH should allow testing a package without interfering # with a real OpenSSH package on a system. This is not needed on systems # that support the -R option to pkgadd. #TEST_DIR=/var/tmp # leave commented out for production build PKGNAME=OpenSSH # revisions within the same version (REV=a) #REV= SYSVINIT_NAME=opensshd AWK=${AWK:="nawk"} MAKE=${MAKE:="make"} SSHDUID=67 # Default privsep uid SSHDGID=67 # Default privsep gid # uncomment these next three as needed #PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=no #X11_FORWARDING=yes #USR_LOCAL_IS_SYMLINK=yes # System V init run levels SYSVINITSTART=S98 SYSVINITSTOPT=K30 # We will source these if they exist POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES=./pkg-post-make-install-fixes.sh POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS=./pkg-post-prototype-edit.sh # We'll be one level deeper looking for these PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL=../pkg-preinstall.local PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL=../pkg-postinstall.local PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL=../pkg-preremove.local PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL=../pkg-postremove.local PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL=../pkg-request.local # end of sourced files # OPENSSHD=opensshd.init OPENSSH_MANIFEST=openssh.xml OPENSSH_FMRI=svc:/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}:default SMF_METHOD_DIR=/lib/svc/method/site SMF_MANIFEST_DIR=/var/svc/manifest/site PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=@PATH_GROUPADD_PROG@ PATH_USERADD_PROG=@PATH_USERADD_PROG@ PATH_PASSWD_PROG=@PATH_PASSWD_PROG@ # # list of system directories we do NOT want to change owner/group/perms # when installing our package SYSTEM_DIR="/etc \ /etc/init.d \ /etc/rcS.d \ /etc/rc0.d \ /etc/rc1.d \ /etc/rc2.d \ /etc/opt \ /lib \ /lib/svc \ /lib/svc/method \ /lib/svc/method/site \ /opt \ /opt/bin \ /usr \ /usr/bin \ /usr/lib \ /usr/sbin \ /usr/share \ /usr/share/man \ /usr/share/man/man1 \ /usr/share/man/man8 \ /usr/local \ /usr/local/bin \ /usr/local/etc \ /usr/local/libexec \ /usr/local/man \ /usr/local/man/man1 \ /usr/local/man/man8 \ /usr/local/sbin \ /usr/local/share \ /var \ /var/opt \ /var/run \ /var/svc \ /var/svc/manifest \ /var/svc/manifest/site \ /var/tmp \ /tmp" # We may need to build as root so we make sure PATH is set up # only set the path if it's not set already [ -d /opt/bin ] && { echo $PATH | grep ":/opt/bin" > /dev/null 2>&1 [ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/opt/bin } [ -d /usr/local/bin ] && { echo $PATH | grep ":/usr/local/bin" > /dev/null 2>&1 [ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin } [ -d /usr/ccs/bin ] && { echo $PATH | grep ":/usr/ccs/bin" > /dev/null 2>&1 [ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/usr/ccs/bin } export PATH # [ -f Makefile ] || { echo "Please run this script from your build directory" exit 1 } # we will look for openssh-config.local to override the above options [ -s ./openssh-config.local ] && . ./openssh-config.local START=`pwd` FAKE_ROOT=$START/pkg ## Fill in some details, like prefix and sysconfdir for confvar in prefix exec_prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datadir mandir sysconfdir piddir srcdir do eval $confvar=`grep "^$confvar=" Makefile | cut -d = -f 2` done ## Are we using Solaris' SMF? DO_SMF=0 if egrep "^#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS" config.h > /dev/null 2>&1 then DO_SMF=1 fi ## Collect value of privsep user for confvar in SSH_PRIVSEP_USER do eval $confvar=`awk '/#define[ \t]'$confvar'/{print $3}' config.h` done ## Set privsep defaults if not defined if [ -z "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ] then SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd fi ## Extract common info requires for the 'info' part of the package. VERSION=`./ssh -V 2>&1 | sed -e 's/,.*//'` ARCH=`uname -m` DEF_MSG="\n" OS_VER=`uname -v` SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh UNAME_R=`uname -r` UNAME_S=`uname -s` case ${UNAME_S} in SunOS) UNAME_S=Solaris OS_VER=${UNAME_R} ARCH=`uname -p` RCS_D=yes DEF_MSG="(default: n)" ;; SCO_SV) case ${UNAME_R} in 3.2) UNAME_S=OpenServer5 OS_VER=`uname -X | grep Release | sed -e 's/^Rel.*3.2v//'` ;; 5) UNAME_S=OpenServer6 ;; esac SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh RC1_D=no DEF_MSG="(default: n)" ;; esac case `basename $0` in buildpkg.sh) ## Start by faking root install echo "Faking root install..." [ -d $FAKE_ROOT ] && rm -fr $FAKE_ROOT mkdir $FAKE_ROOT ${MAKE} install-nokeys DESTDIR=$FAKE_ROOT if [ $? -gt 0 ] then echo "Fake root install failed, stopping." exit 1 fi ## Setup our run level stuff while we are at it. if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] then # For Solaris' SMF, /lib/svc/method/site is the preferred place # for start/stop scripts that aren't supplied with the OS, and # similarly /var/svc/manifest/site for manifests. mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR} mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR} cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME} chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME} cat ${OPENSSH_MANIFEST} | \ sed -e "s|__SYSVINIT_NAME__|${SYSVINIT_NAME}|" \ -e "s|__SMF_METHOD_DIR__|${SMF_METHOD_DIR}|" \ > $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml chmod 644 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml else mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} fi [ "${PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN}" = no ] && \ perl -p -i -e "s/#PermitRootLogin yes/PermitRootLogin no/" \ $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config [ "${X11_FORWARDING}" = yes ] && \ perl -p -i -e "s/#X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/" \ $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config # fix PrintMotd perl -p -i -e "s/#PrintMotd yes/PrintMotd no/" \ $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config # We don't want to overwrite config files on multiple installs mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_config $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_config.default mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config.default # local tweeks here [ -s "${POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES}" ] && . ${POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES} cd $FAKE_ROOT ## Ok, this is outright wrong, but it will work. I'm tired of pkgmk ## whining. for i in *; do PROTO_ARGS="$PROTO_ARGS $i=/$i"; done ## Build info file echo "Building pkginfo file..." cat > pkginfo << _EOF PKG=$PKGNAME NAME="OpenSSH Portable for ${UNAME_S}" DESC="Secure Shell remote access utility; replaces telnet and rlogin/rsh." VENDOR="OpenSSH Portable Team - https://www.openssh.com/portable.html" ARCH=$ARCH VERSION=$VERSION$REV CATEGORY="Security,application" BASEDIR=/ CLASSES="none" PSTAMP="${UNAME_S} ${OS_VER} ${ARCH} `date '+%d%b%Y %H:%M'`" _EOF ## Build empty depend file that may get updated by $POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS echo "Building depend file..." touch depend ## Build space file echo "Building space file..." if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] then # XXX Is this necessary? If not, remove space line from mk-proto.awk. touch space else cat > space << _EOF # extra space required by start/stop links added by installf # in postinstall $TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1 $TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1 _EOF [ "$RC1_D" = no ] || \ echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space [ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && \ echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space fi ## Build preinstall file echo "Building preinstall file..." cat > preinstall << _EOF #! ${SCRIPT_SHELL} # _EOF # local preinstall changes here [ -s "${PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL} cat >> preinstall << _EOF # if [ "\${PRE_INS_STOP}" = "yes" ] then if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] then svcadm disable $OPENSSH_FMRI else ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop fi fi exit 0 _EOF ## Build postinstall file echo "Building postinstall file..." cat > postinstall << _EOF #! ${SCRIPT_SHELL} # [ -f \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config ] || \\ cp -p \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config.default \\ \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config [ -f \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config ] || \\ cp -p \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config.default \\ \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config # make rc?.d dirs only if we are doing a test install [ -n "${TEST_DIR}" ] && [ $DO_SMF -ne 1 ] && { [ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rcS.d mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc0.d [ "$RC1_D" = no ] || mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc1.d mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc2.d } if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] then # Delete the existing service, if it exists, then import the # new one. if svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI > /dev/null 2>&1 then svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI fi # NOTE, The manifest disables sshd by default. svccfg import ${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml else if [ "\${USE_SYM_LINKS}" = yes ] then [ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && \\ installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s [ "$RC1_D" = no ] || \\ installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s else [ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && \\ installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l [ "$RC1_D" = no ] || \\ installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l fi fi # If piddir doesn't exist we add it. (Ie. --with-pid-dir=/var/opt/ssh) [ -d $piddir ] || installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR$piddir d 0755 root sys _EOF # local postinstall changes here [ -s "${PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL} cat >> postinstall << _EOF installf -f ${PKGNAME} # Use chroot to handle PKG_INSTALL_ROOT if [ ! -z "\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}" ] then chroot="chroot \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}" fi # If this is a test build, we will skip the groupadd/useradd/passwd commands if [ ! -z "${TEST_DIR}" ] then chroot=echo fi echo "PrivilegeSeparation user always required." if cut -f1 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null then echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists." SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=\`grep "^$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER:" \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | awk -F: '{print \$4}'\` SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=\`grep ":\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP:" \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | awk -F: '{print \$1}'\` else DO_PASSWD=yes fi [ -z "\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP" ] && SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER # group required? if cut -f1 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | egrep '^'\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP'\$' >/dev/null then echo "PrivSep group \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP already exists." else DO_GROUP=yes fi # create group if required [ "\$DO_GROUP" = yes ] && { # Use gid of 67 if possible if cut -f3 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | egrep '^'$SSHDGID'\$' >/dev/null then : else sshdgid="-g $SSHDGID" fi echo "Creating PrivSep group \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP." \$chroot ${PATH_GROUPADD_PROG} \$sshdgid \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP } # Create user if required [ "\$DO_PASSWD" = yes ] && { # Use uid of 67 if possible if cut -f3 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | egrep '^'$SSHDUID'\$' >/dev/null then : else sshduid="-u $SSHDUID" fi echo "Creating PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER." \$chroot ${PATH_USERADD_PROG} -c 'SSHD PrivSep User' -s /bin/false -g $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER \$sshduid $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER \$chroot ${PATH_PASSWD_PROG} -l $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER } if [ "\${POST_INS_START}" = "yes" ] then if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] then svcadm enable $OPENSSH_FMRI else ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} start fi fi exit 0 _EOF ## Build preremove file echo "Building preremove file..." cat > preremove << _EOF #! ${SCRIPT_SHELL} # if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] then svcadm disable $OPENSSH_FMRI else ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop fi _EOF # local preremove changes here [ -s "${PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL} cat >> preremove << _EOF exit 0 _EOF ## Build postremove file echo "Building postremove file..." cat > postremove << _EOF #! ${SCRIPT_SHELL} # if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] then if svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI > /dev/null 2>&1 then svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI fi fi _EOF # local postremove changes here [ -s "${PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL} cat >> postremove << _EOF exit 0 _EOF ## Build request file echo "Building request file..." cat > request << _EOF trap 'exit 3' 15 _EOF [ -x /usr/bin/ckyorn ] || cat >> request << _EOF ckyorn() { # for some strange reason OpenServer5 has no ckyorn # We build a striped down version here DEFAULT=n PROMPT="Yes or No [yes,no,?,quit]" HELP_PROMPT=" Enter y or yes if your answer is yes; n or no if your answer is no." USAGE="usage: ckyorn [options] where options may include: -d default -h help -p prompt " if [ \$# != 0 ] then while getopts d:p:h: c do case \$c in h) HELP_PROMPT="\$OPTARG" ;; d) DEFAULT=\$OPTARG ;; p) PROMPT=\$OPTARG ;; \\?) echo "\$USAGE" 1>&2 exit 1 ;; esac done shift \`expr \$OPTIND - 1\` fi while true do echo "\${PROMPT}\\c " 1>&2 read key [ -z "\$key" ] && key=\$DEFAULT case \$key in [n,N]|[n,N][o,O]|[y,Y]|[y,Y][e,E][s,S]) echo "\${key}\\c" exit 0 ;; \\?) echo \$HELP_PROMPT 1>&2 ;; q|quit) echo "q\\c" 1>&2 exit 3 ;; esac done } _EOF if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] then # This could get hairy, as the running sshd may not be under SMF. # We'll assume an earlier version of OpenSSH started via SMF. cat >> request << _EOF PRE_INS_STOP=no POST_INS_START=no # determine if should restart the daemon if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid ] && \\ /usr/bin/svcs -H $OPENSSH_FMRI 2>&1 | egrep "^online" > /dev/null 2>&1 then ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\ -p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$? case \$ans in [y,Y]*) PRE_INS_STOP=yes POST_INS_START=yes ;; esac else # determine if we should start sshd ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\ -p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$? case \$ans in [y,Y]*) POST_INS_START=yes ;; esac fi # make parameters available to installation service, # and so to any other packaging scripts cat >\$1 <> request << _EOF USE_SYM_LINKS=no PRE_INS_STOP=no POST_INS_START=no # Use symbolic links? ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\ -p "Do you want symbolic links for the start/stop scripts? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$? case \$ans in [y,Y]*) USE_SYM_LINKS=yes ;; esac # determine if should restart the daemon if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid -a -f ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} ] then ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\ -p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$? case \$ans in [y,Y]*) PRE_INS_STOP=yes POST_INS_START=yes ;; esac else # determine if we should start sshd ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\ -p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$? case \$ans in [y,Y]*) POST_INS_START=yes ;; esac fi # make parameters available to installation service, # and so to any other packaging scripts cat >\$1 <> request << _EOF exit 0 _EOF ## Next Build our prototype echo "Building prototype file..." cat >mk-proto.awk << _EOF BEGIN { print "i pkginfo"; print "i depend"; \\ print "i preinstall"; print "i postinstall"; \\ print "i preremove"; print "i postremove"; \\ print "i request"; print "i space"; \\ split("$SYSTEM_DIR",sys_files); } { for (dir in sys_files) { if ( \$3 != sys_files[dir] ) { if ( \$1 == "s" ) { \$5=""; \$6=""; } else { \$5="root"; \$6="sys"; } } else { \$4="?"; \$5="?"; \$6="?"; break;} } } { print; } _EOF find . | egrep -v "prototype|pkginfo|mk-proto.awk" | sort | \ pkgproto $PROTO_ARGS | ${AWK} -f mk-proto.awk > prototype # /usr/local is a symlink on some systems [ "${USR_LOCAL_IS_SYMLINK}" = yes ] && { grep -v "^d none /usr/local ? ? ?$" prototype > prototype.new mv prototype.new prototype } ## Step back a directory and now build the package. cd .. # local prototype tweeks here [ -s "${POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS}" ] && . ${POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS} echo "Building package.." pkgmk -d ${FAKE_ROOT} -f $FAKE_ROOT/prototype -o echo | pkgtrans -os ${FAKE_ROOT} ${START}/$PKGNAME-$VERSION$REV-$UNAME_S-$ARCH.pkg ;; justpkg.sh) rm -fr ${FAKE_ROOT}/${PKGNAME} grep -v "^PSTAMP=" $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo > $$tmp mv $$tmp $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo cat >> $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo << _EOF PSTAMP="${UNAME_S} ${OS_VER} ${ARCH} `date '+%d%b%Y %H:%M'`" _EOF pkgmk -d ${FAKE_ROOT} -f $FAKE_ROOT/prototype -o echo | pkgtrans -os ${FAKE_ROOT} ${START}/$PKGNAME-$VERSION$REV-$UNAME_S-$ARCH.pkg ;; esac [ "${REMOVE_FAKE_ROOT_WHEN_DONE}" = yes ] && rm -rf $FAKE_ROOT exit 0 openssh-8.2p1/canohost.c010064400017500001750000000113511362136622600134440ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.74 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len) { struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr; struct sockaddr_in *a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr; struct in_addr inaddr; u_int16_t port; if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 || !IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr)) return; debug3("Normalising mapped IPv4 in IPv6 address"); memcpy(&inaddr, ((char *)&a6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(inaddr)); port = a6->sin6_port; memset(a4, 0, sizeof(*a4)); a4->sin_family = AF_INET; *len = sizeof(*a4); memcpy(&a4->sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr)); a4->sin_port = port; } /* * Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string. * The returned string must be freed. */ static char * get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags) { struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; int r; /* Get IP address of client. */ addrlen = sizeof(addr); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); if (remote) { if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0) return NULL; } else { if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0) return NULL; } /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */ if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) { addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen); } switch (addr.ss_family) { case AF_INET: case AF_INET6: /* Get the address in ascii. */ if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) { error("%s: getnameinfo %d failed: %s", __func__, flags, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); return NULL; } return xstrdup(ntop); case AF_UNIX: /* Get the Unix domain socket path. */ return xstrdup(((struct sockaddr_un *)&addr)->sun_path); default: /* We can't look up remote Unix domain sockets. */ return NULL; } } char * get_peer_ipaddr(int sock) { char *p; if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL) return p; return xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } char * get_local_ipaddr(int sock) { char *p; if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL) return p; return xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } char * get_local_name(int fd) { char *host, myname[NI_MAXHOST]; /* Assume we were passed a socket */ if ((host = get_socket_address(fd, 0, NI_NAMEREQD)) != NULL) return host; /* Handle the case where we were passed a pipe */ if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) { verbose("%s: gethostname: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); host = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } else { host = xstrdup(myname); } return host; } /* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */ static int get_sock_port(int sock, int local) { struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int r; /* Get IP address of client. */ fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (local) { if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } } else { if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } } /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); /* Non-inet sockets don't have a port number. */ if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6) return 0; /* Return port number. */ if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0, strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) fatal("%s: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s", __func__, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); return atoi(strport); } int get_peer_port(int sock) { return get_sock_port(sock, 0); } int get_local_port(int sock) { return get_sock_port(sock, 1); } openssh-8.2p1/canohost.h010064400017500001750000000015121362136622600134470ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.12 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef _CANOHOST_H #define _CANOHOST_H char *get_peer_ipaddr(int); int get_peer_port(int); char *get_local_ipaddr(int); char *get_local_name(int); int get_local_port(int); #endif /* _CANOHOST_H */ void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *); openssh-8.2p1/chacha.c010064400017500001750000000124431362136622600130400ustar00djmdjm/* chacha-merged.c version 20080118 D. J. Bernstein Public domain. */ #include "includes.h" #include "chacha.h" /* $OpenBSD: chacha.c,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */ typedef unsigned char u8; typedef unsigned int u32; typedef struct chacha_ctx chacha_ctx; #define U8C(v) (v##U) #define U32C(v) (v##U) #define U8V(v) ((u8)(v) & U8C(0xFF)) #define U32V(v) ((u32)(v) & U32C(0xFFFFFFFF)) #define ROTL32(v, n) \ (U32V((v) << (n)) | ((v) >> (32 - (n)))) #define U8TO32_LITTLE(p) \ (((u32)((p)[0]) ) | \ ((u32)((p)[1]) << 8) | \ ((u32)((p)[2]) << 16) | \ ((u32)((p)[3]) << 24)) #define U32TO8_LITTLE(p, v) \ do { \ (p)[0] = U8V((v) ); \ (p)[1] = U8V((v) >> 8); \ (p)[2] = U8V((v) >> 16); \ (p)[3] = U8V((v) >> 24); \ } while (0) #define ROTATE(v,c) (ROTL32(v,c)) #define XOR(v,w) ((v) ^ (w)) #define PLUS(v,w) (U32V((v) + (w))) #define PLUSONE(v) (PLUS((v),1)) #define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \ a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a),16); \ c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c),12); \ a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a), 8); \ c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c), 7); static const char sigma[16] = "expand 32-byte k"; static const char tau[16] = "expand 16-byte k"; void chacha_keysetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits) { const char *constants; x->input[4] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0); x->input[5] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4); x->input[6] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8); x->input[7] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12); if (kbits == 256) { /* recommended */ k += 16; constants = sigma; } else { /* kbits == 128 */ constants = tau; } x->input[8] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0); x->input[9] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4); x->input[10] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8); x->input[11] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12); x->input[0] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 0); x->input[1] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 4); x->input[2] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 8); x->input[3] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 12); } void chacha_ivsetup(chacha_ctx *x, const u8 *iv, const u8 *counter) { x->input[12] = counter == NULL ? 0 : U8TO32_LITTLE(counter + 0); x->input[13] = counter == NULL ? 0 : U8TO32_LITTLE(counter + 4); x->input[14] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 0); x->input[15] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 4); } void chacha_encrypt_bytes(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes) { u32 x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15; u32 j0, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, j7, j8, j9, j10, j11, j12, j13, j14, j15; u8 *ctarget = NULL; u8 tmp[64]; u_int i; if (!bytes) return; j0 = x->input[0]; j1 = x->input[1]; j2 = x->input[2]; j3 = x->input[3]; j4 = x->input[4]; j5 = x->input[5]; j6 = x->input[6]; j7 = x->input[7]; j8 = x->input[8]; j9 = x->input[9]; j10 = x->input[10]; j11 = x->input[11]; j12 = x->input[12]; j13 = x->input[13]; j14 = x->input[14]; j15 = x->input[15]; for (;;) { if (bytes < 64) { for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) tmp[i] = m[i]; m = tmp; ctarget = c; c = tmp; } x0 = j0; x1 = j1; x2 = j2; x3 = j3; x4 = j4; x5 = j5; x6 = j6; x7 = j7; x8 = j8; x9 = j9; x10 = j10; x11 = j11; x12 = j12; x13 = j13; x14 = j14; x15 = j15; for (i = 20;i > 0;i -= 2) { QUARTERROUND( x0, x4, x8,x12) QUARTERROUND( x1, x5, x9,x13) QUARTERROUND( x2, x6,x10,x14) QUARTERROUND( x3, x7,x11,x15) QUARTERROUND( x0, x5,x10,x15) QUARTERROUND( x1, x6,x11,x12) QUARTERROUND( x2, x7, x8,x13) QUARTERROUND( x3, x4, x9,x14) } x0 = PLUS(x0,j0); x1 = PLUS(x1,j1); x2 = PLUS(x2,j2); x3 = PLUS(x3,j3); x4 = PLUS(x4,j4); x5 = PLUS(x5,j5); x6 = PLUS(x6,j6); x7 = PLUS(x7,j7); x8 = PLUS(x8,j8); x9 = PLUS(x9,j9); x10 = PLUS(x10,j10); x11 = PLUS(x11,j11); x12 = PLUS(x12,j12); x13 = PLUS(x13,j13); x14 = PLUS(x14,j14); x15 = PLUS(x15,j15); x0 = XOR(x0,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 0)); x1 = XOR(x1,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 4)); x2 = XOR(x2,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 8)); x3 = XOR(x3,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 12)); x4 = XOR(x4,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 16)); x5 = XOR(x5,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 20)); x6 = XOR(x6,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 24)); x7 = XOR(x7,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 28)); x8 = XOR(x8,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 32)); x9 = XOR(x9,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 36)); x10 = XOR(x10,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 40)); x11 = XOR(x11,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 44)); x12 = XOR(x12,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 48)); x13 = XOR(x13,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 52)); x14 = XOR(x14,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 56)); x15 = XOR(x15,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 60)); j12 = PLUSONE(j12); if (!j12) { j13 = PLUSONE(j13); /* stopping at 2^70 bytes per nonce is user's responsibility */ } U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 0,x0); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 4,x1); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 8,x2); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 12,x3); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 16,x4); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 20,x5); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 24,x6); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 28,x7); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 32,x8); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 36,x9); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 40,x10); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 44,x11); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 48,x12); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 52,x13); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 56,x14); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 60,x15); if (bytes <= 64) { if (bytes < 64) { for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) ctarget[i] = c[i]; } x->input[12] = j12; x->input[13] = j13; return; } bytes -= 64; c += 64; m += 64; } } openssh-8.2p1/chacha.h010064400017500001750000000017501362136622600130440ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.4 2016/08/27 04:04:56 guenther Exp $ */ /* chacha-merged.c version 20080118 D. J. Bernstein Public domain. */ #ifndef CHACHA_H #define CHACHA_H #include #include struct chacha_ctx { u_int input[16]; }; #define CHACHA_MINKEYLEN 16 #define CHACHA_NONCELEN 8 #define CHACHA_CTRLEN 8 #define CHACHA_STATELEN (CHACHA_NONCELEN+CHACHA_CTRLEN) #define CHACHA_BLOCKLEN 64 void chacha_keysetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *k, u_int kbits) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_MINKEYLEN))); void chacha_ivsetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *iv, const u_char *ctr) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_NONCELEN))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CHACHA_CTRLEN))); void chacha_encrypt_bytes(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *m, u_char *c, u_int bytes) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 4))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4))); #endif /* CHACHA_H */ openssh-8.2p1/channels.c010064400017500001750000004160661362136622600134350ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.395 2020/01/25 06:40:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding. * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections, * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "match.h" /* -- agent forwarding */ #define NUM_SOCKS 10 /* -- tcp forwarding */ /* special-case port number meaning allow any port */ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0 /* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*" /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ #define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset); /* * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests. * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local * network (which might be behind a firewall). */ /* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */ /* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */ /* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */ struct permission { char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */ int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */ char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */ char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */ int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */ Channel *downstream; /* Downstream mux*/ }; /* * Stores the forwarding permission state for a single direction (local or * remote). */ struct permission_set { /* * List of all local permitted host/port pairs to allow for the * user. */ u_int num_permitted_user; struct permission *permitted_user; /* * List of all permitted host/port pairs to allow for the admin. */ u_int num_permitted_admin; struct permission *permitted_admin; /* * If this is true, all opens/listens are permitted. This is the * case on the server on which we have to trust the client anyway, * and the user could do anything after logging in. */ int all_permitted; }; /* Master structure for channels state */ struct ssh_channels { /* * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array * is dynamically extended as needed. */ Channel **channels; /* * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL */ u_int channels_alloc; /* * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is * updated in channel_new. */ int channel_max_fd; /* * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits * relevant to channels in the select bitmasks. * * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for * channels which have events pending. */ chan_fn **channel_pre; chan_fn **channel_post; /* -- tcp forwarding */ struct permission_set local_perms; struct permission_set remote_perms; /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* Saved X11 local (client) display. */ char *x11_saved_display; /* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */ char *x11_saved_proto; /* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */ char *x11_saved_data; u_int x11_saved_data_len; /* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */ u_int x11_refuse_time; /* * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be * sending us; we should replace any occurrences of this by the * real data. */ u_char *x11_fake_data; u_int x11_fake_data_len; /* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ int IPv4or6; }; /* helper */ static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype); static const char *channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host); /* non-blocking connect helpers */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *); static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *); static Channel *rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *, char *, char *); static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *, Channel *); /* Setup helper */ static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc); /* -- channel core */ void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc; if ((sc = calloc(1, sizeof(*sc))) == NULL) fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__); sc->channels_alloc = 10; sc->channels = xcalloc(sc->channels_alloc, sizeof(*sc->channels)); sc->IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; channel_handler_init(sc); ssh->chanctxt = sc; } Channel * channel_by_id(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc) { logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); return NULL; } c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[id]; if (c == NULL) { logit("%s: %d: bad id: channel free", __func__, id); return NULL; } return c; } Channel * channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *ssh, u_int remote_id) { Channel *c; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c != NULL && c->have_remote_id && c->remote_id == remote_id) return c; } return NULL; } /* * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages. * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages. */ Channel * channel_lookup(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) return NULL; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: return c; } logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type); return NULL; } /* * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd */ static void channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */ sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, rfd); sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, wfd); sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, efd); if (rfd != -1) fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); c->rfd = rfd; c->wfd = wfd; c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1; c->efd = efd; c->extended_usage = extusage; if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0) debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd); #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd); #endif /* enable nonblocking mode */ if (nonblock) { if (rfd != -1) set_nonblock(rfd); if (wfd != -1) set_nonblock(wfd); if (efd != -1) set_nonblock(efd); } } /* * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause * remote_name to be freed. */ Channel * channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_int i, found; Channel *c; /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */ for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { if (sc->channels[i] == NULL) { /* Found a free slot. */ found = i; break; } } if (i >= sc->channels_alloc) { /* * There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand * the array. */ found = sc->channels_alloc; if (sc->channels_alloc > CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS) fatal("%s: internal error: channels_alloc %d too big", __func__, sc->channels_alloc); sc->channels = xrecallocarray(sc->channels, sc->channels_alloc, sc->channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(*sc->channels)); sc->channels_alloc += 10; debug2("channel: expanding %d", sc->channels_alloc); } /* Initialize and return new channel. */ c = sc->channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel)); if ((c->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN; c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN; channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0); c->self = found; c->type = type; c->ctype = ctype; c->local_window = window; c->local_window_max = window; c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name); c->ctl_chan = -1; c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */ TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms); debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name); return c; } static void channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *sc) { u_int i; int max = 0; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { max = MAXIMUM(max, c->rfd); max = MAXIMUM(max, c->wfd); max = MAXIMUM(max, c->efd); } } sc->channel_max_fd = max; } int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; int ret = 0, fd = *fdp; if (fd != -1) { ret = close(fd); *fdp = -1; if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd) channel_find_maxfd(sc); } return ret; } /* Close all channel fd/socket. */ static void channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd; channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); if (rfd != sock) channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd); if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd) channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd); if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); } static void fwd_perm_clear(struct permission *perm) { free(perm->host_to_connect); free(perm->listen_host); free(perm->listen_path); bzero(perm, sizeof(*perm)); } /* Returns an printable name for the specified forwarding permission list */ static const char * fwd_ident(int who, int where) { if (who == FORWARD_ADM) { if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL) return "admin local"; else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE) return "admin remote"; } else if (who == FORWARD_USER) { if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL) return "user local"; else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE) return "user remote"; } fatal("Unknown forward permission list %d/%d", who, where); } /* Returns the forwarding permission list for the specified direction */ static struct permission_set * permission_set_get(struct ssh *ssh, int where) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; switch (where) { case FORWARD_LOCAL: return &sc->local_perms; break; case FORWARD_REMOTE: return &sc->remote_perms; break; default: fatal("%s: invalid forwarding direction %d", __func__, where); } } /* Returns pointers to the specified forwarding list and its element count */ static void permission_set_get_array(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, struct permission ***permpp, u_int **npermpp) { struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); switch (who) { case FORWARD_USER: *permpp = &pset->permitted_user; *npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_user; break; case FORWARD_ADM: *permpp = &pset->permitted_admin; *npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_admin; break; default: fatal("%s: invalid forwarding client %d", __func__, who); } } /* Adds an entry to the spcified forwarding list */ static int permission_set_add(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, const char *host_to_connect, int port_to_connect, const char *listen_host, const char *listen_path, int listen_port, Channel *downstream) { struct permission **permp; u_int n, *npermp; permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp); if (*npermp >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s: %s overflow", __func__, fwd_ident(who, where)); *permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, *npermp + 1, sizeof(**permp)); n = (*npermp)++; #define MAYBE_DUP(s) ((s == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(s)) (*permp)[n].host_to_connect = MAYBE_DUP(host_to_connect); (*permp)[n].port_to_connect = port_to_connect; (*permp)[n].listen_host = MAYBE_DUP(listen_host); (*permp)[n].listen_path = MAYBE_DUP(listen_path); (*permp)[n].listen_port = listen_port; (*permp)[n].downstream = downstream; #undef MAYBE_DUP return (int)n; } static void mux_remove_remote_forwardings(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; struct permission *perm; int r; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (perm->downstream != c) continue; /* cancel on the server, since mux client is gone */ debug("channel %d: cleanup remote forward for %s:%u", c->self, perm->listen_host, perm->listen_port); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(perm->listen_host))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, perm->listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ } } /* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */ void channel_free(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; char *s; u_int i, n; Channel *other; struct channel_confirm *cc; for (n = 0, i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { if ((other = sc->channels[i]) == NULL) continue; n++; /* detach from mux client and prepare for closing */ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT && other->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY && other->mux_ctx == c) { other->mux_ctx = NULL; other->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; other->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; other->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; } } debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self, c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n); if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) mux_remove_remote_forwardings(ssh, c); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { s = channel_open_message(ssh); debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s); free(s); } channel_close_fds(ssh, c); sshbuf_free(c->input); sshbuf_free(c->output); sshbuf_free(c->extended); c->input = c->output = c->extended = NULL; free(c->remote_name); c->remote_name = NULL; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; free(c->listening_addr); c->listening_addr = NULL; while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) { if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL) cc->abandon_cb(ssh, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); } if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL) c->filter_cleanup(ssh, c->self, c->filter_ctx); sc->channels[c->self] = NULL; explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c)); free(c); } void channel_free_all(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) if (sc->channels[i] != NULL) channel_free(ssh, sc->channels[i]); free(sc->channels); sc->channels = NULL; sc->channels_alloc = 0; sc->channel_max_fd = 0; free(sc->x11_saved_display); sc->x11_saved_display = NULL; free(sc->x11_saved_proto); sc->x11_saved_proto = NULL; free(sc->x11_saved_data); sc->x11_saved_data = NULL; sc->x11_saved_data_len = 0; free(sc->x11_fake_data); sc->x11_fake_data = NULL; sc->x11_fake_data_len = 0; } /* * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file * descriptors after a fork. */ void channel_close_all(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL) channel_close_fds(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]); } /* * Stop listening to channels. */ void channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); channel_free(ssh, c); break; } } } } /* * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or * more channel is overfull. */ int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; u_int maxsize = ssh_packet_get_maxsize(ssh); Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > maxsize) { debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %zu > %u", c->self, sshbuf_len(c->output), maxsize); return 0; } } return 1; } /* Returns true if any channel is still open. */ int channel_still_open(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: return 1; default: fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return 0; } /* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */ int channel_find_open(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || !c->have_remote_id) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: return i; default: fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return -1; } /* Returns the state of the channel's extended usage flag */ const char * channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *c) { if (c->efd == -1) return "closed"; switch (c->extended_usage) { case CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE: return "write"; case CHAN_EXTENDED_READ: return "read"; case CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE: return "ignore"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } static char * channel_format_status(const Channel *c) { char *ret = NULL; xasprintf(&ret, "t%d %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu e[%s]/%zu " "fd %d/%d/%d sock %d cc %d", c->type, c->have_remote_id ? "r" : "nr", c->remote_id, c->istate, sshbuf_len(c->input), c->ostate, sshbuf_len(c->output), channel_format_extended_usage(c), sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock, c->ctl_chan); return ret; } /* * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections, * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for * newlines. */ char * channel_open_message(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *buf; Channel *c; u_int i; int r; char *cp, *ret; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n")) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: cp = channel_format_status(c); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, " #%d %.300s (%s)\r\n", c->self, c->remote_name, cp)) != 0) { free(cp); fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } free(cp); continue; default: fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string", __func__); sshbuf_free(buf); return ret; } static void open_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, Channel *c, const char *type) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: open: %s", where, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } void channel_send_open(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); int r; if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id); return; } debug2("channel %d: send open", id); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, c->ctype); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } void channel_request_start(struct ssh *ssh, int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); int r; if (c == NULL) { logit("%s: %d: unknown channel id", __func__, id); return; } if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, wantconfirm)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx) { struct channel_confirm *cc; Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc)); cc->cb = cb; cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb; cc->ctx = ctx; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); } void channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); return; } c->open_confirm = fn; c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx; } void channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); return; } c->detach_user = fn; c->detach_close = do_close; } void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); return; } c->detach_user = NULL; c->detach_close = 0; } void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn, channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); return; } c->input_filter = ifn; c->output_filter = ofn; c->filter_ctx = ctx; c->filter_cleanup = cfn; } void channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); int r; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id); if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } static void channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { FD_SET(c->sock, readset); } static void channel_pre_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self); FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } static void channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->remote_window > 0 && sshbuf_len(c->input) < c->remote_window && sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) { FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: " "obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); else chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); } } /** XXX check close conditions, too */ if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0) FD_SET(c->efd, writeset); else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && sshbuf_len(c->extended) < c->remote_window) FD_SET(c->efd, readset); } /* XXX: What about efd? races? */ } /* * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11 * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode. * XXX All this happens at the client side. * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok */ static int x11_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *b) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_char *ucp; u_int proto_len, data_len; /* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */ if (sc->x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= sc->x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return -1; } /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12) return 0; /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */ ucp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b); if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */ proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7]; data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9]; } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */ proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7]; data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9]; } else { debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x", ucp[0]); return -1; } /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */ if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3)) return 0; /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */ if (proto_len != strlen(sc->x11_saved_proto) || memcmp(ucp + 12, sc->x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol."); return -1; } /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */ if (data_len != sc->x11_fake_data_len || timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), sc->x11_fake_data, sc->x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data."); return -1; } /* Check fake data length */ if (sc->x11_fake_data_len != sc->x11_saved_data_len) { error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d", sc->x11_fake_data_len, sc->x11_saved_data_len); return -1; } /* * Received authentication protocol and data match * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real * data. */ memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), sc->x11_saved_data, sc->x11_saved_data_len); return 1; } static void channel_pre_x11_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int ret = x11_open_helper(ssh, c->output); /* c->force_drain = 1; */ if (ret == 1) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; channel_pre_open(ssh, c, readset, writeset); } else if (ret == -1) { logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); chan_read_failed(ssh, c); sshbuf_reset(c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); sshbuf_reset(c->output); chan_write_failed(ssh, c); debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); } } static void channel_pre_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause && sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { /* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */ sshbuf_reset(c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); /* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */ chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); } if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); } } /* try to decode a socks4 header */ static int channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) { const u_char *p; char *host; u_int len, have, i, found, need; char username[256]; struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int16_t dest_port; struct in_addr dest_addr; } s4_req, s4_rsp; int r; debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self); have = sshbuf_len(input); len = sizeof(s4_req); if (have < len) return 0; p = sshbuf_ptr(input); need = 1; /* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */ if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) { debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self); /* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */ need = 2; } /* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */ for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) { if (p[i] == '\0') { found++; if (found == need) break; } if (i > 1024) { /* the peer is probably sending garbage */ debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long", c->self); return -1; } } if (found < need) return 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.version, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.command, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_port, 2)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_addr, 4)) != 0) { debug("channels %d: decode socks4: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } have = sshbuf_len(input); p = sshbuf_ptr(input); if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) { error("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated", c->self); return -1; } len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username)); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */ host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr); c->path = xstrdup(host); } else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */ have = sshbuf_len(input); p = sshbuf_ptr(input); if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) { error("channel %d: decode socks4a: host not nul " "terminated", c->self); return -1; } len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ if (len > NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long", c->self, p); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(p); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command); if (s4_req.command != 1) { debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d", c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command); return -1; } s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */ s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */ s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp))) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } return 1; } /* try to decode a socks5 header */ #define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000 #define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04 #define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00 static int channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) { /* XXX use get/put_u8 instead of trusting struct padding */ struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int8_t reserved; u_int8_t atyp; } s5_req, s5_rsp; u_int16_t dest_port; char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; const u_char *p; u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af; int r; debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self); p = sshbuf_ptr(input); if (p[0] != 0x05) return -1; have = sshbuf_len(input); if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) { /* format: ver | nmethods | methods */ if (have < 2) return 0; nmethods = p[1]; if (have < nmethods + 2) return 0; /* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */ for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) { if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found", c->self); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, nmethods + 2)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } /* version, method */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, 0x05)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE; debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self); return 0; /* need more */ } debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self); if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1) return 0; /* need more */ memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req)); if (s5_req.version != 0x05 || s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT || s5_req.reserved != 0x00) { debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self); return -1; } switch (s5_req.atyp){ case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4: addrlen = 4; af = AF_INET; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN: addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)]; af = -1; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6: addrlen = 16; af = AF_INET6; break; default: debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp); return -1; } need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) need++; if (have < need) return 0; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, sizeof(s5_req))) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { /* host string length */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, 1)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_addr, addrlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_port, 2)) != 0) { debug("channel %d: parse addr/port: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0'; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname " "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr); } else { if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL) return -1; c->path = xstrdup(ntop); } c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command); s5_rsp.version = 0x05; s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS; s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */ s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4; dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port))) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); return 1; } Channel * channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out) { Channel *c; debug("%s %s:%d", __func__, host_to_connect, port_to_connect); c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0); c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect); c->host_port = port_to_connect; c->listening_port = 0; c->force_drain = 1; channel_register_fds(ssh, c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0); port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip"); return c; } /* dynamic port forwarding */ static void channel_pre_dynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { const u_char *p; u_int have; int ret; have = sshbuf_len(c->input); debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have); /* sshbuf_dump(c->input, stderr); */ /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (have < 3) { /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); return; } /* try to guess the protocol */ p = sshbuf_ptr(c->input); /* XXX sshbuf_peek_u8? */ switch (p[0]) { case 0x04: ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->input, c->output); break; case 0x05: ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->input, c->output); break; default: ret = -1; break; } if (ret < 0) { chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } else if (ret == 0) { debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self); /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); if (sshbuf_len(c->output)) FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } else { /* switch to the next state */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip"); } } /* simulate read-error */ static void rdynamic_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; chan_read_failed(ssh, c); sshbuf_reset(c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); sshbuf_reset(c->output); chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } /* reverse dynamic port forwarding */ static void channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { const u_char *p; u_int have, len; int r, ret; have = sshbuf_len(c->output); debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: have %d", c->self, have); /* sshbuf_dump(c->output, stderr); */ /* EOF received */ if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, have)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } rdynamic_close(ssh, c); return; } /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (have < 3) return; /* try to guess the protocol */ p = sshbuf_ptr(c->output); switch (p[0]) { case 0x04: /* switch input/output for reverse forwarding */ ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->output, c->input); break; case 0x05: ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->output, c->input); break; default: ret = -1; break; } if (ret < 0) { rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } else if (ret == 0) { debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: need more", c->self); /* send socks request to peer */ len = sshbuf_len(c->input); if (len > 0 && len < c->remote_window) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, c->input)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: rdynamic: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } c->remote_window -= len; } } else if (rdynamic_connect_finish(ssh, c) < 0) { /* the connect failed */ rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } } /* This is our fake X11 server socket. */ static void channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int r, newsock, oerrno, remote_port; socklen_t addrlen; char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; debug("X11 connection requested."); addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (c->single_connection) { oerrno = errno; debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener."); channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); errno = oerrno; } if (newsock == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } set_nodelay(newsock); remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock); remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d", remote_ipaddr, remote_port); nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted x11 socket", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "x11"); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_port)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); free(remote_ipaddr); } static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype) { char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock); int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock); char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock); int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock); int r; if (remote_port == -1) { /* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */ free(remote_ipaddr); remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1"); remote_port = 65535; } free(c->remote_name); xasprintf(&c->remote_name, "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, " "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d", rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port, remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, rtype); if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { /* target host, port */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->host_port)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* target path */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* listen path */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } else { /* listen address, port */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, local_port)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* reserved for future owner/mode info */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } else { /* originator host and port */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)remote_port)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); free(remote_ipaddr); free(local_ipaddr); } void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *ssh, u_int refuse_time) { ssh->chanctxt->x11_refuse_time = refuse_time; } /* * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port. */ static void channel_post_port_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int newsock, nextstate; socklen_t addrlen; char *rtype; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; debug("Connection to port %d forwarding to %.100s port %d requested.", c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port); if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-tcpip"; } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"; } else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"; } else if (c->host_port == 0) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; } else { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "direct-tcpip"; } addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) set_nodelay(newsock); nc = channel_new(ssh, rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1); nc->listening_port = c->listening_port; nc->host_port = c->host_port; if (c->path != NULL) nc->path = xstrdup(c->path); if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) port_open_helper(ssh, nc, rtype); } /* * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from * clients. */ static void channel_post_auth_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; int r, newsock; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock == -1) { error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted auth socket", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "accepted auth socket", 1); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "auth-agent@openssh.com"); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } static void channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int err = 0, sock, isopen, r; socklen_t sz = sizeof(err); if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) return; if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); /* for rdynamic the OPEN_CONFIRMATION has been sent already */ isopen = (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH); if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) == -1) { err = errno; error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed"); } if (err == 0) { debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d", c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (isopen) { /* no message necessary */ } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } else { debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", c->self, strerror(err)); /* Try next address, if any */ if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) { close(c->sock); c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt); return; } /* Exhausted all addresses */ error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); if (isopen) { rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, strerror(err))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: failure: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } } } static int channel_handle_rfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; ssize_t len; int r, force; force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; if (c->rfd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) return 1; errno = 0; len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) return 1; #ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD if (len <= 0) { #else if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) || (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { #endif debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %zd", c->self, c->rfd, len); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return -1; } else { chan_read_failed(ssh, c); } return -1; } if (c->input_filter != NULL) { if (c->input_filter(ssh, c, buf, len) == -1) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); chan_read_failed(ssh, c); } } else if (c->datagram) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %d: put datagram: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: put data: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } return 1; } static int channel_handle_wfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct termios tio; u_char *data = NULL, *buf; /* XXX const; need filter API change */ size_t dlen, olen = 0; int r, len; if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0) return 1; /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ olen = sshbuf_len(c->output); if (c->output_filter != NULL) { if ((buf = c->output_filter(ssh, c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); else chan_write_failed(ssh, c); return -1; } } else if (c->datagram) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, &data, &dlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); buf = data; } else { buf = data = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(c->output); dlen = sshbuf_len(c->output); } if (c->datagram) { /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */ len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); free(data); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) goto write_fail; goto out; } #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ if (c->wfd_isatty) dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024); #endif len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { write_fail: if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return -1; } else { chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } return -1; } #ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON if (c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') { if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 && !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { /* * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of * traffic analysis. We need to match the * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message * (4 byte channel id + buf) */ if ((r = sshpkt_msg_ignore(ssh, 4+len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %d: ignore: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } #endif /* BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } out: c->local_consumed += olen - sshbuf_len(c->output); return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int r; ssize_t len; if (!FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->extended) == 0) return 1; len = write(c->efd, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), sshbuf_len(c->extended)); debug2("channel %d: written %zd to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } c->local_consumed += len; } return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; ssize_t len; int r, force; force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; if (c->efd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))) return 1; len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf)); debug2("channel %d: read %zd from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); } else { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) { debug3("channel %d: discard efd", c->self); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (c->efd == -1) return 1; /** XXX handle drain efd, too */ if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) return channel_handle_efd_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset); else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) return channel_handle_efd_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset); return 1; } static int channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int r; if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) && ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window > c->local_maxpacket*3) || c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && c->local_consumed > 0) { if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self, c->local_window, c->local_consumed); c->local_window += c->local_consumed; c->local_consumed = 0; } return 1; } static void channel_post_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_handle_rfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); channel_handle_wfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); channel_handle_efd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); channel_check_window(ssh, c); } static u_int read_mux(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, u_int need) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; ssize_t len; u_int rlen; int r; if (sshbuf_len(c->input) < need) { rlen = need - sshbuf_len(c->input); len = read(c->rfd, buf, MINIMUM(rlen, CHAN_RBUF)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) return sshbuf_len(c->input); if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %zd", c->self, c->rfd, len); chan_read_failed(ssh, c); return 0; } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } return sshbuf_len(c->input); } static void channel_post_mux_client_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_int need; if (c->rfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)) return; if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) return; if (c->mux_pause) return; /* * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to * avoid disrupting fd passing. */ if (read_mux(ssh, c, 4) < 4) /* read header */ return; /* XXX sshbuf_peek_u32 */ need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(c->input)); #define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024) if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) { debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u", c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need); chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); return; } if (read_mux(ssh, c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */ return; if (c->mux_rcb(ssh, c) != 0) { debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return; } } static void channel_post_mux_client_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { ssize_t len; int r; if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0) return; len = write(c->wfd, sshbuf_ptr(c->output), sshbuf_len(c->output)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) return; if (len <= 0) { chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } static void channel_post_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_post_mux_client_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset); channel_post_mux_client_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset); } static void channel_post_mux_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; int newsock; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; debug("multiplexing control connection"); /* * Accept connection on control socket */ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addrlen = sizeof(addr); if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addrlen)) == -1) { error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) == -1) { error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(newsock); return; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid()); close(newsock); return; } nc = channel_new(ssh, "multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1); nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb; debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->sock); /* establish state */ nc->mux_rcb(ssh, nc); /* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */ nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL; } static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc) { chan_fn **pre, **post; if ((pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*pre))) == NULL || (post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*post))) == NULL) fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__); pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_pre_connecting; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client; post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; post[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_post_connecting; post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client; sc->channel_pre = pre; sc->channel_post = post; } /* gc dead channels */ static void channel_garbage_collect(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { if (c == NULL) return; if (c->detach_user != NULL) { if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, c->detach_close)) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self); c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, NULL); /* if we still have a callback */ if (c->detach_user != NULL) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self); } if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, 1)) return; debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self); channel_free(ssh, c); } enum channel_table { CHAN_PRE, CHAN_POST }; static void channel_handler(struct ssh *ssh, int table, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, time_t *unpause_secs) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; chan_fn **ftab = table == CHAN_PRE ? sc->channel_pre : sc->channel_post; u_int i, oalloc; Channel *c; time_t now; now = monotime(); if (unpause_secs != NULL) *unpause_secs = 0; for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; if (c->delayed) { if (table == CHAN_PRE) c->delayed = 0; else continue; } if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) { /* * Run handlers that are not paused. */ if (c->notbefore <= now) (*ftab[c->type])(ssh, c, readset, writeset); else if (unpause_secs != NULL) { /* * Collect the time that the earliest * channel comes off pause. */ debug3("%s: chan %d: skip for %d more seconds", __func__, c->self, (int)(c->notbefore - now)); if (*unpause_secs == 0 || (c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs) *unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now; } } channel_garbage_collect(ssh, c); } if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0) debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds", __func__, (int)*unpause_secs); } /* * Create sockets before allocating the select bitmasks. * This is necessary for things that need to happen after reading * the network-input but before channel_prepare_select(). */ static void channel_before_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; Channel *c; u_int i, oalloc; for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN) channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(ssh, c); } } /* * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in * select bitmasks. */ void channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs) { u_int n, sz, nfdset; channel_before_prepare_select(ssh); /* might update channel_max_fd */ n = MAXIMUM(*maxfdp, ssh->chanctxt->channel_max_fd); nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS); /* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */ if (nfdset && SIZE_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask)) fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n); sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask); /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */ if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { *readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); *writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); *nallocp = sz; } *maxfdp = n; memset(*readsetp, 0, sz); memset(*writesetp, 0, sz); if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_PRE, *readsetp, *writesetp, minwait_secs); } /* * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have * events pending. */ void channel_after_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_POST, readset, writeset, NULL); } /* * Enqueue data for channels with open or draining c->input. */ static void channel_output_poll_input_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { size_t len, plen; const u_char *pkt; int r; if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->input)) == 0) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { /* * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown: * tell peer, that we will not send more data: * send IEOF. * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still * in use. */ if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: " "ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); else chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); } return; } if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); if (c->datagram) { /* Check datagram will fit; drop if not */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(c->input, &pkt, &plen)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); /* * XXX this does tail-drop on the datagram queue which is * usually suboptimal compared to head-drop. Better to have * backpressure at read time? (i.e. read + discard) */ if (plen > c->remote_window || plen > c->remote_maxpacket) { debug("channel %d: datagram too big", c->self); return; } /* Enqueue it */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkt, plen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: datagram: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } c->remote_window -= plen; return; } /* Enqueue packet for buffered data. */ if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; if (len == 0) return; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->input), len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); c->remote_window -= len; } /* * Enqueue data for channels with open c->extended in read mode. */ static void channel_output_poll_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { size_t len; int r; if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->extended)) == 0) return; debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %zu euse %d", c->self, c->remote_window, sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->extended_usage); if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; if (len == 0) return; if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); c->remote_window -= len; debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %zu", c->self, len); } /* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */ void channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; Channel *c; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; /* * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered * incoming data. */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if ((c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) { /* XXX is this true? */ debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self); continue; } /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) channel_output_poll_input_open(ssh, c); /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */ if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) channel_output_poll_extended_read(ssh, c); } } /* -- mux proxy support */ /* * When multiplexing channel messages for mux clients we have to deal * with downstream messages from the mux client and upstream messages * from the ssh server: * 1) Handling downstream messages is straightforward and happens * in channel_proxy_downstream(): * - We forward all messages (mostly) unmodified to the server. * - However, in order to route messages from upstream to the correct * downstream client, we have to replace the channel IDs used by the * mux clients with a unique channel ID because the mux clients might * use conflicting channel IDs. * - so we inspect and change both SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and * SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION messages, create a local * SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID * with the newly allocated channel ID. * 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY * channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID * is then translated back to the original mux client ID. * 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE * messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels. * 4) The SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels also need to closed when the * downstream mux client are removed. * 5) Handling SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages from the upstream server * requires more work, because they are not addressed to a specific * channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure * out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a * specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port. * 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently * not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified * easily. */ /* * receive packets from downstream mux clients: * channel callback fired on read from mux client, creates * SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels and translates channel IDs * on channel creation. */ int channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *downstream) { Channel *c = NULL; struct sshbuf *original = NULL, *modified = NULL; const u_char *cp; char *ctype = NULL, *listen_host = NULL; u_char type; size_t have; int ret = -1, r; u_int id, remote_id, listen_port; /* sshbuf_dump(downstream->input, stderr); */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(downstream->input, &cp, &have)) != 0) { error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } if (have < 2) { error("%s: short message", __func__); return -1; } type = cp[1]; /* skip padlen + type */ cp += 2; have -= 2; if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) debug3("%s: channel %u: down->up: type %u", __func__, downstream->self, type); switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN: if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL || (modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) { error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, ctype, 1); c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */ c->mux_downstream_id = id; /* original downstream id */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(modified, ctype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) { error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); channel_free(ssh, c); goto out; } break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: /* * Almost the same as SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, except then we * need to parse 'remote_id' instead of 'ctype'. */ if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL || (modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) { error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, "mux-down-connect", 1); c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */ c->mux_downstream_id = id; c->remote_id = remote_id; c->have_remote_id = 1; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) { error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); channel_free(ssh, c); goto out; } break; case SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST: if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (strcmp(ctype, "tcpip-forward") != 0) { error("%s: unsupported request %s", __func__, ctype); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(original, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &listen_host, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &listen_port)) != 0) { error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (listen_port > 65535) { error("%s: tcpip-forward for %s: bad port %u", __func__, listen_host, listen_port); goto out; } /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, "", -1, listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream); listen_host = NULL; break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: if (have < 4) break; remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp); if ((c = channel_by_remote_id(ssh, remote_id)) != NULL) { if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) channel_free(ssh, c); else c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT; } break; } if (modified) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, modified)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: send %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, cp, have)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: send %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } } ret = 0; out: free(ctype); free(listen_host); sshbuf_free(original); sshbuf_free(modified); return ret; } /* * receive packets from upstream server and de-multiplex packets * to correct downstream: * implemented as a helper for channel input handlers, * replaces local (proxy) channel ID with downstream channel ID. */ int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; Channel *downstream; const u_char *cp = NULL; size_t len; int r; /* * When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we * need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we * restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages, * so we can cleanup the channel. */ if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY) return 0; if ((downstream = c->mux_ctx) == NULL) return 0; switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST: break; default: debug2("%s: channel %u: unsupported type %u", __func__, c->self, type); return 0; } if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc reply", __func__); goto out; } /* get remaining payload (after id) */ cp = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &len); if (cp == NULL) { error("%s: no packet", __func__); goto out; } /* translate id and send to muxclient */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, c->mux_downstream_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(b, cp, len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(downstream->output, b)) != 0) { error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); */ if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) debug3("%s: channel %u: up->down: type %u", __func__, c->self, type); out: /* update state */ switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: /* record remote_id for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE */ if (cp && len > 4) { c->remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp); c->have_remote_id = 1; } break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) channel_free(ssh, c); else c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD; break; } sshbuf_free(b); return 1; } /* -- protocol input */ /* Parse a channel ID from the current packet */ static int channel_parse_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what) { u_int32_t id; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) { error("%s: parse id: %s", where, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s message", what); } if (id > INT_MAX) { error("%s: bad channel id %u: %s", where, id, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s channel id", what); } return (int)id; } /* Lookup a channel from an ID in the current packet */ static Channel * channel_from_packet_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what) { int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, where, what); Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "%s packet referred to nonexistent channel %d", what, id); } return c; } int channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { const u_char *data; size_t data_len, win_len; Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "data"); int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN) return 0; /* Get the data. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %d: get data: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); win_len = data_len; if (c->datagram) win_len += 4; /* string length header */ /* * The sending side reduces its window as it sends data, so we * must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure that window * updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might deadlock. */ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { c->local_window -= win_len; c->local_consumed += win_len; return 0; } if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) { logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %zu, maxpack %u", c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket); return 0; } if (win_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %zu, win %u", c->self, win_len, c->local_window); return 0; } c->local_window -= win_len; if (c->datagram) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %d: append datagram: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %d: append data: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); return 0; } int channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { const u_char *data; size_t data_len; u_int32_t tcode; Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "extended data"); int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", c->self); return 0; } if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", c->self); else ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received extended_data " "after EOF on channel %d.", c->self); } if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tcode)) != 0) { error("%s: parse tcode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message"); } if (c->efd == -1 || c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE || tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) { logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self); return 0; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message"); } if (data_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %zu, win %u", c->self, data_len, c->local_window); return 0; } debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %zu", c->self, data_len); /* XXX sshpkt_getb? */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, data, data_len)) != 0) error("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); c->local_window -= data_len; return 0; } int channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "ieof"); int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ieof message"); } if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; chan_rcvd_ieof(ssh, c); /* XXX force input close */ if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) { debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self); c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; if (sshbuf_len(c->input) == 0) chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); } return 0; } int channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "oclose"); int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid oclose message"); } chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); return 0; } int channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open confirmation"); u_int32_t remote_window, remote_maxpacket; int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open confirmation for " "non-opening channel %d.", c->self); /* * Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel * is now open. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: window/maxpacket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open confirmation message"); } c->have_remote_id = 1; c->remote_window = remote_window; c->remote_maxpacket = remote_maxpacket; c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (c->open_confirm) { debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self); c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self); } debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self, c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket); return 0; } static char * reason2txt(int reason) { switch (reason) { case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED: return "administratively prohibited"; case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED: return "connect failed"; case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE: return "unknown channel type"; case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE: return "resource shortage"; } return "unknown reason"; } int channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open failure"); u_int32_t reason; char *msg = NULL; int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open failure for " "non-opening channel %d.", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0) { error("%s: reason: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message"); } /* skip language */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: message/lang: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message"); } logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", c->self, reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : ""); free(msg); if (c->open_confirm) { debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self); c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self); } /* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */ chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return 0; } int channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "window adjust"); Channel *c; u_int32_t adjust; u_int new_rwin; int r; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id); return 0; } if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &adjust)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: adjust: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid window adjust message"); } debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust); if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) { fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u", c->self, adjust, c->remote_window); } c->remote_window = new_rwin; return 0; } int channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "status confirm"); Channel *c; struct channel_confirm *cc; /* Reset keepalive timeout */ ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0); debug2("%s: type %d id %d", __func__, type, id); if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { logit("%s: %d: unknown", __func__, id); return 0; } if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid status confirm message"); if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; cc->cb(ssh, type, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); return 0; } /* -- tcp forwarding */ void channel_set_af(struct ssh *ssh, int af) { ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6 = af; } /* * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification * and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'') * will bind to whatever address the client asked for. * * Special-case listen_addrs are: * * "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR * "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6 * "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6 * "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set */ static const char * channel_fwd_bind_addr(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp, int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { const char *addr = NULL; int wildcard = 0; if (listen_addr == NULL) { /* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */ if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports) wildcard = 1; } else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) { if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) || *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 || (!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) { wildcard = 1; /* * Notify client if they requested a specific listen * address and it was overridden. */ if (*listen_addr != '\0' && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 && strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Forwarding listen address " "\"%s\" overridden by server " "GatewayPorts", listen_addr); } } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { /* * Accept explicit localhost address when * GatewayPorts=yes. The "localhost" hostname is * deliberately skipped here so it will listen on all * available local address families. */ addr = listen_addr; } } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { /* * If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been * requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in * effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6. */ addr = listen_addr; } if (wildcardp != NULL) *wildcardp = wildcard; return addr; } static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type, struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { Channel *c; int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; const char *host, *addr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; in_port_t *lport_p; is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER); if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) { host = fwd->connect_path; } else { host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host; if (host == NULL) { error("No forward host name."); return 0; } if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("Forward host name too long."); return 0; } } /* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */ addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, fwd->listen_host, &wildcard, is_client, fwd_opts); debug3("%s: type %d wildcard %d addr %s", __func__, type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr); /* * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port); if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { if (addr == NULL) { /* This really shouldn't happen */ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } else { error("%s: getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", __func__, addr, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } return 0; } if (allocated_listen_port != NULL) *allocated_listen_port = 0; for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { switch (ai->ai_family) { case AF_INET: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin_port; break; case AF_INET6: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin6_port; break; default: continue; } /* * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the * same port for all address families. */ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0) *lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port); if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); continue; } /* Create a port to listen for the host. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); continue; } set_reuseaddr(sock); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); /* Bind the socket to the address. */ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { /* * address can be in if use ipv6 address is * already bound */ if (!ai->ai_next) error("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); else verbose("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) { error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); error("listen [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* * fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port - * record what we got. */ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port == 0) { *allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock); debug("Allocated listen port %d", *allocated_listen_port); } /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "port listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(host); c->host_port = fwd->connect_port; c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr); if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT)) c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port; else c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port; success = 1; } if (success == 0) error("%s: cannot listen to port: %d", __func__, fwd->listen_port); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return success; } static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, int type, struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; const char *path; Channel *c; int port, sock; mode_t omask; switch (type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("Local connecting path too long: %s", fwd->connect_path); return 0; } path = fwd->connect_path; port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) { error("No forward host name."); return 0; } if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("Forward host name too long."); return 0; } path = fwd->connect_host; port = fwd->connect_port; } break; case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: path = fwd->listen_path; port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; break; default: error("%s: unexpected channel type %d", __func__, type); return 0; } if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { error("No forward path name."); return 0; } if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path); return 0; } debug3("%s: type %d path %s", __func__, type, fwd->listen_path); /* Start a Unix domain listener. */ omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask); sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink); umask(omask); if (sock < 0) return 0; debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path); /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new(ssh, "unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "unix listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(path); c->host_port = port; c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); return 1; } static int channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port) { u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } static int channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->path == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(ssh, fwd->listen_path); } else { return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(ssh, fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); } } static int channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { u_int i; int found = 0; const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts); for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_port != lport) continue; if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) { /* skip dynamic forwardings */ if (c->host_port == 0) continue; } else { if (c->host_port != cport) continue; } if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) || (c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL)) continue; if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } static int channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; if (path == NULL) { error("%s: no path specified.", __func__); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_addr == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(ssh, fwd->listen_path); } else { return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(ssh, fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts); } } /* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh */ int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts); } } /* Matches a remote forwarding permission against a requested forwarding */ static int remote_open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, struct Forward *fwd) { int ret; char *lhost; /* XXX add ACLs for streamlocal */ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) return 1; if (fwd->listen_host == NULL || allowed_open->listen_host == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && allowed_open->listen_port != fwd->listen_port) return 0; /* Match hostnames case-insensitively */ lhost = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host); lowercase(lhost); ret = match_pattern(lhost, allowed_open->listen_host); free(lhost); return ret; } /* Checks whether a requested remote forwarding is permitted */ static int check_rfwd_permission(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->remote_perms; u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; struct permission *perm; /* XXX apply GatewayPorts override before checking? */ permit = pset->all_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) { permit = 1; break; } } } if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } return permit && permit_adm; } /* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */ int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (!check_rfwd_permission(ssh, fwd)) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "port forwarding refused"); if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) /* XXX always allowed, see remote_open_match() */ logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to " "remote forward to path \"%.100s\", " "but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), fwd->listen_path); else if(fwd->listen_host != NULL) logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to " "remote forward to host %.100s port %d, " "but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port ); else logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to remote " "forward, but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); return 0; } if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port, fwd_opts); } } /* * Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for * this server. */ static const char * channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host) { if (listen_host == NULL) { return "localhost"; } else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) { return ""; } else return listen_host; } /* * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through * the secure channel to host:port from local side. * Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with * channel_update_permission(). */ int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { int r, success = 0, idx = -1; char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path; int port_to_connect, listen_port; /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, fwd->listen_path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: request streamlocal: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tcpip-forward")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: request tcpip-forward: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Assume that server accepts the request */ success = 1; if (success) { /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL; port_to_connect = listen_port = 0; if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path); port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_host); port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port; } if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { listen_path = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { if (fwd->listen_host != NULL) listen_host = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host); listen_port = fwd->listen_port; } idx = permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host_to_connect, port_to_connect, listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL); } return idx; } static int open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, int requestedport) { if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport) return 0; if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST) != 0 && strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Note that in the listen host/port case * we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and * need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host) * and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host) */ static int open_listen_match_tcpip(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate) { const char *allowed_host; if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport) return 0; if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL && requestedhost == NULL) return 1; allowed_host = translate ? channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) : allowed_open->listen_host; if (allowed_host == NULL || requestedhost == NULL || strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0) return 0; return 1; } static int open_listen_match_streamlocal(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedpath) { if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL || strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from * local side. */ static int channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; int r; u_int i; struct permission *perm; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, host, port, 0)) break; perm = NULL; } if (perm == NULL) { debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); return -1; } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(host))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ return 0; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket * path from local side. */ static int channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; int r; u_int i; struct permission *perm; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) break; perm = NULL; } if (perm == NULL) { debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); return -1; } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ return 0; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side. */ int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(ssh, fwd->listen_path); } else { return channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(ssh, fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port); } } /* * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_user[] is empty. This is * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway. */ void channel_permit_all(struct ssh *ssh, int where) { struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); if (pset->num_permitted_user == 0) pset->all_permitted = 1; } /* * Permit the specified host/port for forwarding. */ void channel_add_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, char *host, int port) { int local = where == FORWARD_LOCAL; struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); debug("allow %s forwarding to host %s port %d", fwd_ident(who, where), host, port); /* * Remote forwards set listen_host/port, local forwards set * host/port_to_connect. */ permission_set_add(ssh, who, where, local ? host : 0, local ? port : 0, local ? NULL : host, NULL, local ? 0 : port, NULL); pset->all_permitted = 0; } /* * Administratively disable forwarding. */ void channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *ssh, int where) { channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where); permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } /* * Clear a list of permitted opens. */ void channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where) { struct permission **permp; u_int *npermp; permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp); *permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, 0, sizeof(**permp)); *npermp = 0; } /* * Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after * the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is * passed then they entry will be invalidated. */ void channel_update_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int idx, int newport) { struct permission_set *pset = &ssh->chanctxt->local_perms; if (idx < 0 || (u_int)idx >= pset->num_permitted_user) { debug("%s: index out of range: %d num_permitted_user %d", __func__, idx, pset->num_permitted_user); return; } debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d", newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing", newport, pset->permitted_user[idx].host_to_connect, pset->permitted_user[idx].port_to_connect); if (newport <= 0) fwd_perm_clear(&pset->permitted_user[idx]); else { pset->permitted_user[idx].listen_port = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport; } } /* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */ int permitopen_port(const char *p) { int port; if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0) return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT; if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0) return port; return -1; } /* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx) { int sock, saved_errno; struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; char strport[MAXIMUM(NI_MAXSERV, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))]; for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) { switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) { case AF_UNIX: /* unix:pathname instead of host:port */ sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr; strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop)); strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport)); break; case AF_INET: case AF_INET6: if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed"); continue; } break; default: continue; } if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype, cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) { if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1) fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock); if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) { debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): " "%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); saved_errno = errno; close(sock); errno = saved_errno; continue; /* fail -- try next */ } if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX) set_nodelay(sock); debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) " "in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock); cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next; return sock; } return -1; } static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx) { free(cctx->host); if (cctx->aitop) { if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX) free(cctx->aitop); else freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop); } memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx)); } /* * Return connecting socket to remote host:port or local socket path, * passing back the failure reason if appropriate. */ static int connect_to_helper(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name, int port, int socktype, char *ctype, char *rname, struct channel_connect *cctx, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { struct addrinfo hints; int gaierr; int sock = -1; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; struct addrinfo *ai; if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) { error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG)); return -1; } /* * Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections. * channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family * and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX. */ ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr); ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX; ai->ai_socktype = socktype; ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC; sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr; sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)); cctx->aitop = ai; } else { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = socktype; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx->aitop)) != 0) { if (errmsg != NULL) *errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr); if (reason != NULL) *reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED; error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } } cctx->host = xstrdup(name); cctx->port = port; cctx->ai = cctx->aitop; if ((sock = connect_next(cctx)) == -1) { error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s", name, port, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return sock; } /* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */ static Channel * connect_to(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct channel_connect cctx; Channel *c; int sock; memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname, &cctx, NULL, NULL); if (sock == -1) { channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->host_port = port; c->path = xstrdup(host); c->connect_ctx = cctx; return c; } /* * returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel * that needs to deal with this connection. */ Channel * channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; u_int i; struct permission *perm; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, listen_host, listen_port, 1)) { if (perm->downstream) return perm->downstream; if (perm->port_to_connect == 0) return rdynamic_connect_prepare(ssh, ctype, rname); return connect_to(ssh, perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d", listen_port); return NULL; } Channel * channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; u_int i; struct permission *perm; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) { return connect_to(ssh, perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s", path); return NULL; } /* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */ Channel * channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; struct channel_connect cctx; Channel *c; u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; int sock; struct permission *perm; permit = pset->all_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_match(perm, host, port)) { permit = 1; break; } } } if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (open_match(perm, host, port)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to connect to " "host %.100s port %d, but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), host, port); if (reason != NULL) *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; return NULL; } memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname, &cctx, reason, errmsg); if (sock == -1) { channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->host_port = port; c->path = xstrdup(host); c->connect_ctx = cctx; return c; } /* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */ Channel * channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; struct permission *perm; permit = pset->all_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit = 1; break; } } } if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, " "but the request was denied.", path); return NULL; } return connect_to(ssh, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname); } void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct winsize ws; int r; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { if (sc->channels[i] == NULL || !sc->channels[i]->client_tty || sc->channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if (ioctl(sc->channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1) continue; channel_request_start(ssh, i, "window-change", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: channel %u: send window-change: %s", __func__, i, ssh_err(r)); } } /* Return RDYNAMIC_OPEN channel: channel allows SOCKS, but is not connected */ static Channel * rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, char *rname) { Channel *c; int r; c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN, -1, -1, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->host_port = 0; c->path = NULL; /* * We need to open the channel before we have a FD, * so that we can get SOCKS header from peer. */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) { fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } return c; } /* Return CONNECTING socket to remote host:port or local socket path */ static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct channel_connect cctx; int sock; memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, c->path, c->host_port, SOCK_STREAM, NULL, NULL, &cctx, NULL, NULL); if (sock == -1) channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); else { /* similar to SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING but we've already sent the open */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH; c->connect_ctx = cctx; channel_register_fds(ssh, c, sock, sock, -1, 0, 1, 0); } return sock; } /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections. * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs. */ int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) { Channel *nc = NULL; int display_number, sock; u_short port; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS]; if (chanids == NULL) return -1; for (display_number = x11_display_offset; display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS; display_number++) { port = 6000 + display_number; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) #ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT) #endif ) { error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return -1; } else { debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported", ai->ai_family); continue; } } if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); if (x11_use_localhost) set_reuseaddr(sock); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__, port, strerror(errno)); close(sock); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) close(socks[n]); num_socks = 0; break; } socks[num_socks++] = sock; if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS) break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (num_socks > 0) break; } if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) { error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket."); return -1; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) { error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); return -1; } } /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids)); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "X11 inet listener", 1); nc->single_connection = single_connection; (*chanids)[n] = nc->self; } (*chanids)[n] = -1; /* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */ *display_numberp = display_number; return 0; } static int connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname) { int sock; struct sockaddr_un addr; sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock == -1) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) return sock; close(sock); error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); return -1; } static int connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) { char buf[1024]; snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf); } #ifdef __APPLE__ static int is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen) { struct stat sbuf; if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) { error("%s: display path too long", __func__); return 0; } if (display[0] != '/') return 0; if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) { return 1; } else { char *dot = strrchr(path, '.'); if (dot != NULL) { *dot = '\0'; if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) { return 1; } } } return 0; } #endif int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int display_number; const char *display; char buf[1024], *cp; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, sock = 0; /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (!display) { error("DISPLAY not set."); return -1; } /* * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a * connection to the real X server. */ #ifdef __APPLE__ /* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */ { char path[PATH_MAX]; if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) { debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd"); /* Create a socket. */ sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } } #endif /* * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s] */ if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 || display[0] == ':') { /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */ if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: " "%.100s", display); return -1; } /* Create a socket. */ sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } /* * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address. */ strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf)); cp = strchr(buf, ':'); if (!cp) { error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } *cp = 0; /* * buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the * display number. */ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } /* Look up the host address */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { /* Create a socket. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } /* Connect it to the display. */ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Success */ break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (!ai) { error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); return -1; } set_nodelay(sock); return sock; } /* * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication * data, and enables authentication spoofing. * This should be called in the client only. */ void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *ssh, int client_session_id, const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2; u_int i, value; const char *cp; char *new_data; int r, screen_number; if (sc->x11_saved_display == NULL) sc->x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp); else if (strcmp(disp, sc->x11_saved_display) != 0) { error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different " "$DISPLAY already forwarded"); return; } cp = strchr(disp, ':'); if (cp) cp = strchr(cp, '.'); if (cp) screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL); else screen_number = 0; if (sc->x11_saved_proto == NULL) { /* Save protocol name. */ sc->x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto); /* Extract real authentication data. */ sc->x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len); for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad " "authentication data: %.100s", data); sc->x11_saved_data[i] = value; } sc->x11_saved_data_len = data_len; /* Generate fake data of the same length. */ sc->x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len); arc4random_buf(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len); sc->x11_fake_data_len = data_len; } /* Convert the fake data into hex. */ new_data = tohex(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len); /* Send the request packet. */ channel_request_start(ssh, client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* bool: single connection */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, proto)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, new_data)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, screen_number)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send x11-req: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(new_data); } openssh-8.2p1/channels.h010064400017500001750000000324071362136622600134330ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.133 2020/01/25 22:49:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef CHANNEL_H #define CHANNEL_H /* Definitions for channel types. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12 #define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13 #define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux slave */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY 20 /* proxy channel for mux-slave */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN 21 /* reverse SOCKS, parsing request */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH 22 /* reverse SOCKS, finishing connect */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 23 #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1 /* TCP forwarding */ #define FORWARD_DENY 0 #define FORWARD_REMOTE (1) #define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1) #define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL) #define FORWARD_ADM 0x100 #define FORWARD_USER 0x101 struct ssh; struct Channel; typedef struct Channel Channel; struct fwd_perm_list; typedef void channel_open_fn(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); typedef void channel_callback_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *); typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int); typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *); typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, u_char **, size_t *); /* Channel success/failure callbacks */ typedef void channel_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, struct Channel *, void *); typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, void *); struct channel_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry; channel_confirm_cb *cb; channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb; void *ctx; }; TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm); /* Context for non-blocking connects */ struct channel_connect { char *host; int port; struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop; }; /* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */ typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *); /* * NB. channel IDs on the wire and in c->remote_id are uint32, but local * channel IDs (e.g. c->self) only ever use the int32 subset of this range, * because we use local channel ID -1 for housekeeping. Remote channels have * a dedicated "have_remote_id" flag to indicate their validity. */ struct Channel { int type; /* channel type/state */ int self; /* my own channel identifier */ uint32_t remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */ int have_remote_id; /* non-zero if remote_id is valid */ u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */ u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */ int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */ int rfd; /* read fd */ int wfd; /* write fd */ int efd; /* extended fd */ int sock; /* sock fd */ int ctl_chan; /* control channel (multiplexed connections) */ int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */ #ifdef _AIX int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */ #endif int client_tty; /* (client) TTY has been requested */ int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */ time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */ int delayed; /* post-select handlers for newly created * channels are delayed until the first call * to a matching pre-select handler. * this way post-select handlers are not * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */ struct sshbuf *input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over * encrypted connection */ struct sshbuf *output; /* data received over encrypted connection for * send on socket */ struct sshbuf *extended; char *path; /* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */ int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */ char *listening_addr; /* addr being listened for forwards */ int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */ char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */ u_int remote_window; u_int remote_maxpacket; u_int local_window; u_int local_window_max; u_int local_consumed; u_int local_maxpacket; int extended_usage; int single_connection; char *ctype; /* type */ /* callback */ channel_open_fn *open_confirm; void *open_confirm_ctx; channel_callback_fn *detach_user; int detach_close; struct channel_confirms status_confirms; /* filter */ channel_infilter_fn *input_filter; channel_outfilter_fn *output_filter; void *filter_ctx; channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup; /* keep boundaries */ int datagram; /* non-blocking connect */ /* XXX make this a pointer so the structure can be opaque */ struct channel_connect connect_ctx; /* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */ mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb; void *mux_ctx; int mux_pause; int mux_downstream_id; }; #define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0 #define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1 #define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2 /* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */ #define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024) #define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT) #define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024) #define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT) #define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024) #define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT) /* possible input states */ #define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0 #define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1 #define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 2 #define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 3 /* possible output states */ #define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 2 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 3 #define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01 #define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02 #define CHAN_EOF_SENT 0x04 #define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08 #define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10 /* Read buffer size */ #define CHAN_RBUF (16*1024) /* Hard limit on number of channels */ #define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS (16*1024) /* check whether 'efd' is still in use */ #define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \ (c->efd != -1 || \ sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)) #define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \ c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \ sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)) /* Add channel management structures to SSH transport instance */ void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh); /* channel management */ Channel *channel_by_id(struct ssh *, int); Channel *channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *, u_int); Channel *channel_lookup(struct ssh *, int); Channel *channel_new(struct ssh *, char *, int, int, int, int, u_int, u_int, int, char *, int); void channel_set_fds(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, u_int); void channel_free(struct ssh *, Channel *); void channel_free_all(struct ssh *); void channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *); void channel_send_open(struct ssh *, int); void channel_request_start(struct ssh *, int, char *, int); void channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, channel_callback_fn *, int); void channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *, int, channel_open_fn *, void *); void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *, int, channel_infilter_fn *, channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *); void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int, channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *); void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int); int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *); void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *); /* mux proxy support */ int channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *, Channel *mc); int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *, int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* protocol handler */ int channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* file descriptor handling (read/write) */ void channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *, fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, u_int*, time_t*); void channel_after_select(struct ssh *, fd_set *, fd_set *); void channel_output_poll(struct ssh *); int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *); void channel_close_all(struct ssh *); int channel_still_open(struct ssh *); const char *channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *); char *channel_open_message(struct ssh *); int channel_find_open(struct ssh *); /* tcp forwarding */ struct Forward; struct ForwardOptions; void channel_set_af(struct ssh *, int af); void channel_permit_all(struct ssh *, int); void channel_add_permission(struct ssh *, int, int, char *, int); void channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *, int, int); void channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *, int); void channel_update_permission(struct ssh *, int, int); Channel *channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short, char *, char *, int *, const char **); Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *); Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*, u_short, int, int); Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short, char *, char *); Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *); int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, struct ForwardOptions *); int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, int *, struct ForwardOptions *); int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, int, struct ForwardOptions *); int permitopen_port(const char *); /* x11 forwarding */ void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int); int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *); int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **); void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *, const char *, int); /* channel close */ int chan_is_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *, int); void chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *); /* channel events */ void chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_read_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); #endif openssh-8.2p1/cipher-aes.c010064400017500001750000000110531362136622600136450ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL #include #include #include #include #include "rijndael.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #define RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE 16 struct ssh_rijndael_ctx { rijndael_ctx r_ctx; u_char r_iv[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE]; }; static int ssh_rijndael_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv, int enc) { struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c; if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) { c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c); } if (key != NULL) { if (enc == -1) enc = ctx->encrypt; rijndael_set_key(&c->r_ctx, (u_char *)key, 8*EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), enc); } if (iv != NULL) memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); return (1); } static int ssh_rijndael_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len) { struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c; u_char buf[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE]; u_char *cprev, *cnow, *plain, *ivp; int i, j, blocks = len / RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; if (len == 0) return (1); if (len % RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) fatal("ssh_rijndael_cbc: bad len %d", len); if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) { error("ssh_rijndael_cbc: no context"); return (0); } if (ctx->encrypt) { cnow = dest; plain = (u_char *)src; cprev = c->r_iv; for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++, plain+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE, cnow+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) { for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++) buf[j] = plain[j] ^ cprev[j]; rijndael_encrypt(&c->r_ctx, buf, cnow); cprev = cnow; } memcpy(c->r_iv, cprev, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); } else { cnow = (u_char *) (src+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); plain = dest+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; memcpy(buf, cnow, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); for (i = blocks; i > 0; i--, cnow-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE, plain-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) { rijndael_decrypt(&c->r_ctx, cnow, plain); ivp = (i == 1) ? c->r_iv : cnow-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++) plain[j] ^= ivp[j]; } memcpy(c->r_iv, buf, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); } return (1); } static int ssh_rijndael_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c; if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) { memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); free(c); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); } return (1); } void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, u_int len) { struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c; if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL) fatal("ssh_rijndael_iv: no context"); if (doset) memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, len); else memcpy(iv, c->r_iv, len); } const EVP_CIPHER * evp_rijndael(void) { static EVP_CIPHER rijndal_cbc; memset(&rijndal_cbc, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); rijndal_cbc.nid = NID_undef; rijndal_cbc.block_size = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; rijndal_cbc.iv_len = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; rijndal_cbc.key_len = 16; rijndal_cbc.init = ssh_rijndael_init; rijndal_cbc.cleanup = ssh_rijndael_cleanup; rijndal_cbc.do_cipher = ssh_rijndael_cbc; #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP rijndal_cbc.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; #endif return (&rijndal_cbc); } #endif /* USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL */ openssh-8.2p1/cipher-aesctr.c010064400017500001750000000040741362136622600143630ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.c,v 1.2 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL #include "cipher-aesctr.h" /* * increment counter 'ctr', * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order. * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0]) */ static inline void aesctr_inc(u8 *ctr, u32 len) { ssize_t i; #ifndef CONSTANT_TIME_INCREMENT for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) if (++ctr[i]) /* continue on overflow */ return; #else u8 x, add = 1; for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { ctr[i] += add; /* constant time for: x = ctr[i] ? 1 : 0 */ x = ctr[i]; x = (x | (x >> 4)) & 0xf; x = (x | (x >> 2)) & 0x3; x = (x | (x >> 1)) & 0x1; add *= (x^1); } #endif } void aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits) { x->rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(x->ek, k, kbits); } void aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv) { memcpy(x->ctr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); } void aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes) { u32 n = 0; u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; while ((bytes--) > 0) { if (n == 0) { rijndaelEncrypt(x->ek, x->rounds, x->ctr, buf); aesctr_inc(x->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); } *(c++) = *(m++) ^ buf[n]; n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } } #endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/cipher-aesctr.h010064400017500001750000000024631362136622600143700ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.h,v 1.1 2014/04/29 15:39:33 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef OPENSSH_AESCTR_H #define OPENSSH_AESCTR_H #include "rijndael.h" #define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 typedef struct aesctr_ctx { int rounds; /* keylen-dependent #rounds */ u32 ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */ u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* counter */ } aesctr_ctx; void aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits); void aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv); void aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes); #endif openssh-8.2p1/cipher-chachapoly.c010064400017500001750000000073461362136622600152220ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.8 2016/08/03 05:41:57 djm Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include #include /* needed for log.h */ #include #include /* needed for misc.h */ #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "cipher-chachapoly.h" int chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) { if (keylen != (32 + 32)) /* 2 x 256 bit keys */ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; chacha_keysetup(&ctx->main_ctx, key, 256); chacha_keysetup(&ctx->header_ctx, key + 32, 256); return 0; } /* * chachapoly_crypt() operates as following: * En/decrypt with header key 'aadlen' bytes from 'src', storing result * to 'dest'. The ciphertext here is treated as additional authenticated * data for MAC calculation. * En/decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. Use * POLY1305_TAGLEN bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication * tag. This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption. */ int chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt) { u_char seqbuf[8]; const u_char one[8] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* NB little-endian */ u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* * Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the * packet sequence number. */ memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key)); POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr); chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, NULL); chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, poly_key, poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)); /* If decrypting, check tag before anything else */ if (!do_encrypt) { const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len; poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key); if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; goto out; } } /* Crypt additional data */ if (aadlen) { chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL); chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, src, dest, aadlen); } /* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */ chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one); chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, src + aadlen, dest + aadlen, len); /* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */ if (do_encrypt) { poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len, poly_key); } r = 0; out: explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag)); explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf)); explicit_bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)); return r; } /* Decrypt and extract the encrypted packet length */ int chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) { u_char buf[4], seqbuf[8]; if (len < 4) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr); chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL); chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, cp, buf, 4); *plenp = PEEK_U32(buf); return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/cipher-chachapoly.h010064400017500001750000000031171362136622600152170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.4 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) Damien Miller 2013 * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H #define CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H #include #include "chacha.h" #include "poly1305.h" #define CHACHA_KEYLEN 32 /* Only 256 bit keys used here */ struct chachapoly_ctx { struct chacha_ctx main_ctx, header_ctx; }; int chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); int chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt); int chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5))); #endif /* CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H */ openssh-8.2p1/cipher-ctr.c010064400017500001750000000071141362136622600136700ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.11 2010/10/01 23:05:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR) #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL #include #endif struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx { AES_KEY aes_ctx; u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; }; /* * increment counter 'ctr', * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order. * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0]) */ static void ssh_ctr_inc(u_char *ctr, size_t len) { int i; for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) if (++ctr[i]) /* continue on overflow */ return; } static int ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len) { struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; size_t n = 0; u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; if (len == 0) return (1); if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) return (0); while ((len--) > 0) { if (n == 0) { AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx); ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); } *(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n]; n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } return (1); } static int ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv, int enc) { struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) { c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c); } if (key != NULL) AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &c->aes_ctx); if (iv != NULL) memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); return (1); } static int ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) { memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); free(c); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); } return (1); } void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, size_t len) { struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL) fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_iv: no context"); if (doset) memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, len); else memcpy(iv, c->aes_counter, len); } const EVP_CIPHER * evp_aes_128_ctr(void) { static EVP_CIPHER aes_ctr; memset(&aes_ctr, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); aes_ctr.nid = NID_undef; aes_ctr.block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; aes_ctr.iv_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; aes_ctr.key_len = 16; aes_ctr.init = ssh_aes_ctr_init; aes_ctr.cleanup = ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup; aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr; #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; #endif return (&aes_ctr); } #endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR) */ openssh-8.2p1/cipher.c010064400017500001750000000334741362136622600131120ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.114 2020/01/23 10:24:29 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "cipher.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void #endif struct sshcipher_ctx { int plaintext; int encrypt; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp; struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ const struct sshcipher *cipher; }; struct sshcipher { char *name; u_int block_size; u_int key_len; u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ u_int auth_len; u_int flags; #define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) #define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) #define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) #define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) #define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); #else void *ignored; #endif }; static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES { "3des-cbc", 8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, #endif { "aes128-cbc", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, { "aes192-cbc", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, { "aes256-cbc", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, { "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, { "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, { "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com", 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */ #else { "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, { "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, { "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, #endif { "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com", 8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL }, { "none", 8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL }, { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } }; /*--*/ /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */ char * cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only) { char *tmp, *ret = NULL; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct sshcipher *c; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { if ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) continue; if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0) continue; if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(c->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, c->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } const char * compression_alg_list(int compression) { #ifdef WITH_ZLIB return compression ? "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none" : "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"; #else return "none"; #endif } u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->block_size); } u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->key_len); } u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *c) { if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0) return 14; return cipher_keylen(c); } u_int cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->auth_len); } u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c) { /* * Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that * needs no IV. XXX make iv_len == -1 default? */ return (c->iv_len != 0 || (c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ? c->iv_len : c->block_size; } u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0; } u_int cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { return cc->plaintext; } const struct sshcipher * cipher_by_name(const char *name) { const struct sshcipher *c; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) return c; return NULL; } #define CIPHER_SEP "," int ciphers_valid(const char *names) { const struct sshcipher *c; char *cipher_list, *cp; char *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; if ((cipher_list = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) { c = cipher_by_name(p); if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) { free(cipher_list); return 0; } } free(cipher_list); return 1; } const char * cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) return NULL; /* XXX repurpose for CBC warning */ return NULL; } int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen, int do_encrypt) { struct sshcipher_ctx *cc = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const EVP_CIPHER *type; int klen; #endif *ccp = NULL; if ((cc = calloc(sizeof(*cc), 1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; cc->plaintext = (cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0; cc->encrypt = do_encrypt; if (keylen < cipher->key_len || (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } cc->cipher = cipher; if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { ret = chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen); goto out; } if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { ret = 0; goto out; } #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen); aesctr_ivsetup(&cc->ac_ctx, iv); ret = 0; goto out; } ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ type = (*cipher->evptype)(); if ((cc->evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv, (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (cipher_authlen(cipher) && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (u_char *)iv)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(cc->evp); if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(cc->evp, keylen) == 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } } if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } ret = 0; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ out: if (ret == 0) { /* success */ *ccp = cc; } else { if (cc != NULL) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); } } return ret; } /* * cipher_crypt() operates as following: * Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'. * Theses bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for * authenticated encryption modes. * En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. * Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag. * This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption. * Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0. */ int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen) { if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src, len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt); } if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len); return 0; } #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { if (aadlen) memcpy(dest, src, aadlen); aesctr_encrypt_bytes(&cc->ac_ctx, src + aadlen, dest + aadlen, len); return 0; } return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; #else if (authlen) { u_char lastiv[1]; if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* increment IV */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 1, lastiv)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; /* set tag on decyption */ if (!cc->encrypt && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } if (aadlen) { if (authlen && EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; memcpy(dest, src, aadlen); } if (len % cc->cipher->block_size) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen, len) < 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if (authlen) { /* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */ if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0) return cc->encrypt ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; if (cc->encrypt && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, authlen, dest + aadlen + len)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } return 0; #endif } /* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */ int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) { if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) return chachapoly_get_length(&cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr, cp, len); if (len < 4) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; *plenp = PEEK_U32(cp); return 0; } void cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { if (cc == NULL) return; if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx)); else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp); cc->evp = NULL; #endif explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); } /* * Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent * process. */ int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; if ((c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) return 0; else if ((c->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) return sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); #else return 0; #endif } int cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, size_t len) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; int evplen; #endif if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { if (len != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; return 0; } if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { if (len != sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; memcpy(iv, cc->ac_ctx.ctr, len); return 0; } if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) return 0; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); if (evplen == 0) return 0; else if (evplen < 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if ((size_t)evplen != len) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; #ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 0, iv, len); else #endif if (cipher_authlen(c)) { if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, len, iv)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(cc->evp, iv, len)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; #endif return 0; } int cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv, size_t len) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; int evplen = 0; #endif if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) return 0; if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) return 0; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); if (evplen <= 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if ((size_t)evplen != len) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; #ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR /* XXX iv arg is const, but ssh_aes_ctr_iv isn't */ if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, evplen); else #endif if (cipher_authlen(c)) { /* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(cc->evp, iv, evplen)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; #endif return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/cipher.h010064400017500001750000000063371362136622600131150ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.55 2020/01/23 10:24:29 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef CIPHER_H #define CIPHER_H #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #endif #include "cipher-chachapoly.h" #include "cipher-aesctr.h" #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 struct sshcipher; struct sshcipher_ctx; const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); int ciphers_valid(const char *); char *cipher_alg_list(char, int); const char *compression_alg_list(int); int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **, const struct sshcipher *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int); int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int, u_int, u_int); int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); void cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *); u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *); u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *); u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *); u_int cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *); u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *); u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *); u_int cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *); int cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *, size_t); int cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *, size_t); int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); #endif /* CIPHER_H */ openssh-8.2p1/cleanup.c010064400017500001750000000020131362136622600132500ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: cleanup.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "log.h" /* default implementation */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { _exit(i); } openssh-8.2p1/clientloop.c010064400017500001750000002154621362136622600140070ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.340 2020/02/02 09:45:34 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The main loop for the interactive session (client side). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" /* import options */ extern Options options; /* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */ extern int stdin_null_flag; /* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */ extern int no_shell_flag; /* Flag indicating that ssh should daemonise after authentication is complete */ extern int fork_after_authentication_flag; /* Control socket */ extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */ /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ extern char *host; /* * If this field is not NULL, the ForwardAgent socket is this path and different * instead of SSH_AUTH_SOCK. */ extern char *forward_agent_sock_path; /* * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile * because this is updated in a signal handler. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0; /* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */ static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0; /* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */ static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0; /* Common data for the client loop code. */ volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */ static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */ static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */ static struct sshbuf *stderr_buffer; /* Used for final exit message. */ static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */ static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */ static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh); int session_ident = -1; /* Track escape per proto2 channel */ struct escape_filter_ctx { int escape_pending; int escape_char; }; /* Context for channel confirmation replies */ struct channel_reply_ctx { const char *request_type; int id; enum confirm_action action; }; /* Global request success/failure callbacks */ /* XXX move to struct ssh? */ struct global_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry; global_confirm_cb *cb; void *ctx; int ref_count; }; TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm); static struct global_confirms global_confirms = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms); void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, struct sshbuf *); /* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */ static void leave_non_blocking(void) { if (in_non_blocking_mode) { unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); in_non_blocking_mode = 0; } } /* * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a * flag indicating that the window has changed. */ /*ARGSUSED */ static void window_change_handler(int sig) { received_window_change_signal = 1; } /* * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes. */ /*ARGSUSED */ static void signal_handler(int sig) { received_signal = sig; quit_pending = 1; } /* * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the * ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout. */ static void set_control_persist_exit_time(struct ssh *ssh) { if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) { /* not using a ControlPersist timeout */ control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (channel_still_open(ssh)) { /* some client connections are still open */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__); control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) { /* a client connection has recently closed */ control_persist_exit_time = monotime() + (time_t)options.control_persist_timeout; debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__, options.control_persist_timeout); } /* else we are already counting down to the timeout */ } #define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_" static int client_x11_display_valid(const char *display) { size_t i, dlen; if (display == NULL) return 0; dlen = strlen(display); for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) { if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) && strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) { debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]); return 0; } } return 1; } #define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60 int client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *ssh, const char *display, const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data) { char *cmd, line[512], xdisplay[512]; char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX]; static char proto[512], data[512]; FILE *f; int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, r; struct stat st; u_int now, x11_timeout_real; *_proto = proto; *_data = data; proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0'; if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { if (display != NULL) logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding", display); return -1; } if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) { debug("No xauth program."); xauth_path = NULL; } if (xauth_path != NULL) { /* * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does * not match an authorization entry. For this we * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum". * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal * is not perfect. */ if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) { if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", display + 10)) < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) { error("%s: display name too long", __func__); return -1; } display = xdisplay; } if (trusted == 0) { /* * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie. * * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server. */ mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir)); if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) { error("%s: mkdtemp: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } do_unlink = 1; if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile), "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) { error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__); rmdir(xauthdir); return -1; } if (timeout == 0) { /* auth doesn't time out */ xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s " "untrusted 2>%s", xauth_path, xauthfile, display, SSH_X11_PROTO, _PATH_DEVNULL); } else { /* Add some slack to requested expiry */ if (timeout < UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK) x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK; else { /* Don't overflow on long timeouts */ x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX; } xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s " "untrusted timeout %u 2>%s", xauth_path, xauthfile, display, SSH_X11_PROTO, x11_timeout_real, _PATH_DEVNULL); } debug2("%s: xauth command: %s", __func__, cmd); if (timeout != 0 && x11_refuse_time == 0) { now = monotime() + 1; if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; else x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; channel_set_x11_refuse_time(ssh, x11_refuse_time); } if (system(cmd) == 0) generated = 1; free(cmd); } /* * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step * above. */ if (trusted || generated) { xasprintf(&cmd, "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, xauth_path, generated ? "-f " : "" , generated ? xauthfile : "", display); debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "r"); if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) && sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2) got_data = 1; if (f) pclose(f); free(cmd); } } if (do_unlink) { unlink(xauthfile); rmdir(xauthdir); } /* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */ if (!trusted && !got_data) { error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " "xauth key data not generated"); return -1; } /* * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise * for the local connection. */ if (!got_data) { u_int8_t rnd[16]; u_int i; logit("Warning: No xauth data; " "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding."); strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rnd); i++) { snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x", rnd[i]); } } return 0; } /* * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if * appropriate. */ static void client_check_window_change(struct ssh *ssh) { if (!received_window_change_signal) return; /** XXX race */ received_window_change_signal = 0; debug2("%s: changed", __func__); channel_send_window_changes(ssh); } static int client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct global_confirm *gc; if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; if (gc->cb != NULL) gc->cb(ssh, type, seq, gc->ctx); if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry); explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc)); free(gc); } ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0); return 0; } static void server_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) > options.server_alive_count_max) { logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host); cleanup_exit(255); } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* boolean: want reply */ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */ client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL); } /* * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on * one of the file descriptors). */ static void client_wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying) { struct timeval tv, *tvp; int timeout_secs; time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime(); int r, ret; /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */ channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, &minwait_secs); /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */ if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh) && !ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) { /* clear mask since we did not call select() */ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); return; } FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */ if (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); /* * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other * event pending, or a timeout expires. */ timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) { timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval; server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval; } if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !rekeying) timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh)); set_control_persist_exit_time(ssh); if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, control_persist_exit_time - now); if (timeout_secs < 0) timeout_secs = 0; } if (minwait_secs != 0) timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs); if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX) tvp = NULL; else { tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs; tv.tv_usec = 0; tvp = &tv; } ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); if (ret == -1) { /* * We have to clear the select masks, because we return. * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags * set by the signal handlers. */ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); if (errno == EINTR) return; /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); quit_pending = 1; } else if (ret == 0) { /* * Timeout. Could have been either keepalive or rekeying. * Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop. */ if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime()) server_alive_check(ssh); } } static void client_suspend_self(struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr) { /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */ if (sshbuf_len(bout) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(bout), sshbuf_len(bout)); if (sshbuf_len(berr) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(berr), sshbuf_len(berr)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); sshbuf_reset(bin); sshbuf_reset(bout); sshbuf_reset(berr); /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */ kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); /* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */ received_window_change_signal = 1; enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } static void client_process_net_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset) { char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; int r, len; /* * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of * the packet subsystem. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { /* Read as much as possible. */ len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == 0) { /* * Received EOF. The remote host has closed the * connection. */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n", host)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); quit_pending = 1; return; } /* * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available. */ if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) len = 0; if (len == -1) { /* * An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a * network problem. */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n", host, strerror(errno))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); quit_pending = 1; return; } ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len); } } static void client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx; char errmsg[256]; int r, tochan; /* * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate * one is fatal. */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY && (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)) cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE; /* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */ tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR && c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE; if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) { debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) { if (tochan) { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type); } else { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } /* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident) fatal("%s", errmsg); /* * If error occurred on mux client, append to * their stderr. */ if (tochan) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, errmsg, strlen(errmsg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else error("%s", errmsg); if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) { /* * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode. */ if (c->self == session_ident) leave_raw_mode(0); else mux_tty_alloc_failed(ssh, c); } else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) { chan_read_failed(ssh, c); chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } } free(cr); } static void client_abandon_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } void client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *request, enum confirm_action action) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr)); cr->request_type = request; cr->action = action; channel_register_status_confirm(ssh, id, client_status_confirm, client_abandon_status_confirm, cr); } void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx) { struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc; /* Coalesce identical callbacks */ last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms); if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) { if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d", __func__, last_gc->ref_count); return; } gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc)); gc->cb = cb; gc->ctx = ctx; gc->ref_count = 1; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry); } static void process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh) { void (*handler)(int); char *s, *cmd; int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0; struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); handler = ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO); if (s == NULL) goto out; while (isspace((u_char)*s)) s++; if (*s == '-') s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */ if (*s == '\0') goto out; if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') { logit("Commands:"); logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request local forward"); logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request remote forward"); logit(" -D[bind_address:]port " "Request dynamic forward"); logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port " "Cancel local forward"); logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port " "Cancel remote forward"); logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port " "Cancel dynamic forward"); if (!options.permit_local_command) goto out; logit(" !args " "Execute local command"); goto out; } if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) { s++; ssh_local_cmd(s); goto out; } if (*s == 'K') { delete = 1; s++; } if (*s == 'L') local = 1; else if (*s == 'R') remote = 1; else if (*s == 'D') dynamic = 1; else { logit("Invalid command."); goto out; } while (isspace((u_char)*++s)) ; /* XXX update list of forwards in options */ if (delete) { /* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */ if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) { logit("Bad forwarding close specification."); goto out; } if (remote) ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, &fwd) == 0; else if (dynamic) ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, 0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; else ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; if (!ok) { logit("Unknown port forwarding."); goto out; } logit("Canceled forwarding."); } else { if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) { logit("Bad forwarding specification."); goto out; } if (local || dynamic) { if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } else { if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd) < 0) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } logit("Forwarding port."); } out: ssh_signal(SIGINT, handler); enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); free(cmd); free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); free(fwd.connect_path); } /* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */ #define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 1 /* don't show in mux client sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 2 /* don't show in mux master sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 4 /* don't show when logging to syslog */ struct escape_help_text { const char *cmd; const char *text; unsigned int flags; }; static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = { {".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER}, {".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, }; static void print_escape_help(struct sshbuf *b, int escape_char, int mux_client, int using_stderr) { unsigned int i, suppress_flags; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%c?\r\nSupported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); suppress_flags = (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) | (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) | (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) { if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags) continue; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n", escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n" "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after " "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* * Process the characters one by one. */ static int process_escapes(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr, char *buf, int len) { pid_t pid; int r, bytes = 0; u_int i; u_char ch; char *s; struct escape_filter_ctx *efc = c->filter_ctx == NULL ? NULL : (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx; if (c->filter_ctx == NULL) return 0; if (len <= 0) return (0); for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) { /* Get one character at a time. */ ch = buf[i]; if (efc->escape_pending) { /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ /* Clear the flag now. */ efc->escape_pending = 0; /* Process the escaped character. */ switch (ch) { case '.': /* Terminate the connection. */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c.\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { chan_read_failed(ssh, c); chan_write_failed(ssh, c); if (c->detach_user) { c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, NULL); } c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED; sshbuf_reset(c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); return 0; } else quit_pending = 1; return -1; case 'Z' - 64: /* XXX support this for mux clients */ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { char b[16]; noescape: if (ch == 'Z' - 64) snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z"); else snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c%s escape not available to " "multiplexed sessions\r\n", efc->escape_char, b)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); continue; } /* Suspend the program. Inform the user */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr); /* We have been continued. */ continue; case 'B': if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%cB\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); channel_request_start(ssh, c->self, "break", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1000)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); continue; case 'R': if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) logit("Server does not " "support re-keying"); else need_rekeying = 1; continue; case 'V': /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'v': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; if (!log_is_on_stderr()) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n", efc->escape_char, ch)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); continue; } if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) log_change_level(--options.log_level); if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_change_level(++options.log_level); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", efc->escape_char, ch, log_level_name(options.log_level))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); continue; case '&': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; /* * Detach the program (continue to serve * connections, but put in background and no * more new connections). */ /* Restore tty modes. */ leave_raw_mode( options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* Stop listening for new connections. */ channel_stop_listening(ssh); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c& [backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Fork into background. */ pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */ /* The parent just exits. */ exit(0); } /* The child continues serving connections. */ /* fake EOF on stdin */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, 4)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; case '?': print_escape_help(berr, efc->escape_char, (c && c->ctl_chan != -1), log_is_on_stderr()); continue; case '#': if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c#\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); s = channel_open_message(ssh); if ((r = sshbuf_put(berr, s, strlen(s))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(s); continue; case 'C': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; process_cmdline(ssh); continue; default: if (ch != efc->escape_char) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); bytes++; } /* Escaped characters fall through here */ break; } } else { /* * The previous character was not an escape char. * Check if this is an escape. */ if (last_was_cr && ch == efc->escape_char) { /* * It is. Set the flag and continue to * next character. */ efc->escape_pending = 1; continue; } } /* * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline, * and append it to the buffer. */ last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n'); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, ch)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); bytes++; } return bytes; } /* * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as * there are packets available. * * Any unknown packets received during the actual * session cause the session to terminate. This is * intended to make debugging easier since no * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol * extensions must be negotiated during the * preparatory phase. */ static void client_process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending); } /* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */ /* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */ void * client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char) { struct escape_filter_ctx *ret; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->escape_pending = 0; ret->escape_char = escape_char; return (void *)ret; } /* Free the escape filter context on channel free */ void client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } int client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *buf, int len) { if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) return 0; return process_escapes(ssh, c, c->input, c->output, c->extended, buf, len); } static void client_channel_closed(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) { channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); session_closed = 1; leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } /* * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session. */ int client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; double start_time, total_time; int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; u_int nalloc = 0; char buf[100]; debug("Entering interactive session."); if (options.control_master && !option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) { debug("pledge: id"); if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd sendfd proc exec id tty", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) { debug("pledge: exec"); if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } else if (options.update_hostkeys) { debug("pledge: filesystem full"); if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } else if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) || fork_after_authentication_flag) { debug("pledge: proc"); if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } else { debug("pledge: network"); if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } start_time = monotime_double(); /* Initialize variables. */ last_was_cr = 1; exit_status = -1; connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh); max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out); quit_pending = 0; /* Initialize buffer. */ if ((stderr_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); client_init_dispatch(ssh); /* * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode) * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1) */ if (ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler); if (ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGINT, signal_handler); if (ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler); if (ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler); ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); if (have_pty) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); session_ident = ssh2_chan_id; if (session_ident != -1) { if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx( escape_char_arg)); } channel_register_cleanup(ssh, session_ident, client_channel_closed, 0); } /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ while (!quit_pending) { /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */ client_process_buffered_input_packets(ssh); if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh)) break; if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { debug("rekeying in progress"); } else if (need_rekeying) { /* manual rekey request */ debug("need rekeying"); if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: kex_start_rekex: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); need_rekeying = 0; } else { /* * Make packets from buffered channel data, and * enqueue them for sending to the server. */ if (ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh)) channel_output_poll(ssh); /* * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a * message about it to the server if so. */ client_check_window_change(ssh); if (quit_pending) break; } /* * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes * available on one of the descriptors). */ max_fd2 = max_fd; client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &readset, &writeset, &max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)); if (quit_pending) break; /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset); /* Buffer input from the connection. */ client_process_net_input(ssh, readset); if (quit_pending) break; /* * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the * sender. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) { if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll", __func__); } } /* * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the * timeout has expired without any active client * connections, then quit. */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) { debug("ControlPersist timeout expired"); break; } } } free(readset); free(writeset); /* Terminate the session. */ /* Stop watching for window change. */ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "disconnected by user")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language tag */ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send disconnect: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); channel_free_all(ssh); if (have_pty) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* restore blocking io */ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); /* * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote * exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the * connection was deliberately terminated at this end. */ if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) { received_signal = 0; exit_status = 0; } if (received_signal) { verbose("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal); cleanup_exit(0); } /* * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating * that the connection has been closed. */ if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */ if (sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer) > 0) { len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(stderr_buffer), sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer)); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer)) error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer."); else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(stderr_buffer, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Clear and free any buffers. */ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); sshbuf_free(stderr_buffer); /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */ total_time = monotime_double() - start_time; ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time); if (total_time > 0) verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f", obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time); /* Return the exit status of the program. */ debug("Exit status %d", exit_status); return exit_status; } /*********/ static Channel * client_request_forwarded_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan, u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack) { Channel *c = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *listen_address, *originator_address; u_int listen_port, originator_port; int r; /* Get rest of the packet */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_address, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator_address, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__, listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port); if (listen_port > 0xffff) error("%s: invalid listen port", __func__); else if (originator_port > 0xffff) error("%s: invalid originator port", __func__); else { c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh, listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address); } if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc reply", __func__); goto out; } /* reconstruct and send to muxclient */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, request_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rwindow)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rmaxpack)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, listen_address)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, originator_address)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, b)) != 0) { error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } } out: sshbuf_free(b); free(originator_address); free(listen_address); return c; } static Channel * client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *listen_path; int r; /* Get the remote path. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_path, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("%s: request: %s", __func__, listen_path); c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(ssh, listen_path, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal"); free(listen_path); return c; } static Channel * client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *originator; u_int originator_port; int r, sock; if (!options.forward_x11) { error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return NULL; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* XXX check permission */ /* XXX range check originator port? */ debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %u", originator, originator_port); free(originator); sock = x11_connect_display(ssh); if (sock < 0) return NULL; c = channel_new(ssh, "x11", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } static Channel * client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; int r, sock; if (!options.forward_agent) { error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } if (forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) { r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock); } else { r = ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(forward_agent_sock_path, &sock); } if (r != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } char * client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun) { Channel *c; int r, fd; char *ifname = NULL; if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO) return 0; debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode); /* Open local tunnel device */ if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode, &ifname)) == -1) { error("Tunnel device open failed."); return NULL; } debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname); c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tun@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window_max)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, tun_mode)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_tun)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__); return ifname; } /* XXXX move to generic input handler */ static int client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype = NULL; int r; u_int rchan; size_t len; u_int rmaxpack, rwindow; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0) goto out; debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ssh, ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ssh, ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) { c = client_request_x11(ssh, ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_agent(ssh, ctype, rchan); } if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { debug3("proxied to downstream: %s", ctype); } else if (c != NULL) { debug("confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; c->have_remote_id = 1; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__); } } else { debug("failure %s", ctype); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "open failed")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__); } r = 0; out: free(ctype); return r; } static int client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *rtype = NULL; u_char reply; u_int id, exitval; int r, success = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) return r; if (id <= INT_MAX) c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &reply)) != 0) goto out; debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %u rtype %s reply %d", id, rtype, reply); if (c == NULL) { error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: " "unknown channel", id); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &exitval)) != 0) goto out; if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { mux_exit_message(ssh, c, exitval); success = 1; } else if ((int)id == session_ident) { /* Record exit value of local session */ success = 1; exit_status = exitval; } else { /* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */ debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d", __func__, id); } if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; } if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", __func__, c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__); } r = 0; out: free(rtype); return r; } struct hostkeys_update_ctx { /* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */ char *host_str, *ip_str; /* * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating * whether they already exist in known_hosts. * keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(). */ struct sshkey **keys; int *keys_seen; size_t nkeys, nnew; /* * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted). * Filled in by hostkeys_find(). */ struct sshkey **old_keys; size_t nold; }; static void hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { size_t i; if (ctx == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]); free(ctx->keys); free(ctx->keys_seen); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]); free(ctx->old_keys); free(ctx->host_str); free(ctx->ip_str); free(ctx); } static int hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i; struct sshkey **tmp; if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL) return 0; /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) { debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum); ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1; return 0; } } /* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */ debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold, ctx->nold + 1, sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL) fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nold = %zu", __func__, ctx->nold); ctx->old_keys = tmp; ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key; l->key = NULL; return 0; } static void hostkey_change_preamble(LogLevel loglevel) { do_log2(loglevel, "The server has updated its host keys."); do_log2(loglevel, "These changes were verified by the server's " "existing trusted key."); } static void update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { int r, was_raw = 0, first = 1; int asking = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK; LogLevel loglevel = asking ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; char *fp, *response; size_t i; struct stat sb; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); if (first && asking) hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel); do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp); first = 0; free(fp); } for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); if (first && asking) hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel); do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s", sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp); first = 0; free(fp); } if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) { leave_raw_mode(1); was_raw = 1; } response = NULL; for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) { free(response); response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? " "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO); if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0) break; else if (quit_pending || response == NULL || strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) { options.update_hostkeys = 0; break; } else { do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter " "\"yes\" or \"no\""); } } if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL) options.update_hostkeys = 0; free(response); if (was_raw) enter_raw_mode(1); } if (options.update_hostkeys == 0) return; /* * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't * cancel the operation). */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) { /* * NB. keys are only added to hostfiles[0], for the rest we * just delete the hostname entries. */ if (stat(options.user_hostfiles[i], &sb) != 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) { debug("%s: known hosts file %s does not exist", __func__, strerror(errno)); } else { error("%s: known hosts file %s inaccessible", __func__, strerror(errno)); } continue; } if ((r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, i == 0 ? ctx->keys : NULL, i == 0 ? ctx->nkeys : 0, options.hash_known_hosts, 0, options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) { error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed for %s: %s", __func__, options.user_hostfiles[i], ssh_err(r)); } } } static void client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) { struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i, ndone; struct sshbuf *signdata; int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype; const u_char *sig; size_t siglen; if (ctx->nnew == 0) fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */ if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { error("Server failed to confirm ownership of " "private host keys"); hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); return; } kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain( sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)); if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */ if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0) fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__); /* * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0. */ for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_seen[i]) continue; /* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */ sshbuf_reset(signdata); if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0) fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Extract and verify signature */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated * during KEX to the default (SHA1). */ use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA && sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA; if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata), use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu", __func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i); goto out; } /* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */ ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2; ndone++; } if (ndone != ctx->nnew) fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__, ndone, ctx->nnew); /* Shouldn't happen */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: protocol error", __func__); goto out; } /* Make the edits to known_hosts */ update_known_hosts(ctx); out: hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); } /* * Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms. * Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names. */ static int key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key) { const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key); const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms; if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC) return 0; if (key->type == KEY_RSA && (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 || match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1)) return 1; return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1; } /* * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's * HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted. */ static int client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { const u_char *blob = NULL; size_t i, len = 0; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp; int r; char *fp; static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */ extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL; if (hostkeys_seen) fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__); if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK && options.batch_mode) return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */ if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0) return 1; ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx)); while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) { do_log2(r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); continue; } fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); free(fp); if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) { debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } /* Skip certs */ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } /* Ensure keys are unique */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) { error("%s: received duplicated %s host key", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); goto out; } } /* Key is good, record it */ if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL) fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu", __func__, ctx->nkeys); ctx->keys = tmp; ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key; key = NULL; } if (ctx->nkeys == 0) { debug("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__); goto out; } if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys, sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL) fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__); get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL, options.port, &ctx->host_str, options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL); /* Find which keys we already know about. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) { debug("%s: searching %s for %s / %s", __func__, options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)"); if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i], hostkeys_find, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) { debug("%s: hostkeys file %s does not exist", __func__, options.user_hostfiles[i]); continue; } error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s", __func__, options.user_hostfiles[i], ssh_err(r)); goto out; } } /* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */ ctx->nnew = 0; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (!ctx->keys_seen[i]) ctx->nnew++; } debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove", __func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold); if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) { /* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */ update_known_hosts(ctx); } else if (ctx->nnew != 0) { /* * We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server. * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves. */ debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys", __func__, ctx->nnew); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */ fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_seen[i]) continue; sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); client_register_global_confirm( client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx); ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */ } /* Success */ out: hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(buf); /* * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know * what the client does with its hosts file. */ return 1; } static int client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { char *rtype; u_char want_reply; int r, success = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0) goto out; debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply); if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0) success = client_input_hostkeys(ssh); if (want_reply) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: free(rtype); return r; } void client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, struct sshbuf *cmd, char **env) { int i, j, matched, len, r; char *name, *val; Channel *c = NULL; debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id); if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d: unknown channel", __func__, id); ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, want_tty, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if (want_tty) { struct winsize ws; /* Store window size in the packet. */ if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1) memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "pty-req", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, term != NULL ? term : "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0) fatal("%s: build packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (tiop == NULL) tiop = get_saved_tio(); ssh_tty_make_modes(ssh, -1, tiop); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* XXX wait for reply */ c->client_tty = 1; } /* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */ if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) { debug("Sending environment."); for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Split */ name = xstrdup(env[i]); if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { free(name); continue; } *val++ = '\0'; matched = 0; for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) { matched = 1; break; } } if (!matched) { debug3("Ignored env %s", name); free(name); continue; } debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } free(name); } } for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { /* Split */ name = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]); if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { free(name); continue; } *val++ = '\0'; debug("Setting env %s = %s", name, val); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(name); } len = sshbuf_len(cmd); if (len > 0) { if (len > 900) len = 900; if (want_subsystem) { debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "subsystem", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "subsystem", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } else { debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "exec", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, cmd)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send command: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { channel_request_start(ssh, id, "shell", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal("%s: send shell request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } } static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request); /* rekeying */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); /* global request reply messages */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply); } void client_stop_mux(void) { if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we * should close when all active channels are closed. */ if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) { session_closed = 1; setproctitle("[stopped mux]"); } } /* client specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); leave_non_blocking(); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); ssh_kill_proxy_command(); _exit(i); } openssh-8.2p1/clientloop.h010064400017500001750000000073041362136622600140060ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.36 2018/07/09 21:03:30 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include struct ssh; /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */ int client_loop(struct ssh *, int, int, int); int client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int, char **, char **); void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *); void client_session2_setup(struct ssh *, int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *, int, struct sshbuf *, char **); char *client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *, int, int, int); void client_stop_mux(void); /* Escape filter for protocol 2 sessions */ void *client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int); void client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, void *); int client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *, Channel *, char *, int); /* Global request confirmation callbacks */ typedef void global_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, u_int32_t, void *); void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *, void *); /* Channel request confirmation callbacks */ enum confirm_action { CONFIRM_WARN = 0, CONFIRM_CLOSE, CONFIRM_TTY }; void client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *, int, const char *, enum confirm_action); /* Multiplexing protocol version */ #define SSHMUX_VER 4 /* Multiplexing control protocol flags */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN 1 /* Open new connection */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK 2 /* Check master is alive */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE 3 /* Ask master to exit */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD 4 /* Open stdio fwd (ssh -W) */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD 5 /* Forward only, no command */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP 6 /* Disable mux but not conn */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD 7 /* Cancel forwarding(s) */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY 8 /* Open new connection */ void muxserver_listen(struct ssh *); int muxclient(const char *); void mux_exit_message(struct ssh *, Channel *, int); void mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *); openssh-8.2p1/compat.c010064400017500001750000000151731362136622600131170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.113 2018/08/13 02:41:05 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "match.h" #include "kex.h" int datafellows = 0; /* datafellows bug compatibility */ u_int compat_datafellows(const char *version) { int i; static struct { char *pat; int bugs; } check[] = { { "OpenSSH_2.*," "OpenSSH_3.0*," "OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE }, { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_2*," "OpenSSH_3*," "OpenSSH_4*", SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE }, { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_6.5*," "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_7.0*," "OpenSSH_7.1*," "OpenSSH_7.2*," "OpenSSH_7.3*," "OpenSSH_7.4*," "OpenSSH_7.5*," "OpenSSH_7.6*," "OpenSSH_7.7*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH }, { "*MindTerm*", 0 }, { "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, { "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, { "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, { "1.2.18*," "1.2.19*," "1.2.20*," "1.2.21*," "1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, { "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */ SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, { "Cisco-1.*", SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE| SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, { "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */ SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*OSU_0*," "OSU_1.0*," "OSU_1.1*," "OSU_1.2*," "OSU_1.3*," "OSU_1.4*," "OSU_1.5alpha1*," "OSU_1.5alpha2*," "OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*SSH_Version_Mapper*", SSH_BUG_SCANNER }, { "PuTTY_Local:*," /* dev versions < Sep 2014 */ "PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */ "PuTTY_Release_0.5*," /* 0.58-0.59 */ "PuTTY_Release_0.60*," "PuTTY_Release_0.61*," "PuTTY_Release_0.62*," "PuTTY_Release_0.63*," "PuTTY_Release_0.64*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { "FuTTY*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, /* Putty Fork */ { "Probe-*", SSH_BUG_PROBE }, { "TeraTerm SSH*," "TTSSH/1.5.*," "TTSSH/2.1*," "TTSSH/2.2*," "TTSSH/2.3*," "TTSSH/2.4*," "TTSSH/2.5*," "TTSSH/2.6*," "TTSSH/2.70*," "TTSSH/2.71*," "TTSSH/2.72*", SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, { "WinSCP_release_4*," "WinSCP_release_5.0*," "WinSCP_release_5.1," "WinSCP_release_5.1.*," "WinSCP_release_5.5," "WinSCP_release_5.5.*," "WinSCP_release_5.6," "WinSCP_release_5.6.*," "WinSCP_release_5.7," "WinSCP_release_5.7.1," "WinSCP_release_5.7.2," "WinSCP_release_5.7.3," "WinSCP_release_5.7.4", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { "ConfD-*", SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE }, { "Twisted_*", 0 }, { "Twisted*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, { NULL, 0 } }; /* process table, return first match */ for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) { if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) { debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x", version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs); datafellows = check[i].bugs; /* XXX for now */ return check[i].bugs; } } debug("no match: %s", version); return 0; } #define SEP "," int proto_spec(const char *spec) { char *s, *p, *q; int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; if (spec == NULL) return ret; q = s = strdup(spec); if (s == NULL) return ret; for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) { switch (atoi(p)) { case 2: ret |= SSH_PROTO_2; break; default: logit("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p); break; } } free(s); return ret; } char * compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop) { if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES)) return cipher_prop; debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop); if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_blacklist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL) fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed"); debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop); if (*cipher_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported ciphers found"); return cipher_prop; } char * compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop) { if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5)) return pkalg_prop; debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop); if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_blacklist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL) fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed"); debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop); if (*pkalg_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported PK algorithms found"); return pkalg_prop; } char * compat_kex_proposal(char *p) { if ((datafellows & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0) return p; debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0) if ((p = match_filter_blacklist(p, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL) fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed"); if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) { if ((p = match_filter_blacklist(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL) fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed"); } debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p); if (*p == '\0') fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found"); return p; } openssh-8.2p1/compat.h010064400017500001750000000054211362136622600131170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.54 2018/08/13 02:41:05 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef COMPAT_H #define COMPAT_H #define SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN 0x00 #define SSH_PROTO_1 0x01 #define SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED 0x02 #define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04 #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE 0x00000001 #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE 0x00000002 /* #define unused 0x00000004 */ /* #define unused 0x00000008 */ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010 /* #define unused 0x00000020 */ #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040 /* #define unused 0x00000080 */ #define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100 /* #define unused 0x00000200 */ #define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400 #define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800 #define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000 #define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000 #define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000 #define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000 /* #define unused 0x00010000 */ /* #define unused 0x00020000 */ /* #define unused 0x00040000 */ /* #define unused 0x00100000 */ #define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000 #define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000 /* #define unused 0x00800000 */ #define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000 /* #define unused 0x02000000 */ #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000 #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000 #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000 #define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000 #define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000 u_int compat_datafellows(const char *); int proto_spec(const char *); char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *); char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *); char *compat_kex_proposal(char *); extern int datafellows; #endif openssh-8.2p1/config.guess010075500017500001750000001253651362136622600140150ustar00djmdjm#! /bin/sh # Attempt to guess a canonical system name. # Copyright 1992-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc. timestamp='2016-05-15' # This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it # under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or # (at your option) any later version. # # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but # WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 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We still # use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated. # Portable tmp directory creation inspired by the Autoconf team. set_cc_for_build=' trap "exitcode=\$?; (rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null) && exit \$exitcode" 0 ; trap "rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null; exit 1" 1 2 13 15 ; : ${TMPDIR=/tmp} ; { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } || { test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) ; } || { tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } || { echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; } ; dummy=$tmp/dummy ; tmpfiles="$dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy" ; case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in ,,) echo "int x;" > $dummy.c ; for c in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do if ($c -c -o $dummy.o $dummy.c) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break ; fi ; done ; if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found ; fi ;; ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;; ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;; esac ; set_cc_for_build= ;' # This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe. # (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24) if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH fi UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown case "${UNAME_SYSTEM}" in Linux|GNU|GNU/*) # If the system lacks a compiler, then just pick glibc. # We could probably try harder. LIBC=gnu eval $set_cc_for_build cat <<-EOF > $dummy.c #include #if defined(__UCLIBC__) LIBC=uclibc #elif defined(__dietlibc__) LIBC=dietlibc #else LIBC=gnu #endif EOF eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^LIBC' | sed 's, ,,g'` ;; esac # Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive. case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in *:NetBSD:*:*) # NetBSD (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or # more of the tuples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*, # *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*. For targets that recently # switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old # object file format. This provides both forward # compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the # object file format. # # Note: NetBSD doesn't particularly care about the vendor # portion of the name. We always set it to "unknown". sysctl="sysctl -n hw.machine_arch" UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`(uname -p 2>/dev/null || \ /sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \ /usr/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \ echo unknown)` case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in armeb) machine=armeb-unknown ;; arm*) machine=arm-unknown ;; sh3el) machine=shl-unknown ;; sh3eb) machine=sh-unknown ;; sh5el) machine=sh5le-unknown ;; earmv*) arch=`echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH} | sed -e 's,^e\(armv[0-9]\).*$,\1,'` endian=`echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH} | sed -ne 's,^.*\(eb\)$,\1,p'` machine=${arch}${endian}-unknown ;; *) machine=${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown ;; esac # The Operating System including object format, if it has switched # to ELF recently (or will in the future) and ABI. case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in earm*) os=netbsdelf ;; arm*|i386|m68k|ns32k|sh3*|sparc|vax) eval $set_cc_for_build if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \ | grep -q __ELF__ then # Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout). # Return netbsd for either. 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I hope that # covers most systems running today. This code pipes the CPU # types through head -n 1, so we only detect the type of CPU 0. ALPHA_CPU_TYPE=`/usr/sbin/psrinfo -v | sed -n -e 's/^ The alpha \(.*\) processor.*$/\1/p' | head -n 1` case "$ALPHA_CPU_TYPE" in "EV4 (21064)") UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;; "EV4.5 (21064)") UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;; "LCA4 (21066/21068)") UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;; "EV5 (21164)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;; "EV5.6 (21164A)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;; "EV5.6 (21164PC)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;; "EV5.7 (21164PC)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca57 ;; "EV6 (21264)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;; "EV6.7 (21264A)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;; "EV6.8CB (21264C)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;; "EV6.8AL (21264B)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;; "EV6.8CX (21264D)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;; "EV6.9A (21264/EV69A)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev69 ;; "EV7 (21364)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev7 ;; "EV7.9 (21364A)") UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev79 ;; esac # A Pn.n version is a patched version. # A Vn.n version is a released version. # A Tn.n version is a released field test version. # A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel. # 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r. echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[PVTX]//' | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz` # Reset EXIT trap before exiting to avoid spurious non-zero exit code. exitcode=$? trap '' 0 exit $exitcode ;; Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*) # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem? # Should we change UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead # of the specific Alpha model? echo alpha-pc-interix exit ;; 21064:Windows_NT:50:3) echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5 exit ;; Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*) echo m68k-unknown-sysv4 exit ;; *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos exit ;; *:[Mm]orph[Oo][Ss]:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-morphos exit ;; *:OS/390:*:*) echo i370-ibm-openedition exit ;; *:z/VM:*:*) echo s390-ibm-zvmoe exit ;; *:OS400:*:*) echo powerpc-ibm-os400 exit ;; arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*) echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; arm*:riscos:*:*|arm*:RISCOS:*:*) echo arm-unknown-riscos exit ;; SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*) echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp exit ;; Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*) # akee@wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE. if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3 else echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd fi exit ;; NILE*:*:*:dcosx) echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4 exit ;; DRS?6000:unix:4.0:6*) echo sparc-icl-nx6 exit ;; DRS?6000:UNIX_SV:4.2*:7* | DRS?6000:isis:4.2*:7*) case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in sparc) echo sparc-icl-nx7; exit ;; esac ;; s390x:SunOS:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*) echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*) echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; i86pc:AuroraUX:5.*:* | i86xen:AuroraUX:5.*:*) echo i386-pc-auroraux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; i86pc:SunOS:5.*:* | i86xen:SunOS:5.*:*) eval $set_cc_for_build SUN_ARCH=i386 # If there is a compiler, see if it is configured for 64-bit objects. # Note that the Sun cc does not turn __LP64__ into 1 like gcc does. # This test works for both compilers. if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != no_compiler_found ]; then if (echo '#ifdef __amd64'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \ (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \ grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null then SUN_ARCH=x86_64 fi fi echo ${SUN_ARCH}-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; sun4*:SunOS:6*:*) # According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize # SunOS6. Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but # it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4. echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; sun4*:SunOS:*:*) case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in Series*|S4*) UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v` ;; esac # Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'. echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'` exit ;; sun3*:SunOS:*:*) echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; sun*:*:4.2BSD:*) UNAME_RELEASE=`(sed 1q /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null` test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = x && UNAME_RELEASE=3 case "`/bin/arch`" in sun3) echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} ;; sun4) echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} ;; esac exit ;; aushp:SunOS:*:*) echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; # The situation for MiNT is a little confusing. The machine name # can be virtually everything (everything which is not # "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor # > m68000). The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT" # to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint"). Finally # the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not # MiNT. But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should # be no problem. atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-milan-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-hades-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-unknown-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; m68k:machten:*:*) echo m68k-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; powerpc:machten:*:*) echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; RISC*:Mach:*:*) echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3 exit ;; RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*) echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*) echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; 2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*) echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos) eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #ifdef __cplusplus #include /* for printf() prototype */ int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { #else int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { #endif #if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB) #if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV) printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0); #endif #if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4) printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0); #endif #if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD) printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0); #endif #endif exit (-1); } EOF $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && dummyarg=`echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy $dummyarg` && { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; } echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*) echo powerpc-motorola-powermax exit ;; Motorola:*:4.3:PL8-*) echo powerpc-harris-powermax exit ;; Night_Hawk:*:*:PowerMAX_OS | Synergy:PowerMAX_OS:*:*) echo powerpc-harris-powermax exit ;; Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*) echo powerpc-harris-powerunix exit ;; m88k:CX/UX:7*:*) echo m88k-harris-cxux7 exit ;; m88k:*:4*:R4*) echo m88k-motorola-sysv4 exit ;; m88k:*:3*:R3*) echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 exit ;; AViiON:dgux:*:*) # DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p` if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 ] || [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ] then if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \ [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ] then echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} else echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE} fi else echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} fi exit ;; M88*:DolphinOS:*:*) # DolphinOS (SVR3) echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3 exit ;; M88*:*:R3*:*) # Delta 88k system running SVR3 echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 exit ;; XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3) echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3 exit ;; Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD) echo m68k-tektronix-bsd exit ;; *:IRIX*:*:*) echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'` exit ;; ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2) # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX. echo romp-ibm-aix # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id exit ;; # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX ' i*86:AIX:*:*) echo i386-ibm-aix exit ;; ia64:AIX:*:*) if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel` else IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE} fi echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} exit ;; *:AIX:2:3) if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #include main() { if (!__power_pc()) exit(1); puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5"); exit(0); } EOF if $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` then echo "$SYSTEM_NAME" else echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5 fi elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4 else echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2 fi exit ;; *:AIX:*:[4567]) IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'` if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then IBM_ARCH=rs6000 else IBM_ARCH=powerpc fi if [ -x /usr/bin/lslpp ] ; then IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/lslpp -Lqc bos.rte.libc | awk -F: '{ print $3 }' | sed s/[0-9]*$/0/` else IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE} fi echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} exit ;; *:AIX:*:*) echo rs6000-ibm-aix exit ;; ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4 exit ;; ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) # covers RT/PC BSD and echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE} # 4.3 with uname added to exit ;; # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3 *:BOSX:*:*) echo rs6000-bull-bosx exit ;; DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*) echo m68k-bull-sysv3 exit ;; 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*) echo m68k-hp-bsd exit ;; hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*) echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4 exit ;; 9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*) HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in 9000/31? ) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;; 9000/[34]?? ) HP_ARCH=m68k ;; 9000/[678][0-9][0-9]) if [ -x /usr/bin/getconf ]; then sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null` sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null` case "${sc_cpu_version}" in 523) HP_ARCH=hppa1.0 ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0 528) HP_ARCH=hppa1.1 ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1 532) # CPU_PA_RISC2_0 case "${sc_kernel_bits}" in 32) HP_ARCH=hppa2.0n ;; 64) HP_ARCH=hppa2.0w ;; '') HP_ARCH=hppa2.0 ;; # HP-UX 10.20 esac ;; esac fi if [ "${HP_ARCH}" = "" ]; then eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #define _HPUX_SOURCE #include #include int main () { #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS); #endif long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); switch (cpu) { case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break; case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) switch (bits) { case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break; case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break; default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break; } break; #else /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */ puts ("hppa2.0"); break; #endif default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; } exit (0); } EOF (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`$dummy` test -z "$HP_ARCH" && HP_ARCH=hppa fi ;; esac if [ ${HP_ARCH} = hppa2.0w ] then eval $set_cc_for_build # hppa2.0w-hp-hpux* has a 64-bit kernel and a compiler generating # 32-bit code. hppa64-hp-hpux* has the same kernel and a compiler # generating 64-bit code. GNU and HP use different nomenclature: # # $ CC_FOR_BUILD=cc ./config.guess # => hppa2.0w-hp-hpux11.23 # $ CC_FOR_BUILD="cc +DA2.0w" ./config.guess # => hppa64-hp-hpux11.23 if echo __LP64__ | (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | grep -q __LP64__ then HP_ARCH=hppa2.0w else HP_ARCH=hppa64 fi fi echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} exit ;; ia64:HP-UX:*:*) HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` echo ia64-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} exit ;; 3050*:HI-UX:*:*) eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #include int main () { long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0. CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct results, however. */ if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu)) { switch (cpu) { case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; } } else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu)) puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); exit (0); } EOF $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` && { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; } echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2 exit ;; 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* ) echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd exit ;; 9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*) echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd exit ;; *9??*:MPE/iX:*:* | *3000*:MPE/iX:*:*) echo hppa1.0-hp-mpeix exit ;; hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* ) echo hppa1.1-hp-osf exit ;; hp8??:OSF1:*:*) echo hppa1.0-hp-osf exit ;; i*86:OSF1:*:*) if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk else echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1 fi exit ;; parisc*:Lites*:*:*) echo hppa1.1-hp-lites exit ;; C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*) echo c1-convex-bsd exit ;; C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*) if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc then echo c32-convex-bsd else echo c2-convex-bsd fi exit ;; C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*) echo c34-convex-bsd exit ;; C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*) echo c38-convex-bsd exit ;; C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*) echo c4-convex-bsd exit ;; CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*) echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \ | sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \ -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ \ -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; CRAY*TS:*:*:*) echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; CRAY*T3E:*:*:*) echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; CRAY*SV1:*:*:*) echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; *:UNICOS/mp:*:*) echo craynv-cray-unicosmp${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*) FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz` FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/\///'` FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'` echo "${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}" exit ;; 5000:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/\///'` FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/ /_/'` echo "sparc-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}" exit ;; i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*) echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:BSD/OS:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:FreeBSD:*:*) UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p` case ${UNAME_PROCESSOR} in amd64) echo x86_64-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;; *) echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;; esac exit ;; i*:CYGWIN*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin exit ;; *:MINGW64*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw64 exit ;; *:MINGW*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32 exit ;; *:MSYS*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msys exit ;; i*:windows32*:*) # uname -m includes "-pc" on this system. echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-mingw32 exit ;; i*:PW*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32 exit ;; *:Interix*:*) case ${UNAME_MACHINE} in x86) echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; authenticamd | genuineintel | EM64T) echo x86_64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; IA64) echo ia64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; esac ;; [345]86:Windows_95:* | [345]86:Windows_98:* | [345]86:Windows_NT:*) echo i${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mks exit ;; 8664:Windows_NT:*) echo x86_64-pc-mks exit ;; i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*) # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem? # It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we # UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead of i386? echo i586-pc-interix exit ;; i*:UWIN*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin exit ;; amd64:CYGWIN*:*:* | x86_64:CYGWIN*:*:*) echo x86_64-unknown-cygwin exit ;; p*:CYGWIN*:*) echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin exit ;; prep*:SunOS:5.*:*) echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; *:GNU:*:*) # the GNU system echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-${LIBC}`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'` exit ;; *:GNU/*:*:*) # other systems with GNU libc and userland echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-`echo ${UNAME_SYSTEM} | sed 's,^[^/]*/,,' | tr "[:upper:]" "[:lower:]"``echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`-${LIBC} exit ;; i*86:Minix:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix exit ;; aarch64:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; aarch64_be:Linux:*:*) UNAME_MACHINE=aarch64_be echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; alpha:Linux:*:*) case `sed -n '/^cpu model/s/^.*: \(.*\)/\1/p' < /proc/cpuinfo` in EV5) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;; EV56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;; PCA56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;; PCA57) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;; EV6) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;; EV67) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;; EV68*) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;; esac objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep -q ld.so.1 if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC=gnulibc1 ; fi echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; arc:Linux:*:* | arceb:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; arm*:Linux:*:*) eval $set_cc_for_build if echo __ARM_EABI__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \ | grep -q __ARM_EABI__ then echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} else if echo __ARM_PCS_VFP | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \ | grep -q __ARM_PCS_VFP then echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}eabi else echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}eabihf fi fi exit ;; avr32*:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; cris:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; crisv32:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; e2k:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; frv:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; hexagon:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; i*86:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; ia64:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; k1om:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; m32r*:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; m68*:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} exit ;; mips:Linux:*:* | mips64:Linux:*:*) eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #undef CPU #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE} #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}el #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL) CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}el #else #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB) CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE} #else CPU= #endif #endif EOF eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^CPU'` test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}"; 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exit; } /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep pteron >/dev/null \ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;; m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*) echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) echo m68k-atari-sysv4 exit ;; TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*) echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*) echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*) echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*) echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*) echo mips-sni-sysv4 exit ;; RM*:SINIX-*:*:*) echo mips-sni-sysv4 exit ;; *:SINIX-*:*:*) if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null` echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4 else echo ns32k-sni-sysv fi exit ;; PENTIUM:*:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort # says echo i586-unisys-sysv4 exit ;; *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*) # From Gerald Hewes . # How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4 exit ;; *:*:*:FTX*) # From seanf@swdc.stratus.com. echo i860-stratus-sysv4 exit ;; i*86:VOS:*:*) # From Paul.Green@stratus.com. echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-stratus-vos exit ;; *:VOS:*:*) # From Paul.Green@stratus.com. echo hppa1.1-stratus-vos exit ;; mc68*:A/UX:*:*) echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*) echo mips-sony-newsos6 exit ;; R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*) if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} else echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} fi exit ;; BeBox:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only. echo powerpc-be-beos exit ;; BeMac:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only. echo powerpc-apple-beos exit ;; BePC:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Intel PC compatible. echo i586-pc-beos exit ;; BePC:Haiku:*:*) # Haiku running on Intel PC compatible. echo i586-pc-haiku exit ;; x86_64:Haiku:*:*) echo x86_64-unknown-haiku exit ;; SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-6:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx6-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-7:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx7-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-8:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx8-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-8R:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx8r-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-ACE:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sxace-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; Power*:Rhapsody:*:*) echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:Rhapsody:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:Darwin:*:*) UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` || UNAME_PROCESSOR=unknown eval $set_cc_for_build if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = unknown ; then UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc fi if test `echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\..*//'` -le 10 ; then if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != no_compiler_found ]; then if (echo '#ifdef __LP64__'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \ (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \ grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null then case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in i386) UNAME_PROCESSOR=x86_64 ;; powerpc) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc64 ;; esac fi fi elif test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = i386 ; then # Avoid executing cc on OS X 10.9, as it ships with a stub # that puts up a graphical alert prompting to install # developer tools. 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See the GNU # General Public License for more details. # # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License # along with this program; if not, see . # # As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you # distribute this file as part of a program that contains a # configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under # the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that # program. This Exception is an additional permission under section 7 # of the GNU General Public License, version 3 ("GPLv3"). # Please send patches to . # # Configuration subroutine to validate and canonicalize a configuration type. # Supply the specified configuration type as an argument. # If it is invalid, we print an error message on stderr and exit with code 1. # Otherwise, we print the canonical config type on stdout and succeed. # You can get the latest version of this script from: # http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.sub # This file is supposed to be the same for all GNU packages # and recognize all the CPU types, system types and aliases # that are meaningful with *any* GNU software. # Each package is responsible for reporting which valid configurations # it does not support. The user should be able to distinguish # a failure to support a valid configuration from a meaningless # configuration. # The goal of this file is to map all the various variations of a given # machine specification into a single specification in the form: # CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM # or in some cases, the newer four-part form: # CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM # It is wrong to echo any other type of specification. me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'` usage="\ Usage: $0 [OPTION] CPU-MFR-OPSYS or ALIAS Canonicalize a configuration name. Operation modes: -h, --help print this help, then exit -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit -v, --version print version number, then exit Report bugs and patches to ." version="\ GNU config.sub ($timestamp) Copyright 1992-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. 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We also ### recognize some manufacturers as not being operating systems, so we ### can provide default operating systems below. case $os in -sun*os*) # Prevent following clause from handling this invalid input. ;; -dec* | -mips* | -sequent* | -encore* | -pc532* | -sgi* | -sony* | \ -att* | -7300* | -3300* | -delta* | -motorola* | -sun[234]* | \ -unicom* | -ibm* | -next | -hp | -isi* | -apollo | -altos* | \ -convergent* | -ncr* | -news | -32* | -3600* | -3100* | -hitachi* |\ -c[123]* | -convex* | -sun | -crds | -omron* | -dg | -ultra | -tti* | \ -harris | -dolphin | -highlevel | -gould | -cbm | -ns | -masscomp | \ -apple | -axis | -knuth | -cray | -microblaze*) os= basic_machine=$1 ;; -bluegene*) os=-cnk ;; -sim | -cisco | -oki | -wec | -winbond) os= basic_machine=$1 ;; -scout) ;; -wrs) os=-vxworks basic_machine=$1 ;; -chorusos*) os=-chorusos basic_machine=$1 ;; -chorusrdb) os=-chorusrdb basic_machine=$1 ;; -hiux*) os=-hiuxwe2 ;; -sco6) os=-sco5v6 basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` ;; -sco5) os=-sco3.2v5 basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` ;; -sco4) os=-sco3.2v4 basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` ;; -sco3.2.[4-9]*) os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/sco3.2./sco3.2v/'` basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` ;; -sco3.2v[4-9]*) # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer. basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` ;; -sco5v6*) # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer. basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` ;; -sco*) os=-sco3.2v2 basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` ;; -udk*) basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` ;; -isc) os=-isc2.2 basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` ;; -clix*) basic_machine=clipper-intergraph ;; -isc*) basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` ;; -lynx*178) os=-lynxos178 ;; -lynx*5) os=-lynxos5 ;; -lynx*) os=-lynxos ;; -ptx*) basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-sequent/'` ;; -windowsnt*) os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/windowsnt/winnt/'` ;; -psos*) os=-psos ;; -mint | -mint[0-9]*) basic_machine=m68k-atari os=-mint ;; esac # Decode aliases for certain CPU-COMPANY combinations. case $basic_machine in # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name. # Some are omitted here because they have special meanings below. 1750a | 580 \ | a29k \ | aarch64 | aarch64_be \ | alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphaev6[78] | alphapca5[67] \ | alpha64 | alpha64ev[4-8] | alpha64ev56 | alpha64ev6[78] | alpha64pca5[67] \ | am33_2.0 \ | arc | arceb \ | arm | arm[bl]e | arme[lb] | armv[2-8] | armv[3-8][lb] | armv7[arm] \ | avr | avr32 \ | ba \ | be32 | be64 \ | bfin \ | c4x | c8051 | clipper \ | d10v | d30v | dlx | dsp16xx \ | e2k | epiphany \ | fido | fr30 | frv | ft32 \ | h8300 | h8500 | hppa | hppa1.[01] | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0[nw] | hppa64 \ | hexagon \ | i370 | i860 | i960 | ia64 \ | ip2k | iq2000 \ | k1om \ | le32 | le64 \ | lm32 \ | m32c | m32r | m32rle | m68000 | m68k | m88k \ | maxq | mb | microblaze | microblazeel | mcore | mep | metag \ | mips | mipsbe | mipseb | mipsel | mipsle \ | mips16 \ | mips64 | mips64el \ | mips64octeon | mips64octeonel \ | mips64orion | mips64orionel \ | mips64r5900 | mips64r5900el \ | mips64vr | mips64vrel \ | mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \ | mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el \ | mips64vr5000 | mips64vr5000el \ | mips64vr5900 | mips64vr5900el \ | mipsisa32 | mipsisa32el \ | mipsisa32r2 | mipsisa32r2el \ | mipsisa32r6 | mipsisa32r6el \ | mipsisa64 | mipsisa64el \ | mipsisa64r2 | mipsisa64r2el \ | mipsisa64r6 | mipsisa64r6el \ | mipsisa64sb1 | mipsisa64sb1el \ | mipsisa64sr71k | mipsisa64sr71kel \ | mipsr5900 | mipsr5900el \ | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \ | mn10200 | mn10300 \ | moxie \ | mt \ | msp430 \ | nds32 | nds32le | nds32be \ | nios | nios2 | nios2eb | nios2el \ | ns16k | ns32k \ | open8 | or1k | or1knd | or32 \ | pdp10 | pdp11 | pj | pjl \ | powerpc | powerpc64 | powerpc64le | powerpcle \ | pyramid \ | riscv32 | riscv64 \ | rl78 | rx \ | score \ | sh | sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[24]aeb | sh[23]e | sh[234]eb | sheb | shbe | shle | sh[1234]le | sh3ele \ | sh64 | sh64le \ | sparc | sparc64 | sparc64b | sparc64v | sparc86x | sparclet | sparclite \ | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v \ | spu \ | tahoe | tic4x | tic54x | tic55x | tic6x | tic80 | tron \ | ubicom32 \ | v850 | v850e | v850e1 | v850e2 | v850es | v850e2v3 \ | visium \ | we32k \ | x86 | xc16x | xstormy16 | xtensa \ | z8k | z80) basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown ;; c54x) basic_machine=tic54x-unknown ;; c55x) basic_machine=tic55x-unknown ;; c6x) basic_machine=tic6x-unknown ;; leon|leon[3-9]) basic_machine=sparc-$basic_machine ;; m6811 | m68hc11 | m6812 | m68hc12 | m68hcs12x | nvptx | picochip) basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown os=-none ;; m88110 | m680[12346]0 | m683?2 | m68360 | m5200 | v70 | w65 | z8k) ;; ms1) basic_machine=mt-unknown ;; strongarm | thumb | xscale) basic_machine=arm-unknown ;; xgate) basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown os=-none ;; xscaleeb) basic_machine=armeb-unknown ;; xscaleel) basic_machine=armel-unknown ;; # We use `pc' rather than `unknown' # because (1) that's what they normally are, and # (2) the word "unknown" tends to confuse beginning users. i*86 | x86_64) basic_machine=$basic_machine-pc ;; # Object if more than one company name word. *-*-*) echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2 exit 1 ;; # Recognize the basic CPU types with company name. 580-* \ | a29k-* \ | aarch64-* | aarch64_be-* \ | alpha-* | alphaev[4-8]-* | alphaev56-* | alphaev6[78]-* \ | alpha64-* | alpha64ev[4-8]-* | alpha64ev56-* | alpha64ev6[78]-* \ | alphapca5[67]-* | alpha64pca5[67]-* | arc-* | arceb-* \ | arm-* | armbe-* | armle-* | armeb-* | armv*-* \ | avr-* | avr32-* \ | ba-* \ | be32-* | be64-* \ | bfin-* | bs2000-* \ | c[123]* | c30-* | [cjt]90-* | c4x-* \ | c8051-* | clipper-* | craynv-* | cydra-* \ | d10v-* | d30v-* | dlx-* \ | e2k-* | elxsi-* \ | f30[01]-* | f700-* | fido-* | fr30-* | frv-* | fx80-* \ | h8300-* | h8500-* \ | hppa-* | hppa1.[01]-* | hppa2.0-* | hppa2.0[nw]-* | hppa64-* \ | hexagon-* \ | i*86-* | i860-* | i960-* | ia64-* \ | ip2k-* | iq2000-* \ | k1om-* \ | le32-* | le64-* \ | lm32-* \ | m32c-* | m32r-* | m32rle-* \ | m68000-* | m680[012346]0-* | m68360-* | m683?2-* | m68k-* \ | m88110-* | m88k-* | maxq-* | mcore-* | metag-* \ | microblaze-* | microblazeel-* \ | mips-* | mipsbe-* | mipseb-* | mipsel-* | mipsle-* \ | mips16-* \ | mips64-* | mips64el-* \ | mips64octeon-* | mips64octeonel-* \ | mips64orion-* | mips64orionel-* \ | mips64r5900-* | mips64r5900el-* \ | mips64vr-* | mips64vrel-* \ | mips64vr4100-* | mips64vr4100el-* \ | mips64vr4300-* | mips64vr4300el-* \ | mips64vr5000-* | mips64vr5000el-* \ | mips64vr5900-* | mips64vr5900el-* \ | mipsisa32-* | mipsisa32el-* \ | mipsisa32r2-* | mipsisa32r2el-* \ | mipsisa32r6-* | mipsisa32r6el-* \ | mipsisa64-* | mipsisa64el-* \ | mipsisa64r2-* | mipsisa64r2el-* \ | mipsisa64r6-* | mipsisa64r6el-* \ | mipsisa64sb1-* | mipsisa64sb1el-* \ | mipsisa64sr71k-* | mipsisa64sr71kel-* \ | mipsr5900-* | mipsr5900el-* \ | mipstx39-* | mipstx39el-* \ | mmix-* \ | mt-* \ | msp430-* \ | nds32-* | nds32le-* | nds32be-* \ | nios-* | nios2-* | nios2eb-* | nios2el-* \ | none-* | np1-* | ns16k-* | ns32k-* \ | open8-* \ | or1k*-* \ | orion-* \ | pdp10-* | pdp11-* | pj-* | pjl-* | pn-* | power-* \ | powerpc-* | powerpc64-* | powerpc64le-* | powerpcle-* \ | pyramid-* \ | riscv32-* | riscv64-* \ | rl78-* | romp-* | rs6000-* | rx-* \ | sh-* | sh[1234]-* | sh[24]a-* | sh[24]aeb-* | sh[23]e-* | sh[34]eb-* | sheb-* | shbe-* \ | shle-* | sh[1234]le-* | sh3ele-* | sh64-* | sh64le-* \ | sparc-* | sparc64-* | sparc64b-* | sparc64v-* | sparc86x-* | sparclet-* \ | sparclite-* \ | sparcv8-* | sparcv9-* | sparcv9b-* | sparcv9v-* | sv1-* | sx*-* \ | tahoe-* \ | tic30-* | tic4x-* | tic54x-* | tic55x-* | tic6x-* | tic80-* \ | tile*-* \ | tron-* \ | ubicom32-* \ | v850-* | v850e-* | v850e1-* | v850es-* | v850e2-* | v850e2v3-* \ | vax-* \ | visium-* \ | we32k-* \ | x86-* | x86_64-* | xc16x-* | xps100-* \ | xstormy16-* | xtensa*-* \ | ymp-* \ | z8k-* | z80-*) ;; # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name, with glob match. xtensa*) basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown ;; # Recognize the various machine names and aliases which stand # for a CPU type and a company and sometimes even an OS. 386bsd) basic_machine=i386-unknown os=-bsd ;; 3b1 | 7300 | 7300-att | att-7300 | pc7300 | safari | unixpc) basic_machine=m68000-att ;; 3b*) basic_machine=we32k-att ;; a29khif) basic_machine=a29k-amd os=-udi ;; abacus) basic_machine=abacus-unknown ;; adobe68k) basic_machine=m68010-adobe os=-scout ;; alliant | fx80) basic_machine=fx80-alliant ;; altos | altos3068) basic_machine=m68k-altos ;; am29k) basic_machine=a29k-none os=-bsd ;; amd64) basic_machine=x86_64-pc ;; amd64-*) basic_machine=x86_64-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; amdahl) basic_machine=580-amdahl os=-sysv ;; amiga | amiga-*) basic_machine=m68k-unknown ;; amigaos | amigados) basic_machine=m68k-unknown os=-amigaos ;; amigaunix | amix) basic_machine=m68k-unknown os=-sysv4 ;; apollo68) basic_machine=m68k-apollo os=-sysv ;; apollo68bsd) basic_machine=m68k-apollo os=-bsd ;; aros) basic_machine=i386-pc os=-aros ;; asmjs) basic_machine=asmjs-unknown ;; aux) basic_machine=m68k-apple os=-aux ;; balance) basic_machine=ns32k-sequent os=-dynix ;; blackfin) basic_machine=bfin-unknown os=-linux ;; blackfin-*) basic_machine=bfin-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` os=-linux ;; bluegene*) basic_machine=powerpc-ibm os=-cnk ;; c54x-*) basic_machine=tic54x-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; c55x-*) basic_machine=tic55x-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; c6x-*) basic_machine=tic6x-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; c90) basic_machine=c90-cray os=-unicos ;; cegcc) basic_machine=arm-unknown os=-cegcc ;; convex-c1) basic_machine=c1-convex os=-bsd ;; convex-c2) basic_machine=c2-convex os=-bsd ;; convex-c32) basic_machine=c32-convex os=-bsd ;; convex-c34) basic_machine=c34-convex os=-bsd ;; convex-c38) basic_machine=c38-convex os=-bsd ;; cray | j90) basic_machine=j90-cray os=-unicos ;; craynv) basic_machine=craynv-cray os=-unicosmp ;; cr16 | cr16-*) basic_machine=cr16-unknown os=-elf ;; crds | unos) basic_machine=m68k-crds ;; crisv32 | crisv32-* | etraxfs*) basic_machine=crisv32-axis ;; cris | cris-* | etrax*) basic_machine=cris-axis ;; crx) basic_machine=crx-unknown os=-elf ;; da30 | da30-*) basic_machine=m68k-da30 ;; decstation | decstation-3100 | pmax | pmax-* | pmin | dec3100 | decstatn) basic_machine=mips-dec ;; decsystem10* | dec10*) basic_machine=pdp10-dec os=-tops10 ;; decsystem20* | dec20*) basic_machine=pdp10-dec os=-tops20 ;; delta | 3300 | motorola-3300 | motorola-delta \ | 3300-motorola | delta-motorola) basic_machine=m68k-motorola ;; delta88) basic_machine=m88k-motorola os=-sysv3 ;; dicos) basic_machine=i686-pc os=-dicos ;; djgpp) basic_machine=i586-pc os=-msdosdjgpp ;; dpx20 | dpx20-*) basic_machine=rs6000-bull os=-bosx ;; dpx2* | dpx2*-bull) basic_machine=m68k-bull os=-sysv3 ;; e500v[12]) basic_machine=powerpc-unknown os=$os"spe" ;; e500v[12]-*) basic_machine=powerpc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` os=$os"spe" ;; ebmon29k) basic_machine=a29k-amd os=-ebmon ;; elxsi) basic_machine=elxsi-elxsi os=-bsd ;; encore | umax | mmax) basic_machine=ns32k-encore ;; es1800 | OSE68k | ose68k | ose | OSE) basic_machine=m68k-ericsson os=-ose ;; fx2800) basic_machine=i860-alliant ;; genix) basic_machine=ns32k-ns ;; gmicro) basic_machine=tron-gmicro os=-sysv ;; go32) basic_machine=i386-pc os=-go32 ;; h3050r* | hiux*) basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi os=-hiuxwe2 ;; h8300hms) basic_machine=h8300-hitachi os=-hms ;; h8300xray) basic_machine=h8300-hitachi os=-xray ;; h8500hms) basic_machine=h8500-hitachi os=-hms ;; harris) basic_machine=m88k-harris os=-sysv3 ;; hp300-*) basic_machine=m68k-hp ;; hp300bsd) basic_machine=m68k-hp os=-bsd ;; hp300hpux) basic_machine=m68k-hp os=-hpux ;; hp3k9[0-9][0-9] | hp9[0-9][0-9]) basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp ;; hp9k2[0-9][0-9] | hp9k31[0-9]) basic_machine=m68000-hp ;; hp9k3[2-9][0-9]) basic_machine=m68k-hp ;; hp9k6[0-9][0-9] | hp6[0-9][0-9]) basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp ;; hp9k7[0-79][0-9] | hp7[0-79][0-9]) basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp ;; hp9k78[0-9] | hp78[0-9]) # FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp ;; hp9k8[67]1 | hp8[67]1 | hp9k80[24] | hp80[24] | hp9k8[78]9 | hp8[78]9 | hp9k893 | hp893) # FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp ;; hp9k8[0-9][13679] | hp8[0-9][13679]) basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp ;; hp9k8[0-9][0-9] | hp8[0-9][0-9]) basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp ;; hppa-next) os=-nextstep3 ;; hppaosf) basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp os=-osf ;; hppro) basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp os=-proelf ;; i370-ibm* | ibm*) basic_machine=i370-ibm ;; i*86v32) basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` os=-sysv32 ;; i*86v4*) basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` os=-sysv4 ;; i*86v) basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` os=-sysv ;; i*86sol2) basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` os=-solaris2 ;; i386mach) basic_machine=i386-mach os=-mach ;; i386-vsta | vsta) basic_machine=i386-unknown os=-vsta ;; iris | iris4d) basic_machine=mips-sgi case $os in -irix*) ;; *) os=-irix4 ;; esac ;; isi68 | isi) basic_machine=m68k-isi os=-sysv ;; leon-*|leon[3-9]-*) basic_machine=sparc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/-.*//'` ;; m68knommu) basic_machine=m68k-unknown os=-linux ;; m68knommu-*) basic_machine=m68k-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` os=-linux ;; m88k-omron*) basic_machine=m88k-omron ;; magnum | m3230) basic_machine=mips-mips os=-sysv ;; merlin) basic_machine=ns32k-utek os=-sysv ;; microblaze*) basic_machine=microblaze-xilinx ;; mingw64) basic_machine=x86_64-pc os=-mingw64 ;; mingw32) basic_machine=i686-pc os=-mingw32 ;; mingw32ce) basic_machine=arm-unknown os=-mingw32ce ;; miniframe) basic_machine=m68000-convergent ;; *mint | -mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | *MiNT[0-9]*) basic_machine=m68k-atari os=-mint ;; mips3*-*) basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'` ;; mips3*) basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'`-unknown ;; monitor) basic_machine=m68k-rom68k os=-coff ;; morphos) basic_machine=powerpc-unknown os=-morphos ;; moxiebox) basic_machine=moxie-unknown os=-moxiebox ;; msdos) basic_machine=i386-pc os=-msdos ;; ms1-*) basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/ms1-/mt-/'` ;; msys) basic_machine=i686-pc os=-msys ;; mvs) basic_machine=i370-ibm os=-mvs ;; nacl) basic_machine=le32-unknown os=-nacl ;; ncr3000) basic_machine=i486-ncr os=-sysv4 ;; netbsd386) basic_machine=i386-unknown os=-netbsd ;; netwinder) basic_machine=armv4l-rebel os=-linux ;; news | news700 | news800 | news900) basic_machine=m68k-sony os=-newsos ;; news1000) basic_machine=m68030-sony os=-newsos ;; news-3600 | risc-news) basic_machine=mips-sony os=-newsos ;; necv70) basic_machine=v70-nec os=-sysv ;; next | m*-next ) basic_machine=m68k-next case $os in -nextstep* ) ;; -ns2*) os=-nextstep2 ;; *) os=-nextstep3 ;; esac ;; nh3000) basic_machine=m68k-harris os=-cxux ;; nh[45]000) basic_machine=m88k-harris os=-cxux ;; nindy960) basic_machine=i960-intel os=-nindy ;; mon960) basic_machine=i960-intel os=-mon960 ;; nonstopux) basic_machine=mips-compaq os=-nonstopux ;; np1) basic_machine=np1-gould ;; neo-tandem) basic_machine=neo-tandem ;; nse-tandem) basic_machine=nse-tandem ;; nsr-tandem) basic_machine=nsr-tandem ;; op50n-* | op60c-*) basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki os=-proelf ;; openrisc | openrisc-*) basic_machine=or32-unknown ;; os400) basic_machine=powerpc-ibm os=-os400 ;; OSE68000 | ose68000) basic_machine=m68000-ericsson os=-ose ;; os68k) basic_machine=m68k-none os=-os68k ;; pa-hitachi) basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi os=-hiuxwe2 ;; paragon) basic_machine=i860-intel os=-osf ;; parisc) basic_machine=hppa-unknown os=-linux ;; parisc-*) basic_machine=hppa-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` os=-linux ;; pbd) basic_machine=sparc-tti ;; pbb) basic_machine=m68k-tti ;; pc532 | pc532-*) basic_machine=ns32k-pc532 ;; pc98) basic_machine=i386-pc ;; pc98-*) basic_machine=i386-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; pentium | p5 | k5 | k6 | nexgen | viac3) basic_machine=i586-pc ;; pentiumpro | p6 | 6x86 | athlon | athlon_*) basic_machine=i686-pc ;; pentiumii | pentium2 | pentiumiii | pentium3) basic_machine=i686-pc ;; pentium4) basic_machine=i786-pc ;; pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | k6-* | nexgen-* | viac3-*) basic_machine=i586-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; pentiumpro-* | p6-* | 6x86-* | athlon-*) basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; pentiumii-* | pentium2-* | pentiumiii-* | pentium3-*) basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; pentium4-*) basic_machine=i786-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; pn) basic_machine=pn-gould ;; power) basic_machine=power-ibm ;; ppc | ppcbe) basic_machine=powerpc-unknown ;; ppc-* | ppcbe-*) basic_machine=powerpc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; ppcle | powerpclittle | ppc-le | powerpc-little) basic_machine=powerpcle-unknown ;; ppcle-* | powerpclittle-*) basic_machine=powerpcle-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; ppc64) basic_machine=powerpc64-unknown ;; ppc64-*) basic_machine=powerpc64-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; ppc64le | powerpc64little | ppc64-le | powerpc64-little) basic_machine=powerpc64le-unknown ;; ppc64le-* | powerpc64little-*) basic_machine=powerpc64le-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; ps2) basic_machine=i386-ibm ;; pw32) basic_machine=i586-unknown os=-pw32 ;; rdos | rdos64) basic_machine=x86_64-pc os=-rdos ;; rdos32) basic_machine=i386-pc os=-rdos ;; rom68k) basic_machine=m68k-rom68k os=-coff ;; rm[46]00) basic_machine=mips-siemens ;; rtpc | rtpc-*) basic_machine=romp-ibm ;; s390 | s390-*) basic_machine=s390-ibm ;; s390x | s390x-*) basic_machine=s390x-ibm ;; sa29200) basic_machine=a29k-amd os=-udi ;; sb1) basic_machine=mipsisa64sb1-unknown ;; sb1el) basic_machine=mipsisa64sb1el-unknown ;; sde) basic_machine=mipsisa32-sde os=-elf ;; sei) basic_machine=mips-sei os=-seiux ;; sequent) basic_machine=i386-sequent ;; sh) basic_machine=sh-hitachi os=-hms ;; sh5el) basic_machine=sh5le-unknown ;; sh64) basic_machine=sh64-unknown ;; sparclite-wrs | simso-wrs) basic_machine=sparclite-wrs os=-vxworks ;; sps7) basic_machine=m68k-bull os=-sysv2 ;; spur) basic_machine=spur-unknown ;; st2000) basic_machine=m68k-tandem ;; stratus) basic_machine=i860-stratus os=-sysv4 ;; strongarm-* | thumb-*) basic_machine=arm-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` ;; sun2) basic_machine=m68000-sun ;; sun2os3) basic_machine=m68000-sun os=-sunos3 ;; sun2os4) basic_machine=m68000-sun os=-sunos4 ;; sun3os3) basic_machine=m68k-sun os=-sunos3 ;; sun3os4) basic_machine=m68k-sun os=-sunos4 ;; sun4os3) basic_machine=sparc-sun os=-sunos3 ;; sun4os4) basic_machine=sparc-sun os=-sunos4 ;; sun4sol2) basic_machine=sparc-sun os=-solaris2 ;; sun3 | sun3-*) basic_machine=m68k-sun ;; sun4) basic_machine=sparc-sun ;; sun386 | sun386i | roadrunner) basic_machine=i386-sun ;; sv1) basic_machine=sv1-cray os=-unicos ;; symmetry) basic_machine=i386-sequent os=-dynix ;; t3e) basic_machine=alphaev5-cray os=-unicos ;; t90) basic_machine=t90-cray os=-unicos ;; tile*) basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown os=-linux-gnu ;; tx39) basic_machine=mipstx39-unknown ;; tx39el) basic_machine=mipstx39el-unknown ;; toad1) basic_machine=pdp10-xkl os=-tops20 ;; tower | tower-32) basic_machine=m68k-ncr ;; tpf) basic_machine=s390x-ibm os=-tpf ;; udi29k) basic_machine=a29k-amd os=-udi ;; ultra3) basic_machine=a29k-nyu os=-sym1 ;; v810 | necv810) basic_machine=v810-nec os=-none ;; vaxv) basic_machine=vax-dec os=-sysv ;; vms) basic_machine=vax-dec os=-vms ;; vpp*|vx|vx-*) basic_machine=f301-fujitsu ;; vxworks960) basic_machine=i960-wrs os=-vxworks ;; vxworks68) basic_machine=m68k-wrs os=-vxworks ;; vxworks29k) basic_machine=a29k-wrs os=-vxworks ;; w65*) basic_machine=w65-wdc os=-none ;; w89k-*) basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond os=-proelf ;; xbox) basic_machine=i686-pc os=-mingw32 ;; xps | xps100) basic_machine=xps100-honeywell ;; xscale-* | xscalee[bl]-*) basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^xscale/arm/'` ;; ymp) basic_machine=ymp-cray os=-unicos ;; z8k-*-coff) basic_machine=z8k-unknown os=-sim ;; z80-*-coff) basic_machine=z80-unknown os=-sim ;; none) basic_machine=none-none os=-none ;; # Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types. It is in # some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular. w89k) basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond ;; op50n) basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki ;; op60c) basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki ;; romp) basic_machine=romp-ibm ;; mmix) basic_machine=mmix-knuth ;; rs6000) basic_machine=rs6000-ibm ;; vax) basic_machine=vax-dec ;; pdp10) # there are many clones, so DEC is not a safe bet basic_machine=pdp10-unknown ;; pdp11) basic_machine=pdp11-dec ;; we32k) basic_machine=we32k-att ;; sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[24]aeb | sh[34]eb | sh[1234]le | sh[23]ele) basic_machine=sh-unknown ;; sparc | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v) basic_machine=sparc-sun ;; cydra) basic_machine=cydra-cydrome ;; orion) basic_machine=orion-highlevel ;; orion105) basic_machine=clipper-highlevel ;; mac | mpw | mac-mpw) basic_machine=m68k-apple ;; pmac | pmac-mpw) basic_machine=powerpc-apple ;; *-unknown) # Make sure to match an already-canonicalized machine name. ;; *) echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2 exit 1 ;; esac # Here we canonicalize certain aliases for manufacturers. case $basic_machine in *-digital*) basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/digital.*/dec/'` ;; *-commodore*) basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/commodore.*/cbm/'` ;; *) ;; esac # Decode manufacturer-specific aliases for certain operating systems. if [ x"$os" != x"" ] then case $os in # First match some system type aliases # that might get confused with valid system types. # -solaris* is a basic system type, with this one exception. -auroraux) os=-auroraux ;; -solaris1 | -solaris1.*) os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|solaris1|sunos4|'` ;; -solaris) os=-solaris2 ;; -svr4*) os=-sysv4 ;; -unixware*) os=-sysv4.2uw ;; -gnu/linux*) os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|gnu/linux|linux-gnu|'` ;; # First accept the basic system types. # The portable systems comes first. # Each alternative MUST END IN A *, to match a version number. # -sysv* is not here because it comes later, after sysvr4. -gnu* | -bsd* | -mach* | -minix* | -genix* | -ultrix* | -irix* \ | -*vms* | -sco* | -esix* | -isc* | -aix* | -cnk* | -sunos | -sunos[34]*\ | -hpux* | -unos* | -osf* | -luna* | -dgux* | -auroraux* | -solaris* \ | -sym* | -kopensolaris* | -plan9* \ | -amigaos* | -amigados* | -msdos* | -newsos* | -unicos* | -aof* \ | -aos* | -aros* | -cloudabi* | -sortix* \ | -nindy* | -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -ebmon* | -hms* | -mvs* \ | -clix* | -riscos* | -uniplus* | -iris* | -rtu* | -xenix* \ | -hiux* | -386bsd* | -knetbsd* | -mirbsd* | -netbsd* \ | -bitrig* | -openbsd* | -solidbsd* | -libertybsd* \ | -ekkobsd* | -kfreebsd* | -freebsd* | -riscix* | -lynxos* \ | -bosx* | -nextstep* | -cxux* | -aout* | -elf* | -oabi* \ | -ptx* | -coff* | -ecoff* | -winnt* | -domain* | -vsta* \ | -udi* | -eabi* | -lites* | -ieee* | -go32* | -aux* \ | -chorusos* | -chorusrdb* | -cegcc* \ | -cygwin* | -msys* | -pe* | -psos* | -moss* | -proelf* | -rtems* \ | -midipix* | -mingw32* | -mingw64* | -linux-gnu* | -linux-android* \ | -linux-newlib* | -linux-musl* | -linux-uclibc* \ | -uxpv* | -beos* | -mpeix* | -udk* | -moxiebox* \ | -interix* | -uwin* | -mks* | -rhapsody* | -darwin* | -opened* \ | -openstep* | -oskit* | -conix* | -pw32* | -nonstopux* \ | -storm-chaos* | -tops10* | -tenex* | -tops20* | -its* \ | -os2* | -vos* | -palmos* | -uclinux* | -nucleus* \ | -morphos* | -superux* | -rtmk* | -rtmk-nova* | -windiss* \ | -powermax* | -dnix* | -nx6 | -nx7 | -sei* | -dragonfly* \ | -skyos* | -haiku* | -rdos* | -toppers* | -drops* | -es* \ | -onefs* | -tirtos* | -phoenix*) # Remember, each alternative MUST END IN *, to match a version number. ;; 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Otherwise, code above # will signal an error saying that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating # system, and we'll never get to this point. case $basic_machine in score-*) os=-elf ;; spu-*) os=-elf ;; *-acorn) os=-riscix1.2 ;; arm*-rebel) os=-linux ;; arm*-semi) os=-aout ;; c4x-* | tic4x-*) os=-coff ;; c8051-*) os=-elf ;; hexagon-*) os=-elf ;; tic54x-*) os=-coff ;; tic55x-*) os=-coff ;; tic6x-*) os=-coff ;; # This must come before the *-dec entry. pdp10-*) os=-tops20 ;; pdp11-*) os=-none ;; *-dec | vax-*) os=-ultrix4.2 ;; m68*-apollo) os=-domain ;; i386-sun) os=-sunos4.0.2 ;; m68000-sun) os=-sunos3 ;; m68*-cisco) os=-aout ;; mep-*) os=-elf ;; mips*-cisco) os=-elf ;; mips*-*) os=-elf ;; or32-*) os=-coff ;; *-tti) # must be before sparc entry or we get the wrong os. os=-sysv3 ;; sparc-* | *-sun) os=-sunos4.1.1 ;; *-be) os=-beos ;; *-haiku) os=-haiku ;; *-ibm) os=-aix ;; *-knuth) os=-mmixware ;; *-wec) os=-proelf ;; *-winbond) os=-proelf ;; *-oki) os=-proelf ;; *-hp) os=-hpux ;; *-hitachi) os=-hiux ;; i860-* | *-att | *-ncr | *-altos | *-motorola | *-convergent) os=-sysv ;; *-cbm) os=-amigaos ;; *-dg) os=-dgux ;; *-dolphin) os=-sysv3 ;; m68k-ccur) os=-rtu ;; m88k-omron*) os=-luna ;; *-next ) os=-nextstep ;; *-sequent) os=-ptx ;; *-crds) os=-unos ;; *-ns) os=-genix ;; i370-*) os=-mvs ;; *-next) os=-nextstep3 ;; *-gould) os=-sysv ;; *-highlevel) os=-bsd ;; *-encore) os=-bsd ;; *-sgi) os=-irix ;; *-siemens) os=-sysv4 ;; *-masscomp) os=-rtu ;; f30[01]-fujitsu | f700-fujitsu) os=-uxpv ;; *-rom68k) os=-coff ;; *-*bug) os=-coff ;; *-apple) os=-macos ;; *-atari*) os=-mint ;; *) os=-none ;; esac fi # Here we handle the case where we know the os, and the CPU type, but not the # manufacturer. We pick the logical manufacturer. vendor=unknown case $basic_machine in *-unknown) case $os in -riscix*) vendor=acorn ;; -sunos*) vendor=sun ;; -cnk*|-aix*) vendor=ibm ;; -beos*) vendor=be ;; -hpux*) vendor=hp ;; -mpeix*) vendor=hp ;; -hiux*) vendor=hitachi ;; -unos*) vendor=crds ;; -dgux*) vendor=dg ;; -luna*) vendor=omron ;; -genix*) vendor=ns ;; -mvs* | -opened*) vendor=ibm ;; -os400*) vendor=ibm ;; -ptx*) vendor=sequent ;; -tpf*) vendor=ibm ;; -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -windiss*) vendor=wrs ;; -aux*) vendor=apple ;; -hms*) vendor=hitachi ;; -mpw* | -macos*) vendor=apple ;; -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*) vendor=atari ;; -vos*) vendor=stratus ;; esac basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed "s/unknown/$vendor/"` ;; esac echo $basic_machine$os exit # Local variables: # eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) # time-stamp-start: "timestamp='" # time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d" # time-stamp-end: "'" # End: openssh-8.2p1/configure.ac010064400017500001750000004452361362136622600137650ustar00djmdjm# # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any # purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above # copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES # WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR # ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES # WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN # ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org]) AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.583 $) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c]) AC_LANG([C]) AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h]) AC_PROG_CC([cc gcc]) AC_CANONICAL_HOST AC_C_BIGENDIAN # Checks for programs. AC_PROG_AWK AC_PROG_CPP AC_PROG_RANLIB AC_PROG_INSTALL AC_PROG_EGREP AC_PROG_MKDIR_P AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar]) AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat]) AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill]) AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed]) AC_PATH_PROG([ENT], [ent]) AC_SUBST([ENT]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh]) AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh]) AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff]) AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff awf]) AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh]) dnl select manpage formatter to be used to build "cat" format pages. if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$MANDOC" elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc" elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii" else AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatter found]) MANFMT="false" fi AC_SUBST([MANFMT]) dnl for buildpkg.sh AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd], [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd], [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no]) if test -x /sbin/sh; then AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh]) else AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh]) fi # System features AC_SYS_LARGEFILE if test -z "$AR" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***]) fi AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd]) if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"], [Full path of your "passwd" program]) fi dnl Since autoconf doesn't support it very well, we no longer allow users to dnl override LD, however keeping the hook here for now in case there's a use dnl use case we overlooked and someone needs to re-enable it. Unless a good dnl reason is found we'll be removing this in future. LD="$CC" AC_SUBST([LD]) AC_C_INLINE AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [ #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [ #include #include ]) openssl=yes AC_ARG_WITH([openssl], [ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl=no fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography]) if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi use_stack_protector=1 use_toolchain_hardening=1 AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect], [ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_stack_protector=0 fi ]) AC_ARG_WITH([hardening], [ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_toolchain_hardening=0 fi ]) # We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is # on by default" for things like -fPIE. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) WERROR="-Werror"], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) WERROR="" ] ) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-pipe]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-error=format-truncation]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wextra]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wimplicit-fallthrough]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing]) if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-mretpoline]) # clang OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,retpolineplt]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack]) # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number # of integer operations that should exercise this. OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version]) GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'` case $GCC_VER in 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; 2.8* | 2.9*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; *) ;; esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ] ) # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror. if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \ -fstack-protector; do AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror" AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;} ]], [[ char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1)); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t" LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;} ]], [[ char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1)); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) break ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test]) break ] ) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" done fi if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99" AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], [CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"], [#include ] ) fi fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include __attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1, [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS, 1, [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args]) ] ) if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull]) fi AC_ARG_WITH([rpath], [ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then rpath_opt="" elif test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then rpath_opt="-R" else rpath_opt="$withval" fi ] ) # Allow user to specify flags AC_ARG_WITH([cflags], [ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([cflags-after], [ --with-cflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags], [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] , [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags], [ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags-after], [ --with-ldflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([libs], [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LIBS="$LIBS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([Werror], [ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then werror_flags="-Werror" if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then werror_flags="$withval" fi fi ] ) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ blf.h \ bstring.h \ crypt.h \ crypto/sha2.h \ dirent.h \ endian.h \ elf.h \ err.h \ features.h \ fcntl.h \ floatingpoint.h \ fnmatch.h \ getopt.h \ glob.h \ ia.h \ iaf.h \ ifaddrs.h \ inttypes.h \ langinfo.h \ limits.h \ locale.h \ login.h \ maillock.h \ ndir.h \ net/if_tun.h \ netdb.h \ netgroup.h \ pam/pam_appl.h \ paths.h \ poll.h \ pty.h \ readpassphrase.h \ rpc/types.h \ security/pam_appl.h \ sha2.h \ shadow.h \ stddef.h \ stdint.h \ string.h \ strings.h \ sys/bitypes.h \ sys/bsdtty.h \ sys/cdefs.h \ sys/dir.h \ sys/file.h \ sys/mman.h \ sys/label.h \ sys/ndir.h \ sys/poll.h \ sys/prctl.h \ sys/pstat.h \ sys/ptrace.h \ sys/random.h \ sys/select.h \ sys/stat.h \ sys/stream.h \ sys/stropts.h \ sys/strtio.h \ sys/statvfs.h \ sys/sysmacros.h \ sys/time.h \ sys/timers.h \ sys/vfs.h \ time.h \ tmpdir.h \ ttyent.h \ ucred.h \ unistd.h \ usersec.h \ util.h \ utime.h \ utmp.h \ utmpx.h \ vis.h \ wchar.h \ ]) # On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h] # to be included first. AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/audit.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H # include #endif ]) # sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif ]) # net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h. # sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([net/route.h sys/sysctl.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include ]) # lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif ]) # sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H # include #endif ]) # login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [ #include ]) # older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [ #include ]) # Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [ #include #include ]) # Messages for features tested for in target-specific section SIA_MSG="no" SPC_MSG="no" SP_MSG="no" SPP_MSG="no" # Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both # the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris). SOLARIS_PRIVS="no" # Check for some target-specific stuff case "$host" in *-*-aix*) # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc. # It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are # not fatal. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #define testmacro foo #define testmacro bar]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)]) if (test -z "$blibpath"); then blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib" fi saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:" else flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath," fi for tryflags in $flags ;do if (test -z "$blibflags"); then LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])], [blibflags=$tryflags], []) fi done if (test -z "$blibflags"); then AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags]) fi LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1], [Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate], [ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE]) LIBS="$LIBS -ls" ]) ]) dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers. AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess, passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include ]) dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed], [AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1], [Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])], [], [#include ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb]) AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM], AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]), [], [ #include #include ] ) check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1 AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1], [Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken]) dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1], [Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this]) AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd]) AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNDUP], 1, [strndup broken, see APAR IY61211]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNLEN], 1, [strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551]) ;; *-*-android*) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) ;; *-*-cygwin*) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()]) AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1], [Define to disable UID restoration test]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1], [Define if you want to disable shadow passwords]) AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1], [Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size]) AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters]) # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings. OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes]) ;; *-*-dgux*) AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1], [Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-*-darwin*) use_pie=auto AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) exit(0); else exit(1); } ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([working])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1], [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1], [Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) [#include ] AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too]) ) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h]) AC_CHECK_LIB([sandbox], [sandbox_apply], [ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox" ]) # proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() replacement. AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libproc.h]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([proc_pidinfo]) ;; *-*-dragonfly*) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt" TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" ;; *-*-haiku*) LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd " CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_BSD_SOURCE" AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx]) MANTYPE=man ;; *-*-hpux*) # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1" IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT]) AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) maildir="/var/mail" LIBS="$LIBS -lsec" AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])]) # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae" fi ;; *-*-hpux11*) AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1], [Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to the conversation function with an extra level of indirection]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1 check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1 ;; esac # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10.26) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1], [Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database]) disable_ptmx_check=yes LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw" ;; esac ;; *-*-irix5*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1], [Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue)]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1], [Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; *-*-irix6*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1], [Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session management, not C arrays)]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1], [Define if you want IRIX project management]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1], [Define if you want IRIX audit trails]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1], [Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; *-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) ;; *-*-linux*) no_dev_ptmx=1 use_pie=auto check_for_libcrypt_later=1 check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1 dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics. dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE" AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1], [Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM], [Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.]) AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP]) AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer]) inet6_default_4in6=yes case `uname -r` in 1.*|2.0.*) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1], [Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly]) ;; esac # tun(4) forwarding compat code AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h]) if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1], [Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) fi AC_CHECK_HEADER([linux/if.h], AC_DEFINE([SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX], [1], [Support routing domains using Linux VRF]), [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [], [], [#include ]) # Obtain MIPS ABI case "$host" in mips*) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32 #error #endif ]])],[mips_abi="o32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32 #error #endif ]])],[mips_abi="n32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64 #error #endif ]])],[mips_abi="n64"],[AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown MIPS ABI]) ]) ]) ]) ;; esac AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture]) seccomp_audit_arch= case "$host" in x86_64-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 ;; i*86-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386 ;; arm*-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM ;; aarch64*-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 ;; s390x-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X ;; s390-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390 ;; powerpc64-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64 ;; powerpc64le-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE ;; mips-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS ;; mipsel-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL ;; mips64-*) case "$mips_abi" in "n32") seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32 ;; "n64") seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 ;; esac ;; mips64el-*) case "$mips_abi" in "n32") seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32 ;; "n64") seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 ;; esac ;; esac if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch], [Specify the system call convention in use]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported]) fi ;; mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty]) SONY=1 ;; *-*-netbsd*) check_for_libcrypt_before=1 if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then rpath_opt="-R" fi CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE" AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1], [NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it]) ;; *-*-freebsd*) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload # and will crash if they cannot be opened. AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1], [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things]) ;; *-*-bsdi*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-next-*) conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog" conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp maildir=/usr/spool/mail AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT]) ;; *-*-openbsd*) use_pie=auto AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1], [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" ;; *-*-solaris*) if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then rpath_opt="-R" fi AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], [Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty. AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1], [Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid()]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd in case the name is longer than 8 chars]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang]) external_path_file=/etc/default/login # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions) conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x]) sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'` if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setpflags]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setppriv]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([priv_basicset]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([priv.h]) AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts], [ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris process contracts]) LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract" SPC_MSG="yes" ], ) ], ) AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects], [ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris projects]) LIBS="$LIBS -lproject" SP_MSG="yes" ], ) ], ) AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-privs], [ --with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)], [ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Solaris/Illumos privilege support]) if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \ "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes AC_MSG_RESULT([found]) AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1], [Define to disable UID restoration test]) AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris privileges]) SPP_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs]) fi ], ) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell ;; *-*-sunos4*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam]) AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx]) ;; *-ncr-sysv*) LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-sni-sysv*) # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,) # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ]) IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) external_path_file=/etc/default/login # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc, # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog ;; # UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel. *-*-sysv4.2*) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell ;; # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8 *-*-sysv5*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf" AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell check_for_libcrypt_later=1 case "$host" in *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x maildir=/var/spool/mail AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot]) ], , ) ;; *) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; esac ;; *-*-sysv*) ;; # SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX *-*-sco3.2v4*) AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.") ;; # SCO OpenServer 5.x *-*-sco3.2v5*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf" fi LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm" no_dev_ptmx=1 AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid]) MANTYPE=man TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes ;; *-dec-osf*) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA]) no_osfsia="" AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia], [ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled]) no_osfsia=1 fi ], ) if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1], [Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1], [Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud" SIA_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) fi fi AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv]) ;; *-*-nto-qnx*) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken]) enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login case "$host" in *-*-nto-qnx6*) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) ;; esac ;; *-*-ultrix*) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1]) AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to for controlling tty]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Disable utmpx]) # DISABLE_FD_PASSING so that we call setpgrp as root, otherwise we # don't get a controlling tty. AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Need to call setpgrp as root]) # On Ultrix some headers are not protected against multiple includes, # so we create wrappers and put it where the compiler will find it. AC_MSG_WARN([creating compat wrappers for headers]) mkdir -p netinet for header in netinet/ip.h netdb.h resolv.h; do name=`echo $header | tr 'a-z/.' 'A-Z__'` cat >$header < ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ] ) dnl Checks for header files. # Checks for libraries. AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])]) dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname], ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [ save_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *s, buf[32]; strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32); s = dirname(buf); if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) { exit(1); } else { exit(0); } } ]])], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], ) LIBS="$save_LIBS" ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h]) fi ]) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1], [Define if you have the basename function.])]) dnl zlib defaults to enabled zlib=yes AC_ARG_WITH([zlib], [ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then zlib=no elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then if test -d "$withval/lib"; then if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "$withval/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for zlib]) if test "x${zlib}" = "xno"; then AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ZLIB], [1], [Enable zlib]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], , [ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" save_LIBS="$LIBS" dnl Check default zlib install dir if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${rpath_opt}/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" fi CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" LIBS="$LIBS -lz" AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***]) ] ) ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check], [ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then zlib_check_nonfatal=1 fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v; n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d); if (n != 3 && n != 4) exit(1); v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d; fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v); /* 1.1.4 is OK */ if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4) exit(0); /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */ if (v >= 1020300) exit(0); exit(2); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([no]), [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log *** Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running "./configure --without-zlib-version-check". If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater. See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.]) else AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ] ) fi dnl UnixWare 2.x AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp], [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes], [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES]) LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ] ) dnl Checks for libutil functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp]) # On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv # or libnsl. AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([gethostbyname], [resolv nsl]) # "Particular Function Checks" # see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html AC_FUNC_STRFTIME AC_FUNC_MALLOC AC_FUNC_REALLOC # autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL; AC_MSG_CHECKING([if calloc(0, N) returns non-null]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include ]], [[ void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL); ]] )], [ func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes ], [ func_calloc_0_nonnull=no ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming same as malloc]) func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull"] ) AC_MSG_RESULT([$func_calloc_0_nonnull]) if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 1, [calloc(0, x) returns non-null]) else AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 0, [calloc(0, x) returns NULL]) AC_DEFINE(calloc, rpl_calloc, [Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used.]) fi # Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support]) AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT], [ #include #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC FOUNDIT #endif ], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) # Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ #ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT #error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension" #endif glob_t g; g.gl_statv = NULL; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([VIS_ALL], , AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_STRNVIS, 1, [missing VIS_ALL]), [#include ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct dirent d; exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char)); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1], [Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory]) if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi # Check whether user wants to use ldns LDNS_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(ldns, [ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)], [ ldns="" if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no]) if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" ldns=yes else LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`" ldns=yes fi elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" ldns=yes fi # Verify that it works. if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support]) LDNS_MSG="yes" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); } ]]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.]) ]) fi ]) # Check whether user wants libedit support LIBEDIT_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([libedit], [ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit]) if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi else CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit` CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`" else LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses" fi OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'` AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp]) LIBEDIT_MSG="yes" AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ], [ $OTHERLIBS ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int i = H_SETSIZE; el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL); exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ] ) fi ] ) AUDIT_MODULE=none AC_ARG_WITH([audit], [ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)], [ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module]) case "$withval" in bsm) AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm]) AUDIT_MODULE=bsm dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])], [ #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H # include #endif ] ) AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])]) # These are optional AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module]) if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1], [The system has incomplete BSM API]) fi ;; linux) AC_MSG_RESULT([linux]) AUDIT_MODULE=linux dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit" AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module]) ;; debug) AUDIT_MODULE=debug AC_MSG_RESULT([debug]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module]) ;; no) AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval]) ;; esac ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([pie], [ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then use_pie=yes fi ] ) if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off. use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4 #error gcc is too old #endif ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) use_pie=no ] ) fi if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie]) # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither. AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported]) if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS" fi fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether -fPIC is accepted]) SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC" AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]] )], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) PICFLAG="-fPIC"; ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) PICFLAG=""; ]) CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS" AC_SUBST([PICFLAG]) dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ Blowfish_initstate \ Blowfish_expandstate \ Blowfish_expand0state \ Blowfish_stream2word \ SHA256Update \ SHA384Update \ SHA512Update \ asprintf \ b64_ntop \ __b64_ntop \ b64_pton \ __b64_pton \ bcopy \ bcrypt_pbkdf \ bindresvport_sa \ blf_enc \ bzero \ cap_rights_limit \ clock \ closefrom \ dirfd \ endgrent \ err \ errx \ explicit_bzero \ fchmod \ fchmodat \ fchown \ fchownat \ flock \ fnmatch \ freeaddrinfo \ freezero \ fstatfs \ fstatvfs \ futimes \ getaddrinfo \ getcwd \ getgrouplist \ getline \ getnameinfo \ getopt \ getpagesize \ getpeereid \ getpeerucred \ getpgid \ _getpty \ getrlimit \ getrandom \ getsid \ getttyent \ glob \ group_from_gid \ inet_aton \ inet_ntoa \ inet_ntop \ innetgr \ llabs \ localtime_r \ login_getcapbool \ md5_crypt \ memmem \ memmove \ memset_s \ mkdtemp \ ngetaddrinfo \ nsleep \ ogetaddrinfo \ openlog_r \ pledge \ poll \ prctl \ pstat \ raise \ readpassphrase \ reallocarray \ realpath \ recvmsg \ recallocarray \ rresvport_af \ sendmsg \ setdtablesize \ setegid \ setenv \ seteuid \ setgroupent \ setgroups \ setlinebuf \ setlogin \ setpassent\ setpcred \ setproctitle \ setregid \ setreuid \ setrlimit \ setsid \ setvbuf \ sigaction \ sigvec \ snprintf \ socketpair \ statfs \ statvfs \ strcasestr \ strdup \ strerror \ strlcat \ strlcpy \ strmode \ strndup \ strnlen \ strnvis \ strptime \ strsignal \ strtonum \ strtoll \ strtoul \ strtoull \ swap32 \ sysconf \ tcgetpgrp \ timingsafe_bcmp \ truncate \ unsetenv \ updwtmpx \ utimensat \ user_from_uid \ usleep \ vasprintf \ vsnprintf \ waitpid \ warn \ ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([bzero, memmem]) dnl Wide character support. AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth]) TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes} AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8"); if (loc != NULL) exit(0); exit(1); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT(yes), [AC_MSG_RESULT(no) TEST_SSH_UTF8=no], AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) ) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include ]], [[ return (isblank('a')); ]])], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).]) ]) disable_pkcs11= AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11], [ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then disable_pkcs11=1 fi ] ) disable_sk= AC_ARG_ENABLE([security-key], [ --disable-security-key disable U2F/FIDO support code [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then disable_sk=1 fi ] ) enable_sk_internal= AC_ARG_WITH([security-key-builtin], [ --with-security-key-builtin include builtin U2F/FIDO support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then enable_sk_internal=yes fi ] ) test "x$disable_sk" != "x" && enable_sk_internal="" AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen]) AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include ]) # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror() AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include const char *gai_strerror(int); ]], [[ char *str; str = gai_strerror(0); ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1], [Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1], [Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])]) dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them. AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_STRING_H # include #endif ]) dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])], [#include ] ) AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD], , , [ #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([readv, writev], , , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [ #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [ #include ]) # extra bits for select(2) AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [ dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ errno=0; setresuid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1], [Define if your setresuid() is broken]) AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] ) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [ dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ errno=0; setresgid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1], [Define if your setresgid() is broken]) AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] ) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working fflush(NULL)]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include ]], [[fflush(NULL); exit(0);]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]), [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([FFLUSH_NULL_BUG], [1], [define if fflush(NULL) does not work])], AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working]) ) dnl Checks for time functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time]) dnl Checks for utmp functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname]) dnl Checks for utmpx functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname]) dnl Checks for lastlog functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon], [LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])] ) AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1], [Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize], [LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])] ) # Check for broken snprintf if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char b[5]; snprintf(b,5,"123456789"); exit(b[4]!='\0'); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [Define if your snprintf is busted]) AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf understands %zu]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ size_t a = 1, b = 2; char z[128]; snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b); exit(strcmp(z, "12")); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [snprintf does not understand %zu]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ] ) fi # We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the # number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3) if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...) { size_t ret; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } ]], [[ char x[1]; if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) return 1; if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) return 1; return 0; ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [Define if your snprintf is busted]) AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ] ) fi # On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio, # check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *. # This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; } ]], [[ snprintf(0, 0, 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const], [Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])]) # Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support NO_PEERCHECK="" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) NO_PEERCHECK=1 ]) fi dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test"; if (mkstemp(template) == -1) exit(1); unlink(template); exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP], [1], [Silly mkstemp()]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP]) ] ) fi dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include ]], [[ pid_t pid; int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status; pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { /* failed */ exit(1); } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */ waitpid(pid, &status, 0); if (WIFEXITED(status)) exit(WEXITSTATUS(status)); else exit(2); } else { /* child */ close(0); close(1); close(2); setsid(); openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */ else exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */ } ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #define TEST_PORT "2222" ]], [[ int err, sock; struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); if (err != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); exit(1); } for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); if (err != 0) { if (err == EAI_SYSTEM) perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM"); else fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n", gai_strerror(err)); exit(2); } sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) perror("socket"); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { if (errno == EBADF) exit(3); } } exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #define TEST_PORT "2222" ]], [[ int err, sock; struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); if (err != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); exit(1); } for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) { perror("getnameinfo"); exit(2); } } exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1], [Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then AC_CHECK_DECLS(AI_NUMERICSERV, , , [#include #include #include ]) fi if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1], [Conflicting defs for getspnam]) ] ) fi dnl NetBSD added an strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the dnl existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having existed dnl for over ten years). Despite this incompatibility being reported during dnl development (see http://gnats.netbsd.org/44977) they still shipped it. dnl Even more unfortunately FreeBSD and later MacOS picked up this incompatible dnl implementation. Try to detect this mess, and assume the only safe option dnl if we're cross compiling. dnl dnl OpenBSD, 2001: strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t dlen, int flag); dnl NetBSD: 2012, strnvis(char *dst, size_t dlen, const char *src, int flag); if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working strnvis]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); } ]], [[ char dst[16]; signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler); if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0) exit(0); exit(1) ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis detected broken])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming broken]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis assumed broken])] ) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpgrp],[ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getpgrp accepts zero args]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[$ac_includes_default]], [[ getpgrp(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [1], [getpgrp takes zero args])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [0], [getpgrp takes one arg])] ) ]) # Search for OpenSSL saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir], [ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ], [ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled]) fi if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then case "$withval" in # Relative paths ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval" esac if test -d "$withval/lib"; then if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "$withval/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check], [ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl_check_nonfatal=1 fi ] ) openssl_engine=no AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine], [ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled]) fi openssl_engine=yes fi ] ) if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS" AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** working libcrypto not found, check config.log])]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) # Determine OpenSSL header version AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.sslincver" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver` AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) # Determining OpenSSL library version is version dependent. AC_CHECK_FUNCS([OpenSSL_version OpenSSL_version_num]) # Determine OpenSSL library version AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.ssllibver" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); #ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION # define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION # define OpenSSL_version SSLeay_version #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM # define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay #endif if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", (unsigned long)OpenSSL_version_num(), OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION))) < 0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver` # Check version is supported. case "$ssl_library_ver" in 10000*|0*) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) ;; 100*) ;; # 1.0.x 101000[[0123456]]*) # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613 AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) ;; 101*) ;; # 1.1.x 200*) ;; # LibreSSL 300*) ;; # OpenSSL development branch. *) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")]) ;; esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) # Sanity check OpenSSL headers AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM # define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay #endif exit(OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check". Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches. ]) else AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -ldl" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ] ) ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ BN_is_prime_ex \ DSA_generate_parameters_ex \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl \ EVP_DigestFinal_ex \ EVP_DigestInit_ex \ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \ EVP_MD_CTX_init \ HMAC_CTX_init \ RSA_generate_key_ex \ RSA_get_default_method \ ]) # OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro. AC_CHECK_FUNC(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a function]), AC_CHECK_DECL(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a macro]), , [[#include ]] ) ) # LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ OPENSSL_init_crypto \ DH_get0_key \ DH_get0_pqg \ DH_set0_key \ DH_set_length \ DH_set0_pqg \ DSA_get0_key \ DSA_get0_pqg \ DSA_set0_key \ DSA_set0_pqg \ DSA_SIG_get0 \ DSA_SIG_set0 \ ECDSA_SIG_get0 \ ECDSA_SIG_set0 \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \ RSA_get0_crt_params \ RSA_get0_factors \ RSA_get0_key \ RSA_set0_crt_params \ RSA_set0_factors \ RSA_set0_key \ RSA_meth_free \ RSA_meth_dup \ RSA_meth_set1_name \ RSA_meth_get_finish \ RSA_meth_set_priv_enc \ RSA_meth_set_priv_dec \ RSA_meth_set_finish \ EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA \ EVP_MD_CTX_new \ EVP_MD_CTX_free \ ]) if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1], [Enable OpenSSL engine support]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found]) ]) fi # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1], [libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions]) ] ) # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL || EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1], [libcrypto has EVP AES CTR]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1], [libcrypto has EVP AES GCM]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \ aes128-gcm@openssh.com \ aes256-gcm@openssh.com" ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1], [Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void]) ] ) # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, # because the system crypt() is more featureful. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt]) fi # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the # version in OpenSSL. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt]) # Check for SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 support in OpenSSL AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_sha256 EVP_sha384 EVP_sha512]) # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp256=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp384=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]],[[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ exit(e == NULL || m == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp521=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes]) enable_nistp521=1 ] )], AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ) COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#" TEST_SSH_ECC=no if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \ test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EC_KEY_METHOD_new]) openssl_ecc=yes else openssl_ecc=no fi if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1], [libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC]) AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC]) else AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt]) fi # PKCS11/U2F depend on OpenSSL and dlopen(). enable_pkcs11=yes enable_sk=yes if test "x$openssl" != "xyes" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing libcrypto" enable_sk="disabled; missing libcrypto" fi if test "x$openssl_ecc" != "xyes" ; then enable_sk="disabled; OpenSSL has no ECC support" fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != "xyes" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing dlopen(3)" enable_sk="disabled; missing dlopen(3)" fi if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" != "xyes" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW" enable_sk="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW" fi if test ! -z "$disable_pkcs11" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled by user" fi if test ! -z "$disable_sk" ; then enable_sk="disabled by user" fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable PKCS11]) if test "x$enable_pkcs11" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support]) fi AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_pkcs11]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable U2F]) if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK], [], [Enable for U2F/FIDO support]) fi AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_sk]) # Now check for built-in security key support. if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_sk_internal" = "xyes" ; then AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2= if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2]) if "$PKGCONFIG" libfido2; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=yes else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2" = "xyes"; then LIBFIDO2=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libfido2` CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libfido2`" else LIBFIDO2="-lfido2 -lcbor" fi OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBFIDO2 | sed 's/-lfido2//'` AC_CHECK_LIB([fido2], [fido_init], [ AC_SUBST([LIBFIDO2]) AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL], [], [Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support]) enable_sk="built-in" ], [ ], [ $OTHERLIBS ] ) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ arc4random \ arc4random_buf \ arc4random_stir \ arc4random_uniform \ ]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [ LIBS="$LIBS -liaf" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1], [Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id]) ]) ]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ### Configure cryptographic random number support # Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly. OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes ] ) fi # PRNGD TCP socket AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port], [ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT], [ case "$withval" in no) withval="" ;; [[0-9]]*) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port]) ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then PRNGD_PORT="$withval" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT], [Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) fi ] ) # PRNGD Unix domain socket AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket], [ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)], [ case "$withval" in yes) withval="/var/run/egd-pool" ;; no) withval="" ;; /*) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket]) ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket]) fi if test ! -r "$withval" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable]) fi PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"], [Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) fi ], [ # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket]) # Insert other locations here for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"]) break; fi done if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) fi fi ] ) # Which randomness source do we use? if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT" elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET" elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1], [Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only]) RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY" elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible]) else AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options]) fi # Check for PAM libs PAM_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([pam], [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found]) fi saved_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , ) AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" PAM_MSG="yes" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1], [Define if you want to enable PAM support]) if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then case "$LIBS" in *-ldl*) # libdl already in LIBS ;; *) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" ;; esac fi fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([pam-service], [ --with-pam-service=name Specify PAM service name ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSHD_PAM_SERVICE], ["$withval"], [sshd PAM service name]) fi ] ) # Check for older PAM if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) #include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) #include #endif ]], [[ (void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1], [Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to pam_strerror]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) PAM_MSG="yes (old library)" ]) fi case "$host" in *-*-cygwin*) SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER ;; *) SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd ;; esac AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user], [ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval fi ] ) if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation]) else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"], [non-privileged user for privilege separation]) fi AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER]) if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [ #include #include ]) fi if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch; errno = 0; prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0); exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) # Disable seccomp filter as a target have_seccomp_filter=0 ] ) fi # Decide which sandbox style to use sandbox_arg="" AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox], [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)], [ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then sandbox_arg="" else sandbox_arg="$withval" fi ] ) # Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type # function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor # when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; int fd, r; fd_set fds; struct timeval tv; fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY); FD_ZERO(&fds); FD_SET(fd, &fds); rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero); setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv); exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) select_works_with_rlimit=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) select_works_with_rlimit=no], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) select_works_with_rlimit=yes] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; int r; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1, [setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support]) SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_PLEDGE], [1], [Sandbox using pledge(2)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support]) SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \ "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \ test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host]) test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS]) test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers]) test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header]) test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function]) test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit]) SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SOLARIS], [1], [Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges]) elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \ test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then SANDBOX_STYLE="none" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing]) else AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox]) fi # Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right. if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -liberty"; fi # Check for long long datatypes AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double]) # Check datatype sizes AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int]) # Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX) if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0 fi # compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them. if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include /* Why is this so damn hard? */ #ifdef __GNUC__ # undef __GNUC__ #endif #define __USE_ISOC99 #include #define DATA "conftest.llminmax" #define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a)) /* * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so * we do this the hard way. */ static int fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n) { unsigned int i; int l[sizeof(long long) * 8]; if (n < 0) if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) { l[i] = my_abs(n % 10); n /= 10; } do { if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0) return -1; } while (i != 0); if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0) return -1; return 0; } ]], [[ FILE *f; long long i, llmin, llmax = 0; if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL) exit(1); #if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX) fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); llmin = LLONG_MIN; llmax = LLONG_MAX; #else fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */ for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++) llmax = i; llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */ #endif /* Sanity check */ if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0 || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) { fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n"); exit(2); } if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0) exit(3); if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0) exit(4); if (fclose(f) < 0) exit(5); exit(0); ]])], [ llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax` llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax` AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL], [max value of long long calculated by configure]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long]) AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL], [min value of long long calculated by configure]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) fi AC_CHECK_DECLS([UINT32_MAX], , , [[ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_LIMITS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif ]]) # More checks for data types AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int a; a = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type]) have_u_int=1 fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type]) have_intxx_t=1 fi if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H # include #endif ]], [[ int64_t a; a = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type]) have_u_intxx_t=1 fi if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type]) have_u_int64_t=1 fi if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1], [define if you have uintxx_t data type]) fi fi if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g; a = b = c = e = f = g = 1; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type]) fi AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif ]) TYPE_SOCKLEN_T AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t], , , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct statfs.f_files, struct statfs.f_flags], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , , [#include #include ]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ] ) ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1], [define if you have sa_family_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1], [define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1], [define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1], [define if you have struct in6_addr data type]) dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , , [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #include ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1], [define if you have struct addrinfo data type]) fi AC_HEADER_TIME AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval]) have_struct_timeval=1 fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timespec], ac_cv_have_struct_timespec, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME # include # include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include # else # include # endif #endif ]], [[ struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC], [1], [define if you have struct timespec]) have_struct_timespec=1 fi # We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail. if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install" echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing." echo "" exit 1; else dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF main() { char buf[50]; char expected_out[50]; int mazsize = 50 ; #if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; #else long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; #endif strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) exit(1); exit(0); } #else main() { exit(0); } #endif ]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ], AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ) fi dnl Checks for structure members OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtime]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class, struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire], [], [], [[ #include #include ]]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state], [Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])], [[ #include #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) fi dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr], ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifdef msg_accrights #error "msg_accrights is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_accrights = 0; exit(0); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ] ) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1], [Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif ]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) ]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr], ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifdef msg_control #error "msg_control is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_control = 0; exit(0); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ] ) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1], [Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include va_list x,y; ]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include va_list x,y; ]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support], ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1], [Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr]) fi # Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1], [Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])], [ # Needed by our getrrsetbyname() AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]), [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [LIBS="$saved_LIBS" AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , , [#include #include ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1], [Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], , [#include ]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include extern struct __res_state _res; ]], [[ struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */ return 0; ]],)], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1], [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check whether user wants SELinux support SELINUX_MSG="no" LIBSELINUX="" AC_ARG_WITH([selinux], [ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then save_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1], [Define if you want SELinux support.]) SELINUX_MSG="yes" AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], , AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header])) AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon], [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux" ], AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library])) SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level]) LIBS="$save_LIBS" fi ] ) AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS]) AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS]) # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support KRB5_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], [ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then KRB5ROOT="/usr/local" else KRB5ROOT=${withval} fi AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support]) KRB5_MSG="yes" AC_PATH_TOOL([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config], [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config], [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH]) if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`" K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support]) if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1], [Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol]) GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`" GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1], [Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) else CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib" AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL]) K5LIBS="-lkrb5" K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1" AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write], [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"]) AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt], [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err" ]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgss" ], AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail])) ]) ]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], , [ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], , AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail]) ) ] ) oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], , [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ]) fi if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS ${rpath_opt}${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1], [Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H # include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H # include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H) # include #endif ]]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" fi ] ) AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS]) AC_SUBST([K5LIBS]) # Looking for programs, paths and files PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path], [ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval fi ] ) AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH]) AC_ARG_WITH([xauth], [ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then xauth_path=$withval fi ], [ TestPath="$PATH" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin" AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath]) if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth" fi ] ) STRIP_OPT=-s AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip], [ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then STRIP_OPT= fi ] ) AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT]) if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then XAUTH_PATH="undefined" AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"], [Define if xauth is found in your path]) XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) fi dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority. dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that. dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers. dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail. # Check for mail directory AC_ARG_WITH([maildir], [ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory], [ if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \ test "x${withval}" != xyes; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"], [Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR]) fi ],[ if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) else AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H #include #endif #define DATA "conftest.maildir" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); #if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0) exit(1); #elif defined (MAILDIR) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0) exit(1); #elif defined (_PATH_MAIL) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0) exit(1); #else exit (2); #endif exit(0); ]])], [ maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir` maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \ | sed 's|/$||'` AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what]) if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) fi ], [ if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then # our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail]) ] ) fi ] ) # maildir if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test]) disable_ptmx_check=yes fi if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"], [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1], [Define if you have /dev/ptmx]) have_dev_ptmx=1 ] ) fi fi if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"], [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1], [Define if you have /dev/ptc]) have_dev_ptc=1 ] ) else AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test]) fi # Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above AC_ARG_WITH([mantype], [ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type], [ case "$withval" in man|cat|doc) MANTYPE=$withval ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval]) ;; esac ] ) if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then if ${MANDOC} ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=doc elif ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=doc elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=man else MANTYPE=cat fi fi AC_SUBST([MANTYPE]) if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then mansubdir=man; else mansubdir=$MANTYPE; fi AC_SUBST([mansubdir]) # Check whether to enable MD5 passwords MD5_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords], [ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1], [Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords]) MD5_MSG="yes" fi ] ) # Whether to disable shadow password support AC_ARG_WITH([shadow], [ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) disable_shadow=yes fi ] ) if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include struct spwd sp; ]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])], [ sp_expire_available=yes ], [ ]) if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [Define if you want to use shadow password expire field]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi # Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1], [Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY]) else DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display], [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY]) DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" fi ] ) fi # check for /etc/default/login and use it if present. AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login], [ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled]) etc_default_login=no else etc_default_login=yes fi ], [ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login]) etc_default_login=no else etc_default_login=yes fi ] ) if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"], [ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ]) if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1], [Define if your system has /etc/default/login]) fi fi dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \ test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then external_path_file=/etc/login.conf fi # Whether to mess with the default path SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)" AC_ARG_WITH([default-path], [ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ --with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system. Edit /etc/login.conf instead.]) elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ --with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in $external_path_file .]) fi user_path="$withval" SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval" fi ], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf]) else if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included, otherwise scp will not work.]) fi AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ /* find out what STDPATH is */ #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifndef _PATH_STDPATH # ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */ # define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH # else # define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" # endif #endif #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.stdpath" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ], [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ], [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ] ) # make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work t_bindir="${bindir}" while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}` case $t_bindir in NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;; esac case $t_bindir in NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac done echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 if test $? -ne 0 ; then echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 if test $? -ne 0 ; then user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work]) fi fi fi ] ) if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH]) AC_SUBST([user_path]) fi # Set superuser path separately to user path AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path], [ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"], [Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser]) superuser_path=$withval fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(4in6, [ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1], [Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi ], [ if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)]) AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)]) fi ] ) # Whether to enable BSD auth support BSD_AUTH_MSG=no AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth], [ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1], [Define if you have BSD auth support]) BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes fi ] ) # Where to place sshd.pid piddir=/var/run # make sure the directory exists if test ! -d $piddir ; then piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` case $piddir in NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac fi AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir], [ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of sshd.pid file], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then piddir=$withval if test ! -d $piddir ; then AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **]) fi fi ] ) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"], [Specify location of ssh.pid]) AC_SUBST([piddir]) dnl allow user to disable some login recording features AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog], [ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp], [ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx], [ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp], [ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx], [ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil], [ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline], [ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1], [Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline], [ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog], [ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then conf_lastlog_location=$withval fi ] ) dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the dnl need for command-line parameters dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails dnl lastlog detection dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_lastlog_path=no ]) ]) if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then conf_lastlog_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **]) dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file]) fi dnl utmp detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_utmp_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do if test -f $f ; then conf_utmp_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file]) fi dnl wtmp detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_wtmp_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do if test -f $f ; then conf_wtmp_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file]) fi dnl wtmpx detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_wtmpx_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX]) fi else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file]) fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath" AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile]) fi AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [ if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) fi ], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H #include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) ], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H #include #endif ]) dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running. dnl Add now. CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then TEST_SSH_IPV6=no else TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes fi AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_UTF8], [$TEST_SSH_UTF8]) AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS]) AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms]) AC_SUBST([DEPEND], [$(cat $srcdir/.depend)]) CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}" LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}" # Make a copy of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS without PIE options. LDFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -pie//'` CFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$CFLAGS" | sed 's/ -fPIE//'` AC_SUBST([LDFLAGS_NOPIE]) AC_SUBST([CFLAGS_NOPIE]) AC_EXEEXT AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \ openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \ survey.sh]) AC_OUTPUT # Print summary of options # Someone please show me a better way :) A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}` B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}` C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}` D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}` E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}` F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}` G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}` H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}` I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}` J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}` echo "" echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:" echo " User binaries: $B" echo " System binaries: $C" echo " Configuration files: $D" echo " Askpass program: $E" echo " Manual pages: $F" echo " PID file: $G" echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H" if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file" echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work" else echo " sshd default user PATH: $I" if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If" echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)" fi fi if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J" fi echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE" echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG" echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG" echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG" echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG" echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG" echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG" echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" echo " PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11" echo " U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk" echo "" echo " Host: ${host}" echo " Compiler: ${CC}" echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}" echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" fi if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}" fi echo "" if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\"" echo "" fi if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file " echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. " echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ " echo "subdirectory" echo "" fi if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not" echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the" echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to" echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to" echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious" echo "user can connect to your agent." echo "" fi if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL." echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details." fi openssh-8.2p1/contrib004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600130455ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/contrib/Makefile010064400017500001750000000012701362136622600145610ustar00djmdjmPKG_CONFIG = pkg-config all: @echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2" gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \ gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \ `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui` gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \ gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \ `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11` gnome-ssh-askpass3: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-3.0` \ gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass3 \ `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-3.0 x11` clean: rm -f *.o gnome-ssh-askpass gnome-ssh-askpass[123] openssh-8.2p1/contrib/README010064400017500001750000000033601362136622600140030ustar00djmdjmOther patches and addons for OpenSSH. Please send submissions to djm@mindrot.org Externally maintained --------------------- SSH Proxy Command -- connect.c Shun-ichi GOTO has written a very useful ProxyCommand which allows the use of outbound SSH from behind a SOCKS4, SOCKS5 or https CONNECT style proxy server. His page for connect.c has extensive documentation on its use as well as compiled versions for Win32. https://bitbucket.org/gotoh/connect/wiki/Home X11 SSH Askpass: Jim Knoble has written an excellent X11 passphrase requester. This is highly recommended: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/ In this directory ----------------- ssh-copy-id: Phil Hands' shell script to automate the process of adding your public key to a remote machine's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file. gnome-ssh-askpass[12]: A GNOME and Gtk2 passphrase requesters. Use "make gnome-ssh-askpass1" or "make gnome-ssh-askpass2" to build. sshd.pam.generic: A generic PAM config file which may be useful on your system. YMMV sshd.pam.freebsd: A PAM config file which works with FreeBSD's PAM port. Contributed by Dominik Brettnacher findssl.sh: Search for all instances of OpenSSL headers and libraries and print their versions. This is intended to help diagnose OpenSSH's "OpenSSL headers do not match your library" errors. aix: Files to build an AIX native (installp or SMIT installable) package. caldera: RPM spec file and scripts for building Caldera OpenLinuix packages cygwin: Support files for Cygwin hpux: Support files for HP-UX redhat: RPM spec file and scripts for building Redhat packages suse: RPM spec file and scripts for building SuSE packages openssh-8.2p1/contrib/aix004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600136265ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/contrib/aix/README010064400017500001750000000024141362136622600145630ustar00djmdjmOverview: This directory contains files to build an AIX native (installp or SMIT installable) openssh package. Directions: (optional) create config.local in your build dir ./configure [options] contrib/aix/buildbff.sh The file config.local or the environment is read to set the following options (default first): PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=[no|yes] X11_FORWARDING=[no|yes] AIX_SRC=[no|yes] Acknowledgements: The contents of this directory are based on Ben Lindstrom's Solaris buildpkg.sh. Ben also supplied inventory.sh. Jim Abbey's (GPL'ed) lppbuild-2.1 was used to learn how to build .bff's and for comparison with the output from this script, however no code from lppbuild is included and it is not required for operation. SRC support based on examples provided by Sandor Sklar and Maarten Kreuger. PrivSep account handling fixes contributed by W. Earl Allen. Other notes: The script treats all packages as USR packages (not ROOT+USR when appropriate). It seems to work, though...... If there are any patches to this that have not yet been integrated they may be found at http://www.dtucker.net/openssh/. Disclaimer: It is hoped that it is useful but there is no warranty. If it breaks you get to keep both pieces. - Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au) 2002/03/01 openssh-8.2p1/contrib/aix/buildbff.sh010075500017500001750000000213631362136622600160230ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # # buildbff.sh: Create AIX SMIT-installable OpenSSH packages # # Author: Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au) # This file is placed in the public domain and comes with absolutely # no warranty. # # Based originally on Ben Lindstrom's buildpkg.sh for Solaris # # # Tunable configuration settings # create a "config.local" in your build directory or set # environment variables to override these. # [ -z "$PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN" ] && PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=no [ -z "$X11_FORWARDING" ] && X11_FORWARDING=no [ -z "$AIX_SRC" ] && AIX_SRC=no umask 022 startdir=`pwd` perl -v >/dev/null || (echo perl required; exit 1) # Path to inventory.sh: same place as buildbff.sh if echo $0 | egrep '^/' then inventory=`dirname $0`/inventory.sh # absolute path else inventory=`pwd`/`dirname $0`/inventory.sh # relative path fi # # We still support running from contrib/aix, but this is deprecated # if pwd | egrep 'contrib/aix$' then echo "Changing directory to `pwd`/../.." echo "Please run buildbff.sh from your build directory in future." cd ../.. contribaix=1 fi if [ ! -f Makefile ] then echo "Makefile not found (did you run configure?)" exit 1 fi # # Directories used during build: # current dir = $objdir directory you ran ./configure in. # $objdir/$PKGDIR/ directory package files are constructed in # $objdir/$PKGDIR/root/ package root ($FAKE_ROOT) # objdir=`pwd` PKGNAME=openssh PKGDIR=package # # Collect local configuration settings to override defaults # if [ -s ./config.local ] then echo Reading local settings from config.local . ./config.local fi # # Fill in some details from Makefile, like prefix and sysconfdir # the eval also expands variables like sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc # provided they are eval'ed in the correct order # for confvar in prefix exec_prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datadir mandir mansubdir sysconfdir piddir srcdir do eval $confvar=`grep "^$confvar=" $objdir/Makefile | cut -d = -f 2` done # # Collect values of privsep user and privsep path # currently only found in config.h # for confvar in SSH_PRIVSEP_USER PRIVSEP_PATH do eval $confvar=`awk '/#define[ \t]'$confvar'/{print $3}' $objdir/config.h` done # Set privsep defaults if not defined if [ -z "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ] then SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd fi if [ -z "$PRIVSEP_PATH" ] then PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty fi # Clean package build directory rm -rf $objdir/$PKGDIR FAKE_ROOT=$objdir/$PKGDIR/root mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT # Start by faking root install echo "Faking root install..." cd $objdir make install-nokeys DESTDIR=$FAKE_ROOT if [ $? -gt 0 ] then echo "Fake root install failed, stopping." exit 1 fi # # Copy informational files to include in package # cp $srcdir/LICENCE $objdir/$PKGDIR/ cp $srcdir/README* $objdir/$PKGDIR/ # # Extract common info requires for the 'info' part of the package. # AIX requires 4-part version numbers # VERSION=`./ssh -V 2>&1 | cut -f 1 -d , | cut -f 2 -d _` MAJOR=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 1 -d .` MINOR=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 2 -d .` PATCH=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 3 -d .` PORTABLE=`echo $VERSION | awk 'BEGIN{FS="p"}{print $2}'` [ "$PATCH" = "" ] && PATCH=0 [ "$PORTABLE" = "" ] && PORTABLE=0 BFFVERSION=`printf "%d.%d.%d.%d" $MAJOR $MINOR $PATCH $PORTABLE` echo "Building BFF for $PKGNAME $VERSION (package version $BFFVERSION)" # # Set ssh and sshd parameters as per config.local # if [ "${PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN}" = no ] then perl -p -i -e "s/#PermitRootLogin yes/PermitRootLogin no/" \ $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config fi if [ "${X11_FORWARDING}" = yes ] then perl -p -i -e "s/#X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/" \ $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config fi # Rename config files; postinstall script will copy them if necessary for cfgfile in ssh_config sshd_config do mv $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/$cfgfile $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/$cfgfile.default done # # Generate lpp control files. # working dir is $FAKE_ROOT but files are generated in dir above # and moved into place just before creation of .bff # cd $FAKE_ROOT echo Generating LPP control files find . ! -name . -print >../openssh.al $inventory >../openssh.inventory cat <../openssh.copyright This software is distributed under a BSD-style license. For the full text of the license, see /usr/lpp/openssh/LICENCE EOD # # openssh.size file allows filesystem expansion as required # generate list of directories containing files # then calculate disk usage for each directory and store in openssh.size # files=`find . -type f -print` dirs=`for file in $files; do dirname $file; done | sort -u` for dir in $dirs do du $dir done > ../openssh.size # # Create postinstall script # cat <>../openssh.post_i #!/bin/sh echo Creating configs from defaults if necessary. for cfgfile in ssh_config sshd_config do if [ ! -f $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile ] then echo "Creating \$cfgfile from default" cp $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile.default $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile else echo "\$cfgfile already exists." fi done echo # Create PrivilegeSeparation user and group if not present echo Checking for PrivilegeSeparation user and group. if cut -f1 -d: /etc/group | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null then echo "PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists." else echo "Creating PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER." mkgroup -A $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER fi # Create user if required if lsuser "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" >/dev/null then echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists." else echo "Creating PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER." mkuser gecos='SSHD PrivSep User' login=false rlogin=false account_locked=true pgrp=$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER fi if egrep '^[ \t]*UsePrivilegeSeparation[ \t]+no' $sysconfdir/sshd_config >/dev/null then echo UsePrivilegeSeparation not enabled, privsep directory not required. else # create chroot directory if required if [ -d $PRIVSEP_PATH ] then echo "PrivSep chroot directory $PRIVSEP_PATH already exists." else echo "Creating PrivSep chroot directory $PRIVSEP_PATH." mkdir $PRIVSEP_PATH chown 0 $PRIVSEP_PATH chgrp 0 $PRIVSEP_PATH chmod 755 $PRIVSEP_PATH fi fi echo # Generate keys unless they already exist echo Creating host keys if required. $bindir/ssh-keygen -A echo # Set startup command depending on SRC support if [ "$AIX_SRC" = "yes" ] then echo Creating SRC sshd subsystem. rmssys -s sshd 2>&1 >/dev/null mkssys -s sshd -p "$sbindir/sshd" -a '-D' -u 0 -S -n 15 -f 9 -R -G tcpip startupcmd="start $sbindir/sshd \\\"\\\$src_running\\\"" oldstartcmd="$sbindir/sshd" else startupcmd="$sbindir/sshd" oldstartcmd="start $sbindir/sshd \\\"$src_running\\\"" fi # If migrating to or from SRC, change previous startup command # otherwise add to rc.tcpip if egrep "^\$oldstartcmd" /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null then if sed "s|^\$oldstartcmd|\$startupcmd|g" /etc/rc.tcpip >/etc/rc.tcpip.new then chmod 0755 /etc/rc.tcpip.new mv /etc/rc.tcpip /etc/rc.tcpip.old && \ mv /etc/rc.tcpip.new /etc/rc.tcpip else echo "Updating /etc/rc.tcpip failed, please check." fi else # Add to system startup if required if grep "^\$startupcmd" /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null then echo "sshd found in rc.tcpip, not adding." else echo "Adding sshd to rc.tcpip" echo >>/etc/rc.tcpip echo "# Start sshd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip echo "\$startupcmd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip fi fi EOF # # Create liblpp.a and move control files into it # echo Creating liblpp.a ( cd .. for i in openssh.al openssh.copyright openssh.inventory openssh.post_i openssh.size LICENCE README* do ar -r liblpp.a $i rm $i done ) # # Create lpp_name # # This will end up looking something like: # 4 R I OpenSSH { # OpenSSH 3.0.2.1 1 N U en_US OpenSSH 3.0.2p1 Portable for AIX # [ # % # /usr/local/bin 8073 # /usr/local/etc 189 # /usr/local/libexec 185 # /usr/local/man/man1 145 # /usr/local/man/man8 83 # /usr/local/sbin 2105 # /usr/local/share 3 # % # ] # } echo Creating lpp_name cat <../lpp_name 4 R I $PKGNAME { $PKGNAME $BFFVERSION 1 N U en_US OpenSSH $VERSION Portable for AIX [ % EOF for i in $bindir $sysconfdir $libexecdir $mandir/${mansubdir}1 $mandir/${mansubdir}8 $sbindir $datadir /usr/lpp/openssh do # get size in 512 byte blocks if [ -d $FAKE_ROOT/$i ] then size=`du $FAKE_ROOT/$i | awk '{print $1}'` echo "$i $size" >>../lpp_name fi done echo '%' >>../lpp_name echo ']' >>../lpp_name echo '}' >>../lpp_name # # Move pieces into place # mkdir -p usr/lpp/openssh mv ../liblpp.a usr/lpp/openssh mv ../lpp_name . # # Now invoke backup to create .bff file # note: lpp_name needs to be the first file so we generate the # file list on the fly and feed it to backup using -i # echo Creating $PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff with backup... rm -f $PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff ( echo "./lpp_name" find . ! -name lpp_name -a ! -name . -print ) | backup -i -q -f ../$PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff $filelist # # Move package into final location and clean up # mv ../$PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff $startdir cd $startdir rm -rf $objdir/$PKGDIR echo $0: done. openssh-8.2p1/contrib/aix/inventory.sh010075500017500001750000000030351362136622600162770ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # # inventory.sh # # Originally written by Ben Lindstrom, modified by Darren Tucker to use perl # This file is placed into the public domain. # # This will produce an AIX package inventory file, which looks like: # # /usr/local/bin: # class=apply,inventory,openssh # owner=root # group=system # mode=755 # type=DIRECTORY # /usr/local/bin/slogin: # class=apply,inventory,openssh # owner=root # group=system # mode=777 # type=SYMLINK # target=ssh # /usr/local/share/Ssh.bin: # class=apply,inventory,openssh # owner=root # group=system # mode=644 # type=FILE # size=VOLATILE # checksum=VOLATILE find . ! -name . -print | perl -ne '{ chomp; if ( -l $_ ) { ($dev,$ino,$mod,$nl,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$sz,$at,$mt,$ct,$bsz,$blk)=lstat; } else { ($dev,$ino,$mod,$nl,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$sz,$at,$mt,$ct,$bsz,$blk)=stat; } # Start to display inventory information $name = $_; $name =~ s|^.||; # Strip leading dot from path print "$name:\n"; print "\tclass=apply,inventory,openssh\n"; print "\towner=root\n"; print "\tgroup=system\n"; printf "\tmode=%lo\n", $mod & 07777; # Mask perm bits if ( -l $_ ) { # Entry is SymLink print "\ttype=SYMLINK\n"; printf "\ttarget=%s\n", readlink($_); } elsif ( -f $_ ) { # Entry is File print "\ttype=FILE\n"; print "\tsize=$sz\n"; print "\tchecksum=VOLATILE\n"; } elsif ( -d $_ ) { # Entry is Directory print "\ttype=DIRECTORY\n"; } }' openssh-8.2p1/contrib/aix/pam.conf010064400017500001750000000012741362136622600153320ustar00djmdjm# # PAM configuration file /etc/pam.conf # Example for OpenSSH on AIX 5.2 # # Authentication Management sshd auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix OTHER auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix # Account Management sshd account required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix OTHER account required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix # Password Management sshd password required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix OTHER password required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix # Session Management sshd session required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix OTHER session required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix openssh-8.2p1/contrib/cygwin004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600143455ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/contrib/cygwin/Makefile010064400017500001750000000060441362136622600160650ustar00djmdjmsrcdir=../.. copyidsrcdir=.. prefix=/usr exec_prefix=$(prefix) bindir=$(prefix)/bin datadir=$(prefix)/share mandir=$(datadir)/man docdir=$(datadir)/doc sshdocdir=$(docdir)/openssh cygdocdir=$(docdir)/Cygwin sysconfdir=/etc defaultsdir=$(sysconfdir)/defaults/etc inetdefdir=$(defaultsdir)/inetd.d PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty INSTALL=/usr/bin/install -c MKDIR_P=$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs DESTDIR= all: @echo @echo "Use \`make cygwin-postinstall DESTDIR=[package directory]'" @echo "Be sure having DESTDIR set correctly!" @echo move-config-files: $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir) mv $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir) mv $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir) remove-empty-dir: rm -rf $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH) install-inetd-config: $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(inetdefdir) $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd-inetd $(DESTDIR)$(inetdefdir)/sshd-inetd install-sshdoc: $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir) -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/CREDITS $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/CREDITS -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/ChangeLog $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/ChangeLog -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/LICENCE $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/LICENCE -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/OVERVIEW $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/OVERVIEW -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.agent $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.agent -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.certkeys $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.certkeys -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.mux $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.mux -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.dns $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.dns -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.platform $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.platform -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.privsep $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.privsep -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.tun $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.tun -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/TODO $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/TODO install-cygwindoc: README $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(cygdocdir) $(INSTALL) -m 644 README $(DESTDIR)$(cygdocdir)/openssh.README install-doc: install-sshdoc install-cygwindoc install-scripts: ssh-host-config ssh-user-config $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) $(INSTALL) -m 755 ssh-host-config $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-host-config $(INSTALL) -m 755 ssh-user-config $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-user-config install-copy-id: $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id.1 $(INSTALL) -m 755 $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-copy-id $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/ssh-copy-id.1 gzip-man-pages: rm $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/slogin.1 gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/*.1 gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man5/*.5 gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man8/*.8 cd $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1 && ln -s ssh.1.gz slogin.1.gz cygwin-postinstall: move-config-files remove-empty-dir install-inetd-config install-doc install-scripts install-copy-id gzip-man-pages @echo "Cygwin specific configuration finished." openssh-8.2p1/contrib/cygwin/README010064400017500001750000000060071362136622600153040ustar00djmdjmThis package describes important Cygwin specific stuff concerning OpenSSH. The binary package is usually built for recent Cygwin versions and might not run on older versions. Please check http://cygwin.com/ for information about current Cygwin releases. ================== Host configuration ================== If you are installing OpenSSH the first time, you can generate global config files and server keys, as well as installing sshd as a service, by running /usr/bin/ssh-host-config Note that this binary archive doesn't contain default config files in /etc. That files are only created if ssh-host-config is started. To support testing and unattended installation ssh-host-config got some options: usage: ssh-host-config [OPTION]... Options: --debug -d Enable shell's debug output. --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically. --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically. --cygwin -c Use "options" as value for CYGWIN environment var. --name -N sshd windows service name. --port -p sshd listens on port n. --user -u privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'. --pwd -w Use "pwd" as password for privileged user. --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user instead of LocalSystem for sshd service. Installing sshd as daemon via ssh-host-config is recommended. Alternatively you can start sshd via inetd, if you have the inetutils package installed. Just run ssh-host-config, but answer "no" when asked to install sshd as service. The ssh-host-config script also adds the required lines to /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services. ================== User configuration ================== Any user can simplify creating the own private and public keys by running /usr/bin/ssh-user-config To support testing and unattended installation ssh-user-config got some options as well: usage: ssh-user-config [OPTION]... Options: --debug -d Enable shell's debug output. --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically. --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically. --passphrase -p word Use "word" as passphrase automatically. Please note that OpenSSH does never use the value of $HOME to search for the users configuration files! It always uses the value of the pw_dir field in /etc/passwd as the home directory. If no home diretory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory is used instead! ================ Building OpenSSH ================ Building from source is easy. Just unpack the source archive, cd to that directory, and call cygport: cygport openssh.cygport all You must have installed the following packages to be able to build OpenSSH with the aforementioned cygport script: zlib crypt libssl-devel libedit-devel libkrb5-devel Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin@cygwin.com. Have fun, Corinna Vinschen Cygwin Developer Red Hat Inc. openssh-8.2p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config010064400017500001750000000554201362136622600173650ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/bash # # ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc. # # This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH. # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any # purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above # copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS # OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. # IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, # DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR # OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR # THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. # ====================================================================== # Initialization # ====================================================================== CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh # List of apps used. This is checkad for existence in csih_sanity_check # Don't use *any* transient commands before sourcing the csih helper script, # otherwise the sanity checks are short-circuited. declare -a csih_required_commands=( /usr/bin/basename coreutils /usr/bin/cat coreutils /usr/bin/chmod coreutils /usr/bin/dirname coreutils /usr/bin/id coreutils /usr/bin/mv coreutils /usr/bin/rm coreutils /usr/bin/cygpath cygwin /usr/bin/mkpasswd cygwin /usr/bin/mount cygwin /usr/bin/ps cygwin /usr/bin/umount cygwin /usr/bin/cmp diffutils /usr/bin/grep grep /usr/bin/awk gawk /usr/bin/ssh-keygen openssh /usr/sbin/sshd openssh /usr/bin/sed sed ) csih_sanity_check_server=yes source ${CSIH_SCRIPT} PROGNAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $0) _tdir=$(/usr/bin/dirname $0) PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd) # Subdirectory where the new package is being installed PREFIX=/usr # Directory where the config files are stored SYSCONFDIR=/etc LOCALSTATEDIR=/var sshd_config_configured=no port_number=22 service_name=cygsshd strictmodes=yes cygwin_value="" user_account= password_value= opt_force=no # ====================================================================== # Routine: update_services_file # ====================================================================== update_services_file() { local _my_etcdir="/ssh-host-config.$$" local _win_etcdir local _services local _spaces local _serv_tmp local _wservices local ret=0 _win_etcdir="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc" _services="${_my_etcdir}/services" _spaces=" #" _serv_tmp="${_my_etcdir}/srv.out.$$" /usr/bin/mount -o text,posix=0,noacl -f "${_win_etcdir}" "${_my_etcdir}" # Depends on the above mount _wservices=`cygpath -w "${_services}"` # Add ssh 22/tcp and ssh 22/udp to services if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[[:space:]][[:space:]]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ] then if /usr/bin/awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh 22/tcp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh 22/udp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}" then if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}" then csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_wservices}" else csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!" let ++ret fi /usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}" else csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!" let ++ret fi fi /usr/bin/umount "${_my_etcdir}" return $ret } # --- End of update_services_file --- # # ====================================================================== # Routine: sshd_strictmodes # MODIFIES: strictmodes # ====================================================================== sshd_strictmodes() { if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ] then echo csih_inform "StrictModes is set to 'yes' by default." csih_inform "This is the recommended setting, but it requires that the POSIX" csih_inform "permissions of the user's home directory, the user's .ssh" csih_inform "directory, and the user's ssh key files are tight so that" csih_inform "only the user has write permissions." csih_inform "On the other hand, StrictModes don't work well with default" csih_inform "Windows permissions of a home directory mounted with the" csih_inform "'noacl' option, and they don't work at all if the home" csih_inform "directory is on a FAT or FAT32 partition." if ! csih_request "Should StrictModes be used?" then strictmodes=no fi fi return 0 } # ====================================================================== # Routine: sshd_privsep # Try to create ssshd user account # ====================================================================== sshd_privsep() { local ret=0 if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ] then if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd then csih_error_recoverable "Could not create user 'sshd'!" csih_error_recoverable "You will not be able to run an sshd service" csih_error_recoverable "under a privileged account successfully." csih_error_recoverable "Make sure to create a non-privileged user 'sshd'" csih_error_recoverable "manually before trying to run the service!" let ++ret fi fi return $ret } # --- End of sshd_privsep --- # # ====================================================================== # Routine: sshd_config_tweak # ====================================================================== sshd_config_tweak() { local ret=0 # Modify sshd_config csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file" if [ "${port_number}" -ne 22 ] then /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]].*/Port ${port_number}/" \ ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config if [ $? -ne 0 ] then csih_warning "Setting listening port to ${port_number} failed!" csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!" let ++ret fi fi if [ "${strictmodes}" = "no" ] then /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*StrictModes[[:space:]].*/StrictModes no/" \ ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config if [ $? -ne 0 ] then csih_warning "Setting StrictModes to 'no' failed!" csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!" let ++ret fi fi return $ret } # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- # # ====================================================================== # Routine: update_inetd_conf # ====================================================================== update_inetd_conf() { local _inetcnf="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf" local _inetcnf_tmp="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf.$$" local _inetcnf_dir="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.d" local _sshd_inetd_conf="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd" local _sshd_inetd_conf_tmp="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd.$$" local _with_comment=1 local ret=0 if [ -d "${_inetcnf_dir}" ] then # we have inetutils-1.5 inetd.d support if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ] then /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0 # check for sshd OR ssh in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/ if [ $(/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?) -eq 0 ] then /usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}" if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ] then if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}" then csih_inform "Removed ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf}" else csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!" let ++ret fi /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" else csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!" let ++ret fi fi fi csih_install_config "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" >/dev/null 2>&1 then if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ] then /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" else /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" fi if /usr/bin/mv "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" then csih_inform "Updated ${_sshd_inetd_conf}" else csih_warning "Updating ${_sshd_inetd_conf} failed!" let ++ret fi fi elif [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ] then /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0 # check for sshd in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/ if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ] then /usr/bin/grep -v '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}" if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ] then if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}" then csih_inform "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}" else csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!" let ++ret fi /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" else csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!" let ++ret fi fi # Add ssh line to inetd.conf if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ] then if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ] then echo 'ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}" else echo '# ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}" fi if [ $? -eq 0 ] then csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}" else csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_inetcnf} failed!" let ++ret fi fi fi return $ret } # --- End of update_inetd_conf --- # # ====================================================================== # Routine: check_service_files_ownership # Checks that the files in /etc and /var belong to the right owner # ====================================================================== check_service_files_ownership() { local run_service_as=$1 local ret=0 if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ] then accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ "${service_name}" | /usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp') if [ "${accnt_name}" = "LocalSystem" ] then # Convert "LocalSystem" to "SYSTEM" as is the correct account name run_service_as="SYSTEM" else dom="${accnt_name%%\\*}" accnt_name="${accnt_name#*\\}" if [ "${dom}" = '.' ] then # Check local account run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -l -u "${accnt_name}" | /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}') else # Check domain run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -d "${dom}" -u "${accnt_name}" | /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}') fi fi if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ] then csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running ${service_name} service from account database!" csih_warning "As a result, this script cannot make sure that the files used" csih_warning "by the ${service_name} service belong to the user running the service." return 1 fi fi for i in "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/sshd_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key.pub do if [ -f "$i" ] then if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 "$i" >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of $i!" let ++ret fi fi done if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!" let ++ret fi if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!" let ++ret fi if [ -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log ] then if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log!" let ++ret fi fi if [ $ret -ne 0 ] then csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of important files to ${run_service_as}!" csih_warning "This may cause the ${service_name} service to fail! Please make sure that" csih_warning "you have sufficient permissions to change the ownership of files" csih_warning "and try to run the ssh-host-config script again." fi return $ret } # --- End of check_service_files_ownership --- # # ====================================================================== # Routine: install_service # Install sshd as a service # ====================================================================== install_service() { local run_service_as local password local ret=0 echo if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_inform "Sshd service is already installed." check_service_files_ownership "" || let ret+=$? else echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Do you want to install sshd as a service?" if csih_request "(Say \"no\" if it is already installed as a service)" then csih_get_cygenv "${cygwin_value}" if ( [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" != "yes" ] ) then # Enforce using privileged user on 64 bit Vista or W7 under WOW64 is_wow64=$(/usr/bin/uname | /usr/bin/grep -q 'WOW' && echo 1 || echo 0) if ( csih_is_nt2003 && ! csih_is_windows8 && [ "${is_wow64}" = "1" ] ) then csih_inform "Running 32 bit Cygwin on 64 bit Windows Vista or Windows 7" csih_inform "the SYSTEM account is not sufficient to setuid to a local" csih_inform "user account. You need to have or to create a privileged" csih_inform "account. This script will help you do so." echo csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes fi fi if ( [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] ) then [ "${opt_force}" = "yes" ] && opt_f=-f [ -n "${user_account}" ] && opt_u="-u ""${user_account}""" csih_select_privileged_username ${opt_f} ${opt_u} sshd if ! csih_create_privileged_user "${password_value}" then csih_error_recoverable "There was a serious problem creating a privileged user." csih_request "Do you want to proceed anyway?" || exit 1 let ++ret fi # Never returns empty if NT or above run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as) else run_service_as="SYSTEM" fi if [ "${run_service_as}" = "${csih_PRIVILEGED_USERNAME}" ] then password="${csih_PRIVILEGED_PASSWORD}" if [ -z "${password}" ] then csih_get_value "Please enter the password for user '${run_service_as}':" "-s" password="${csih_value}" fi fi # At this point, we either have $run_service_as = "system" and # $password is empty, or $run_service_as is some privileged user and # (hopefully) $password contains the correct password. So, from here # out, we use '-z "${password}"' to discriminate the two cases. csih_check_user "${run_service_as}" if [ -n "${csih_cygenv}" ] then cygwin_env=( -e "CYGWIN=${csih_cygenv}" ) fi if [ -z "${password}" ] then if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \ -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" then echo csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the LocalSystem" csih_inform "account (also known as SYSTEM). To start the service now, call" csih_inform "\`net start ${service_name}' or \`cygrunsrv -S ${service_name}'. Otherwise, it" csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot." fi else if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \ -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" \ -u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}" then /usr/bin/editrights -u "${run_service_as}" -a SeServiceLogonRight echo csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the '${run_service_as}'" csih_inform "account. To start the service now, call \`net start ${service_name}' or" csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S ${service_name}'. Otherwise, it will start automatically" csih_inform "after the next reboot." fi fi if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1 then check_service_files_ownership "${run_service_as}" || let ret+=$? else csih_error_recoverable "Installing sshd as a service failed!" let ++ret fi fi # user allowed us to install as service fi # service not yet installed return $ret } # --- End of install_service --- # # ====================================================================== # Main Entry Point # ====================================================================== # Check how the script has been started. If # (1) it has been started by giving the full path and # that path is /etc/postinstall, OR # (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable # SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set # then set auto_answer to "no". This allows automatic # creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting # them if they already exist. In both cases, color # escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent # cluttering setup's logfiles. if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ] then csih_auto_answer="no" csih_disable_color opt_force=yes fi if [ -n "${SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ] then csih_auto_answer="no" csih_disable_color opt_force=yes fi # ====================================================================== # Parse options # ====================================================================== while : do case $# in 0) break ;; esac option=$1 shift case "${option}" in -d | --debug ) set -x csih_trace_on ;; -y | --yes ) csih_auto_answer=yes opt_force=yes ;; -n | --no ) csih_auto_answer=no opt_force=yes ;; -c | --cygwin ) cygwin_value="$1" shift ;; -N | --name ) service_name=$1 shift ;; -p | --port ) port_number=$1 shift ;; -u | --user ) user_account="$1" shift ;; -w | --pwd ) password_value="$1" shift ;; --privileged ) csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes ;; *) echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..." echo echo "This script creates an OpenSSH host configuration." echo echo "Options:" echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output." echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically." echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically." echo " --cygwin -c Use \"options\" as value for CYGWIN environment var." echo " --name -N sshd windows service name." echo " --port -p sshd listens on port n." echo " --user -u privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'." echo " --pwd -w Use \"pwd\" as password for privileged user." echo " --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user" echo " instead of LocalSystem for sshd service." echo exit 1 ;; esac done # ====================================================================== # Action! # ====================================================================== # Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while # some ssh processes are still running if /usr/bin/ps -ef | /usr/bin/grep -q '/sshd\?$' then echo csih_error "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first." fi # Make sure the user is running in an administrative context admin=$(/usr/bin/id -G | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '\<544\>' && echo yes || echo no) if [ "${admin}" != "yes" ] then echo csih_warning "Running this script typically requires administrator privileges!" csih_warning "However, it seems your account does not have these privileges." csih_warning "Here's the list of groups in your user token:" echo /usr/bin/id -Gnz | xargs -0n1 echo " " echo csih_warning "This usually means you're running this script from a non-admin" csih_warning "desktop session, or in a non-elevated shell under UAC control." echo csih_warning "Make sure you have the appropriate privileges right now," csih_warning "otherwise parts of this script will probably fail!" echo echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Are you sure you want to continue? (Say \"no\" if you're not sure" if ! csih_request "you have the required privileges)" then echo csih_inform "Ok. Exiting. Make sure to switch to an administrative account" csih_inform "or to start this script from an elevated shell." exit 1 fi fi echo warning_cnt=0 # Create /var/log/lastlog if not already exists if [ -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog -a ! -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ] then echo csih_error_multi "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog exists, but is not a file." \ "Cannot create ssh host configuration." fi if [ ! -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ] then /usr/bin/cat /dev/null > ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog if ! /usr/bin/chmod 644 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!" let ++warning_cnt fi fi # Create /var/empty file used as chroot jail for privilege separation csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" "Cannot create ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty directory." if ! /usr/bin/chmod 755 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!" let ++warning_cnt fi # generate missing host keys csih_inform "Generating missing SSH host keys" /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A || let warning_cnt+=$? # handle ssh_config csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" >/dev/null 2>&1 then if [ "${port_number}" != "22" ] then csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file with requested port" echo "Host localhost" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config echo " Port ${port_number}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config fi fi # handle sshd_config # make sure not to change the existing file mod_before="" if [ -e "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" ] then mod_before=$(stat "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" | grep '^Modify:') fi csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt mod_now=$(stat "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" | grep '^Modify:') if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1 then sshd_config_configured=yes fi if [ "${mod_before}" != "${mod_now}" ] then sshd_strictmodes || let warning_cnt+=$? sshd_config_tweak || let warning_cnt+=$? fi #sshd_privsep || let warning_cnt+=$? update_services_file || let warning_cnt+=$? update_inetd_conf || let warning_cnt+=$? install_service || let warning_cnt+=$? echo if [ $warning_cnt -eq 0 ] then csih_inform "Host configuration finished. Have fun!" else csih_warning "Host configuration exited with ${warning_cnt} errors or warnings!" csih_warning "Make sure that all problems reported are fixed," csih_warning "then re-run ssh-host-config." fi exit $warning_cnt openssh-8.2p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config010064400017500001750000000177411362136622600173720ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/bash # # ssh-user-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc. # # This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH. # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any # purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above # copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS # OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. # IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, # DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR # OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR # THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. # ====================================================================== # Initialization # ====================================================================== PROGNAME=$(basename -- $0) _tdir=$(dirname -- $0) PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd) CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh # Subdirectory where the new package is being installed PREFIX=/usr # Directory where the config files are stored SYSCONFDIR=/etc source ${CSIH_SCRIPT} auto_passphrase="no" passphrase="" pwdhome= with_passphrase= # ====================================================================== # Routine: create_identity # optionally create identity of type argument in ~/.ssh # optionally add result to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys # ====================================================================== create_identity() { local file="$1" local type="$2" local name="$3" if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" ] then if csih_request "Shall I create a ${name} identity file for you?" then csih_inform "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ] then ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null else ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null fi if csih_request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?" then csih_inform "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" fi fi fi } # === End of create_ssh1_identity() === # readonly -f create_identity # ====================================================================== # Routine: check_user_homedir # Perform various checks on the user's home directory # SETS GLOBAL VARIABLE: # pwdhome # ====================================================================== check_user_homedir() { pwdhome=$(getent passwd $UID | awk -F: '{ print $6; }') if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X" ] then csih_error_multi \ "There is no home directory set for you in the account database." \ 'Setting $HOME is not sufficient!' fi if [ ! -d "${pwdhome}" ] then csih_error_multi \ "${pwdhome} is set in the account database as your home directory" \ 'but it is not a valid directory. Cannot create user identity files.' fi # If home is the root dir, set home to empty string to avoid error messages # in subsequent parts of that script. if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X/" ] then # But first raise a warning! csih_warning "Your home directory in the account database is set to root (/). This is not recommended!" if csih_request "Would you like to proceed anyway?" then pwdhome='' else csih_warning "Exiting. Configuration is not complete" exit 1 fi fi if [ -d "${pwdhome}" -a -n "`chmod -c g-w,o-w "${pwdhome}"`" ] then echo csih_warning 'group and other have been revoked write permission to your home' csih_warning "directory ${pwdhome}." csih_warning 'This is required by OpenSSH to allow public key authentication using' csih_warning 'the key files stored in your .ssh subdirectory.' csih_warning 'Revert this change ONLY if you know what you are doing!' echo fi } # === End of check_user_homedir() === # readonly -f check_user_homedir # ====================================================================== # Routine: check_user_dot_ssh_dir # Perform various checks on the ~/.ssh directory # PREREQUISITE: # pwdhome -- check_user_homedir() # ====================================================================== check_user_dot_ssh_dir() { if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" -a ! -d "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ] then csih_error "${pwdhome}/.ssh is existent but not a directory. Cannot create user identity files." fi if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ] then mkdir "${pwdhome}/.ssh" if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ] then csih_error "Creating users ${pwdhome}/.ssh directory failed" fi fi } # === End of check_user_dot_ssh_dir() === # readonly -f check_user_dot_ssh_dir # ====================================================================== # Routine: fix_authorized_keys_perms # Corrects the permissions of ~/.ssh/authorized_keys # PREREQUISITE: # pwdhome -- check_user_homedir() # ====================================================================== fix_authorized_keys_perms() { if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" ] then setfacl -b "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" 2>/dev/null || echo -n if ! chmod u-x,g-wx,o-wx "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" then csih_warning "Setting correct permissions to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" csih_warning "failed. Please care for the correct permissions. The minimum requirement" csih_warning "is, the owner needs read permissions." echo fi fi } # === End of fix_authorized_keys_perms() === # readonly -f fix_authorized_keys_perms # ====================================================================== # Main Entry Point # ====================================================================== # Check how the script has been started. If # (1) it has been started by giving the full path and # that path is /etc/postinstall, OR # (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable # SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set # then set auto_answer to "no". This allows automatic # creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting # them if they already exist. In both cases, color # escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent # cluttering setup's logfiles. if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ] then csih_auto_answer="no" csih_disable_color fi if [ -n "${SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ] then csih_auto_answer="no" csih_disable_color fi # ====================================================================== # Parse options # ====================================================================== while : do case $# in 0) break ;; esac option=$1 shift case "$option" in -d | --debug ) set -x csih_trace_on ;; -y | --yes ) csih_auto_answer=yes ;; -n | --no ) csih_auto_answer=no ;; -p | --passphrase ) with_passphrase="yes" passphrase=$1 shift ;; *) echo "usage: ${PROGNAME} [OPTION]..." echo echo "This script creates an OpenSSH user configuration." echo echo "Options:" echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output." echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically." echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically." echo " --passphrase -p word Use \"word\" as passphrase automatically." echo exit 1 ;; esac done # ====================================================================== # Action! # ====================================================================== check_user_homedir check_user_dot_ssh_dir create_identity id_rsa rsa "SSH2 RSA" create_identity id_dsa dsa "SSH2 DSA" create_identity id_ecdsa ecdsa "SSH2 ECDSA" create_identity identity rsa1 "(deprecated) SSH1 RSA" fix_authorized_keys_perms echo csih_inform "Configuration finished. Have fun!" openssh-8.2p1/contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd010064400017500001750000000003001362136622600163770ustar00djmdjm# This file can be used to enable sshd as a slave of the inetd service # To do so, the line below should be uncommented. @COMMENT@ ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i openssh-8.2p1/contrib/findssl.sh010064400017500001750000000112751362136622600151250ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # # findssl.sh # Search for all instances of OpenSSL headers and libraries # and print their versions. # Intended to help diagnose OpenSSH's "OpenSSL headers do not # match your library" errors. # # Written by Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au) # This file is placed in the public domain. # # Release history: # 2002-07-27: Initial release. # 2002-08-04: Added public domain notice. # 2003-06-24: Incorporated readme, set library paths. First cvs version. # 2004-12-13: Add traps to cleanup temp files, from Amarendra Godbole. # # "OpenSSL headers do not match your library" are usually caused by # OpenSSH's configure picking up an older version of OpenSSL headers # or libraries. You can use the following # procedure to help identify # the cause. # # The output of configure will tell you the versions of the OpenSSL # headers and libraries that were picked up, for example: # # checking OpenSSL header version... 90604f (OpenSSL 0.9.6d 9 May 2002) # checking OpenSSL library version... 90602f (OpenSSL 0.9.6b [engine] 9 Jul 2001) # checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library... no # configure: error: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library # # Now run findssl.sh. This should identify the headers and libraries # present and their versions. You should be able to identify the # libraries and headers used and adjust your CFLAGS or remove incorrect # versions. The output will show OpenSSL's internal version identifier # and should look something like: # $ ./findssl.sh # Searching for OpenSSL header files. # 0x0090604fL /usr/include/openssl/opensslv.h # 0x0090604fL /usr/local/ssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h # # Searching for OpenSSL shared library files. # 0x0090602fL /lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.6b # 0x0090602fL /lib/libcrypto.so.2 # 0x0090581fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0 # 0x0090602fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so # 0x0090581fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.5a # 0x0090600fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.6 # 0x0090600fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.1 # # Searching for OpenSSL static library files. # 0x0090602fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.a # 0x0090604fL /usr/local/ssl/lib/libcrypto.a # # In this example, I gave configure no extra flags, so it's picking up # the OpenSSL header from /usr/include/openssl (90604f) and the library # from /usr/lib/ (90602f). # # Adjust these to suit your compiler. # You may also need to set the *LIB*PATH environment variables if # DEFAULT_LIBPATH is not correct for your system. # CC=gcc STATIC=-static # # Cleanup on interrupt # trap 'rm -f conftest.c' INT HUP TERM # # Set up conftest C source # rm -f findssl.log cat >conftest.c < int main(){printf("0x%08xL\n", SSLeay());} EOD # # Set default library paths if not already set # DEFAULT_LIBPATH=/usr/lib:/usr/local/lib LIBPATH=${LIBPATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH} LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${LD_LIBRARY_PATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH} LIBRARY_PATH=${LIBRARY_PATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH} export LIBPATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH LIBRARY_PATH # not all platforms have a 'which' command if which ls >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then : which is defined else which () { saveIFS="$IFS" IFS=: for p in $PATH; do if test -x "$p/$1" -a -f "$p/$1"; then IFS="$saveIFS" echo "$p/$1" return 0 fi done IFS="$saveIFS" return 1 } fi # # Search for OpenSSL headers and print versions # echo Searching for OpenSSL header files. if [ -x "`which locate`" ] then headers=`locate opensslv.h` else headers=`find / -name opensslv.h -print 2>/dev/null` fi for header in $headers do ver=`awk '/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER/{printf \$3}' $header` echo "$ver $header" done echo # # Search for shared libraries. # Relies on shared libraries looking like "libcrypto.s*" # echo Searching for OpenSSL shared library files. if [ -x "`which locate`" ] then libraries=`locate libcrypto.s` else libraries=`find / -name 'libcrypto.s*' -print 2>/dev/null` fi for lib in $libraries do (echo "Trying libcrypto $lib" >>findssl.log dir=`dirname $lib` LIBPATH="$dir:$LIBPATH" LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$dir:$LIBPATH" LIBRARY_PATH="$dir:$LIBPATH" export LIBPATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH LIBRARY_PATH ${CC} -o conftest conftest.c $lib 2>>findssl.log if [ -x ./conftest ] then ver=`./conftest 2>/dev/null` rm -f ./conftest echo "$ver $lib" fi) done echo # # Search for static OpenSSL libraries and print versions # echo Searching for OpenSSL static library files. if [ -x "`which locate`" ] then libraries=`locate libcrypto.a` else libraries=`find / -name libcrypto.a -print 2>/dev/null` fi for lib in $libraries do libdir=`dirname $lib` echo "Trying libcrypto $lib" >>findssl.log ${CC} ${STATIC} -o conftest conftest.c -L${libdir} -lcrypto 2>>findssl.log if [ -x ./conftest ] then ver=`./conftest 2>/dev/null` rm -f ./conftest echo "$ver $lib" fi done # # Clean up # rm -f conftest.c openssh-8.2p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c010064400017500001750000000125401362136622600167130ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the * environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of * gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null". * * There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable * "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab * the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the * pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if * you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always. */ /* * Compile with: * * cc `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \ * gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \ * `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui` * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include void report_failed_grab (void) { GtkWidget *err; err = gnome_message_box_new("Could not grab keyboard or mouse.\n" "A malicious client may be eavesdropping on your session.", GNOME_MESSAGE_BOX_ERROR, "EXIT", NULL); gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(err), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL); gnome_dialog_run_and_close(GNOME_DIALOG(err)); } int passphrase_dialog(char *message) { char *passphrase; char **messages; int result, i, grab_server, grab_pointer; GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *label; grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL); grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL); dialog = gnome_dialog_new("OpenSSH", GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_OK, GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_CANCEL, NULL); messages = g_strsplit(message, "\\n", 0); if (messages) for(i = 0; messages[i]; i++) { label = gtk_label_new(messages[i]); gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), label, FALSE, FALSE, 0); } entry = gtk_entry_new(); gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0); gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE); gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry); /* Center window and prepare for grab */ gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(dialog), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL); gnome_dialog_set_default(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), 0); gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); gtk_window_set_policy(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), FALSE, FALSE, TRUE); gnome_dialog_close_hides(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), TRUE); gtk_container_set_border_width(GTK_CONTAINER(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), GNOME_PAD); gtk_widget_show_all(dialog); /* Grab focus */ if (grab_server) XGrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY()); if (grab_pointer && gdk_pointer_grab(dialog->window, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME)) goto nograb; if (gdk_keyboard_grab(dialog->window, FALSE, GDK_CURRENT_TIME)) goto nograbkb; /* Make close dialog */ gnome_dialog_editable_enters(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_EDITABLE(entry)); /* Run dialog */ result = gnome_dialog_run(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)); /* Ungrab */ if (grab_server) XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY()); if (grab_pointer) gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); gdk_flush(); /* Report passphrase if user selected OK */ passphrase = gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)); if (result == 0) puts(passphrase); /* Zero passphrase in memory */ memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase)); gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase); gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)); return (result == 0 ? 0 : -1); /* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot fail. */ nograbkb: gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); nograb: if (grab_server) XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY()); gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)); report_failed_grab(); return (-1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *message; int result; gnome_init("GNOME ssh-askpass", "0.1", argc, argv); if (argc == 2) message = argv[1]; else message = "Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:"; setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0); result = passphrase_dialog(message); return (result); } openssh-8.2p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c010064400017500001750000000162721362136622600167220ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* GTK2 support by Nalin Dahyabhai */ /* * This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the * environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of * gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null". * * There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable * "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab * the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the * pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if * you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always. */ #define GRAB_TRIES 16 #define GRAB_WAIT 250 /* milliseconds */ #define PROMPT_ENTRY 0 #define PROMPT_CONFIRM 1 #define PROMPT_NONE 2 /* * Compile with: * * cc -Wall `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \ * gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \ * `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0` * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static void report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what) { GtkWidget *err; err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0, GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE, "Could not grab %s. " "A malicious client may be eavesdropping " "on your session.", what); gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err)); gtk_widget_destroy(err); } static void ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dialog) { g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_DIALOG(dialog)); gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK); } static int passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type) { const char *failed; char *passphrase, *local; int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer; int buttons, default_response; GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry; GdkGrabStatus status; grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL); grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL); grab_tries = 0; /* Create an invisible parent window so that GtkDialog doesn't * complain. */ parent_window = gtk_window_new(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL); switch (prompt_type) { case PROMPT_CONFIRM: buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_YES_NO; default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_YES; break; case PROMPT_NONE: buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE; default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE; break; default: buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL; default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_OK; break; } dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0, GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION, buttons, "%s", message); gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH"); gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE); gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), default_response); gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE); if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) { entry = gtk_entry_new(); gtk_box_pack_start( GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0); gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE); gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry); gtk_widget_show(entry); /* Make close dialog */ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate", G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog); } /* Grab focus */ gtk_widget_show_now(dialog); if (grab_pointer) { for(;;) { status = gdk_pointer_grab( (gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog))), TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME); if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS) break; usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000); if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) { failed = "mouse"; goto nograb; } } } for(;;) { status = gdk_keyboard_grab( gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog)), FALSE, GDK_CURRENT_TIME); if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS) break; usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000); if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) { failed = "keyboard"; goto nograbkb; } } if (grab_server) { gdk_x11_grab_server(); } result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)); /* Ungrab */ if (grab_server) XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay()); if (grab_pointer) gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); gdk_flush(); /* Report passphrase if user selected OK */ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) { passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry))); if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) { local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), NULL, NULL, NULL); if (local != NULL) { puts(local); memset(local, '\0', strlen(local)); g_free(local); } else { puts(passphrase); } } /* Zero passphrase in memory */ memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase)); gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase); memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase)); g_free(passphrase); } gtk_widget_destroy(dialog); if (result != GTK_RESPONSE_OK && result != GTK_RESPONSE_YES) return -1; return 0; nograbkb: /* * At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report * the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot * fail. */ gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); nograb: if (grab_server) XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay()); gtk_widget_destroy(dialog); report_failed_grab(parent_window, failed); return (-1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *message, *prompt_mode; int result, prompt_type = PROMPT_ENTRY; gtk_init(&argc, &argv); if (argc > 1) { message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1); } else { message = g_strdup("Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:"); } if ((prompt_mode = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT")) != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "confirm") == 0) prompt_type = PROMPT_CONFIRM; else if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "none") == 0) prompt_type = PROMPT_NONE; } setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0); result = passphrase_dialog(message, prompt_type); g_free(message); return (result); } openssh-8.2p1/contrib/hpux004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600140315ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/contrib/hpux/README010064400017500001750000000021641362136622600147700ustar00djmdjmREADME for OpenSSH HP-UX contrib files Kevin Steves sshd: configuration file for sshd.rc sshd.rc: SSH startup script egd: configuration file for egd.rc egd.rc: EGD (entropy gathering daemon) startup script To install: sshd.rc: o Verify paths in sshd.rc match your local installation (WHAT_PATH and WHAT_PID) o Customize sshd if needed (SSHD_ARGS) o Install: # cp sshd /etc/rc.config.d # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/sshd # cp sshd.rc /sbin/init.d # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K100sshd # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S900sshd egd.rc: o Verify egd.pl path in egd.rc matches your local installation (WHAT_PATH) o Customize egd if needed (EGD_ARGS and EGD_LOG) o Add pseudo account: # groupadd egd # useradd -g egd egd # mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd # chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd # chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd o Install: # cp egd /etc/rc.config.d # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/egd # cp egd.rc /sbin/init.d # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/egd.rc # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K600egd # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S400egd openssh-8.2p1/contrib/hpux/egd010064400017500001750000000006051362136622600145700ustar00djmdjm# EGD_START: Set to 1 to start entropy gathering daemon # EGD_ARGS: Command line arguments to pass to egd # EGD_LOG: EGD stdout and stderr log file (default /etc/opt/egd/egd.log) # # To configure the egd environment: # groupadd egd # useradd -g egd egd # mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd # chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd # chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd EGD_START=1 EGD_ARGS='/etc/opt/egd/entropy' EGD_LOG= openssh-8.2p1/contrib/hpux/egd.rc010075500017500001750000000042471362136622600152040ustar00djmdjm#!/sbin/sh # # egd.rc: EGD start-up and shutdown script # # Allowed exit values: # 0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist. # 1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist. # 2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist. # Use this value if execution of this script is overridden # by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not # appropriate to execute for some other reason. # 3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution. # Input and output: # stdin is redirected from /dev/null # # stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file # during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode. umask 022 PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin export PATH WHAT='EGD (entropy gathering daemon)' WHAT_PATH=/opt/perl/bin/egd.pl WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/egd WHAT_LOG=/etc/opt/egd/egd.log # NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might # not be available. Do not attempt to access commands or files in # /usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater. Other # file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var # and /opt. rval=0 # Check the exit value of a command run by this script. If non-zero, the # exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script # is set to indicate failure. set_return() { x=$? if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then echo "EXIT CODE: $x" rval=1 # script FAILed fi } case $1 in 'start_msg') echo "Starting $WHAT" ;; 'stop_msg') echo "Stopping $WHAT" ;; 'start') if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then . $WHAT_CONFIG else echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING" fi if [ "$EGD_START" -eq 1 -a -x $WHAT_PATH ]; then EGD_LOG=${EGD_LOG:-$WHAT_LOG} su egd -c "nohup $WHAT_PATH $EGD_ARGS >$EGD_LOG 2>&1" && echo $WHAT started set_return else rval=2 fi ;; 'stop') pid=`ps -fuegd | awk '$1 == "egd" { print $2 }'` if [ "X$pid" != "X" ]; then if kill "$pid"; then echo "$WHAT stopped" else rval=1 echo "Unable to stop $WHAT" fi fi set_return ;; *) echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}" rval=1 ;; esac exit $rval openssh-8.2p1/contrib/hpux/sshd010064400017500001750000000001731362136622600147720ustar00djmdjm# SSHD_START: Set to 1 to start SSH daemon # SSHD_ARGS: Command line arguments to pass to sshd # SSHD_START=1 SSHD_ARGS= openssh-8.2p1/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc010075500017500001750000000036661362136622600154120ustar00djmdjm#!/sbin/sh # # sshd.rc: SSH daemon start-up and shutdown script # # Allowed exit values: # 0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist. # 1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist. # 2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist. # Use this value if execution of this script is overridden # by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not # appropriate to execute for some other reason. # 3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution. # Input and output: # stdin is redirected from /dev/null # # stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file # during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode. PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin export PATH WHAT='OpenSSH' WHAT_PATH=/opt/openssh/sbin/sshd WHAT_PID=/var/run/sshd.pid WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/sshd # NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might # not be available. Do not attempt to access commands or files in # /usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater. Other # file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var # and /opt. rval=0 # Check the exit value of a command run by this script. If non-zero, the # exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script # is set to indicate failure. set_return() { x=$? if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then echo "EXIT CODE: $x" rval=1 # script FAILed fi } case $1 in 'start_msg') echo "Starting $WHAT" ;; 'stop_msg') echo "Stopping $WHAT" ;; 'start') if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then . $WHAT_CONFIG else echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING" fi if [ "$SSHD_START" -eq 1 -a -x "$WHAT_PATH" ]; then $WHAT_PATH $SSHD_ARGS && echo "$WHAT started" set_return else rval=2 fi ;; 'stop') if kill `cat $WHAT_PID`; then echo "$WHAT stopped" else rval=1 echo "Unable to stop $WHAT" fi set_return ;; *) echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}" rval=1 ;; esac exit $rval openssh-8.2p1/contrib/redhat004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600143145ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh010064400017500001750000000000721362136622600204310ustar00djmdjmsetenv SSH_ASKPASS /usr/libexec/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass openssh-8.2p1/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh010064400017500001750000000001061362136622600202640ustar00djmdjmSSH_ASKPASS=/usr/libexec/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass export SSH_ASKPASS openssh-8.2p1/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec010064400017500001750000000721471362136622600167360ustar00djmdjm%define ver 8.2p1 %define rel 1%{?dist} # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID %define sshd_uid 74 %define sshd_gid 74 # Version of ssh-askpass %define aversion 1.2.4.1 # Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %define no_x11_askpass 0 # Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %define no_gnome_askpass 0 # Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no) %define static_libcrypto 0 # Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no) %define scard 0 # Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass %define gtk2 1 # Use build6x options for older RHEL builds # RHEL 7 not yet supported %if 0%{?rhel} > 6 %define build6x 0 %else %define build6x 1 %endif %if 0%{?fedora} >= 26 %define compat_openssl 1 %else %define compat_openssl 0 %endif # Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no) %define kerberos5 1 # Reserve options to override askpass settings with: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1' %{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1} %{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1} # Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+. # RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples. # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1' %{?no_gtk2:%define gtk2 0} # Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier? %{?build_6x:%define build6x 1} # If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc. %if %{build6x} %define _sysconfdir /etc %endif # Options for static OpenSSL link: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1" %{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1} # Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine) # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1" %{?smartcard:%define scard 1} # Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no) %define rescue 0 %{?build_rescue:%define rescue 1} # Turn off some stuff for resuce builds %if %{rescue} %define kerberos5 0 %endif Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol version 2. Name: openssh Version: %{ver} %if %{rescue} Release: %{rel}rescue %else Release: %{rel} %endif URL: https://www.openssh.com/portable.html Source0: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz License: BSD Group: Applications/Internet BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot Obsoletes: ssh %if %{build6x} PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00 %else Requires: initscripts >= 5.20 %endif BuildRequires: perl %if %{compat_openssl} BuildRequires: compat-openssl10-devel %else BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.0.1 BuildRequires: openssl-devel < 1.1 %endif BuildRequires: /bin/login %if ! %{build6x} BuildRequires: glibc-devel, pam %else BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h # Xt development tools BuildRequires: libXt-devel # Provides xmkmf BuildRequires: imake # Rely on relatively recent gtk BuildRequires: gtk2-devel %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} BuildRequires: pkgconfig %endif %if %{kerberos5} BuildRequires: krb5-devel BuildRequires: krb5-libs %endif %package clients Summary: OpenSSH clients. Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Group: Applications/Internet Obsoletes: ssh-clients %package server Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon. Group: System Environment/Daemons Obsoletes: ssh-server Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9 %if ! %{build6x} Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth %endif %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %package askpass-gnome Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %description SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries. This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. To make this package useful, you should also install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both. %description clients OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients. %description server OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh package installed. %description askpass OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %description askpass-gnome OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop environment. %prep %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build %if %{rescue} CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS %endif %configure \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \ --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \ --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \ --with-md5-passwords \ --mandir=%{_mandir} \ --with-mantype=man \ --disable-strip \ %if %{scard} --with-smartcard \ %endif %if %{rescue} --without-pam \ %else --with-pam \ %endif %if %{kerberos5} --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \ %endif %if %{static_libcrypto} perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile %endif make %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion} %configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh xmkmf -a make popd %endif # Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary # because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements. %if %{gtk2} gtk2=yes %else gtk2=no %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} pushd contrib if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then make gnome-ssh-askpass2 mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass else make gnome-ssh-askpass1 mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass fi popd %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh %if %{build6x} install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %else install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %endif install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} install x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{scard} rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ %endif perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %triggerun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then touch /var/run/sshd.restart fi %triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1 # Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have. gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1} /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1} END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config # And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default # behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't # specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying # one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both. if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config fi %triggerpostun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart /sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || : fi fi %pre server %{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || : %{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \ -g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || : %post server /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd %postun server /sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || : %preun server if [ "$1" = 0 ] then /sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || : /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd fi %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %if ! %{rescue} %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %endif %if %{scard} %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %files clients %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %if ! %{rescue} %attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %endif %if ! %{rescue} %files server %defattr(-,root,root) %dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} %files askpass-gnome %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %changelog * Sat Feb 10 2018 Darren Tucker - Update openssl-devel dependency to match current requirements. - Handle Fedora >=6 openssl 1.0 compat libs. - Remove SSH1 from description. - Don't strip binaries at build time so that debuginfo package can be created. * Sun Nov 16 2014 Nico Kadel-Garcia - Add '--mandir' and '--with-mantype' for RHEL 5 compatibility - Add 'dist' option to 'ver' so package names reflect OS at build time - Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in SRPM - Add openssh-x11-aspass BuildRequires for libXT-devel, imake, gtk2-devel - Discard 'K5DIR' reporting, not usable inside 'mock' for RHEL 5 compatibility - Discard obsolete '--with-rsh' configure option - Update openssl-devel dependency to 0.9.8f, as found in autoconf * Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice - test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass * Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller - Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config file using new AddressFamily directive * Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller - Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass (patch from bet@rahul.net) * Tue Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller - Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks * Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller - Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs * Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta) - Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages - Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client * Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little - Add Privsep user, group and directory * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2 - bump and grind (through the build system) * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-1 - require sharutils for building (mindrot #137) - require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck - require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again - add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're building for 6.x * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-0 - update to 3.1p1 * Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020305 - update to SNAP-20020305 - drop debug patch, fixed upstream * Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020220 - update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind) * Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-3 - add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key exchange, authentication, and named key support * Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-2 - remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole by gnome-libs-devel * Sat Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix from Hugo van der Kooij) * Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-1 - update to 3.0.2p1 * Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.1p1-1 - update to 3.0.1p1 * Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to current CVS (not for use in distribution) * Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0p1-1 - merge some of Damien Miller changes from the upstream 3.0p1 spec file and init script * Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 3.0p1 - update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1 - change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package - replace primes with moduli * Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-9 - incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs * Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer 2.9p2-8 - Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd * Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-7 - fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc. (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827) - configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247) - pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298) - mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337) - refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug - change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751) - pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611) - clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221) * Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-6 - add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke) * Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2 * Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions - pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263) * Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci) * Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151) * Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2 * Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - disable the gssapi patch * Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9p2 - refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch * Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD - add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem so that we can verify it - drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch) - don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate - clear supplemental groups list at startup * Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config - add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not dealing with comments right * Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house, to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure from the upstream version * Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - finish marking strings in the init script for translation - modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by Pekka Savola) - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed * Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9 - drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS * Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer) * Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown - remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue - make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid races in condrestart * Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378) - bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly, because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like open connections) - require the version of openssl we had when we were built * Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and when to reinitialize them - add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata * Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p2 - call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually be group memberships * Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation) - don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to three password attempts as it is) - remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely * Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise * Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Revert the patch to move pam_open_session. - Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750) - Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540) * Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Chuck the closing patch. - Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we specify any other HostKey values, which we do. * Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user. - Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf. * Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.1p1. - Add init script mods from Pekka Savola. - Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely. - Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try adding id_rsa. * Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.0p1. - Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0. - Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init script now. * Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690). - Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which host the user is attempting a login from. - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS. - Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS). - Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS). * Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd - i18n-tweak to initscript. * Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - More gettextizing. - Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing). - Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client). - Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness. * Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Finish with the gettextizing. * Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877) - Gettextize the init script. * Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case. * Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs. * Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none" authentication. (#21268) * Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301) - Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290) * Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when doing keyboard-interactive authentication. * Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM. - Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client will try it when the server disallows password authentication. - Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway. * Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall. - Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch. * Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884). - Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984). - Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself. * Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata. - Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh. * Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1. - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0. - Enable keyboard-interactive authentication. * Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3. - Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966). * Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files it generates. * Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always build PAM authentication in. - Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed. - Clean out no-longer-used patches. - Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only when neither exists. * Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835) - Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will always find them in the right place. (#17909) - Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909) - Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865) * Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835) - Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023) * Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 20000823 snapshot. - Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release} - Back out the pipe patch. * Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems. - Move the init script back. - Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness. * Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok(). * Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Move condrestart to server postun. - Move key generation to init script. - Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script. - Clean up the init script a bit. * Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard. * Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p2. - Use of strtok() considered harmful. * Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Get the build root out of the man pages. * Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add and use condrestart support in the init script. - Add newer initscripts as a prereq. * Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Build in new environment (release 2) - Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group * Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.1p1 * Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref. - Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks. - Fix for possibly-compressed man pages. * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller - Added Jim Knoble's askpass * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. openssh-8.2p1/contrib/redhat/sshd.init010075500017500001750000000032711362136622600162240ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/bash # # Init file for OpenSSH server daemon # # chkconfig: 2345 55 25 # description: OpenSSH server daemon # # processname: sshd # config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key # config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub # config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed # config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config # pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid # source function library . /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions # pull in sysconfig settings [ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd RETVAL=0 prog="sshd" # Some functions to make the below more readable SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid do_restart_sanity_check() { $SSHD -t RETVAL=$? if [ $RETVAL -ne 0 ]; then failure $"Configuration file or keys are invalid" echo fi } start() { # Create keys if necessary /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then /sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub /sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub /sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub fi echo -n $"Starting $prog:" $SSHD $OPTIONS && success || failure RETVAL=$? [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd echo } stop() { echo -n $"Stopping $prog:" killproc $SSHD -TERM RETVAL=$? [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd echo } reload() { echo -n $"Reloading $prog:" killproc $SSHD -HUP RETVAL=$? echo } case "$1" in start) start ;; stop) stop ;; restart) stop start ;; reload) reload ;; condrestart) if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then do_restart_sanity_check if [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] ; then stop # avoid race sleep 3 start fi fi ;; status) status $SSHD RETVAL=$? ;; *) echo $"Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|reload|condrestart|status}" RETVAL=1 esac exit $RETVAL openssh-8.2p1/contrib/redhat/sshd.init.old010075500017500001750000000052051362136622600170000ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/bash # # Init file for OpenSSH server daemon # # chkconfig: 2345 55 25 # description: OpenSSH server daemon # # processname: sshd # config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key # config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub # config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed # config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config # pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid # source function library . /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions # pull in sysconfig settings [ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd RETVAL=0 prog="sshd" # Some functions to make the below more readable KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid my_success() { local msg if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then msg="$2" else msg="done" fi case "`type -type success`" in function) success "$1" ;; *) echo -n "${msg}" ;; esac } my_failure() { local msg if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then msg="$2" else msg="FAILED" fi case "`type -type failure`" in function) failure "$1" ;; *) echo -n "${msg}" ;; esac } do_rsa_keygen() { if [ ! -s $RSA_KEY ]; then echo -n "Generating SSH2 RSA host key: " if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then chmod 600 $RSA_KEY chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub my_success "RSA key generation" echo else my_failure "RSA key generation" echo exit 1 fi fi } do_dsa_keygen() { if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY ]; then echo -n "Generating SSH2 DSA host key: " if $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then chmod 600 $DSA_KEY chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub my_success "DSA key generation" echo else my_failure "DSA key generation" echo exit 1 fi fi } do_restart_sanity_check() { $SSHD -t RETVAL=$? if [ ! "$RETVAL" = 0 ]; then my_failure "Configuration file or keys" echo fi } case "$1" in start) # Create keys if necessary do_rsa_keygen; do_dsa_keygen; echo -n "Starting sshd: " if [ ! -f $PID_FILE ] ; then sshd $OPTIONS RETVAL=$? if [ "$RETVAL" = "0" ] ; then my_success "sshd startup" "sshd" touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd else my_failure "sshd startup" "" fi fi echo ;; stop) echo -n "Shutting down sshd: " if [ -f $PID_FILE ] ; then killproc sshd RETVAL=$? [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd fi echo ;; restart) do_restart_sanity_check $0 stop $0 start RETVAL=$? ;; condrestart) if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then do_restart_sanity_check $0 stop $0 start RETVAL=$? fi ;; status) status sshd RETVAL=$? ;; *) echo "Usage: sshd {start|stop|restart|status|condrestart}" exit 1 ;; esac exit $RETVAL openssh-8.2p1/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam010064400017500001750000000004251362136622600160310ustar00djmdjm#%PAM-1.0 auth required pam_stack.so service=system-auth account required pam_nologin.so account required pam_stack.so service=system-auth password required pam_stack.so service=system-auth session required pam_stack.so service=system-auth openssh-8.2p1/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old010064400017500001750000000006321362136622600166060ustar00djmdjm#%PAM-1.0 auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nodelay auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so openssh-8.2p1/contrib/solaris004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600145215ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/contrib/solaris/README010064400017500001750000000024471362136622600154640ustar00djmdjmThe following is a new package build script for Solaris. This is being introduced into OpenSSH 3.0 and above in hopes of simplifying the build process. As of 3.1p2 the script should work on all platforms that have SVR4 style package tools. The build process is called a 'dummy install'.. Which means the software does a "make install-nokeys DESTDIR=[fakeroot]". This way all manpages should be handled correctly and key are deferred until the first time the sshd is started. Directions: 1. make -F Makefile.in distprep (Only if you are getting from the CVS tree) 2. ./configure --with-pam [..any other options you want..] 3. look at the top of buildpkg.sh for the configurable options and put any changes you want in openssh-config.local. Additional customizations can be done to the build process by creating one or more of the following scripts that will be sourced by buildpkg.sh. pkg_post_make_install_fixes.sh pkg-post-prototype-edit.sh pkg-preinstall.local pkg-postinstall.local pkg-preremove.local pkg-postremove.local pkg-request.local 4. Run "make package" If all goes well you should have a solaris package ready to be installed. If you have any problems with this script please post them to openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org and I will try to assist you as best as I can. - Ben Lindstrom openssh-8.2p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id010064400017500001750000000246421362136622600152130ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # Copyright (c) 1999-2016 Philip Hands # 2013 Martin Kletzander # 2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= # 2010 Eric Moret # 2009 Xr # 2007 Justin Pryzby # 2004 Reini Urban # 2003 Colin Watson # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without # modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions # are met: # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the # documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR # IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES # OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. # IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, # INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT # NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, # DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY # THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT # (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF # THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # Shell script to install your public key(s) on a remote machine # See the ssh-copy-id(1) man page for details # check that we have something mildly sane as our shell, or try to find something better if false ^ printf "%s: WARNING: ancient shell, hunting for a more modern one... " "$0" then SANE_SH=${SANE_SH:-/usr/bin/ksh} if printf 'true ^ false\n' | "$SANE_SH" then printf "'%s' seems viable.\n" "$SANE_SH" exec "$SANE_SH" "$0" "$@" else cat <<-EOF oh dear. If you have a more recent shell available, that supports \$(...) etc. please try setting the environment variable SANE_SH to the path of that shell, and then retry running this script. If that works, please report a bug describing your setup, and the shell you used to make it work. EOF printf "%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n" "$0" exit 1 fi fi most_recent_id="$(cd "$HOME" ; ls -t .ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)" DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE="${most_recent_id:+$HOME/}$most_recent_id" usage () { printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-f|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o ] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2 printf '\t-f: force mode -- copy keys without trying to check if they are already installed\n' >&2 printf '\t-n: dry run -- no keys are actually copied\n' >&2 printf '\t-h|-?: print this help\n' >&2 exit 1 } # escape any single quotes in an argument quote() { printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g" } use_id_file() { local L_ID_FILE="$1" if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then printf "%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n" "$0" exit 1 fi if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : ".*\.pub$" >/dev/null ; then PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE" else PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub" fi [ "$FORCED" ] || PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub) # check that the files are readable for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || { local L_PRIVMSG="" [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG=" (to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)" printf "\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf "%s\n%s\n" "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')" exit 1 } done printf '%s: INFO: Source of key(s) to be installed: "%s"\n' "$0" "$PUB_ID_FILE" >&2 GET_ID="cat \"$PUB_ID_FILE\"" } if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then GET_ID="ssh-add -L" fi while test "$#" -gt 0 do [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && { printf "\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n" "$0" usage } OPT= OPTARG= # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain case "$1" in -i?*|-o?*|-p?*) OPT="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c1-2)" OPTARG="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c3-)" shift ;; -o|-p) OPT="$1" OPTARG="$2" shift 2 ;; -i) OPT="$1" test "$#" -le 2 || expr "$2" : "[-]" >/dev/null || { OPTARG="$2" shift } shift ;; -f|-n|-h|-\?) OPT="$1" OPTARG= shift ;; --) shift while test "$#" -gt 0 do SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'" shift done break ;; -*) printf "\n%s: ERROR: invalid option (%s)\n\n" "$0" "$1" usage ;; *) SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'" shift continue ;; esac case "$OPT" in -i) SEEN_OPT_I="yes" use_id_file "${OPTARG:-$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ;; -o|-p) SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }$OPT '$(quote "$OPTARG")'" ;; -f) FORCED=1 ;; -n) DRY_RUN=1 ;; -h|-\?) usage ;; esac done eval set -- "$SAVEARGS" if [ $# = 0 ] ; then usage fi if [ $# != 1 ] ; then printf '%s: ERROR: Too many arguments. Expecting a target hostname, got: %s\n\n' "$0" "$SAVEARGS" >&2 usage fi # drop trailing colon USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//') # tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'" # and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options) eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS" if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] && [ -r "${PUB_ID_FILE:=$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ] ; then use_id_file "$PUB_ID_FILE" fi if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] ; then printf '%s: ERROR: No identities found\n' "$0" >&2 exit 1 fi # populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...) # and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS populate_new_ids() { local L_SUCCESS="$1" if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then NEW_IDS=$(eval $GET_ID) return fi # repopulate "$@" inside this function eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS" umask 0177 local L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX) if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2 exit 1 fi local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\"" trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2 NEW_IDS=$( eval $GET_ID | { while read ID || [ "$ID" ] ; do printf '%s\n' "$ID" > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE" # the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this # assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options. # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile ssh -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \ -o ControlPath=none \ -o LogLevel=INFO \ -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \ -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit 2>"$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" "$L_TMP_ID_FILE" else grep 'Permission denied' "$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" >/dev/null || { sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <"$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" >"$L_TMP_ID_FILE" cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end } fi cat "$L_TMP_ID_FILE" done } ) eval "$L_CLEANUP" && trap - EXIT TERM INT QUIT if expr "$NEW_IDS" : "^ERROR: " >/dev/null ; then printf '\n%s: %s\n\n' "$0" "$NEW_IDS" >&2 exit 1 fi if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2 printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' "$0" >&2 exit 0 fi printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2 } REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' -o ControlPath=none "$@" 2>&1 | sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p') case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in NetScreen*) populate_new_ids 1 for KEY in $(printf "%s" "$NEW_IDS" | cut -d' ' -f2) ; do KEY_NO=$(($KEY_NO + 1)) printf "%s\n" "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || { printf '%s: WARNING: Non-dsa key (#%d) skipped (NetScreen only supports DSA keys)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2 continue } [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | ssh -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? = 255 ] ; then printf '%s: ERROR: installation of key #%d failed (please report a bug describing what caused this, so that we can make this message useful)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2 else ADDED=$(($ADDED + 1)) fi done if [ -z "$ADDED" ] ; then exit 1 fi ;; *) # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect populate_new_ids 0 # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX; # 'cd' to be at $HOME; add a newline if it's missing; and all on one line, because tcsh. [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \ ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys ; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \ || exit 1 ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l) ;; esac if [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then cat <<-EOF =-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Would have added the following key(s): $NEW_IDS =-=-=-=-=-=-=-= EOF else cat <<-EOF Number of key(s) added: $ADDED Now try logging into the machine, with: "ssh $SSH_OPTS" and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added. EOF fi # =-=-=-= openssh-8.2p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1010064400017500001750000000146321362136622600153500ustar00djmdjm.ig \" -*- nroff -*- Copyright (c) 1999-2013 hands.com Ltd. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .. .Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $ .Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-copy-id .Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm .Op Fl f .Op Fl n .Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl o Ar ssh_option .Op Ar user Ns @ Ns .Ar hostname .Nm .Fl h | Fl ? .br .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a script that uses .Xr ssh 1 to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password, so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some clever use of multiple identities). It assembles a list of one or more fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using .Xr ssh-agent 1 this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases). It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh, enables logins with those keys on the remote server. By default it adds the keys by appending them to the remote user's .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (creating the file, and directory, if necessary). It is also capable of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its .Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ... command instead. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl i Ar identity_file Use only the key(s) contained in .Ar identity_file (rather than looking for identities via .Xr ssh-add 1 or in the .Ic default_ID_file ) . If the filename does not end in .Pa .pub this is added. If the filename is omitted, the .Ic default_ID_file is used. .Pp Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted. .It Fl f Forced mode: doesn't check if the keys are present on the remote server. This means that it does not need the private key. Of course, this can result in more than one copy of the key being installed on the remote system. .It Fl n do a dry-run. Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply prints the key(s) that would have been installed. .It Fl h , Fl ? Print Usage summary .It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their argument, to allow one to set the port or other .Xr ssh 1 options, respectively. .Pp Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in .Xr ssh 1 Ns 's configuration file: .Xr ssh_config 5 . .El .Pp Default behaviour without .Fl i , is to check if .Ql ssh-add -L provides any output, and if so those keys are used. Note that this results in the comment on the key being the filename that was given to .Xr ssh-add 1 when the key was loaded into your .Xr ssh-agent 1 rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame. Otherwise, if .Xr ssh-add 1 provides no keys contents of the .Ic default_ID_file will be used. .Pp The .Ic default_ID_file is the most recent file that matches: .Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub , (excluding those that match .Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub ) so if you create a key that is not the one you want .Nm to use, just use .Xr touch 1 on your preferred key's .Pa .pub file to reinstate it as the most recent. .Pp .Sh EXAMPLES If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say, it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've installed the new key. One way of dealing with this is to load both the new key and old key(s) into your .Xr ssh-agent 1 . Load the new key first, without the .Fl c option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the .Fl A option to allow agent forwarding: .Pp .D1 user@newclient$ ssh-add .D1 user@newclient$ ssh -A old.client .D1 user@oldl$ ssh-add -c .D1 No ... prompt for pass-phrase ... .D1 user@old$ logoff .D1 user@newclient$ ssh someserver .Pp now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run .Pp .D1 user@newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver .Pp The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the .Pa .pub file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into your agent. It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than all the keys that you have in your .Xr ssh-agent 1 . Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the .Xr ssh-agent 1 as you prefer. .Pp Having mentioned .Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's .Fl c option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use .Xr ssh 1 Ns 's .Ar ProxyCommand and .Fl W option, to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your .Xr ssh-agent 1 . A web search for .Ql ssh proxycommand nc should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the .Fl W option, rather than .Xr nc 1 ) . .Sh "SEE ALSO" .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr sshd 8 openssh-8.2p1/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd010064400017500001750000000002671362136622600161770ustar00djmdjmsshd auth required pam_unix.so try_first_pass sshd account required pam_unix.so sshd password required pam_permit.so sshd session required pam_permit.so openssh-8.2p1/contrib/sshd.pam.generic010064400017500001750000000006321362136622600161750ustar00djmdjm#%PAM-1.0 auth required /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nodelay account required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so account required /lib/security/pam_unix.so password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so password required /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nullok use_authtok session required /lib/security/pam_unix.so session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so openssh-8.2p1/contrib/suse004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600140245ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/contrib/suse/openssh.spec010064400017500001750000000210211362136622600164270ustar00djmdjm# Default values for additional components %define build_x11_askpass 1 # Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation %define sshd_gid 65 %define sshd_uid 71 # The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use %define xversion 1.2.4.1 # Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1 %{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0} Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation Name: openssh Version: 8.2p1 URL: https://www.openssh.com/ Release: 1 Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz License: BSD Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot PreReq: openssl Obsoletes: ssh Provides: ssh # # (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.) # building prerequisites -- stuff for # OpenSSL (openssl-devel), # and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd) # BuildPrereq: openssl BuildPrereq: zlib-devel #BuildPrereq: glibdev #BuildPrereq: gtkdev #BuildPrereq: gnlibsd %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System. Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Requires: openssh = %{version} Obsoletes: ssh-extras Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %if %{build_x11_askpass} BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel %endif %description Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL). This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. %description askpass Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL). This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %changelog * Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan - Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check * Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan - Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH * Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller - Glob manpages to catch compressed files * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia - Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass * Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia - Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into his released tarfile - Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600 even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs - Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing message if an SSH host key is already in place - Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation) * Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia - Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support - Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer) * Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia - Made this package correct for SuSE. - Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default. * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. %prep %if %{build_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \ %configure --prefix=/usr \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --mandir=%{_mandir} \ --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \ --with-pam \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh make %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} %configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh xmkmf -a make cd .. %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \ $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin %endif %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %pre /usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || : /usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : %post /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A %{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd} %run_permissions %verifyscript %verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh %preun %stop_on_removal sshd %postun %restart_on_update sshd %{insserv_cleanup} %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* %doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh %if %{build_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass %endif openssh-8.2p1/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd010064400017500001750000000000751362136622600166350ustar00djmdjm# # Start the Secure Shell (SSH) Daemon? # START_SSHD="yes" openssh-8.2p1/contrib/suse/rc.sshd010064400017500001750000000061421362136622600153720ustar00djmdjm#! /bin/sh # Copyright (c) 1995-2000 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany. # # Author: Jiri Smid # # /etc/init.d/sshd # # and symbolic its link # # /usr/sbin/rcsshd # ### BEGIN INIT INFO # Provides: sshd # Required-Start: $network $remote_fs # Required-Stop: $network $remote_fs # Default-Start: 3 5 # Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6 # Description: Start the sshd daemon ### END INIT INFO SSHD_BIN=/usr/sbin/sshd test -x $SSHD_BIN || exit 5 SSHD_SYSCONFIG=/etc/sysconfig/ssh test -r $SSHD_SYSCONFIG || exit 6 . $SSHD_SYSCONFIG SSHD_PIDFILE=/var/run/sshd.init.pid . /etc/rc.status # Shell functions sourced from /etc/rc.status: # rc_check check and set local and overall rc status # rc_status check and set local and overall rc status # rc_status -v ditto but be verbose in local rc status # rc_status -v -r ditto and clear the local rc status # rc_failed set local and overall rc status to failed # rc_reset clear local rc status (overall remains) # rc_exit exit appropriate to overall rc status # First reset status of this service rc_reset case "$1" in start) # Generate any missing host keys ssh-keygen -A echo -n "Starting SSH daemon" ## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails ## the echo return value is set appropriate. startproc -f -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN $SSHD_OPTS -o "PidFile=$SSHD_PIDFILE" # Remember status and be verbose rc_status -v ;; stop) echo -n "Shutting down SSH daemon" ## Stop daemon with killproc(8) and if this fails ## set echo the echo return value. killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN # Remember status and be verbose rc_status -v ;; try-restart) ## Stop the service and if this succeeds (i.e. the ## service was running before), start it again. $0 status >/dev/null && $0 restart # Remember status and be quiet rc_status ;; restart) ## Stop the service and regardless of whether it was ## running or not, start it again. $0 stop $0 start # Remember status and be quiet rc_status ;; force-reload|reload) ## Signal the daemon to reload its config. Most daemons ## do this on signal 1 (SIGHUP). echo -n "Reload service sshd" killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -HUP $SSHD_BIN rc_status -v ;; status) echo -n "Checking for service sshd " ## Check status with checkproc(8), if process is running ## checkproc will return with exit status 0. # Status has a slightly different for the status command: # 0 - service running # 1 - service dead, but /var/run/ pid file exists # 2 - service dead, but /var/lock/ lock file exists # 3 - service not running checkproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN rc_status -v ;; probe) ## Optional: Probe for the necessity of a reload, ## give out the argument which is required for a reload. test /etc/ssh/sshd_config -nt $SSHD_PIDFILE && echo reload ;; *) echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|status|try-restart|restart|force-reload|reload|probe}" exit 1 ;; esac rc_exit openssh-8.2p1/contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh010064400017500001750000000002421362136622600166210ustar00djmdjm## Path: Network/Remote access/SSH ## Description: SSH server settings ## Type: string ## Default: "" ## ServiceRestart: sshd # # Options for sshd # SSHD_OPTS="" openssh-8.2p1/crypto_api.h010064400017500001750000000033741362136622600140120ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: crypto_api.h,v 1.5 2019/01/21 10:20:12 djm Exp $ */ /* * Assembled from generated headers and source files by Markus Friedl. * Placed in the public domain. */ #ifndef crypto_api_h #define crypto_api_h #include "includes.h" #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include typedef int8_t crypto_int8; typedef uint8_t crypto_uint8; typedef int16_t crypto_int16; typedef uint16_t crypto_uint16; typedef int32_t crypto_int32; typedef uint32_t crypto_uint32; #define randombytes(buf, buf_len) arc4random_buf((buf), (buf_len)) #define small_random32() arc4random() #define crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES 64U int crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, unsigned long long); int crypto_verify_32(const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *); #define crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES 64U #define crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32U #define crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES 64U int crypto_sign_ed25519(unsigned char *, unsigned long long *, const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, const unsigned char *); int crypto_sign_ed25519_open(unsigned char *, unsigned long long *, const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, const unsigned char *); int crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(unsigned char *, unsigned char *); #define crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_PUBLICKEYBYTES 1218 #define crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_SECRETKEYBYTES 1600 #define crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES 1047 #define crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_BYTES 32 int crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_enc(unsigned char *cstr, unsigned char *k, const unsigned char *pk); int crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_dec(unsigned char *k, const unsigned char *cstr, const unsigned char *sk); int crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk); #endif /* crypto_api_h */ openssh-8.2p1/defines.h010064400017500001750000000543121362136622600132540ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _DEFINES_H #define _DEFINES_H /* Constants */ #if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0 enum { SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */ SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */ SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */ }; # define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD # define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR # define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR #endif /* * Cygwin doesn't really have a notion of reserved ports. It is still * is useful on the client side so for compatibility it defines as 1024 via * netinet/in.h inside an enum. We * don't actually want that restriction * so we want to set that to zero, but we can't do it direct in config.h * because it'll cause a conflicting definition the first time we include * netinet/in.h. */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN #define IPPORT_RESERVED 0 #endif /* * Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos) */ #include #include #ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY # define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10 # define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08 # define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04 # define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02 # define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST #endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */ /* * Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFC2474 */ #ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 0x28 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 0x30 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 0x38 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 0x48 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 0x50 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 0x58 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 0x68 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 0x70 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 0x78 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 0x88 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 0x90 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 0x98 # define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8 #endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */ #ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 0x00 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 0x20 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 0x40 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 0x60 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 0x80 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 0xa0 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 0xc0 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 0xe0 #endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */ #ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF # define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8 #endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */ #ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_LE # define IPTOS_DSCP_LE 0x01 #endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_LE */ #ifndef IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP # define IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP 0xa0 #endif #ifndef IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL # define IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL 0xc0 #endif #ifndef IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL # define IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL 0xe0 #endif #ifndef PATH_MAX # ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX # define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX # endif #endif #ifndef MAXPATHLEN # ifdef PATH_MAX # define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX # else /* PATH_MAX */ # define MAXPATHLEN 64 # endif /* PATH_MAX */ #endif /* MAXPATHLEN */ #ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX # include "netdb.h" /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */ # if defined(_POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX) # define HOST_NAME_MAX _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX # elif defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN) # define HOST_NAME_MAX MAXHOSTNAMELEN # else # define HOST_NAME_MAX 255 # endif #endif /* HOST_NAME_MAX */ #if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0 # define MAXSYMLINKS 5 #endif #ifndef STDIN_FILENO # define STDIN_FILENO 0 #endif #ifndef STDOUT_FILENO # define STDOUT_FILENO 1 #endif #ifndef STDERR_FILENO # define STDERR_FILENO 2 #endif #ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */ #ifdef NGROUPS #define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS #else #define NGROUPS_MAX 0 #endif #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0 # define O_NONBLOCK 00004 /* Non Blocking Open */ #endif #ifndef S_IFSOCK # define S_IFSOCK 0 #endif /* S_IFSOCK */ #ifndef S_ISDIR # define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR)) #endif /* S_ISDIR */ #ifndef S_ISREG # define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG)) #endif /* S_ISREG */ #ifndef S_ISLNK # define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) #endif /* S_ISLNK */ #ifndef S_IXUSR # define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */ # define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */ # define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */ # define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */ # define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */ # define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */ # define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */ # define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */ # define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */ # define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */ # define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */ # define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */ # define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */ #endif /* S_IXUSR */ #if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS) #define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS #endif #ifndef MAP_FAILED # define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1) #endif /* SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6 */ #ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK #define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001) #endif /* Types */ /* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ /* (or die trying) */ #ifndef HAVE_U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T typedef signed char int8_t; # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) typedef short int int16_t; # else # error "16 bit int type not found." # endif # if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) typedef int int32_t; # else # error "32 bit int type not found." # endif #endif /* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ #ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T # ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T typedef uint8_t u_int8_t; typedef uint16_t u_int16_t; typedef uint32_t u_int32_t; # define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1 # else typedef unsigned char u_int8_t; # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t; # else # error "16 bit int type not found." # endif # if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) typedef unsigned int u_int32_t; # else # error "32 bit int type not found." # endif # endif #define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__ #endif #ifndef UINT32_MAX # if defined(HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX) && (HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX == 0) # if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) # define UINT32_MAX UINT_MAX # endif # endif #endif /* 64-bit types */ #ifndef HAVE_INT64_T # if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) typedef long int int64_t; # else # if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) typedef long long int int64_t; # endif # endif #endif #ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T # if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t; # else # if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t; # endif # endif #endif #ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T typedef u_int8_t uint8_t; typedef u_int16_t uint16_t; typedef u_int32_t uint32_t; typedef u_int64_t uint64_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T typedef long long intmax_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR typedef unsigned char u_char; # define HAVE_U_CHAR #endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */ #ifndef ULLONG_MAX # define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1) #endif #ifndef SIZE_T_MAX #define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX #endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */ #ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T typedef unsigned int size_t; # define HAVE_SIZE_T # define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX #endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */ #ifndef SIZE_MAX #define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX #endif #ifndef INT32_MAX # if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) # define INT32_MAX INT_MAX # elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 4) # define INT32_MAX LONG_MAX # else # error "need INT32_MAX" # endif #endif #ifndef INT64_MAX # if (SIZEOF_INT == 8) # define INT64_MAX INT_MAX # elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 8) # define INT64_MAX LONG_MAX # elif (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) # define INT64_MAX LLONG_MAX # else # error "need INT64_MAX" # endif #endif #ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T typedef int ssize_t; #define SSIZE_MAX INT_MAX # define HAVE_SSIZE_T #endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */ #ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T typedef long clock_t; # define HAVE_CLOCK_T #endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */ #ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T typedef int sa_family_t; # define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T #endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */ #ifndef HAVE_PID_T typedef int pid_t; # define HAVE_PID_T #endif /* HAVE_PID_T */ #ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T typedef int sig_atomic_t; # define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T #endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */ #ifndef HAVE_MODE_T typedef int mode_t; # define HAVE_MODE_T #endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */ #if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) # define ss_family __ss_family #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */ #ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H struct sockaddr_un { short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */ char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */ }; #endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */ #ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T typedef u_int32_t in_addr_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T typedef u_int16_t in_port_t; #endif #if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE) #define _STRUCT_WINSIZE struct winsize { unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */ unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */ unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */ unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */ }; #endif /* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */ #ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK typedef unsigned long int fd_mask; #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0 # define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long)) #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0 # define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y)) #endif /* Paths */ #ifndef _PATH_BSHELL # define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" #endif #ifdef USER_PATH # ifdef _PATH_STDPATH # undef _PATH_STDPATH # endif # define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH #endif #ifndef _PATH_STDPATH # define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" #endif #ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH # define SUPERUSER_PATH _PATH_STDPATH #endif #ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL # define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" #endif /* user may have set a different path */ #if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) # undef _PATH_MAILDIR #endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */ #ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY # define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY #endif #ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN # define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" #endif /* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */ #ifdef XAUTH_PATH #define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH #endif /* XAUTH_PATH */ /* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */ #ifndef X_UNIX_PATH # ifdef __hpux # define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u" # else # define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u" # endif #endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */ #define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH #ifndef _PATH_TTY # define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty" #endif /* Macros */ #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H) # define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP #endif #ifndef MAX # define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) # define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b)) #endif #ifndef roundup # define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y)) #endif #ifndef timersub #define timersub(a, b, result) \ do { \ (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \ (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \ if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \ --(result)->tv_sec; \ (result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \ } \ } while (0) #endif #ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC #define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) { \ (ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec; \ (ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000; \ } #endif #ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL #define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) { \ (tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec; \ (tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000; \ } #endif #ifndef timespeccmp #define timespeccmp(tsp, usp, cmp) \ (((tsp)->tv_sec == (usp)->tv_sec) ? \ ((tsp)->tv_nsec cmp (usp)->tv_nsec) : \ ((tsp)->tv_sec cmp (usp)->tv_sec)) #endif #ifndef __P # define __P(x) x #endif #if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) # define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \ ((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \ (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff))) #endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */ #if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) # define __attribute__(x) #endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */ #if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__) # define __sentinel__ #endif #if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__) # define __bounded__(x, y, z) #endif #if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__) # define __nonnull__(x) #endif #ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES #define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1) #endif #ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN #define __CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) #endif /* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */ #ifndef CMSG_LEN #define CMSG_LEN(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len)) #endif /* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */ #ifndef CMSG_SPACE #define CMSG_SPACE(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len)) #endif /* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */ #ifndef CMSG_DATA #define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr))) #endif /* CMSG_DATA */ /* * RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns * an empty list for some reasons. */ #ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR #define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \ ((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \ (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \ (struct cmsghdr *)NULL) #endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */ #if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0 # define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member) #endif /* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */ /* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */ #ifndef BYTE_ORDER # ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN # define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234 # endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */ # ifndef BIG_ENDIAN # define BIG_ENDIAN 4321 # endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */ # ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN # define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN # else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */ # define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN # endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */ #endif /* BYTE_ORDER */ /* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */ #if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO)) # define HAVE_GETADDRINFO #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET # undef getopt # undef opterr # undef optind # undef optopt # undef optreset # undef optarg # define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o) # define opterr BSDopterr # define optind BSDoptind # define optopt BSDoptopt # define optreset BSDoptreset # define optarg BSDoptarg #endif #if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) # undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO #endif #if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO) # undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO #endif #if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) # undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR #endif #if defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) # if defined(HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV) && HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV == 0 # define AI_NUMERICSERV 0 # endif #endif #if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX) # undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX #endif #if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) # undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE #endif #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \ defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND) # define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND #endif #if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) # define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n)) #endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */ #ifndef GETPGRP_VOID # include # define getpgrp() getpgrp(0) #endif #ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT # define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS # define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #endif #ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT # define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS # define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #endif #if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__) # define __func__ __FUNCTION__ #elif !defined(HAVE___func__) # define __func__ "" #endif #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) # define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code) #endif /* Maximum number of file descriptors available */ #ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF # define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) #else # define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000 #endif #ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL /* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value */ #define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \ ((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \ ((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL)) #elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL) #define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \ ((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \ ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL)) #else # define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f)) #endif #if defined(__Lynx__) /* * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions. */ # define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1) # define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES) /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */ int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...); int mkstemp (char *); char *crypt (const char *, const char *); int seteuid (uid_t); int setegid (gid_t); char *mkdtemp (char *); int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t); int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); #endif /* * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the * client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems. * * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems * but you may need to set it yourself */ /* #define USE_PIPES 1 */ /** ** login recorder definitions **/ /* FIXME: put default paths back in */ #ifndef UTMP_FILE # ifdef _PATH_UTMP # define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP # else # ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE # define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE # endif # endif #endif #ifndef WTMP_FILE # ifdef _PATH_WTMP # define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP # else # ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE # define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE # endif # endif #endif /* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */ #ifndef LASTLOG_FILE # ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG # define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG # else # ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE # define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE # endif # endif #endif #if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) # define USE_SHADOW #endif /* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */ #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN) # define USE_LOGIN #else /* Simply select your favourite login types. */ /* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... */ # if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX) # define USE_UTMPX # endif # if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP) # define USE_UTMP # endif # if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX) # define USE_WTMPX # endif # if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP) # define USE_WTMP # endif #endif #ifndef UT_LINESIZE # define UT_LINESIZE 8 #endif /* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */ #if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG) # define USE_LASTLOG #endif #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA # ifdef USE_SHADOW # undef USE_SHADOW # endif # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1 #endif #if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1 #endif #if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF) # define USE_LIBIAF #endif /* HP-UX 11.11 */ #ifdef BTMP_FILE # define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE #endif #if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP) # define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN #endif /** end of login recorder definitions */ #ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS # define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b))) #endif #if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP) # undef HAVE_MMAP #endif #ifndef IOV_MAX # if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX) # define IOV_MAX _XOPEN_IOV_MAX # elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX) # define IOV_MAX DEF_IOV_MAX # else # define IOV_MAX 16 # endif #endif #ifndef EWOULDBLOCK # define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN #endif #ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */ #define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46 #endif #ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ # define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192 #endif /* * We want functions in openbsd-compat, if enabled, to override system ones. * We no-op out the weak symbol definition rather than remove it to reduce * future sync problems. Some compilers (eg Unixware) do not allow an * empty statement, so we use a bogus function declaration. */ #define DEF_WEAK(x) void __ssh_compat_weak_##x(void) /* * Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir() * shouldn't need the latter. */ #if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \ !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR) # define arc4random_stir() #endif #ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY # ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY # define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src) # else # define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src) # endif #endif #ifndef __predict_true # if defined(__GNUC__) && \ ((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96))) # define __predict_true(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1) # define __predict_false(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0) # else # define __predict_true(exp) ((exp) != 0) # define __predict_false(exp) ((exp) != 0) # endif /* gcc version */ #endif /* __predict_true */ #if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \ defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) && \ defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \ !defined(BROKEN_GLOB) # define USE_SYSTEM_GLOB #endif #endif /* _DEFINES_H */ openssh-8.2p1/dh.c010064400017500001750000000362151362136622600122270ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.71 2019/09/06 06:08:11 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "dh.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" static int parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg) { char *cp, *arg; char *strsize, *gen, *prime; const char *errstr = NULL; long long n; dhg->p = dhg->g = NULL; cp = line; if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace */ if (*arg == '\0') arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#') return 0; /* time */ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') goto truncated; arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* type */ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') goto truncated; /* Ensure this is a safe prime */ n = strtonum(arg, 0, 5, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL || n != MODULI_TYPE_SAFE) { error("moduli:%d: type is not %d", linenum, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE); goto fail; } arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tests */ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') goto truncated; /* Ensure prime has been tested and is not composite */ n = strtonum(arg, 0, 0x1f, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL || (n & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) || !(n & ~MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE)) { error("moduli:%d: invalid moduli tests flag", linenum); goto fail; } arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tries */ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') goto truncated; n = strtonum(arg, 0, 1<<30, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL || n == 0) { error("moduli:%d: invalid primality trial count", linenum); goto fail; } strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */ if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' || (dhg->size = (int)strtonum(strsize, 0, 64*1024, &errstr)) == 0 || errstr) { error("moduli:%d: invalid prime length", linenum); goto fail; } /* The whole group is one bit larger */ dhg->size++; gen = strsep(&cp, " "); /* gen */ if (cp == NULL || *gen == '\0') goto truncated; prime = strsep(&cp, " "); /* prime */ if (cp != NULL || *prime == '\0') { truncated: error("moduli:%d: truncated", linenum); goto fail; } if ((dhg->g = BN_new()) == NULL || (dhg->p = BN_new()) == NULL) { error("parse_prime: BN_new failed"); goto fail; } if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0) { error("moduli:%d: could not parse generator value", linenum); goto fail; } if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->p, prime) == 0) { error("moduli:%d: could not parse prime value", linenum); goto fail; } if (BN_num_bits(dhg->p) != dhg->size) { error("moduli:%d: prime has wrong size: actual %d listed %d", linenum, BN_num_bits(dhg->p), dhg->size - 1); goto fail; } if (BN_cmp(dhg->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) { error("moduli:%d: generator is invalid", linenum); goto fail; } return 1; fail: BN_clear_free(dhg->g); BN_clear_free(dhg->p); dhg->g = dhg->p = NULL; return 0; } DH * choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; int best, bestcount, which, linenum; struct dhgroup dhg; if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) { logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus", _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno)); return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); } linenum = 0; best = bestcount = 0; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { linenum++; if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg)) continue; BN_clear_free(dhg.g); BN_clear_free(dhg.p); if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) continue; if ((dhg.size > wantbits && dhg.size < best) || (dhg.size > best && best < wantbits)) { best = dhg.size; bestcount = 0; } if (dhg.size == best) bestcount++; } free(line); line = NULL; linesize = 0; rewind(f); if (bestcount == 0) { fclose(f); logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_MODULI); return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); } which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount); linenum = 0; bestcount = 0; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { linenum++; if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg)) continue; if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) || dhg.size != best || bestcount++ != which) { BN_clear_free(dhg.g); BN_clear_free(dhg.p); continue; } break; } free(line); line = NULL; fclose(f); if (bestcount != which + 1) { logit("WARNING: selected prime disappeared in %s, giving up", _PATH_DH_MODULI); return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); } return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p)); } /* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */ int dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub) { int i; int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub); int bits_set = 0; BIGNUM *tmp; const BIGNUM *dh_p; DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL); if (BN_is_negative(dh_pub)) { logit("invalid public DH value: negative"); return 0; } if (BN_cmp(dh_pub, BN_value_one()) != 1) { /* pub_exp <= 1 */ logit("invalid public DH value: <= 1"); return 0; } if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); return 0; } if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh_p, BN_value_one()) || BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) { /* pub_exp > p-2 */ BN_clear_free(tmp); logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1"); return 0; } BN_clear_free(tmp); for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i)) bits_set++; debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p)); /* * if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial */ if (bits_set < 4) { logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p)); return 0; } return 1; } int dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) { int pbits; const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key; DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL); if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL || (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 || need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (need < 256) need = 256; /* * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)), * so double requested need here. */ if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1))) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL); if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; return 0; } DH * dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus) { DH *dh; BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return NULL; if (BN_hex2bn(&dh_p, modulus) == 0 || BN_hex2bn(&dh_g, gen) == 0) goto fail; if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) goto fail; return dh; fail: DH_free(dh); BN_clear_free(dh_p); BN_clear_free(dh_g); return NULL; } /* * This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange * value. */ DH * dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus) { DH *dh; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return NULL; if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, modulus, NULL, gen)) { DH_free(dh); return NULL; } return dh; } /* rfc2409 "Second Oakley Group" (1024 bits) */ DH * dh_new_group1(void) { static char *gen = "2", *group1 = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE65381" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group1)); } /* rfc3526 group 14 "2048-bit MODP Group" */ DH * dh_new_group14(void) { static char *gen = "2", *group14 = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" "15728E5A" "8AACAA68" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group14)); } /* rfc3526 group 16 "4096-bit MODP Group" */ DH * dh_new_group16(void) { static char *gen = "2", *group16 = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64" "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7" "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B" "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C" "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31" "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7" "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA" "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6" "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED" "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9" "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34063199" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16)); } /* rfc3526 group 18 "8192-bit MODP Group" */ DH * dh_new_group18(void) { static char *gen = "2", *group18 = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64" "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7" "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B" "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C" "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31" "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7" "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA" "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6" "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED" "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9" "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34028492" "36C3FAB4" "D27C7026" "C1D4DCB2" "602646DE" "C9751E76" "3DBA37BD" "F8FF9406" "AD9E530E" "E5DB382F" "413001AE" "B06A53ED" "9027D831" "179727B0" "865A8918" "DA3EDBEB" "CF9B14ED" "44CE6CBA" "CED4BB1B" "DB7F1447" "E6CC254B" "33205151" "2BD7AF42" "6FB8F401" "378CD2BF" "5983CA01" "C64B92EC" "F032EA15" "D1721D03" "F482D7CE" "6E74FEF6" "D55E702F" "46980C82" "B5A84031" "900B1C9E" "59E7C97F" "BEC7E8F3" "23A97A7E" "36CC88BE" "0F1D45B7" "FF585AC5" "4BD407B2" "2B4154AA" "CC8F6D7E" "BF48E1D8" "14CC5ED2" "0F8037E0" "A79715EE" "F29BE328" "06A1D58B" "B7C5DA76" "F550AA3D" "8A1FBFF0" "EB19CCB1" "A313D55C" "DA56C9EC" "2EF29632" "387FE8D7" "6E3C0468" "043E8F66" "3F4860EE" "12BF2D5B" "0B7474D6" "E694F91E" "6DBE1159" "74A3926F" "12FEE5E4" "38777CB6" "A932DF8C" "D8BEC4D0" "73B931BA" "3BC832B6" "8D9DD300" "741FA7BF" "8AFC47ED" "2576F693" "6BA42466" "3AAB639C" "5AE4F568" "3423B474" "2BF1C978" "238F16CB" "E39D652D" "E3FDB8BE" "FC848AD9" "22222E04" "A4037C07" "13EB57A8" "1A23F0C7" "3473FC64" "6CEA306B" "4BCBC886" "2F8385DD" "FA9D4B7F" "A2C087E8" "79683303" "ED5BDD3A" "062B3CF5" "B3A278A6" "6D2A13F8" "3F44F82D" "DF310EE0" "74AB6A36" "4597E899" "A0255DC1" "64F31CC5" "0846851D" "F9AB4819" "5DED7EA1" "B1D510BD" "7EE74D73" "FAF36BC3" "1ECFA268" "359046F4" "EB879F92" "4009438B" "481C6CD7" "889A002E" "D5EE382B" "C9190DA6" "FC026E47" "9558E447" "5677E9AA" "9E3050E2" "765694DF" "C81F56E8" "80B96E71" "60C980DD" "98EDD3DF" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group18)); } /* Select fallback group used by DH-GEX if moduli file cannot be read. */ DH * dh_new_group_fallback(int max) { debug3("%s: requested max size %d", __func__, max); if (max < 3072) { debug3("using 2k bit group 14"); return dh_new_group14(); } else if (max < 6144) { debug3("using 4k bit group 16"); return dh_new_group16(); } debug3("using 8k bit group 18"); return dh_new_group18(); } /* * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits). * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value * from RFC4419 section 3. */ u_int dh_estimate(int bits) { if (bits <= 112) return 2048; if (bits <= 128) return 3072; if (bits <= 192) return 7680; return 8192; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/dh.h010064400017500001750000000051631362136622600122320ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.18 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef DH_H #define DH_H #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL struct dhgroup { int size; BIGNUM *g; BIGNUM *p; }; DH *choose_dh(int, int, int); DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *); DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *); DH *dh_new_group1(void); DH *dh_new_group14(void); DH *dh_new_group16(void); DH *dh_new_group18(void); DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int); int dh_gen_key(DH *, int); int dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *); u_int dh_estimate(int); /* * Max value from RFC4419. * Min value from RFC8270. */ #define DH_GRP_MIN 2048 #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 /* * Values for "type" field of moduli(5) * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus. */ #define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0) #define MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED (1) #define MODULI_TYPE_SAFE (2) #define MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR (3) #define MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN (4) #define MODULI_TYPE_STRONG (5) /* * Values for "tests" field of moduli(5) * Specifies the methods used in checking for primality. * Usually, more than one test is used. */ #define MODULI_TESTS_UNTESTED (0x00) #define MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE (0x01) #define MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE (0x02) #define MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN (0x04) #define MODULI_TESTS_JACOBI (0x08) #define MODULI_TESTS_ELLIPTIC (0x10) #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #endif /* DH_H */ openssh-8.2p1/digest-libc.c010064400017500001750000000133471362136622600140230ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.6 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #if 0 #include #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SHA1_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H #include #endif #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" typedef void md_init_fn(void *mdctx); typedef void md_update_fn(void *mdctx, const u_int8_t *m, size_t mlen); typedef void md_final_fn(u_int8_t[], void *mdctx); struct ssh_digest_ctx { int alg; void *mdctx; }; struct ssh_digest { int id; const char *name; size_t block_len; size_t digest_len; size_t ctx_len; md_init_fn *md_init; md_update_fn *md_update; md_final_fn *md_final; }; /* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */ const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = { { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(MD5_CTX), (md_init_fn *) MD5Init, (md_update_fn *) MD5Update, (md_final_fn *) MD5Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA1_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA1Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA1Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA1Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA2_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA256Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA256Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA256Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA2_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA384Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA384Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA384Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA2_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA512Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA512Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA512Final } }; static const struct ssh_digest * ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg) { if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX) return NULL; if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */ return NULL; return &(digests[alg]); } int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name) { int alg; for (alg = 0; alg < SSH_DIGEST_MAX; alg++) { if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0) return digests[alg].id; } return -1; } const char * ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name; } size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len; } size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->block_len; } struct ssh_digest_ctx * ssh_digest_start(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret; if (digest == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; if ((ret->mdctx = calloc(1, digest->ctx_len)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret->alg = alg; digest->md_init(ret->mdctx); return ret; } int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(from->alg); if (digest == NULL || from->alg != to->alg) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; memcpy(to->mdctx, from->mdctx, digest->ctx_len); return 0; } int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); if (digest == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; digest->md_update(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen); return 0; } int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b) { return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); } int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); if (digest == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen > UINT_MAX) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; digest->md_final(d, ctx->mdctx); return 0; } void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) { const struct ssh_digest *digest; if (ctx != NULL) { digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); if (digest) { explicit_bzero(ctx->mdctx, digest->ctx_len); free(ctx->mdctx); explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); free(ctx); } } } int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg); if (ctx == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ssh_digest_free(ctx); return 0; } int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen); } #endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/digest-openssl.c010064400017500001750000000116351362136622600145730ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.7 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 # define EVP_sha256 NULL #endif #ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA384 # define EVP_sha384 NULL #endif #ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA512 # define EVP_sha512 NULL #endif struct ssh_digest_ctx { int alg; EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; }; struct ssh_digest { int id; const char *name; size_t digest_len; const EVP_MD *(*mdfunc)(void); }; /* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = { { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", 16, EVP_md5 }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", 20, EVP_sha1 }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", 48, EVP_sha384 }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", 64, EVP_sha512 }, { -1, NULL, 0, NULL }, }; static const struct ssh_digest * ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg) { if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX) return NULL; if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */ return NULL; if (digests[alg].mdfunc == NULL) return NULL; return &(digests[alg]); } int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name) { int alg; for (alg = 0; digests[alg].id != -1; alg++) { if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0) return digests[alg].id; } return -1; } const char * ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name; } size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len; } size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) { return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(ctx->mdctx); } struct ssh_digest_ctx * ssh_digest_start(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret; if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)) return NULL; ret->alg = alg; if ((ret->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) { ssh_digest_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to) { if (from->alg != to->alg) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(to->mdctx, from->mdctx)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; return 0; } int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) { if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; return 0; } int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b) { return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); } int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); u_int l = dlen; if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); } int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); u_int mdlen; if (digest == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen > UINT_MAX) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen < digest->digest_len) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; mdlen = dlen; if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, digest->mdfunc(), NULL)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; return 0; } int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/digest.h010064400017500001750000000050131362136622600131100ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.8 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _DIGEST_H #define _DIGEST_H /* Maximum digest output length */ #define SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH 64 /* Digest algorithms */ #define SSH_DIGEST_MD5 0 #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 1 #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 2 #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 3 #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 4 #define SSH_DIGEST_MAX 5 struct sshbuf; struct ssh_digest_ctx; /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */ int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name); /* Returns the algorithm name for a digest identifier */ const char *ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg); /* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */ size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg); /* Returns the block size of the digest, e.g. for implementing HMAC */ size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx); /* Copies internal state of digest of 'from' to 'to' */ int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to); /* One-shot API */ int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5))); int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4))); /* Update API */ struct ssh_digest_ctx *ssh_digest_start(int alg); int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b); int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx); #endif /* _DIGEST_H */ openssh-8.2p1/dispatch.c010064400017500001750000000070321362136622600134260ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.32 2019/01/19 21:33:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "ssh2.h" #include "log.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" int dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int r; logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__); return 0; } int dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq); return 0; } void ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *ssh, dispatch_fn *dflt) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++) ssh->dispatch[i] = dflt; } void ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *ssh, u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn) { u_int i; for (i = from; i <= to; i++) { if (i >= DISPATCH_MAX) break; ssh->dispatch[i] = fn; } } void ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *ssh, int type, dispatch_fn *fn) { ssh->dispatch[type] = fn; } int ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done) { int r; u_char type; u_int32_t seqnr; for (;;) { if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) { r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr); if (r != 0) return r; } else { r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr); if (r != 0) return r; if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE) return 0; } if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) { if (ssh->dispatch_skip_packets) { debug2("skipped packet (type %u)", type); ssh->dispatch_skip_packets--; continue; } r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh); if (r != 0) return r; } else { r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "protocol error: rcvd type %d", type); if (r != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; } if (done != NULL && *done) return 0; } } void ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done) { int r; if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__); } openssh-8.2p1/dispatch.h010064400017500001750000000037271362136622600134420ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.15 2019/01/19 21:45:31 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef DISPATCH_H #define DISPATCH_H #define DISPATCH_MAX 255 enum { DISPATCH_BLOCK, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK }; struct ssh; typedef int dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); void ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *, dispatch_fn *); void ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *, int, dispatch_fn *); void ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *, u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *); int ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *); void ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *); #endif openssh-8.2p1/dns.c010064400017500001750000000222111362136622600124070ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.38 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "dns.h" #include "log.h" #include "digest.h" static const char *errset_text[] = { "success", /* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */ "out of memory", /* 1 ERRSET_NOMEMORY */ "general failure", /* 2 ERRSET_FAIL */ "invalid parameter", /* 3 ERRSET_INVAL */ "name does not exist", /* 4 ERRSET_NONAME */ "data does not exist", /* 5 ERRSET_NODATA */ }; static const char * dns_result_totext(unsigned int res) { switch (res) { case ERRSET_SUCCESS: return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS]; case ERRSET_NOMEMORY: return errset_text[ERRSET_NOMEMORY]; case ERRSET_FAIL: return errset_text[ERRSET_FAIL]; case ERRSET_INVAL: return errset_text[ERRSET_INVAL]; case ERRSET_NONAME: return errset_text[ERRSET_NONAME]; case ERRSET_NODATA: return errset_text[ERRSET_NODATA]; default: return "unknown error"; } } /* * Read SSHFP parameters from key buffer. */ static int dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, struct sshkey *key) { int r, success = 0; int fp_alg = -1; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RSA; if (!*digest_type) *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; break; case KEY_DSA: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA; if (!*digest_type) *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; break; case KEY_ECDSA: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA; if (!*digest_type) *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; break; case KEY_ED25519: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ED25519; if (!*digest_type) *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; break; case KEY_XMSS: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_XMSS; if (!*digest_type) *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; break; default: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */ *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */ } switch (*digest_type) { case SSHFP_HASH_SHA1: fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; break; case SSHFP_HASH_SHA256: fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; break; default: *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */ } if (*algorithm && *digest_type) { if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_alg, digest, digest_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint_raw: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); success = 1; } else { *digest = NULL; *digest_len = 0; success = 0; } return success; } /* * Read SSHFP parameters from rdata buffer. */ static int dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len) { int success = 0; *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; if (rdata_len >= 2) { *algorithm = rdata[0]; *digest_type = rdata[1]; *digest_len = rdata_len - 2; if (*digest_len > 0) { *digest = xmalloc(*digest_len); memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len); } else { *digest = (u_char *)xstrdup(""); } success = 1; } return success; } /* * Check if hostname is numerical. * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise */ static int is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai; /* * We shouldn't ever get a null host but if we do then log an error * and return -1 which stops DNS key fingerprint processing. */ if (hostname == NULL) { error("is_numeric_hostname called with NULL hostname"); return -1; } memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { freeaddrinfo(ai); return -1; } return 0; } /* * Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS. * Returns 0 if lookup succeeds, -1 otherwise */ int verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address, struct sshkey *hostkey, int *flags) { u_int counter; int result; struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL; u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm; u_int8_t hostkey_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; u_char *hostkey_digest; size_t hostkey_digest_len; u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm; u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type; u_char *dnskey_digest; size_t dnskey_digest_len; *flags = 0; debug3("verify_host_key_dns"); if (hostkey == NULL) fatal("No key to look up!"); if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) { debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname"); return -1; } result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints); if (result) { verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result)); return -1; } if (fingerprints->rri_flags & RRSET_VALIDATED) { *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_SECURE; debug("found %d secure fingerprints in DNS", fingerprints->rri_nrdatas); } else { debug("found %d insecure fingerprints in DNS", fingerprints->rri_nrdatas); } /* Initialize default host key parameters */ if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &hostkey_digest_type, &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) { error("Error calculating host key fingerprint."); freerrset(fingerprints); return -1; } if (fingerprints->rri_nrdatas) *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FOUND; for (counter = 0; counter < fingerprints->rri_nrdatas; counter++) { /* * Extract the key from the answer. Ignore any badly * formatted fingerprints. */ if (!dns_read_rdata(&dnskey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type, &dnskey_digest, &dnskey_digest_len, fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_data, fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_length)) { verbose("Error parsing fingerprint from DNS."); continue; } if (hostkey_digest_type != dnskey_digest_type) { hostkey_digest_type = dnskey_digest_type; free(hostkey_digest); /* Initialize host key parameters */ if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &hostkey_digest_type, &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) { error("Error calculating key fingerprint."); freerrset(fingerprints); return -1; } } /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key */ if (hostkey_algorithm == dnskey_algorithm && hostkey_digest_type == dnskey_digest_type) { if (hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len && timingsafe_bcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest, hostkey_digest_len) == 0) *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_MATCH; } free(dnskey_digest); } free(hostkey_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */ freerrset(fingerprints); if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) debug("matching host key fingerprint found in DNS"); else debug("mismatching host key fingerprint found in DNS"); else debug("no host key fingerprint found in DNS"); return 0; } /* * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record */ int export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, struct sshkey *key, FILE *f, int generic) { u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0; u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; u_int8_t dtype; u_char *rdata_digest; size_t i, rdata_digest_len; int success = 0; for (dtype = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; dtype < SSHFP_HASH_MAX; dtype++) { rdata_digest_type = dtype; if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type, &rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) { if (generic) { fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %zu %02x %02x ", hostname, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 2 + rdata_digest_len, rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type); } else { fprintf(f, "%s IN SSHFP %d %d ", hostname, rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type); } for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++) fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]); fprintf(f, "\n"); free(rdata_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */ success = 1; } } /* No SSHFP record was generated at all */ if (success == 0) { error("%s: unsupported algorithm and/or digest_type", __func__); } return success; } openssh-8.2p1/dns.h010064400017500001750000000040351362136622600124200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.18 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef DNS_H #define DNS_H enum sshfp_types { SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED = 0, SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1, SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2, SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3, SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4, SSHFP_KEY_XMSS = 5 }; enum sshfp_hashes { SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED = 0, SSHFP_HASH_SHA1 = 1, SSHFP_HASH_SHA256 = 2, SSHFP_HASH_MAX = 3 }; #define DNS_RDATACLASS_IN 1 #define DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP 44 #define DNS_VERIFY_FOUND 0x00000001 #define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH 0x00000002 #define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE 0x00000004 int verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *, int *); int export_dns_rr(const char *, struct sshkey *, FILE *, int); #endif /* DNS_H */ openssh-8.2p1/ed25519.c010064400017500001750000000061431362136622600126270ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ed25519.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ed25519.c */ #include "includes.h" #include "crypto_api.h" #include "ge25519.h" static void get_hram(unsigned char *hram, const unsigned char *sm, const unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *playground, unsigned long long smlen) { unsigned long long i; for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) playground[i] = sm[i]; for (i = 32;i < 64;++i) playground[i] = pk[i-32]; for (i = 64;i < smlen;++i) playground[i] = sm[i]; crypto_hash_sha512(hram,playground,smlen); } int crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair( unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk ) { sc25519 scsk; ge25519 gepk; unsigned char extsk[64]; int i; randombytes(sk, 32); crypto_hash_sha512(extsk, sk, 32); extsk[0] &= 248; extsk[31] &= 127; extsk[31] |= 64; sc25519_from32bytes(&scsk,extsk); ge25519_scalarmult_base(&gepk, &scsk); ge25519_pack(pk, &gepk); for(i=0;i<32;i++) sk[32 + i] = pk[i]; return 0; } int crypto_sign_ed25519( unsigned char *sm,unsigned long long *smlen, const unsigned char *m,unsigned long long mlen, const unsigned char *sk ) { sc25519 sck, scs, scsk; ge25519 ger; unsigned char r[32]; unsigned char s[32]; unsigned char extsk[64]; unsigned long long i; unsigned char hmg[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES]; unsigned char hram[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES]; crypto_hash_sha512(extsk, sk, 32); extsk[0] &= 248; extsk[31] &= 127; extsk[31] |= 64; *smlen = mlen+64; for(i=0;i #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* for offsetof */ #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "misc.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" /* * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding: * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from * PRNGd. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY /* * Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon * listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at * * 'socket_path'. * Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be * supplied. * Returns 0 on success, -1 on error */ int get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len, unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path) { int fd, addr_len, rval, errors; u_char msg[2]; struct sockaddr_storage addr; struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr; struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr; sshsig_t old_sigpipe; /* Sanity checks */ if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0) fatal("You must specify a port or a socket"); if (socket_path != NULL && strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path)) fatal("Random pool path is too long"); if (len <= 0 || len > 255) fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len); memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); if (tcp_port != 0) { addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET; addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port); addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in); } else { addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path, sizeof(addr_un->sun_path)); addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(socket_path) + 1; } old_sigpipe = ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); errors = 0; rval = -1; reopen: fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (fd == -1) { error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno)); goto done; } if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) { if (tcp_port != 0) { error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s", tcp_port, strerror(errno)); } else { error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s", addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno)); } goto done; } /* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */ msg[0] = 0x02; msg[1] = len; if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) { if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) { close(fd); errors++; goto reopen; } error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s", strerror(errno)); goto done; } if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) { if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) { close(fd); errors++; goto reopen; } error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s", strerror(errno)); goto done; } rval = 0; done: ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe); if (fd != -1) close(fd); return rval; } static int seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes) { #ifdef PRNGD_PORT debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT); if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0) return 0; #endif #ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET); if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0) return 0; #endif return -1; } void rexec_send_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *m) { u_char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE]; size_t len = sizeof(buf); int r; if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0) { error("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)", ERR_get_error()); len = 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, buf, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); } void rexec_recv_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *m) { const u_char *buf = NULL; size_t len = 0; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &buf, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %lu bytes", (unsigned long)len); RAND_add(buf, len, len); } #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ void seed_rng(void) { unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE]; /* Initialise libcrypto */ ssh_libcrypto_init(); if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OpenSSL_version_num())) fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you " "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OpenSSL_version_num()); #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY if (RAND_status() == 1) debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding"); else { if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1) fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd"); RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); } #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ if (RAND_status() != 1) fatal("PRNG is not seeded"); /* Ensure arc4random() is primed */ arc4random_buf(buf, sizeof(buf)); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); } #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #include #include /* Actual initialisation is handled in arc4random() */ void seed_rng(void) { unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE]; /* Ensure arc4random() is primed */ arc4random_buf(buf, sizeof(buf)); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/entropy.h010064400017500001750000000027451362136622600133420ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _RANDOMS_H #define _RANDOMS_H struct sshbuf; void seed_rng(void); void rexec_send_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *); void rexec_recv_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *); #endif /* _RANDOMS_H */ openssh-8.2p1/fatal.c010064400017500001750000000032051362136622600127140ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: fatal.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include "log.h" /* Fatal messages. This function never returns. */ void fatal(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); va_end(args); cleanup_exit(255); } openssh-8.2p1/fe25519.c010064400017500001750000000202121362136622600126220ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: fe25519.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/fe25519.c */ #include "includes.h" #define WINDOWSIZE 1 /* Should be 1,2, or 4 */ #define WINDOWMASK ((1<>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */ return x; } static crypto_uint32 ge(crypto_uint32 a,crypto_uint32 b) /* 16-bit inputs */ { unsigned int x = a; x -= (unsigned int) b; /* 0..65535: yes; 4294901761..4294967295: no */ x >>= 31; /* 0: yes; 1: no */ x ^= 1; /* 1: yes; 0: no */ return x; } static crypto_uint32 times19(crypto_uint32 a) { return (a << 4) + (a << 1) + a; } static crypto_uint32 times38(crypto_uint32 a) { return (a << 5) + (a << 2) + (a << 1); } static void reduce_add_sub(fe25519 *r) { crypto_uint32 t; int i,rep; for(rep=0;rep<4;rep++) { t = r->v[31] >> 7; r->v[31] &= 127; t = times19(t); r->v[0] += t; for(i=0;i<31;i++) { t = r->v[i] >> 8; r->v[i+1] += t; r->v[i] &= 255; } } } static void reduce_mul(fe25519 *r) { crypto_uint32 t; int i,rep; for(rep=0;rep<2;rep++) { t = r->v[31] >> 7; r->v[31] &= 127; t = times19(t); r->v[0] += t; for(i=0;i<31;i++) { t = r->v[i] >> 8; r->v[i+1] += t; r->v[i] &= 255; } } } /* reduction modulo 2^255-19 */ void fe25519_freeze(fe25519 *r) { int i; crypto_uint32 m = equal(r->v[31],127); for(i=30;i>0;i--) m &= equal(r->v[i],255); m &= ge(r->v[0],237); m = -m; r->v[31] -= m&127; for(i=30;i>0;i--) r->v[i] -= m&255; r->v[0] -= m&237; } void fe25519_unpack(fe25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32]) { int i; for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = x[i]; r->v[31] &= 127; } /* Assumes input x being reduced below 2^255 */ void fe25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const fe25519 *x) { int i; fe25519 y = *x; fe25519_freeze(&y); for(i=0;i<32;i++) r[i] = y.v[i]; } int fe25519_iszero(const fe25519 *x) { int i; int r; fe25519 t = *x; fe25519_freeze(&t); r = equal(t.v[0],0); for(i=1;i<32;i++) r &= equal(t.v[i],0); return r; } int fe25519_iseq_vartime(const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y) { int i; fe25519 t1 = *x; fe25519 t2 = *y; fe25519_freeze(&t1); fe25519_freeze(&t2); for(i=0;i<32;i++) if(t1.v[i] != t2.v[i]) return 0; return 1; } void fe25519_cmov(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, unsigned char b) { int i; crypto_uint32 mask = b; mask = -mask; for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] ^= mask & (x->v[i] ^ r->v[i]); } unsigned char fe25519_getparity(const fe25519 *x) { fe25519 t = *x; fe25519_freeze(&t); return t.v[0] & 1; } void fe25519_setone(fe25519 *r) { int i; r->v[0] = 1; for(i=1;i<32;i++) r->v[i]=0; } void fe25519_setzero(fe25519 *r) { int i; for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i]=0; } void fe25519_neg(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x) { fe25519 t; int i; for(i=0;i<32;i++) t.v[i]=x->v[i]; fe25519_setzero(r); fe25519_sub(r, r, &t); } void fe25519_add(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y) { int i; for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = x->v[i] + y->v[i]; reduce_add_sub(r); } void fe25519_sub(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y) { int i; crypto_uint32 t[32]; t[0] = x->v[0] + 0x1da; t[31] = x->v[31] + 0xfe; for(i=1;i<31;i++) t[i] = x->v[i] + 0x1fe; for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = t[i] - y->v[i]; reduce_add_sub(r); } void fe25519_mul(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y) { int i,j; crypto_uint32 t[63]; for(i=0;i<63;i++)t[i] = 0; for(i=0;i<32;i++) for(j=0;j<32;j++) t[i+j] += x->v[i] * y->v[j]; for(i=32;i<63;i++) r->v[i-32] = t[i-32] + times38(t[i]); r->v[31] = t[31]; /* result now in r[0]...r[31] */ reduce_mul(r); } void fe25519_square(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x) { fe25519_mul(r, x, x); } void fe25519_invert(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x) { fe25519 z2; fe25519 z9; fe25519 z11; fe25519 z2_5_0; fe25519 z2_10_0; fe25519 z2_20_0; fe25519 z2_50_0; fe25519 z2_100_0; fe25519 t0; fe25519 t1; int i; /* 2 */ fe25519_square(&z2,x); /* 4 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&z2); /* 8 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); /* 9 */ fe25519_mul(&z9,&t0,x); /* 11 */ fe25519_mul(&z11,&z9,&z2); /* 22 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z11); /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_5_0,&t0,&z9); /* 2^6 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_5_0); /* 2^7 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); /* 2^8 - 2^3 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); /* 2^9 - 2^4 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); /* 2^10 - 2^5 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); /* 2^10 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_10_0,&t0,&z2_5_0); /* 2^11 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_10_0); /* 2^12 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); /* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); } /* 2^20 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_20_0,&t1,&z2_10_0); /* 2^21 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_20_0); /* 2^22 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); /* 2^40 - 2^20 */ for (i = 2;i < 20;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); } /* 2^40 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t0,&t1,&z2_20_0); /* 2^41 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); /* 2^42 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); /* 2^50 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); } /* 2^50 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_50_0,&t0,&z2_10_0); /* 2^51 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_50_0); /* 2^52 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); /* 2^100 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); } /* 2^100 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_100_0,&t1,&z2_50_0); /* 2^101 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&z2_100_0); /* 2^102 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); /* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for (i = 2;i < 100;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); } /* 2^200 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t1,&t0,&z2_100_0); /* 2^201 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); /* 2^202 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); /* 2^250 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); } /* 2^250 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t0,&t1,&z2_50_0); /* 2^251 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); /* 2^252 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); /* 2^253 - 2^3 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); /* 2^254 - 2^4 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); /* 2^255 - 2^5 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); /* 2^255 - 21 */ fe25519_mul(r,&t1,&z11); } void fe25519_pow2523(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x) { fe25519 z2; fe25519 z9; fe25519 z11; fe25519 z2_5_0; fe25519 z2_10_0; fe25519 z2_20_0; fe25519 z2_50_0; fe25519 z2_100_0; fe25519 t; int i; /* 2 */ fe25519_square(&z2,x); /* 4 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2); /* 8 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 9 */ fe25519_mul(&z9,&t,x); /* 11 */ fe25519_mul(&z11,&z9,&z2); /* 22 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z11); /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_5_0,&t,&z9); /* 2^6 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_5_0); /* 2^10 - 2^5 */ for (i = 1;i < 5;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } /* 2^10 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_10_0,&t,&z2_5_0); /* 2^11 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_10_0); /* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 1;i < 10;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } /* 2^20 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_20_0,&t,&z2_10_0); /* 2^21 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_20_0); /* 2^40 - 2^20 */ for (i = 1;i < 20;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } /* 2^40 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_20_0); /* 2^41 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 2^50 - 2^10 */ for (i = 1;i < 10;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } /* 2^50 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_50_0,&t,&z2_10_0); /* 2^51 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_50_0); /* 2^100 - 2^50 */ for (i = 1;i < 50;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } /* 2^100 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_100_0,&t,&z2_50_0); /* 2^101 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_100_0); /* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for (i = 1;i < 100;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } /* 2^200 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_100_0); /* 2^201 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 2^250 - 2^50 */ for (i = 1;i < 50;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } /* 2^250 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_50_0); /* 2^251 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 2^252 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); /* 2^252 - 3 */ fe25519_mul(r,&t,x); } openssh-8.2p1/fe25519.h010064400017500001750000000044741362136622600126430ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: fe25519.h,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/fe25519.h */ #ifndef FE25519_H #define FE25519_H #include "crypto_api.h" #define fe25519 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519 #define fe25519_freeze crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze #define fe25519_unpack crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack #define fe25519_pack crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack #define fe25519_iszero crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero #define fe25519_iseq_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime #define fe25519_cmov crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov #define fe25519_setone crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone #define fe25519_setzero crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero #define fe25519_neg crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg #define fe25519_getparity crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity #define fe25519_add crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add #define fe25519_sub crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub #define fe25519_mul crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul #define fe25519_square crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square #define fe25519_invert crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert #define fe25519_pow2523 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523 typedef struct { crypto_uint32 v[32]; } fe25519; void fe25519_freeze(fe25519 *r); void fe25519_unpack(fe25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32]); void fe25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const fe25519 *x); int fe25519_iszero(const fe25519 *x); int fe25519_iseq_vartime(const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y); void fe25519_cmov(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, unsigned char b); void fe25519_setone(fe25519 *r); void fe25519_setzero(fe25519 *r); void fe25519_neg(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x); unsigned char fe25519_getparity(const fe25519 *x); void fe25519_add(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y); void fe25519_sub(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y); void fe25519_mul(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y); void fe25519_square(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x); void fe25519_invert(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x); void fe25519_pow2523(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x); #endif openssh-8.2p1/fixalgorithms010075500017500001750000000006461362136622600142750ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # # fixciphers - remove unsupported ciphers from man pages. # Usage: fixpaths /path/to/sed cipher1 [cipher2] outfile # # Author: Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com.au). Placed in the public domain. die() { echo $* exit -1 } SED=$1 shift for c in $*; do subs="$subs -e /.Dq.$c.*$/d" subs="$subs -e s/$c,//g" done # now remove any entirely empty lines subs="$subs -e /^$/d" ${SED} $subs exit 0 openssh-8.2p1/fixpaths010075500017500001750000000007631362136622600132430ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # # fixpaths - substitute makefile variables into text files # Usage: fixpaths -Dsomething=somethingelse ... die() { echo $* exit -1 } test -n "`echo $1|grep -- -D`" || \ die $0: nothing to do - no substitutions listed! test -n "`echo $1|grep -- '-D[^=]\+=[^ ]\+'`" || \ die $0: error in command line arguments. test -n "`echo $*|grep -- ' [^-]'`" || \ die Usage: $0 '[-Dstring=replacement] [[infile] ...]' sed `echo $*|sed -e 's/-D\([^=]\+\)=\([^ ]*\)/-e s=\1=\2=g/g'` exit 0 openssh-8.2p1/ge25519.c010064400017500001750000000260561362136622600126370ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ge25519.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519.c */ #include "includes.h" #include "fe25519.h" #include "sc25519.h" #include "ge25519.h" /* * Arithmetic on the twisted Edwards curve -x^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2 * with d = -(121665/121666) = 37095705934669439343138083508754565189542113879843219016388785533085940283555 * Base point: (15112221349535400772501151409588531511454012693041857206046113283949847762202,46316835694926478169428394003475163141307993866256225615783033603165251855960); */ /* d */ static const fe25519 ge25519_ecd = {{0xA3, 0x78, 0x59, 0x13, 0xCA, 0x4D, 0xEB, 0x75, 0xAB, 0xD8, 0x41, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x0A, 0x70, 0x00, 0x98, 0xE8, 0x79, 0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xC7, 0x8C, 0x73, 0xFE, 0x6F, 0x2B, 0xEE, 0x6C, 0x03, 0x52}}; /* 2*d */ static const fe25519 ge25519_ec2d = {{0x59, 0xF1, 0xB2, 0x26, 0x94, 0x9B, 0xD6, 0xEB, 0x56, 0xB1, 0x83, 0x82, 0x9A, 0x14, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x30, 0xD1, 0xF3, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x80, 0x8E, 0x19, 0xE7, 0xFC, 0xDF, 0x56, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0x06, 0x24}}; /* sqrt(-1) */ static const fe25519 ge25519_sqrtm1 = {{0xB0, 0xA0, 0x0E, 0x4A, 0x27, 0x1B, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x78, 0xE4, 0x2F, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x18, 0x43, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xD7, 0xFB, 0x3D, 0x99, 0x00, 0x4D, 0x2B, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0xC1, 0x4F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x83, 0x2B}}; #define ge25519_p3 ge25519 typedef struct { fe25519 x; fe25519 z; fe25519 y; fe25519 t; } ge25519_p1p1; typedef struct { fe25519 x; fe25519 y; fe25519 z; } ge25519_p2; typedef struct { fe25519 x; fe25519 y; } ge25519_aff; /* Packed coordinates of the base point */ const ge25519 ge25519_base = {{{0x1A, 0xD5, 0x25, 0x8F, 0x60, 0x2D, 0x56, 0xC9, 0xB2, 0xA7, 0x25, 0x95, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x2C, 0x69, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0xD6, 0xFD, 0x31, 0xE2, 0xA4, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x53, 0x6E, 0xCD, 0xD3, 0x36, 0x69, 0x21}}, {{0x58, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66}}, {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, {{0xA3, 0xDD, 0xB7, 0xA5, 0xB3, 0x8A, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0xF5, 0x52, 0x51, 0x77, 0x80, 0x9F, 0xF0, 0x20, 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xAB, 0x64, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xEA, 0x66, 0x65, 0x76, 0x8B, 0xD7, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0x87, 0x67}}}; /* Multiples of the base point in affine representation */ static const ge25519_aff ge25519_base_multiples_affine[425] = { #include "ge25519_base.data" }; static void p1p1_to_p2(ge25519_p2 *r, const ge25519_p1p1 *p) { fe25519_mul(&r->x, &p->x, &p->t); fe25519_mul(&r->y, &p->y, &p->z); fe25519_mul(&r->z, &p->z, &p->t); } static void p1p1_to_p3(ge25519_p3 *r, const ge25519_p1p1 *p) { p1p1_to_p2((ge25519_p2 *)r, p); fe25519_mul(&r->t, &p->x, &p->y); } static void ge25519_mixadd2(ge25519_p3 *r, const ge25519_aff *q) { fe25519 a,b,t1,t2,c,d,e,f,g,h,qt; fe25519_mul(&qt, &q->x, &q->y); fe25519_sub(&a, &r->y, &r->x); /* A = (Y1-X1)*(Y2-X2) */ fe25519_add(&b, &r->y, &r->x); /* B = (Y1+X1)*(Y2+X2) */ fe25519_sub(&t1, &q->y, &q->x); fe25519_add(&t2, &q->y, &q->x); fe25519_mul(&a, &a, &t1); fe25519_mul(&b, &b, &t2); fe25519_sub(&e, &b, &a); /* E = B-A */ fe25519_add(&h, &b, &a); /* H = B+A */ fe25519_mul(&c, &r->t, &qt); /* C = T1*k*T2 */ fe25519_mul(&c, &c, &ge25519_ec2d); fe25519_add(&d, &r->z, &r->z); /* D = Z1*2 */ fe25519_sub(&f, &d, &c); /* F = D-C */ fe25519_add(&g, &d, &c); /* G = D+C */ fe25519_mul(&r->x, &e, &f); fe25519_mul(&r->y, &h, &g); fe25519_mul(&r->z, &g, &f); fe25519_mul(&r->t, &e, &h); } static void add_p1p1(ge25519_p1p1 *r, const ge25519_p3 *p, const ge25519_p3 *q) { fe25519 a, b, c, d, t; fe25519_sub(&a, &p->y, &p->x); /* A = (Y1-X1)*(Y2-X2) */ fe25519_sub(&t, &q->y, &q->x); fe25519_mul(&a, &a, &t); fe25519_add(&b, &p->x, &p->y); /* B = (Y1+X1)*(Y2+X2) */ fe25519_add(&t, &q->x, &q->y); fe25519_mul(&b, &b, &t); fe25519_mul(&c, &p->t, &q->t); /* C = T1*k*T2 */ fe25519_mul(&c, &c, &ge25519_ec2d); fe25519_mul(&d, &p->z, &q->z); /* D = Z1*2*Z2 */ fe25519_add(&d, &d, &d); fe25519_sub(&r->x, &b, &a); /* E = B-A */ fe25519_sub(&r->t, &d, &c); /* F = D-C */ fe25519_add(&r->z, &d, &c); /* G = D+C */ fe25519_add(&r->y, &b, &a); /* H = B+A */ } /* See http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-twisted-extended-1.html#doubling-dbl-2008-hwcd */ static void dbl_p1p1(ge25519_p1p1 *r, const ge25519_p2 *p) { fe25519 a,b,c,d; fe25519_square(&a, &p->x); fe25519_square(&b, &p->y); fe25519_square(&c, &p->z); fe25519_add(&c, &c, &c); fe25519_neg(&d, &a); fe25519_add(&r->x, &p->x, &p->y); fe25519_square(&r->x, &r->x); fe25519_sub(&r->x, &r->x, &a); fe25519_sub(&r->x, &r->x, &b); fe25519_add(&r->z, &d, &b); fe25519_sub(&r->t, &r->z, &c); fe25519_sub(&r->y, &d, &b); } /* Constant-time version of: if(b) r = p */ static void cmov_aff(ge25519_aff *r, const ge25519_aff *p, unsigned char b) { fe25519_cmov(&r->x, &p->x, b); fe25519_cmov(&r->y, &p->y, b); } static unsigned char equal(signed char b,signed char c) { unsigned char ub = b; unsigned char uc = c; unsigned char x = ub ^ uc; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */ crypto_uint32 y = x; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */ y -= 1; /* 4294967295: yes; 0..254: no */ y >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */ return y; } static unsigned char negative(signed char b) { unsigned long long x = b; /* 18446744073709551361..18446744073709551615: yes; 0..255: no */ x >>= 63; /* 1: yes; 0: no */ return x; } static void choose_t(ge25519_aff *t, unsigned long long pos, signed char b) { /* constant time */ fe25519 v; *t = ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+0]; cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+1],equal(b,1) | equal(b,-1)); cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+2],equal(b,2) | equal(b,-2)); cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+3],equal(b,3) | equal(b,-3)); cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+4],equal(b,-4)); fe25519_neg(&v, &t->x); fe25519_cmov(&t->x, &v, negative(b)); } static void setneutral(ge25519 *r) { fe25519_setzero(&r->x); fe25519_setone(&r->y); fe25519_setone(&r->z); fe25519_setzero(&r->t); } /* ******************************************************************** * EXPORTED FUNCTIONS ******************************************************************** */ /* return 0 on success, -1 otherwise */ int ge25519_unpackneg_vartime(ge25519_p3 *r, const unsigned char p[32]) { unsigned char par; fe25519 t, chk, num, den, den2, den4, den6; fe25519_setone(&r->z); par = p[31] >> 7; fe25519_unpack(&r->y, p); fe25519_square(&num, &r->y); /* x = y^2 */ fe25519_mul(&den, &num, &ge25519_ecd); /* den = dy^2 */ fe25519_sub(&num, &num, &r->z); /* x = y^2-1 */ fe25519_add(&den, &r->z, &den); /* den = dy^2+1 */ /* Computation of sqrt(num/den) */ /* 1.: computation of num^((p-5)/8)*den^((7p-35)/8) = (num*den^7)^((p-5)/8) */ fe25519_square(&den2, &den); fe25519_square(&den4, &den2); fe25519_mul(&den6, &den4, &den2); fe25519_mul(&t, &den6, &num); fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &den); fe25519_pow2523(&t, &t); /* 2. computation of r->x = t * num * den^3 */ fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &num); fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &den); fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &den); fe25519_mul(&r->x, &t, &den); /* 3. Check whether sqrt computation gave correct result, multiply by sqrt(-1) if not: */ fe25519_square(&chk, &r->x); fe25519_mul(&chk, &chk, &den); if (!fe25519_iseq_vartime(&chk, &num)) fe25519_mul(&r->x, &r->x, &ge25519_sqrtm1); /* 4. Now we have one of the two square roots, except if input was not a square */ fe25519_square(&chk, &r->x); fe25519_mul(&chk, &chk, &den); if (!fe25519_iseq_vartime(&chk, &num)) return -1; /* 5. Choose the desired square root according to parity: */ if(fe25519_getparity(&r->x) != (1-par)) fe25519_neg(&r->x, &r->x); fe25519_mul(&r->t, &r->x, &r->y); return 0; } void ge25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const ge25519_p3 *p) { fe25519 tx, ty, zi; fe25519_invert(&zi, &p->z); fe25519_mul(&tx, &p->x, &zi); fe25519_mul(&ty, &p->y, &zi); fe25519_pack(r, &ty); r[31] ^= fe25519_getparity(&tx) << 7; } int ge25519_isneutral_vartime(const ge25519_p3 *p) { int ret = 1; if(!fe25519_iszero(&p->x)) ret = 0; if(!fe25519_iseq_vartime(&p->y, &p->z)) ret = 0; return ret; } /* computes [s1]p1 + [s2]p2 */ void ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(ge25519_p3 *r, const ge25519_p3 *p1, const sc25519 *s1, const ge25519_p3 *p2, const sc25519 *s2) { ge25519_p1p1 tp1p1; ge25519_p3 pre[16]; unsigned char b[127]; int i; /* precomputation s2 s1 */ setneutral(pre); /* 00 00 */ pre[1] = *p1; /* 00 01 */ dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1,(ge25519_p2 *)p1); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[2], &tp1p1); /* 00 10 */ add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1], &pre[2]); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[3], &tp1p1); /* 00 11 */ pre[4] = *p2; /* 01 00 */ add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1], &pre[4]); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[5], &tp1p1); /* 01 01 */ add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[2], &pre[4]); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[6], &tp1p1); /* 01 10 */ add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[3], &pre[4]); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[7], &tp1p1); /* 01 11 */ dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1,(ge25519_p2 *)p2); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[8], &tp1p1); /* 10 00 */ add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1], &pre[8]); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[9], &tp1p1); /* 10 01 */ dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1,(ge25519_p2 *)&pre[5]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[10], &tp1p1); /* 10 10 */ add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[3], &pre[8]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[11], &tp1p1); /* 10 11 */ add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[4], &pre[8]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[12], &tp1p1); /* 11 00 */ add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1],&pre[12]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[13], &tp1p1); /* 11 01 */ add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[2],&pre[12]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[14], &tp1p1); /* 11 10 */ add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[3],&pre[12]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[15], &tp1p1); /* 11 11 */ sc25519_2interleave2(b,s1,s2); /* scalar multiplication */ *r = pre[b[126]]; for(i=125;i>=0;i--) { dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1, (ge25519_p2 *)r); p1p1_to_p2((ge25519_p2 *) r, &tp1p1); dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1, (ge25519_p2 *)r); if(b[i]!=0) { p1p1_to_p3(r, &tp1p1); add_p1p1(&tp1p1, r, &pre[b[i]]); } if(i != 0) p1p1_to_p2((ge25519_p2 *)r, &tp1p1); else p1p1_to_p3(r, &tp1p1); } } void ge25519_scalarmult_base(ge25519_p3 *r, const sc25519 *s) { signed char b[85]; int i; ge25519_aff t; sc25519_window3(b,s); choose_t((ge25519_aff *)r, 0, b[0]); fe25519_setone(&r->z); fe25519_mul(&r->t, &r->x, &r->y); for(i=1;i<85;i++) { choose_t(&t, (unsigned long long) i, b[i]); ge25519_mixadd2(r, &t); } } openssh-8.2p1/ge25519.h010064400017500001750000000025501362136622600126350ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ge25519.h,v 1.4 2015/02/16 18:26:26 miod Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519.h */ #ifndef GE25519_H #define GE25519_H #include "fe25519.h" #include "sc25519.h" #define ge25519 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519 #define ge25519_base crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519_base #define ge25519_unpackneg_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime #define ge25519_pack crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack #define ge25519_isneutral_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime #define ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime #define ge25519_scalarmult_base crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base typedef struct { fe25519 x; fe25519 y; fe25519 z; fe25519 t; } ge25519; extern const ge25519 ge25519_base; int ge25519_unpackneg_vartime(ge25519 *r, const unsigned char p[32]); void ge25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const ge25519 *p); int ge25519_isneutral_vartime(const ge25519 *p); void ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(ge25519 *r, const ge25519 *p1, const sc25519 *s1, const ge25519 *p2, const sc25519 *s2); void ge25519_scalarmult_base(ge25519 *r, const sc25519 *s); #endif openssh-8.2p1/ge25519_base.data010064400017500001750000005111601362136622600143130ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ge25519_base.data,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519_base.data */ {{{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}}, {{{0x1a, 0xd5, 0x25, 0x8f, 0x60, 0x2d, 0x56, 0xc9, 0xb2, 0xa7, 0x25, 0x95, 0x60, 0xc7, 0x2c, 0x69, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0xd6, 0xfd, 0x31, 0xe2, 0xa4, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x53, 0x6e, 0xcd, 0xd3, 0x36, 0x69, 0x21}} , {{0x58, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66}}}, {{{0x0e, 0xce, 0x43, 0x28, 0x4e, 0xa1, 0xc5, 0x83, 0x5f, 0xa4, 0xd7, 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0x78, 0x83, 0xad, 0x1b, 0x39, 0x82, 0x2f, 0x02, 0x6f, 0x47, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xb0, 0xe1, 0x91, 0x99, 0x55, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x3a, 0xa0, 0x44, 0x11, 0x51}}} openssh-8.2p1/groupaccess.c010064400017500001750000000070141362136622600141450ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.17 2019/03/06 22:14:23 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "match.h" #include "log.h" static int ngroups; static char **groups_byname; /* * Initialize group access list for user with primary (base) and * supplementary groups. Return the number of groups in the list. */ int ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base) { gid_t *groups_bygid; int i, j, retry = 0; struct group *gr; if (ngroups > 0) ga_free(); ngroups = NGROUPS_MAX; #if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX) ngroups = MAX(NGROUPS_MAX, sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)); #endif groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid)); while (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1) { if (retry++ > 0) fatal("getgrouplist: groups list too small"); groups_bygid = xreallocarray(groups_bygid, ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid)); } groups_byname = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_byname)); for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++) if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL) groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name); free(groups_bygid); return (ngroups = j); } /* * Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups. * Return 0 otherwise. Use match_pattern() for string comparison. */ int ga_match(char * const *groups, int n) { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) for (j = 0; j < n; j++) if (match_pattern(groups_byname[i], groups[j])) return 1; return 0; } /* * Return 1 if one of user's groups matches group_pattern list. * Return 0 on negated or no match. */ int ga_match_pattern_list(const char *group_pattern) { int i, found = 0; for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) { switch (match_usergroup_pattern_list(groups_byname[i], group_pattern)) { case -1: return 0; /* Negated match wins */ case 0: continue; case 1: found = 1; } } return found; } /* * Free memory allocated for group access list. */ void ga_free(void) { int i; if (ngroups > 0) { for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) free(groups_byname[i]); ngroups = 0; free(groups_byname); groups_byname = NULL; } } openssh-8.2p1/groupaccess.h010064400017500001750000000030421362136622600141470ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.h,v 1.8 2008/07/04 03:44:59 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef GROUPACCESS_H #define GROUPACCESS_H int ga_init(const char *, gid_t); int ga_match(char * const *, int); int ga_match_pattern_list(const char *); void ga_free(void); #endif openssh-8.2p1/gss-genr.c010064400017500001750000000177611362136622600133660ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.26 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */ int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) { int r; u_char *p; size_t len; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &p, &len)) != 0) return r; g->value = p; g->length = len; return 0; } /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) { return (ctx != NULL && ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID && ctx->oid->length == len && memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, data, len) == 0); } /* Set the contexts OID from a data stream */ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) { if (ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) { free(ctx->oid->elements); free(ctx->oid); } ctx->oid = xcalloc(1, sizeof(gss_OID_desc)); ctx->oid->length = len; ctx->oid->elements = xmalloc(len); memcpy(ctx->oid->elements, data, len); } /* Set the contexts OID */ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_OID oid) { ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(ctx, oid->elements, oid->length); } /* All this effort to report an error ... */ void ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt) { char *s; s = ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL); debug("%s", s); free(s); } char * ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status) { OM_uint32 lmin; gss_buffer_desc msg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 ctx; struct sshbuf *b; char *ret; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (major_status != NULL) *major_status = ctxt->major; if (minor_status != NULL) *minor_status = ctxt->minor; ctx = 0; /* The GSSAPI error */ do { gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->major, GSS_C_GSS_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, msg.value, msg.length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg); } while (ctx != 0); /* The mechanism specific error */ do { gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->minor, GSS_C_MECH_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, msg.value, msg.length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg); } while (ctx != 0); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ret = xstrdup((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(b)); sshbuf_free(b); return (ret); } /* * Initialise our GSSAPI context. We use this opaque structure to contain all * of the data which both the client and server need to persist across * {accept,init}_sec_context calls, so that when we do it from the userauth * stuff life is a little easier */ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) { *ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof (Gssctxt)); (*ctx)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; (*ctx)->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; (*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID; (*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; (*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME; (*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; } /* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) { OM_uint32 ms; if ((*ctx) == NULL) return; if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) gss_delete_sec_context(&ms, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); if ((*ctx)->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->name); if ((*ctx)->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) { free((*ctx)->oid->elements); free((*ctx)->oid); (*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID; } if ((*ctx)->creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->creds); if ((*ctx)->client != GSS_C_NO_NAME) gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client); if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds); free(*ctx); *ctx = NULL; } /* * Wrapper to init_sec_context * Requires that the context contains: * oid * server name (from ssh_gssapi_import_name) */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, gss_buffer_desc* send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags) { int deleg_flag = 0; if (deleg_creds) { deleg_flag = GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; debug("Delegating credentials"); } ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } /* Create a service name for the given host */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host) { gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; char *val; xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host); gssbuf.value = val; gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); if ((ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); free(gssbuf.value); return (ctx->major); } OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) { if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, const char *context) { int r; sshbuf_reset(b); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, user)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, context)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) { gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 major, minor; gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && (memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0)) return 0; /* false */ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, NULL); gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token); if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); } if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ openssh-8.2p1/gss-serv-krb5.c010064400017500001750000000132001362136622600142330ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #ifdef KRB5 #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" extern ServerOptions options; #ifdef HEIMDAL # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H # include #elif HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H # include #endif static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void) { krb5_error_code problem; if (krb_context != NULL) return 1; problem = krb5_init_context(&krb_context); if (problem) { logit("Cannot initialize krb5 context"); return 0; } return 1; } /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own. * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0 */ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) { krb5_principal princ; int retval; const char *errmsg; if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) return 0; if ((retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value, &princ))) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, retval); logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); return 0; } if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) { retval = 1; logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", name, (char *)client->displayname.value); } else retval = 0; krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); return retval; } /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ static void ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) { krb5_ccache ccache; krb5_error_code problem; krb5_principal princ; OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; int len; const char *errmsg; if (client->creds == NULL) { debug("No credentials stored"); return; } if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) return; #ifdef HEIMDAL # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE if ((problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache)) != 0) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); logit("krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg); # else if ((problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(krb_context, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache))) { logit("krb5_cc_gen_new(): %.100s", krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); # endif krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); return; } #else if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); return; } #endif /* #ifdef HEIMDAL */ if ((problem = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value, &princ))) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); return; } if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); return; } krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ccache))) { logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed"); krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); return; } client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval); #endif krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); return; } ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", "Kerberos", {9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"}, NULL, &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, NULL, &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds }; #endif /* KRB5 */ #endif /* GSSAPI */ openssh-8.2p1/gss-serv.c010064400017500001750000000245121362136622600134020ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.31 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" extern ServerOptions options; static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; #ifdef KRB5 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; #endif ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= { #ifdef KRB5 &gssapi_kerberos_mech, #endif &gssapi_null_mech, }; /* * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up. */ static gss_OID_set supported_oids; void ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void) { ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported_oids); } OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *ms, gss_OID member, int *present) { if (supported_oids == NULL) ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); return gss_test_oid_set_member(ms, member, supported_oids, present); } /* * Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host. * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID */ /* Returns a GSSAPI error code */ /* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */ static OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) { OM_uint32 status; char lname[NI_MAXHOST]; gss_OID_set oidset; if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); return (-1); } if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); return (ctx->major); } if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); return (ctx->major); } else { ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; } return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } /* Privileged */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) { if (*ctx) ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx)); } /* Unprivileged */ void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) { int i = 0; OM_uint32 min_status; int present; gss_OID_set supported; gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, &supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present))) present = 0; if (present) gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status, &supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset); i++; } gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported); } /* Wrapper around accept_sec_context * Requires that the context contains: * oid * credentials (from ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred) */ /* Privileged */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags) { OM_uint32 status; gss_OID mech; ctx->major = gss_accept_sec_context(&ctx->minor, &ctx->context, ctx->creds, recv_tok, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &ctx->client, &mech, send_tok, flags, NULL, &ctx->client_creds); if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); if (ctx->client_creds) debug("Received some client credentials"); else debug("Got no client credentials"); status = ctx->major; /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then * we flag the user as also having been authenticated */ if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) && (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) { if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client)) fatal("Couldn't convert client name"); } return (status); } /* * This parses an exported name, extracting the mechanism specific portion * to use for ACL checking. It verifies that the name belongs the mechanism * originally selected. */ static OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name) { u_char *tok; OM_uint32 offset; OM_uint32 oidl; tok = ename->value; /* * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct */ if (ename->length < 6 || memcmp(tok, "\x04\x01", 2) != 0) return GSS_S_FAILURE; /* * Extract the OID, and check it. Here GSSAPI breaks with tradition * and does use the OID type and length bytes. To confuse things * there are two lengths - the first including these, and the * second without. */ oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */ oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */ /* * Check the BER encoding for correct type and length, that the * string is long enough and that the OID matches that in our context */ if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl || ename->length < oidl+6 || !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx, tok+6, oidl)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; offset = oidl+6; if (ename->length < offset+4) return GSS_S_FAILURE; name->length = get_u32(tok+offset); offset += 4; if (UINT_MAX - offset < name->length) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if (ename->length < offset+name->length) return GSS_S_FAILURE; name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1); memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length); ((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably * be called once for a context */ /* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) { int i = 0; gss_buffer_desc ename; client->mech = NULL; while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length && (memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements, ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0)) client->mech = supported_mechs[i]; i++; } if (client->mech == NULL) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, &client->displayname, NULL))) { ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, &ename))) { ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename, &client->exportedname))) { return (ctx->major); } /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; return (ctx->major); } /* As user - called on fatal/exit */ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) { if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", gssapi_client.store.filename); unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); } } /* As user */ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void) { if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) { (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client); } else debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism"); } /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based * on the passed authentication process and credentials. */ /* As user */ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep) { if (gssapi_client.store.envvar != NULL && gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL) { debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, gssapi_client.store.envval); child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar, gssapi_client.store.envval); } } /* Privileged */ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) { OM_uint32 lmin; if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 || gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) { debug("No suitable client data"); return 0; } if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) return 1; else { /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds); explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client)); return 0; } else debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism"); return (0); } /* Privileged */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) { ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); return (ctx->major); } /* Privileged */ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void) { if (gssapi_client.displayname.length == 0 || gssapi_client.displayname.value == NULL) return NULL; return (char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/hash.c010064400017500001750000000015131362136622600125500ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.4 2017/12/14 21:07:39 naddy Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.6 2019/11/29 00:11:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Public domain. Author: Christian Weisgerber * API compatible reimplementation of function from nacl */ #include "includes.h" #include "crypto_api.h" #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include int crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) { if (!EVP_Digest(in, inlen, out, NULL, EVP_sha512(), NULL)) return -1; return 0; } #else # ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H # include # endif int crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) { SHA2_CTX ctx; SHA512Init(&ctx); SHA512Update(&ctx, in, inlen); SHA512Final(out, &ctx); return 0; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/hmac.c010064400017500001750000000121421362136622600125350ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.13 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #include "hmac.h" struct ssh_hmac_ctx { int alg; struct ssh_digest_ctx *ictx; struct ssh_digest_ctx *octx; struct ssh_digest_ctx *digest; u_char *buf; size_t buf_len; }; size_t ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg) { return ssh_digest_bytes(alg); } struct ssh_hmac_ctx * ssh_hmac_start(int alg) { struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ret; if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; ret->alg = alg; if ((ret->ictx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL || (ret->octx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL || (ret->digest = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL) goto fail; ret->buf_len = ssh_digest_blocksize(ret->ictx); if ((ret->buf = calloc(1, ret->buf_len)) == NULL) goto fail; return ret; fail: ssh_hmac_free(ret); return NULL; } int ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen) { size_t i; /* reset ictx and octx if no is key given */ if (key != NULL) { /* truncate long keys */ if (klen <= ctx->buf_len) memcpy(ctx->buf, key, klen); else if (ssh_digest_memory(ctx->alg, key, klen, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++) ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36; if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->ictx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++) ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->octx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0) return -1; explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len); } /* start with ictx */ if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->ictx, ctx->digest) < 0) return -1; return 0; } int ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) { return ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, m, mlen); } int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b) { return ssh_digest_update_buffer(ctx->digest, b); } int ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { size_t len; len = ssh_digest_bytes(ctx->alg); if (dlen < len || ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len)) return -1; /* switch to octx */ if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->octx, ctx->digest) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, d, dlen) < 0) return -1; return 0; } void ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx) { if (ctx != NULL) { ssh_digest_free(ctx->ictx); ssh_digest_free(ctx->octx); ssh_digest_free(ctx->digest); if (ctx->buf) { explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len); free(ctx->buf); } explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); free(ctx); } } #ifdef TEST /* cc -DTEST hmac.c digest.c buffer.c cleanup.c fatal.c log.c xmalloc.c -lcrypto */ static void hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen) { struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx; size_t i; u_char digest[16]; if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) printf("ssh_hmac_start failed"); if (ssh_hmac_init(ctx, key, klen) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 || ssh_hmac_final(ctx, digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0) printf("ssh_hmac_xxx failed"); ssh_hmac_free(ctx); if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) { for (i = 0; i < elen; i++) printf("[%zu] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]); printf("mismatch\n"); } else printf("ok\n"); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* try test vectors from RFC 2104 */ u_char key1[16] = { 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb }; u_char *data1 = "Hi There"; u_char dig1[16] = { 0x92, 0x94, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x38, 0xbb, 0x1c, 0x13, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x8b, 0xfc, 0x9d }; u_char *key2 = "Jefe"; u_char *data2 = "what do ya want for nothing?"; u_char dig2[16] = { 0x75, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0xb5, 0x03, 0xea, 0xa8, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xb7, 0x38 }; u_char key3[16]; u_char data3[50]; u_char dig3[16] = { 0x56, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x52, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x88, 0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6 }; memset(key3, 0xaa, sizeof(key3)); memset(data3, 0xdd, sizeof(data3)); hmac_test(key1, sizeof(key1), data1, strlen(data1), dig1, sizeof(dig1)); hmac_test(key2, strlen(key2), data2, strlen(data2), dig2, sizeof(dig2)); hmac_test(key3, sizeof(key3), data3, sizeof(data3), dig3, sizeof(dig3)); return 0; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/hmac.h010064400017500001750000000031761362136622600125510ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: hmac.h,v 1.9 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _HMAC_H #define _HMAC_H /* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */ size_t ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg); struct sshbuf; struct ssh_hmac_ctx; struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ssh_hmac_start(int alg); /* Sets the state of the HMAC or resets the state if key == NULL */ int ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); int ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b); int ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); void ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx); #endif /* _HMAC_H */ openssh-8.2p1/hostfile.c010064400017500001750000000532761362136622600134570ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.77 2020/01/25 00:21:08 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #include "hmac.h" struct hostkeys { struct hostkey_entry *entries; u_int num_entries; }; /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */ static int extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len) { char *p, *b64salt; u_int b64len; int ret; if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) { debug2("extract_salt: string too short"); return (-1); } if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier"); return (-1); } s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1; l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1; if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) { debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character"); return (-1); } b64len = p - s; /* Sanity check */ if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) { debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len); return (-1); } b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len); memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len); b64salt[b64len] = '\0'; ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len); free(b64salt); if (ret == -1) { debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error"); return (-1); } if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) { debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d", ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret); return (-1); } return (0); } char * host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len) { struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx; u_char salt[256], result[256]; char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512]; static char encoded[1024]; u_int len; len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) { /* Create new salt */ arc4random_buf(salt, len); } else { /* Extract salt from known host entry */ if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt, sizeof(salt)) == -1) return (NULL); } if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result))) fatal("%s: ssh_hmac failed", __func__); ssh_hmac_free(ctx); if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 || __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1) fatal("%s: __b64_ntop failed", __func__); snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt, HASH_DELIM, uu_result); return (encoded); } /* * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the * pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end. */ int hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, struct sshkey *ret) { char *cp; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (sshkey_read(ret, &cp) != 0) return 0; /* Skip trailing whitespace. */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; /* Return results. */ *cpp = cp; if (bitsp != NULL) *bitsp = sshkey_size(ret); return 1; } static HostkeyMarker check_markers(char **cpp) { char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp; int ret = MRK_NONE; while (*cp == '@') { /* Only one marker is allowed */ if (ret != MRK_NONE) return MRK_ERROR; /* Markers are terminated by whitespace */ if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL && (sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL) return MRK_ERROR; /* Extract marker for comparison */ if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker)) return MRK_ERROR; memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp); marker[sp - cp] = '\0'; if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0) ret = MRK_CA; else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0) ret = MRK_REVOKE; else return MRK_ERROR; /* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */ cp = sp; for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; } *cpp = cp; return ret; } struct hostkeys * init_hostkeys(void) { struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->entries = NULL; return ret; } struct load_callback_ctx { const char *host; u_long num_loaded; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; }; static int record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx; struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys; struct hostkey_entry *tmp; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { /* XXX make this verbose() in the future */ debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file", l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__, l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" : (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "), sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); if ((tmp = recallocarray(hostkeys->entries, hostkeys->num_entries, hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; hostkeys->entries = tmp; hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(ctx->host); hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(l->path); hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = l->linenum; hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = l->key; l->key = NULL; /* steal it */ hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = l->marker; hostkeys->num_entries++; ctx->num_loaded++; return 0; } void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path) { int r; struct load_callback_ctx ctx; ctx.host = host; ctx.num_loaded = 0; ctx.hostkeys = hostkeys; if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(path, record_hostkey, &ctx, host, NULL, HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno != ENOENT) debug("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s", __func__, path, ssh_err(r)); } if (ctx.num_loaded != 0) debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys from %s", __func__, ctx.num_loaded, host); } void free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { free(hostkeys->entries[i].host); free(hostkeys->entries[i].file); sshkey_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key); explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries)); } free(hostkeys->entries); explicit_bzero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys)); free(hostkeys); } static int check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k) { int is_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k); u_int i; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE) continue; if (sshkey_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) return -1; if (is_cert && sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) return -1; } return 0; } /* * Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type. * * If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return * HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW. * * If looking for a key (key != NULL): * 1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK * 2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK * 3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then * return HOST_CHANGED * 4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW. * * Finally, check any found key is not revoked. */ static HostStatus check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { u_int i; HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW; int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k); HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE; if (found != NULL) *found = NULL; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker) continue; if (k == NULL) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype) continue; end_return = HOST_FOUND; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; k = hostkeys->entries[i].key; break; } if (want_cert) { if (sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) { /* A matching CA exists */ end_return = HOST_OK; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; break; } } else { if (sshkey_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) { end_return = HOST_OK; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; break; } /* A non-maching key exists */ end_return = HOST_CHANGED; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; } } if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) { end_return = HOST_REVOKED; if (found != NULL) *found = NULL; } return end_return; } HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { if (key == NULL) fatal("no key to look up"); return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, found); } int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype, found) == HOST_FOUND); } static int write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip, const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash) { int r, success = 0; char *hashed_host = NULL, *lhost; lhost = xstrdup(host); lowercase(lhost); if (store_hash) { if ((hashed_host = host_hash(lhost, NULL, 0)) == NULL) { error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__); free(lhost); return 0; } fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host); } else if (ip != NULL) fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", lhost, ip); else { fprintf(f, "%s ", lhost); } free(lhost); if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0) success = 1; else error("%s: sshkey_write failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fputc('\n', f); return success; } /* * Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not * be appended. */ int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash) { FILE *f; int success; if (key == NULL) return 1; /* XXX ? */ f = fopen(filename, "a"); if (!f) return 0; success = write_host_entry(f, host, NULL, key, store_hash); fclose(f); return success; } struct host_delete_ctx { FILE *out; int quiet; const char *host; int *skip_keys; /* XXX split for host/ip? might want to ensure both */ struct sshkey * const *keys; size_t nkeys; int modified; }; static int host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct host_delete_ctx *ctx = (struct host_delete_ctx *)_ctx; int loglevel = ctx->quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; size_t i; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } /* * If this line contains one of the keys that we will be * adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for * skipping. */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key)) { ctx->skip_keys[i] = 1; fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); debug3("%s: %s key already at %s:%ld", __func__, sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } } /* * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke marker, delete it * by *not* writing the line to ctx->out. */ do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: Removed %s key for host %s", ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "", l->path, l->linenum, sshkey_type(l->key), ctx->host); ctx->modified = 1; return 0; } /* Retain non-matching hosts and invalid lines when deleting */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: invalid known_hosts entry", ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "", l->path, l->linenum); } fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } int hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip, struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg) { int r, fd, oerrno = 0; int loglevel = quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; struct host_delete_ctx ctx; char *fp, *temp = NULL, *back = NULL; mode_t omask; size_t i; omask = umask(077); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.host = host; ctx.quiet = quiet; if ((ctx.skip_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.skip_keys))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ctx.keys = keys; ctx.nkeys = nkeys; ctx.modified = 0; /* * Prepare temporary file for in-place deletion. */ if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) == -1 || (r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } if ((fd = mkstemp(temp)) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { oerrno = errno; close(fd); error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } /* Remove all entries for the specified host from the file */ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(filename, host_delete, &ctx, host, ip, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto fail; } /* Add the requested keys */ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (ctx.skip_keys[i]) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } do_log2(loglevel, "%s%sAdding new key for %s to %s: %s %s", quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", host, filename, sshkey_ssh_name(keys[i]), fp); free(fp); if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip, keys[i], store_hash)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto fail; } ctx.modified = 1; } fclose(ctx.out); ctx.out = NULL; if (ctx.modified) { /* Backup the original file and replace it with the temporary */ if (unlink(back) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: unlink %.100s: %s", __func__, back, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if (link(filename, back) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: link %.100s to %.100s: %s", __func__, filename, back, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if (rename(temp, filename) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", __func__, temp, filename, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } } else { /* No changes made; just delete the temporary file */ if (unlink(temp) != 0) error("%s: unlink \"%s\": %s", __func__, temp, strerror(errno)); } /* success */ r = 0; fail: if (temp != NULL && r != 0) unlink(temp); free(temp); free(back); if (ctx.out != NULL) fclose(ctx.out); free(ctx.skip_keys); umask(omask); if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) errno = oerrno; return r; } static int match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed) { int hashed = *names == HASH_DELIM; const char *hashed_host; size_t nlen = strlen(names); if (was_hashed != NULL) *was_hashed = hashed; if (hashed) { if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, names, nlen)) == NULL) return -1; return nlen == strlen(hashed_host) && strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0; } return match_hostname(host, names) == 1; } int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL, ktype[128]; u_long linenum = 0; char *cp, *cp2; u_int kbits; int hashed; int s, r = 0; struct hostkey_foreach_line lineinfo; size_t linesize = 0, l; memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo)); if (host == NULL && (options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; debug3("%s: reading file \"%s\"", __func__, path); while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { linenum++; line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0'; free(lineinfo.line); sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo)); lineinfo.path = path; lineinfo.linenum = linenum; lineinfo.line = xstrdup(line); lineinfo.marker = MRK_NONE; lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_OK; lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; /* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') { if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) { lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_COMMENT; if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) break; } continue; } if ((lineinfo.marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) { verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu", __func__, path, linenum); if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) goto bad; continue; } /* Find the end of the host name portion. */ for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++) ; lineinfo.hosts = cp; *cp2++ = '\0'; /* Check if the host name matches. */ if (host != NULL) { if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(host, lineinfo.hosts, &hashed)) == -1) { debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"", __func__, path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts); goto bad; } if (s == 1) { lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_HOST | (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED : 0); } /* Try matching IP address if supplied */ if (ip != NULL) { if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(ip, lineinfo.hosts, &hashed)) == -1) { debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad ip hash " "\"%.32s\"", __func__, path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts); goto bad; } if (s == 1) { lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_IP | (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED : 0); } } /* * Skip this line if host matching requested and * neither host nor address matched. */ if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0 && lineinfo.status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) continue; } /* Got a match. Skip host name and any following whitespace */ for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++) ; if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') { debug2("%s:%ld: truncated before key type", path, linenum); goto bad; } lineinfo.rawkey = cp = cp2; if ((options & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0) { /* * Extract the key from the line. This will skip * any leading whitespace. Ignore badly formatted * lines. */ if ((lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; } if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) { goto bad; } lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type; lineinfo.comment = cp; } else { /* Extract and parse key type */ l = strcspn(lineinfo.rawkey, " \t"); if (l <= 1 || l >= sizeof(ktype) || lineinfo.rawkey[l] == '\0') goto bad; memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l); ktype[l] = '\0'; lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); /* * Assume legacy RSA1 if the first component is a short * decimal number. */ if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 && strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l) goto bad; /* * Check that something other than whitespace follows * the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but * it does catch trivial truncation. */ cp2 += l; /* Skip past key type */ for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++) ; if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') { debug2("%s:%ld: truncated after key type", path, linenum); lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; } if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC) { bad: sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); lineinfo.key = NULL; lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID; if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) break; continue; } } if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) break; } sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); free(lineinfo.line); free(line); fclose(f); return r; } openssh-8.2p1/hostfile.h010064400017500001750000000074661362136622600134640ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.24 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef HOSTFILE_H #define HOSTFILE_H typedef enum { HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_REVOKED, HOST_FOUND } HostStatus; typedef enum { MRK_ERROR, MRK_NONE, MRK_REVOKE, MRK_CA } HostkeyMarker; struct hostkey_entry { char *host; char *file; u_long line; struct sshkey *key; HostkeyMarker marker; }; struct hostkeys; struct hostkeys *init_hostkeys(void); void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, const char *, const char *); void free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *); HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *, const struct hostkey_entry **); int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int, const struct hostkey_entry **); int hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *); int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, const struct sshkey *, int); int hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip, struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg); #define HASH_MAGIC "|1|" #define HASH_DELIM '|' #define CA_MARKER "@cert-authority" #define REVOKE_MARKER "@revoked" char *host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int); /* * Iterate through a hostkeys file, optionally parsing keys and matching * hostnames. Allows access to the raw keyfile lines to allow * streaming edits to the file to take place. */ #define HKF_WANT_MATCH (1) /* return only matching hosts/addrs */ #define HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY (1<<1) /* need key parsed */ #define HKF_STATUS_OK 0 /* Line parsed, didn't match host */ #define HKF_STATUS_INVALID 1 /* line had parse error */ #define HKF_STATUS_COMMENT 2 /* valid line contained no key */ #define HKF_STATUS_MATCHED 3 /* hostname or IP matched */ #define HKF_MATCH_HOST (1) /* hostname matched */ #define HKF_MATCH_IP (1<<1) /* address matched */ #define HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED (1<<2) /* hostname was hashed */ #define HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED (1<<3) /* address was hashed */ /* XXX HKF_MATCH_KEY_TYPE? */ /* * The callback function receives this as an argument for each matching * hostkey line. The callback may "steal" the 'key' field by setting it to NULL. * If a parse error occurred, then "hosts" and subsequent options may be NULL. */ struct hostkey_foreach_line { const char *path; /* Path of file */ u_long linenum; /* Line number */ u_int status; /* One of HKF_STATUS_* */ u_int match; /* Zero or more of HKF_MATCH_* OR'd together */ char *line; /* Entire key line; mutable by callback */ int marker; /* CA/revocation markers; indicated by MRK_* value */ const char *hosts; /* Raw hosts text, may be hashed or list multiple */ const char *rawkey; /* Text of key and any comment following it */ int keytype; /* Type of key; KEY_UNSPEC for invalid/comment lines */ struct sshkey *key; /* Key, if parsed ok and HKF_WANT_MATCH_HOST set */ const char *comment; /* Any comment following the key */ }; /* * Callback fires for each line (or matching line if a HKF_WANT_* option * is set). The foreach loop will terminate if the callback returns a non- * zero exit status. */ typedef int hostkeys_foreach_fn(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *ctx); /* Iterate over a hostkeys file */ int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options); #endif openssh-8.2p1/includes.h010064400017500001750000000075511362136622600134500ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.54 2006/07/22 20:48:23 stevesk Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file includes most of the needed system headers. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef INCLUDES_H #define INCLUDES_H #include "config.h" #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE /* activate extra prototypes for glibc */ #endif #include #include #include /* For CMSG_* */ #ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H # include /* For PATH_MAX, _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_TTYENT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H # include /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_NEXT # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif /* *-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively */ #ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H # include /* For u_intXX_t */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H # include /* For __P() */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include /* For S_* constants and macros */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H # include /* For MIN, MAX, etc */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include /* for timespeccmp if present */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H #include /* for MAP_ANONYMOUS */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H #include /* for TIOCCBRK on HP-UX */ #endif #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H) && defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) # if defined(HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H) # include /* reqd for queue_t on Solaris 2.5.1 */ # endif #include /* for grantpt() and friends */ #endif #include #include /* For typedefs */ #ifdef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H # include /* For INADDR_LOOPBACK */ #endif #ifdef USE_PAM #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) # include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) # include #endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_IA_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_IAF_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H # include #endif #if defined(HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H) # include #elif defined(HAVE_LIBUTIL_H) # include #endif #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) # include # include #endif #if defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H) # include #endif #include /* * On HP-UX 11.11, shadow.h and prot.h provide conflicting declarations * of getspnam when _INCLUDE__STDC__ is defined, so we unset it here. */ #ifdef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS # ifdef _INCLUDE__STDC__ # undef _INCLUDE__STDC__ # endif #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ #endif #include "defines.h" #include "platform.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" #include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h" #include "entropy.h" #endif /* INCLUDES_H */ openssh-8.2p1/install-sh010075500017500001750000000332551362136622600134750ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # install - install a program, script, or datafile scriptversion=2011-11-20.07; # UTC # This originates from X11R5 (mit/util/scripts/install.sh), which was # later released in X11R6 (xc/config/util/install.sh) with the # following copyright and license. # # Copyright (C) 1994 X Consortium # # Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy # of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to # deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the # rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or # sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is # furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: # # The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in # all copies or substantial portions of the Software. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR # IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, # FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # X CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN # AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNEC- # TION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. # # Except as contained in this notice, the name of the X Consortium shall not # be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the sale, use or other deal- # ings in this Software without prior written authorization from the X Consor- # tium. # # # FSF changes to this file are in the public domain. # # Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent # 'make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it # when there is no Makefile. # # This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written # from scratch. nl=' ' IFS=" "" $nl" # set DOITPROG to echo to test this script # Don't use :- since 4.3BSD and earlier shells don't like it. doit=${DOITPROG-} if test -z "$doit"; then doit_exec=exec else doit_exec=$doit fi # Put in absolute file names if you don't have them in your path; # or use environment vars. chgrpprog=${CHGRPPROG-chgrp} chmodprog=${CHMODPROG-chmod} chownprog=${CHOWNPROG-chown} cmpprog=${CMPPROG-cmp} cpprog=${CPPROG-cp} mkdirprog=${MKDIRPROG-mkdir} mvprog=${MVPROG-mv} rmprog=${RMPROG-rm} stripprog=${STRIPPROG-strip} posix_glob='?' initialize_posix_glob=' test "$posix_glob" != "?" || { if (set -f) 2>/dev/null; then posix_glob= else posix_glob=: fi } ' posix_mkdir= # Desired mode of installed file. mode=0755 chgrpcmd= chmodcmd=$chmodprog chowncmd= mvcmd=$mvprog rmcmd="$rmprog -f" stripcmd= src= dst= dir_arg= dst_arg= copy_on_change=false no_target_directory= usage="\ Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [-T] SRCFILE DSTFILE or: $0 [OPTION]... SRCFILES... DIRECTORY or: $0 [OPTION]... -t DIRECTORY SRCFILES... or: $0 [OPTION]... -d DIRECTORIES... In the 1st form, copy SRCFILE to DSTFILE. In the 2nd and 3rd, copy all SRCFILES to DIRECTORY. In the 4th, create DIRECTORIES. Options: --help display this help and exit. --version display version info and exit. -c (ignored) -C install only if different (preserve the last data modification time) -d create directories instead of installing files. -g GROUP $chgrpprog installed files to GROUP. -m MODE $chmodprog installed files to MODE. -o USER $chownprog installed files to USER. -s $stripprog installed files. -t DIRECTORY install into DIRECTORY. -T report an error if DSTFILE is a directory. Environment variables override the default commands: CHGRPPROG CHMODPROG CHOWNPROG CMPPROG CPPROG MKDIRPROG MVPROG RMPROG STRIPPROG " while test $# -ne 0; do case $1 in -c) ;; -C) copy_on_change=true;; -d) dir_arg=true;; -g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2" shift;; --help) echo "$usage"; exit $?;; -m) mode=$2 case $mode in *' '* | *' '* | *' '* | *'*'* | *'?'* | *'['*) echo "$0: invalid mode: $mode" >&2 exit 1;; esac shift;; -o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2" shift;; -s) stripcmd=$stripprog;; -t) dst_arg=$2 # Protect names problematic for 'test' and other utilities. case $dst_arg in -* | [=\(\)!]) dst_arg=./$dst_arg;; esac shift;; -T) no_target_directory=true;; --version) echo "$0 $scriptversion"; exit $?;; --) shift break;; -*) echo "$0: invalid option: $1" >&2 exit 1;; *) break;; esac shift done if test $# -ne 0 && test -z "$dir_arg$dst_arg"; then # When -d is used, all remaining arguments are directories to create. # When -t is used, the destination is already specified. # Otherwise, the last argument is the destination. 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(umask $mkdir_umask && eval "\$doit_exec \$mkdirprog $prefixes") || test -d "$dstdir" || exit 1 obsolete_mkdir_used=true fi fi fi if test -n "$dir_arg"; then { test -z "$chowncmd" || $doit $chowncmd "$dst"; } && { test -z "$chgrpcmd" || $doit $chgrpcmd "$dst"; } && { test "$obsolete_mkdir_used$chowncmd$chgrpcmd" = false || test -z "$chmodcmd" || $doit $chmodcmd $mode "$dst"; } || exit 1 else # Make a couple of temp file names in the proper directory. dsttmp=$dstdir/_inst.$$_ rmtmp=$dstdir/_rm.$$_ # Trap to clean up those temp files at exit. trap 'ret=$?; rm -f "$dsttmp" "$rmtmp" && exit $ret' 0 # Copy the file name to the temp name. (umask $cp_umask && $doit_exec $cpprog "$src" "$dsttmp") && # and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits. # # If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing. 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In this case, the final cleanup might fail but the new # file should still install successfully. { test ! -f "$dst" || $doit $rmcmd -f "$dst" 2>/dev/null || { $doit $mvcmd -f "$dst" "$rmtmp" 2>/dev/null && { $doit $rmcmd -f "$rmtmp" 2>/dev/null; :; } } || { echo "$0: cannot unlink or rename $dst" >&2 (exit 1); exit 1 } } && # Now rename the file to the real destination. $doit $mvcmd "$dsttmp" "$dst" } fi || exit 1 trap '' 0 fi done # Local variables: # eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) # time-stamp-start: "scriptversion=" # time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d.%02H" # time-stamp-time-zone: "UTC" # time-stamp-end: "; # UTC" # End: openssh-8.2p1/kex.c010064400017500001750000001067001362136622600124200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.156 2020/01/23 10:24:29 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "version.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "misc.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" /* prototype */ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { "KEX algorithms", "host key algorithms", "ciphers ctos", "ciphers stoc", "MACs ctos", "MACs stoc", "compression ctos", "compression stoc", "languages ctos", "languages stoc", }; struct kexalg { char *name; u_int type; int ec_nid; int hash_alg; }; static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, { KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, { KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, { KEX_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, }; char * kex_alg_list(char sep) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct kexalg *k; for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(k->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } static const struct kexalg * kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) { const struct kexalg *k; for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) return k; } return NULL; } /* Validate KEX method name list */ int kex_names_valid(const char *names) { char *s, *cp, *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); free(s); return 0; } } debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names); free(s); return 1; } /* * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process. * Caller must free returned string. */ char * kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m; size_t len; if (a == NULL || *a == '\0') return strdup(b); if (b == NULL || *b == '\0') return strdup(a); if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024) return NULL; len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2; if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) { free(tmp); return NULL; } strlcpy(ret, a, len); for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) { free(m); continue; /* Algorithm already present */ } if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len || strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) { free(tmp); free(ret); return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */ } } free(tmp); return ret; } /* * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to * indicate that it should be appended to the default, '-' that the * specified names should be removed, or '^' that they should be placed * at the head. */ int kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all) { char *cp, *tmp, *patterns; char *list = NULL, *ret = NULL, *matching = NULL, *opatterns = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (listp == NULL || def == NULL || all == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (*listp == NULL || **listp == '\0') { if ((*listp = strdup(def)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } list = *listp; *listp = NULL; if (*list == '+') { /* Append names to default list */ if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(def, list + 1)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } free(list); list = tmp; } else if (*list == '-') { /* Remove names from default list */ if ((*listp = match_filter_blacklist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } free(list); /* filtering has already been done */ return 0; } else if (*list == '^') { /* Place names at head of default list */ if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(list + 1, def)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } free(list); list = tmp; } else { /* Explicit list, overrides default - just use "list" as is */ } /* * The supplied names may be a pattern-list. For the -list case, * the patterns are applied above. For the +list and explicit list * cases we need to do it now. */ ret = NULL; if ((patterns = opatterns = strdup(list)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } /* Apply positive (i.e. non-negated) patterns from the list */ while ((cp = strsep(&patterns, ",")) != NULL) { if (*cp == '!') { /* negated matches are not supported here */ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto fail; } free(matching); if ((matching = match_filter_whitelist(all, cp)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(ret, matching)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } free(ret); ret = tmp; } if (ret == NULL || *ret == '\0') { /* An empty name-list is an error */ /* XXX better error code? */ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto fail; } /* success */ *listp = ret; ret = NULL; r = 0; fail: free(matching); free(opatterns); free(list); free(ret); return r; } /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */ int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { u_int i; int r; sshbuf_reset(b); /* * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0) return r; } for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* first_kex_packet_follows */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0) /* uint32 reserved */ return r; return 0; } /* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */ int kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char v; u_int i; char **proposal = NULL; int r; *propp = NULL; if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) { /* skip cookie */ error("%s: consume cookie: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* extract kex init proposal strings */ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: parse proposal %u: %s", __func__, i, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } debug2("%s: %s", proposal_names[i], proposal[i]); } /* first kex follows / reserved */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) { /* reserved */ error("%s: parse: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (first_kex_follows != NULL) *first_kex_follows = v; debug2("first_kex_follows %d ", v); debug2("reserved %u ", i); r = 0; *propp = proposal; out: if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL) kex_prop_free(proposal); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } void kex_prop_free(char **proposal) { u_int i; if (proposal == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) free(proposal[i]); free(proposal); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int r; error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static void kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error); } static int kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; char *algs; debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO"); if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* XXX filter algs list by allowed pubkey/hostbased types */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: compose: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: free(algs); return r; } int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys); if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c && (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0) return r; debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS"); return 0; } int kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; u_int32_t i, ninfo; char *name; u_char *val; size_t vlen; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0) return r; for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &vlen)) != 0) { free(name); return r; } if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) { /* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */ if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) { error("%s: nul byte in %s", __func__, name); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val); kex->server_sig_algs = val; val = NULL; } else debug("%s: %s (unrecognised)", __func__, name); free(name); free(val); } return sshpkt_get_end(ssh); } static int kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) return r; if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0) return r; kex->done = 1; kex->flags &= ~KEX_INITIAL; sshbuf_reset(kex->peer); /* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */ kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT; free(kex->name); kex->name = NULL; return 0; } int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh) { u_char *cookie; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; if (kex == NULL) { error("%s: no hex", __func__); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) return 0; kex->done = 0; /* generate a random cookie */ if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) { error("%s: bad kex length: %zu < %d", __func__, sshbuf_len(kex->my), KEX_COOKIE_LEN); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: compose reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return r; } debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent"); kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT; return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; const u_char *ptr; u_int i; size_t dlen; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received"); if (kex == NULL) { error("%s: no hex", __func__); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL); ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen); if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0) return r; /* discard packet */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: discard cookie: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return r; } } for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: discard proposal: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return r; } } /* * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using * a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should * be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a * packet later. * XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) return r; if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh); error("%s: unknown kex type %u", __func__, kex->kex_type); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } struct kex * kex_new(void) { struct kex *kex; if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL || (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->client_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->server_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { kex_free(kex); return NULL; } return kex; } void kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys) { if (newkeys == NULL) return; if (newkeys->enc.key) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len); free(newkeys->enc.key); newkeys->enc.key = NULL; } if (newkeys->enc.iv) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len); free(newkeys->enc.iv); newkeys->enc.iv = NULL; } free(newkeys->enc.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc)); free(newkeys->comp.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); if (newkeys->mac.key) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len); free(newkeys->mac.key); newkeys->mac.key = NULL; } free(newkeys->mac.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac)); explicit_bzero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys)); free(newkeys); } void kex_free(struct kex *kex) { u_int mode; if (kex == NULL) return; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL DH_free(kex->dh); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]); kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; } sshbuf_free(kex->peer); sshbuf_free(kex->my); sshbuf_free(kex->client_version); sshbuf_free(kex->server_version); sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); free(kex->session_id); free(kex->failed_choice); free(kex->hostkey_alg); free(kex->name); free(kex); } int kex_ready(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { int r; if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal)) != 0) return r; ssh->kex->flags = KEX_INITIAL; kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); return 0; } int kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { int r; if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0) return r; if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */ kex_free(ssh->kex); ssh->kex = NULL; return r; } return 0; } /* * Request key re-exchange, returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error * code otherwise. Must not be called if KEX is incomplete or in-progress. */ int kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->kex == NULL) { error("%s: no kex", __func__); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if (ssh->kex->done == 0) { error("%s: requested twice", __func__); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ssh->kex->done = 0; return kex_send_kexinit(ssh); } static int choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) { error("%s: unsupported cipher %s", __func__, name); free(name); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } enc->name = name; enc->enabled = 0; enc->iv = NULL; enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher); enc->key = NULL; enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher); enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher); return 0; } static int choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) { error("%s: unsupported MAC %s", __func__, name); free(name); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } mac->name = name; mac->key = NULL; mac->enabled = 0; return 0; } static int choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; #ifdef WITH_ZLIB if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_ZLIB; } else #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */ if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_NONE; } else { error("%s: unsupported compression scheme %s", __func__, name); free(name); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } comp->name = name; return 0; } static int choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server) { const struct kexalg *kexalg; k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL); debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)"); if (k->name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH; if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) { error("%s: unsupported KEX method %s", __func__, k->name); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } k->kex_type = kexalg->type; k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg; k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid; return 0; } static int choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server) { k->hostkey_alg = match_list(client, server, NULL); debug("kex: host key algorithm: %s", k->hostkey_alg ? k->hostkey_alg : "(no match)"); if (k->hostkey_alg == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH; k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(k->hostkey_alg); if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) { error("%s: unsupported hostkey algorithm %s", __func__, k->hostkey_alg); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(k->hostkey_alg); return 0; } static int proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { static int check[] = { PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1 }; int *idx; char *p; for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) { if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) { debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s", my[*idx], peer[*idx]); return (0); } } debug2("proposals match"); return (1); } static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct newkeys *newkeys; char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL; char **cprop, **sprop; int nenc, nmac, ncomp; u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen; int r, first_kex_follows; debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client"); if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0) goto out; debug2("peer %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "client" : "server"); if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0) goto out; if (kex->server) { cprop=peer; sprop=my; } else { cprop=my; sprop=peer; } /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */ if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) { char *ext; ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL); free(ext); } /* Algorithm Negotiation */ if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL; goto out; } if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL; goto out; } for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys; ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC; nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC; ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC; if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], sprop[nenc])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc]; peer[nenc] = NULL; goto out; } authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher); /* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */ if (authlen == 0 && (r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[nmac]; peer[nmac] = NULL; goto out; } if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp]; peer[ncomp] = NULL; goto out; } debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s", ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client", newkeys->enc.name, authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", newkeys->comp.name); } need = dh_need = 0; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode]; need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.key_len); need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.block_size); need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->mac.key_len); dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher)); dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); } /* XXX need runden? */ kex->we_need = need; kex->dh_need = dh_need; /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */ if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer)) ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1; r = 0; out: kex_prop_free(my); kex_prop_free(peer); return r; } static int derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL; char c = id; u_int have; size_t mdsz; u_char *digest; int r; if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((digest = calloc(1, ROUNDUP(need, mdsz))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */ if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; error("%s: KEX hash failed", __func__); goto out; } ssh_digest_free(hashctx); hashctx = NULL; /* * expand key: * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1) * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn */ for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) { if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) { error("%s: KDF failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } ssh_digest_free(hashctx); hashctx = NULL; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEX fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c); dump_digest("key", digest, need); #endif *keyp = digest; digest = NULL; r = 0; out: free(digest); ssh_digest_free(hashctx); return r; } #define NKEYS 6 int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const struct sshbuf *shared_secret) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; u_char *keys[NKEYS]; u_int i, j, mode, ctos; int r; /* save initial hash as session id */ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { kex->session_id_len = hashlen; kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); if (kex->session_id == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); } for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) { if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen, shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) { for (j = 0; j < i; j++) free(keys[j]); return r; } } for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1]; kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3]; kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5]; } return 0; } int kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey **prvp, struct sshkey **pubp) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; *pubp = NULL; *prvp = NULL; if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { error("%s: missing hostkey loader", __func__); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } *pubp = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); *prvp = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); if (*pubp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; return 0; } int kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *server_host_key) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) { error("%s: missing hostkey verifier", __func__); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type || (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA && server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; return 0; } #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_char *digest, int len) { fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr); } #endif /* * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n. * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server. */ static void send_error(struct ssh *ssh, char *msg) { char *crnl = "\r\n"; if (!ssh->kex->server) return; if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh), msg, strlen(msg)) != strlen(msg) || atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh), crnl, strlen(crnl)) != strlen(crnl)) error("%s: write: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } /* * Sends our identification string and waits for the peer's. Will block for * up to timeout_ms (or indefinitely if timeout_ms <= 0). * Returns on 0 success or a ssherr.h code on failure. */ int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms, const char *version_addendum) { int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch; size_t len, i, n; int r, expect_nl; u_char c; struct sshbuf *our_version = ssh->kex->server ? ssh->kex->server_version : ssh->kex->client_version; struct sshbuf *peer_version = ssh->kex->server ? ssh->kex->client_version : ssh->kex->server_version; char *our_version_string = NULL, *peer_version_string = NULL; char *cp, *remote_version = NULL; /* Prepare and send our banner */ sshbuf_reset(our_version); if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0') version_addendum = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n", PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ", version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) { error("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(our_version), sshbuf_len(our_version)) != sshbuf_len(our_version)) { error("%s: write: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(our_version, 2)) != 0) { /* trim \r\n */ error("%s: sshbuf_consume_end: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } our_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(our_version); if (our_version_string == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } debug("Local version string %.100s", our_version_string); /* Read other side's version identification. */ for (n = 0; ; n++) { if (n >= SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) { send_error(ssh, "No SSH identification string " "received."); error("%s: No SSH version received in first %u lines " "from server", __func__, SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } sshbuf_reset(peer_version); expect_nl = 0; for (i = 0; ; i++) { if (timeout_ms > 0) { r = waitrfd(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), &timeout_ms); if (r == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) { send_error(ssh, "Timed out waiting " "for SSH identification string."); error("Connection timed out during " "banner exchange"); r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; goto out; } else if (r == -1) { error("%s: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } } len = atomicio(read, ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), &c, 1); if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) { error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; goto out; } else if (len != 1) { error("%s: read: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if (c == '\r') { expect_nl = 1; continue; } if (c == '\n') break; if (c == '\0' || expect_nl) { error("%s: banner line contains invalid " "characters", __func__); goto invalid; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(peer_version, c)) != 0) { error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN) { error("%s: banner line too long", __func__); goto invalid; } } /* Is this an actual protocol banner? */ if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > 4 && memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(peer_version), "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; /* If not, then just log the line and continue */ if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* Do not accept lines before the SSH ident from a client */ if (ssh->kex->server) { error("%s: client sent invalid protocol identifier " "\"%.256s\"", __func__, cp); free(cp); goto invalid; } debug("%s: banner line %zu: %s", __func__, n, cp); free(cp); } peer_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version); if (peer_version_string == NULL) error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); /* XXX must be same size for sscanf */ if ((remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(peer_version))) == NULL) { error("%s: calloc failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(peer_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { error("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", peer_version_string); invalid: send_error(ssh, "Invalid SSH identification string."); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); mismatch = 0; switch (remote_major) { case 2: break; case 1: if (remote_minor != 99) mismatch = 1; break; default: mismatch = 1; break; } if (mismatch) { error("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major); send_error(ssh, "Protocol major versions differ."); r = SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto out; } if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) { logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), peer_version_string); r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */ goto out; } if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) { logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), peer_version_string); r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */ goto out; } if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { logit("Remote version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); } /* success */ r = 0; out: free(our_version_string); free(peer_version_string); free(remote_version); return r; } openssh-8.2p1/kex.h010064400017500001750000000204211362136622600124200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.109 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef KEX_H #define KEX_H #include "mac.h" #include "crypto_api.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # include # include # include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ # define DH void # define BIGNUM void # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16 #define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" #define KEX_DH14_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" #define KEX_DH14_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" #define KEX_DH16_SHA512 "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" #define KEX_DH18_SHA512 "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512" #define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" #define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256 "ecdh-sha2-nistp256" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384 "ecdh-sha2-nistp384" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521 "ecdh-sha2-nistp521" #define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256 "curve25519-sha256" #define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" #define KEX_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512 "sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org" #define COMP_NONE 0 /* pre-auth compression (COMP_ZLIB) is only supported in the client */ #define COMP_ZLIB 1 #define COMP_DELAYED 2 #define CURVE25519_SIZE 32 enum kex_init_proposals { PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS, PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC, PROPOSAL_MAX }; enum kex_modes { MODE_IN, MODE_OUT, MODE_MAX }; enum kex_exchange { KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, KEX_C25519_SHA256, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512, KEX_MAX }; #define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001 #define KEX_INITIAL 0x0002 struct sshenc { char *name; const struct sshcipher *cipher; int enabled; u_int key_len; u_int iv_len; u_int block_size; u_char *key; u_char *iv; }; struct sshcomp { u_int type; int enabled; char *name; }; struct newkeys { struct sshenc enc; struct sshmac mac; struct sshcomp comp; }; struct ssh; struct kex { u_char *session_id; size_t session_id_len; struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; u_int we_need; u_int dh_need; int server; char *name; char *hostkey_alg; int hostkey_type; int hostkey_nid; u_int kex_type; char *server_sig_algs; int ext_info_c; struct sshbuf *my; struct sshbuf *peer; struct sshbuf *client_version; struct sshbuf *server_version; sig_atomic_t done; u_int flags; int hash_alg; int ec_nid; char *failed_choice; int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *(*load_host_private_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); int (*host_key_index)(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); int (*sign)(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *); int (*kex[KEX_MAX])(struct ssh *); /* kex specific state */ DH *dh; /* DH */ u_int min, max, nbits; /* GEX */ EC_KEY *ec_client_key; /* ECDH */ const EC_GROUP *ec_group; /* ECDH */ u_char c25519_client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 + KEM */ u_char c25519_client_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */ u_char sntrup4591761_client_key[crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_SECRETKEYBYTES]; /* KEM */ struct sshbuf *client_pub; }; int kex_names_valid(const char *); char *kex_alg_list(char); char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *); int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *); struct kex *kex_new(void); int kex_ready(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]); int kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]); void kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *); void kex_free(struct kex *); int kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *, int *, char ***); int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]); void kex_prop_free(char **); int kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *, struct sshkey **, struct sshkey **); int kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *); int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *); int kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kex_input_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const struct sshbuf *); int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *); int kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *); int kexgex_client(struct ssh *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *); int kex_gen_client(struct ssh *); int kex_gen_server(struct ssh *); int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *); int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **); int kex_dh_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **); int kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *); int kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **); int kex_ecdh_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **); int kex_c25519_keypair(struct kex *); int kex_c25519_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **); int kex_c25519_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **); int kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_keypair(struct kex *); int kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **); int kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **); int kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *); int kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *, BIGNUM *, struct sshbuf *); int kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, int, int, int, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t *); void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); int kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); int kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int); #endif #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) || !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #endif #endif openssh-8.2p1/kexc25519.c010064400017500001750000000133751362136622600131760ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.17 2019/01/21 10:40:11 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh2.h" extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CURVE25519_SIZE))); void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) { static const u_char basepoint[CURVE25519_SIZE] = {9}; arc4random_buf(key, CURVE25519_SIZE); crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint); } int kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int raw) { u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; u_char zero[CURVE25519_SIZE]; int r; crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub); /* Check for all-zero shared secret */ explicit_bzero(zero, CURVE25519_SIZE); if (timingsafe_bcmp(zero, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0) return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif if (raw) r = sshbuf_put(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); else r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); return r; } int kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out) { return kexc25519_shared_key_ext(key, pub, out, 0); } int kex_c25519_keypair(struct kex *kex) { struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; u_char *cp = NULL; int r; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, CURVE25519_SIZE, &cp)) != 0) goto out; kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif kex->client_pub = buf; buf = NULL; out: sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } int kex_c25519_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; const u_char *client_pub; u_char *server_pub; u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; int r; *server_blobp = NULL; *shared_secretp = NULL; if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != CURVE25519_SIZE) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("client public key 25519:", client_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif /* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */ if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(server_blob, CURVE25519_SIZE, &server_pub)) != 0) goto out; kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub); /* allocate shared secret */ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 0)) < 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE); dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); #endif *server_blobp = server_blob; *shared_secretp = buf; server_blob = NULL; buf = NULL; out: explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key)); sshbuf_free(server_blob); sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } int kex_c25519_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; const u_char *server_pub; int r; *shared_secretp = NULL; if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != CURVE25519_SIZE) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } server_pub = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif /* shared secret */ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub, buf, 0)) < 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); #endif *shared_secretp = buf; buf = NULL; out: sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } openssh-8.2p1/kexdh.c010064400017500001750000000117341362136622600127360ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.32 2019/01/21 10:40:11 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "dh.h" int kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex) { switch (kex->kex_type) { case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: kex->dh = dh_new_group1(); break; case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1: case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256: kex->dh = dh_new_group14(); break; case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512: kex->dh = dh_new_group16(); break; case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: kex->dh = dh_new_group18(); break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if (kex->dh == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return (dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)); } int kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out) { BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; u_char *kbuf = NULL; size_t klen = 0; int kout, r; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_pub); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_pub)); DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); #endif if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_pub)) { r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; goto out; } klen = DH_size(kex->dh); if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 || BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); #endif r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret); out: freezero(kbuf, klen); BN_clear_free(shared_secret); return r; } int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *kex) { const BIGNUM *pub_key; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; int r; if ((r = kex_dh_keygen(kex)) != 0) return r; DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, pub_key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); #endif kex->client_pub = buf; buf = NULL; out: sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { const BIGNUM *pub_key; struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; int r; *server_blobp = NULL; *shared_secretp = NULL; if ((r = kex_dh_keygen(kex)) != 0) goto out; DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(server_blob, pub_key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(server_blob, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_dh_dec(kex, client_blob, shared_secretp)) != 0) goto out; *server_blobp = server_blob; server_blob = NULL; out: DH_free(kex->dh); kex->dh = NULL; sshbuf_free(server_blob); return r; } int kex_dh_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *dh_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; BIGNUM *dh_pub = NULL; int r; *shared_secretp = NULL; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, dh_blob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_pub)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_pub, buf)) != 0) goto out; *shared_secretp = buf; buf = NULL; out: DH_free(kex->dh); kex->dh = NULL; sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/kexecdh.c010064400017500001750000000141421362136622600132420ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.10 2019/01/21 10:40:11 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" static int kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **); int kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex) { EC_KEY *client_key = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; const EC_POINT *public_key; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; int r; if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key); public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key); if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_ec(buf, public_key, group)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH fputs("client private key:\n", stderr); sshkey_dump_ec_key(client_key); #endif kex->ec_client_key = client_key; kex->ec_group = group; client_key = NULL; /* owned by the kex */ kex->client_pub = buf; buf = NULL; out: EC_KEY_free(client_key); sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } int kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { const EC_GROUP *group; const EC_POINT *pub_key; EC_KEY *server_key = NULL; struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; int r; *server_blobp = NULL; *shared_secretp = NULL; if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH fputs("server private key:\n", stderr); sshkey_dump_ec_key(server_key); #endif pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key); if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_ec(server_blob, pub_key, group)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(server_blob, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(kex, client_blob, server_key, group, shared_secretp)) != 0) goto out; *server_blobp = server_blob; server_blob = NULL; out: EC_KEY_free(server_key); sshbuf_free(server_blob); return r; } static int kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob, EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL; u_char *kbuf = NULL; size_t klen = 0; int r; *shared_secretp = NULL; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0) goto out; if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) { goto out; } sshbuf_reset(buf); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH fputs("public key:\n", stderr); sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub); #endif if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; goto out; } klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen || BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen); #endif if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0) goto out; *shared_secretp = buf; buf = NULL; out: EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub); BN_clear_free(shared_secret); freezero(kbuf, klen); sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } int kex_ecdh_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { int r; r = kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(kex, server_blob, kex->ec_client_key, kex->ec_group, shared_secretp); EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key); kex->ec_client_key = NULL; return r; } #else #include "ssherr.h" struct kex; struct sshbuf; struct sshkey; int kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex) { return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; } int kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; } int kex_ecdh_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; } #endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */ openssh-8.2p1/kexgen.c010064400017500001750000000230051362136622600131060ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kexgen.c,v 1.4 2019/11/25 00:51:37 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh); static int kex_gen_hash( int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version, const struct sshbuf *server_version, const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob, const struct sshbuf *client_pub, const struct sshbuf *server_pub, const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_version)) != 0 || /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(client_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(b, client_kexinit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(server_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(b, server_kexinit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(b, shared_secret)) != 0) { sshbuf_free(b); return r; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEX sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) { sshbuf_free(b); return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } sshbuf_free(b); *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); #ifdef DEBUG_KEX dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen); #endif return 0; } int kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; switch (kex->kex_type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1: case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256: case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512: case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: r = kex_dh_keypair(kex); break; case KEX_ECDH_SHA2: r = kex_ecdh_keypair(kex); break; #endif case KEX_C25519_SHA256: r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex); break; case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512: r = kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_keypair(kex); break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; break; } if (r != 0) return r; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_gen_reply); return 0; } static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL; struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; struct sshbuf *tmp = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; u_char *signature = NULL; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t slen, hashlen; int r; /* hostkey */ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0) goto out; /* sshkey_fromb() consumes its buffer, so make a copy */ if ((tmp = sshbuf_fromb(server_host_key_blob)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_fromb(tmp, &server_host_key)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_verify_host_key(ssh, server_host_key)) != 0) goto out; /* Q_S, server public key */ /* signed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; /* compute shared secret */ switch (kex->kex_type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1: case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256: case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512: case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); break; case KEX_ECDH_SHA2: r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); break; #endif case KEX_C25519_SHA256: r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); break; case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512: r = kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; break; } if (r !=0 ) goto out; /* calc and verify H */ hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kex_gen_hash( kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer, server_host_key_blob, kex->client_pub, server_blob, shared_secret, hash, &hashlen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); explicit_bzero(kex->sntrup4591761_client_key, sizeof(kex->sntrup4591761_client_key)); sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); sshbuf_free(tmp); sshkey_free(server_host_key); sshbuf_free(server_blob); sshbuf_free(shared_secret); sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); kex->client_pub = NULL; return r; } int kex_gen_server(struct ssh *ssh) { debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_gen_init); return 0; } static int input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public; struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL; struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL; struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; u_char *signature = NULL, hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t slen, hashlen; int r; if ((r = kex_load_hostkey(ssh, &server_host_private, &server_host_public)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; /* compute shared secret */ switch (kex->kex_type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1: case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256: case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512: case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); break; case KEX_ECDH_SHA2: r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); break; #endif case KEX_C25519_SHA256: r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); break; case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512: r = kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; break; } if (r !=0 ) goto out; /* calc H */ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_putb(server_host_public, server_host_key_blob)) != 0) goto out; hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kex_gen_hash( kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, kex->peer, kex->my, server_host_key_blob, client_pubkey, server_pubkey, shared_secret, hash, &hashlen)) != 0) goto out; /* sign H */ if ((r = kex->sign(ssh, server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0) goto out; /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); sshbuf_free(shared_secret); sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); sshbuf_free(server_pubkey); return r; } openssh-8.2p1/kexgex.c010064400017500001750000000072601362136622600131250ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.32 2019/01/23 00:30:41 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" int kexgex_hash( int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version, const struct sshbuf *server_version, const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob, int min, int wantbits, int max, const BIGNUM *prime, const BIGNUM *gen, const BIGNUM *client_dh_pub, const BIGNUM *server_dh_pub, const u_char *shared_secret, size_t secretlen, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_version)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_version)) < 0 || /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(client_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(b, client_kexinit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(server_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(b, server_kexinit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 || (min != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, min)) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, wantbits)) != 0 || (max != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, max)) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, prime)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, gen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, client_dh_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, server_dh_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(b, shared_secret, secretlen)) != 0) { sshbuf_free(b); return r; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) { sshbuf_free(b); return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } sshbuf_free(b); *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen); #endif return 0; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/kexgexc.c010064400017500001750000000145751362136622600132770ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.35 2019/11/25 00:51:37 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "compat.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; u_int nbits; nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; kex->nbits = nbits; if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE) kex->nbits = MINIMUM(kex->nbits, 4096); /* New GEX request */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent", kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n", kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max); #endif ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, &input_kex_dh_gex_group); r = 0; out: return r; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL; const BIGNUM *pub_key; int r, bits; debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 || (u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) { r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; goto out; } if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) goto out; DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent"); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); #endif ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply); r = 0; out: BN_clear_free(p); BN_clear_free(g); return r; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; struct sshbuf *tmp = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL; u_char *signature = NULL; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t slen, hashlen; int r; debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY"); /* key, cert */ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0) goto out; /* sshkey_fromb() consumes its buffer, so make a copy */ if ((tmp = sshbuf_fromb(server_host_key_blob)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_fromb(tmp, &server_host_key)) != 0 || (r = kex_verify_host_key(ssh, server_host_key)) != 0) goto out; /* DH parameter f, server public DH key, signed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_server_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) goto out; if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) kex->min = kex->max = -1; /* calc and verify H */ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kexgex_hash( kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer, server_host_key_blob, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, pub_key, dh_server_pub, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); DH_free(kex->dh); kex->dh = NULL; BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); sshbuf_free(shared_secret); sshkey_free(server_host_key); sshbuf_free(tmp); sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/kexgexs.c010064400017500001750000000137201362136622600133060ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.42 2019/01/23 00:30:41 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "compat.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, &input_kex_dh_gex_request); debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST"); return 0; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0; const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; kex->nbits = nbits; kex->min = min; kex->max = max; min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min); max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max); nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min || kex->max < kex->nbits || kex->max < DH_GRP_MIN) { r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; goto out; } /* Contact privileged parent */ kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); if (kex->dh == NULL) { sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found"); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent"); DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) goto out; debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init); r = 0; out: return r; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private; u_char *signature = NULL; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t slen, hashlen; int r; if ((r = kex_load_hostkey(ssh, &server_host_private, &server_host_public)) != 0) goto out; /* key, cert */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) goto out; if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_putb(server_host_public, server_host_key_blob)) != 0) goto out; /* calc H */ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kexgex_hash( kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, kex->peer, kex->my, server_host_key_blob, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, dh_client_pub, pub_key, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen)) != 0) goto out; /* sign H */ if ((r = kex->sign(ssh, server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg)) < 0) goto out; /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); DH_free(kex->dh); kex->dh = NULL; BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); sshbuf_free(shared_secret); sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/kexsntrup4591761x25519.c010064400017500001750000000161101362136622600152460ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kexsntrup4591761x25519.c,v 1.3 2019/01/21 10:40:11 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" int kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex) { struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; u_char *cp = NULL; size_t need; int r; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; need = crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0) goto out; crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_keypair(cp, kex->sntrup4591761_client_key); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("client public key sntrup4591761:", cp, crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_PUBLICKEYBYTES); #endif cp += crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_PUBLICKEYBYTES; kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif kex->client_pub = buf; buf = NULL; out: sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } int kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; const u_char *client_pub; u_char *kem_key, *ciphertext, *server_pub; u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t need; int r; *server_blobp = NULL; *shared_secretp = NULL; /* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */ need = crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE; if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("client public key sntrup4591761:", client_pub, crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_PUBLICKEYBYTES); dump_digest("client public key 25519:", client_pub + crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_PUBLICKEYBYTES, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif /* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */ /* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_BYTES, &kem_key)) != 0) goto out; /* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */ if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } need = crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(server_blob, need, &ciphertext)) != 0) goto out; /* generate and encrypt KEM key with client key */ crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_enc(ciphertext, kem_key, client_pub); /* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */ server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES; kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub); /* append ECDH shared key */ client_pub += crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_PUBLICKEYBYTES; if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE); dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES); dump_digest("server kem key:", kem_key, sizeof(kem_key)); dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); #endif /* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */ sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); #endif *server_blobp = server_blob; *shared_secretp = buf; server_blob = NULL; buf = NULL; out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key)); sshbuf_free(server_blob); sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } int kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) { struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; u_char *kem_key = NULL; const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t need; int r, decoded; *shared_secretp = NULL; need = crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE; if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob); server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES); dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif /* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_BYTES, &kem_key)) != 0) goto out; decoded = crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_dec(kem_key, ciphertext, kex->sntrup4591761_client_key); if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub, buf, 1)) < 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("client kem key:", kem_key, sizeof(kem_key)); dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); #endif sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); #endif if (decoded != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } *shared_secretp = buf; buf = NULL; out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } openssh-8.2p1/krl.c010064400017500001750000001067301362136622600124240ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.47 2020/01/25 23:02:13 djm Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "digest.h" #include "bitmap.h" #include "krl.h" /* #define DEBUG_KRL */ #ifdef DEBUG_KRL # define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x #else # define KRL_DBG(x) #endif /* * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order. */ /* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */ struct revoked_serial { u_int64_t lo, hi; RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry; }; static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp); /* Tree of key IDs */ struct revoked_key_id { char *key_id; RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry; }; static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp); /* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */ struct revoked_blob { u_char *blob; size_t len; RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry; }; static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp); /* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */ struct revoked_certs { struct sshkey *ca_key; struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials; struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids; TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry; }; TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs); struct ssh_krl { u_int64_t krl_version; u_int64_t generated_date; u_int64_t flags; char *comment; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha256s; struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs; }; /* Return equal if a and b overlap */ static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b) { if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi) return 0; return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1; } static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b) { return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id); } static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b) { int r; if (a->len != b->len) { if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MINIMUM(a->len, b->len))) != 0) return r; return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1; } else return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len); } struct ssh_krl * ssh_krl_init(void) { struct ssh_krl *krl; if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL) return NULL; RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys); RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s); RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha256s); TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs); return krl; } static void revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc) { struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs; struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki; RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); free(rs); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); free(rki->key_id); free(rki); } sshkey_free(rc->ca_key); } void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl) { struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb; struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc; if (krl == NULL) return; free(krl->comment); RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); revoked_certs_free(rc); } } void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version) { krl->krl_version = version; } int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment) { free(krl->comment); if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } /* * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already. */ static int revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create) { struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; *rcp = NULL; TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) || sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) { *rcp = rc; return 0; } } if (!allow_create) return 0; /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */ if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (ca_key == NULL) rc->ca_key = NULL; else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) { free(rc); return r; } RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials); RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__, ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key))); *rcp = rc; return 0; } static int insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) { struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs; KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi)); memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); rs.lo = lo; rs.hi = hi; ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs); if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) { /* No entry matches. Just insert */ if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs)); ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs); if (ers != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__)); /* Shouldn't happen */ free(irs); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ers = irs; } else { KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); /* * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the * existing entry. */ if (ers->lo > lo) ers->lo = lo; if (ers->hi < hi) ers->hi = hi; } /* * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones; * coalesce as necessary. */ /* Check predecessors */ while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1) break; /* This entry overlaps. */ if (crs->lo < ers->lo) { ers->lo = crs->lo; KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); } RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); free(crs); } /* Check successors */ while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1) break; /* This entry overlaps. */ if (crs->hi > ers->hi) { ers->hi = crs->hi; KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); } RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); free(crs); } KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial) { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial); } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) { struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; if (lo > hi || lo == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) return r; return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi); } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id) { struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki; struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) return r; KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id)); if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL || (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) { free(rki); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); if (erki != NULL) { free(rki->key_id); free(rki); } return 0; } /* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */ static int plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen) { struct sshkey *kcopy; int r; if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0) return r; if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) { if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) { sshkey_free(kcopy); return r; } } r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen); sshkey_free(kcopy); return r; } /* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */ static int revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len) { struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb; if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; rb->blob = blob; rb->len = len; erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb); if (erb != NULL) { free(rb->blob); free(rb); } return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { u_char *blob; size_t len; int r; debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0) return r; return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len); } static int revoke_by_hash(struct revoked_blob_tree *target, const u_char *p, size_t len) { u_char *blob; int r; /* need to copy hash, as revoke_blob steals ownership */ if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; memcpy(blob, p, len); if ((r = revoke_blob(target, blob, len)) != 0) { free(blob); return r; } return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len) { debug3("%s: revoke by sha1", __func__); if (len != 20) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha1s, p, len); } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len) { debug3("%s: revoke by sha256", __func__); if (len != 32) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha256s, p, len); } int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { /* XXX replace with SHA256? */ if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) return ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); if (key->cert->serial == 0) { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, key->cert->signature_key, key->cert->key_id); } else { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, key->cert->signature_key, key->cert->serial); } } /* * Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on * the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial. * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL. */ static int choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final, u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section) { int new_state; u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart; /* * Avoid unsigned overflows. * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations. */ contig = MINIMUM(contig, 1ULL<<31); last_gap = MINIMUM(last_gap, 1ULL<<31); next_gap = MINIMUM(next_gap, 1ULL<<31); /* * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates. * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their * switching cost is independent of the current_state. */ cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0; cost_range = 8; switch (current_state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: cost_list = 8; cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: case 0: cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; cost_list = 8; } /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */ cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64); cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64); cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64)); cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64)); /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */ cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8; cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8; cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8; cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8; /* Now pick the best choice */ *force_new_section = 0; new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; cost = cost_bitmap; if (cost_range < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE; cost = cost_range; } if (cost_list < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST; cost = cost_list; } if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; *force_new_section = 1; cost = cost_bitmap_restart; } KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:" "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, " "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig, (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final, (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range, (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap, (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state, *force_new_section ? " restart" : "")); return new_state; } static int put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap) { size_t len; u_char *blob; int r; len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap); if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) { free(blob); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len); free(blob); return r; } /* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */ static int revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf) { int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0; struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs; struct revoked_key_id *rki; int next_state, state = 0; struct sshbuf *sect; struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */ if (rc->ca_key == NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; } else { if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Store the revoked serials. */ for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials); rs != NULL; rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) { KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__, (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi, state)); /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */ nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); final = nrs == NULL; gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi; contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo); /* Choose next state based on these */ next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final, state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect); /* * If the current section is a range section or has a different * type to the next section, then finish it off now. */ if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state || state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) { KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state)); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) goto out; bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(sect); } /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */ if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) { KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__, next_state)); state = next_state; sshbuf_reset(sect); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } bitmap_start = rs->lo; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, bitmap_start)) != 0) goto out; break; } } /* Perform section-specific processing */ switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0) goto out; } break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) { error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__); goto out; } for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap, rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } } break; } last = rs->hi; } /* Flush the remaining section, if any */ if (state != 0) { KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x", __func__, state)); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) goto out; bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__)); /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */ sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: bitmap_free(bitmap); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct revoked_certs *rc; struct revoked_blob *rb; struct sshbuf *sect; u_char *sblob = NULL; size_t slen, i; if (krl->generated_date == 0) krl->generated_date = time(NULL); if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Store the header */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0) goto out; /* Store sections for revoked certificates */ TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { sshbuf_reset(sect); if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */ sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) { KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) { KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i]))); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: free(sblob); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } static void format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts) { time_t t; struct tm *tm; t = timestamp; tm = localtime(&t); if (tm == NULL) strlcpy(ts, "", nts); else { *ts = '\0'; strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm); } } static int parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_char type; const u_char *blob; size_t blen, nbits; struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL; u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi; struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; char *key_id = NULL; struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL; if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Header: key, reserved */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) goto out; if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0) goto out; while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) { sshbuf_free(subsect); subsect = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type)); /* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */ switch (type) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, serial)) != 0) goto out; } break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap); for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) { if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) { error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial)) continue; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0) goto out; } bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID: while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect, &key_id, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca_key, key_id)) != 0) goto out; free(key_id); key_id = NULL; } break; default: error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } r = 0; out: if (bitmap != NULL) bitmap_free(bitmap); free(key_id); sshkey_free(ca_key); sshbuf_free(subsect); return r; } static int blob_section(struct sshbuf *sect, struct revoked_blob_tree *target_tree, size_t expected_len) { u_char *rdata = NULL; size_t rlen = 0; int r; while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0) return r; if (expected_len != 0 && rlen != expected_len) { error("%s: bad length", __func__); free(rdata); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } if ((r = revoke_blob(target_tree, rdata, rlen)) != 0) { free(rdata); return r; } } return 0; } /* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */ int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys) { struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL; struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; char timestamp[64]; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used; u_char type; const u_char *blob; size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, nca_used; u_int format_version; nca_used = 0; *krlp = NULL; if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 || memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__); return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC; } /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0) goto out; if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0) goto out; if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s", (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp, *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment); /* * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified. */ sig_seen = 0; if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type)); if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) { if (sig_seen) { error("KRL contains non-signature section " "after signature"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Not interested for now. */ continue; } sig_seen = 1; /* First string component is the signing key */ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); /* Second string component is the signature itself */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */ if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */ for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) { error("KRL signed more than once with " "the same key"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */ tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used)); if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } ca_used = tmp_ca_used; ca_used[nca_used++] = key; key = NULL; } if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point * where the section start. */ sshbuf_free(copy); if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0) goto out; while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { sshbuf_free(sect); sect = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(copy, §)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type)); switch (type) { case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES: if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY: if ((r = blob_section(sect, &krl->revoked_keys, 0)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1: if ((r = blob_section(sect, &krl->revoked_sha1s, 20)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256: if ((r = blob_section(sect, &krl->revoked_sha256s, 32)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE: /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */ sshbuf_free(sect); sect = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0) goto out; break; default: error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { error("KRL section contains unparsed data"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */ sig_seen = 0; for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0) sig_seen = 1; else { sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); ca_used[i] = NULL; } } if (nca_used && !sig_seen) { error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked"); r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; goto out; } /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */ if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) { sig_seen = 0; for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) { for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) { if (ca_used[j] == NULL) continue; if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) { sig_seen = 1; break; } } } if (!sig_seen) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; error("KRL not signed with any trusted key"); goto out; } } *krlp = krl; r = 0; out: if (r != 0) ssh_krl_free(krl); for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); free(ca_used); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(copy); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } /* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */ static int is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc) { struct revoked_serial rs, *ers; struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki; /* Check revocation by cert key ID */ memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki)); rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id; erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki); if (erki != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } /* * Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the * CA doesn't specify one). */ if (key->cert->serial == 0) return 0; memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial; ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs); if (ers != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__, key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } return 0; } /* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */ static int is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { struct revoked_blob rb, *erb; struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) return r; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) return r; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA256", __func__)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } /* Next, explicit keys */ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) return r; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) return 0; /* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key, &rc, 0)) != 0) return r; if (rc != NULL) { if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) return r; } /* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0) return r; if (rc != NULL) { if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) return r; } KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { int r; KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__)); if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0) return r; if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__); if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0) return r; } KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key) { struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL; struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; int oerrno = 0, r; if (path == NULL) return 0; if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) { oerrno = errno; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path); r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key); out: sshbuf_free(krlbuf); ssh_krl_free(krl); if (r != 0) errno = oerrno; return r; } openssh-8.2p1/krl.h010064400017500001750000000052471362136622600124320ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.7 2019/06/21 04:21:04 djm Exp $ */ #ifndef _KRL_H #define _KRL_H /* Functions to manage key revocation lists */ #define KRL_MAGIC "SSHKRL\n\0" #define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1 /* KRL section types */ #define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1 #define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2 #define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3 #define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4 #define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256 5 /* KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES subsection types */ #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23 struct sshkey; struct sshbuf; struct ssh_krl; struct ssh_krl *ssh_krl_init(void); void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl); void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version); int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment); int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial); int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi); int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id); int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key); int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len); int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len); int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key); int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys); int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys); int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key); int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key); #endif /* _KRL_H */ openssh-8.2p1/log.c010064400017500001750000000252601362136622600124130ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.51 2018/07/27 12:03:17 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) # include #endif #include "log.h" static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; static int log_on_stderr = 1; static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO; static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH; static char *argv0; static log_handler_fn *log_handler; static void *log_handler_ctx; extern char *__progname; #define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS (VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL) #define LOG_STDERR_VIS (VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL) /* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */ static struct { const char *name; SyslogFacility val; } log_facilities[] = { { "DAEMON", SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON }, { "USER", SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER }, { "AUTH", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH }, #ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV { "AUTHPRIV", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV }, #endif { "LOCAL0", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 }, { "LOCAL1", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 }, { "LOCAL2", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 }, { "LOCAL3", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 }, { "LOCAL4", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 }, { "LOCAL5", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 }, { "LOCAL6", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 }, { "LOCAL7", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 }, { NULL, SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET } }; static struct { const char *name; LogLevel val; } log_levels[] = { { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL }, { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR }, { "INFO", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO }, { "VERBOSE", SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE }, { "DEBUG", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 }, { "DEBUG1", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 }, { "DEBUG2", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 }, { "DEBUG3", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 }, { NULL, SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET } }; LogLevel log_level_get(void) { return log_level; } SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *name) { int i; if (name != NULL) for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0) return log_facilities[i].val; return SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; } const char * log_facility_name(SyslogFacility facility) { u_int i; for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++) if (log_facilities[i].val == facility) return log_facilities[i].name; return NULL; } LogLevel log_level_number(char *name) { int i; if (name != NULL) for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0) return log_levels[i].val; return SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; } const char * log_level_name(LogLevel level) { u_int i; for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name != NULL; i++) if (log_levels[i].val == level) return log_levels[i].name; return NULL; } /* Error messages that should be logged. */ void error(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, fmt, args); va_end(args); } void sigdie(const char *fmt,...) { #ifdef DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); va_end(args); #endif _exit(1); } void logdie(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args); va_end(args); cleanup_exit(255); } /* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */ void logit(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args); va_end(args); } /* More detailed messages (information that does not need to go to the log). */ void verbose(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, fmt, args); va_end(args); } /* Debugging messages that should not be logged during normal operation. */ void debug(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, fmt, args); va_end(args); } void debug2(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, fmt, args); va_end(args); } void debug3(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, fmt, args); va_end(args); } /* * Initialize the log. */ void log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr) { #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; #endif argv0 = av0; if (log_change_level(level) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n", (int) level); exit(1); } log_handler = NULL; log_handler_ctx = NULL; log_on_stderr = on_stderr; if (on_stderr) return; switch (facility) { case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON: log_facility = LOG_DAEMON; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER: log_facility = LOG_USER; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH: log_facility = LOG_AUTH; break; #ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV: log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV; break; #endif case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7; break; default: fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n", (int) facility); exit(1); } /* * If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog * immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong * facility, so we force an open/close of syslog here. */ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata); closelog_r(&sdata); #else openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility); closelog(); #endif } int log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level) { /* no-op if log_init has not been called */ if (argv0 == NULL) return 0; switch (new_log_level) { case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3: log_level = new_log_level; return 0; default: return -1; } } int log_is_on_stderr(void) { return log_on_stderr && log_stderr_fd == STDERR_FILENO; } /* redirect what would usually get written to stderr to specified file */ void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *logfile) { int fd; if ((fd = open(logfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0600)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open logfile %s: %s\n", logfile, strerror(errno)); exit(1); } log_stderr_fd = fd; } #define MSGBUFSIZ 1024 void set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *handler, void *ctx) { log_handler = handler; log_handler_ctx = ctx; } void do_log2(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(level, fmt, args); va_end(args); } void do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args) { #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; #endif char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ]; char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ]; char *txt = NULL; int pri = LOG_INFO; int saved_errno = errno; log_handler_fn *tmp_handler; if (level > log_level) return; switch (level) { case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: if (!log_on_stderr) txt = "fatal"; pri = LOG_CRIT; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR: if (!log_on_stderr) txt = "error"; pri = LOG_ERR; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO: pri = LOG_INFO; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE: pri = LOG_INFO; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1: txt = "debug1"; pri = LOG_DEBUG; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2: txt = "debug2"; pri = LOG_DEBUG; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3: txt = "debug3"; pri = LOG_DEBUG; break; default: txt = "internal error"; pri = LOG_ERR; break; } if (txt != NULL && log_handler == NULL) { snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt); vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args); } else { vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args); } strnvis(fmtbuf, msgbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), log_on_stderr ? LOG_STDERR_VIS : LOG_SYSLOG_VIS); if (log_handler != NULL) { /* Avoid recursion */ tmp_handler = log_handler; log_handler = NULL; tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx); log_handler = tmp_handler; } else if (log_on_stderr) { snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n", (int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf); (void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf)); } else { #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata); syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf); closelog_r(&sdata); #else openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility); syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf); closelog(); #endif } errno = saved_errno; } openssh-8.2p1/log.h010064400017500001750000000052631362136622600124210ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.24 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef SSH_LOG_H #define SSH_LOG_H #include /* va_list */ /* Supported syslog facilities and levels. */ typedef enum { SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, #ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV, #endif SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0, SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2, SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4, SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5, SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6, SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7, SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET = -1 } SyslogFacility; typedef enum { SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET = -1 } LogLevel; typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *); void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int); LogLevel log_level_get(void); int log_change_level(LogLevel); int log_is_on_stderr(void); void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *); SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *); const char * log_facility_name(SyslogFacility); LogLevel log_level_number(char *); const char * log_level_name(LogLevel); void fatal(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn)) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void error(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void sigdie(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn)) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void logdie(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn)) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void logit(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void verbose(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *); void do_log2(LogLevel, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); void do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list); void cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn)); #endif openssh-8.2p1/loginrec.c010064400017500001750000001237521362136622600134410ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved. * Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under * the the following license: * * Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, * advertising materials, and other materials related to such * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed * by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived * from this software without specific prior written permission. * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. */ /** ** loginrec.c: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval **/ /* * The new login code explained * ============================ * * This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording * (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval. * * Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a * union of all the useful fields in the various different types of * system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants. * * We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be * used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures * on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code * gets compiled here. * * The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular * recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so * many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in * the old code. * * For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as * these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems * this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably * in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back * to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method * requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing * information. These files and their access methods are very system * specific indeed. * * For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are * setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have * these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such * a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp * code should suffice. * * Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even * more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a * simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a * relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in * a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the * information separately at all. For systems in the latter category, * we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry * for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could * incur a significant performance penalty. * * Calling the new code * -------------------- * * In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in * login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c * program there are more examples. * * Internal handler calling method * ------------------------------- * * When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both * routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in, * or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which * calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf * selects for the local system. * * The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both * struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see * construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems * that introduce new features to either structure. * * While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar * code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to * write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining * support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is * a difficult and time-consuming task. * * Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog() * (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call * getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last * login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can, * otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0, * meaning "tilt". * * Maintenance * ----------- * * In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct * methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection * code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_ or CONF__FILE * symbols for the platform. * * Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying * configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself * with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.) * * Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful! */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "loginrec.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "packet.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "auth.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif /** ** prototypes for helper functions in this file **/ #if HAVE_UTMP_H void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut); void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut); #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut); void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut); #endif int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li); int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; /* pick the shortest string */ #define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2)) /** ** platform-independent login functions **/ /* * login_login(struct logininfo *) - Record a login * * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry() * * Returns: * >0 if successful * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) */ int login_login(struct logininfo *li) { li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN; return (login_write(li)); } /* * login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout * * Call as with login_login() * * Returns: * >0 if successful * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) */ int login_logout(struct logininfo *li) { li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT; return (login_write(li)); } /* * login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time * * Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the * system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back * to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary * * Returns: * 0 on failure, or if user has never logged in * Time in seconds from the epoch if successful * * Useful preprocessor symbols: * DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog * info * USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog * facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set, * try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx. */ unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid) { struct logininfo li; if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid)) return (li.tv_sec); else return (0); } /* * login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int) - Retrieve a lastlog entry * * Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with * information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no * system lastlog information exists. * * Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo. * * Returns: * >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) */ struct logininfo * login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid) { struct passwd *pw; memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li)); li->uid = uid; /* * If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to * reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see * wtmp_get_entry().) */ pw = getpwuid(uid); if (pw == NULL) fatal("%s: Cannot find account for uid %ld", __func__, (long)uid); if (strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username)) >= sizeof(li->username)) { error("%s: username too long (%lu > max %lu)", __func__, (unsigned long)strlen(pw->pw_name), (unsigned long)sizeof(li->username) - 1); return NULL; } if (getlast_entry(li)) return (li); else return (NULL); } /* * login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*) - Allocate and initialise * a logininfo structure * * This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure * meant to carry the information required to portably record login info. * * Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory * allocation fails, the program halts. */ struct logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username, const char *hostname, const char *line) { struct logininfo *newli; newli = xmalloc(sizeof(*newli)); login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line); return (newli); } /* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *) - free struct memory */ void login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li) { free(li); } /* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*) * - initialise a struct logininfo * * Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry * the information required to portably record login info. * * Returns: 1 */ int login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username, const char *hostname, const char *line) { struct passwd *pw; memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li)); li->pid = pid; /* set the line information */ if (line) line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line)); if (username) { strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username)); pw = getpwnam(li->username); if (pw == NULL) { fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__, li->username); } li->uid = pw->pw_uid; } if (hostname) strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname)); return (1); } /* * login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *) - set the current time * * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is * meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for * time handling. */ void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li) { struct timeval tv; gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec; li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec; } /* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */ void login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa, const unsigned int sa_size) { unsigned int bufsize = sa_size; /* make sure we don't overrun our union */ if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size) bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr); memcpy(&li->hostaddr.sa, sa, bufsize); } /** ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf ** results **/ int login_write(struct logininfo *li) { #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (geteuid() != 0) { logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)"); return (1); } #endif /* set the timestamp */ login_set_current_time(li); #ifdef USE_LOGIN syslogin_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef USE_LASTLOG if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN) lastlog_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef USE_UTMP utmp_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef USE_WTMP wtmp_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef USE_UTMPX utmpx_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef USE_WTMPX wtmpx_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN && !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line, loginmsg)) logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN) audit_session_open(li); else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) audit_session_close(li); #endif return (0); } #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li) { li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN; login_set_current_time(li); # ifdef USE_UTMP utmp_write_entry(li); # endif # ifdef USE_WTMP wtmp_write_entry(li); # endif # ifdef USE_UTMPX utmpx_write_entry(li); # endif # ifdef USE_WTMPX wtmpx_write_entry(li); # endif return (0); } #endif /** ** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login ** time. **/ /* take the uid in li and return the last login time */ int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li) { #ifdef USE_LASTLOG return(lastlog_get_entry(li)); #else /* !USE_LASTLOG */ #if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \ defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER) return (utmpx_get_entry(li)); #endif #if defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG) /* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login * time, e.g. AIX */ return (0); # elif defined(USE_WTMP) && \ (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)) /* retrieve last login time from utmp */ return (wtmp_get_entry(li)); # elif defined(USE_WTMPX) && \ (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)) /* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */ return (wtmpx_get_entry(li)); # else /* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */ return (0); # endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */ #endif /* USE_LASTLOG */ } /* * 'line' string utility functions * * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms: * * 1. The full filename (including '/dev') * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev') * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00 * /dev/pts/1 -> ts/1 ) * * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok. */ /* * line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh) */ char * line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize) { memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5))) strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize); else { strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize); strlcat(dst, src, dstsize); } return (dst); } /* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */ char * line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize) { memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize); else strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize); return (dst); } /* * line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character) * form of the line (Just use the last characters of the * full name.) * * NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero * termination */ char * line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize) { size_t len; memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); /* Always skip prefix if present */ if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) src += 5; #ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0) src += 3; #endif len = strlen(src); if (len > 0) { if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0) src += ((int)len - dstsize); /* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */ strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize); } return (dst); } /** ** utmp utility functions ** ** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences ** into account. **/ #if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN) /* build the utmp structure */ void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { # if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP) ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec; ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec; # elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec; # endif } void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; # endif memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut)); /* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */ # ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id)); # endif # ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP /* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */ switch (li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; break; case LTYPE_LOGOUT: ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; break; } # endif set_utmp_time(li, ut); line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)); # ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP ut->ut_pid = li->pid; # endif /* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */ if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) return; /* * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank * for logouts. */ /* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */ strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username, MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username)); # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname)); # endif # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr; # endif # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP /* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa); memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16); if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) { ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3]; ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0; ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0; ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0; } } # endif } #endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */ /** ** utmpx utility functions ** ** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system ** variations. **/ #if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX) /* build the utmpx structure */ void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { # if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX) utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec; utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec; # elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec; # endif } void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; # endif memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx)); # ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id)); # endif /* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */ switch (li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; break; case LTYPE_LOGOUT: utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; break; } line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line)); set_utmpx_time(li, utx); utx->ut_pid = li->pid; /* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */ strncpy(utx->ut_user, li->username, MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_user, li->username)); if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) return; /* * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank * for logouts. */ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname)); # endif # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr; # endif # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP /* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa); memcpy(utx->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16); if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) { utx->ut_addr_v6[0] = utx->ut_addr_v6[3]; utx->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0; utx->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0; utx->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0; } } # endif # ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX /* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */ utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host)); # endif } #endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */ /** ** Low-level utmp functions **/ /* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */ #ifdef USE_UTMP /* if we can, use pututline() etc. */ # if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \ defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE) # define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY # endif /* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */ # ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY static int utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { setutent(); pututline(ut); # ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT endutent(); # endif return (1); } # else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */ /* * Write a utmp entry direct to the file * This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c */ static int utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { struct utmp old_ut; register int fd; int tty; /* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */ #if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT) struct ttyent *ty; tty=0; setttyent(); while (NULL != (ty = getttyent())) { tty++; if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line))) break; } endttyent(); if (NULL == ty) { logit("%s: tty not found", __func__); return (0); } #else /* FIXME */ tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */ #endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */ if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) { off_t pos, ret; pos = (off_t)tty * sizeof(struct utmp); if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) { logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (0); } if (ret != pos) { logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s", __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE); close(fd); return (0); } /* * Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host. * If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not * and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line. */ if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) && (ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') && (strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) && (strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0)) memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host)); if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) { logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (0); } if (ret != pos) { logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s", __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE); close(fd); return (0); } if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) { logit("%s: error writing %s: %s", __func__, UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (0); } close(fd); return (1); } else { return (0); } } # endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */ static int utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmp ut; construct_utmp(li, &ut); # ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__); return (0); } # else if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__); return (0); } # endif return (1); } static int utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmp ut; construct_utmp(li, &ut); # ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__); return (0); } # else if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__); return (0); } # endif return (1); } int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return (utmp_perform_login(li)); case LTYPE_LOGOUT: return (utmp_perform_logout(li)); default: logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } #endif /* USE_UTMP */ /** ** Low-level utmpx functions **/ /* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */ #ifdef USE_UTMPX /* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */ # if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \ defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE) # define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY # endif /* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */ # ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY static int utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { setutxent(); pututxline(utx); # ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT endutxent(); # endif return (1); } # else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */ /* write a utmp entry direct to the file */ static int utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { logit("%s: not implemented!", __func__); return (0); } # endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */ static int utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmpx utx; construct_utmpx(li, &utx); # ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__); return (0); } # else if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__); return (0); } # endif return (1); } static int utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmpx utx; construct_utmpx(li, &utx); # ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id)); # endif # ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; # endif # ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY utmpx_write_library(li, &utx); # else utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx); # endif return (1); } int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return (utmpx_perform_login(li)); case LTYPE_LOGOUT: return (utmpx_perform_logout(li)); default: logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } #endif /* USE_UTMPX */ /** ** Low-level wtmp functions **/ #ifdef USE_WTMP /* * Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c */ static int wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { struct stat buf; int fd, ret = 1; if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) { logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__, WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0) if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) { ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size); logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__, WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); ret = 0; } close(fd); return (ret); } static int wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmp ut; construct_utmp(li, &ut); return (wtmp_write(li, &ut)); } static int wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmp ut; construct_utmp(li, &ut); return (wtmp_write(li, &ut)); } int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return (wtmp_perform_login(li)); case LTYPE_LOGOUT: return (wtmp_perform_logout(li)); default: logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } /* * Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx * * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank * username on a given tty line. However, some systems (HP-UX is one) * leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS. * * Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username * must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for * ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.) * * Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS * to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also, * it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in * place and not have ut_type. */ /* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */ static int wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name, MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) { # ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS) return (1); # else return (1); # endif } return (0); } int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct stat st; struct utmp ut; int fd, found = 0; /* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */ li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0; if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (0); } /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) { /* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */ close(fd); return (0); } while (!found) { if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) { logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__, WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); close (fd); return (0); } if (wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) { found = 1; /* * We've already checked for a time in struct * utmp, in login_getlast() */ # ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time; # else # if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec; # endif # endif line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line, MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line)); # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host, MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host)); # endif continue; } /* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) { /* We've found the start of the file, so quit */ close(fd); return (0); } } /* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */ close(fd); return (1); } # endif /* USE_WTMP */ /** ** Low-level wtmpx functions **/ #ifdef USE_WTMPX /* * Write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c */ static int wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { #ifndef HAVE_UPDWTMPX struct stat buf; int fd, ret = 1; if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) { logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0) if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) { ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size); logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__, WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); ret = 0; } close(fd); return (ret); #else updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utx); return (1); #endif } static int wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmpx utx; construct_utmpx(li, &utx); return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx)); } static int wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmpx utx; construct_utmpx(li, &utx); return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx)); } int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return (wtmpx_perform_login(li)); case LTYPE_LOGOUT: return (wtmpx_perform_logout(li)); default: logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } /* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the next two functions */ /* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */ static int wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { if (strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_user, MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_user)) == 0 ) { # ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS) return (1); # else return (1); # endif } return (0); } int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct stat st; struct utmpx utx; int fd, found=0; /* Clear the time entries */ li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0; if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (0); } /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) { /* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */ close(fd); return (0); } while (!found) { if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) { logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__, WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); close (fd); return (0); } /* * Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular * line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx */ if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) { found = 1; # if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX) li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec; # elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time; # endif line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line)); # if defined(HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX) strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host, MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host)); # endif continue; } if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) { close(fd); return (0); } } close(fd); return (1); } #endif /* USE_WTMPX */ /** ** Low-level libutil login() functions **/ #ifdef USE_LOGIN static int syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmp *ut; ut = xmalloc(sizeof(*ut)); construct_utmp(li, ut); login(ut); free(ut); return (1); } static int syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) { # ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT char line[UT_LINESIZE]; (void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line)); if (!logout(line)) logit("%s: logout() returned an error", __func__); # ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP else logwtmp(line, "", ""); # endif /* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have * login, but no logout? what if logout but no logwtmp? All * routines are in libutil so they should all be there, * but... */ # endif return (1); } int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch (li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return (syslogin_perform_login(li)); case LTYPE_LOGOUT: return (syslogin_perform_logout(li)); default: logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } #endif /* USE_LOGIN */ /* end of file log-syslogin.c */ /** ** Low-level lastlog functions **/ #ifdef USE_LASTLOG #if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME) /* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */ static int lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode) { off_t offset; char lastlog_file[1024]; struct stat st; if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) { logit("%s: Couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s", LASTLOG_FILE, li->username); } else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file)); } else { logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__, LASTLOG_FILE); return (0); } *fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600); if (*fd < 0) { debug("%s: Couldn't open %s: %s", __func__, lastlog_file, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { /* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */ offset = (off_t) ((u_long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog)); if (lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset) { logit("%s: %s->lseek(): %s", __func__, lastlog_file, strerror(errno)); close(*fd); return (0); } } return (1); } #endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ #ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */ default: logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field"); return 0; } } #else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */ int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct lastlog last; int fd; switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: /* create our struct lastlog */ memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last)); line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line)); strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname)); last.ll_time = li->tv_sec; if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT)) return (0); /* write the entry */ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) { close(fd); logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } close(fd); return (1); default: logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } #endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */ #ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct lastlogx l, *ll; if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) { memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l)); ll = &l; } line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line)); strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host, MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host)); li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec; li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec; return (1); } #else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct lastlog last; int fd, ret; if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY)) return (0); ret = atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last)); close(fd); switch (ret) { case 0: memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last)); /* FALLTHRU */ case sizeof(last): line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line)); strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host, MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host)); li->tv_sec = last.ll_time; return (1); case -1: error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); default: error("%s: Error reading from %s: Expecting %d, got %d", __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, (int)sizeof(last), ret); return (0); } /* NOTREACHED */ return (0); } #endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ #endif /* USE_LASTLOG */ #if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \ defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER) int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmpx *utx; if (setutxdb(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN, NULL) != 0) return (0); utx = getutxuser(li->username); if (utx == NULL) { endutxent(); return (0); } line_fullname(li->line, utx->ut_line, MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, utx->ut_line)); strlcpy(li->hostname, utx->ut_host, MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx->ut_host)); li->tv_sec = utx->ut_tv.tv_sec; li->tv_usec = utx->ut_tv.tv_usec; endutxent(); return (1); } #endif /* USE_UTMPX && HAVE_SETUTXDB && UTXDB_LASTLOGIN && HAVE_GETUTXUSER */ #ifdef USE_BTMP /* * Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists. * The most common login failure is to give password instead of username. * So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that * only root can read it. */ void record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, const char *username, const char *hostname, const char *ttyn) { int fd; struct utmp ut; struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from); struct sockaddr_in *a4; struct sockaddr_in6 *a6; time_t t; struct stat fst; if (geteuid() != 0) return; if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) { debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP, strerror(errno)); return; } if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) { logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if((fst.st_mode & (S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){ logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s", _PATH_BTMP); goto out; } memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut)); /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */ strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user)); strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line)); time(&t); ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */ ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; ut.ut_pid = getpid(); /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */ strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host)); if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) && getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) { ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) { a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from; memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr), MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr)); } #ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) { a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from; memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr), MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr)); } #endif } if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP, strerror(errno)); out: close(fd); } #endif /* USE_BTMP */ openssh-8.2p1/loginrec.h010064400017500001750000000112071362136622600134350ustar00djmdjm#ifndef _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ #define _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /** ** loginrec.h: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval **/ #include "includes.h" struct ssh; /** ** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies **/ /* * login_netinfo structure */ union login_netinfo { struct sockaddr sa; struct sockaddr_in sa_in; struct sockaddr_storage sa_storage; }; /* * * logininfo structure * */ /* types - different to utmp.h 'type' macros */ /* (though set to the same value as linux, openbsd and others...) */ #define LTYPE_LOGIN 7 #define LTYPE_LOGOUT 8 /* string lengths - set very long */ #define LINFO_PROGSIZE 64 #define LINFO_LINESIZE 64 #define LINFO_NAMESIZE 512 #define LINFO_HOSTSIZE 256 struct logininfo { char progname[LINFO_PROGSIZE]; /* name of program (for PAM) */ int progname_null; short int type; /* type of login (LTYPE_*) */ pid_t pid; /* PID of login process */ uid_t uid; /* UID of this user */ char line[LINFO_LINESIZE]; /* tty/pty name */ char username[LINFO_NAMESIZE]; /* login username */ char hostname[LINFO_HOSTSIZE]; /* remote hostname */ /* 'exit_status' structure components */ int exit; /* process exit status */ int termination; /* process termination status */ /* struct timeval (sys/time.h) isn't always available, if it isn't we'll * use time_t's value as tv_sec and set tv_usec to 0 */ unsigned int tv_sec; unsigned int tv_usec; union login_netinfo hostaddr; /* caller's host address(es) */ }; /* struct logininfo */ /* * login recording functions */ /** 'public' functions */ /* construct a new login entry */ struct logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username, const char *hostname, const char *line); /* free a structure */ void login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li); /* fill out a pre-allocated structure with useful information */ int login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username, const char *hostname, const char *line); /* place the current time in a logininfo struct */ void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li); /* record the entry */ int login_login (struct logininfo *li); int login_logout(struct logininfo *li); #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li); #endif /** End of public functions */ /* record the entry */ int login_write (struct logininfo *li); int login_log_entry(struct logininfo *li); /* set the network address based on network address type */ void login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa, const unsigned int sa_size); /* * lastlog retrieval functions */ /* lastlog *entry* functions fill out a logininfo */ struct logininfo *login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid); /* lastlog *time* functions return time_t equivalent (uint) */ unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid); /* produce various forms of the line filename */ char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize); char *line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize); char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize); void record_failed_login(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *, const char *); #endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */ openssh-8.2p1/logintest.c010064400017500001750000000211241362136622600136350ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /** ** logintest.c: simple test driver for platform-independent login recording ** and lastlog retrieval **/ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H #include #endif #include "loginrec.h" extern char *__progname; #define PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT 3 int nologtest = 0; int compile_opts_only = 0; int be_verbose = 0; /* Dump a logininfo to stdout. Assumes a tab size of 8 chars. */ void dump_logininfo(struct logininfo *li, char *descname) { /* yes I know how nasty this is */ printf("struct logininfo %s = {\n\t" "progname\t'%s'\n\ttype\t\t%d\n\t" "pid\t\t%d\n\tuid\t\t%d\n\t" "line\t\t'%s'\n\tusername\t'%s'\n\t" "hostname\t'%s'\n\texit\t\t%d\n\ttermination\t%d\n\t" "tv_sec\t%d\n\ttv_usec\t%d\n\t" "struct login_netinfo hostaddr {\n\t\t" "struct sockaddr sa {\n" "\t\t\tfamily\t%d\n\t\t}\n" "\t}\n" "}\n", descname, li->progname, li->type, li->pid, li->uid, li->line, li->username, li->hostname, li->exit, li->termination, li->tv_sec, li->tv_usec, li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family); } int testAPI() { struct logininfo *li1; struct passwd *pw; struct hostent *he; struct sockaddr_in sa_in4; char cmdstring[256], stripline[8]; char username[32]; #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H time_t t0, t1, t2, logintime, logouttime; char s_t0[64],s_t1[64],s_t2[64]; char s_logintime[64], s_logouttime[64]; /* ctime() strings */ #endif printf("**\n** Testing the API...\n**\n"); pw = getpwuid(getuid()); strlcpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username)); /* gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); */ printf("login_alloc_entry test (no host info):\n"); /* FIXME fake tty more effectively - this could upset some platforms */ li1 = login_alloc_entry((int)getpid(), username, NULL, ttyname(0)); strlcpy(li1->progname, "OpenSSH-logintest", sizeof(li1->progname)); if (be_verbose) dump_logininfo(li1, "li1"); printf("Setting host address info for 'localhost' (may call out):\n"); if (! (he = gethostbyname("localhost"))) { printf("Couldn't set hostname(lookup failed)\n"); } else { /* NOTE: this is messy, but typically a program wouldn't have to set * any of this, a sockaddr_in* would be already prepared */ memcpy((void *)&(sa_in4.sin_addr), (void *)&(he->h_addr_list[0][0]), sizeof(struct in_addr)); login_set_addr(li1, (struct sockaddr *) &sa_in4, sizeof(sa_in4)); strlcpy(li1->hostname, "localhost", sizeof(li1->hostname)); } if (be_verbose) dump_logininfo(li1, "li1"); if ((int)geteuid() != 0) { printf("NOT RUNNING LOGIN TESTS - you are not root!\n"); return 1; } if (nologtest) return 1; line_stripname(stripline, li1->line, sizeof(stripline)); printf("Performing an invalid login attempt (no type field)\n--\n"); login_write(li1); printf("--\n(Should have written errors to stderr)\n"); #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H (void)time(&t0); strlcpy(s_t0, ctime(&t0), sizeof(s_t0)); t1 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid()); strlcpy(s_t1, ctime(&t1), sizeof(s_t1)); printf("Before logging in:\n\tcurrent time is %d - %s\t" "lastlog time is %d - %s\n", (int)t0, s_t0, (int)t1, s_t1); #endif printf("Performing a login on line %s ", stripline); #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H (void)time(&logintime); strlcpy(s_logintime, ctime(&logintime), sizeof(s_logintime)); printf("at %d - %s", (int)logintime, s_logintime); #endif printf("--\n"); login_login(li1); snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "who | grep '%s '", stripline); system(cmdstring); printf("--\nPausing for %d second(s)...\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT); sleep(PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT); printf("Performing a logout "); #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H (void)time(&logouttime); strlcpy(s_logouttime, ctime(&logouttime), sizeof(s_logouttime)); printf("at %d - %s", (int)logouttime, s_logouttime); #endif printf("\nThe root login shown above should be gone.\n" "If the root login hasn't gone, but another user on the same\n" "pty has, this is OK - we're hacking it here, and there\n" "shouldn't be two users on one pty in reality...\n" "-- ('who' output follows)\n"); login_logout(li1); system(cmdstring); printf("-- ('who' output ends)\n"); #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H t2 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid()); strlcpy(s_t2, ctime(&t2), sizeof(s_t2)); printf("After logging in, lastlog time is %d - %s\n", (int)t2, s_t2); if (t1 == t2) printf("The lastlog times before and after logging in are the " "same.\nThis indicates that lastlog is ** NOT WORKING " "CORRECTLY **\n"); else if (t0 != t2) /* We can be off by a second or so, even when recording works fine. * I'm not 100% sure why, but it's true. */ printf("** The login time and the lastlog time differ.\n" "** This indicates that lastlog is either recording the " "wrong time,\n** or retrieving the wrong entry.\n" "If it's off by less than %d second(s) " "run the test again.\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT); else printf("lastlog agrees with the login time. This is a good thing.\n"); #endif printf("--\nThe output of 'last' shown next should have " "an entry for root \n on %s for the time shown above:\n--\n", stripline); snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "last | grep '%s ' | head -3", stripline); system(cmdstring); printf("--\nEnd of login test.\n"); login_free_entry(li1); return 1; } /* testAPI() */ void testLineName(char *line) { /* have to null-terminate - these functions are designed for * structures with fixed-length char arrays, and don't null-term.*/ char full[17], strip[9], abbrev[5]; memset(full, '\0', sizeof(full)); memset(strip, '\0', sizeof(strip)); memset(abbrev, '\0', sizeof(abbrev)); line_fullname(full, line, sizeof(full)-1); line_stripname(strip, full, sizeof(strip)-1); line_abbrevname(abbrev, full, sizeof(abbrev)-1); printf("%s: %s, %s, %s\n", line, full, strip, abbrev); } /* testLineName() */ int testOutput() { printf("**\n** Testing linename functions\n**\n"); testLineName("/dev/pts/1"); testLineName("pts/1"); testLineName("pts/999"); testLineName("/dev/ttyp00"); testLineName("ttyp00"); return 1; } /* testOutput() */ /* show which options got compiled in */ void showOptions(void) { printf("**\n** Compile-time options\n**\n"); printf("login recording methods selected:\n"); #ifdef USE_LOGIN printf("\tUSE_LOGIN\n"); #endif #ifdef USE_UTMP printf("\tUSE_UTMP (UTMP_FILE=%s)\n", UTMP_FILE); #endif #ifdef USE_UTMPX printf("\tUSE_UTMPX\n"); #endif #ifdef USE_WTMP printf("\tUSE_WTMP (WTMP_FILE=%s)\n", WTMP_FILE); #endif #ifdef USE_WTMPX printf("\tUSE_WTMPX (WTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", WTMPX_FILE); #endif #ifdef USE_LASTLOG printf("\tUSE_LASTLOG (LASTLOG_FILE=%s)\n", LASTLOG_FILE); #endif printf("\n"); } /* showOptions() */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("Platform-independent login recording test driver\n"); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); if (argc == 2) { if (strncmp(argv[1], "-i", 3) == 0) compile_opts_only = 1; else if (strncmp(argv[1], "-v", 3) == 0) be_verbose=1; } if (!compile_opts_only) { if (be_verbose && !testOutput()) return 1; if (!testAPI()) return 1; } showOptions(); return 0; } /* main() */ openssh-8.2p1/mac.c010064400017500001750000000163111362136622600123670ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.35 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "digest.h" #include "hmac.h" #include "umac.h" #include "mac.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #define SSH_DIGEST 1 /* SSH_DIGEST_XXX */ #define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */ #define SSH_UMAC128 3 struct macalg { char *name; int type; int alg; int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */ int key_len; /* just for UMAC */ int len; /* just for UMAC */ int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ }; static const struct macalg macs[] = { /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-md5", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-md5-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, { "umac-64@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 }, { "umac-128@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 }, /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */ { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 1 }, { "umac-64-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 1 }, { "umac-128-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 1 }, { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } }; /* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */ char * mac_alg_list(char sep) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct macalg *m; for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(m->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, m->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } static int mac_setup_by_alg(struct sshmac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg) { mac->type = macalg->type; if (mac->type == SSH_DIGEST) { if ((mac->hmac_ctx = ssh_hmac_start(macalg->alg)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = ssh_hmac_bytes(macalg->alg); } else { mac->mac_len = macalg->len / 8; mac->key_len = macalg->key_len / 8; mac->umac_ctx = NULL; } if (macalg->truncatebits != 0) mac->mac_len = macalg->truncatebits / 8; mac->etm = macalg->etm; return 0; } int mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name) { const struct macalg *m; for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0) continue; if (mac != NULL) return mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m); return 0; } return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } int mac_init(struct sshmac *mac) { if (mac->key == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; switch (mac->type) { case SSH_DIGEST: if (mac->hmac_ctx == NULL || ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len) < 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; return 0; case SSH_UMAC: if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; case SSH_UMAC128: if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac128_new(mac->key)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } } int mac_compute(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, const u_char *data, int datalen, u_char *digest, size_t dlen) { static union { u_char m[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; u_int64_t for_align; } u; u_char b[4]; u_char nonce[8]; if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(u)) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; switch (mac->type) { case SSH_DIGEST: put_u32(b, seqno); /* reset HMAC context */ if (ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, b, sizeof(b)) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, data, datalen) < 0 || ssh_hmac_final(mac->hmac_ctx, u.m, sizeof(u.m)) < 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; break; case SSH_UMAC: POKE_U64(nonce, seqno); umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen); umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce); break; case SSH_UMAC128: put_u64(nonce, seqno); umac128_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen); umac128_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce); break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if (digest != NULL) { if (dlen > mac->mac_len) dlen = mac->mac_len; memcpy(digest, u.m, dlen); } return 0; } int mac_check(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const u_char *theirmac, size_t mlen) { u_char ourmac[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; int r; if (mac->mac_len > mlen) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = mac_compute(mac, seqno, data, dlen, ourmac, sizeof(ourmac))) != 0) return r; if (timingsafe_bcmp(ourmac, theirmac, mac->mac_len) != 0) return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; return 0; } void mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac) { if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) { if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL) umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx); } else if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC128) { if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL) umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx); } else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL) ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx); mac->hmac_ctx = NULL; mac->umac_ctx = NULL; } /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ #define MAC_SEP "," int mac_valid(const char *names) { char *maclist, *cp, *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; if ((maclist = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) { if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) { free(maclist); return 0; } } free(maclist); return 1; } openssh-8.2p1/mac.h010064400017500001750000000037251362136622600124010ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.10 2016/07/08 03:44:42 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef SSHMAC_H #define SSHMAC_H #include struct sshmac { char *name; int enabled; u_int mac_len; u_char *key; u_int key_len; int type; int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ struct ssh_hmac_ctx *hmac_ctx; struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx; }; int mac_valid(const char *); char *mac_alg_list(char); int mac_setup(struct sshmac *, char *); int mac_init(struct sshmac *); int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int, u_char *, size_t); int mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t); void mac_clear(struct sshmac *); #endif /* SSHMAC_H */ openssh-8.2p1/match.c010064400017500001750000000230201362136622600127160ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.41 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "misc.h" /* * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ? * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match. */ int match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern) { for (;;) { /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */ if (!*pattern) return !*s; if (*pattern == '*') { /* Skip the asterisk. */ pattern++; /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */ if (!*pattern) return 1; /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') { /* * Look instances of the next character in * pattern, and try to match starting from * those. */ for (; *s; s++) if (*s == *pattern && match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1)) return 1; /* Failed. */ return 0; } /* * Move ahead one character at a time and try to * match at each position. */ for (; *s; s++) if (match_pattern(s, pattern)) return 1; /* Failed. */ return 0; } /* * There must be at least one more character in the string. * If we are at the end, fail. */ if (!*s) return 0; /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s) return 0; /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */ s++; pattern++; } /* NOTREACHED */ } /* * Tries to match the string against the * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all. */ int match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower) { char sub[1024]; int negated; int got_positive; u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern); got_positive = 0; for (i = 0; i < len;) { /* Check if the subpattern is negated. */ if (pattern[i] == '!') { negated = 1; i++; } else negated = 0; /* * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the * subpattern to lowercase. */ for (subi = 0; i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ','; subi++, i++) sub[subi] = dolower && isupper((u_char)pattern[i]) ? tolower((u_char)pattern[i]) : pattern[i]; /* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */ if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1) return 0; /* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */ if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',') i++; /* Null-terminate the subpattern. */ sub[subi] = '\0'; /* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */ if (match_pattern(string, sub)) { if (negated) return -1; /* Negative */ else got_positive = 1; /* Positive */ } } /* * Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here. */ return got_positive; } /* Match a list representing users or groups. */ int match_usergroup_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern) { #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN /* Windows usernames may be Unicode and are not case sensitive */ return cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(string, pattern); #else /* Case sensitive match */ return match_pattern_list(string, pattern, 0); #endif } /* * Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all. */ int match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern) { char *hostcopy = xstrdup(host); int r; lowercase(hostcopy); r = match_pattern_list(hostcopy, pattern, 1); free(hostcopy); return r; } /* * returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip * or if we get no match at all. returns -1 on error, or 1 on * successful match. */ int match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr, const char *patterns) { int mhost, mip; if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2) return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */ else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1) return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */ /* negative hostname match */ if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1) return 0; /* no match at all */ if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern. * If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/ * Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match. */ int match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr, const char *pattern) { char *p, *pat; int ret; /* test mode */ if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) { if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL && match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0) return -1; return 0; } if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) == NULL) return match_pattern(user, pattern); pat = xstrdup(pattern); p = strchr(pat, '@'); *p++ = '\0'; if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1) ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p); free(pat); return ret; } /* * Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list, * caller must free the returned string. */ #define MAX_PROP 40 #define SEP "," char * match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next) { char *sproposals[MAX_PROP]; char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp; int i, j, nproposals; c = cp = xstrdup(client); s = sp = xstrdup(server); for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) { if (i < MAX_PROP) sproposals[i] = p; else break; } nproposals = i; for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) { for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) { if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) { ret = xstrdup(p); if (next != NULL) *next = (cp == NULL) ? strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c); free(c); free(s); return ret; } } } if (next != NULL) *next = strlen(c); free(c); free(s); return NULL; } /* * Filter proposal using pattern-list filter. * "blacklist" determines sense of filter: * non-zero indicates that items matching filter should be excluded. * zero indicates that only items matching filter should be included. * returns NULL on allocation error, otherwise caller must free result. */ static char * filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter, int blacklist) { size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1; char *fix_prop = malloc(len); char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal); char *cp, *tmp; int r; if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) { free(orig_prop); free(fix_prop); return NULL; } tmp = orig_prop; *fix_prop = '\0'; while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) { r = match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0); if ((blacklist && r != 1) || (!blacklist && r == 1)) { if (*fix_prop != '\0') strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len); strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len); } } free(orig_prop); return fix_prop; } /* * Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching * the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string. */ char * match_filter_blacklist(const char *proposal, const char *filter) { return filter_list(proposal, filter, 1); } /* * Filters a comma-separated list of strings, including only entries matching * the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string. */ char * match_filter_whitelist(const char *proposal, const char *filter) { return filter_list(proposal, filter, 0); } openssh-8.2p1/match.h010064400017500001750000000023501362136622600127260ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.19 2019/03/06 22:14:23 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef MATCH_H #define MATCH_H int match_pattern(const char *, const char *); int match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, int); int match_usergroup_pattern_list(const char *, const char *); int match_hostname(const char *, const char *); int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *); int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *); char *match_filter_blacklist(const char *, const char *); char *match_filter_whitelist(const char *, const char *); /* addrmatch.c */ int addr_match_list(const char *, const char *); int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *); #endif openssh-8.2p1/md5crypt.c010064400017500001750000000077561362136622600134130ustar00djmdjm/* * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42): * wrote this file. As long as you retain this * notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some * day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in * return. Poul-Henning Kamp * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) #include #include #include /* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */ static unsigned char itoa64[] = "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; static char *magic = "$1$"; static char * to64(unsigned long v, int n) { static char buf[5]; char *s = buf; if (n > 4) return (NULL); memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); while (--n >= 0) { *s++ = itoa64[v&0x3f]; v >>= 6; } return (buf); } int is_md5_salt(const char *salt) { return (strncmp(salt, magic, strlen(magic)) == 0); } char * md5_crypt(const char *pw, const char *salt) { static char passwd[120], salt_copy[9]; static const char *sp, *ep; unsigned char final[16]; int sl, pl, i, j; MD5_CTX ctx, ctx1; unsigned long l; /* Refine the Salt first */ sp = salt; /* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */ if(strncmp(sp, magic, strlen(magic)) == 0) sp += strlen(magic); /* It stops at the first '$', max 8 chars */ for (ep = sp; *ep != '$'; ep++) { if (*ep == '\0' || ep >= (sp + 8)) return (NULL); } /* get the length of the true salt */ sl = ep - sp; /* Stash the salt */ memcpy(salt_copy, sp, sl); salt_copy[sl] = '\0'; MD5_Init(&ctx); /* The password first, since that is what is most unknown */ MD5_Update(&ctx, pw, strlen(pw)); /* Then our magic string */ MD5_Update(&ctx, magic, strlen(magic)); /* Then the raw salt */ MD5_Update(&ctx, sp, sl); /* Then just as many characters of the MD5(pw, salt, pw) */ MD5_Init(&ctx1); MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw)); MD5_Update(&ctx1, sp, sl); MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw)); MD5_Final(final, &ctx1); for(pl = strlen(pw); pl > 0; pl -= 16) MD5_Update(&ctx, final, pl > 16 ? 16 : pl); /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */ memset(final, '\0', sizeof final); /* Then something really weird... */ for (j = 0, i = strlen(pw); i != 0; i >>= 1) if (i & 1) MD5_Update(&ctx, final + j, 1); else MD5_Update(&ctx, pw + j, 1); /* Now make the output string */ snprintf(passwd, sizeof(passwd), "%s%s$", magic, salt_copy); MD5_Final(final, &ctx); /* * and now, just to make sure things don't run too fast * On a 60 Mhz Pentium this takes 34 msec, so you would * need 30 seconds to build a 1000 entry dictionary... */ for(i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { MD5_Init(&ctx1); if (i & 1) MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw)); else MD5_Update(&ctx1, final, 16); if (i % 3) MD5_Update(&ctx1, sp, sl); if (i % 7) MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw)); if (i & 1) MD5_Update(&ctx1, final, 16); else MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw)); MD5_Final(final, &ctx1); } l = (final[ 0]<<16) | (final[ 6]<<8) | final[12]; strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd)); l = (final[ 1]<<16) | (final[ 7]<<8) | final[13]; strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd)); l = (final[ 2]<<16) | (final[ 8]<<8) | final[14]; strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd)); l = (final[ 3]<<16) | (final[ 9]<<8) | final[15]; strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd)); l = (final[ 4]<<16) | (final[10]<<8) | final[ 5]; strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd)); l = final[11] ; strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 2), sizeof(passwd)); /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */ memset(final, 0, sizeof(final)); memset(salt_copy, 0, sizeof(salt_copy)); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); memset(&ctx1, 0, sizeof(ctx1)); (void)to64(0, 4); return (passwd); } #endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */ openssh-8.2p1/md5crypt.h010064400017500001750000000013501362136622600134000ustar00djmdjm/* * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42): * wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #ifndef _MD5CRYPT_H #define _MD5CRYPT_H #include "config.h" #if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) int is_md5_salt(const char *); char *md5_crypt(const char *, const char *); #endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */ #endif /* MD5CRYPT_H */ openssh-8.2p1/mdoc2man.awk010064400017500001750000000206101362136622600136640ustar00djmdjm#!/usr/bin/awk # # Version history: # v4+ Adapted for OpenSSH Portable (see cvs Id and history) # v3, I put the program under a proper license # Dan Nelson added .An, .Aq and fixed a typo # v2, fixed to work on GNU awk --posix and MacOS X # v1, first attempt, didn't work on MacOS X # # Copyright (c) 2003 Peter Stuge # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any # purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above # copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES # WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR # ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES # WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN # ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. BEGIN { optlist=0 oldoptlist=0 nospace=0 synopsis=0 reference=0 block=0 ext=0 extopt=0 literal=0 prenl=0 breakw=0 line="" } function wtail() { retval="" while(w0;i--) { add(refauthors[i]) if(i>1) add(", ") } if(nrefauthors>1) add(" and ") if(nrefauthors>0) add(refauthors[0] ", ") add("\\fI" reftitle "\\fP") if(length(refissue)) add(", " refissue) if(length(refreport)) { add(", " refreport) } if(length(refdate)) add(", " refdate) if(length(refopt)) add(", " refopt) add(".") reference=0 } else if(reference) { if(match(words[w],"^%A$")) { refauthors[nrefauthors++]=wtail() } if(match(words[w],"^%T$")) { reftitle=wtail() sub("^\"","",reftitle) sub("\"$","",reftitle) } if(match(words[w],"^%N$")) { refissue=wtail() } if(match(words[w],"^%D$")) { refdate=wtail() } if(match(words[w],"^%O$")) { refopt=wtail() } if(match(words[w],"^%R$")) { refreport=wtail() } } else if(match(words[w],"^Nm$")) { if(synopsis) { add(".br") prenl++ } n=words[++w] if(!length(name)) name=n if(!length(n)) n=name add("\\fB" n "\\fP") if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]")) nospace=1 } else if(match(words[w],"^Nd$")) { add("\\- " wtail()) } else if(match(words[w],"^Fl$")) { add("\\fB\\-" words[++w] "\\fP") if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]")) nospace=1 } else if(match(words[w],"^Ar$")) { add("\\fI") if(w==nwords) add("file ...\\fP") else { add(words[++w] "\\fP") while(match(words[w+1],"^\\|$")) add(OFS words[++w] " \\fI" words[++w] "\\fP") } if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]")) nospace=1 } else if(match(words[w],"^Cm$")) { add("\\fB" words[++w] "\\fP") while(w") if(option) add("]") if(ext&&!extopt&&!match(line," $")) add(OFS) if(!ext&&!extopt&&length(line)) { print line prenl=0 line="" } } openssh-8.2p1/misc.c010064400017500001750000001410061362136622600125620ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.146 2020/01/28 01:49:36 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #include #endif #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "platform.h" /* remove newline at end of string */ char * chop(char *s) { char *t = s; while (*t) { if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') { *t = '\0'; return s; } t++; } return s; } /* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */ int set_nonblock(int fd) { int val; val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL); if (val == -1) { error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (val & O_NONBLOCK) { debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd); return (0); } debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd); val |= O_NONBLOCK; if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } int unset_nonblock(int fd) { int val; val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL); if (val == -1) { error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) { debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd); return (0); } debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd); val &= ~O_NONBLOCK; if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } const char * ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr) { if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0) return strerror(errno); return gai_strerror(gaierr); } /* disable nagle on socket */ void set_nodelay(int fd) { int opt; socklen_t optlen; optlen = sizeof opt; if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) { debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return; } if (opt == 1) { debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd); return; } opt = 1; debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd); if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1) error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } /* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT */ int set_reuseaddr(int fd) { int on = 1; if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) { error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return 0; } /* Get/set routing domain */ char * get_rdomain(int fd) { #if defined(HAVE_SYS_GET_RDOMAIN) return sys_get_rdomain(fd); #elif defined(__OpenBSD__) int rtable; char *ret; socklen_t len = sizeof(rtable); if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtable, &len) == -1) { error("Failed to get routing domain for fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } xasprintf(&ret, "%d", rtable); return ret; #else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ return NULL; #endif } int set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name) { #if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_RDOMAIN) return sys_set_rdomain(fd, name); #elif defined(__OpenBSD__) int rtable; const char *errstr; if (name == NULL) return 0; /* default table */ rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) { /* Shouldn't happen */ error("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr); return -1; } if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtable, sizeof(rtable)) == -1) { error("Failed to set routing domain %d on fd %d: %s", rtable, fd, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return 0; #else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ error("Setting routing domain is not supported on this platform"); return -1; #endif } /* * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for events on fd. Updates * *timeoutp with time remaining. * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno). */ static int waitfd(int fd, int *timeoutp, short events) { struct pollfd pfd; struct timeval t_start; int oerrno, r; monotime_tv(&t_start); pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = events; for (; *timeoutp >= 0;) { r = poll(&pfd, 1, *timeoutp); oerrno = errno; ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp); errno = oerrno; if (r > 0) return 0; else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN) return -1; else if (r == 0) break; } /* timeout */ errno = ETIMEDOUT; return -1; } /* * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates * *timeoutp with time remaining. * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno). */ int waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp) { return waitfd(fd, timeoutp, POLLIN); } /* * Attempt a non-blocking connect(2) to the specified address, waiting up to * *timeoutp milliseconds for the connection to complete. If the timeout is * <=0, then wait indefinitely. * * Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure. */ int timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp) { int optval = 0; socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval); /* No timeout: just do a blocking connect() */ if (timeoutp == NULL || *timeoutp <= 0) return connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); set_nonblock(sockfd); if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) { /* Succeeded already? */ unset_nonblock(sockfd); return 0; } else if (errno != EINPROGRESS) return -1; if (waitfd(sockfd, timeoutp, POLLIN | POLLOUT) == -1) return -1; /* Completed or failed */ if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) { debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (optval != 0) { errno = optval; return -1; } unset_nonblock(sockfd); return 0; } /* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" #define QUOTE "\"" /* return next token in configuration line */ static char * strdelim_internal(char **s, int split_equals) { char *old; int wspace = 0; if (*s == NULL) return NULL; old = *s; *s = strpbrk(*s, split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE); if (*s == NULL) return (old); if (*s[0] == '\"') { memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */ /* Find matching quote */ if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) { return (NULL); /* no matching quote */ } else { *s[0] = '\0'; *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; return (old); } } /* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */ if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=') wspace = 1; *s[0] = '\0'; /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=' && !wspace) *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; return (old); } /* * Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace or a * single '=' character. */ char * strdelim(char **s) { return strdelim_internal(s, 1); } /* * Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace only. */ char * strdelimw(char **s) { return strdelim_internal(s, 0); } struct passwd * pwcopy(struct passwd *pw) { struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy)); copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos); #endif copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); #endif copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); return copy; } /* * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number. * Port must be >=0 and <=65535. * Return -1 if invalid. */ int a2port(const char *s) { struct servent *se; long long port; const char *errstr; port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr); if (errstr == NULL) return (int)port; if ((se = getservbyname(s, "tcp")) != NULL) return ntohs(se->s_port); return -1; } int a2tun(const char *s, int *remote) { const char *errstr = NULL; char *sp, *ep; int tun; if (remote != NULL) { *remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; sp = xstrdup(s); if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) { free(sp); return (a2tun(s, NULL)); } ep[0] = '\0'; ep++; *remote = a2tun(ep, NULL); tun = a2tun(sp, NULL); free(sp); return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun); } if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0) return (SSH_TUNID_ANY); tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return (SSH_TUNID_ERR); return (tun); } #define SECONDS 1 #define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60) #define HOURS (MINUTES * 60) #define DAYS (HOURS * 24) #define WEEKS (DAYS * 7) /* * Convert a time string into seconds; format is * a sequence of: * time[qualifier] * * Valid time qualifiers are: * seconds * s|S seconds * m|M minutes * h|H hours * d|D days * w|W weeks * * Examples: * 90m 90 minutes * 1h30m 90 minutes * 2d 2 days * 1w 1 week * * Return -1 if time string is invalid. */ long convtime(const char *s) { long total, secs, multiplier = 1; const char *p; char *endp; errno = 0; total = 0; p = s; if (p == NULL || *p == '\0') return -1; while (*p) { secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10); if (p == endp || (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) || secs < 0) return -1; switch (*endp++) { case '\0': endp--; break; case 's': case 'S': break; case 'm': case 'M': multiplier = MINUTES; break; case 'h': case 'H': multiplier = HOURS; break; case 'd': case 'D': multiplier = DAYS; break; case 'w': case 'W': multiplier = WEEKS; break; default: return -1; } if (secs >= LONG_MAX / multiplier) return -1; secs *= multiplier; if (total >= LONG_MAX - secs) return -1; total += secs; if (total < 0) return -1; p = endp; } return total; } /* * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string. * Caller must free returned string. */ char * put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port) { char *hoststr; if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) return(xstrdup(host)); if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) == -1) fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno)); debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr); return hoststr; } /* * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports. * Argument may be modified (for termination). * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds. * *cp is set to the start of the next field, if one was found. * The delimiter char, if present, is stored in delim. * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL. */ char * hpdelim2(char **cp, char *delim) { char *s, *old; if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL) return NULL; old = s = *cp; if (*s == '[') { if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL) return NULL; else s++; } else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL) s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */ switch (*s) { case '\0': *cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/ break; case ':': case '/': if (delim != NULL) *delim = *s; *s = '\0'; /* terminate */ *cp = s + 1; break; default: return NULL; } return old; } char * hpdelim(char **cp) { return hpdelim2(cp, NULL); } char * cleanhostname(char *host) { if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') { host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0'; return (host + 1); } else return host; } char * colon(char *cp) { int flag = 0; if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ return NULL; if (*cp == '[') flag = 1; for (; *cp; ++cp) { if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[') flag = 1; if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag) return (cp+1); if (*cp == ':' && !flag) return (cp); if (*cp == '/') return NULL; } return NULL; } /* * Parse a [user@]host:[path] string. * Caller must free returned user, host and path. * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking). * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL. * If host was not specified then *hostp will be set to NULL. * If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to ".". * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int parse_user_host_path(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, char **pathp) { char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL; char *sdup, *tmp; int ret = -1; if (userp != NULL) *userp = NULL; if (hostp != NULL) *hostp = NULL; if (pathp != NULL) *pathp = NULL; sdup = xstrdup(s); /* Check for remote syntax: [user@]host:[path] */ if ((tmp = colon(sdup)) == NULL) goto out; /* Extract optional path */ *tmp++ = '\0'; if (*tmp == '\0') tmp = "."; path = xstrdup(tmp); /* Extract optional user and mandatory host */ tmp = strrchr(sdup, '@'); if (tmp != NULL) { *tmp++ = '\0'; host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(tmp)); if (*sdup != '\0') user = xstrdup(sdup); } else { host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(sdup)); user = NULL; } /* Success */ if (userp != NULL) { *userp = user; user = NULL; } if (hostp != NULL) { *hostp = host; host = NULL; } if (pathp != NULL) { *pathp = path; path = NULL; } ret = 0; out: free(sdup); free(user); free(host); free(path); return ret; } /* * Parse a [user@]host[:port] string. * Caller must free returned user and host. * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking). * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL. * If port was not specified then *portp will be -1. * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int parse_user_host_port(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp) { char *sdup, *cp, *tmp; char *user = NULL, *host = NULL; int port = -1, ret = -1; if (userp != NULL) *userp = NULL; if (hostp != NULL) *hostp = NULL; if (portp != NULL) *portp = -1; if ((sdup = tmp = strdup(s)) == NULL) return -1; /* Extract optional username */ if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) { *cp = '\0'; if (*tmp == '\0') goto out; if ((user = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) goto out; tmp = cp + 1; } /* Extract mandatory hostname */ if ((cp = hpdelim(&tmp)) == NULL || *cp == '\0') goto out; host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp)); /* Convert and verify optional port */ if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') { if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0) goto out; } /* Success */ if (userp != NULL) { *userp = user; user = NULL; } if (hostp != NULL) { *hostp = host; host = NULL; } if (portp != NULL) *portp = port; ret = 0; out: free(sdup); free(user); free(host); return ret; } /* * Converts a two-byte hex string to decimal. * Returns the decimal value or -1 for invalid input. */ static int hexchar(const char *s) { unsigned char result[2]; int i; for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if (s[i] >= '0' && s[i] <= '9') result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - '0'); else if (s[i] >= 'a' && s[i] <= 'f') result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'a') + 10; else if (s[i] >= 'A' && s[i] <= 'F') result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'A') + 10; else return -1; } return (result[0] << 4) | result[1]; } /* * Decode an url-encoded string. * Returns a newly allocated string on success or NULL on failure. */ static char * urldecode(const char *src) { char *ret, *dst; int ch; ret = xmalloc(strlen(src) + 1); for (dst = ret; *src != '\0'; src++) { switch (*src) { case '+': *dst++ = ' '; break; case '%': if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) || !isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) || (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) { free(ret); return NULL; } *dst++ = ch; src += 2; break; default: *dst++ = *src; break; } } *dst = '\0'; return ret; } /* * Parse an (scp|ssh|sftp)://[user@]host[:port][/path] URI. * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04 * Either user or path may be url-encoded (but not host or port). * Caller must free returned user, host and path. * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking) * but the scheme must always be specified. * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL. * If port was not specified then *portp will be -1. * If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to NULL. * Returns 0 on success, 1 if non-uri/wrong scheme, -1 on error/invalid uri. */ int parse_uri(const char *scheme, const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp, char **pathp) { char *uridup, *cp, *tmp, ch; char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL; int port = -1, ret = -1; size_t len; len = strlen(scheme); if (strncmp(uri, scheme, len) != 0 || strncmp(uri + len, "://", 3) != 0) return 1; uri += len + 3; if (userp != NULL) *userp = NULL; if (hostp != NULL) *hostp = NULL; if (portp != NULL) *portp = -1; if (pathp != NULL) *pathp = NULL; uridup = tmp = xstrdup(uri); /* Extract optional ssh-info (username + connection params) */ if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) { char *delim; *cp = '\0'; /* Extract username and connection params */ if ((delim = strchr(tmp, ';')) != NULL) { /* Just ignore connection params for now */ *delim = '\0'; } if (*tmp == '\0') { /* Empty username */ goto out; } if ((user = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL) goto out; tmp = cp + 1; } /* Extract mandatory hostname */ if ((cp = hpdelim2(&tmp, &ch)) == NULL || *cp == '\0') goto out; host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp)); if (!valid_domain(host, 0, NULL)) goto out; if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') { if (ch == ':') { /* Convert and verify port. */ if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '/')) != NULL) *cp = '\0'; if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0) goto out; tmp = cp ? cp + 1 : NULL; } if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') { /* Extract optional path */ if ((path = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL) goto out; } } /* Success */ if (userp != NULL) { *userp = user; user = NULL; } if (hostp != NULL) { *hostp = host; host = NULL; } if (portp != NULL) *portp = port; if (pathp != NULL) { *pathp = path; path = NULL; } ret = 0; out: free(uridup); free(user); free(host); free(path); return ret; } /* function to assist building execv() arguments */ void addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; u_int nalloc; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (r == -1) fatal("addargs: argument too long"); nalloc = args->nalloc; if (args->list == NULL) { nalloc = 32; args->num = 0; } else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc) nalloc *= 2; args->list = xrecallocarray(args->list, args->nalloc, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); args->nalloc = nalloc; args->list[args->num++] = cp; args->list[args->num] = NULL; } void replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (r == -1) fatal("replacearg: argument too long"); if (which >= args->num) fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d", which, args->num); free(args->list[which]); args->list[which] = cp; } void freeargs(arglist *args) { u_int i; if (args->list != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++) free(args->list[i]); free(args->list); args->nalloc = args->num = 0; args->list = NULL; } } /* * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc. * Warning: this calls getpw*. */ char * tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid) { const char *path, *sep; char user[128], *ret; struct passwd *pw; u_int len, slash; if (*filename != '~') return (xstrdup(filename)); filename++; path = strchr(filename, '/'); if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */ slash = path - filename; if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long"); memcpy(user, filename, slash); user[slash] = '\0'; if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user); } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid); /* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */ len = strlen(pw->pw_dir); if (len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/') sep = "/"; else sep = ""; /* Skip leading '/' from specified path */ if (path != NULL) filename = path + 1; if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= PATH_MAX) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long"); return (ret); } /* * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory * allocated by xmalloc. */ char * percent_expand(const char *string, ...) { #define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16 u_int num_keys, i; struct { const char *key; const char *repl; } keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS]; struct sshbuf *buf; va_list ap; int r; char *ret; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Gather keys */ va_start(ap, string); for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) { keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *); if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL) break; keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *); if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL) fatal("%s: NULL replacement", __func__); } if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL) fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__); va_end(ap); /* Expand string */ for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) { if (*string != '%') { append: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, *string)) != 0) { fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } continue; } string++; /* %% case */ if (*string == '%') goto append; if (*string == '\0') fatal("%s: invalid format", __func__); for (i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) { if (strchr(keys[i].key, *string) != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, keys[i].repl, strlen(keys[i].repl))) != 0) { fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } break; } } if (i >= num_keys) fatal("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string); } if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); sshbuf_free(buf); return ret; #undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS } int tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname) { #if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN) return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode, ifname)); #elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD) struct ifreq ifr; char name[100]; int fd = -1, sock; const char *tunbase = "tun"; if (ifname != NULL) *ifname = NULL; if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) tunbase = "tap"; /* Open the tunnel device */ if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun); fd = open(name, O_RDWR); } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) { for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun); if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0) break; } } else { debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun); return -1; } if (fd == -1) { debug("%s: %s open: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno)); return -1; } debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd); /* Bring interface up if it is not already */ snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) goto failed; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) { debug("%s: get interface %s flags: %s", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno)); goto failed; } if (!(ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) { ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) { debug("%s: activate interface %s: %s", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno)); goto failed; } } if (ifname != NULL) *ifname = xstrdup(ifr.ifr_name); close(sock); return fd; failed: if (fd >= 0) close(fd); if (sock >= 0) close(sock); return -1; #else error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform"); return (-1); #endif } void sanitise_stdfd(void) { int nullfd, dupfd; if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } while (++dupfd <= STDERR_FILENO) { /* Only populate closed fds. */ if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL) == -1 && errno == EBADF) { if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } } } if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO) close(nullfd); } char * tohex(const void *vp, size_t l) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; char b[3], *r; size_t i, hl; if (l > 65536) return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536"); hl = l * 2 + 1; r = xcalloc(1, hl); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]); strlcat(r, b, hl); } return (r); } /* * Extend string *sp by the specified format. If *sp is not NULL (or empty), * then the separator 'sep' will be prepended before the formatted arguments. * Extended strings are heap allocated. */ void xextendf(char **sp, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *tmp1, *tmp2; va_start(ap, fmt); xvasprintf(&tmp1, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (*sp == NULL || **sp == '\0') { free(*sp); *sp = tmp1; return; } xasprintf(&tmp2, "%s%s%s", *sp, sep == NULL ? "" : sep, tmp1); free(tmp1); free(*sp); *sp = tmp2; } u_int64_t get_u64(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int64_t v; v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56; v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48; v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40; v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32; v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24; v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16; v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8; v |= (u_int64_t)p[7]; return (v); } u_int32_t get_u32(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int32_t v; v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24; v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16; v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8; v |= (u_int32_t)p[3]; return (v); } u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int32_t v; v = (u_int32_t)p[0]; v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8; v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16; v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24; return (v); } u_int16_t get_u16(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int16_t v; v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8; v |= (u_int16_t)p[1]; return (v); } void put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff; p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; } void put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms) { struct timeval diff, finish; monotime_tv(&finish); timersub(&finish, start, &diff); *ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000); } void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms) { if (ms < 0) ms = 0; tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000; tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000; } void monotime_ts(struct timespec *ts) { struct timeval tv; #if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && (defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || \ defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_REALTIME)) static int gettime_failed = 0; if (!gettime_failed) { # ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ts) == 0) return; # endif /* CLOCK_BOOTTIME */ # ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ts) == 0) return; # endif /* CLOCK_MONOTONIC */ # ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME /* Not monotonic, but we're almost out of options here. */ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ts) == 0) return; # endif /* CLOCK_REALTIME */ debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno)); gettime_failed = 1; } #endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (BOOTTIME || MONOTONIC || REALTIME) */ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); ts->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec; ts->tv_nsec = (long)tv.tv_usec * 1000; } void monotime_tv(struct timeval *tv) { struct timespec ts; monotime_ts(&ts); tv->tv_sec = ts.tv_sec; tv->tv_usec = ts.tv_nsec / 1000; } time_t monotime(void) { struct timespec ts; monotime_ts(&ts); return ts.tv_sec; } double monotime_double(void) { struct timespec ts; monotime_ts(&ts); return ts.tv_sec + ((double)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000000); } void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen) { bw->buflen = buflen; bw->rate = kbps; bw->thresh = buflen; bw->lamt = 0; timerclear(&bw->bwstart); timerclear(&bw->bwend); } /* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */ void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len) { u_int64_t waitlen; struct timespec ts, rm; bw->lamt += read_len; if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) { monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart); return; } if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh) return; monotime_tv(&bw->bwend); timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend); if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend)) return; bw->lamt *= 8; waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate; bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L; bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L; if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) { timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend); /* Adjust the wait time */ if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) { bw->thresh /= 2; if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4) bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4; } else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) { bw->thresh *= 2; if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8) bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8; } TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts); while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) break; ts = rm; } } bw->lamt = 0; monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart); } /* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */ void mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len) { const char *tmpdir; int r; if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) { r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len) return; } r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX"); if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len) fatal("%s: template string too short", __func__); } static const struct { const char *name; int value; } ipqos[] = { { "none", INT_MAX }, /* can't use 0 here; that's CS0 */ { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 }, { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 }, { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 }, { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 }, { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 }, { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 }, { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 }, { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 }, { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 }, { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 }, { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 }, { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 }, { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 }, { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 }, { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 }, { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 }, { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 }, { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 }, { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 }, { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 }, { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF }, { "le", IPTOS_DSCP_LE }, { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY }, { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT }, { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY }, { NULL, -1 } }; int parse_ipqos(const char *cp) { u_int i; char *ep; long val; if (cp == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0) return ipqos[i].value; } /* Try parsing as an integer */ val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255) return -1; return val; } const char * iptos2str(int iptos) { int i; static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"]; for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { if (ipqos[i].value == iptos) return ipqos[i].name; } snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos); return iptos_str; } void lowercase(char *s) { for (; *s; s++) *s = tolower((u_char)*s); } int unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; int saved_errno, sock; memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("%s: path \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", __func__, path); errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return -1; } sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock == -1) { saved_errno = errno; error("%s: socket: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } if (unlink_first == 1) { if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT) error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno)); } if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) { saved_errno = errno; error("%s: cannot bind to path %s: %s", __func__, path, strerror(errno)); close(sock); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } if (listen(sock, backlog) == -1) { saved_errno = errno; error("%s: cannot listen on path %s: %s", __func__, path, strerror(errno)); close(sock); unlink(path); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } return sock; } void sock_set_v6only(int s) { #if defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) int on = 1; debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s); if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno)); #endif } /* * Compares two strings that maybe be NULL. Returns non-zero if strings * are both NULL or are identical, returns zero otherwise. */ static int strcmp_maybe_null(const char *a, const char *b) { if ((a == NULL && b != NULL) || (a != NULL && b == NULL)) return 0; if (a != NULL && strcmp(a, b) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Compare two forwards, returning non-zero if they are identical or * zero otherwise. */ int forward_equals(const struct Forward *a, const struct Forward *b) { if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_host, b->listen_host) == 0) return 0; if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port) return 0; if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_path, b->listen_path) == 0) return 0; if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_host, b->connect_host) == 0) return 0; if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port) return 0; if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_path, b->connect_path) == 0) return 0; /* allocated_port and handle are not checked */ return 1; } /* returns 1 if process is already daemonized, 0 otherwise */ int daemonized(void) { int fd; if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) { close(fd); return 0; /* have controlling terminal */ } if (getppid() != 1) return 0; /* parent is not init */ if (getsid(0) != getpid()) return 0; /* not session leader */ debug3("already daemonized"); return 1; } /* * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector * and its members. */ int argv_split(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; int argc = 0, quote, i, j; char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv)); *argvp = NULL; *argcp = 0; for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { /* Skip leading whitespace */ if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t') continue; /* Start of a token */ quote = 0; if (s[i] == '\\' && (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\')) i++; else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"') quote = s[i++]; argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv)); arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1); argv[argc] = NULL; /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */ for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (s[i] == '\\') { if (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\') { i++; /* Skip '\' */ arg[j++] = s[i]; } else { /* Unrecognised escape */ arg[j++] = s[i]; } } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')) break; /* done */ else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote) break; /* done */ else arg[j++] = s[i]; } if (s[i] == '\0') { if (quote != 0) { /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } break; } } /* Success */ *argcp = argc; *argvp = argv; argc = 0; argv = NULL; r = 0; out: if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) free(argv[i]); free(argv); } return r; } /* * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as * necessary. Caller must free returned string. */ char * argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv) { int i, j, ws, r; char c, *ret; struct sshbuf *buf, *arg; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { ws = 0; sshbuf_reset(arg); for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) { r = 0; c = argv[i][j]; switch (c) { case ' ': case '\t': ws = 1; r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); break; case '\\': case '\'': case '"': if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0) break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); break; } if (r != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) || (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 || (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0)) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL) fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__); memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0'; sshbuf_free(buf); sshbuf_free(arg); return ret; } /* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */ int exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd, int quiet) { int status; while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) { error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); return -1; } } if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status)); return -1; } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { do_log2(quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, "%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status)); return -1; } return 0; } /* * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. * * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? * * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an * error buffer plus max size as arguments. * * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ int safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) { char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX]; char *cp; int comparehome = 0; struct stat st; if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) comparehome = 1; if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); return -1; } if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", buf); return -1; } /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ for (;;) { if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); return -1; } strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); if (stat(buf, &st) == -1 || (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); return -1; } /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) break; /* * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too */ if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) break; } return 0; } /* * Version of safe_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to * avoid races. * * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ int safe_path_fd(int fd, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, char *err, size_t errlen) { struct stat st; /* check the open file to avoid races */ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", file, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return safe_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); } /* * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable * already exists, its value is overridden. */ void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, const char *value) { char **env; u_int envsize; u_int i, namelen; if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) { error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name); return; } /* * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null * entry before continuing. */ if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) { *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); *envp[0] = NULL; *envsizep = 1; } /* * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. */ env = *envp; namelen = strlen(name); for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=') break; if (env[i]) { /* Reuse the slot. */ free(env[i]); } else { /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */ envsize = *envsizep; if (i >= envsize - 1) { if (envsize >= 1000) fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars"); envsize += 50; env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); *envsizep = envsize; } /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */ env[i + 1] = NULL; } /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */ /* XXX xasprintf */ env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1); snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value); } /* * Check and optionally lowercase a domain name, also removes trailing '.' * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure, storing an error message in errstr. */ int valid_domain(char *name, int makelower, const char **errstr) { size_t i, l = strlen(name); u_char c, last = '\0'; static char errbuf[256]; if (l == 0) { strlcpy(errbuf, "empty domain name", sizeof(errbuf)); goto bad; } if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0])) { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name \"%.100s\" " "starts with invalid character", name); goto bad; } for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { c = tolower((u_char)name[i]); if (makelower) name[i] = (char)c; if (last == '.' && c == '.') { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name " "\"%.100s\" contains consecutive separators", name); goto bad; } if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) && c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */ { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name " "\"%.100s\" contains invalid characters", name); goto bad; } last = c; } if (name[l - 1] == '.') name[l - 1] = '\0'; if (errstr != NULL) *errstr = NULL; return 1; bad: if (errstr != NULL) *errstr = errbuf; return 0; } /* * Verify that a environment variable name (not including initial '$') is * valid; consisting of one or more alphanumeric or underscore characters only. * Returns 1 on valid, 0 otherwise. */ int valid_env_name(const char *name) { const char *cp; if (name[0] == '\0') return 0; for (cp = name; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (!isalnum((u_char)*cp) && *cp != '_') return 0; } return 1; } const char * atoi_err(const char *nptr, int *val) { const char *errstr = NULL; long long num; if (nptr == NULL || *nptr == '\0') return "missing"; num = strtonum(nptr, 0, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr == NULL) *val = (int)num; return errstr; } int parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp) { struct tm tm; time_t tt; char buf[32], *fmt; *tp = 0; /* * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way. */ switch (strlen(s)) { case 8: /* YYYYMMDD */ fmt = "%Y-%m-%d"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6); break; case 12: /* YYYYMMDDHHMM */ fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10); break; case 14: /* YYYYMMDDHHMMSS */ fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12); break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm)); if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* success */ *tp = (uint64_t)tt; return 0; } void format_absolute_time(uint64_t t, char *buf, size_t len) { time_t tt = t > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : t; /* XXX revisit in 2038 :P */ struct tm tm; localtime_r(&tt, &tm); strftime(buf, len, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", &tm); } /* check if path is absolute */ int path_absolute(const char *path) { return (*path == '/') ? 1 : 0; } void skip_space(char **cpp) { char *cp; for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; *cpp = cp; } /* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */ /* * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match * 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0 * if negated option matches. * If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to * point to the first character after the option. */ int opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp) { size_t opt_len = strlen(opt); const char *opts = *optsp; int negate = 0; if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) { opts += 3; negate = 1; } if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) { *optsp = opts + opt_len; return negate ? 0 : 1; } return -1; } char * opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp) { const char *s = *sp; char *ret; size_t i; *errstrp = NULL; if (*s != '"') { *errstrp = "missing start quote"; return NULL; } s++; if ((ret = malloc(strlen((s)) + 1)) == NULL) { *errstrp = "memory allocation failed"; return NULL; } for (i = 0; *s != '\0' && *s != '"';) { if (s[0] == '\\' && s[1] == '"') s++; ret[i++] = *s++; } if (*s == '\0') { *errstrp = "missing end quote"; free(ret); return NULL; } ret[i] = '\0'; s++; *sp = s; return ret; } int opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term) { if (strncasecmp((*opts), term, strlen(term)) == 0 && (*opts)[strlen(term)] == '=') { *opts += strlen(term) + 1; return 1; } return 0; } sshsig_t ssh_signal(int signum, sshsig_t handler) { struct sigaction sa, osa; /* mask all other signals while in handler */ bzero(&sa, sizeof(sa)); sa.sa_handler = handler; sigfillset(&sa.sa_mask); if (signum != SIGALRM) sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; if (sigaction(signum, &sa, &osa) == -1) { debug3("sigaction(%s): %s", strsignal(signum), strerror(errno)); return SIG_ERR; } return osa.sa_handler; } openssh-8.2p1/misc.h010064400017500001750000000152141362136622600125700ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.84 2020/01/24 23:54:40 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef _MISC_H #define _MISC_H #include #include #include /* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */ struct Forward { char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */ int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */ char *listen_path; /* Path to bind domain socket. */ char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */ int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */ char *connect_path; /* Path to connect domain socket. */ int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */ int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */ }; int forward_equals(const struct Forward *, const struct Forward *); int daemonized(void); /* Common server and client forwarding options. */ struct ForwardOptions { int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */ mode_t streamlocal_bind_mask; /* umask for streamlocal binds */ int streamlocal_bind_unlink; /* unlink socket before bind */ }; /* misc.c */ char *chop(char *); void skip_space(char **); char *strdelim(char **); char *strdelimw(char **); int set_nonblock(int); int unset_nonblock(int); void set_nodelay(int); int set_reuseaddr(int); char *get_rdomain(int); int set_rdomain(int, const char *); int waitrfd(int, int *); int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t, int *); int a2port(const char *); int a2tun(const char *, int *); char *put_host_port(const char *, u_short); char *hpdelim2(char **, char *); char *hpdelim(char **); char *cleanhostname(char *); char *colon(char *); int parse_user_host_path(const char *, char **, char **, char **); int parse_user_host_port(const char *, char **, char **, int *); int parse_uri(const char *, const char *, char **, char **, int *, char **); long convtime(const char *); char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t); char *percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__)); char *tohex(const void *, size_t); void xextendf(char **s, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3))); void sanitise_stdfd(void); void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *); void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int); void monotime_ts(struct timespec *); void monotime_tv(struct timeval *); time_t monotime(void); double monotime_double(void); void lowercase(char *s); int unix_listener(const char *, int, int); int valid_domain(char *, int, const char **); int valid_env_name(const char *); const char *atoi_err(const char *, int *); int parse_absolute_time(const char *, uint64_t *); void format_absolute_time(uint64_t, char *, size_t); int path_absolute(const char *); void sock_set_v6only(int); struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *); const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int); typedef struct arglist arglist; struct arglist { char **list; u_int num; u_int nalloc; }; void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); void replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4))); void freeargs(arglist *); int tun_open(int, int, char **); /* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */ #define SSH_TUNMODE_NO 0x00 #define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 0x01 #define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 0x02 #define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT #define SSH_TUNMODE_YES (SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) #define SSH_TUNID_ANY 0x7fffffff #define SSH_TUNID_ERR (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1) #define SSH_TUNID_MAX (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2) /* Fake port to indicate that host field is really a path. */ #define PORT_STREAMLOCAL -2 /* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */ u_int64_t get_u64(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8))); u_int32_t get_u32(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4))); u_int16_t get_u16(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2))); void put_u64(void *, u_int64_t) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8))); void put_u32(void *, u_int32_t) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4))); void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2))); /* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */ u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); void put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); struct bwlimit { size_t buflen; u_int64_t rate; /* desired rate in kbit/s */ u_int64_t thresh; /* threshold after which we'll check timers */ u_int64_t lamt; /* amount written in last timer interval */ struct timeval bwstart, bwend; }; void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *, u_int64_t, size_t); void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *, size_t); int parse_ipqos(const char *); const char *iptos2str(int); void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t); void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, const char *value); int argv_split(const char *, int *, char ***); char *argv_assemble(int, char **argv); int exited_cleanly(pid_t, const char *, const char *, int); struct stat; int safe_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t, char *, size_t); int safe_path_fd(int, const char *, struct passwd *, char *err, size_t errlen); /* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */ int opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp); char *opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp); int opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term); /* readpass.c */ #define RP_ECHO 0x0001 #define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002 #define RP_ALLOW_EOF 0x0004 #define RP_USE_ASKPASS 0x0008 struct notifier_ctx; char *read_passphrase(const char *, int); int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); struct notifier_ctx *notify_start(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); void notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *); #define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) #define MAXIMUM(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) #define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y)) typedef void (*sshsig_t)(int); sshsig_t ssh_signal(int, sshsig_t); #endif /* _MISC_H */ openssh-8.2p1/mkinstalldirs010075500017500001750000000011711362136622600142670ustar00djmdjm#! /bin/sh # mkinstalldirs --- make directory hierarchy # Author: Noah Friedman # Created: 1993-05-16 # Public domain errstatus=0 for file do set fnord `echo ":$file" | sed -ne 's/^:\//#/;s/^://;s/\// /g;s/^#/\//;p'` shift pathcomp= for d do pathcomp="$pathcomp$d" case "$pathcomp" in -* ) pathcomp=./$pathcomp ;; esac if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then echo "mkdir $pathcomp" mkdir "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$? if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then errstatus=$lasterr fi fi pathcomp="$pathcomp/" done done exit $errstatus # mkinstalldirs ends here openssh-8.2p1/moduli010064400017500001750000020253321362136622600127040ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.25 2019/10/22 07:06:35 dtucker Exp $ # Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus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openssh-8.2p1/msg.c010064400017500001750000000054761362136622600124270ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.18 2020/01/22 04:49:16 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "msg.h" #include "misc.h" int ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, struct sshbuf *m) { u_char buf[5]; u_int mlen = sshbuf_len(m); debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, (unsigned int)type & 0xff); put_u32(buf, mlen + 1); buf[4] = type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) { error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } int ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m) { u_char buf[4], *p; u_int msg_len; int r; debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering"); if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { if (errno != EPIPE) error("%s: read header: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } msg_len = get_u32(buf); if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) { error("%s: read: bad msg_len %u", __func__, msg_len); return (-1); } sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } if (atomicio(read, fd, p, msg_len) != msg_len) { error("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } openssh-8.2p1/moduli.5010064400017500001750000000071451362136622600130470ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: moduli.5,v 1.17 2012/09/26 17:34:38 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller .\" .\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any .\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above .\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. .\" .\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES .\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF .\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR .\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES .\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN .\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF .\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. .Dd $Mdocdate: September 26 2012 $ .Dt MODULI 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm moduli .Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli .Sh DESCRIPTION The .Pa /etc/moduli file contains prime numbers and generators for use by .Xr sshd 8 in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method. .Pp New moduli may be generated with .Xr ssh-keygen 1 using a two-step process. An initial .Em candidate generation pass, using .Ic ssh-keygen -G , calculates numbers that are likely to be useful. A second .Em primality testing pass, using .Ic ssh-keygen -T , provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers are prime and are safe for use in Diffie-Hellman operations by .Xr sshd 8 . This .Nm format is used as the output from each pass. .Pp The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus, containing seven space-separated fields. These fields are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Description -offset indent .It timestamp The time that the modulus was last processed as YYYYMMDDHHMMSS. .It type Decimal number specifying the internal structure of the prime modulus. Supported types are: .Pp .Bl -tag -width 0x00 -compact .It 0 Unknown, not tested. .It 2 "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime. .It 4 Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime. .El .Pp Moduli candidates initially produced by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 are Sophie Germain primes (type 4). Further primality testing with .Xr ssh-keygen 1 produces safe prime moduli (type 2) that are ready for use in .Xr sshd 8 . Other types are not used by OpenSSH. .It tests Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests that the number has been subjected to represented as a bitmask of the following values: .Pp .Bl -tag -width 0x00 -compact .It 0x00 Not tested. .It 0x01 Composite number \(en not prime. .It 0x02 Sieve of Eratosthenes. .It 0x04 Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests. .El .Pp The .Xr ssh-keygen 1 moduli candidate generation uses the Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02). Subsequent .Xr ssh-keygen 1 primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests (flag 0x04). .It trials Decimal number indicating the number of primality trials that have been performed on the modulus. .It size Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in bits. .It generator The recommended generator for use with this modulus (hexadecimal). .It modulus The modulus itself in hexadecimal. .El .Pp When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, .Xr sshd 8 first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher. .Xr sshd 8 then randomly selects a modulus from .Fa /etc/moduli that best meets the size requirement. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh STANDARDS .Rs .%A M. Friedl .%A N. Provos .%A W. Simpson .%D March 2006 .%R RFC 4419 .%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .%D 2006 .Re openssh-8.2p1/moduli.c010064400017500001750000000511221362136622600131170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.37 2019/11/15 06:00:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1994 Phil Karn * Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson * Copyright 2000 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Two-step process to generate safe primes for DHGEX * * Sieve candidates for "safe" primes, * suitable for use as Diffie-Hellman moduli; * that is, where q = (p-1)/2 is also prime. * * First step: generate candidate primes (memory intensive) * Second step: test primes' safety (processor intensive) */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "dh.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" /* * File output defines */ /* need line long enough for largest moduli plus headers */ #define QLINESIZE (100+8192) /* * Size: decimal. * Specifies the number of the most significant bit (0 to M). * WARNING: internally, usually 1 to N. */ #define QSIZE_MINIMUM (511) /* * Prime sieving defines */ /* Constant: assuming 8 bit bytes and 32 bit words */ #define SHIFT_BIT (3) #define SHIFT_BYTE (2) #define SHIFT_WORD (SHIFT_BIT+SHIFT_BYTE) #define SHIFT_MEGABYTE (20) #define SHIFT_MEGAWORD (SHIFT_MEGABYTE-SHIFT_BYTE) /* * Using virtual memory can cause thrashing. This should be the largest * number that is supported without a large amount of disk activity -- * that would increase the run time from hours to days or weeks! */ #define LARGE_MINIMUM (8UL) /* megabytes */ /* * Do not increase this number beyond the unsigned integer bit size. * Due to a multiple of 4, it must be LESS than 128 (yielding 2**30 bits). */ #define LARGE_MAXIMUM (127UL) /* megabytes */ /* * Constant: when used with 32-bit integers, the largest sieve prime * has to be less than 2**32. */ #define SMALL_MAXIMUM (0xffffffffUL) /* Constant: can sieve all primes less than 2**32, as 65537**2 > 2**32-1. */ #define TINY_NUMBER (1UL<<16) /* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */ #define TEST_MAXIMUM (1UL<<16) #define TEST_MINIMUM (QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1) /* real TEST_MINIMUM (1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */ #define TEST_POWER (3) /* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */ /* bit operations on 32-bit words */ #define BIT_CLEAR(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31))) #define BIT_SET(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31))) #define BIT_TEST(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31))) /* * Prime testing defines */ /* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */ #define TRIAL_MINIMUM (4) /* * Sieving data (XXX - move to struct) */ /* sieve 2**16 */ static u_int32_t *TinySieve, tinybits; /* sieve 2**30 in 2**16 parts */ static u_int32_t *SmallSieve, smallbits, smallbase; /* sieve relative to the initial value */ static u_int32_t *LargeSieve, largewords, largetries, largenumbers; static u_int32_t largebits, largememory; /* megabytes */ static BIGNUM *largebase; int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, unsigned long); /* * print moduli out in consistent form, */ static int qfileout(FILE * ofile, u_int32_t otype, u_int32_t otests, u_int32_t otries, u_int32_t osize, u_int32_t ogenerator, BIGNUM * omodulus) { struct tm *gtm; time_t time_now; int res; time(&time_now); gtm = gmtime(&time_now); if (gtm == NULL) return -1; res = fprintf(ofile, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d %u %u %u %u %x ", gtm->tm_year + 1900, gtm->tm_mon + 1, gtm->tm_mday, gtm->tm_hour, gtm->tm_min, gtm->tm_sec, otype, otests, otries, osize, ogenerator); if (res < 0) return (-1); if (BN_print_fp(ofile, omodulus) < 1) return (-1); res = fprintf(ofile, "\n"); fflush(ofile); return (res > 0 ? 0 : -1); } /* ** Sieve p's and q's with small factors */ static void sieve_large(u_int32_t s) { u_int32_t r, u; debug3("sieve_large %u", s); largetries++; /* r = largebase mod s */ r = BN_mod_word(largebase, s); if (r == 0) u = 0; /* s divides into largebase exactly */ else u = s - r; /* largebase+u is first entry divisible by s */ if (u < largebits * 2) { /* * The sieve omits p's and q's divisible by 2, so ensure that * largebase+u is odd. Then, step through the sieve in * increments of 2*s */ if (u & 0x1) u += s; /* Make largebase+u odd, and u even */ /* Mark all multiples of 2*s */ for (u /= 2; u < largebits; u += s) BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u); } /* r = p mod s */ r = (2 * r + 1) % s; if (r == 0) u = 0; /* s divides p exactly */ else u = s - r; /* p+u is first entry divisible by s */ if (u < largebits * 4) { /* * The sieve omits p's divisible by 4, so ensure that * largebase+u is not. Then, step through the sieve in * increments of 4*s */ while (u & 0x3) { if (SMALL_MAXIMUM - u < s) return; u += s; } /* Mark all multiples of 4*s */ for (u /= 4; u < largebits; u += s) BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u); } } /* * list candidates for Sophie-Germain primes (where q = (p-1)/2) * to standard output. * The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30). */ int gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start) { BIGNUM *q; u_int32_t j, r, s, t; u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6; u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6; time_t time_start, time_stop; u_int32_t i; int ret = 0; largememory = memory; if (memory != 0 && (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) { error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)", LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM); return (-1); } /* * Set power to the length in bits of the prime to be generated. * This is changed to 1 less than the desired safe prime moduli p. */ if (power > TEST_MAXIMUM) { error("Too many bits: %u > %lu", power, TEST_MAXIMUM); return (-1); } else if (power < TEST_MINIMUM) { error("Too few bits: %u < %u", power, TEST_MINIMUM); return (-1); } power--; /* decrement before squaring */ /* * The density of ordinary primes is on the order of 1/bits, so the * density of safe primes should be about (1/bits)**2. Set test range * to something well above bits**2 to be reasonably sure (but not * guaranteed) of catching at least one safe prime. */ largewords = ((power * power) >> (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)); /* * Need idea of how much memory is available. We don't have to use all * of it. */ if (largememory > LARGE_MAXIMUM) { logit("Limited memory: %u MB; limit %lu MB", largememory, LARGE_MAXIMUM); largememory = LARGE_MAXIMUM; } if (largewords <= (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD)) { logit("Increased memory: %u MB; need %u bytes", largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE)); largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD); } else if (largememory > 0) { logit("Decreased memory: %u MB; want %u bytes", largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE)); largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD); } TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t)); tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD; SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t)); smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD; /* * dynamically determine available memory */ while ((LargeSieve = calloc(largewords, sizeof(u_int32_t))) == NULL) largewords -= (1L << (SHIFT_MEGAWORD - 2)); /* 1/4 MB chunks */ largebits = largewords << SHIFT_WORD; largenumbers = largebits * 2; /* even numbers excluded */ /* validation check: count the number of primes tried */ largetries = 0; if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("BN_new failed"); /* * Generate random starting point for subprime search, or use * specified parameter. */ if ((largebase = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("BN_new failed"); if (start == NULL) { if (BN_rand(largebase, power, 1, 1) == 0) fatal("BN_rand failed"); } else { if (BN_copy(largebase, start) == NULL) fatal("BN_copy: failed"); } /* ensure odd */ if (BN_set_bit(largebase, 0) == 0) fatal("BN_set_bit: failed"); time(&time_start); logit("%.24s Sieve next %u plus %u-bit", ctime(&time_start), largenumbers, power); debug2("start point: 0x%s", BN_bn2hex(largebase)); /* * TinySieve */ for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) { if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i)) continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */ /* The next tiny prime */ t = 2 * i + 3; /* Mark all multiples of t */ for (j = i + t; j < tinybits; j += t) BIT_SET(TinySieve, j); sieve_large(t); } /* * Start the small block search at the next possible prime. To avoid * fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped. */ for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3; smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER); smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) { for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) { if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i)) continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */ /* The next tiny prime */ t = 2 * i + 3; r = smallbase % t; if (r == 0) { s = 0; /* t divides into smallbase exactly */ } else { /* smallbase+s is first entry divisible by t */ s = t - r; } /* * The sieve omits even numbers, so ensure that * smallbase+s is odd. Then, step through the sieve * in increments of 2*t */ if (s & 1) s += t; /* Make smallbase+s odd, and s even */ /* Mark all multiples of 2*t */ for (s /= 2; s < smallbits; s += t) BIT_SET(SmallSieve, s); } /* * SmallSieve */ for (i = 0; i < smallbits; i++) { if (BIT_TEST(SmallSieve, i)) continue; /* 2*i+smallbase is composite */ /* The next small prime */ sieve_large((2 * i) + smallbase); } memset(SmallSieve, 0, smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE); } time(&time_stop); logit("%.24s Sieved with %u small primes in %lld seconds", ctime(&time_stop), largetries, (long long)(time_stop - time_start)); for (j = r = 0; j < largebits; j++) { if (BIT_TEST(LargeSieve, j)) continue; /* Definitely composite, skip */ debug2("test q = largebase+%u", 2 * j); if (BN_set_word(q, 2 * j) == 0) fatal("BN_set_word failed"); if (BN_add(q, q, largebase) == 0) fatal("BN_add failed"); if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN, MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE, largetries, (power - 1) /* MSB */, (0), q) == -1) { ret = -1; break; } r++; /* count q */ } time(&time_stop); free(LargeSieve); free(SmallSieve); free(TinySieve); logit("%.24s Found %u candidates", ctime(&time_stop), r); return (ret); } static void write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t lineno) { FILE *fp; char tmp[PATH_MAX]; int r; r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s.XXXXXXXXXX", cpfile); if (r < 0 || r >= PATH_MAX) { logit("write_checkpoint: temp pathname too long"); return; } if ((r = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) { logit("mkstemp(%s): %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); return; } if ((fp = fdopen(r, "w")) == NULL) { logit("write_checkpoint: fdopen: %s", strerror(errno)); unlink(tmp); close(r); return; } if (fprintf(fp, "%lu\n", (unsigned long)lineno) > 0 && fclose(fp) == 0 && rename(tmp, cpfile) == 0) debug3("wrote checkpoint line %lu to '%s'", (unsigned long)lineno, cpfile); else logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile, strerror(errno)); } static unsigned long read_checkpoint(char *cpfile) { FILE *fp; unsigned long lineno = 0; if ((fp = fopen(cpfile, "r")) == NULL) return 0; if (fscanf(fp, "%lu\n", &lineno) < 1) logit("Failed to load checkpoint from '%s'", cpfile); else logit("Loaded checkpoint from '%s' line %lu", cpfile, lineno); fclose(fp); return lineno; } static unsigned long count_lines(FILE *f) { unsigned long count = 0; char lp[QLINESIZE + 1]; if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) { debug("input file is not seekable"); return ULONG_MAX; } while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, f) != NULL) count++; rewind(f); debug("input file has %lu lines", count); return count; } static char * fmt_time(time_t seconds) { int day, hr, min; static char buf[128]; min = (seconds / 60) % 60; hr = (seconds / 60 / 60) % 24; day = seconds / 60 / 60 / 24; if (day > 0) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%dd %d:%02d", day, hr, min); else snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d:%02d", hr, min); return buf; } static void print_progress(unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long current_lineno, unsigned long end_lineno) { static time_t time_start, time_prev; time_t time_now, elapsed; unsigned long num_to_process, processed, remaining, percent, eta; double time_per_line; char *eta_str; time_now = monotime(); if (time_start == 0) { time_start = time_prev = time_now; return; } /* print progress after 1m then once per 5m */ if (time_now - time_prev < 5 * 60) return; time_prev = time_now; elapsed = time_now - time_start; processed = current_lineno - start_lineno; remaining = end_lineno - current_lineno; num_to_process = end_lineno - start_lineno; time_per_line = (double)elapsed / processed; /* if we don't know how many we're processing just report count+time */ time(&time_now); if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) { logit("%.24s processed %lu in %s", ctime(&time_now), processed, fmt_time(elapsed)); return; } percent = 100 * processed / num_to_process; eta = time_per_line * remaining; eta_str = xstrdup(fmt_time(eta)); logit("%.24s processed %lu of %lu (%lu%%) in %s, ETA %s", ctime(&time_now), processed, num_to_process, percent, fmt_time(elapsed), eta_str); free(eta_str); } /* * perform a Miller-Rabin primality test * on the list of candidates * (checking both q and p) * The result is a list of so-call "safe" primes */ int prime_test(FILE *in, FILE *out, u_int32_t trials, u_int32_t generator_wanted, char *checkpoint_file, unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long num_lines) { BIGNUM *q, *p, *a; char *cp, *lp; u_int32_t count_in = 0, count_out = 0, count_possible = 0; u_int32_t generator_known, in_tests, in_tries, in_type, in_size; unsigned long last_processed = 0, end_lineno; time_t time_start, time_stop; int res, is_prime; if (trials < TRIAL_MINIMUM) { error("Minimum primality trials is %d", TRIAL_MINIMUM); return (-1); } if (num_lines == 0) end_lineno = count_lines(in); else end_lineno = start_lineno + num_lines; time(&time_start); if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("BN_new failed"); if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("BN_new failed"); debug2("%.24s Final %u Miller-Rabin trials (%x generator)", ctime(&time_start), trials, generator_wanted); if (checkpoint_file != NULL) last_processed = read_checkpoint(checkpoint_file); last_processed = start_lineno = MAXIMUM(last_processed, start_lineno); if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) debug("process from line %lu from pipe", last_processed); else debug("process from line %lu to line %lu", last_processed, end_lineno); res = 0; lp = xmalloc(QLINESIZE + 1); while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, in) != NULL && count_in < end_lineno) { count_in++; if (count_in <= last_processed) { debug3("skipping line %u, before checkpoint or " "specified start line", count_in); continue; } if (checkpoint_file != NULL) write_checkpoint(checkpoint_file, count_in); print_progress(start_lineno, count_in, end_lineno); if (strlen(lp) < 14 || *lp == '!' || *lp == '#') { debug2("%10u: comment or short line", count_in); continue; } /* XXX - fragile parser */ /* time */ cp = &lp[14]; /* (skip) */ /* type */ in_type = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); /* tests */ in_tests = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) { debug2("%10u: known composite", count_in); continue; } /* tries */ in_tries = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); /* size (most significant bit) */ in_size = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); /* generator (hex) */ generator_known = strtoul(cp, &cp, 16); /* Skip white space */ cp += strspn(cp, " "); /* modulus (hex) */ switch (in_type) { case MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN: debug2("%10u: (%u) Sophie-Germain", count_in, in_type); a = q; if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0) fatal("BN_hex2bn failed"); /* p = 2*q + 1 */ if (BN_lshift(p, q, 1) == 0) fatal("BN_lshift failed"); if (BN_add_word(p, 1) == 0) fatal("BN_add_word failed"); in_size += 1; generator_known = 0; break; case MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED: case MODULI_TYPE_SAFE: case MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR: case MODULI_TYPE_STRONG: case MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN: debug2("%10u: (%u)", count_in, in_type); a = p; if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0) fatal("BN_hex2bn failed"); /* q = (p-1) / 2 */ if (BN_rshift(q, p, 1) == 0) fatal("BN_rshift failed"); break; default: debug2("Unknown prime type"); break; } /* * due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check * the proposed bit size. */ if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) { debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size); continue; } if (in_size < QSIZE_MINIMUM) { debug2("%10u: bit size %u too short", count_in, in_size); continue; } if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN) in_tries += trials; else in_tries = trials; /* * guess unknown generator */ if (generator_known == 0) { if (BN_mod_word(p, 24) == 11) generator_known = 2; else { u_int32_t r = BN_mod_word(p, 10); if (r == 3 || r == 7) generator_known = 5; } } /* * skip tests when desired generator doesn't match */ if (generator_wanted > 0 && generator_wanted != generator_known) { debug2("%10u: generator %d != %d", count_in, generator_known, generator_wanted); continue; } /* * Primes with no known generator are useless for DH, so * skip those. */ if (generator_known == 0) { debug2("%10u: no known generator", count_in); continue; } count_possible++; /* * The (1/4)^N performance bound on Miller-Rabin is * extremely pessimistic, so don't spend a lot of time * really verifying that q is prime until after we know * that p is also prime. A single pass will weed out the * vast majority of composite q's. */ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, 1, NULL, NULL); if (is_prime < 0) fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed"); if (is_prime == 0) { debug("%10u: q failed first possible prime test", count_in); continue; } /* * q is possibly prime, so go ahead and really make sure * that p is prime. If it is, then we can go back and do * the same for q. If p is composite, chances are that * will show up on the first Rabin-Miller iteration so it * doesn't hurt to specify a high iteration count. */ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(p, trials, NULL, NULL); if (is_prime < 0) fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed"); if (is_prime == 0) { debug("%10u: p is not prime", count_in); continue; } debug("%10u: p is almost certainly prime", count_in); /* recheck q more rigorously */ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, trials - 1, NULL, NULL); if (is_prime < 0) fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed"); if (is_prime == 0) { debug("%10u: q is not prime", count_in); continue; } debug("%10u: q is almost certainly prime", count_in); if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE, in_tests | MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN, in_tries, in_size, generator_known, p)) { res = -1; break; } count_out++; } time(&time_stop); free(lp); BN_free(p); BN_free(q); if (checkpoint_file != NULL) unlink(checkpoint_file); logit("%.24s Found %u safe primes of %u candidates in %ld seconds", ctime(&time_stop), count_out, count_possible, (long) (time_stop - time_start)); return (res); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/monitor.c010064400017500001750000001513631362136622600133250ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.208 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "dh.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "packet.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sk-api.h" #ifdef GSSAPI static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; #endif /* Imports */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_int utmp_len; extern u_char session_id[]; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ /* State exported from the child */ static struct sshbuf *child_state; /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */ int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_skeyquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_skeyrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_rsa_response(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #ifdef USE_PAM int mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #endif static Authctxt *authctxt; /* local state for key verify */ static u_char *key_blob = NULL; static size_t key_bloblen = 0; static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL; static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL; static char *hostbased_chost = NULL; static char *auth_method = "unknown"; static char *auth_submethod = NULL; static u_int session_id2_len = 0; static u_char *session_id2 = NULL; static pid_t monitor_child_pid; struct mon_table { enum monitor_reqtype type; int flags; int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); }; #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */ #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */ #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */ #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */ #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE) #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */ static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *, struct mon_table **); static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, #ifdef USE_PAM {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_respond}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify}, #ifdef GSSAPI {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table *mon_dispatch; /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */ static void monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit) { while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) { ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; return; } ent++; } } static void monitor_permit_authentications(int permit) { struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch; while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) { ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; } ent++; } } void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct mon_table *ent; int authenticated = 0, partial = 0; debug3("preauth child monitor started"); if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0) close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0) close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); ssh->authctxt = authctxt; authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg; mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ while (!authenticated) { partial = 0; auth_method = "unknown"; auth_submethod = NULL; auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt); authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1); /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if (authenticated && !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, auth_method, auth_submethod)) { debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__, auth_method); authenticated = 0; partial = 1; } } if (authenticated) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE)) fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d", __func__, ent->type); if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method)) authenticated = 0; #ifdef USE_PAM /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */ if (options.use_pam && authenticated) { struct sshbuf *m; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account( ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); sshbuf_free(m); } #endif } if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) { auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial, auth_method, auth_submethod); if (!partial && !authenticated) authctxt->failures++; if (authenticated || partial) { auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, auth_method, auth_submethod); } } } if (!authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__); if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0) fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__); debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process", __func__, authctxt->user); ssh->authctxt = NULL; ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user); mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ; if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0) close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0) close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; } static void monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid) { monitor_child_pid = pid; } static void monitor_child_handler(int sig) { kill(monitor_child_pid, sig); } void monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler); ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler); #ifdef SIGXFSZ ssh_signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN); #endif mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1); } for (;;) monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL); } static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct sshbuf *logmsg; u_int len, level; char *msg; u_char *p; int r; if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); /* Read length */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0) fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) { if (errno == EPIPE) { sshbuf_free(logmsg); debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; return -1; } fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: get len: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (len <= 4 || len > 8192) fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len); /* Read severity, message */ sshbuf_reset(logmsg); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0) fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len) fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Log it */ if (log_level_name(level) == NULL) fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", __func__, level); do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg); sshbuf_free(logmsg); free(msg); return 0; } static int monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, struct mon_table **pent) { struct sshbuf *m; int r, ret; u_char type; struct pollfd pfd[2]; for (;;) { memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd)); pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd; pfd[0].events = POLLIN; pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd; pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN; if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) continue; fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } if (pfd[1].revents) { /* * Drain all log messages before processing next * monitor request. */ monitor_read_log(pmonitor); continue; } if (pfd[0].revents) break; /* Continues below */ } if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type); while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) break; ent++; } if (ent->f != NULL) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT)) fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__, type); ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); sshbuf_free(m); /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */ if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) { debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__, type); ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; } if (pent != NULL) *pent = ent; return ret; } fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type); /* NOTREACHED */ return (-1); } /* allowed key state */ static int monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen) { /* make sure key is allowed */ if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen || timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen)) return (0); return (1); } static void monitor_reset_key_state(void) { /* reset state */ free(key_blob); free(hostbased_cuser); free(hostbased_chost); sshauthopt_free(key_opts); key_blob = NULL; key_bloblen = 0; key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; key_opts = NULL; hostbased_cuser = NULL; hostbased_chost = NULL; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { DH *dh; const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; int r; u_int min, want, max; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d", __func__, min, want, max); /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */ if (max < min || want < min || max < want) fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d", __func__, min, want, max); sshbuf_reset(m); dh = choose_dh(min, want, max); if (dh == NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return (0); } else { /* Send first bignum */ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); DH_free(dh); } mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m); return (0); } #endif int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */ struct sshkey *key; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL; char *alg = NULL; size_t datlen, siglen, alglen; int r, is_proof = 0; u_int keyid, compat; const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"; debug3("%s", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (keyid > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__); /* * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes), * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes). * * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey * proof. * * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too? * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather * than the full kex structure... */ if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) { /* * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what * the client sent us. */ if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */ fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen); if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid); if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0) fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key " "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) || memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0) fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu", __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf)); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); is_proof = 1; } /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */ if (session_id2_len == 0) { session_id2_len = datlen; session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len); } if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg, options.sk_provider, compat)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL && auth_sock > 0) { if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) { fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } else fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid); debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__, is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", signature, siglen); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(alg); free(p); free(signature); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m); /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); return (0); } /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char *username; struct passwd *pwent; int r, allowed = 0; u_int i; debug3("%s", __func__); if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0) fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username); authctxt->user = xstrdup(username); setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown"); free(username); sshbuf_reset(m); if (pwent == NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); goto out; } allowed = 1; authctxt->pw = pwent; authctxt->valid = 1; /* XXX don't sent pwent to unpriv; send fake class/dir/shell too */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(*pwent))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 || #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 || #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 || #endif (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); out: ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s", authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ if (options.x != NULL) { \ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \ __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ } \ } while (0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \ __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ } \ } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT /* Create valid auth method lists */ if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) { /* * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any * authentication to succeed. */ debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__); } debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m); /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1); #endif return (0); } int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char *banner; int r; sshbuf_reset(m); banner = auth2_read_banner(); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); free(banner); return (0); } int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { int r; monitor_permit_authentications(1); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s", __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style); if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) { free(authctxt->style); authctxt->style = NULL; } return (0); } /* * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are * performed in the unprivileged authentication code). * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key, const char *list) { char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list); int found = 0; l = ol; for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) { if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method, sshkey_ssh_name(key), list); } free(ol); return found; } int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { static int call_count; char *passwd; int r, authenticated; size_t plen; if (!options.password_authentication) fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */ authenticated = options.password_authentication && auth_password(ssh, passwd); explicit_bzero(passwd, plen); free(passwd); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #ifdef USE_PAM if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #endif debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m); call_count++; if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1) auth_method = "none"; else auth_method = "password"; /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char *name, *infotxt; u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success; char **prompts; int r; if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__); success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1; sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (success) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); if (success) { free(name); free(infotxt); free(prompts); free(echo_on); } return (0); } int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char *response; int r, authok; if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__); if (authctxt->as == NULL) fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); authok = options.challenge_response_authentication && auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0); authctxt->as = NULL; debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok); free(response); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "bsdauth"; return (authok != 0); } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM int mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); start_pam(ssh); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1); if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { u_int ret; int r; if (!options.use_pam) fatal("%s: PAM not enabled", __func__); ret = do_pam_account(); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); return (ret); } static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok; extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device; int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { u_int ok = 0; int r; debug3("%s", __func__); if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__); if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) fatal("%s: already called", __func__); sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt); sshpam_authok = NULL; sshbuf_reset(m); if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 1); ok = 1; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL; u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0; int r, ret; debug3("%s", __func__); sshpam_authok = NULL; if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no context", __func__); ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on); if (ret == 0 && num == 0) sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL) fatal("sshpam_device.query failed"); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, 1); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, info)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(name); free(info); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[i])) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echo_on[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(prompts[i]); } free(prompts); free(echo_on); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char **resp; u_int i, num; int r, ret; debug3("%s", __func__); if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no context", __func__); sshpam_authok = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &num)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (num > 0) { resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &(resp[i]), NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) free(resp[i]); free(resp); } else { ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL); } sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; if (ret == 0) sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt; debug3("%s", __func__); if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no context", __func__); (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt); sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL; sshbuf_reset(m); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); /* Allow another attempt */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; return r; } #endif int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *cuser, *chost; u_int pubkey_auth_attempt; enum mm_keytype type = 0; int r, allowed = 0; struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key); if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) { /* These should not make it past the privsep child */ if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__); switch (type) { case MM_USERKEY: auth_method = "publickey"; if (!options.pubkey_authentication) break; if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) break; if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key, options.pubkey_key_types)) break; allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key, pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: auth_method = "hostbased"; if (!options.hostbased_authentication) break; if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) break; if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key, options.hostbased_key_types)) break; allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); auth2_record_info(authctxt, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type); break; } } debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__, auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test", (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key), allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key); /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */ monitor_reset_key_state(); if (allowed) { /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); key_blobtype = type; key_opts = opts; hostbased_cuser = cuser; hostbased_chost = chost; } else { /* Log failed attempt */ auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL); free(cuser); free(chost); } sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m); if (!allowed) sshauthopt_free(opts); return (0); } static int monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen) { struct sshbuf *b; const u_char *p; char *userstyle, *cp; size_t len; u_char type; int r, fail = 0; if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_from", __func__); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { p = sshbuf_ptr(b); len = sshbuf_len(b); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len < session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) { logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: " "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp); fail++; } free(userstyle); free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0) fail++; free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type == 0) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) fail++; sshbuf_free(b); return (fail == 0); } static int monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *cuser, const char *chost) { struct sshbuf *b; const u_char *p; char *cp, *userstyle; size_t len; int r, fail = 0; u_char type; if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) { logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: " "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp); fail++; } free(userstyle); free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0) fail++; free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.') cp[len - 1] = '\0'; if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0) fail++; free(cp); /* verify client user */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0) fail++; free(cp); if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) fail++; sshbuf_free(b); return (fail == 0); } int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { struct sshkey *key; const u_char *signature, *data, *blob; char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL; size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; int r, ret, req_presence = 0, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret; struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */ if (*sigalg == '\0') { free(sigalg); sigalg = NULL; } /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0) fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (key_blobtype) { case MM_USERKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen); auth_method = "publickey"; break; case MM_HOSTKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen, hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost); auth_method = "hostbased"; break; default: valid_data = 0; break; } if (!valid_data) fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s%s%s", __func__, auth_method, key, (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified", (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : ""); if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) { req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) || !key_opts->no_require_user_presence; if (req_presence && (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) { error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s " "port %d rejected: user presence " "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; } } auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key); if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY) auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts); monitor_reset_key_state(); sshbuf_reset(m); /* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */ encoded_ret = (ret != 0); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (sig_details != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); free(sigalg); free(fp); sshkey_free(key); return ret == 0; } static void mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); } static void mm_session_close(Session *s) { debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } session_unused(s->self); } int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; Session *s; int r, res, fd0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); sshbuf_reset(m); s = session_new(); if (s == NULL) goto error; s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid; res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)); if (res == 0) goto error; pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* We need to trick ttyslot */ if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2", __func__); mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw); /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */ close(0); /* send messages generated by record_login */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0) fatal("%s: put login message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 || mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (fd0 != 0) error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0); /* slave is not needed */ close(s->ttyfd); s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd; /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */ s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd; debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd); return (0); error: if (s != NULL) mm_session_close(s); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { Session *s; char *tty; int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) mm_session_close(s); sshbuf_reset(m); free(tty); return (0); } int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; int res, status; debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__); /* The child is terminating */ session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) sshpam_cleanup(); #endif while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) exit(1); res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1; /* Terminate process */ exit(res); } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* Report that an audit event occurred */ int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { u_int n; ssh_audit_event_t event; int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); event = (ssh_audit_event_t)n; switch (event) { case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: case SSH_INVALID_USER: audit_event(ssh, event); break; default: fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event); } return (0); } int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { char *cmd; int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* sanity check command, if so how? */ audit_run_command(cmd); free(cmd); return (0); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ void monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN); ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); sshbuf_free(child_state); child_state = NULL; } void monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct kex *kex; int r; debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__); if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(child_state); child_state = NULL; if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) { /* XXX set callbacks */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; # endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; } } /* This function requries careful sanity checking */ void mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, child_state); debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__); } /* XXX */ #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \ if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \ fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \ } while (0) static void monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds) { int pair[2]; #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE int on = 1; #endif if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_recvfd = pair[0]; mon->m_sendfd = pair[1]; if (do_logfds) { if (pipe(pair) == -1) fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0]; mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1]; } else mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1; } #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536 struct monitor * monitor_init(void) { struct monitor *mon; mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon)); monitor_openfds(mon, 1); return mon; } void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) { monitor_openfds(mon, 0); } #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { gss_OID_desc goid; OM_uint32 major; size_t len; u_char *p; int r; if (!options.gss_authentication) fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goid.elements = p; goid.length = len; major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid); free(goid.elements); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m); /* Now we have a context, enable the step */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { gss_buffer_desc in; gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 major, minor; OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ int r; if (!options.gss_authentication) fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); free(in.value); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m); gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out); if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); } return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic; OM_uint32 ret; int r; if (!options.gss_authentication) fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 || (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic); free(gssbuf.value); free(mic.value); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m); if (!GSS_ERROR(ret)) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { int r, authenticated; const char *displayname; if (!options.gss_authentication) fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ openssh-8.2p1/monitor.h010064400017500001750000000075741362136622600133360ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.23 2019/01/19 21:43:56 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _MONITOR_H_ #define _MONITOR_H_ /* Please keep *_REQ_* values on even numbers and *_ANS_* on odd numbers */ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_REQ_MODULI = 0, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI = 1, MONITOR_REQ_FREE = 2, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV = 4, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN = 6, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN = 7, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM = 8, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM = 9, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 10, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 11, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD = 12, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD = 13, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY = 14, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY = 15, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 16, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 17, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED = 22, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED = 23, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY = 24, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY = 25, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT = 26, MONITOR_REQ_PTY = 28, MONITOR_ANS_PTY = 29, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP = 30, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY = 32, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY = 33, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID = 34, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED = 36, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED = 37, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE = 38, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE = 39, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE = 40, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE = 41, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP = 42, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP = 43, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP = 44, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP = 45, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK = 46, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK = 47, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49, MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, }; struct ssh; struct monitor { int m_recvfd; int m_sendfd; int m_log_recvfd; int m_log_sendfd; struct kex **m_pkex; pid_t m_pid; }; struct monitor *monitor_init(void); void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *); struct Authctxt; void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *); void monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *); void monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor *); void monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor *); /* Prototypes for request sending and receiving */ void mm_request_send(int, enum monitor_reqtype, struct sshbuf *); void mm_request_receive(int, struct sshbuf *); void mm_request_receive_expect(int, enum monitor_reqtype, struct sshbuf *); void mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor *); #endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */ openssh-8.2p1/monitor_fdpass.c010064400017500001750000000113331362136622600146550ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.21 2016/02/29 20:22:36 jca Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H #include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H # include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #include "log.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" int mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd) { #if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR)) struct msghdr msg; #ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR union { struct cmsghdr hdr; char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; } cmsgbuf; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; #endif struct iovec vec; char ch = '\0'; ssize_t n; struct pollfd pfd; memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); #ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd; msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd); #else memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf)); msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf); cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)); cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = fd; #endif vec.iov_base = &ch; vec.iov_len = 1; msg.msg_iov = &vec; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; pfd.fd = sock; pfd.events = POLLOUT; while ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) { debug3("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno)); (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); } if (n == -1) { error("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (n != 1) { error("%s: sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %zd", __func__, n); return -1; } return 0; #else error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__); return -1; #endif } int mm_receive_fd(int sock) { #if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR)) struct msghdr msg; #ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR union { struct cmsghdr hdr; char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; } cmsgbuf; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; #endif struct iovec vec; ssize_t n; char ch; int fd; struct pollfd pfd; memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); vec.iov_base = &ch; vec.iov_len = 1; msg.msg_iov = &vec; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; #ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd; msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd); #else memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf)); msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf); #endif pfd.fd = sock; pfd.events = POLLIN; while ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) { debug3("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); } if (n == -1) { error("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (n != 1) { error("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %zd", __func__, n); return -1; } #ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR if (msg.msg_accrightslen != sizeof(fd)) { error("%s: no fd", __func__); return -1; } #else cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); if (cmsg == NULL) { error("%s: no message header", __func__); return -1; } #ifndef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) { error("%s: expected type %d got %d", __func__, SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg->cmsg_type); return -1; } #endif fd = (*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)); #endif return fd; #else error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__); return -1; #endif } openssh-8.2p1/monitor_fdpass.h010064400017500001750000000027721362136622600146710ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.h,v 1.4 2007/09/04 03:21:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _MM_FDPASS_H_ #define _MM_FDPASS_H_ int mm_send_fd(int, int); int mm_receive_fd(int); #endif /* _MM_FDPASS_H_ */ openssh-8.2p1/monitor_wrap.c010064400017500001750000000666571362136622600143710ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.117 2019/12/15 18:57:30 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include "dh.h" #endif #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "packet.h" #include "mac.h" #include "log.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "ssherr.h" /* Imports */ extern struct monitor *pmonitor; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern ServerOptions options; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx) { struct sshbuf *log_msg; struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx; int r; size_t len; if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1) fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__); if ((log_msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, 0)) != 0 || /* length; filled below */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, level)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(log_msg, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((len = sshbuf_len(log_msg)) < 4 || len > 0xffffffff) fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, len); POKE_U32(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len - 4); if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len) != len) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(log_msg); } int mm_is_monitor(void) { /* * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and * points to the unprivileged child. */ return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0); } void mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m) { size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m); u_char buf[5]; debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); if (mlen >= 0xffffffff) fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, mlen); POKE_U32(buf, mlen + 1); buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } void mm_request_receive(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { u_char buf[4], *p = NULL; u_int msg_len; int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { if (errno == EPIPE) cleanup_exit(255); fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } msg_len = PEEK_U32(buf); if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (atomicio(read, sock, p, msg_len) != msg_len) fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } void mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m) { u_char rtype; int r; debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); mm_request_receive(sock, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &rtype)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (rtype != type) fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__, rtype, type); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL DH * mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) { BIGNUM *p, *g; int r; u_char success = 0; struct sshbuf *m; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, min)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, nbits)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, max)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &success)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (success == 0) fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &g)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("%s: remaining %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(m)); sshbuf_free(m); return (dh_new_group(g, p)); } #endif int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *hostkey_alg, const char *sk_provider, u_int compat) { struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex; struct sshbuf *m; u_int ndx = kex->host_key_index(key, 0, ssh); int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ndx)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, hostkey_alg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, compat)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, sigp, lenp)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); return (0); } struct passwd * mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *username) { struct sshbuf *m; struct passwd *pw; size_t len; u_int i; ServerOptions *newopts; int r; u_char ok; const u_char *p; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, username)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ok)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ok == 0) { pw = NULL; goto out; } /* XXX don't like passing struct passwd like this */ pw = xcalloc(sizeof(*pw), 1); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (len != sizeof(*pw)) fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__); memcpy(pw, p, sizeof(*pw)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_passwd, NULL)) != 0 || #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_gecos, NULL)) != 0 || #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_class, NULL)) != 0 || #endif (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_dir, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_shell, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); out: /* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (len != sizeof(*newopts)) fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__); newopts = xcalloc(sizeof(*newopts), 1); memcpy(newopts, p, sizeof(*newopts)); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ if (newopts->x != NULL) { \ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \ &newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \ __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ } \ } while (0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \ NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \ for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) { \ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \ &newopts->x[i], NULL)) != 0) \ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \ __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ } \ } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1); log_change_level(options.log_level); process_permitopen(ssh, &options); free(newopts); sshbuf_free(m); return (pw); } char * mm_auth2_read_banner(void) { struct sshbuf *m; char *banner; int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); sshbuf_reset(m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &banner, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); /* treat empty banner as missing banner */ if (strlen(banner) == 0) { free(banner); banner = NULL; } return (banner); } /* Inform the privileged process about service and style */ void mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style) { struct sshbuf *m; int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, style ? style : "")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, m); sshbuf_free(m); } /* Do the password authentication */ int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password) { struct sshbuf *m; int r, authenticated = 0; #ifdef USE_PAM u_int maxtries = 0; #endif debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, password)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #ifdef USE_PAM if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxtries)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (maxtries > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: bad maxtries %u", __func__, maxtries); sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(maxtries); #endif sshbuf_free(m); debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated", __func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp) { return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key, pubkey_auth_attempt, authoptp)); } int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, const char *user, const char *host, struct sshkey *key) { return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0, NULL)); } int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host, struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp) { struct sshbuf *m; int r, allowed = 0; struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (authoptp != NULL) *authoptp = NULL; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, user ? user : "")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, host ? host : "")) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &allowed)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (allowed && type == MM_USERKEY) { if ((r = sshauthopt_deserialise(m, &opts)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshauthopt_deserialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } sshbuf_free(m); if (authoptp != NULL) { *authoptp = opts; opts = NULL; } sshauthopt_free(opts); return allowed; } /* * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed * for authentication. */ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp) { struct sshbuf *m; u_int encoded_ret = 0; int r; u_char sig_details_present, flags; u_int counter; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (sig_detailsp != NULL) *sig_detailsp = NULL; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &encoded_ret)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &sig_details_present)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (sig_details_present && encoded_ret == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &counter)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flags)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (sig_detailsp != NULL) { *sig_detailsp = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**sig_detailsp)); (*sig_detailsp)->sk_counter = counter; (*sig_detailsp)->sk_flags = flags; } } sshbuf_free(m); if (encoded_ret != 0) return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; return 0; } void mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor) { struct sshbuf *m; int r; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = ssh_packet_get_state(ssh, m)) != 0) fatal("%s: get_state failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, m); debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__); sshbuf_free(m); } int mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) { struct sshbuf *m; char *p, *msg; int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1, r; /* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */ if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) { error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__); if (tmp1 > 0) close(tmp1); if (tmp2 > 0) close(tmp2); return 0; } close(tmp1); close(tmp2); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__); sshbuf_free(m); return (0); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &p, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */ free(p); if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(msg); if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || (*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__); /* Success */ return (1); } void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) { struct sshbuf *m; int r; if (s->ttyfd == -1) return; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, m); sshbuf_free(m); /* closed dup'ed master */ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1) error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); /* unlink pty from session */ s->ttyfd = -1; } #ifdef USE_PAM void mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, m); sshbuf_free(m); } u_int mm_do_pam_account(void) { struct sshbuf *m; u_int ret; char *msg; size_t msglen; int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, &msglen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, msglen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(msg); sshbuf_free(m); debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret); return (ret); } void * mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct sshbuf *m; int r, success; debug3("%s", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__); sshbuf_free(m); return (NULL); } sshbuf_free(m); return (authctxt); } int mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { struct sshbuf *m; u_int i, n; int r, ret; debug3("%s", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, info, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, num)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret); sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(n); if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) fatal("%s: received %u PAM messages, expected <= %u", __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG); *prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int)); for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &((*prompts)[i]), NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &((*echo_on)[i]))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } sshbuf_free(m); return (ret); } int mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) { struct sshbuf *m; u_int n, i; int r, ret; debug3("%s", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, resp[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ret = (int)n; /* XXX */ debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret); sshbuf_free(m); return (ret); } void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) { struct sshbuf *m; debug3("%s", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); sshbuf_free(m); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ /* Request process termination */ void mm_terminate(void) { struct sshbuf *m; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, m); sshbuf_free(m); } static void mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { *name = xstrdup(""); *infotxt = xstrdup(""); *numprompts = 1; *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int)); (*echo_on)[0] = 0; } int mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { struct sshbuf *m; u_int success; char *challenge; int r; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__); sshbuf_free(m); return (-1); } /* Get the challenge, and format the response */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &challenge, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on); (*prompts)[0] = challenge; debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge); return (0); } int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) { struct sshbuf *m; int r, authok; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if (numresponses != 1) return (-1); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, responses[0])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authok)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0); } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) { struct sshbuf *m; int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, event)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, m); sshbuf_free(m); } void mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) { struct sshbuf *m; int r; debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); sshbuf_free(m); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid) { struct sshbuf *m; OM_uint32 major; int r; /* Client doesn't get to see the context */ *ctx = NULL; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, goid->elements, goid->length)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); return (major); } OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in, gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flagsp) { struct sshbuf *m; OM_uint32 major; u_int flags; int r; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, in->value, in->length)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 || (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, out)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (flagsp != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &flags)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); *flagsp = flags; } sshbuf_free(m); return (major); } OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) { struct sshbuf *m; OM_uint32 major; int r; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); return(major); } int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) { struct sshbuf *m; int r, authenticated = 0; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ openssh-8.2p1/monitor_wrap.h010064400017500001750000000073731362136622600143640ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.44 2019/11/25 00:51:37 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_ #define _MM_WRAP_H_ extern int use_privsep; #define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x) enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY }; struct ssh; struct monitor; struct Authctxt; struct sshkey; struct sshauthopt; struct sshkey_sig_details; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *); int mm_is_monitor(void); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); #endif int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int compat); void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *); char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *); int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *, int, struct sshauthopt **); int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int, struct sshauthopt **); int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *); int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); #endif #ifdef USE_PAM void mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh); u_int mm_do_pam_account(void); void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *); int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **); void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #include "audit.h" void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t); void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); #endif struct Session; void mm_terminate(void); int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t); void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *); /* Key export functions */ struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int); int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *); void mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor*); /* bsdauth */ int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); #endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */ openssh-8.2p1/msg.h010064400017500001750000000027641362136622600124310ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.5 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef SSH_MSG_H #define SSH_MSG_H struct sshbuf; int ssh_msg_send(int, u_char, struct sshbuf *); int ssh_msg_recv(int, struct sshbuf *); #endif openssh-8.2p1/mux.c010064400017500001750000002041551362136622600124450ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.81 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* ssh session multiplexing support */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "channels.h" #include "msg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "ssherr.h" /* from ssh.c */ extern int tty_flag; extern Options options; extern int stdin_null_flag; extern char *host; extern int subsystem_flag; extern struct sshbuf *command; extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Context for session open confirmation callback */ struct mux_session_confirm_ctx { u_int want_tty; u_int want_subsys; u_int want_x_fwd; u_int want_agent_fwd; struct sshbuf *cmd; char *term; struct termios tio; char **env; u_int rid; }; /* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */ struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx { u_int rid; }; /* Context for global channel callback */ struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx { u_int cid; /* channel id */ u_int rid; /* request id */ int fid; /* forward id */ }; /* fd to control socket */ int muxserver_sock = -1; /* client request id */ u_int muxclient_request_id = 0; /* Multiplexing control command */ u_int muxclient_command = 0; /* Set when signalled. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0; /* PID of multiplex server */ static u_int muxserver_pid = 0; static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL; struct mux_master_state { int hello_rcvd; }; /* mux protocol messages */ #define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001 #define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002 #define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004 #define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005 #define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006 #define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007 #define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008 #define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009 #define MUX_C_PROXY 0x1000000f #define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001 #define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002 #define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003 #define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004 #define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005 #define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006 #define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007 #define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008 #define MUX_S_PROXY 0x8000000f /* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */ #define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1 #define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2 #define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3 static void mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); static void mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); static int mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static const struct { u_int type; int (*handler)(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); } mux_master_handlers[] = { { MUX_MSG_HELLO, mux_master_process_hello }, { MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, mux_master_process_new_session }, { MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, mux_master_process_alive_check }, { MUX_C_TERMINATE, mux_master_process_terminate }, { MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, mux_master_process_open_fwd }, { MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, mux_master_process_close_fwd }, { MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, mux_master_process_stdio_fwd }, { MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, mux_master_process_stop_listening }, { MUX_C_PROXY, mux_master_process_proxy }, { 0, NULL } }; /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused) { Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid); debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); if (c == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); c->ctl_chan = -1; cc->remote_id = 0; cc->have_remote_id = 0; chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, cc); } channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self); } /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused) { Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid); debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); if (c == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); if (c->have_remote_id) { if ((sc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->remote_id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %u", __func__, c->self, c->remote_id); c->remote_id = 0; c->have_remote_id = 0; sc->ctl_chan = -1; if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) { debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, sc); } else { if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) chan_read_failed(ssh, sc); if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) chan_write_failed(ssh, sc); } } channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self); } /* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */ static int env_permitted(char *env) { int i, ret; char name[1024], *cp; if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env) return 0; ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env); if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) { error("%s: name '%.100s...' too long", __func__, env); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++) if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i])) return 1; return 0; } /* Mux master protocol message handlers */ static int mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { u_int ver; struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; int r; if (state == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", __func__, c->self); if (state->hello_rcvd) { error("%s: HELLO received twice", __func__); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0) { error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) { error("%s: unsupported multiplexing protocol version %u " "(expected %u)", __func__, ver, SSHMUX_VER); return -1; } debug2("%s: channel %d slave version %u", __func__, c->self, ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) { char *name = NULL; size_t value_len = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, NULL, &value_len)) != 0) { error("%s: malformed extension: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } debug2("%s: Unrecognised extension \"%s\" length %zu", __func__, name, value_len); free(name); } state->hello_rcvd = 1; return 0; } /* Enqueue a "ok" response to the reply buffer */ static void reply_ok(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int rid) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_OK)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Enqueue an error response to the reply buffer */ static void reply_error(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int type, u_int rid, const char *msg) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(reply, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static int mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { Channel *nc; struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx; char *cmd, *cp; u_int i, j, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax; int r, new_fd[3]; /* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */ cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); cctx->term = NULL; cctx->rid = rid; cmd = NULL; cctx->env = NULL; env_len = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_tty)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_x_fwd)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_agent_fwd)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_subsys)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &escape_char)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cctx->term, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) { malf: free(cmd); for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) free(cctx->env[j]); free(cctx->env); free(cctx->term); free(cctx); error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } #define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096 while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cp, NULL)) != 0) goto malf; if (!env_permitted(cp)) { free(cp); continue; } cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2, sizeof(*cctx->env)); cctx->env[env_len++] = cp; cctx->env[env_len] = NULL; if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) { error("%s: >%d environment variables received, " "ignoring additional", __func__, MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS); break; } } debug2("%s: channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, " "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", __func__, c->self, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len); if ((cctx->cmd = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put(cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd))) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(cmd); cmd = NULL; /* Gather fds from client */ for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave", __func__, i); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) close(new_fd[j]); for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) free(cctx->env[j]); free(cctx->env); free(cctx->term); sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd); free(cctx); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "did not receive file descriptors"); return -1; } } debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ if (c->have_remote_id) { debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "Multiple sessions not supported"); cleanup: close(new_fd[0]); close(new_fd[1]); close(new_fd[2]); free(cctx->term); if (env_len != 0) { for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++) free(cctx->env[i]); free(cctx->env); } sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd); free(cctx); return 0; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: session refused by user", __func__); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, "Permission denied"); goto cleanup; } } /* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */ if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1) error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); if (!isatty(new_fd[2])) set_nonblock(new_fd[2]); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (cctx->want_tty) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ c->have_remote_id = 1; if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) { channel_register_filter(ssh, nc->self, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char)); } debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); channel_send_open(ssh, nc->self); channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } static int mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { int r; debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self); /* prepare reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_ALIVE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, (u_int)getpid())) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return 0; } static int mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self); if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: termination refused by user", __func__); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, "Permission denied"); return 0; } } quit_pending = 1; reply_ok(reply, rid); /* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */ return 0; } static char * format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) { char *ret; switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); break; case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *", (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown forward type %u", __func__, ftype); } return ret; } static int compare_host(const char *a, const char *b) { if (a == NULL && b == NULL) return 1; if (a == NULL || b == NULL) return 0; return strcmp(a, b) == 0; } static int compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b) { if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host)) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path)) return 0; if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host)) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path)) return 0; if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port) return 0; return 1; } static void mux_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt; char *failmsg = NULL; struct Forward *rfwd; Channel *c; struct sshbuf *out; u_int port; int r; if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, fctx->cid)) == NULL) { /* no channel for reply */ error("%s: unknown channel", __func__); return; } if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards || (options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL && options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) { xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid); goto fail; } rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid]; debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__, type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (port > 65535) { fatal("Invalid allocated port %u for " "mux remote forward to %s:%d", port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); } rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port; debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward" " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, fctx->rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, rfwd->allocated_port)) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } else { reply_ok(out, fctx->rid); } goto out; } else { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " "listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); debug2("%s: clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, " "connect %s:%d", __func__, rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); free(rfwd->listen_host); free(rfwd->listen_path); free(rfwd->connect_host); free(rfwd->connect_path); memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd)); } fail: error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg); reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, fctx->rid, failmsg); free(failmsg); out: if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(out); if (c->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause); c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ } static int mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { struct Forward fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; char *listen_addr, *connect_addr; u_int ftype; u_int lport, cport; int r, i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); /* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 || (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { error("%s: malformed message", __func__); ret = -1; goto out; } if (*listen_addr == '\0') { free(listen_addr); listen_addr = NULL; } if (*connect_addr == '\0') { free(connect_addr); connect_addr = NULL; } memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_port = lport; if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; else fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; fwd.connect_port = cport; if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; else fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self, (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype); invalid: free(listen_addr); free(connect_addr); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "Invalid forwarding request"); return 0; } if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) { logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards " "are mutually exclusive", __func__); goto invalid; } if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) { logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__, fwd.listen_port); goto invalid; } if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.connect_port >= 65536) || (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) { logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__, fwd.connect_port); goto invalid; } if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && fwd.connect_path == NULL) { logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__); goto invalid; } /* Skip forwards that have already been requested */ switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.local_forwards + i)) { exists: debug2("%s: found existing forwarding", __func__); reply_ok(reply, rid); goto out; } } break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (!compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) continue; if (fwd.listen_port != 0) goto exists; debug2("%s: found allocated port", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port)) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } break; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) { debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, "Permission denied"); goto out; } } if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { fail: logit("%s: requested %s failed", __func__, fwd_desc); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "Port forwarding failed"); goto out; } add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); freefwd = 0; } else { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx; fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd); if (fwd.handle < 0) goto fail; add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx)); fctx->cid = c->self; fctx->rid = rid; fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1; client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward, fctx); freefwd = 0; c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */ /* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */ goto out; } reply_ok(reply, rid); out: free(fwd_desc); if (freefwd) { free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); free(fwd.connect_path); } return ret; } static int mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; const char *error_reason = NULL; char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL; u_int ftype; int r, i, ret = 0; u_int lport, cport; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 || (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { error("%s: malformed message", __func__); ret = -1; goto out; } if (*listen_addr == '\0') { free(listen_addr); listen_addr = NULL; } if (*connect_addr == '\0') { free(connect_addr); connect_addr = NULL; } memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_port = lport; if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; else fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; fwd.connect_port = cport; if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; else fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self, (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); /* make sure this has been requested */ found_fwd = NULL; switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.local_forwards + i)) { found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i; break; } } break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) { found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i; break; } } break; } if (found_fwd == NULL) error_reason = "port not forwarded"; else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) { /* * This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port * between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens. * However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need * to use the actual listen port. */ if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, found_fwd) == -1) error_reason = "port not in permitted opens"; } else { /* local and dynamic forwards */ /* Ditto */ if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, fwd.connect_port, &options.fwd_opts) == -1) error_reason = "port not found"; } if (error_reason != NULL) reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, error_reason); else { reply_ok(reply, rid); free(found_fwd->listen_host); free(found_fwd->listen_path); free(found_fwd->connect_host); free(found_fwd->connect_path); found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL; found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL; found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0; } out: free(fwd_desc); free(listen_addr); free(connect_addr); return ret; } static int mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { Channel *nc; char *chost = NULL; u_int cport, i, j; int r, new_fd[2]; struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0) { free(chost); error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } debug2("%s: channel %d: request stdio fwd to %s:%u", __func__, c->self, chost, cport); /* Gather fds from client */ for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave", __func__, i); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) close(new_fd[j]); free(chost); /* prepare reply */ reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "did not receive file descriptors"); return -1; } } debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", __func__, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ if (c->have_remote_id) { debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "Multiple sessions not supported"); cleanup: close(new_fd[0]); close(new_fd[1]); free(chost); return 0; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ", chost, cport)) { debug2("%s: stdio fwd refused by user", __func__); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, "Permission denied"); goto cleanup; } } /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); free(chost); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ c->have_remote_id = 1; debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); cctx->rid = rid; channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */ static void mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; Channel *c, *cc; struct sshbuf *reply; int r; if (cctx == NULL) fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, id, c->ctl_chan); if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if (!success) { debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid, "Session open refused by peer"); /* prepare reply */ goto done; } debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); done: /* Send reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause); cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; free(cctx); } static int mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self); if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared " "connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: stop listen refused by user", __func__); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, "Permission denied"); return 0; } } if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) { channel_free(ssh, mux_listener_channel); client_stop_mux(); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; mux_listener_channel = NULL; muxserver_sock = -1; } reply_ok(reply, rid); return 0; } static int mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { int r; debug("%s: channel %d: proxy request", __func__, c->self); c->mux_rcb = channel_proxy_downstream; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_PROXY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return 0; } /* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */ static int mux_master_read_cb(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; struct sshbuf *in = NULL, *out = NULL; u_int type, rid, i; int r, ret = -1; if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); /* Setup ctx and */ if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) { state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state)); c->mux_ctx = state; channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0); /* Send hello */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* no extensions */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self); ret = 0; goto out; } /* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(c->input, &in)) != 0) { malf: error("%s: malformed message", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &type)) != 0) goto malf; debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %zu", __func__, c->self, type, sshbuf_len(in)); if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO) rid = 0; else { if (!state->hello_rcvd) { error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), " "received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &rid)) != 0) goto malf; } for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) { ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(ssh, rid, c, in, out); break; } } if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type); reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "unsupported request"); ret = 0; } /* Enqueue reply packet */ if (sshbuf_len(out) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } out: sshbuf_free(in); sshbuf_free(out); return ret; } void mux_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int exitval) { struct sshbuf *m; Channel *mux_chan; int r; debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self, exitval); if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, exitval)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); } void mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct sshbuf *m; Channel *mux_chan; int r; debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self); if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); } /* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */ void muxserver_listen(struct ssh *ssh) { mode_t old_umask; char *orig_control_path = options.control_path; char rbuf[16+1]; u_int i, r; int oerrno; if (options.control_path == NULL || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) return; debug("setting up multiplex master socket"); /* * Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically * establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid * other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting * an unready socket. */ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) { r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10); rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r : (r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 : '0' + r - 26 - 26; } rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0'; options.control_path = NULL; xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf); debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path); old_umask = umask(0177); muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0); oerrno = errno; umask(old_umask); if (muxserver_sock < 0) { if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) { error("ControlSocket %s already exists, " "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path); disable_mux_master: if (muxserver_sock != -1) { close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; } free(orig_control_path); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; return; } else { /* unix_listener() logs the error */ cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */ if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) { if (errno != EEXIST) { fatal("%s: link mux listener %s => %s: %s", __func__, options.control_path, orig_control_path, strerror(errno)); } error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing", orig_control_path); unlink(options.control_path); goto disable_mux_master; } unlink(options.control_path); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = orig_control_path; set_nonblock(muxserver_sock); mux_listener_channel = channel_new(ssh, "mux listener", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, options.control_path, 1); mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb; debug3("%s: mux listener channel %d fd %d", __func__, mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock); } /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */ static void mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; const char *display; Channel *c, *cc; int i, r; struct sshbuf *reply; if (cctx == NULL) fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, id, c->ctl_chan); if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if (!success) { debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid, "Session open refused by peer"); goto done; } display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ if (client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto, data, 1); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); } } if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } client_session2_setup(ssh, id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, cctx->cmd, cctx->env); debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0) fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); done: /* Send reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause); cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd); free(cctx->term); if (cctx->env != NULL) { for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++) free(cctx->env[i]); free(cctx->env); } free(cctx); } /* ** Multiplexing client support */ /* Exit signal handler */ static void control_client_sighandler(int signo) { muxclient_terminate = signo; } /* * Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to * mux master. */ static void control_client_sigrelay(int signo) { int save_errno = errno; if (muxserver_pid > 1) kill(muxserver_pid, signo); errno = save_errno; } static int mux_client_read(int fd, struct sshbuf *b, size_t need) { size_t have; ssize_t len; u_char *p; struct pollfd pfd; int r; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = POLLIN; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(b, need, &p)) != 0) fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (have = 0; have < need; ) { if (muxclient_terminate) { errno = EINTR; return -1; } len = read(fd, p + have, need - have); if (len == -1) { switch (errno) { #if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif case EAGAIN: (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case EINTR: continue; default: return -1; } } if (len == 0) { errno = EPIPE; return -1; } have += (size_t)len; } return 0; } static int mux_client_write_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m) { struct sshbuf *queue; u_int have, need; int r, oerrno, len; const u_char *ptr; struct pollfd pfd; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = POLLOUT; if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(queue, m)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); need = sshbuf_len(queue); ptr = sshbuf_ptr(queue); for (have = 0; have < need; ) { if (muxclient_terminate) { sshbuf_free(queue); errno = EINTR; return -1; } len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have); if (len == -1) { switch (errno) { #if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif case EAGAIN: (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case EINTR: continue; default: oerrno = errno; sshbuf_free(queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } } if (len == 0) { sshbuf_free(queue); errno = EPIPE; return -1; } have += (u_int)len; } sshbuf_free(queue); return 0; } static int mux_client_read_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m) { struct sshbuf *queue; size_t need, have; const u_char *ptr; int r, oerrno; if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, 4) != 0) { if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE) debug3("%s: read header failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(queue)); if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, need) != 0) { oerrno = errno; debug3("%s: read body failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(queue, &ptr, &have)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(m, ptr, have)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(queue); return 0; } static int mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; u_int type, ver; int r, ret = -1; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0) fatal("%s: hello: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* no extensions */ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) { debug("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their HELLO */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { debug("%s: read packet failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) { error("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode version: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) { error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); goto out; } debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) { char *name = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0) { /* value */ error("%s: malformed extension: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name); free(name); } /* success */ ret = 0; out: sshbuf_free(m); return ret; } static u_int mux_client_request_alive(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; u_int pid, type, rid; int r; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { sshbuf_free(m); return 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode remote ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode PID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); debug3("%s: done pid = %u", __func__, pid); muxclient_request_id++; return pid; } static void mux_client_request_terminate(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; u_int type, rid; int r; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_TERMINATE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { /* Remote end exited already */ if (errno == EPIPE) { sshbuf_free(m); return; } fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e); default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } sshbuf_free(m); muxclient_request_id++; } static int mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e, *fwd_desc; const char *lhost, *chost; u_int type, rid; int r; fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd); debug("Requesting %s %s", cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc); free(fwd_desc); type = cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD; if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) lhost = fwd->listen_path; else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL) lhost = ""; else if (*fwd->listen_host == '\0') lhost = "*"; else lhost = fwd->listen_host; if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) chost = fwd->connect_path; else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) chost = ""; else chost = fwd->connect_host; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ftype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, lhost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->connect_port)) != 0) fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { sshbuf_free(m); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT: if (cancel_flag) fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &fwd->allocated_port)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode port: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", fwd->allocated_port, fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "", fwd->connect_port); if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD) fprintf(stdout, "%i\n", fwd->allocated_port); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e); return -1; case MUX_S_FAILURE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); error("%s: forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e); return -1; default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } sshbuf_free(m); muxclient_request_id++; return 0; } static int mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag) { int i, ret = 0; debug3("%s: %s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", __func__, cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request", options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards); /* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ? MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL, options.local_forwards + i) != 0) ret = -1; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, options.remote_forwards + i) != 0) ret = -1; } return ret; } static int mux_client_request_session(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; const char *term; u_int echar, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen; extern char **environ; int r, i, devnull, rawmode; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__); return -1; } ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); if (stdin_null_flag) { if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } if ((term = getenv("TERM")) == NULL) term = ""; echar = 0xffffffff; if (options.escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) echar = (u_int)options.escape_char; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, tty_flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_x11)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_agent)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, subsystem_flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echar)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, term)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, command)) != 0) fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Pass environment */ if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) { for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { if (!env_permitted(environ[i])) continue; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, environ[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.setenv[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); debug3("%s: session request sent", __func__); /* Read their reply */ sshbuf_reset(m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { error("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(m); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); error("Master refused session request: %s", e); sshbuf_free(m); return -1; case MUX_S_FAILURE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); error("%s: session request failed: %s", __func__, e); sshbuf_free(m); return -1; default: sshbuf_free(m); error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); return -1; } muxclient_request_id++; if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); platform_pledge_mux(); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); rawmode = tty_flag; if (tty_flag) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. * Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message. * This process must read the value and wait for the closure of * the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will * terminate early too (possibly losing data). */ for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) { sshbuf_reset(m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) break; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (type) { case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (esid != sid) fatal("%s: tty alloc fail on unknown session: " "my id %u theirs %u", __func__, sid, esid); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); rawmode = 0; continue; case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (esid != sid) fatal("%s: exit on unknown session: " "my id %u theirs %u", __func__, sid, esid); if (exitval_seen) fatal("%s: exitval sent twice", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &exitval)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode exit value: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); exitval_seen = 1; continue; default: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); } } close(fd); if (rawmode) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (muxclient_terminate) { debug2("Exiting on signal: %s", strsignal(muxclient_terminate)); exitval = 255; } else if (!exitval_seen) { debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly"); exitval = 255; } else debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval); if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host); exit(exitval); } static int mux_client_proxy(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; u_int type, rid; int r; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_PROXY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { sshbuf_free(m); return 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); if (type != MUX_S_PROXY) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); } sshbuf_free(m); debug3("%s: done", __func__); muxclient_request_id++; return 0; } static int mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; u_int type, rid, sid; int r, devnull; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__); return -1; } ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); if (stdin_null_flag) { if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.stdio_forward_host)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.stdio_forward_port)) != 0) fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); platform_pledge_mux(); debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__); /* Read their reply */ sshbuf_reset(m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { error("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(m); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(m); fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e); default: sshbuf_free(m); error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); return -1; } muxclient_request_id++; ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); /* * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. */ sshbuf_reset(m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { if (errno == EPIPE || (errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0)) return 0; fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type); } static void mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; u_int type, rid; int r; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fatal("%s: stop listening request failed: %s", __func__, e); default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } sshbuf_free(m); muxclient_request_id++; } /* Multiplex client main loop. */ int muxclient(const char *path) { struct sockaddr_un addr; int sock; u_int pid; if (muxclient_command == 0) { if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD; else muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN; } switch (options.control_master) { case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO: case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK: debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master"); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO: break; default: return -1; } memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) fatal("ControlPath too long ('%s' >= %u bytes)", path, (unsigned int)sizeof(addr.sun_path)); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) { switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: break; default: fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, strerror(errno)); } if (errno == ECONNREFUSED && options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) { debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path); unlink(path); } else if (errno == ENOENT) { debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path); } else { error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, strerror(errno)); } close(sock); return -1; } set_nonblock(sock); if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) { error("%s: master hello exchange failed", __func__); close(sock); return -1; } switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK: if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0) fatal("%s: master alive check failed", __func__); fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%u)\r\n", pid); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE: mux_client_request_terminate(sock); if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) { error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__); return -1; } mux_client_request_session(sock); return -1; case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP: mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock); if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0) error("%s: master cancel forward request failed", __func__); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY: mux_client_proxy(sock); return (sock); default: fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command); } } openssh-8.2p1/myproposal.h010064400017500001750000000072511362136622600140440ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.67 2020/01/24 00:28:57 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #define KEX_SERVER_KEX \ "curve25519-sha256," \ "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \ "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \ "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" #define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com," \ "ssh-ed25519," \ "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \ "rsa-sha2-512," \ "rsa-sha2-256," \ "ssh-rsa" #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com" #define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT #define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-64@openssh.com," \ "umac-128@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256," \ "hmac-sha2-512," \ "hmac-sha1" #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */ #define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com," \ "ssh-ed25519," \ "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \ "rsa-sha2-512," \ "rsa-sha2-256" #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com" #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" #define KEX_CLIENT \ KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \ KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \ KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG #define KEX_SERVER \ KEX_SERVER_KEX, \ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \ KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_SERVER_MAC, \ KEX_SERVER_MAC, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG openssh-8.2p1/nchan.c010064400017500001750000000301101362136622600127070ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.70 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "packet.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" /* * SSH Protocol 1.5 aka New Channel Protocol * Thanks to Martina, Axel and everyone who left Erlangen, leaving me bored. * Written by Markus Friedl in October 1999 * * Protocol versions 1.3 and 1.5 differ in the handshake protocol used for the * tear down of channels: * * 1.3: strict request-ack-protocol: * CLOSE -> * <- CLOSE_CONFIRM * * 1.5: uses variations of: * IEOF -> * <- OCLOSE * <- IEOF * OCLOSE -> * i.e. both sides have to close the channel * * 2.0: the EOF messages are optional * * See the debugging output from 'ssh -v' and 'sshd -d' of * ssh-1.2.27 as an example. * */ /* functions manipulating channel states */ /* * EVENTS update channel input/output states execute ACTIONS */ /* * ACTIONS: should never update the channel states */ static void chan_send_eof2(struct ssh *, Channel *); static void chan_send_eow2(struct ssh *, Channel *); /* helper */ static void chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *, Channel *); static void chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *, Channel *); static void chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *, Channel *); static const char *ostates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_ieof", "closed" }; static const char *istates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_oclose", "closed" }; static void chan_set_istate(Channel *c, u_int next) { if (c->istate > CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || next > CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) fatal("chan_set_istate: bad state %d -> %d", c->istate, next); debug2("channel %d: input %s -> %s", c->self, istates[c->istate], istates[next]); c->istate = next; } static void chan_set_ostate(Channel *c, u_int next) { if (c->ostate > CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED || next > CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) fatal("chan_set_ostate: bad state %d -> %d", c->ostate, next); debug2("channel %d: output %s -> %s", c->self, ostates[c->ostate], ostates[next]); c->ostate = next; } void chan_read_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: read failed", c->self); switch (c->istate) { case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c); chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN); break; default: error("channel %d: chan_read_failed for istate %d", c->self, c->istate); break; } } void chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: ibuf empty", c->self); if (sshbuf_len(c->input)) { error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for non empty buffer", c->self); return; } switch (c->istate) { case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: if (!(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_LOCAL))) chan_send_eof2(ssh, c); chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); break; default: error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for istate %d", c->self, c->istate); break; } } void chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: obuf empty", c->self); if (sshbuf_len(c->output)) { error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for non empty buffer", c->self); return; } switch (c->ostate) { case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: chan_shutdown_write(ssh, c); chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED); break; default: error("channel %d: internal error: obuf_empty for ostate %d", c->self, c->ostate); break; } } void chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: rcvd eow", c->self); switch (c->istate) { case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c); chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); break; } } static void chan_send_eof2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int r; debug2("channel %d: send eof", c->self); switch (c->istate) { case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", __func__, c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_SENT; break; default: error("channel %d: cannot send eof for istate %d", c->self, c->istate); break; } } static void chan_send_close2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int r; debug2("channel %d: send close", c->self); if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED || c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) { error("channel %d: cannot send close for istate/ostate %d/%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); } else if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) { error("channel %d: already sent close", c->self); } else { if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", __func__, c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT; } } static void chan_send_eow2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int r; debug2("channel %d: send eow", c->self); if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) { error("channel %d: must not sent eow on closed output", c->self); return; } if (!(datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) return; if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", __func__, c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "eow@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* shared */ void chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: rcvd eof", c->self); c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_RCVD; if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN); if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN && sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0 && !CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); } void chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: rcvd close", c->self); if (!(c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL)) { if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) error("channel %d: protocol error: close rcvd twice", c->self); c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD; } if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { /* tear down larval channels immediately */ chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED); chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); return; } switch (c->ostate) { case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: /* * wait until a data from the channel is consumed if a CLOSE * is received */ chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN); break; } switch (c->istate) { case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c); chan_shutdown_extended_read(ssh, c); chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); break; case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: if (!(c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL)) chan_send_eof2(ssh, c); chan_shutdown_extended_read(ssh, c); chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); break; } } void chan_write_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: write failed", c->self); switch (c->ostate) { case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: chan_shutdown_write(ssh, c); if (strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0) chan_send_eow2(ssh, c); chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED); break; default: error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d", c->self, c->ostate); break; } } void chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE; } int chan_is_dead(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int do_send) { if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE) { debug2("channel %d: zombie", c->self); return 1; } if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) return 0; if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && c->efd != -1 && sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0) { debug2("channel %d: active efd: %d len %zu", c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); return 0; } if (c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL) { debug2("channel %d: is dead (local)", c->self); return 1; } if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { if (do_send) { chan_send_close2(ssh, c); } else { /* channel would be dead if we sent a close */ if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) { debug2("channel %d: almost dead", c->self); return 1; } } } if ((c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) && (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) { debug2("channel %d: is dead", c->self); return 1; } return 0; } /* helper */ static void chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { sshbuf_reset(c->output); if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) return; /* shutdown failure is allowed if write failed already */ debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])", c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->wfd, c->efd, channel_format_extended_usage(c)); if (c->sock != -1) { if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_WR) == -1) { debug2("channel %d: %s: shutdown() failed for " "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, __func__, c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); } } else { if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd) < 0) { logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for " "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, __func__, c->wfd, c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); } } } static void chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) return; debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])", c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd, channel_format_extended_usage(c)); if (c->sock != -1) { /* * shutdown(sock, SHUT_READ) may return ENOTCONN if the * write side has been closed already. (bug on Linux) * HP-UX may return ENOTCONN also. */ if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RD) == -1 && errno != ENOTCONN) { error("channel %d: %s: shutdown() failed for " "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, __func__, c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); } } else { if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd) < 0) { logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for " "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, __func__, c->rfd, c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); } } } static void chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL || c->efd == -1) return; if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) return; debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])", c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd, channel_format_extended_usage(c)); if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd) < 0) { logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for " "extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, __func__, c->efd, c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); } } openssh-8.2p1/nchan.ms010064400017500001750000000075561362136622600131260ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: nchan.ms,v 1.8 2003/11/21 11:57:03 djm Exp $ .\" .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .TL OpenSSH Channel Close Protocol 1.5 Implementation .SH Channel Input State Diagram .PS reset l=1 s=1.2 ellipsewid=s*ellipsewid boxwid=s*boxwid ellipseht=s*ellipseht S1: ellipse "INPUT" "OPEN" move right 2*l from last ellipse.e S4: ellipse "INPUT" "CLOSED" move down l from last ellipse.s S3: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "OCLOSED" move down l from 1st ellipse.s S2: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" arrow "" "rcvd OCLOSE/" "shutdown_read" "send IEOF" from S1.e to S4.w arrow "ibuf_empty/" "send IEOF" from S2.e to S3.w arrow from S1.s to S2.n box invis "read_failed/" "shutdown_read" with .e at last arrow.c arrow from S3.n to S4.s box invis "rcvd OCLOSE/" "-" with .w at last arrow.c ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w arrow from S2.ne to S4.sw box invis "rcvd OCLOSE/ " with .e at last arrow.c box invis " send IEOF" with .w at last arrow.c .PE .SH Channel Output State Diagram .PS S1: ellipse "OUTPUT" "OPEN" move right 2*l from last ellipse.e S3: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "IEOF" move down l from last ellipse.s S4: ellipse "OUTPUT" "CLOSED" move down l from 1st ellipse.s S2: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" arrow "" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send OCLOSE" from S1.e to S3.w arrow "obuf_empty ||" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send OCLOSE" from S2.e to S4.w arrow from S1.s to S2.n box invis "rcvd IEOF/" "-" with .e at last arrow.c arrow from S3.s to S4.n box invis "rcvd IEOF/" "-" with .w at last arrow.c ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w .PE .SH Notes .PP The input buffer is filled with data from the socket (the socket represents the local consumer/producer of the forwarded channel). The data is then sent over the INPUT-end (transmit-end) of the channel to the remote peer. Data sent by the peer is received on the OUTPUT-end (receive-end), saved in the output buffer and written to the socket. .PP If the local protocol instance has forwarded all data on the INPUT-end of the channel, it sends an IEOF message to the peer. If the peer receives the IEOF and has consumed all data he replies with an OCLOSE. When the local instance receives the OCLOSE he considers the INPUT-half of the channel closed. The peer has his OUTOUT-half closed. .PP A channel can be deallocated by a protocol instance if both the INPUT- and the OUTOUT-half on his side of the channel are closed. Note that when an instance is unable to consume the received data, he is permitted to send an OCLOSE before the matching IEOF is received. openssh-8.2p1/nchan2.ms010064400017500001750000000066021362136622600131770ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: nchan2.ms,v 1.4 2008/05/15 23:52:24 djm Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .TL OpenSSH Channel Close Protocol 2.0 Implementation .SH Channel Input State Diagram .PS reset l=1 s=1.2 ellipsewid=s*ellipsewid boxwid=s*boxwid ellipseht=s*ellipseht S1: ellipse "INPUT" "OPEN" move right 2*l from last ellipse.e S3: ellipse invis move down l from last ellipse.s S4: ellipse "INPUT" "CLOSED" move down l from 1st ellipse.s S2: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" arrow from S1.e to S4.n box invis "rcvd CLOSE/" "shutdown_read" with .sw at last arrow.c arrow "ibuf_empty ||" "rcvd CLOSE/" "send EOF" "" from S2.e to S4.w arrow from S1.s to S2.n box invis "read_failed ||" "rcvd EOW/" "shutdown_read" with .e at last arrow.c ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w .PE .SH Channel Output State Diagram .PS S1: ellipse "OUTPUT" "OPEN" move right 2*l from last ellipse.e S3: ellipse invis move down l from last ellipse.s S4: ellipse "OUTPUT" "CLOSED" move down l from 1st ellipse.s S2: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" arrow from S1.e to S4.n box invis "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send EOW" with .sw at last arrow.c arrow "obuf_empty ||" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "" from S2.e to S4.w arrow from S1.s to S2.n box invis "rcvd EOF ||" "rcvd CLOSE/" "-" with .e at last arrow.c ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w .PE .SH Notes .PP The input buffer is filled with data from the socket (the socket represents the local consumer/producer of the forwarded channel). The data is then sent over the INPUT-end (transmit-end) of the channel to the remote peer. Data sent by the peer is received on the OUTPUT-end (receive-end), saved in the output buffer and written to the socket. .PP If the local protocol instance has forwarded all data on the INPUT-end of the channel, it sends an EOF message to the peer. .PP A CLOSE message is sent to the peer if both the INPUT- and the OUTOUT-half of the local end of the channel are closed. .PP The channel can be deallocated by a protocol instance if a CLOSE message he been both sent and received. openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600143205ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in010064400017500001750000000036021362136622600164420ustar00djmdjmsysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ srcdir=@srcdir@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ VPATH=@srcdir@ CC=@CC@ LD=@LD@ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@ PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@ LIBS=@LIBS@ AR=@AR@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@ LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@ LDFLAGS_NOPIE=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS_NOPIE@ OPENBSD=base64.o \ basename.o \ bcrypt_pbkdf.o \ bcrypt_pbkdf.o \ bindresvport.o \ blowfish.o \ daemon.o \ dirname.o \ explicit_bzero.o \ fmt_scaled.o \ freezero.o \ fnmatch.o \ getcwd.o \ getgrouplist.o \ getopt_long.o \ getrrsetbyname.o \ glob.o \ inet_aton.o \ inet_ntoa.o \ inet_ntop.o \ md5.o \ memmem.o \ mktemp.o \ pwcache.o \ readpassphrase.o \ reallocarray.o \ recallocarray.o \ rresvport.o \ setenv.o \ setproctitle.o \ sha1.o \ sha2.o \ sigact.o \ strcasestr.o \ strlcat.o \ strlcpy.o \ strmode.o \ strndup.o \ strnlen.o \ strptime.o \ strsep.o \ strtoll.o \ strtonum.o \ strtoull.o \ strtoul.o \ timingsafe_bcmp.o \ vis.o COMPAT= arc4random.o \ bsd-asprintf.o \ bsd-closefrom.o \ bsd-cygwin_util.o \ bsd-err.o \ bsd-flock.o \ bsd-getline.o \ bsd-getpagesize.o \ bsd-getpeereid.o \ bsd-malloc.o \ bsd-misc.o \ bsd-nextstep.o \ bsd-openpty.o \ bsd-poll.o \ bsd-setres_id.o \ bsd-signal.o \ bsd-snprintf.o \ bsd-statvfs.o \ bsd-waitpid.o \ fake-rfc2553.o \ getrrsetbyname-ldns.o \ kludge-fd_set.o \ openssl-compat.o \ libressl-api-compat.o \ xcrypt.o PORTS= port-aix.o \ port-irix.o \ port-linux.o \ port-solaris.o \ port-net.o \ port-uw.o .c.o: $(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< all: libopenbsd-compat.a $(COMPAT): ../config.h $(OPENBSD): ../config.h $(PORTS): ../config.h libopenbsd-compat.a: $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS) $(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS) $(RANLIB) $@ clean: rm -f *.o *.a core distclean: clean rm -f Makefile *~ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c010064400017500001750000000160741362136622600166020ustar00djmdjm/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypto/arc4random.c */ /* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.25 2013/10/01 18:34:57 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H # include #endif #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #include "log.h" #define KEYSTREAM_ONLY #include "chacha_private.h" #ifdef __GNUC__ #define inline __inline #else /* !__GNUC__ */ #define inline #endif /* !__GNUC__ */ /* OpenSSH isn't multithreaded */ #define _ARC4_LOCK() #define _ARC4_UNLOCK() #define KEYSZ 32 #define IVSZ 8 #define BLOCKSZ 64 #define RSBUFSZ (16*BLOCKSZ) static int rs_initialized; static pid_t rs_stir_pid; static chacha_ctx rs; /* chacha context for random keystream */ static u_char rs_buf[RSBUFSZ]; /* keystream blocks */ static size_t rs_have; /* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */ static size_t rs_count; /* bytes till reseed */ static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen); static inline void _rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n) { if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ) return; chacha_keysetup(&rs, buf, KEYSZ * 8, 0); chacha_ivsetup(&rs, buf + KEYSZ); } #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL # ifndef SSH_RANDOM_DEV # define SSH_RANDOM_DEV "/dev/urandom" # endif /* SSH_RANDOM_DEV */ static void getrnd(u_char *s, size_t len) { int fd; ssize_t r; size_t o = 0; #ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM if ((r = getrandom(s, len, 0)) > 0 && (size_t)r == len) return; #endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */ if ((fd = open(SSH_RANDOM_DEV, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("Couldn't open %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno)); while (o < len) { r = read(fd, s + o, len - o); if (r < 0) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) continue; fatal("read %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno)); } o += r; } close(fd); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ static void _rs_stir(void) { u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ]; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0) fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error 0x%lx)", (unsigned long)ERR_get_error()); #else getrnd(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #endif if (!rs_initialized) { rs_initialized = 1; _rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); } else _rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* invalidate rs_buf */ rs_have = 0; memset(rs_buf, 0, RSBUFSZ); rs_count = 1600000; } static inline void _rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len) { pid_t pid = getpid(); if (rs_count <= len || !rs_initialized || rs_stir_pid != pid) { rs_stir_pid = pid; _rs_stir(); } else rs_count -= len; } static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen) { #ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY memset(rs_buf, 0,RSBUFSZ); #endif /* fill rs_buf with the keystream */ chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rs, rs_buf, rs_buf, RSBUFSZ); /* mix in optional user provided data */ if (dat) { size_t i, m; m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ); for (i = 0; i < m; i++) rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i]; } /* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */ _rs_init(rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ); memset(rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ); rs_have = RSBUFSZ - KEYSZ - IVSZ; } static inline void _rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n) { u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf; size_t m; _rs_stir_if_needed(n); while (n > 0) { if (rs_have > 0) { m = MIN(n, rs_have); memcpy(buf, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, m); memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, m); buf += m; n -= m; rs_have -= m; } if (rs_have == 0) _rs_rekey(NULL, 0); } } static inline void _rs_random_u32(u_int32_t *val) { _rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val)); if (rs_have < sizeof(*val)) _rs_rekey(NULL, 0); memcpy(val, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, sizeof(*val)); memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, sizeof(*val)); rs_have -= sizeof(*val); return; } void arc4random_stir(void) { _ARC4_LOCK(); _rs_stir(); _ARC4_UNLOCK(); } void arc4random_addrandom(u_char *dat, int datlen) { int m; _ARC4_LOCK(); if (!rs_initialized) _rs_stir(); while (datlen > 0) { m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ); _rs_rekey(dat, m); dat += m; datlen -= m; } _ARC4_UNLOCK(); } u_int32_t arc4random(void) { u_int32_t val; _ARC4_LOCK(); _rs_random_u32(&val); _ARC4_UNLOCK(); return val; } /* * If we are providing arc4random, then we can provide a more efficient * arc4random_buf(). */ # ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF void arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n) { _ARC4_LOCK(); _rs_random_buf(buf, n); _ARC4_UNLOCK(); } # endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */ #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ /* arc4random_buf() that uses platform arc4random() */ #if !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) void arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n) { size_t i; u_int32_t r = 0; char *buf = (char *)_buf; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) r = arc4random(); buf[i] = r & 0xff; r >>= 8; } explicit_bzero(&r, sizeof(r)); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) */ #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM /* * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound * avoiding "modulo bias". * * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This * guarantees the selected random number will be inside * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound) * after reduction modulo upper_bound. */ u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound) { u_int32_t r, min; if (upper_bound < 2) return 0; /* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */ min = -upper_bound % upper_bound; /* * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need * to re-roll. */ for (;;) { r = arc4random(); if (r >= min) break; } return r % upper_bound; } #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */ #if 0 /*-------- Test code for i386 --------*/ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { const int iter = 1000000; int i; pctrval v; v = rdtsc(); for (i = 0; i < iter; i++) arc4random(); v = rdtsc() - v; v /= iter; printf("%qd cycles\n", v); exit(0); } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/base64.c010064400017500001750000000243761362136622600156400ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: base64.c,v 1.5 2006/10/21 09:55:03 otto Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS * SOFTWARE. */ /* * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc. * * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior * permission. * * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software. No immunity is * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A * PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/base64.c */ #include "includes.h" #if (!defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP)) || (!defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON)) #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "base64.h" static const char Base64[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; static const char Pad64 = '='; /* (From RFC1521 and draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt) The following encoding technique is taken from RFC 1521 by Borenstein and Freed. It is reproduced here in a slightly edited form for convenience. A 65-character subset of US-ASCII is used, enabling 6 bits to be represented per printable character. (The extra 65th character, "=", is used to signify a special processing function.) The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a 24-bit input group is formed by concatenating 3 8-bit input groups. These 24 bits are then treated as 4 concatenated 6-bit groups, each of which is translated into a single digit in the base64 alphabet. Each 6-bit group is used as an index into an array of 64 printable characters. The character referenced by the index is placed in the output string. Table 1: The Base64 Alphabet Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding 0 A 17 R 34 i 51 z 1 B 18 S 35 j 52 0 2 C 19 T 36 k 53 1 3 D 20 U 37 l 54 2 4 E 21 V 38 m 55 3 5 F 22 W 39 n 56 4 6 G 23 X 40 o 57 5 7 H 24 Y 41 p 58 6 8 I 25 Z 42 q 59 7 9 J 26 a 43 r 60 8 10 K 27 b 44 s 61 9 11 L 28 c 45 t 62 + 12 M 29 d 46 u 63 / 13 N 30 e 47 v 14 O 31 f 48 w (pad) = 15 P 32 g 49 x 16 Q 33 h 50 y Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available at the end of the data being encoded. A full encoding quantum is always completed at the end of a quantity. When fewer than 24 input bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on the right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups. Padding at the end of the data is performed using the '=' character. Since all base64 input is an integral number of octets, only the ------------------------------------------------- following cases can arise: (1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded output will be an integral multiple of 4 characters with no "=" padding, (2) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits; here, the final unit of encoded output will be two characters followed by two "=" padding characters, or (3) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 16 bits; here, the final unit of encoded output will be three characters followed by one "=" padding character. */ #if !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) int b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, size_t targsize) { size_t datalength = 0; u_char input[3]; u_char output[4]; u_int i; while (2 < srclength) { input[0] = *src++; input[1] = *src++; input[2] = *src++; srclength -= 3; output[0] = input[0] >> 2; output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4); output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6); output[3] = input[2] & 0x3f; if (datalength + 4 > targsize) return (-1); target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]]; target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]]; target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]]; target[datalength++] = Base64[output[3]]; } /* Now we worry about padding. */ if (0 != srclength) { /* Get what's left. */ input[0] = input[1] = input[2] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < srclength; i++) input[i] = *src++; output[0] = input[0] >> 2; output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4); output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6); if (datalength + 4 > targsize) return (-1); target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]]; target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]]; if (srclength == 1) target[datalength++] = Pad64; else target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]]; target[datalength++] = Pad64; } if (datalength >= targsize) return (-1); target[datalength] = '\0'; /* Returned value doesn't count \0. */ return (datalength); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) */ #if !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON) /* skips all whitespace anywhere. converts characters, four at a time, starting at (or after) src from base - 64 numbers into three 8 bit bytes in the target area. it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or -1 on error. */ int b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize) { u_int tarindex, state; int ch; char *pos; state = 0; tarindex = 0; while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') { if (isspace(ch)) /* Skip whitespace anywhere. */ continue; if (ch == Pad64) break; pos = strchr(Base64, ch); if (pos == 0) /* A non-base64 character. */ return (-1); switch (state) { case 0: if (target) { if (tarindex >= targsize) return (-1); target[tarindex] = (pos - Base64) << 2; } state = 1; break; case 1: if (target) { if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize) return (-1); target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64) >> 4; target[tarindex+1] = ((pos - Base64) & 0x0f) << 4 ; } tarindex++; state = 2; break; case 2: if (target) { if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize) return (-1); target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64) >> 2; target[tarindex+1] = ((pos - Base64) & 0x03) << 6; } tarindex++; state = 3; break; case 3: if (target) { if (tarindex >= targsize) return (-1); target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64); } tarindex++; state = 0; break; } } /* * We are done decoding Base-64 chars. Let's see if we ended * on a byte boundary, and/or with erroneous trailing characters. */ if (ch == Pad64) { /* We got a pad char. */ ch = *src++; /* Skip it, get next. */ switch (state) { case 0: /* Invalid = in first position */ case 1: /* Invalid = in second position */ return (-1); case 2: /* Valid, means one byte of info */ /* Skip any number of spaces. */ for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++) if (!isspace(ch)) break; /* Make sure there is another trailing = sign. */ if (ch != Pad64) return (-1); ch = *src++; /* Skip the = */ /* Fall through to "single trailing =" case. */ /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 3: /* Valid, means two bytes of info */ /* * We know this char is an =. Is there anything but * whitespace after it? */ for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++) if (!isspace(ch)) return (-1); /* * Now make sure for cases 2 and 3 that the "extra" * bits that slopped past the last full byte were * zeros. If we don't check them, they become a * subliminal channel. */ if (target && target[tarindex] != 0) return (-1); } } else { /* * We ended by seeing the end of the string. Make sure we * have no partial bytes lying around. */ if (state != 0) return (-1); } return (tarindex); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON) */ #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/base64.h010064400017500001750000000053071362136622600156360ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS * SOFTWARE. */ /* * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc. * * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior * permission. * * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software. No immunity is * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A * PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. */ #ifndef _BSD_BASE64_H #define _BSD_BASE64_H #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE___B64_NTOP # ifndef HAVE_B64_NTOP int b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, size_t targsize); # endif /* !HAVE_B64_NTOP */ # define __b64_ntop(a,b,c,d) b64_ntop(a,b,c,d) #endif /* HAVE___B64_NTOP */ #ifndef HAVE___B64_PTON # ifndef HAVE_B64_PTON int b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize); # endif /* !HAVE_B64_PTON */ # define __b64_pton(a,b,c) b64_pton(a,b,c) #endif /* HAVE___B64_PTON */ #endif /* _BSD_BASE64_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/basename.c010064400017500001750000000034341362136622600163170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: basename.c,v 1.14 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1997, 2004 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/basename.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_BASENAME #include #include char * basename(const char *path) { static char bname[MAXPATHLEN]; size_t len; const char *endp, *startp; /* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { bname[0] = '.'; bname[1] = '\0'; return (bname); } /* Strip any trailing slashes */ endp = path + strlen(path) - 1; while (endp > path && *endp == '/') endp--; /* All slashes becomes "/" */ if (endp == path && *endp == '/') { bname[0] = '/'; bname[1] = '\0'; return (bname); } /* Find the start of the base */ startp = endp; while (startp > path && *(startp - 1) != '/') startp--; len = endp - startp + 1; if (len >= sizeof(bname)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return (NULL); } memcpy(bname, startp, len); bname[len] = '\0'; return (bname); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_BASENAME) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c010064400017500001750000000126071362136622600172170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.13 2015/01/12 03:20:04 tedu Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_BLF_H # include #endif #include "crypto_api.h" #ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH # undef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH #endif #define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES #define MINIMUM(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) /* * pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash * * The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing * function with the following modifications: * 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512. * 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits. * 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modified * to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite" * 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state * expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.) * * Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller * as a performance optimization. * * One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material * linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to * generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an * attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user * always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the * entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a * wise caller could do; we just do it for you. */ #define BCRYPT_WORDS 8 #define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4) static void bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out) { blf_ctx state; u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] = "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"; uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS]; int i; uint16_t j; size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; /* key expansion */ Blowfish_initstate(&state); Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen); for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen); Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen); } /* encryption */ j = 0; for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext), &j); for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t)); /* copy out */ for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) { out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff; out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff; out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff; out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff; } /* zap */ explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext)); explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata)); explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state)); } int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t saltlen, u_int8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds) { u_int8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; u_int8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; u_int8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]; u_int8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]; u_int8_t *countsalt; size_t i, j, amt, stride; uint32_t count; size_t origkeylen = keylen; /* nothing crazy */ if (rounds < 1) return -1; if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 || keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out) || saltlen > 1<<20) return -1; if ((countsalt = calloc(1, saltlen + 4)) == NULL) return -1; stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out); amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride; memcpy(countsalt, salt, saltlen); /* collapse password */ crypto_hash_sha512(sha2pass, pass, passlen); /* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */ for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) { countsalt[saltlen + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff; countsalt[saltlen + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff; countsalt[saltlen + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff; countsalt[saltlen + 3] = count & 0xff; /* first round, salt is salt */ crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, countsalt, saltlen + 4); bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout); memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out)); for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) { /* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */ crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout)); bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout); for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++) out[j] ^= tmpout[j]; } /* * pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly. */ amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen); for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) { size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1); if (dest >= origkeylen) break; key[dest] = out[i]; } keylen -= i; } /* zap */ explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out)); free(countsalt); return 0; } #endif /* HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c010064400017500001750000000063711362136622600172700ustar00djmdjm/* This file has be substantially modified from the original OpenBSD source */ /* $OpenBSD: bindresvport.c,v 1.17 2005/12/21 01:40:22 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1996, Jason Downs. All rights reserved. * Copyright 1998, Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright 2000, Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/rpc/bindresvport.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA #include #include #include #include #include #include #define STARTPORT 600 #define ENDPORT (IPPORT_RESERVED - 1) #define NPORTS (ENDPORT - STARTPORT + 1) /* * Bind a socket to a privileged IP port */ int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa) { int error, af; struct sockaddr_storage myaddr; struct sockaddr_in *in; struct sockaddr_in6 *in6; u_int16_t *portp; u_int16_t port; socklen_t salen; int i; if (sa == NULL) { memset(&myaddr, 0, sizeof(myaddr)); sa = (struct sockaddr *)&myaddr; salen = sizeof(myaddr); if (getsockname(sd, sa, &salen) == -1) return -1; /* errno is correctly set */ af = sa->sa_family; memset(&myaddr, 0, salen); } else af = sa->sa_family; if (af == AF_INET) { in = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); portp = &in->sin_port; } else if (af == AF_INET6) { in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); portp = &in6->sin6_port; } else { errno = EPFNOSUPPORT; return (-1); } sa->sa_family = af; port = ntohs(*portp); if (port == 0) port = arc4random_uniform(NPORTS) + STARTPORT; /* Avoid warning */ error = -1; for(i = 0; i < NPORTS; i++) { *portp = htons(port); error = bind(sd, sa, salen); /* Terminate on success */ if (error == 0) break; /* Terminate on errors, except "address already in use" */ if ((error < 0) && !((errno == EADDRINUSE) || (errno == EINVAL))) break; port++; if (port > ENDPORT) port = STARTPORT; } return (error); } #endif /* HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/blf.h010064400017500001750000000067661362136622600153270ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: blf.h,v 1.7 2007/03/14 17:59:41 grunk Exp $ */ /* * Blowfish - a fast block cipher designed by Bruce Schneier * * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * This product includes software developed by Niels Provos. * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _BLF_H_ #define _BLF_H_ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && !defined(HAVE_BLH_H) /* Schneier specifies a maximum key length of 56 bytes. * This ensures that every key bit affects every cipher * bit. However, the subkeys can hold up to 72 bytes. * Warning: For normal blowfish encryption only 56 bytes * of the key affect all cipherbits. */ #define BLF_N 16 /* Number of Subkeys */ #define BLF_MAXKEYLEN ((BLF_N-2)*4) /* 448 bits */ #define BLF_MAXUTILIZED ((BLF_N+2)*4) /* 576 bits */ /* Blowfish context */ typedef struct BlowfishContext { u_int32_t S[4][256]; /* S-Boxes */ u_int32_t P[BLF_N + 2]; /* Subkeys */ } blf_ctx; /* Raw access to customized Blowfish * blf_key is just: * Blowfish_initstate( state ) * Blowfish_expand0state( state, key, keylen ) */ void Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *); void Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *); void Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *); void Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t); void Blowfish_expandstate (blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t); /* Standard Blowfish */ void blf_key(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t); void blf_enc(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int16_t); void blf_dec(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int16_t); void blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t); void blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t); void blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t); void blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t); /* Converts u_int8_t to u_int32_t */ u_int32_t Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t , u_int16_t *); #endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && !defined(HAVE_BLH_H) */ #endif /* _BLF_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c010064400017500001750000000561571362136622600163730ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: blowfish.c,v 1.18 2004/11/02 17:23:26 hshoexer Exp $ */ /* * Blowfish block cipher for OpenBSD * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Implementation advice by David Mazieres . * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * This product includes software developed by Niels Provos. * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * This code is derived from section 14.3 and the given source * in section V of Applied Cryptography, second edition. * Blowfish is an unpatented fast block cipher designed by * Bruce Schneier. */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \ !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC)) #if 0 #include /* used for debugging */ #include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_BLF_H #include #endif #undef inline #ifdef __GNUC__ #define inline __inline #else /* !__GNUC__ */ #define inline #endif /* !__GNUC__ */ /* Function for Feistel Networks */ #define F(s, x) ((((s)[ (((x)>>24)&0xFF)] \ + (s)[0x100 + (((x)>>16)&0xFF)]) \ ^ (s)[0x200 + (((x)>> 8)&0xFF)]) \ + (s)[0x300 + ( (x) &0xFF)]) #define BLFRND(s,p,i,j,n) (i ^= F(s,j) ^ (p)[n]) void Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr) { u_int32_t Xl; u_int32_t Xr; u_int32_t *s = c->S[0]; u_int32_t *p = c->P; Xl = *xl; Xr = *xr; Xl ^= p[0]; BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 1); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 2); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 3); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 4); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 5); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 6); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 7); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 8); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 9); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 10); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 11); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 12); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 13); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 14); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 15); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 16); *xl = Xr ^ p[17]; *xr = Xl; } void Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr) { u_int32_t Xl; u_int32_t Xr; u_int32_t *s = c->S[0]; u_int32_t *p = c->P; Xl = *xl; Xr = *xr; Xl ^= p[17]; BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 16); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 15); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 14); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 13); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 12); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 11); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 10); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 9); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 8); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 7); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 6); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 5); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 4); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 3); BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 2); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 1); *xl = Xr ^ p[0]; *xr = Xl; } void Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *c) { /* P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi */ static const blf_ctx initstate = { { { 0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7, 0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99, 0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16, 0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e, 0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee, 0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013, 0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef, 0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e, 0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60, 0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440, 0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce, 0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a, 0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e, 0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677, 0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193, 0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032, 0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88, 0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239, 0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e, 0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0, 0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3, 0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98, 0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88, 0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe, 0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6, 0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d, 0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b, 0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7, 0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba, 0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463, 0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f, 0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09, 0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3, 0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb, 0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279, 0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8, 0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab, 0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82, 0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db, 0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573, 0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0, 0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b, 0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790, 0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8, 0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4, 0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0, 0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7, 0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c, 0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad, 0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1, 0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299, 0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9, 0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477, 0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf, 0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49, 0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af, 0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa, 0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5, 0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41, 0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915, 0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400, 0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915, 0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664, 0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a}, { 0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623, 0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266, 0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1, 0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e, 0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6, 0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1, 0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e, 0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1, 0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737, 0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8, 0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff, 0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd, 0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701, 0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7, 0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41, 0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331, 0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf, 0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af, 0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e, 0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87, 0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c, 0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2, 0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16, 0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd, 0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b, 0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509, 0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e, 0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3, 0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f, 0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a, 0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4, 0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960, 0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66, 0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28, 0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802, 0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84, 0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510, 0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf, 0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14, 0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e, 0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50, 0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7, 0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8, 0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281, 0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99, 0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696, 0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128, 0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73, 0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0, 0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0, 0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105, 0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250, 0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3, 0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285, 0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00, 0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061, 0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb, 0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e, 0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735, 0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc, 0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9, 0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340, 0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20, 0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7}, { 0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934, 0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068, 0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af, 0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840, 0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45, 0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504, 0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a, 0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb, 0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee, 0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6, 0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42, 0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b, 0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2, 0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb, 0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527, 0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b, 0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33, 0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c, 0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3, 0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc, 0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17, 0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564, 0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b, 0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115, 0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922, 0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728, 0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0, 0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e, 0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37, 0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d, 0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804, 0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b, 0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3, 0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb, 0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d, 0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c, 0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350, 0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9, 0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a, 0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe, 0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d, 0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc, 0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f, 0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61, 0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2, 0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9, 0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2, 0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c, 0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e, 0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633, 0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10, 0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169, 0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52, 0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027, 0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5, 0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62, 0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634, 0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76, 0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24, 0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc, 0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4, 0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c, 0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837, 0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0}, { 0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b, 0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe, 0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b, 0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4, 0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8, 0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6, 0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304, 0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22, 0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4, 0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6, 0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9, 0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59, 0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593, 0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51, 0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28, 0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c, 0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b, 0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28, 0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c, 0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd, 0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a, 0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319, 0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb, 0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f, 0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991, 0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32, 0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680, 0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166, 0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae, 0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb, 0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5, 0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47, 0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370, 0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d, 0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84, 0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048, 0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8, 0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd, 0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9, 0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7, 0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38, 0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f, 0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c, 0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525, 0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1, 0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442, 0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964, 0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e, 0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8, 0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d, 0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f, 0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299, 0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02, 0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc, 0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614, 0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a, 0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6, 0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b, 0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0, 0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060, 0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e, 0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9, 0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f, 0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6} }, { 0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344, 0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89, 0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c, 0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917, 0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b } }; *c = initstate; } u_int32_t Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes, u_int16_t *current) { u_int8_t i; u_int16_t j; u_int32_t temp; temp = 0x00000000; j = *current; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, j++) { if (j >= databytes) j = 0; temp = (temp << 8) | data[j]; } *current = j; return temp; } void Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes) { u_int16_t i; u_int16_t j; u_int16_t k; u_int32_t temp; u_int32_t datal; u_int32_t datar; j = 0; for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) { /* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */ temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j); c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp; } j = 0; datal = 0x00000000; datar = 0x00000000; for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) { Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar); c->P[i] = datal; c->P[i + 1] = datar; } for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) { Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar); c->S[i][k] = datal; c->S[i][k + 1] = datar; } } } void Blowfish_expandstate(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes, const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes) { u_int16_t i; u_int16_t j; u_int16_t k; u_int32_t temp; u_int32_t datal; u_int32_t datar; j = 0; for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) { /* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */ temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j); c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp; } j = 0; datal = 0x00000000; datar = 0x00000000; for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) { datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j); datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j); Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar); c->P[i] = datal; c->P[i + 1] = datar; } for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) { datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j); datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j); Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar); c->S[i][k] = datal; c->S[i][k + 1] = datar; } } } void blf_key(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *k, u_int16_t len) { /* Initialize S-boxes and subkeys with Pi */ Blowfish_initstate(c); /* Transform S-boxes and subkeys with key */ Blowfish_expand0state(c, k, len); } void blf_enc(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks) { u_int32_t *d; u_int16_t i; d = data; for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) { Blowfish_encipher(c, d, d + 1); d += 2; } } void blf_dec(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks) { u_int32_t *d; u_int16_t i; d = data; for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) { Blowfish_decipher(c, d, d + 1); d += 2; } } void blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len) { u_int32_t l, r; u_int32_t i; for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) { l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3]; r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7]; Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r); data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff; data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff; data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff; data[3] = l & 0xff; data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff; data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff; data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff; data[7] = r & 0xff; data += 8; } } void blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len) { u_int32_t l, r; u_int32_t i; for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) { l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3]; r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7]; Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r); data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff; data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff; data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff; data[3] = l & 0xff; data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff; data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff; data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff; data[7] = r & 0xff; data += 8; } } void blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iv, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len) { u_int32_t l, r; u_int32_t i, j; for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) { for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) data[j] ^= iv[j]; l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3]; r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7]; Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r); data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff; data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff; data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff; data[3] = l & 0xff; data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff; data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff; data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff; data[7] = r & 0xff; iv = data; data += 8; } } void blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iva, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len) { u_int32_t l, r; u_int8_t *iv; u_int32_t i, j; iv = data + len - 16; data = data + len - 8; for (i = len - 8; i >= 8; i -= 8) { l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3]; r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7]; Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r); data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff; data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff; data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff; data[3] = l & 0xff; data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff; data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff; data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff; data[7] = r & 0xff; for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) data[j] ^= iv[j]; iv -= 8; data -= 8; } l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3]; r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7]; Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r); data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff; data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff; data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff; data[3] = l & 0xff; data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff; data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff; data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff; data[7] = r & 0xff; for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) data[j] ^= iva[j]; } #if 0 void report(u_int32_t data[], u_int16_t len) { u_int16_t i; for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2) printf("Block %0hd: %08lx %08lx.\n", i / 2, data[i], data[i + 1]); } void main(void) { blf_ctx c; char key[] = "AAAAA"; char key2[] = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; u_int32_t data[10]; u_int32_t data2[] = {0x424c4f57l, 0x46495348l}; u_int16_t i; /* First test */ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) data[i] = i; blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key, 5); blf_enc(&c, data, 5); blf_dec(&c, data, 1); blf_dec(&c, data + 2, 4); printf("Should read as 0 - 9.\n"); report(data, 10); /* Second test */ blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key2, strlen(key2)); blf_enc(&c, data2, 1); printf("\nShould read as: 0x324ed0fe 0xf413a203.\n"); report(data2, 2); blf_dec(&c, data2, 1); report(data2, 2); } #endif #endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \ !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC)) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c010064400017500001750000000044771362136622600171500ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker. * * Based originally on asprintf.c from OpenBSD: * Copyright (c) 1997 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" /* * Don't let systems with broken printf(3) avoid our replacements * via asprintf(3)/vasprintf(3) calling libc internally. */ #if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) # undef HAVE_VASPRINTF # undef HAVE_ASPRINTF #endif #ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF #include #include #include #define INIT_SZ 128 int vasprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, va_list ap) { int ret = -1; va_list ap2; char *string, *newstr; size_t len; VA_COPY(ap2, ap); if ((string = malloc(INIT_SZ)) == NULL) goto fail; ret = vsnprintf(string, INIT_SZ, fmt, ap2); if (ret >= 0 && ret < INIT_SZ) { /* succeeded with initial alloc */ *str = string; } else if (ret == INT_MAX || ret < 0) { /* Bad length */ free(string); goto fail; } else { /* bigger than initial, realloc allowing for nul */ len = (size_t)ret + 1; if ((newstr = realloc(string, len)) == NULL) { free(string); goto fail; } else { va_end(ap2); VA_COPY(ap2, ap); ret = vsnprintf(newstr, len, fmt, ap2); if (ret >= 0 && (size_t)ret < len) { *str = newstr; } else { /* failed with realloc'ed string, give up */ free(newstr); goto fail; } } } va_end(ap2); return (ret); fail: *str = NULL; errno = ENOMEM; va_end(ap2); return (-1); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF int asprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int ret; *str = NULL; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vasprintf(str, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c010064400017500001750000000075001362136622600173010ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2004-2005 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H # include # define NAMLEN(dirent) strlen((dirent)->d_name) #else # define dirent direct # define NAMLEN(dirent) (dirent)->d_namlen # ifdef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H # include # endif # ifdef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H # include # endif # ifdef HAVE_NDIR_H # include # endif #endif #if defined(HAVE_LIBPROC_H) # include #endif #ifndef OPEN_MAX # define OPEN_MAX 256 #endif #if 0 __unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: closefrom.c,v 1.11 2006/08/17 15:26:54 millert Exp $"; #endif /* lint */ #ifndef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM /* * Close all file descriptors greater than or equal to lowfd. */ static void closefrom_fallback(int lowfd) { long fd, maxfd; /* * Fall back on sysconf() or getdtablesize(). We avoid checking * resource limits since it is possible to open a file descriptor * and then drop the rlimit such that it is below the open fd. */ #ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX); #else maxfd = getdtablesize(); #endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */ if (maxfd < 0) maxfd = OPEN_MAX; for (fd = lowfd; fd < maxfd; fd++) (void) close((int) fd); } #endif /* HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */ #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM void closefrom(int lowfd) { (void) fcntl(lowfd, F_CLOSEM, 0); } #elif defined(HAVE_LIBPROC_H) && defined(HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO) void closefrom(int lowfd) { int i, r, sz; pid_t pid = getpid(); struct proc_fdinfo *fdinfo_buf = NULL; sz = proc_pidinfo(pid, PROC_PIDLISTFDS, 0, NULL, 0); if (sz == 0) return; /* no fds, really? */ else if (sz == -1) goto fallback; if ((fdinfo_buf = malloc(sz)) == NULL) goto fallback; r = proc_pidinfo(pid, PROC_PIDLISTFDS, 0, fdinfo_buf, sz); if (r < 0 || r > sz) goto fallback; for (i = 0; i < r / (int)PROC_PIDLISTFD_SIZE; i++) { if (fdinfo_buf[i].proc_fd >= lowfd) close(fdinfo_buf[i].proc_fd); } free(fdinfo_buf); return; fallback: free(fdinfo_buf); closefrom_fallback(lowfd); return; } #elif defined(HAVE_DIRFD) && defined(HAVE_PROC_PID) void closefrom(int lowfd) { long fd; char fdpath[PATH_MAX], *endp; struct dirent *dent; DIR *dirp; int len; /* Check for a /proc/$$/fd directory. */ len = snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/%ld/fd", (long)getpid()); if (len > 0 && (size_t)len < sizeof(fdpath) && (dirp = opendir(fdpath))) { while ((dent = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10); if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' && fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp)) (void) close((int) fd); } (void) closedir(dirp); return; } /* /proc/$$/fd strategy failed, fall back to brute force closure */ closefrom_fallback(lowfd); } #else void closefrom(int lowfd) { closefrom_fallback(lowfd); } #endif /* !HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */ #endif /* HAVE_CLOSEFROM */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c010064400017500001750000000151411362136622600176450ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv * * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to * binary mode on Windows systems. */ #define NO_BINARY_OPEN /* Avoid redefining open to binary_open for this file */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" int binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...) { va_list ap; mode_t mode; va_start(ap, flags); mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t); va_end(ap); return (open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode)); } int check_ntsec(const char *filename) { return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS)); } const char * cygwin_ssh_privsep_user() { static char cyg_privsep_user[DNLEN + UNLEN + 2]; if (!cyg_privsep_user[0]) { #ifdef CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user, sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0) #endif strlcpy(cyg_privsep_user, "sshd", sizeof(cyg_privsep_user)); } return cyg_privsep_user; } #define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1) #define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0])) static struct wenv { const char *name; size_t namelen; } wenv_arr[] = { { NL("ALLUSERSPROFILE=") }, { NL("COMPUTERNAME=") }, { NL("COMSPEC=") }, { NL("CYGWIN=") }, { NL("OS=") }, { NL("PATH=") }, { NL("PATHEXT=") }, { NL("PROGRAMFILES=") }, { NL("SYSTEMDRIVE=") }, { NL("SYSTEMROOT=") }, { NL("WINDIR=") } }; char ** fetch_windows_environment(void) { char **e, **p; unsigned int i, idx = 0; p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *)); for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) { for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) { if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen)) p[idx++] = *e; } } p[idx] = NULL; return p; } void free_windows_environment(char **p) { free(p); } /* * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ? * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match. * * The Cygwin version of this function must be case-insensitive and take * Unicode characters into account. */ static int __match_pattern (const wchar_t *s, const wchar_t *pattern) { for (;;) { /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */ if (!*pattern) return !*s; if (*pattern == '*') { /* Skip the asterisk. */ pattern++; /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */ if (!*pattern) return 1; /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') { /* * Look instances of the next character in * pattern, and try to match starting from * those. */ for (; *s; s++) if (*s == *pattern && __match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1)) return 1; /* Failed. */ return 0; } /* * Move ahead one character at a time and try to * match at each position. */ for (; *s; s++) if (__match_pattern(s, pattern)) return 1; /* Failed. */ return 0; } /* * There must be at least one more character in the string. * If we are at the end, fail. */ if (!*s) return 0; /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */ if (*pattern != '?' && towlower(*pattern) != towlower(*s)) return 0; /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */ s++; pattern++; } /* NOTREACHED */ } static int _match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern) { wchar_t *ws; wchar_t *wpattern; size_t len; int ret; if ((len = mbstowcs(NULL, s, 0)) < 0) return 0; ws = (wchar_t *) xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof (wchar_t)); mbstowcs(ws, s, len + 1); if ((len = mbstowcs(NULL, pattern, 0)) < 0) return 0; wpattern = (wchar_t *) xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof (wchar_t)); mbstowcs(wpattern, pattern, len + 1); ret = __match_pattern (ws, wpattern); free(ws); free(wpattern); return ret; } /* * Tries to match the string against the * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all. */ int cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern) { char sub[1024]; int negated; int got_positive; u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern); got_positive = 0; for (i = 0; i < len;) { /* Check if the subpattern is negated. */ if (pattern[i] == '!') { negated = 1; i++; } else negated = 0; /* * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the * subpattern to lowercase. */ for (subi = 0; i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ','; subi++, i++) sub[subi] = pattern[i]; /* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */ if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1) return 0; /* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */ if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',') i++; /* Null-terminate the subpattern. */ sub[subi] = '\0'; /* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */ if (_match_pattern(string, sub)) { if (negated) return -1; /* Negative */ else got_positive = 1; /* Positive */ } } /* * Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here. */ return got_positive; } #endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h010064400017500001750000000046371362136622600176620ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv * * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to * binary mode on Windows systems. */ #ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H #define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN #undef ERROR /* Avoid including windows headers. */ typedef void *HANDLE; #define INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ((HANDLE) -1) #define DNLEN 16 #define UNLEN 256 /* Cygwin functions for which declarations are only available when including windows headers, so we have to define them here explicitly. */ extern HANDLE cygwin_logon_user (const struct passwd *, const char *); extern void cygwin_set_impersonation_token (const HANDLE); #include #include #define CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER (cygwin_ssh_privsep_user()) const char *cygwin_ssh_privsep_user(); int binary_open(const char *, int , ...); int check_ntsec(const char *); char **fetch_windows_environment(void); void free_windows_environment(char **); int cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *); #ifndef NO_BINARY_OPEN #define open binary_open #endif #endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ #endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c010064400017500001750000000042331362136622600161000ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2015 Tim Rice * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef HAVE_ERR void err(int r, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno)); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); fputc('\n', stderr); va_end(args); exit(r); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_ERRX void errx(int r, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); fputc('\n', stderr); va_end(args); exit(r); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_WARN void warn(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno)); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); fputc('\n', stderr); va_end(args); } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-flock.c010064400017500001750000000043551362136622600164130ustar00djmdjm/* $NetBSD: flock.c,v 1.6 2008/04/28 20:24:12 martin Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 2001 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation * by Todd Vierling. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Emulate flock() with fcntl(), where available. * Otherwise, don't do locking; just pretend success. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_FLOCK #include #include int flock(int fd, int op) { int rc = 0; #if defined(F_SETLK) && defined(F_SETLKW) struct flock fl = {0}; switch (op & (LOCK_EX|LOCK_SH|LOCK_UN)) { case LOCK_EX: fl.l_type = F_WRLCK; break; case LOCK_SH: fl.l_type = F_RDLCK; break; case LOCK_UN: fl.l_type = F_UNLCK; break; default: errno = EINVAL; return -1; } fl.l_whence = SEEK_SET; rc = fcntl(fd, op & LOCK_NB ? F_SETLK : F_SETLKW, &fl); if (rc && (errno == EAGAIN)) errno = EWOULDBLOCK; #else rc = -1; errno = ENOSYS; #endif return rc; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-getline.c010064400017500001750000000056311362136622600167420ustar00djmdjm/* $NetBSD: getline.c,v 1.1.1.6 2015/01/02 20:34:27 christos Exp $ */ /* NetBSD: getline.c,v 1.2 2014/09/16 17:23:50 christos Exp */ /*- * Copyright (c) 2011 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation * by Christos Zoulas. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* NETBSD ORIGINAL: external/bsd/file/dist/src/getline.c */ #include "includes.h" #if 0 #include "file.h" #endif #if !HAVE_GETLINE #include #include #include #include #include static ssize_t getdelim(char **buf, size_t *bufsiz, int delimiter, FILE *fp) { char *ptr, *eptr; if (*buf == NULL || *bufsiz == 0) { if ((*buf = malloc(BUFSIZ)) == NULL) return -1; *bufsiz = BUFSIZ; } for (ptr = *buf, eptr = *buf + *bufsiz;;) { int c = fgetc(fp); if (c == -1) { if (feof(fp)) { ssize_t diff = (ssize_t)(ptr - *buf); if (diff != 0) { *ptr = '\0'; return diff; } } return -1; } *ptr++ = c; if (c == delimiter) { *ptr = '\0'; return ptr - *buf; } if (ptr + 2 >= eptr) { char *nbuf; size_t nbufsiz = *bufsiz * 2; ssize_t d = ptr - *buf; if ((nbuf = realloc(*buf, nbufsiz)) == NULL) return -1; *buf = nbuf; *bufsiz = nbufsiz; eptr = nbuf + nbufsiz; ptr = nbuf + d; } } } ssize_t getline(char **buf, size_t *bufsiz, FILE *fp) { return getdelim(buf, bufsiz, '\n', fp); } #endif #ifdef TEST int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char *p = NULL; ssize_t len; size_t n = 0; while ((len = getline(&p, &n, stdin)) != -1) (void)printf("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "d %s", len, p); free(p); return 0; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c010064400017500001750000000007171362136622600176220ustar00djmdjm/* Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE #include #include int getpagesize(void) { #if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_PAGESIZE) long r = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); if (r > 0 && r < INT_MAX) return (int)r; #endif /* * This is at the lower end of common values and appropriate for * our current use of getpagesize() in recallocarray(). */ return 4096; } #endif /* HAVE_GETPAGESIZE */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c010064400017500001750000000032651362136622600174310ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2002,2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) #include #include #include #if defined(SO_PEERCRED) int getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid) { struct ucred cred; socklen_t len = sizeof(cred); if (getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, &len) < 0) return (-1); *euid = cred.uid; *gid = cred.gid; return (0); } #elif defined(HAVE_GETPEERUCRED) #ifdef HAVE_UCRED_H # include #endif int getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid) { ucred_t *ucred = NULL; if (getpeerucred(s, &ucred) == -1) return (-1); if ((*euid = ucred_geteuid(ucred)) == -1) return (-1); if ((*gid = ucred_getrgid(ucred)) == -1) return (-1); ucred_free(ucred); return (0); } #else int getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid) { *euid = geteuid(); *gid = getgid(); return (0); } #endif /* defined(SO_PEERCRED) */ #endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c010064400017500001750000000026251362136622600165620ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2017 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au). * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "config.h" #undef malloc #undef calloc #undef realloc #include #include #if defined(HAVE_MALLOC) && HAVE_MALLOC == 0 void * rpl_malloc(size_t size) { if (size == 0) size = 1; return malloc(size); } #endif #if defined(HAVE_CALLOC) && HAVE_CALLOC == 0 void * rpl_calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size) { if (nmemb == 0) nmemb = 1; if (size == 0) size = 1; return calloc(nmemb, size); } #endif #if defined (HAVE_REALLOC) && HAVE_REALLOC == 0 void * rpl_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size) { if (size == 0) size = 1; if (ptr == 0) return malloc(size); return realloc(ptr, size); } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c010064400017500001750000000201151362136622600162400ustar00djmdjm /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME char *__progname; #endif /* * NB. duplicate __progname in case it is an alias for argv[0] * Otherwise it may get clobbered by setproctitle() */ char *ssh_get_progname(char *argv0) { char *p, *q; #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME extern char *__progname; p = __progname; #else if (argv0 == NULL) return ("unknown"); /* XXX */ p = strrchr(argv0, '/'); if (p == NULL) p = argv0; else p++; #endif if ((q = strdup(p)) == NULL) { perror("strdup"); exit(1); } return q; } #ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN int setlogin(const char *name) { return (0); } #endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */ #ifndef HAVE_INNETGR int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host, const char *user, const char *domain) { return (0); } #endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */ #if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) int seteuid(uid_t euid) { return (setreuid(-1, euid)); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */ #if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) int setegid(uid_t egid) { return(setresgid(-1, egid, -1)); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */ #if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR) const char *strerror(int e) { extern int sys_nerr; extern char *sys_errlist[]; if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr)) return (sys_errlist[e]); return ("unlisted error"); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_UTIMES int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp) { struct utimbuf ub; ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec; ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec; return (utime(filename, &ub)); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_UTIMENSAT /* * A limited implementation of utimensat() that only implements the * functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and * AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. */ int utimensat(int fd, const char *path, const struct timespec times[2], int flag) { struct timeval tv[2]; int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY; tv[0].tv_sec = times[0].tv_sec; tv[0].tv_usec = times[0].tv_nsec / 1000; tv[1].tv_sec = times[1].tv_sec; tv[1].tv_usec = times[1].tv_nsec / 1000; if (fd != AT_FDCWD) { errno = ENOSYS; return -1; } # ifndef HAVE_FUTIMES return utimes(path, tv); # else # ifdef O_NOFOLLOW if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW; # endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */ if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1) return -1; ret = futimes(fd, tv); close(fd); return ret; # endif } #endif #ifndef HAVE_FCHOWNAT /* * A limited implementation of fchownat() that only implements the * functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and * AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. */ int fchownat(int fd, const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group, int flag) { int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY; if (fd != AT_FDCWD) { errno = ENOSYS; return -1; } # ifndef HAVE_FCHOWN return chown(path, owner, group); # else # ifdef O_NOFOLLOW if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW; # endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */ if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1) return -1; ret = fchown(fd, owner, group); close(fd); return ret; # endif } #endif #ifndef HAVE_FCHMODAT /* * A limited implementation of fchmodat() that only implements the * functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and * AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. */ int fchmodat(int fd, const char *path, mode_t mode, int flag) { int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY; if (fd != AT_FDCWD) { errno = ENOSYS; return -1; } # ifndef HAVE_FCHMOD return chmod(path, mode); # else # ifdef O_NOFOLLOW if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW; # endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */ if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1) return -1; ret = fchmod(fd, mode); close(fd); return ret; # endif } #endif #ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE int truncate(const char *path, off_t length) { int fd, ret, saverrno; fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); if (fd < 0) return (-1); ret = ftruncate(fd, length); saverrno = errno; close(fd); if (ret == -1) errno = saverrno; return(ret); } #endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */ #if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP) int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem) { int rc, saverrno; extern int errno; struct timeval tstart, tstop, tremain, time2wait; TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&time2wait, req) (void) gettimeofday(&tstart, NULL); rc = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &time2wait); if (rc == -1) { saverrno = errno; (void) gettimeofday (&tstop, NULL); errno = saverrno; tremain.tv_sec = time2wait.tv_sec - (tstop.tv_sec - tstart.tv_sec); tremain.tv_usec = time2wait.tv_usec - (tstop.tv_usec - tstart.tv_usec); tremain.tv_sec += tremain.tv_usec / 1000000L; tremain.tv_usec %= 1000000L; } else { tremain.tv_sec = 0; tremain.tv_usec = 0; } if (rem != NULL) TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem) return(rc); } #endif #if !defined(HAVE_USLEEP) int usleep(unsigned int useconds) { struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = useconds / 1000000; ts.tv_nsec = (useconds % 1000000) * 1000; return nanosleep(&ts, NULL); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP pid_t tcgetpgrp(int fd) { int ctty_pgrp; if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) == -1) return(-1); else return(ctty_pgrp); } #endif /* HAVE_TCGETPGRP */ #ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK int tcsendbreak(int fd, int duration) { # if defined(TIOCSBRK) && defined(TIOCCBRK) struct timeval sleepytime; sleepytime.tv_sec = 0; sleepytime.tv_usec = 400000; if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSBRK, 0) == -1) return (-1); (void)select(0, 0, 0, 0, &sleepytime); if (ioctl(fd, TIOCCBRK, 0) == -1) return (-1); return (0); # else return -1; # endif } #endif /* HAVE_TCSENDBREAK */ #ifndef HAVE_STRDUP char * strdup(const char *str) { size_t len; char *cp; len = strlen(str) + 1; cp = malloc(len); if (cp != NULL) return(memcpy(cp, str, len)); return NULL; } #endif #ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK int isblank(int c) { return (c == ' ' || c == '\t'); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETPGID pid_t getpgid(pid_t pid) { #if defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) && !defined(GETPGRP_VOID) && GETPGRP_VOID == 0 return getpgrp(pid); #elif defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) if (pid == 0) return getpgrp(); #endif errno = ESRCH; return -1; } #endif #ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE int pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[]) { return 0; } #endif #ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC /* a mbtowc that only supports ASCII */ int mbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, const char *s, size_t n) { if (s == NULL || *s == '\0') return 0; /* ASCII is not state-dependent */ if (*s < 0 || *s > 0x7f || n < 1) { errno = EOPNOTSUPP; return -1; } if (pwc != NULL) *pwc = *s; return 1; } #endif #ifndef HAVE_LLABS long long llabs(long long j) { return (j < 0 ? -j : j); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_BZERO void bzero(void *b, size_t n) { (void)memset(b, 0, n); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_RAISE int raise(int sig) { kill(getpid(), sig); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETSID pid_t getsid(pid_t pid) { errno = ENOSYS; return -1; } #endif #ifdef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG #undef fflush int _ssh_compat_fflush(FILE *f) { int r1, r2; if (f == NULL) { r1 = fflush(stdout); r2 = fflush(stderr); if (r1 == -1 || r2 == -1) return -1; return 0; } return fflush(f); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R struct tm * localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result) { struct tm *tm = localtime(timep); *result = *tm; return result; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h010064400017500001750000000104571362136622600162550ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _BSD_MISC_H #define _BSD_MISC_H #include "includes.h" char *ssh_get_progname(char *); #ifndef HAVE_SETSID #define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid()) #endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */ #ifndef HAVE_SETENV int setenv(const char *, const char *, int); #endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */ #ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN int setlogin(const char *); #endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */ #ifndef HAVE_INNETGR int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); #endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */ #if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) int seteuid(uid_t); #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */ #if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) int setegid(uid_t); #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */ #if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR) const char *strerror(int); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF) #define setlinebuf(a) (setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0)) #endif #ifndef HAVE_UTIMES #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL struct timeval { long tv_sec; long tv_usec; } #endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */ int utimes(char *, struct timeval *); #endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */ #ifndef AT_FDCWD # define AT_FDCWD (-2) #endif #ifndef HAVE_FCHMODAT int fchmodat(int, const char *, mode_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_FCHOWNAT int fchownat(int, const char *, uid_t, gid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE int truncate (const char *, off_t); #endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */ #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC struct timespec { time_t tv_sec; long tv_nsec; }; #endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC */ #if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP) # include int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_UTIMENSAT # include /* start with the high bits and work down to minimise risk of overlap */ # ifndef AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW # define AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x80000000 # endif int utimensat(int, const char *, const struct timespec[2], int); #endif /* !HAVE_UTIMENSAT */ #ifndef HAVE_USLEEP int usleep(unsigned int useconds); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP pid_t tcgetpgrp(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK int tcsendbreak(int, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV int unsetenv(const char *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK int isblank(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETPGID pid_t getpgid(pid_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT # define endgrent() do { } while(0) #endif #ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE # define krb5_get_error_message krb5_get_err_text #endif #ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE # define krb5_free_error_message(a,b) do { } while(0) #endif #ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE int pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[]); #endif /* bsd-err.h */ #ifndef HAVE_ERR void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ERRX void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); #endif #ifndef HAVE_WARN void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); #endif #ifndef HAVE_LLABS long long llabs(long long); #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_BZERO) && HAVE_DECL_BZERO == 0 void bzero(void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_RAISE int raise(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETSID pid_t getsid(pid_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_FLOCK # define LOCK_SH 0x01 # define LOCK_EX 0x02 # define LOCK_NB 0x04 # define LOCK_UN 0x08 int flock(int, int); #endif #ifdef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG # define fflush(x) (_ssh_compat_fflush(x)) #endif #ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R struct tm *localtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_REALPATH #define realpath(x, y) (sftp_realpath((x), (y))) #endif #endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c010064400017500001750000000050001362136622600171530ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000,2001 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef HAVE_NEXT #include #include #include "bsd-nextstep.h" pid_t posix_wait(int *status) { union wait statusp; pid_t wait_pid; #undef wait /* Use NeXT's wait() function */ wait_pid = wait(&statusp); if (status) *status = (int) statusp.w_status; return (wait_pid); } int tcgetattr(int fd, struct termios *t) { return (ioctl(fd, TIOCGETA, t)); } int tcsetattr(int fd, int opt, const struct termios *t) { struct termios localterm; if (opt & TCSASOFT) { localterm = *t; localterm.c_cflag |= CIGNORE; t = &localterm; } switch (opt & ~TCSASOFT) { case TCSANOW: return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETA, t)); case TCSADRAIN: return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAW, t)); case TCSAFLUSH: return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAF, t)); default: errno = EINVAL; return (-1); } } int tcsetpgrp(int fd, pid_t pgrp) { return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSPGRP, &pgrp)); } speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *t) { return (t->c_ospeed); } speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *t) { return (t->c_ispeed); } int cfsetospeed(struct termios *t,int speed) { t->c_ospeed = speed; return (0); } int cfsetispeed(struct termios *t, int speed) { t->c_ispeed = speed; return (0); } #endif /* HAVE_NEXT */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h010064400017500001750000000043441362136622600171720ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000,2001 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #ifndef _NEXT_POSIX_H #define _NEXT_POSIX_H #ifdef HAVE_NEXT #include /* NGROUPS_MAX is behind -lposix. Use the BSD version which is NGROUPS */ #undef NGROUPS_MAX #define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS /* NeXT's readdir() is BSD (struct direct) not POSIX (struct dirent) */ #define dirent direct /* Swap out NeXT's BSD wait() for a more POSIX compliant one */ pid_t posix_wait(int *); #define wait(a) posix_wait(a) /* #ifdef wrapped functions that need defining for clean compiling */ pid_t getppid(void); void vhangup(void); int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); /* TERMCAP */ int tcgetattr(int, struct termios *); int tcsetattr(int, int, const struct termios *); int tcsetpgrp(int, pid_t); speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *); speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *); int cfsetospeed(struct termios *, int); int cfsetispeed(struct termios *, int); #endif /* HAVE_NEXT */ #endif /* _NEXT_POSIX_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c010064400017500001750000000122261362136622600170070ustar00djmdjm/* * Please note: this implementation of openpty() is far from complete. * it is just enough for portable OpenSSH's needs. */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */ #ifdef HAVE_PTY_H # include #endif #if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) && defined(HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H) # include #endif #include #include #include #include "misc.h" #ifndef O_NOCTTY #define O_NOCTTY 0 #endif int openpty(int *amaster, int *aslave, char *name, struct termios *termp, struct winsize *winp) { #if defined(HAVE__GETPTY) /* * _getpty(3) exists in SGI Irix 4.x, 5.x & 6.x -- it generates more * pty's automagically when needed */ char *slave; if ((slave = _getpty(amaster, O_RDWR, 0622, 0)) == NULL) return (-1); /* Open the slave side. */ if ((*aslave = open(slave, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { close(*amaster); return (-1); } return (0); #elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) /* * This code is used e.g. on Solaris 2.x. (Note that Solaris 2.3 * also has bsd-style ptys, but they simply do not work.) */ int ptm; char *pts; sshsig_t old_signal; if ((ptm = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) return (-1); /* XXX: need to close ptm on error? */ old_signal = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (grantpt(ptm) < 0) return (-1); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, old_signal); if (unlockpt(ptm) < 0) return (-1); if ((pts = ptsname(ptm)) == NULL) return (-1); *amaster = ptm; /* Open the slave side. */ if ((*aslave = open(pts, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { close(*amaster); return (-1); } # if defined(I_FIND) && defined(__SVR4) /* * If the streams modules have already been pushed then there * is no more work to do here. */ if (ioctl(*aslave, I_FIND, "ptem") != 0) return 0; # endif /* * Try to push the appropriate streams modules, as described * in Solaris pts(7). */ ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ptem"); ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ldterm"); # ifndef __hpux ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ttcompat"); # endif /* __hpux */ return (0); #elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC) /* AIX-style pty code. */ const char *ttname; if ((*amaster = open("/dev/ptc", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) return (-1); if ((ttname = ttyname(*amaster)) == NULL) return (-1); if ((*aslave = open(ttname, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { close(*amaster); return (-1); } return (0); #else /* BSD-style pty code. */ char ptbuf[64], ttbuf[64]; int i; const char *ptymajors = "pqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmno" "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"; const char *ptyminors = "0123456789abcdef"; int num_minors = strlen(ptyminors); int num_ptys = strlen(ptymajors) * num_minors; struct termios tio; for (i = 0; i < num_ptys; i++) { snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/pty%c%c", ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]); snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/tty%c%c", ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]); if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { /* Try SCO style naming */ snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/ptyp%d", i); snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/ttyp%d", i); if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) continue; } /* Open the slave side. */ if ((*aslave = open(ttbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { close(*amaster); return (-1); } /* set tty modes to a sane state for broken clients */ if (tcgetattr(*amaster, &tio) != -1) { tio.c_lflag |= (ECHO | ISIG | ICANON); tio.c_oflag |= (OPOST | ONLCR); tio.c_iflag |= ICRNL; tcsetattr(*amaster, TCSANOW, &tio); } return (0); } return (-1); #endif } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c010064400017500001750000000056441362136622600162650ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005, 2007 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au). * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_POLL) #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include "bsd-poll.h" /* * A minimal implementation of poll(2), built on top of select(2). * * Only supports POLLIN and POLLOUT flags in pfd.events, and POLLIN, POLLOUT * and POLLERR flags in revents. * * Supports pfd.fd = -1 meaning "unused" although it's not standard. */ int poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout) { nfds_t i; int saved_errno, ret, fd, maxfd = 0; fd_set *readfds = NULL, *writefds = NULL, *exceptfds = NULL; size_t nmemb; struct timeval tv, *tvp = NULL; for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) { fd = fds[i].fd; if (fd >= FD_SETSIZE) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } maxfd = MAX(maxfd, fd); } nmemb = howmany(maxfd + 1 , NFDBITS); if ((readfds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL || (writefds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL || (exceptfds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL) { saved_errno = ENOMEM; ret = -1; goto out; } /* populate event bit vectors for the events we're interested in */ for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) { fd = fds[i].fd; if (fd == -1) continue; if (fds[i].events & POLLIN) { FD_SET(fd, readfds); FD_SET(fd, exceptfds); } if (fds[i].events & POLLOUT) { FD_SET(fd, writefds); FD_SET(fd, exceptfds); } } /* poll timeout is msec, select is timeval (sec + usec) */ if (timeout >= 0) { tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; tv.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000; tvp = &tv; } ret = select(maxfd + 1, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp); saved_errno = errno; /* scan through select results and set poll() flags */ for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) { fd = fds[i].fd; fds[i].revents = 0; if (fd == -1) continue; if (FD_ISSET(fd, readfds)) { fds[i].revents |= POLLIN; } if (FD_ISSET(fd, writefds)) { fds[i].revents |= POLLOUT; } if (FD_ISSET(fd, exceptfds)) { fds[i].revents |= POLLERR; } } out: free(readfds); free(writefds); free(exceptfds); if (ret == -1) errno = saved_errno; return ret; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h010064400017500001750000000041011362136622600162550ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: poll.h,v 1.11 2003/12/10 23:10:08 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/poll.h */ #if !defined(HAVE_POLL) && !defined(HAVE_POLL_H) #ifndef _COMPAT_POLL_H_ #define _COMPAT_POLL_H_ typedef struct pollfd { int fd; short events; short revents; } pollfd_t; typedef unsigned int nfds_t; #define POLLIN 0x0001 #define POLLOUT 0x0004 #define POLLERR 0x0008 #define POLLHUP 0x0010 #define POLLNVAL 0x0020 #if 0 /* the following are currently not implemented */ #define POLLPRI 0x0002 #define POLLRDNORM 0x0040 #define POLLNORM POLLRDNORM #define POLLWRNORM POLLOUT #define POLLRDBAND 0x0080 #define POLLWRBAND 0x0100 #endif #define INFTIM (-1) /* not standard */ int poll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, int); #endif /* !_COMPAT_POLL_H_ */ #endif /* !HAVE_POLL_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c010064400017500001750000000046151362136622600172750ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au). * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #if !defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID) int setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) { int ret = 0, saved_errno; if (rgid != sgid) { errno = ENOSYS; return -1; } #if defined(HAVE_SETREGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREGID) if (setregid(rgid, egid) < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("setregid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)rgid, strerror(errno)); errno = saved_errno; ret = -1; } #else if (setegid(egid) < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("setegid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)egid, strerror(errno)); errno = saved_errno; ret = -1; } if (setgid(rgid) < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("setgid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)rgid, strerror(errno)); errno = saved_errno; ret = -1; } #endif return ret; } #endif #if !defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID) int setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) { int ret = 0, saved_errno; if (ruid != suid) { errno = ENOSYS; return -1; } #if defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID) if (setreuid(ruid, euid) < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("setreuid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)ruid, strerror(errno)); errno = saved_errno; ret = -1; } #else # ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID if (seteuid(euid) < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("seteuid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)euid, strerror(errno)); errno = saved_errno; ret = -1; } # endif if (setuid(ruid) < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("setuid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)ruid, strerror(errno)); errno = saved_errno; ret = -1; } #endif return ret; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h010064400017500001750000000016421362136622600172770ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au). * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef HAVE_SETRESGID int setresgid(gid_t, gid_t, gid_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETRESUID int setresuid(uid_t, uid_t, uid_t); #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c010064400017500001750000000020771362136622600165710ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h" #if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL) char *strsignal(int sig) { static char buf[16]; (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", sig); return buf; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h010064400017500001750000000020461362136622600165720ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _BSD_SIGNAL_H #define _BSD_SIGNAL_H #include "includes.h" #include #ifndef _NSIG # ifdef NSIG # define _NSIG NSIG # else # define _NSIG 128 # endif #endif #if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL) char *strsignal(int); #endif #endif /* _BSD_SIGNAL_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c010064400017500001750000000511251362136622600171550ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995 * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell (papowell@astart.com) * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact * on all source code distributions */ /************************************************************** * Original: * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995 * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included. * Sigh. This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with. Note that * the version here does not include floating point... * * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks * for string length. This covers a nasty loophole. * * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from * causing nast effects. * * More Recently: * Brandon Long 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43 * This was ugly. It is still ugly. I opted out of floating point * numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything * from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from * the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page. * * Brandon Long 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1 * Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this * probably requires libm on most operating systems. Don't yet * support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G). Also, fmtint() * was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways * which showed it, so that's been fixed. Also, formatted the code * to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the * original. Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with: * gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm * and run snprintf for results. * * Thomas Roessler 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i * The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats. * Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work. * * Michael Elkins 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8 * The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were * missing. Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so * the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF. * * Andrew Tridgell (tridge@samba.org) Oct 1998 * fixed handling of %.0f * added test for HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE * * tridge@samba.org, idra@samba.org, April 2001 * got rid of fcvt code (twas buggy and made testing harder) * added C99 semantics * * date: 2002/12/19 19:56:31; author: herb; state: Exp; lines: +2 -0 * actually print args for %g and %e * * date: 2002/06/03 13:37:52; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +8 -0 * Since includes.h isn't included here, VA_COPY has to be defined here. I don't * see any include file that is guaranteed to be here, so I'm defining it * locally. Fixes AIX and Solaris builds. * * date: 2002/06/03 03:07:24; author: tridge; state: Exp; lines: +5 -13 * put the ifdef for HAVE_VA_COPY in one place rather than in lots of * functions * * date: 2002/05/17 14:51:22; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +21 -4 * Fix usage of va_list passed as an arg. Use __va_copy before using it * when it exists. * * date: 2002/04/16 22:38:04; author: idra; state: Exp; lines: +20 -14 * Fix incorrect zpadlen handling in fmtfp. * Thanks to Ollie Oldham for spotting it. * few mods to make it easier to compile the tests. * addedd the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones. * * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) April 2003 * Remove NO_CONFIG_H so that the test case can be built within a source * tree with less trouble. * Remove unnecessary SAFE_FREE() definition. * * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) May 2003 * Put in a prototype for dummy_snprintf() to quiet compiler warnings. * * Move #endif to make sure VA_COPY, LDOUBLE, etc are defined even * if the C library has some snprintf functions already. * * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org) Jan 2007 * Fix integer overflows in return value. * Make formatting quite a bit faster by inlining dopr_outch() * **************************************************************/ #include "includes.h" #if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) /* For those with broken snprintf() */ # undef HAVE_SNPRINTF # undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF #endif #if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE # define LDOUBLE long double #else # define LDOUBLE double #endif #ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG # define LLONG long long #else # define LLONG long #endif /* * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf */ /* format read states */ #define DP_S_DEFAULT 0 #define DP_S_FLAGS 1 #define DP_S_MIN 2 #define DP_S_DOT 3 #define DP_S_MAX 4 #define DP_S_MOD 5 #define DP_S_CONV 6 #define DP_S_DONE 7 /* format flags - Bits */ #define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0) #define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1) #define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2) #define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3) #define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4) #define DP_F_UP (1 << 5) #define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6) /* Conversion Flags */ #define DP_C_SHORT 1 #define DP_C_LONG 2 #define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3 #define DP_C_LLONG 4 #define DP_C_SIZE 5 #define DP_C_INTMAX 6 #define char_to_int(p) ((p)- '0') #ifndef MAX # define MAX(p,q) (((p) >= (q)) ? (p) : (q)) #endif #define DOPR_OUTCH(buf, pos, buflen, thechar) \ do { \ if (pos + 1 >= INT_MAX) { \ errno = ERANGE; \ return -1; \ } \ if (pos < buflen) \ buf[pos] = thechar; \ (pos)++; \ } while (0) static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in); static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char *value, int flags, int min, int max); static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags); static int fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags); static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in) { char ch; intmax_t value; LDOUBLE fvalue; char *strvalue; int min; int max; int state; int flags; int cflags; size_t currlen; va_list args; VA_COPY(args, args_in); state = DP_S_DEFAULT; currlen = flags = cflags = min = 0; max = -1; ch = *format++; while (state != DP_S_DONE) { if (ch == '\0') state = DP_S_DONE; switch(state) { case DP_S_DEFAULT: if (ch == '%') state = DP_S_FLAGS; else DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch); ch = *format++; break; case DP_S_FLAGS: switch (ch) { case '-': flags |= DP_F_MINUS; ch = *format++; break; case '+': flags |= DP_F_PLUS; ch = *format++; break; case ' ': flags |= DP_F_SPACE; ch = *format++; break; case '#': flags |= DP_F_NUM; ch = *format++; break; case '0': flags |= DP_F_ZERO; ch = *format++; break; default: state = DP_S_MIN; break; } break; case DP_S_MIN: if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch); ch = *format++; } else if (ch == '*') { min = va_arg (args, int); ch = *format++; state = DP_S_DOT; } else { state = DP_S_DOT; } break; case DP_S_DOT: if (ch == '.') { state = DP_S_MAX; ch = *format++; } else { state = DP_S_MOD; } break; case DP_S_MAX: if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { if (max < 0) max = 0; max = 10*max + char_to_int (ch); ch = *format++; } else if (ch == '*') { max = va_arg (args, int); ch = *format++; state = DP_S_MOD; } else { state = DP_S_MOD; } break; case DP_S_MOD: switch (ch) { case 'h': cflags = DP_C_SHORT; ch = *format++; break; case 'j': cflags = DP_C_INTMAX; ch = *format++; break; case 'l': cflags = DP_C_LONG; ch = *format++; if (ch == 'l') { /* It's a long long */ cflags = DP_C_LLONG; ch = *format++; } break; case 'L': cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE; ch = *format++; break; case 'z': cflags = DP_C_SIZE; ch = *format++; break; default: break; } state = DP_S_CONV; break; case DP_S_CONV: switch (ch) { case 'd': case 'i': if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = va_arg (args, long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = va_arg (args, LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, ssize_t); else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, intmax_t); else value = va_arg (args, int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'o': flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, size_t); #ifdef notyet else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); #endif else value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 8, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'u': flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, size_t); #ifdef notyet else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); #endif else value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'X': flags |= DP_F_UP; case 'x': flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, size_t); #ifdef notyet else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); #endif else value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 16, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'f': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg (args, double); if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'E': flags |= DP_F_UP; case 'e': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg (args, double); if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'G': flags |= DP_F_UP; case 'g': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg (args, double); if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'c': DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, va_arg (args, int)); break; case 's': strvalue = va_arg (args, char *); if (!strvalue) strvalue = "(NULL)"; if (max == -1) { max = strlen(strvalue); } if (min > 0 && max >= 0 && min > max) max = min; if (fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue, flags, min, max) == -1) return -1; break; case 'p': strvalue = va_arg (args, void *); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; #if we_dont_want_this_in_openssh case 'n': if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) { short int *num; num = va_arg (args, short int *); *num = currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) { long int *num; num = va_arg (args, long int *); *num = (long int)currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) { LLONG *num; num = va_arg (args, LLONG *); *num = (LLONG)currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) { ssize_t *num; num = va_arg (args, ssize_t *); *num = (ssize_t)currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) { intmax_t *num; num = va_arg (args, intmax_t *); *num = (intmax_t)currlen; } else { int *num; num = va_arg (args, int *); *num = currlen; } break; #endif case '%': DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch); break; case 'w': /* not supported yet, treat as next char */ ch = *format++; break; default: /* Unknown, skip */ break; } ch = *format++; state = DP_S_DEFAULT; flags = cflags = min = 0; max = -1; break; case DP_S_DONE: break; default: /* hmm? */ break; /* some picky compilers need this */ } } if (maxlen != 0) { if (currlen < maxlen - 1) buffer[currlen] = '\0'; else if (maxlen > 0) buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0'; } return currlen < INT_MAX ? (int)currlen : -1; } static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char *value, int flags, int min, int max) { int padlen, strln; /* amount to pad */ int cnt = 0; #ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF printf("fmtstr min=%d max=%d s=[%s]\n", min, max, value); #endif if (value == 0) { value = ""; } for (strln = 0; strln < max && value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */ padlen = min - strln; if (padlen < 0) padlen = 0; if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */ while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); --padlen; ++cnt; } while (*value && (cnt < max)) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value); value++; ++cnt; } while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); ++padlen; ++cnt; } return 0; } /* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */ static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags) { int signvalue = 0; unsigned LLONG uvalue; char convert[20]; int place = 0; int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */ int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */ int caps = 0; if (max < 0) max = 0; uvalue = value; if(!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) { if( value < 0 ) { signvalue = '-'; uvalue = -value; } else { if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */ signvalue = '+'; else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) signvalue = ' '; } } if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */ do { convert[place++] = (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef") [uvalue % (unsigned)base ]; uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base ); } while(uvalue && (place < 20)); if (place == 20) place--; convert[place] = 0; zpadlen = max - place; spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0); if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0; if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0; if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) { zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen); spadlen = 0; } if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */ #ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF printf("zpad: %d, spad: %d, min: %d, max: %d, place: %d\n", zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place); #endif /* Spaces */ while (spadlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); --spadlen; } /* Sign */ if (signvalue) DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); /* Zeros */ if (zpadlen > 0) { while (zpadlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); --zpadlen; } } /* Digits */ while (place > 0) { --place; DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, convert[place]); } /* Left Justified spaces */ while (spadlen < 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); ++spadlen; } return 0; } static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value) { LDOUBLE result = value; if (value < 0) result = -value; return result; } static LDOUBLE POW10(int val) { LDOUBLE result = 1; while (val) { result *= 10; val--; } return result; } static LLONG ROUND(LDOUBLE value) { LLONG intpart; intpart = (LLONG)value; value = value - intpart; if (value >= 0.5) intpart++; return intpart; } /* a replacement for modf that doesn't need the math library. Should be portable, but slow */ static double my_modf(double x0, double *iptr) { int i; long l; double x = x0; double f = 1.0; for (i=0;i<100;i++) { l = (long)x; if (l <= (x+1) && l >= (x-1)) break; x *= 0.1; f *= 10.0; } if (i == 100) { /* * yikes! the number is beyond what we can handle. * What do we do? */ (*iptr) = 0; return 0; } if (i != 0) { double i2; double ret; ret = my_modf(x0-l*f, &i2); (*iptr) = l*f + i2; return ret; } (*iptr) = l; return x - (*iptr); } static int fmtfp (char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags) { int signvalue = 0; double ufvalue; char iconvert[311]; char fconvert[311]; int iplace = 0; int fplace = 0; int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */ int zpadlen = 0; int caps = 0; int idx; double intpart; double fracpart; double temp; /* * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6 */ if (max < 0) max = 6; ufvalue = abs_val (fvalue); if (fvalue < 0) { signvalue = '-'; } else { if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) { /* Do a sign (+/i) */ signvalue = '+'; } else { if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) signvalue = ' '; } } #if 0 if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */ #endif #if 0 if (max == 0) ufvalue += 0.5; /* if max = 0 we must round */ #endif /* * Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our * conversion method */ if (max > 16) max = 16; /* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by * multiplying by a factor of 10 */ temp = ufvalue; my_modf(temp, &intpart); fracpart = ROUND((POW10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart)); if (fracpart >= POW10(max)) { intpart++; fracpart -= POW10(max); } /* Convert integer part */ do { temp = intpart*0.1; my_modf(temp, &intpart); idx = (int) ((temp -intpart +0.05)* 10.0); /* idx = (int) (((double)(temp*0.1) -intpart +0.05) *10.0); */ /* printf ("%llf, %f, %x\n", temp, intpart, idx); */ iconvert[iplace++] = (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx]; } while (intpart && (iplace < 311)); if (iplace == 311) iplace--; iconvert[iplace] = 0; /* Convert fractional part */ if (fracpart) { do { temp = fracpart*0.1; my_modf(temp, &fracpart); idx = (int) ((temp -fracpart +0.05)* 10.0); /* idx = (int) ((((temp/10) -fracpart) +0.05) *10); */ /* printf ("%lf, %lf, %ld\n", temp, fracpart, idx ); */ fconvert[fplace++] = (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx]; } while(fracpart && (fplace < 311)); if (fplace == 311) fplace--; } fconvert[fplace] = 0; /* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */ padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0); zpadlen = max - fplace; if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0; if (padlen < 0) padlen = 0; if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */ if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) { if (signvalue) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); --padlen; signvalue = 0; } while (padlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); --padlen; } } while (padlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); --padlen; } if (signvalue) DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); while (iplace > 0) { --iplace; DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, iconvert[iplace]); } #ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF printf("fmtfp: fplace=%d zpadlen=%d\n", fplace, zpadlen); #endif /* * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct * char to print out. */ if (max > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '.'); while (zpadlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); --zpadlen; } while (fplace > 0) { --fplace; DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, fconvert[fplace]); } } while (padlen < 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); ++padlen; } return 0; } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */ #if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) int vsnprintf (char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args) { return dopr(str, count, fmt, args); } #endif #if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) int snprintf(char *str, size_t count, SNPRINTF_CONST char *fmt, ...) { size_t ret; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c010064400017500001750000000044211362136622600170010ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2008,2014 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_STATVFS) || !defined(HAVE_FSTATVFS) #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H # include #endif #include #ifndef MNAMELEN # define MNAMELEN 32 #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES # define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS static void copy_statfs_to_statvfs(struct statvfs *to, struct statfs *from) { to->f_bsize = from->f_bsize; to->f_frsize = from->f_bsize; /* no exact equivalent */ to->f_blocks = from->f_blocks; to->f_bfree = from->f_bfree; to->f_bavail = from->f_bavail; to->f_files = from->f_files; to->f_ffree = from->f_ffree; to->f_favail = from->f_ffree; /* no exact equivalent */ to->f_fsid = 0; /* XXX fix me */ #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS to->f_flag = from->f_flags; #else to->f_flag = 0; #endif to->f_namemax = MNAMELEN; } #endif # ifndef HAVE_STATVFS int statvfs(const char *path, struct statvfs *buf) { # if defined(HAVE_STATFS) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS) struct statfs fs; memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs)); if (statfs(path, &fs) == -1) return -1; copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs); return 0; # else errno = ENOSYS; return -1; # endif } # endif # ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS int fstatvfs(int fd, struct statvfs *buf) { # if defined(HAVE_FSTATFS) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS) struct statfs fs; memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs)); if (fstatfs(fd, &fs) == -1) return -1; copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs); return 0; # else errno = ENOSYS; return -1; # endif } # endif #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h010064400017500001750000000043671362136622600170170ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2008,2014 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_STATVFS) || !defined(HAVE_FSTATVFS) #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H #include #endif #ifndef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T typedef unsigned long fsblkcnt_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T typedef unsigned long fsfilcnt_t; #endif #ifndef ST_RDONLY #define ST_RDONLY 1 #endif #ifndef ST_NOSUID #define ST_NOSUID 2 #endif /* as defined in IEEE Std 1003.1, 2004 Edition */ struct statvfs { unsigned long f_bsize; /* File system block size. */ unsigned long f_frsize; /* Fundamental file system block size. */ fsblkcnt_t f_blocks; /* Total number of blocks on file system in */ /* units of f_frsize. */ fsblkcnt_t f_bfree; /* Total number of free blocks. */ fsblkcnt_t f_bavail; /* Number of free blocks available to */ /* non-privileged process. */ fsfilcnt_t f_files; /* Total number of file serial numbers. */ fsfilcnt_t f_ffree; /* Total number of free file serial numbers. */ fsfilcnt_t f_favail; /* Number of file serial numbers available to */ /* non-privileged process. */ unsigned long f_fsid; /* File system ID. */ unsigned long f_flag; /* BBit mask of f_flag values. */ unsigned long f_namemax;/* Maximum filename length. */ }; #endif #ifndef HAVE_STATVFS int statvfs(const char *, struct statvfs *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS int fstatvfs(int, struct statvfs *); #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c010064400017500001750000000034271362136622600167550ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_WAITPID #include #include #include "bsd-waitpid.h" pid_t waitpid(int pid, int *stat_loc, int options) { union wait statusp; pid_t wait_pid; if (pid <= 0) { if (pid != -1) { errno = EINVAL; return (-1); } /* wait4() wants pid=0 for indiscriminate wait. */ pid = 0; } wait_pid = wait4(pid, &statusp, options, NULL); if (stat_loc) *stat_loc = (int) statusp.w_status; return (wait_pid); } #endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h010064400017500001750000000040301362136622600167510ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #ifndef _BSD_WAITPID_H #define _BSD_WAITPID_H #ifndef HAVE_WAITPID /* Clean out any potential issues */ #undef WIFEXITED #undef WIFSTOPPED #undef WIFSIGNALED /* Define required functions to mimic a POSIX look and feel */ #define _W_INT(w) (*(int*)&(w)) /* convert union wait to int */ #define WIFEXITED(w) (!((_W_INT(w)) & 0377)) #define WIFSTOPPED(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & 0100) #define WIFSIGNALED(w) (!WIFEXITED(w) && !WIFSTOPPED(w)) #define WEXITSTATUS(w) (int)(WIFEXITED(w) ? ((_W_INT(w) >> 8) & 0377) : -1) #define WTERMSIG(w) (int)(WIFSIGNALED(w) ? (_W_INT(w) & 0177) : -1) #define WCOREFLAG 0x80 #define WCOREDUMP(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & WCOREFLAG) /* Prototype */ pid_t waitpid(int, int *, int); #endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */ #endif /* _BSD_WAITPID_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h010064400017500001750000000124151362136622600175110ustar00djmdjm/* chacha-merged.c version 20080118 D. J. Bernstein Public domain. */ /* $OpenBSD: chacha_private.h,v 1.2 2013/10/04 07:02:27 djm Exp $ */ typedef unsigned char u8; typedef unsigned int u32; typedef struct { u32 input[16]; /* could be compressed */ } chacha_ctx; #define U8C(v) (v##U) #define U32C(v) (v##U) #define U8V(v) ((u8)(v) & U8C(0xFF)) #define U32V(v) ((u32)(v) & U32C(0xFFFFFFFF)) #define ROTL32(v, n) \ (U32V((v) << (n)) | ((v) >> (32 - (n)))) #define U8TO32_LITTLE(p) \ (((u32)((p)[0]) ) | \ ((u32)((p)[1]) << 8) | \ ((u32)((p)[2]) << 16) | \ ((u32)((p)[3]) << 24)) #define U32TO8_LITTLE(p, v) \ do { \ (p)[0] = U8V((v) ); \ (p)[1] = U8V((v) >> 8); \ (p)[2] = U8V((v) >> 16); \ (p)[3] = U8V((v) >> 24); \ } while (0) #define ROTATE(v,c) (ROTL32(v,c)) #define XOR(v,w) ((v) ^ (w)) #define PLUS(v,w) (U32V((v) + (w))) #define PLUSONE(v) (PLUS((v),1)) #define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \ a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a),16); \ c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c),12); \ a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a), 8); \ c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c), 7); static const char sigma[16] = "expand 32-byte k"; static const char tau[16] = "expand 16-byte k"; static void chacha_keysetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits) { const char *constants; x->input[4] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0); x->input[5] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4); x->input[6] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8); x->input[7] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12); if (kbits == 256) { /* recommended */ k += 16; constants = sigma; } else { /* kbits == 128 */ constants = tau; } x->input[8] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0); x->input[9] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4); x->input[10] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8); x->input[11] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12); x->input[0] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 0); x->input[1] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 4); x->input[2] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 8); x->input[3] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 12); } static void chacha_ivsetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *iv) { x->input[12] = 0; x->input[13] = 0; x->input[14] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 0); x->input[15] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 4); } static void chacha_encrypt_bytes(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes) { u32 x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15; u32 j0, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, j7, j8, j9, j10, j11, j12, j13, j14, j15; u8 *ctarget = NULL; u8 tmp[64]; u_int i; if (!bytes) return; j0 = x->input[0]; j1 = x->input[1]; j2 = x->input[2]; j3 = x->input[3]; j4 = x->input[4]; j5 = x->input[5]; j6 = x->input[6]; j7 = x->input[7]; j8 = x->input[8]; j9 = x->input[9]; j10 = x->input[10]; j11 = x->input[11]; j12 = x->input[12]; j13 = x->input[13]; j14 = x->input[14]; j15 = x->input[15]; for (;;) { if (bytes < 64) { for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) tmp[i] = m[i]; m = tmp; ctarget = c; c = tmp; } x0 = j0; x1 = j1; x2 = j2; x3 = j3; x4 = j4; x5 = j5; x6 = j6; x7 = j7; x8 = j8; x9 = j9; x10 = j10; x11 = j11; x12 = j12; x13 = j13; x14 = j14; x15 = j15; for (i = 20;i > 0;i -= 2) { QUARTERROUND( x0, x4, x8,x12) QUARTERROUND( x1, x5, x9,x13) QUARTERROUND( x2, x6,x10,x14) QUARTERROUND( x3, x7,x11,x15) QUARTERROUND( x0, x5,x10,x15) QUARTERROUND( x1, x6,x11,x12) QUARTERROUND( x2, x7, x8,x13) QUARTERROUND( x3, x4, x9,x14) } x0 = PLUS(x0,j0); x1 = PLUS(x1,j1); x2 = PLUS(x2,j2); x3 = PLUS(x3,j3); x4 = PLUS(x4,j4); x5 = PLUS(x5,j5); x6 = PLUS(x6,j6); x7 = PLUS(x7,j7); x8 = PLUS(x8,j8); x9 = PLUS(x9,j9); x10 = PLUS(x10,j10); x11 = PLUS(x11,j11); x12 = PLUS(x12,j12); x13 = PLUS(x13,j13); x14 = PLUS(x14,j14); x15 = PLUS(x15,j15); #ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY x0 = XOR(x0,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 0)); x1 = XOR(x1,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 4)); x2 = XOR(x2,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 8)); x3 = XOR(x3,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 12)); x4 = XOR(x4,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 16)); x5 = XOR(x5,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 20)); x6 = XOR(x6,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 24)); x7 = XOR(x7,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 28)); x8 = XOR(x8,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 32)); x9 = XOR(x9,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 36)); x10 = XOR(x10,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 40)); x11 = XOR(x11,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 44)); x12 = XOR(x12,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 48)); x13 = XOR(x13,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 52)); x14 = XOR(x14,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 56)); x15 = XOR(x15,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 60)); #endif j12 = PLUSONE(j12); if (!j12) { j13 = PLUSONE(j13); /* stopping at 2^70 bytes per nonce is user's responsibility */ } U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 0,x0); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 4,x1); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 8,x2); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 12,x3); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 16,x4); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 20,x5); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 24,x6); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 28,x7); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 32,x8); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 36,x9); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 40,x10); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 44,x11); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 48,x12); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 52,x13); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 56,x14); U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 60,x15); if (bytes <= 64) { if (bytes < 64) { for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) ctarget[i] = c[i]; } x->input[12] = j12; x->input[13] = j13; return; } bytes -= 64; c += 64; #ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY m += 64; #endif } } openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/charclass.h010064400017500001750000000012761362136622600165160ustar00djmdjm/* * Public domain, 2008, Todd C. Miller * * $OpenBSD: charclass.h,v 1.1 2008/10/01 23:04:13 millert Exp $ */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/charclass.h */ /* * POSIX character class support for fnmatch() and glob(). */ static struct cclass { const char *name; int (*isctype)(int); } cclasses[] = { { "alnum", isalnum }, { "alpha", isalpha }, { "blank", isblank }, { "cntrl", iscntrl }, { "digit", isdigit }, { "graph", isgraph }, { "lower", islower }, { "print", isprint }, { "punct", ispunct }, { "space", isspace }, { "upper", isupper }, { "xdigit", isxdigit }, { NULL, NULL } }; #define NCCLASSES (sizeof(cclasses) / sizeof(cclasses[0]) - 1) openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/daemon.c010064400017500001750000000045131362136622600160060ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: daemon.c,v 1.6 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/daemon.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_DAEMON #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H # include #endif int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose) { int fd; switch (fork()) { case -1: return (-1); case 0: break; default: _exit(0); } if (setsid() == -1) return (-1); if (!nochdir) (void)chdir("/"); if (!noclose && (fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); if (fd > 2) (void)close (fd); } return (0); } #endif /* !HAVE_DAEMON */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/dirname.c010064400017500001750000000035701362136622600161640ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1997, 2004 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/dirname.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME #include #include #include char * dirname(const char *path) { static char dname[MAXPATHLEN]; size_t len; const char *endp; /* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { dname[0] = '.'; dname[1] = '\0'; return (dname); } /* Strip any trailing slashes */ endp = path + strlen(path) - 1; while (endp > path && *endp == '/') endp--; /* Find the start of the dir */ while (endp > path && *endp != '/') endp--; /* Either the dir is "/" or there are no slashes */ if (endp == path) { dname[0] = *endp == '/' ? '/' : '.'; dname[1] = '\0'; return (dname); } else { /* Move forward past the separating slashes */ do { endp--; } while (endp > path && *endp == '/'); } len = endp - path + 1; if (len >= sizeof(dname)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return (NULL); } memcpy(dname, path, len); dname[len] = '\0'; return (dname); } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c010064400017500001750000000021331362136622600175610ustar00djmdjm/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/explicit_bzero.c */ /* $OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.1 2014/01/22 21:06:45 tedu Exp $ */ /* * Public domain. * Written by Ted Unangst */ #include "includes.h" #include /* * explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero */ #ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO #ifdef HAVE_MEMSET_S void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n) { if (n == 0) return; (void)memset_s(p, n, 0, n); } #else /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */ /* * Indirect bzero through a volatile pointer to hopefully avoid * dead-store optimisation eliminating the call. */ static void (* volatile ssh_bzero)(void *, size_t) = bzero; void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n) { if (n == 0) return; /* * clang -fsanitize=memory needs to intercept memset-like functions * to correctly detect memory initialisation. Make sure one is called * directly since our indirection trick above successfully confuses it. */ #if defined(__has_feature) # if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) memset(p, 0, n); # endif #endif ssh_bzero(p, n); } #endif /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */ #endif /* HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c010064400017500001750000000142271362136622600165430ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions * * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags) { struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; struct hostent *hp; char tmpserv[16]; if (sa->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC && sa->sa_family != AF_INET) return (EAI_FAMILY); if (serv != NULL) { snprintf(tmpserv, sizeof(tmpserv), "%d", ntohs(sin->sin_port)); if (strlcpy(serv, tmpserv, servlen) >= servlen) return (EAI_MEMORY); } if (host != NULL) { if (flags & NI_NUMERICHOST) { if (strlcpy(host, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), hostlen) >= hostlen) return (EAI_MEMORY); else return (0); } else { hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&sin->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET); if (hp == NULL) return (EAI_NODATA); if (strlcpy(host, hp->h_name, hostlen) >= hostlen) return (EAI_MEMORY); else return (0); } } return (0); } #endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */ #ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR #ifdef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO const char * #else char * #endif gai_strerror(int err) { switch (err) { case EAI_NODATA: return ("no address associated with name"); case EAI_MEMORY: return ("memory allocation failure."); case EAI_NONAME: return ("nodename nor servname provided, or not known"); case EAI_FAMILY: return ("ai_family not supported"); default: return ("unknown/invalid error."); } } #endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */ #ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai) { struct addrinfo *next; for(; ai != NULL;) { next = ai->ai_next; free(ai); ai = next; } } #endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */ #ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO static struct addrinfo *malloc_ai(int port, u_long addr, const struct addrinfo *hints) { struct addrinfo *ai; ai = malloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); if (ai == NULL) return (NULL); memset(ai, '\0', sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); /* XXX -- ssh doesn't use sa_len */ ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); ai->ai_addr->sa_family = ai->ai_family = AF_INET; ((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_port = port; ((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr = addr; /* XXX: the following is not generally correct, but does what we want */ if (hints->ai_socktype) ai->ai_socktype = hints->ai_socktype; else ai->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if (hints->ai_protocol) ai->ai_protocol = hints->ai_protocol; return (ai); } int getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname, const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res) { struct hostent *hp; struct servent *sp; struct in_addr in; int i; long int port; u_long addr; port = 0; if (hints && hints->ai_family != AF_UNSPEC && hints->ai_family != AF_INET) return (EAI_FAMILY); if (servname != NULL) { char *cp; port = strtol(servname, &cp, 10); if (port > 0 && port <= 65535 && *cp == '\0') port = htons(port); else if ((sp = getservbyname(servname, NULL)) != NULL) port = sp->s_port; else port = 0; } if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE) { addr = htonl(0x00000000); if (hostname && inet_aton(hostname, &in) != 0) addr = in.s_addr; *res = malloc_ai(port, addr, hints); if (*res == NULL) return (EAI_MEMORY); return (0); } if (!hostname) { *res = malloc_ai(port, htonl(0x7f000001), hints); if (*res == NULL) return (EAI_MEMORY); return (0); } if (inet_aton(hostname, &in)) { *res = malloc_ai(port, in.s_addr, hints); if (*res == NULL) return (EAI_MEMORY); return (0); } /* Don't try DNS if AI_NUMERICHOST is set */ if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST) return (EAI_NONAME); hp = gethostbyname(hostname); if (hp && hp->h_name && hp->h_name[0] && hp->h_addr_list[0]) { struct addrinfo *cur, *prev; cur = prev = *res = NULL; for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) { struct in_addr *in = (struct in_addr *)hp->h_addr_list[i]; cur = malloc_ai(port, in->s_addr, hints); if (cur == NULL) { if (*res != NULL) freeaddrinfo(*res); return (EAI_MEMORY); } if (prev) prev->ai_next = cur; else *res = cur; prev = cur; } return (0); } return (EAI_NODATA); } #endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h010064400017500001750000000123151362136622600165440ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions * * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose. */ #ifndef _FAKE_RFC2553_H #define _FAKE_RFC2553_H #include "includes.h" #include #if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H) # include #endif /* * First, socket and INET6 related definitions */ #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE # define _SS_MAXSIZE 128 /* Implementation specific max size */ # define _SS_PADSIZE (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr)) struct sockaddr_storage { struct sockaddr ss_sa; char __ss_pad2[_SS_PADSIZE]; }; # define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family #endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */ #ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK # define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \ (((u_int32_t *)(a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[1] == 0 && \ ((u_int32_t *)(a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[3] == htonl(1)) #endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */ #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR struct in6_addr { u_int8_t s6_addr[16]; }; #endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR */ #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 struct sockaddr_in6 { unsigned short sin6_family; u_int16_t sin6_port; u_int32_t sin6_flowinfo; struct in6_addr sin6_addr; u_int32_t sin6_scope_id; }; #endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */ #ifndef AF_INET6 /* Define it to something that should never appear */ #define AF_INET6 AF_MAX #endif /* * Next, RFC2553 name / address resolution API */ #ifndef NI_NUMERICHOST # define NI_NUMERICHOST (1) #endif #ifndef NI_NAMEREQD # define NI_NAMEREQD (1<<1) #endif #ifndef NI_NUMERICSERV # define NI_NUMERICSERV (1<<2) #endif #ifndef AI_PASSIVE # define AI_PASSIVE (1) #endif #ifndef AI_CANONNAME # define AI_CANONNAME (1<<1) #endif #ifndef AI_NUMERICHOST # define AI_NUMERICHOST (1<<2) #endif #ifndef AI_NUMERICSERV # define AI_NUMERICSERV (1<<3) #endif #ifndef NI_MAXSERV # define NI_MAXSERV 32 #endif /* !NI_MAXSERV */ #ifndef NI_MAXHOST # define NI_MAXHOST 1025 #endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */ #ifndef EAI_NODATA # define EAI_NODATA (INT_MAX - 1) #endif #ifndef EAI_MEMORY # define EAI_MEMORY (INT_MAX - 2) #endif #ifndef EAI_NONAME # define EAI_NONAME (INT_MAX - 3) #endif #ifndef EAI_SYSTEM # define EAI_SYSTEM (INT_MAX - 4) #endif #ifndef EAI_FAMILY # define EAI_FAMILY (INT_MAX - 5) #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO struct addrinfo { int ai_flags; /* AI_PASSIVE, AI_CANONNAME */ int ai_family; /* PF_xxx */ int ai_socktype; /* SOCK_xxx */ int ai_protocol; /* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */ size_t ai_addrlen; /* length of ai_addr */ char *ai_canonname; /* canonical name for hostname */ struct sockaddr *ai_addr; /* binary address */ struct addrinfo *ai_next; /* next structure in linked list */ }; #endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO */ #ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO #ifdef getaddrinfo # undef getaddrinfo #endif #define getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d) (ssh_getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d)) int getaddrinfo(const char *, const char *, const struct addrinfo *, struct addrinfo **); #endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */ #if !defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) && !defined(HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO) #define gai_strerror(a) (_ssh_compat_gai_strerror(a)) char *gai_strerror(int); #endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */ #ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO #define freeaddrinfo(a) (ssh_freeaddrinfo(a)) void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *); #endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */ #ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO #define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (ssh_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g)) int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t, char *, size_t, int); #endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */ #endif /* !_FAKE_RFC2553_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.c010064400017500001750000000363221362136622600161660ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: fnmatch.c,v 1.21 2016/03/01 20:29:03 millert Exp $ */ /* Copyright (c) 2011, VMware, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * Neither the name of the VMware, Inc. nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL VMWARE, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Copyright (c) 2008, 2016 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Authored by William A. Rowe Jr. , April 2011 * * Derived from The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7, IEEE Std 1003.1-2008 * as described in; * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fnmatch.html * * Filename pattern matches defined in section 2.13, "Pattern Matching Notation" * from chapter 2. "Shell Command Language" * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/utilities/V3_chap02.html#tag_18_13 * where; 1. A bracket expression starting with an unquoted '^' * character CONTINUES to specify a non-matching list; 2. an explicit '.' * in a bracket expression matching list, e.g. "[.abc]" does NOT match a leading * in a filename; 3. a '[' which does not introduce * a valid bracket expression is treated as an ordinary character; 4. a differing * number of consecutive slashes within pattern and string will NOT match; * 5. a trailing '\' in FNM_ESCAPE mode is treated as an ordinary '\' character. * * Bracket expansion defined in section 9.3.5, "RE Bracket Expression", * from chapter 9, "Regular Expressions" * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap09.html#tag_09_03_05 * with no support for collating symbols, equivalence class expressions or * character class expressions. A partial range expression with a leading * hyphen following a valid range expression will match only the ordinary * and the ending character (e.g. "[a-m-z]" will match characters * 'a' through 'm', a '-', or a 'z'). * * Supports BSD extensions FNM_LEADING_DIR to match pattern to the end of one * path segment of string, and FNM_CASEFOLD to ignore alpha case. * * NOTE: Only POSIX/C single byte locales are correctly supported at this time. * Notably, non-POSIX locales with FNM_CASEFOLD produce undefined results, * particularly in ranges of mixed case (e.g. "[A-z]") or spanning alpha and * nonalpha characters within a range. * * XXX comments below indicate porting required for multi-byte character sets * and non-POSIX locale collation orders; requires mbr* APIs to track shift * state of pattern and string (rewinding pattern and string repeatedly). * * Certain parts of the code assume 0x00-0x3F are unique with any MBCS (e.g. * UTF-8, SHIFT-JIS, etc). Any implementation allowing '\' as an alternate * path delimiter must be aware that 0x5C is NOT unique within SHIFT-JIS. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/fnmatch.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_FNMATCH #include #include #include #include "charclass.h" #define RANGE_MATCH 1 #define RANGE_NOMATCH 0 #define RANGE_ERROR (-1) static int classmatch(const char *pattern, char test, int foldcase, const char **ep) { const char * const mismatch = pattern; const char *colon; struct cclass *cc; int rval = RANGE_NOMATCH; size_t len; if (pattern[0] != '[' || pattern[1] != ':') { *ep = mismatch; return RANGE_ERROR; } pattern += 2; if ((colon = strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']') { *ep = mismatch; return RANGE_ERROR; } *ep = colon + 2; len = (size_t)(colon - pattern); if (foldcase && strncmp(pattern, "upper:]", 7) == 0) pattern = "lower:]"; for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) { if (!strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0') { if (cc->isctype((unsigned char)test)) rval = RANGE_MATCH; break; } } if (cc->name == NULL) { /* invalid character class, treat as normal text */ *ep = mismatch; rval = RANGE_ERROR; } return rval; } /* Most MBCS/collation/case issues handled here. Wildcard '*' is not handled. * EOS '\0' and the FNM_PATHNAME '/' delimiters are not advanced over, * however the "\/" sequence is advanced to '/'. * * Both pattern and string are **char to support pointer increment of arbitrary * multibyte characters for the given locale, in a later iteration of this code */ static int fnmatch_ch(const char **pattern, const char **string, int flags) { const char * const mismatch = *pattern; const int nocase = !!(flags & FNM_CASEFOLD); const int escape = !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE); const int slash = !!(flags & FNM_PATHNAME); int result = FNM_NOMATCH; const char *startch; int negate; if (**pattern == '[') { ++*pattern; /* Handle negation, either leading ! or ^ operators */ negate = (**pattern == '!') || (**pattern == '^'); if (negate) ++*pattern; /* ']' is an ordinary char at the start of the range pattern */ if (**pattern == ']') goto leadingclosebrace; while (**pattern) { if (**pattern == ']') { ++*pattern; /* XXX: Fix for MBCS character width */ ++*string; return (result ^ negate); } if (escape && (**pattern == '\\')) { ++*pattern; /* Patterns must terminate with ']', not EOS */ if (!**pattern) break; } /* Patterns must terminate with ']' not '/' */ if (slash && (**pattern == '/')) break; /* Match character classes. */ switch (classmatch(*pattern, **string, nocase, pattern)) { case RANGE_MATCH: result = 0; continue; case RANGE_NOMATCH: /* Valid character class but no match. */ continue; default: /* Not a valid character class. */ break; } if (!**pattern) break; leadingclosebrace: /* Look at only well-formed range patterns; * "x-]" is not allowed unless escaped ("x-\]") * XXX: Fix for locale/MBCS character width */ if (((*pattern)[1] == '-') && ((*pattern)[2] != ']')) { startch = *pattern; *pattern += (escape && ((*pattern)[2] == '\\')) ? 3 : 2; /* * NOT a properly balanced [expr] pattern, EOS * terminated or ranges containing a slash in * FNM_PATHNAME mode pattern fall out to to the * rewind and test '[' literal code path. */ if (!**pattern || (slash && (**pattern == '/'))) break; /* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by MBCS char width */ if ((**string >= *startch) && (**string <= **pattern)) result = 0; else if (nocase && (isupper((unsigned char)**string) || isupper((unsigned char)*startch) || isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) && (tolower((unsigned char)**string) >= tolower((unsigned char)*startch)) && (tolower((unsigned char)**string) <= tolower((unsigned char)**pattern))) result = 0; ++*pattern; continue; } /* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by MBCS char width */ if ((**string == **pattern)) result = 0; else if (nocase && (isupper((unsigned char)**string) || isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) && (tolower((unsigned char)**string) == tolower((unsigned char)**pattern))) result = 0; ++*pattern; } /* * NOT a properly balanced [expr] pattern; * Rewind and reset result to test '[' literal */ *pattern = mismatch; result = FNM_NOMATCH; } else if (**pattern == '?') { /* Optimize '?' match before unescaping **pattern */ if (!**string || (slash && (**string == '/'))) return FNM_NOMATCH; result = 0; goto fnmatch_ch_success; } else if (escape && (**pattern == '\\') && (*pattern)[1]) { ++*pattern; } /* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by the MBCS char width */ if (**string == **pattern) result = 0; else if (nocase && (isupper((unsigned char)**string) || isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) && (tolower((unsigned char)**string) == tolower((unsigned char)**pattern))) result = 0; /* Refuse to advance over trailing slash or NULs */ if (**string == '\0' || **pattern == '\0' || (slash && ((**string == '/') || (**pattern == '/')))) return result; fnmatch_ch_success: ++*pattern; ++*string; return result; } int fnmatch(const char *pattern, const char *string, int flags) { static const char dummystring[2] = {' ', 0}; const int escape = !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE); const int slash = !!(flags & FNM_PATHNAME); const int leading_dir = !!(flags & FNM_LEADING_DIR); const char *dummyptr, *matchptr, *strendseg; int wild; /* For '*' wild processing only; surpress 'used before initialization' * warnings with dummy initialization values; */ const char *strstartseg = NULL; const char *mismatch = NULL; int matchlen = 0; if (*pattern == '*') goto firstsegment; while (*pattern && *string) { /* * Pre-decode "\/" which has no special significance, and * match balanced slashes, starting a new segment pattern. */ if (slash && escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/')) ++pattern; if (slash && (*pattern == '/') && (*string == '/')) { ++pattern; ++string; } firstsegment: /* * At the beginning of each segment, validate leading period * behavior. */ if ((flags & FNM_PERIOD) && (*string == '.')) { if (*pattern == '.') ++pattern; else if (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '.')) pattern += 2; else return FNM_NOMATCH; ++string; } /* * Determine the end of string segment. Presumes '/' * character is unique, not composite in any MBCS encoding */ if (slash) { strendseg = strchr(string, '/'); if (!strendseg) strendseg = strchr(string, '\0'); } else { strendseg = strchr(string, '\0'); } /* * Allow pattern '*' to be consumed even with no remaining * string to match. */ while (*pattern) { if ((string > strendseg) || ((string == strendseg) && (*pattern != '*'))) break; if (slash && ((*pattern == '/') || (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/')))) break; /* * Reduce groups of '*' and '?' to n '?' matches * followed by one '*' test for simplicity. */ for (wild = 0; (*pattern == '*') || (*pattern == '?'); ++pattern) { if (*pattern == '*') { wild = 1; } else if (string < strendseg) { /* && (*pattern == '?') */ /* XXX: Advance 1 char for MBCS locale */ ++string; } else { /* (string >= strendseg) && (*pattern == '?') */ return FNM_NOMATCH; } } if (wild) { strstartseg = string; mismatch = pattern; /* * Count fixed (non '*') char matches remaining * in pattern * excluding '/' (or "\/") and '*'. */ for (matchptr = pattern, matchlen = 0; 1; ++matchlen) { if ((*matchptr == '\0') || (slash && ((*matchptr == '/') || (escape && (*matchptr == '\\') && (matchptr[1] == '/'))))) { /* Compare precisely this many * trailing string chars, the * resulting match needs no * wildcard loop. */ /* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */ if (string + matchlen > strendseg) return FNM_NOMATCH; string = strendseg - matchlen; wild = 0; break; } if (*matchptr == '*') { /* * Ensure at least this many * trailing string chars remain * for the first comparison. */ /* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */ if (string + matchlen > strendseg) return FNM_NOMATCH; /* * Begin first wild comparison * at the current position. */ break; } /* * Skip forward in pattern by a single * character match Use a dummy * fnmatch_ch() test to count one * "[range]" escape. */ /* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */ if (escape && (*matchptr == '\\') && matchptr[1]) { matchptr += 2; } else if (*matchptr == '[') { dummyptr = dummystring; fnmatch_ch(&matchptr, &dummyptr, flags); } else { ++matchptr; } } } /* Incrementally match string against the pattern. */ while (*pattern && (string < strendseg)) { /* Success; begin a new wild pattern search. */ if (*pattern == '*') break; if (slash && ((*string == '/') || (*pattern == '/') || (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/')))) break; /* * Compare ch's (the pattern is advanced over * "\/" to the '/', but slashes will mismatch, * and are not consumed). */ if (!fnmatch_ch(&pattern, &string, flags)) continue; /* * Failed to match, loop against next char * offset of string segment until not enough * string chars remain to match the fixed * pattern. */ if (wild) { /* XXX: Advance 1 char for MBCS locale */ string = ++strstartseg; if (string + matchlen > strendseg) return FNM_NOMATCH; pattern = mismatch; continue; } else return FNM_NOMATCH; } } if (*string && !((slash || leading_dir) && (*string == '/'))) return FNM_NOMATCH; if (*pattern && !(slash && ((*pattern == '/') || (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/'))))) return FNM_NOMATCH; if (leading_dir && !*pattern && *string == '/') return 0; } /* Where both pattern and string are at EOS, declare success. */ if (!*string && !*pattern) return 0; /* Pattern didn't match to the end of string. */ return FNM_NOMATCH; } #endif /* HAVE_FNMATCH */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c010064400017500001750000000173041362136622600166460ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.17 2018/05/14 04:39:04 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Ian F. Darwin. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libutil/fmt_scaled.c */ /* * fmt_scaled: Format numbers scaled for human comprehension * scan_scaled: Scan numbers in this format. * * "Human-readable" output uses 4 digits max, and puts a unit suffix at * the end. Makes output compact and easy-to-read esp. on huge disks. * Formatting code was originally in OpenBSD "df", converted to library routine. * Scanning code written for OpenBSD libutil. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED #include #include #include #include #include #include typedef enum { NONE = 0, KILO = 1, MEGA = 2, GIGA = 3, TERA = 4, PETA = 5, EXA = 6 } unit_type; /* These three arrays MUST be in sync! XXX make a struct */ static unit_type units[] = { NONE, KILO, MEGA, GIGA, TERA, PETA, EXA }; static char scale_chars[] = "BKMGTPE"; static long long scale_factors[] = { 1LL, 1024LL, 1024LL*1024, 1024LL*1024*1024, 1024LL*1024*1024*1024, 1024LL*1024*1024*1024*1024, 1024LL*1024*1024*1024*1024*1024, }; #define SCALE_LENGTH (sizeof(units)/sizeof(units[0])) #define MAX_DIGITS (SCALE_LENGTH * 3) /* XXX strlen(sprintf("%lld", -1)? */ /* Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result". * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set on error. */ int scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result) { char *p = scaled; int sign = 0; unsigned int i, ndigits = 0, fract_digits = 0; long long scale_fact = 1, whole = 0, fpart = 0; /* Skip leading whitespace */ while (isascii((unsigned char)*p) && isspace((unsigned char)*p)) ++p; /* Then at most one leading + or - */ while (*p == '-' || *p == '+') { if (*p == '-') { if (sign) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } sign = -1; ++p; } else if (*p == '+') { if (sign) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } sign = +1; ++p; } } /* Main loop: Scan digits, find decimal point, if present. * We don't allow exponentials, so no scientific notation * (but note that E for Exa might look like e to some!). * Advance 'p' to end, to get scale factor. */ for (; isascii((unsigned char)*p) && (isdigit((unsigned char)*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) { if (*p == '.') { if (fract_digits > 0) { /* oops, more than one '.' */ errno = EINVAL; return -1; } fract_digits = 1; continue; } i = (*p) - '0'; /* whew! finally a digit we can use */ if (fract_digits > 0) { if (fract_digits >= MAX_DIGITS-1) /* ignore extra fractional digits */ continue; fract_digits++; /* for later scaling */ if (fpart > LLONG_MAX / 10) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } fpart *= 10; if (i > LLONG_MAX - fpart) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } fpart += i; } else { /* normal digit */ if (++ndigits >= MAX_DIGITS) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } if (whole > LLONG_MAX / 10) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } whole *= 10; if (i > LLONG_MAX - whole) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } whole += i; } } if (sign) { whole *= sign; fpart *= sign; } /* If no scale factor given, we're done. fraction is discarded. */ if (!*p) { *result = whole; return 0; } /* Validate scale factor, and scale whole and fraction by it. */ for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) { /* Are we there yet? */ if (*p == scale_chars[i] || *p == tolower((unsigned char)scale_chars[i])) { /* If it ends with alphanumerics after the scale char, bad. */ if (isalnum((unsigned char)*(p+1))) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } scale_fact = scale_factors[i]; /* check for overflow and underflow after scaling */ if (whole > LLONG_MAX / scale_fact || whole < LLONG_MIN / scale_fact) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } /* scale whole part */ whole *= scale_fact; /* truncate fpart so it doesn't overflow. * then scale fractional part. */ while (fpart >= LLONG_MAX / scale_fact) { fpart /= 10; fract_digits--; } fpart *= scale_fact; if (fract_digits > 0) { for (i = 0; i < fract_digits -1; i++) fpart /= 10; } whole += fpart; *result = whole; return 0; } } /* Invalid unit or character */ errno = EINVAL; return -1; } /* Format the given "number" into human-readable form in "result". * Result must point to an allocated buffer of length FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE. * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set if error. */ int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result) { long long abval, fract = 0; unsigned int i; unit_type unit = NONE; abval = llabs(number); /* Not every negative long long has a positive representation. * Also check for numbers that are just too darned big to format */ if (abval < 0 || abval / 1024 >= scale_factors[SCALE_LENGTH-1]) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } /* scale whole part; get unscaled fraction */ for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) { if (abval/1024 < scale_factors[i]) { unit = units[i]; fract = (i == 0) ? 0 : abval % scale_factors[i]; number /= scale_factors[i]; if (i > 0) fract /= scale_factors[i - 1]; break; } } fract = (10 * fract + 512) / 1024; /* if the result would be >= 10, round main number */ if (fract >= 10) { if (number >= 0) number++; else number--; fract = 0; } else if (fract < 0) { /* shouldn't happen */ fract = 0; } if (number == 0) strlcpy(result, "0B", FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE); else if (unit == NONE || number >= 100 || number <= -100) { if (fract >= 5) { if (number >= 0) number++; else number--; } (void)snprintf(result, FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE, "%lld%c", number, scale_chars[unit]); } else (void)snprintf(result, FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE, "%lld.%1lld%c", number, fract, scale_chars[unit]); return 0; } #ifdef MAIN /* * This is the original version of the program in the man page. * Copy-and-paste whatever you need from it. */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *cinput = "1.5K", buf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; long long ninput = 10483892, result; if (scan_scaled(cinput, &result) == 0) printf("\"%s\" -> %lld\n", cinput, result); else perror(cinput); if (fmt_scaled(ninput, buf) == 0) printf("%lld -> \"%s\"\n", ninput, buf); else fprintf(stderr, "%lld invalid (%s)\n", ninput, strerror(errno)); return 0; } #endif #endif /* HAVE_FMT_SCALED */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h010064400017500001750000000051171362136622600161710ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: fnmatch.h,v 1.8 2005/12/13 00:35:22 millert Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: fnmatch.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:53 cgd Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * @(#)fnmatch.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/fnmatch.h */ #ifndef HAVE_FNMATCH_H /* Ensure we define FNM_CASEFOLD */ #define __BSD_VISIBLE 1 #ifndef _FNMATCH_H_ #define _FNMATCH_H_ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H #include #endif #define FNM_NOMATCH 1 /* Match failed. */ #define FNM_NOSYS 2 /* Function not supported (unused). */ #define FNM_NOESCAPE 0x01 /* Disable backslash escaping. */ #define FNM_PATHNAME 0x02 /* Slash must be matched by slash. */ #define FNM_PERIOD 0x04 /* Period must be matched by period. */ #if __BSD_VISIBLE #define FNM_LEADING_DIR 0x08 /* Ignore / after Imatch. */ #define FNM_CASEFOLD 0x10 /* Case insensitive search. */ #define FNM_IGNORECASE FNM_CASEFOLD #define FNM_FILE_NAME FNM_PATHNAME #endif /* __BEGIN_DECLS */ int fnmatch(const char *, const char *, int); /* __END_DECLS */ #endif /* !_FNMATCH_H_ */ #endif /* ! HAVE_FNMATCH_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/freezero.c010064400017500001750000000020061362136622600163570ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2008, 2010, 2011, 2016 Otto Moerbeek * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO void freezero(void *ptr, size_t sz) { if (ptr == NULL) return; explicit_bzero(ptr, sz); free(ptr); } #endif /* HAVE_FREEZERO */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c010064400017500001750000000137101362136622600160170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: getcwd.c,v 1.14 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp */ /* * Copyright (c) 1989, 1991, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/getcwd.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "includes.h" #define ISDOT(dp) \ (dp->d_name[0] == '.' && (dp->d_name[1] == '\0' || \ (dp->d_name[1] == '.' && dp->d_name[2] == '\0'))) char * getcwd(char *pt, size_t size) { struct dirent *dp; DIR *dir = NULL; dev_t dev; ino_t ino; int first; char *bpt, *bup; struct stat s; dev_t root_dev; ino_t root_ino; size_t ptsize, upsize; int save_errno; char *ept, *eup, *up; /* * If no buffer specified by the user, allocate one as necessary. * If a buffer is specified, the size has to be non-zero. The path * is built from the end of the buffer backwards. */ if (pt) { ptsize = 0; if (!size) { errno = EINVAL; return (NULL); } ept = pt + size; } else { if ((pt = malloc(ptsize = MAXPATHLEN)) == NULL) return (NULL); ept = pt + ptsize; } bpt = ept - 1; *bpt = '\0'; /* * Allocate bytes for the string of "../"'s. * Should always be enough (it's 340 levels). If it's not, allocate * as necessary. Special * case the first stat, it's ".", not "..". */ if ((up = malloc(upsize = MAXPATHLEN)) == NULL) goto err; eup = up + upsize; bup = up; up[0] = '.'; up[1] = '\0'; /* Save root values, so know when to stop. */ if (stat("/", &s)) goto err; root_dev = s.st_dev; root_ino = s.st_ino; errno = 0; /* XXX readdir has no error return. */ for (first = 1;; first = 0) { /* Stat the current level. */ if (lstat(up, &s)) goto err; /* Save current node values. */ ino = s.st_ino; dev = s.st_dev; /* Check for reaching root. */ if (root_dev == dev && root_ino == ino) { *--bpt = '/'; /* * It's unclear that it's a requirement to copy the * path to the beginning of the buffer, but it's always * been that way and stuff would probably break. */ memmove(pt, bpt, ept - bpt); free(up); return (pt); } /* * Build pointer to the parent directory, allocating memory * as necessary. Max length is 3 for "../", the largest * possible component name, plus a trailing NUL. */ if (bup + 3 + MAXNAMLEN + 1 >= eup) { char *nup; if ((nup = realloc(up, upsize *= 2)) == NULL) goto err; bup = nup + (bup - up); up = nup; eup = up + upsize; } *bup++ = '.'; *bup++ = '.'; *bup = '\0'; /* Open and stat parent directory. */ if (!(dir = opendir(up)) || fstat(dirfd(dir), &s)) goto err; /* Add trailing slash for next directory. */ *bup++ = '/'; /* * If it's a mount point, have to stat each element because * the inode number in the directory is for the entry in the * parent directory, not the inode number of the mounted file. */ save_errno = 0; if (s.st_dev == dev) { for (;;) { if (!(dp = readdir(dir))) goto notfound; if (dp->d_fileno == ino) break; } } else for (;;) { if (!(dp = readdir(dir))) goto notfound; if (ISDOT(dp)) continue; memcpy(bup, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen + 1); /* Save the first error for later. */ if (lstat(up, &s)) { if (!save_errno) save_errno = errno; errno = 0; continue; } if (s.st_dev == dev && s.st_ino == ino) break; } /* * Check for length of the current name, preceding slash, * leading slash. */ if (bpt - pt < dp->d_namlen + (first ? 1 : 2)) { size_t len; char *npt; if (!ptsize) { errno = ERANGE; goto err; } len = ept - bpt; if ((npt = realloc(pt, ptsize *= 2)) == NULL) goto err; bpt = npt + (bpt - pt); pt = npt; ept = pt + ptsize; memmove(ept - len, bpt, len); bpt = ept - len; } if (!first) *--bpt = '/'; bpt -= dp->d_namlen; memcpy(bpt, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen); (void)closedir(dir); /* Truncate any file name. */ *bup = '\0'; } notfound: /* * If readdir set errno, use it, not any saved error; otherwise, * didn't find the current directory in its parent directory, set * errno to ENOENT. */ if (!errno) errno = save_errno ? save_errno : ENOENT; /* FALLTHROUGH */ err: save_errno = errno; if (ptsize) free(pt); free(up); if (dir) (void)closedir(dir); errno = save_errno; return (NULL); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c010064400017500001750000000053171362136622600172760ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: getgrouplist.c,v 1.12 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp */ /* * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/getgrouplist.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST /* * get credential */ #include #include #include #include int getgrouplist(const char *uname, gid_t agroup, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt) { struct group *grp; int i, ngroups; int ret, maxgroups; int bail; ret = 0; ngroups = 0; maxgroups = *grpcnt; /* * install primary group */ if (ngroups >= maxgroups) { *grpcnt = ngroups; return (-1); } groups[ngroups++] = agroup; /* * Scan the group file to find additional groups. */ setgrent(); while ((grp = getgrent())) { if (grp->gr_gid == agroup) continue; for (bail = 0, i = 0; bail == 0 && i < ngroups; i++) if (groups[i] == grp->gr_gid) bail = 1; if (bail) continue; for (i = 0; grp->gr_mem[i]; i++) { if (!strcmp(grp->gr_mem[i], uname)) { if (ngroups >= maxgroups) { ret = -1; goto out; } groups[ngroups++] = grp->gr_gid; break; } } } out: endgrent(); *grpcnt = ngroups; return (ret); } #endif /* HAVE_GETGROUPLIST */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/getopt.h010064400017500001750000000053221362136622600160510ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: getopt.h,v 1.2 2008/06/26 05:42:04 ray Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: getopt.h,v 1.4 2000/07/07 10:43:54 ad Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation * by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _GETOPT_H_ #define _GETOPT_H_ /* * GNU-like getopt_long() and 4.4BSD getsubopt()/optreset extensions */ #define no_argument 0 #define required_argument 1 #define optional_argument 2 struct option { /* name of long option */ const char *name; /* * one of no_argument, required_argument, and optional_argument: * whether option takes an argument */ int has_arg; /* if not NULL, set *flag to val when option found */ int *flag; /* if flag not NULL, value to set *flag to; else return value */ int val; }; int getopt_long(int, char * const *, const char *, const struct option *, int *); int getopt_long_only(int, char * const *, const char *, const struct option *, int *); #ifndef _GETOPT_DEFINED_ #define _GETOPT_DEFINED_ int getopt(int, char * const *, const char *); int getsubopt(char **, char * const *, char **); extern char *optarg; /* getopt(3) external variables */ extern int opterr; extern int optind; extern int optopt; extern int optreset; extern char *suboptarg; /* getsubopt(3) external variable */ #endif #endif /* !_GETOPT_H_ */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c010064400017500001750000000347331362136622600170730ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.25 2011/03/05 22:10:11 guenther Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.15 2002/01/31 22:43:40 tv Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. * * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. */ /*- * Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation * by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/getopt_long.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) /* * Some defines to make it easier to keep the code in sync with upstream. * getopt opterr optind optopt optreset optarg are all in defines.h which is * pulled in by includes.h. */ #define warnx logit #if 0 #include #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" int opterr = 1; /* if error message should be printed */ int optind = 1; /* index into parent argv vector */ int optopt = '?'; /* character checked for validity */ int optreset; /* reset getopt */ char *optarg; /* argument associated with option */ #define PRINT_ERROR ((opterr) && (*options != ':')) #define FLAG_PERMUTE 0x01 /* permute non-options to the end of argv */ #define FLAG_ALLARGS 0x02 /* treat non-options as args to option "-1" */ #define FLAG_LONGONLY 0x04 /* operate as getopt_long_only */ /* return values */ #define BADCH (int)'?' #define BADARG ((*options == ':') ? (int)':' : (int)'?') #define INORDER (int)1 #define EMSG "" static int getopt_internal(int, char * const *, const char *, const struct option *, int *, int); static int parse_long_options(char * const *, const char *, const struct option *, int *, int); static int gcd(int, int); static void permute_args(int, int, int, char * const *); static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */ /* XXX: set optreset to 1 rather than these two */ static int nonopt_start = -1; /* first non option argument (for permute) */ static int nonopt_end = -1; /* first option after non options (for permute) */ /* Error messages */ static const char recargchar[] = "option requires an argument -- %c"; static const char recargstring[] = "option requires an argument -- %s"; static const char ambig[] = "ambiguous option -- %.*s"; static const char noarg[] = "option doesn't take an argument -- %.*s"; static const char illoptchar[] = "unknown option -- %c"; static const char illoptstring[] = "unknown option -- %s"; /* * Compute the greatest common divisor of a and b. */ static int gcd(int a, int b) { int c; c = a % b; while (c != 0) { a = b; b = c; c = a % b; } return (b); } /* * Exchange the block from nonopt_start to nonopt_end with the block * from nonopt_end to opt_end (keeping the same order of arguments * in each block). */ static void permute_args(int panonopt_start, int panonopt_end, int opt_end, char * const *nargv) { int cstart, cyclelen, i, j, ncycle, nnonopts, nopts, pos; char *swap; /* * compute lengths of blocks and number and size of cycles */ nnonopts = panonopt_end - panonopt_start; nopts = opt_end - panonopt_end; ncycle = gcd(nnonopts, nopts); cyclelen = (opt_end - panonopt_start) / ncycle; for (i = 0; i < ncycle; i++) { cstart = panonopt_end+i; pos = cstart; for (j = 0; j < cyclelen; j++) { if (pos >= panonopt_end) pos -= nnonopts; else pos += nopts; swap = nargv[pos]; /* LINTED const cast */ ((char **) nargv)[pos] = nargv[cstart]; /* LINTED const cast */ ((char **)nargv)[cstart] = swap; } } } /* * parse_long_options -- * Parse long options in argc/argv argument vector. * Returns -1 if short_too is set and the option does not match long_options. */ static int parse_long_options(char * const *nargv, const char *options, const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int short_too) { char *current_argv, *has_equal; size_t current_argv_len; int i, match; current_argv = place; match = -1; optind++; if ((has_equal = strchr(current_argv, '=')) != NULL) { /* argument found (--option=arg) */ current_argv_len = has_equal - current_argv; has_equal++; } else current_argv_len = strlen(current_argv); for (i = 0; long_options[i].name; i++) { /* find matching long option */ if (strncmp(current_argv, long_options[i].name, current_argv_len)) continue; if (strlen(long_options[i].name) == current_argv_len) { /* exact match */ match = i; break; } /* * If this is a known short option, don't allow * a partial match of a single character. */ if (short_too && current_argv_len == 1) continue; if (match == -1) /* partial match */ match = i; else { /* ambiguous abbreviation */ if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(ambig, (int)current_argv_len, current_argv); optopt = 0; return (BADCH); } } if (match != -1) { /* option found */ if (long_options[match].has_arg == no_argument && has_equal) { if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(noarg, (int)current_argv_len, current_argv); /* * XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag */ if (long_options[match].flag == NULL) optopt = long_options[match].val; else optopt = 0; return (BADARG); } if (long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument || long_options[match].has_arg == optional_argument) { if (has_equal) optarg = has_equal; else if (long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument) { /* * optional argument doesn't use next nargv */ optarg = nargv[optind++]; } } if ((long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument) && (optarg == NULL)) { /* * Missing argument; leading ':' indicates no error * should be generated. */ if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(recargstring, current_argv); /* * XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag */ if (long_options[match].flag == NULL) optopt = long_options[match].val; else optopt = 0; --optind; return (BADARG); } } else { /* unknown option */ if (short_too) { --optind; return (-1); } if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(illoptstring, current_argv); optopt = 0; return (BADCH); } if (idx) *idx = match; if (long_options[match].flag) { *long_options[match].flag = long_options[match].val; return (0); } else return (long_options[match].val); } /* * getopt_internal -- * Parse argc/argv argument vector. Called by user level routines. */ static int getopt_internal(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options, const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int flags) { char *oli; /* option letter list index */ int optchar, short_too; static int posixly_correct = -1; if (options == NULL) return (-1); /* * XXX Some GNU programs (like cvs) set optind to 0 instead of * XXX using optreset. Work around this braindamage. */ if (optind == 0) optind = optreset = 1; /* * Disable GNU extensions if POSIXLY_CORRECT is set or options * string begins with a '+'. */ if (posixly_correct == -1 || optreset) posixly_correct = (getenv("POSIXLY_CORRECT") != NULL); if (*options == '-') flags |= FLAG_ALLARGS; else if (posixly_correct || *options == '+') flags &= ~FLAG_PERMUTE; if (*options == '+' || *options == '-') options++; optarg = NULL; if (optreset) nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1; start: if (optreset || !*place) { /* update scanning pointer */ optreset = 0; if (optind >= nargc) { /* end of argument vector */ place = EMSG; if (nonopt_end != -1) { /* do permutation, if we have to */ permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end, optind, nargv); optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start; } else if (nonopt_start != -1) { /* * If we skipped non-options, set optind * to the first of them. */ optind = nonopt_start; } nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1; return (-1); } if (*(place = nargv[optind]) != '-' || (place[1] == '\0' && strchr(options, '-') == NULL)) { place = EMSG; /* found non-option */ if (flags & FLAG_ALLARGS) { /* * GNU extension: * return non-option as argument to option 1 */ optarg = nargv[optind++]; return (INORDER); } if (!(flags & FLAG_PERMUTE)) { /* * If no permutation wanted, stop parsing * at first non-option. */ return (-1); } /* do permutation */ if (nonopt_start == -1) nonopt_start = optind; else if (nonopt_end != -1) { permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end, optind, nargv); nonopt_start = optind - (nonopt_end - nonopt_start); nonopt_end = -1; } optind++; /* process next argument */ goto start; } if (nonopt_start != -1 && nonopt_end == -1) nonopt_end = optind; /* * If we have "-" do nothing, if "--" we are done. */ if (place[1] != '\0' && *++place == '-' && place[1] == '\0') { optind++; place = EMSG; /* * We found an option (--), so if we skipped * non-options, we have to permute. */ if (nonopt_end != -1) { permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end, optind, nargv); optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start; } nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1; return (-1); } } /* * Check long options if: * 1) we were passed some * 2) the arg is not just "-" * 3) either the arg starts with -- we are getopt_long_only() */ if (long_options != NULL && place != nargv[optind] && (*place == '-' || (flags & FLAG_LONGONLY))) { short_too = 0; if (*place == '-') place++; /* --foo long option */ else if (*place != ':' && strchr(options, *place) != NULL) short_too = 1; /* could be short option too */ optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options, idx, short_too); if (optchar != -1) { place = EMSG; return (optchar); } } if ((optchar = (int)*place++) == (int)':' || (optchar == (int)'-' && *place != '\0') || (oli = strchr(options, optchar)) == NULL) { /* * If the user specified "-" and '-' isn't listed in * options, return -1 (non-option) as per POSIX. * Otherwise, it is an unknown option character (or ':'). */ if (optchar == (int)'-' && *place == '\0') return (-1); if (!*place) ++optind; if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(illoptchar, optchar); optopt = optchar; return (BADCH); } if (long_options != NULL && optchar == 'W' && oli[1] == ';') { /* -W long-option */ if (*place) /* no space */ /* NOTHING */; else if (++optind >= nargc) { /* no arg */ place = EMSG; if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(recargchar, optchar); optopt = optchar; return (BADARG); } else /* white space */ place = nargv[optind]; optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options, idx, 0); place = EMSG; return (optchar); } if (*++oli != ':') { /* doesn't take argument */ if (!*place) ++optind; } else { /* takes (optional) argument */ optarg = NULL; if (*place) /* no white space */ optarg = place; else if (oli[1] != ':') { /* arg not optional */ if (++optind >= nargc) { /* no arg */ place = EMSG; if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(recargchar, optchar); optopt = optchar; return (BADARG); } else optarg = nargv[optind]; } place = EMSG; ++optind; } /* dump back option letter */ return (optchar); } /* * getopt -- * Parse argc/argv argument vector. * * [eventually this will replace the BSD getopt] */ int getopt(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options) { /* * We don't pass FLAG_PERMUTE to getopt_internal() since * the BSD getopt(3) (unlike GNU) has never done this. * * Furthermore, since many privileged programs call getopt() * before dropping privileges it makes sense to keep things * as simple (and bug-free) as possible. */ return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, NULL, NULL, 0)); } #if 0 /* * getopt_long -- * Parse argc/argv argument vector. */ int getopt_long(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options, const struct option *long_options, int *idx) { return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx, FLAG_PERMUTE)); } /* * getopt_long_only -- * Parse argc/argv argument vector. */ int getopt_long_only(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options, const struct option *long_options, int *idx) { return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx, FLAG_PERMUTE|FLAG_LONGONLY)); } #endif #endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_OPTRESET) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c010064400017500001750000000174761362136622600205500ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.10 2005/03/30 02:58:28 tedu Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2007 Simon Vallet / Genoscope * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS) #include #include #include #include "getrrsetbyname.h" #include "log.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #define malloc(x) (xmalloc(x)) #define calloc(x, y) (xcalloc((x),(y))) int getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass, unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags, struct rrsetinfo **res) { int result; unsigned int i, j, index_ans, index_sig; struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL; struct rdatainfo *rdata; size_t len; ldns_resolver *ldns_res = NULL; ldns_rdf *domain = NULL; ldns_pkt *pkt = NULL; ldns_rr_list *rrsigs = NULL, *rrdata = NULL; ldns_status err; ldns_rr *rr; /* check for invalid class and type */ if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) { result = ERRSET_INVAL; goto fail; } /* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */ if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) { result = ERRSET_INVAL; goto fail; } /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */ if (flags) { result = ERRSET_INVAL; goto fail; } /* Initialize resolver from resolv.conf */ domain = ldns_dname_new_frm_str(hostname); if ((err = ldns_resolver_new_frm_file(&ldns_res, NULL)) != \ LDNS_STATUS_OK) { result = ERRSET_FAIL; goto fail; } #ifdef LDNS_DEBUG ldns_resolver_set_debug(ldns_res, true); #endif /* LDNS_DEBUG */ ldns_resolver_set_dnssec(ldns_res, true); /* Use DNSSEC */ /* make query */ pkt = ldns_resolver_query(ldns_res, domain, rdtype, rdclass, LDNS_RD); /*** TODO: finer errcodes -- see original **/ if (!pkt || ldns_pkt_ancount(pkt) < 1) { result = ERRSET_FAIL; goto fail; } /* initialize rrset */ rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo)); if (rrset == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } rrdata = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, rdtype, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER); rrset->rri_nrdatas = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrdata); if (!rrset->rri_nrdatas) { result = ERRSET_NODATA; goto fail; } /* copy name from answer section */ len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0))); if ((rrset->rri_name = malloc(len)) == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } memcpy(rrset->rri_name, ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0))), len); rrset->rri_rdclass = ldns_rr_get_class(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0)); rrset->rri_rdtype = ldns_rr_get_type(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0)); rrset->rri_ttl = ldns_rr_ttl(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0)); debug2("ldns: got %u answers from DNS", rrset->rri_nrdatas); /* Check for authenticated data */ if (ldns_pkt_ad(pkt)) { rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED; } else { /* AD is not set, try autonomous validation */ ldns_rr_list * trusted_keys = ldns_rr_list_new(); debug2("ldns: trying to validate RRset"); /* Get eventual sigs */ rrsigs = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER); rrset->rri_nsigs = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrsigs); debug2("ldns: got %u signature(s) (RRTYPE %u) from DNS", rrset->rri_nsigs, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG); if ((err = ldns_verify_trusted(ldns_res, rrdata, rrsigs, trusted_keys)) == LDNS_STATUS_OK) { rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED; debug2("ldns: RRset is signed with a valid key"); } else { debug2("ldns: RRset validation failed: %s", ldns_get_errorstr_by_id(err)); } ldns_rr_list_deep_free(trusted_keys); } /* allocate memory for answers */ rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas, sizeof(struct rdatainfo)); if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } /* allocate memory for signatures */ if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) { rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs, sizeof(struct rdatainfo)); if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } } /* copy answers & signatures */ for (i=0, index_ans=0, index_sig=0; i< pkt->_header->_ancount; i++) { rdata = NULL; rr = ldns_rr_list_rr(ldns_pkt_answer(pkt), i); if (ldns_rr_get_class(rr) == rrset->rri_rdclass && ldns_rr_get_type(rr) == rrset->rri_rdtype) { rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++]; } if (rr->_rr_class == rrset->rri_rdclass && rr->_rr_type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG && rrset->rri_sigs) { rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++]; } if (rdata) { size_t rdata_offset = 0; rdata->rdi_length = 0; for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) { rdata->rdi_length += ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j)); } rdata->rdi_data = malloc(rdata->rdi_length); if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } /* Re-create the raw DNS RDATA */ for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) { len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j)); memcpy(rdata->rdi_data + rdata_offset, ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j)), len); rdata_offset += len; } } } *res = rrset; result = ERRSET_SUCCESS; fail: /* freerrset(rrset); */ ldns_rdf_deep_free(domain); ldns_pkt_free(pkt); ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrsigs); ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrdata); ldns_resolver_deep_free(ldns_res); return result; } void freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset) { u_int16_t i; if (rrset == NULL) return; if (rrset->rri_rdatas) { for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) { if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL) break; free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data); } free(rrset->rri_rdatas); } if (rrset->rri_sigs) { for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) { if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL) break; free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data); } free(rrset->rri_sigs); } if (rrset->rri_name) free(rrset->rri_name); free(rrset); } #endif /* !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c010064400017500001750000000330741362136622600176020ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.11 2007/10/11 18:36:41 jakob Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/getrrsetbyname.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && !defined (HAVE_LDNS) #include #include #include #include #include "getrrsetbyname.h" #if defined(HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO) && !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO extern int h_errno; #endif /* We don't need multithread support here */ #ifdef _THREAD_PRIVATE # undef _THREAD_PRIVATE #endif #define _THREAD_PRIVATE(a,b,c) (c) #ifndef HAVE__RES_EXTERN struct __res_state _res; #endif /* Necessary functions and macros */ /* * Inline versions of get/put short/long. Pointer is advanced. * * These macros demonstrate the property of C whereby it can be * portable or it can be elegant but rarely both. */ #ifndef INT32SZ # define INT32SZ 4 #endif #ifndef INT16SZ # define INT16SZ 2 #endif #ifndef GETSHORT #define GETSHORT(s, cp) { \ register u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \ (s) = ((u_int16_t)t_cp[0] << 8) \ | ((u_int16_t)t_cp[1]) \ ; \ (cp) += INT16SZ; \ } #endif #ifndef GETLONG #define GETLONG(l, cp) { \ register u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \ (l) = ((u_int32_t)t_cp[0] << 24) \ | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[1] << 16) \ | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[2] << 8) \ | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[3]) \ ; \ (cp) += INT32SZ; \ } #endif /* * Routines to insert/extract short/long's. */ #ifndef HAVE__GETSHORT static u_int16_t _getshort(msgp) register const u_char *msgp; { register u_int16_t u; GETSHORT(u, msgp); return (u); } #elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT) && (HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT == 0) u_int16_t _getshort(register const u_char *); #endif #ifndef HAVE__GETLONG static u_int32_t _getlong(msgp) register const u_char *msgp; { register u_int32_t u; GETLONG(u, msgp); return (u); } #elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETLONG) && (HAVE_DECL__GETLONG == 0) u_int32_t _getlong(register const u_char *); #endif /* ************** */ #define ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE 0xffff struct dns_query { char *name; u_int16_t type; u_int16_t class; struct dns_query *next; }; struct dns_rr { char *name; u_int16_t type; u_int16_t class; u_int16_t ttl; u_int16_t size; void *rdata; struct dns_rr *next; }; struct dns_response { HEADER header; struct dns_query *query; struct dns_rr *answer; struct dns_rr *authority; struct dns_rr *additional; }; static struct dns_response *parse_dns_response(const u_char *, int); static struct dns_query *parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *, int, const u_char **, int); static struct dns_rr *parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *, int, const u_char **, int); static void free_dns_query(struct dns_query *); static void free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *); static void free_dns_response(struct dns_response *); static int count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *, u_int16_t, u_int16_t); int getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass, unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags, struct rrsetinfo **res) { struct __res_state *_resp = _THREAD_PRIVATE(_res, _res, &_res); int result; struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL; struct dns_response *response = NULL; struct dns_rr *rr; struct rdatainfo *rdata; int length; unsigned int index_ans, index_sig; u_char answer[ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE]; /* check for invalid class and type */ if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) { result = ERRSET_INVAL; goto fail; } /* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */ if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) { result = ERRSET_INVAL; goto fail; } /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */ if (flags) { result = ERRSET_INVAL; goto fail; } /* initialize resolver */ if ((_resp->options & RES_INIT) == 0 && res_init() == -1) { result = ERRSET_FAIL; goto fail; } #ifdef DEBUG _resp->options |= RES_DEBUG; #endif /* DEBUG */ #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */ if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0) _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC; #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */ /* make query */ length = res_query(hostname, (signed int) rdclass, (signed int) rdtype, answer, sizeof(answer)); if (length < 0) { switch(h_errno) { case HOST_NOT_FOUND: result = ERRSET_NONAME; goto fail; case NO_DATA: result = ERRSET_NODATA; goto fail; default: result = ERRSET_FAIL; goto fail; } } /* parse result */ response = parse_dns_response(answer, length); if (response == NULL) { result = ERRSET_FAIL; goto fail; } if (response->header.qdcount != 1) { result = ERRSET_FAIL; goto fail; } /* initialize rrset */ rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo)); if (rrset == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } rrset->rri_rdclass = response->query->class; rrset->rri_rdtype = response->query->type; rrset->rri_ttl = response->answer->ttl; rrset->rri_nrdatas = response->header.ancount; #ifdef HAVE_HEADER_AD /* check for authenticated data */ if (response->header.ad == 1) rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED; #endif /* copy name from answer section */ rrset->rri_name = strdup(response->answer->name); if (rrset->rri_name == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } /* count answers */ rrset->rri_nrdatas = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass, rrset->rri_rdtype); rrset->rri_nsigs = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass, T_RRSIG); /* allocate memory for answers */ rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas, sizeof(struct rdatainfo)); if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } /* allocate memory for signatures */ if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) { rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs, sizeof(struct rdatainfo)); if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } } /* copy answers & signatures */ for (rr = response->answer, index_ans = 0, index_sig = 0; rr; rr = rr->next) { rdata = NULL; if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass && rr->type == rrset->rri_rdtype) rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++]; if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass && rr->type == T_RRSIG) rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++]; if (rdata) { rdata->rdi_length = rr->size; rdata->rdi_data = malloc(rr->size); if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } memcpy(rdata->rdi_data, rr->rdata, rr->size); } } free_dns_response(response); *res = rrset; return (ERRSET_SUCCESS); fail: if (rrset != NULL) freerrset(rrset); if (response != NULL) free_dns_response(response); return (result); } void freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset) { u_int16_t i; if (rrset == NULL) return; if (rrset->rri_rdatas) { for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) { if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL) break; free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data); } free(rrset->rri_rdatas); } if (rrset->rri_sigs) { for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) { if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL) break; free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data); } free(rrset->rri_sigs); } if (rrset->rri_name) free(rrset->rri_name); free(rrset); } /* * DNS response parsing routines */ static struct dns_response * parse_dns_response(const u_char *answer, int size) { struct dns_response *resp; const u_char *cp; /* allocate memory for the response */ resp = calloc(1, sizeof(*resp)); if (resp == NULL) return (NULL); /* initialize current pointer */ cp = answer; /* copy header */ memcpy(&resp->header, cp, HFIXEDSZ); cp += HFIXEDSZ; /* fix header byte order */ resp->header.qdcount = ntohs(resp->header.qdcount); resp->header.ancount = ntohs(resp->header.ancount); resp->header.nscount = ntohs(resp->header.nscount); resp->header.arcount = ntohs(resp->header.arcount); /* there must be at least one query */ if (resp->header.qdcount < 1) { free_dns_response(resp); return (NULL); } /* parse query section */ resp->query = parse_dns_qsection(answer, size, &cp, resp->header.qdcount); if (resp->header.qdcount && resp->query == NULL) { free_dns_response(resp); return (NULL); } /* parse answer section */ resp->answer = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp, resp->header.ancount); if (resp->header.ancount && resp->answer == NULL) { free_dns_response(resp); return (NULL); } /* parse authority section */ resp->authority = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp, resp->header.nscount); if (resp->header.nscount && resp->authority == NULL) { free_dns_response(resp); return (NULL); } /* parse additional section */ resp->additional = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp, resp->header.arcount); if (resp->header.arcount && resp->additional == NULL) { free_dns_response(resp); return (NULL); } return (resp); } static struct dns_query * parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp, int count) { struct dns_query *head, *curr, *prev; int i, length; char name[MAXDNAME]; for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) { /* allocate and initialize struct */ curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_query)); if (curr == NULL) { free_dns_query(head); return (NULL); } if (head == NULL) head = curr; if (prev != NULL) prev->next = curr; /* name */ length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name, sizeof(name)); if (length < 0) { free_dns_query(head); return (NULL); } curr->name = strdup(name); if (curr->name == NULL) { free_dns_query(head); return (NULL); } *cp += length; /* type */ curr->type = _getshort(*cp); *cp += INT16SZ; /* class */ curr->class = _getshort(*cp); *cp += INT16SZ; } return (head); } static struct dns_rr * parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp, int count) { struct dns_rr *head, *curr, *prev; int i, length; char name[MAXDNAME]; for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) { /* allocate and initialize struct */ curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_rr)); if (curr == NULL) { free_dns_rr(head); return (NULL); } if (head == NULL) head = curr; if (prev != NULL) prev->next = curr; /* name */ length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name, sizeof(name)); if (length < 0) { free_dns_rr(head); return (NULL); } curr->name = strdup(name); if (curr->name == NULL) { free_dns_rr(head); return (NULL); } *cp += length; /* type */ curr->type = _getshort(*cp); *cp += INT16SZ; /* class */ curr->class = _getshort(*cp); *cp += INT16SZ; /* ttl */ curr->ttl = _getlong(*cp); *cp += INT32SZ; /* rdata size */ curr->size = _getshort(*cp); *cp += INT16SZ; /* rdata itself */ curr->rdata = malloc(curr->size); if (curr->rdata == NULL) { free_dns_rr(head); return (NULL); } memcpy(curr->rdata, *cp, curr->size); *cp += curr->size; } return (head); } static void free_dns_query(struct dns_query *p) { if (p == NULL) return; if (p->name) free(p->name); free_dns_query(p->next); free(p); } static void free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p) { if (p == NULL) return; if (p->name) free(p->name); if (p->rdata) free(p->rdata); free_dns_rr(p->next); free(p); } static void free_dns_response(struct dns_response *p) { if (p == NULL) return; free_dns_query(p->query); free_dns_rr(p->answer); free_dns_rr(p->authority); free_dns_rr(p->additional); free(p); } static int count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p, u_int16_t class, u_int16_t type) { int n = 0; while(p) { if (p->class == class && p->type == type) n++; p = p->next; } return (n); } #endif /* !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && !defined (HAVE_LDNS) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h010064400017500001750000000071741362136622600176110ustar00djmdjm/* OPENBSD BASED ON : include/netdb.h */ /* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.4 2001/08/16 18:16:43 ho Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _GETRRSETBYNAME_H #define _GETRRSETBYNAME_H #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef HFIXEDSZ #define HFIXEDSZ 12 #endif #ifndef T_RRSIG #define T_RRSIG 46 #endif /* * Flags for getrrsetbyname() */ #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED # define RRSET_VALIDATED 1 #endif /* * Return codes for getrrsetbyname() */ #ifndef ERRSET_SUCCESS # define ERRSET_SUCCESS 0 # define ERRSET_NOMEMORY 1 # define ERRSET_FAIL 2 # define ERRSET_INVAL 3 # define ERRSET_NONAME 4 # define ERRSET_NODATA 5 #endif struct rdatainfo { unsigned int rdi_length; /* length of data */ unsigned char *rdi_data; /* record data */ }; struct rrsetinfo { unsigned int rri_flags; /* RRSET_VALIDATED ... */ unsigned int rri_rdclass; /* class number */ unsigned int rri_rdtype; /* RR type number */ unsigned int rri_ttl; /* time to live */ unsigned int rri_nrdatas; /* size of rdatas array */ unsigned int rri_nsigs; /* size of sigs array */ char *rri_name; /* canonical name */ struct rdatainfo *rri_rdatas; /* individual records */ struct rdatainfo *rri_sigs; /* individual signatures */ }; int getrrsetbyname(const char *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, struct rrsetinfo **); void freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *); #endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) */ #endif /* _GETRRSETBYNAME_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/glob.c010064400017500001750000000632701362136622600154730ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.48 2019/02/04 16:45:40 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by * Guido van Rossum. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */ /* * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2. * * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh). * * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX: * * GLOB_QUOTE: * Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following * character might have (except \ at end of string is retained). * GLOB_MAGCHAR: * Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character. * GLOB_NOMAGIC: * Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did * not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing] * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC: * Use alternately specified directory access functions. * GLOB_TILDE: * expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo * GLOB_BRACE: * expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b * gl_matchc: * Number of matches in the current invocation of glob. */ #include "includes.h" #include "glob.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \ !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \ defined(BROKEN_GLOB) #include "charclass.h" #define DOLLAR '$' #define DOT '.' #define EOS '\0' #define LBRACKET '[' #define NOT '!' #define QUESTION '?' #define QUOTE '\\' #define RANGE '-' #define RBRACKET ']' #define SEP '/' #define STAR '*' #define TILDE '~' #define UNDERSCORE '_' #define LBRACE '{' #define RBRACE '}' #define SLASH '/' #define COMMA ',' #ifndef DEBUG #define M_QUOTE 0x8000 #define M_PROTECT 0x4000 #define M_MASK 0xffff #define M_ASCII 0x00ff typedef u_short Char; #else #define M_QUOTE 0x80 #define M_PROTECT 0x40 #define M_MASK 0xff #define M_ASCII 0x7f typedef char Char; #endif #define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII)) #define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE)) #define M_ALL META('*') #define M_END META(']') #define M_NOT META('!') #define M_ONE META('?') #define M_RNG META('-') #define M_SET META('[') #define M_CLASS META(':') #define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0) #define GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC 65536 #define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 2048 #define GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR 16384 struct glob_lim { size_t glim_malloc; size_t glim_stat; size_t glim_readdir; }; struct glob_path_stat { char *gps_path; struct stat *gps_stat; }; static int compare(const void *, const void *); static int compare_gps(const void *, const void *); static int g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, size_t); static int g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); static DIR *g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *); static Char *g_strchr(const Char *, int); static int g_strncmp(const Char *, const char *, size_t); static int g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *, struct stat *); static const Char * globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *); static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *); #ifdef DEBUG static void qprintf(const char *, Char *); #endif int glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob) { const u_char *patnext; int c; Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[PATH_MAX]; struct glob_lim limit = { 0, 0, 0 }; patnext = (u_char *) pattern; if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) { pglob->gl_pathc = 0; pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; pglob->gl_statv = NULL; if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS)) pglob->gl_offs = 0; } pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR; pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc; pglob->gl_matchc = 0; if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX) return(GLOB_NOMATCH); if (pglob->gl_offs >= SSIZE_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1) return GLOB_NOSPACE; bufnext = patbuf; bufend = bufnext + PATH_MAX - 1; if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE) while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS) *bufnext++ = c; else { /* Protect the quoted characters. */ while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS) if (c == QUOTE) { if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) { c = QUOTE; --patnext; } *bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT; } else *bufnext++ = c; } *bufnext = EOS; if (flags & GLOB_BRACE) return globexp1(patbuf, pglob, &limit); else return glob0(patbuf, pglob, &limit); } /* * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic * characters */ static int globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { const Char* ptr = pattern; /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */ if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS) return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp); if ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr(ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL) return globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, limitp); return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp); } /* * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace. * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern. * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns. */ static int globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { int i, rv; Char *lm, *ls; const Char *pe, *pm, *pl; Char patbuf[PATH_MAX]; /* copy part up to the brace */ for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++) ; *lm = EOS; ls = lm; /* Find the balanced brace */ for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++) if (*pe == LBRACKET) { /* Ignore everything between [] */ for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++) ; if (*pe == EOS) { /* * We could not find a matching RBRACKET. * Ignore and just look for RBRACE */ pe = pm; } } else if (*pe == LBRACE) i++; else if (*pe == RBRACE) { if (i == 0) break; i--; } /* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */ if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS) return glob0(patbuf, pglob, limitp); for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) { switch (*pm) { case LBRACKET: /* Ignore everything between [] */ for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++) ; if (*pm == EOS) { /* * We could not find a matching RBRACKET. * Ignore and just look for RBRACE */ pm = pl; } break; case LBRACE: i++; break; case RBRACE: if (i) { i--; break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case COMMA: if (i && *pm == COMMA) break; else { /* Append the current string */ for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++) ; /* * Append the rest of the pattern after the * closing brace */ for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; ) ; /* Expand the current pattern */ #ifdef DEBUG qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf); #endif rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob, limitp); if (rv && rv != GLOB_NOMATCH) return rv; /* move after the comma, to the next string */ pl = pm + 1; } break; default: break; } } return 0; } /* * expand tilde from the passwd file. */ static const Char * globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_t patbuf_len, glob_t *pglob) { struct passwd *pwd; char *h; const Char *p; Char *b, *eb; if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE)) return pattern; /* Copy up to the end of the string or / */ eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1]; for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf; h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++) ; *h = EOS; #if 0 if (h == (char *)eb) return what; #endif if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) { /* * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME * first and then trying the password file */ #if 0 if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) { #endif if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) { if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) return pattern; else h = pwd->pw_dir; } } else { /* * Expand a ~user */ if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL) return pattern; else h = pwd->pw_dir; } /* Copy the home directory */ for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++) ; /* Append the rest of the pattern */ while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS) ; *b = EOS; return patbuf; } static int g_strncmp(const Char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n) { int rv = 0; while (n--) { rv = *(Char *)s1 - *(const unsigned char *)s2++; if (rv) break; if (*s1++ == '\0') break; } return rv; } static int g_charclass(const Char **patternp, Char **bufnextp) { const Char *pattern = *patternp + 1; Char *bufnext = *bufnextp; const Char *colon; struct cclass *cc; size_t len; if ((colon = g_strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']') return 1; /* not a character class */ len = (size_t)(colon - pattern); for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) { if (!g_strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0') break; } if (cc->name == NULL) return -1; /* invalid character class */ *bufnext++ = M_CLASS; *bufnext++ = (Char)(cc - &cclasses[0]); *bufnextp = bufnext; *patternp += len + 3; return 0; } /* * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0 * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error * to find no matches. */ static int glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { const Char *qpatnext; int c, err; size_t oldpathc; Char *bufnext, patbuf[PATH_MAX]; qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, PATH_MAX, pglob); oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc; bufnext = patbuf; /* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */ while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) { switch (c) { case LBRACKET: c = *qpatnext; if (c == NOT) ++qpatnext; if (*qpatnext == EOS || g_strchr(qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) { *bufnext++ = LBRACKET; if (c == NOT) --qpatnext; break; } *bufnext++ = M_SET; if (c == NOT) *bufnext++ = M_NOT; c = *qpatnext++; do { if (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':') { do { err = g_charclass(&qpatnext, &bufnext); if (err) break; c = *qpatnext++; } while (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':'); if (err == -1 && !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK)) return GLOB_NOMATCH; if (c == RBRACKET) break; } *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); if (*qpatnext == RANGE && (c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) { *bufnext++ = M_RNG; *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); qpatnext += 2; } } while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET); pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; *bufnext++ = M_END; break; case QUESTION: pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; *bufnext++ = M_ONE; break; case STAR: pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; /* collapse adjacent stars to one, * to avoid exponential behavior */ if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL) *bufnext++ = M_ALL; break; default: *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); break; } } *bufnext = EOS; #ifdef DEBUG qprintf("glob0:", patbuf); #endif if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+PATH_MAX-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0) return(err); /* * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh. */ if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) { if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) || ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) && !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR))) return(globextend(pattern, pglob, limitp, NULL)); else return(GLOB_NOMATCH); } if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) { if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT)) { /* Keep the paths and stat info synced during sort */ struct glob_path_stat *path_stat; size_t i; size_t n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc; size_t o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc; if ((path_stat = calloc(n, sizeof(*path_stat))) == NULL) return GLOB_NOSPACE; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { path_stat[i].gps_path = pglob->gl_pathv[o + i]; path_stat[i].gps_stat = pglob->gl_statv[o + i]; } qsort(path_stat, n, sizeof(*path_stat), compare_gps); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { pglob->gl_pathv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_path; pglob->gl_statv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_stat; } free(path_stat); } else { qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc, pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *), compare); } } return(0); } static int compare(const void *p, const void *q) { return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q)); } static int compare_gps(const void *_p, const void *_q) { const struct glob_path_stat *p = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_p; const struct glob_path_stat *q = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_q; return(strcmp(p->gps_path, q->gps_path)); } static int glob1(Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { Char pathbuf[PATH_MAX]; /* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */ if (*pattern == EOS) return(0); return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+PATH_MAX-1, pathbuf, pathbuf+PATH_MAX-1, pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp)); } /* * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more * meta characters. */ static int glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last, Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { struct stat sb; Char *p, *q; int anymeta; /* * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until * segment with meta character found. */ for (anymeta = 0;;) { if (*pattern == EOS) { /* End of pattern? */ *pathend = EOS; if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && limitp->glim_stat++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) { errno = 0; *pathend++ = SEP; *pathend = EOS; return(GLOB_NOSPACE); } if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob)) return(0); if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) && pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) || (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) && (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) { if (pathend+1 > pathend_last) return (1); *pathend++ = SEP; *pathend = EOS; } ++pglob->gl_matchc; return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp, &sb)); } /* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */ q = pathend; p = pattern; while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) { if (ismeta(*p)) anymeta = 1; if (q+1 > pathend_last) return (1); *q++ = *p++; } if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */ pathend = q; pattern = p; while (*pattern == SEP) { if (pathend+1 > pathend_last) return (1); *pathend++ = *pattern++; } } else /* Need expansion, recurse. */ return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend, pathend_last, pattern, p, pattern_last, pglob, limitp)); } /* NOTREACHED */ } static int glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last, Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, Char *restpattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { struct dirent *dp; DIR *dirp; int err; char buf[PATH_MAX]; /* * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque * structures. */ struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *); if (pathend > pathend_last) return (1); *pathend = EOS; errno = 0; if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) { /* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */ if (pglob->gl_errfunc) { if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf))) return(GLOB_ABORTED); if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) || pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR) return(GLOB_ABORTED); } return(0); } err = 0; /* Search directory for matching names. */ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir; else readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir; while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) { u_char *sc; Char *dc; if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && limitp->glim_readdir++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) { errno = 0; *pathend++ = SEP; *pathend = EOS; err = GLOB_NOSPACE; break; } /* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */ if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT) continue; dc = pathend; sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name; while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS) ; if (dc >= pathend_last) { *dc = EOS; err = 1; break; } if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern)) { *pathend = EOS; continue; } err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last, restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp); if (err) break; } if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) (*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp); else closedir(dirp); return(err); } /* * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item, * add the new item, and update gl_pathc. * * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic * behavior. * * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated. * * Invariant of the glob_t structure: * Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and * gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items. */ static int globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp, struct stat *sb) { char **pathv; size_t i, newn, len; char *copy = NULL; const Char *p; struct stat **statv; newn = 2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs; if (pglob->gl_offs >= SSIZE_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX || newn >= SSIZE_MAX || SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*pathv) <= newn || SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*statv) <= newn) { nospace: for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < newn - 2; i++) { if (pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i]) free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]); if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0 && pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i]) free(pglob->gl_statv[i]); } free(pglob->gl_pathv); pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; free(pglob->gl_statv); pglob->gl_statv = NULL; return(GLOB_NOSPACE); } pathv = reallocarray(pglob->gl_pathv, newn, sizeof(*pathv)); if (pathv == NULL) goto nospace; if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) { /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */ pathv += pglob->gl_offs; for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; ) *--pathv = NULL; } pglob->gl_pathv = pathv; if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0) { statv = reallocarray(pglob->gl_statv, newn, sizeof(*statv)); if (statv == NULL) goto nospace; if (pglob->gl_statv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) { /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */ statv += pglob->gl_offs; for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; ) *--statv = NULL; } pglob->gl_statv = statv; if (sb == NULL) statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL; else { limitp->glim_malloc += sizeof(**statv); if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && limitp->glim_malloc >= GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) { errno = 0; return(GLOB_NOSPACE); } if ((statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = malloc(sizeof(**statv))) == NULL) goto copy_error; memcpy(statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc], sb, sizeof(*sb)); } statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc + 1] = NULL; } for (p = path; *p++;) ; len = (size_t)(p - path); limitp->glim_malloc += len; if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) { if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) { free(copy); return(GLOB_NOSPACE); } pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy; } pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL; if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && (newn * sizeof(*pathv)) + limitp->glim_malloc > GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) { errno = 0; return(GLOB_NOSPACE); } copy_error: return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0); } /* * pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the * * pattern causes an iteration. * * Note, this function differs from the original as per the discussion * here: https://research.swtch.com/glob * * Basically we removed the recursion and made it use the algorithm * from Russ Cox to not go quadratic on cases like a file called * ("a" x 100) . "x" matched against a pattern like "a*a*a*a*a*a*a*y". */ static int match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend) { int ok, negate_range; Char c, k; Char *nextp = NULL; Char *nextn = NULL; loop: while (pat < patend) { c = *pat++; switch (c & M_MASK) { case M_ALL: while (pat < patend && (*pat & M_MASK) == M_ALL) pat++; /* eat consecutive '*' */ if (pat == patend) return(1); if (*name == EOS) return(0); nextn = name + 1; nextp = pat - 1; break; case M_ONE: if (*name++ == EOS) goto fail; break; case M_SET: ok = 0; if ((k = *name++) == EOS) goto fail; if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS) ++pat; while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) { if ((c & M_MASK) == M_CLASS) { Char idx = *pat & M_MASK; if (idx < NCCLASSES && cclasses[idx].isctype(k)) ok = 1; ++pat; } if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) { if (c <= k && k <= pat[1]) ok = 1; pat += 2; } else if (c == k) ok = 1; } if (ok == negate_range) goto fail; break; default: if (*name++ != c) goto fail; break; } } if (*name == EOS) return(1); fail: if (nextn) { pat = nextp; name = nextn; goto loop; } return(0); } /* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */ void globfree(glob_t *pglob) { size_t i; char **pp; if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) { pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs; for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp) free(*pp); free(pglob->gl_pathv); pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; } if (pglob->gl_statv != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < pglob->gl_pathc; i++) { free(pglob->gl_statv[i]); } free(pglob->gl_statv); pglob->gl_statv = NULL; } } static DIR * g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; if (!*str) strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf); else { if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf))) return(NULL); } if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf)); return(opendir(buf)); } static int g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf))) return(-1); if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb)); return(lstat(buf, sb)); } static int g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf))) return(-1); if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb)); return(stat(buf, sb)); } static Char * g_strchr(const Char *str, int ch) { do { if (*str == ch) return ((Char *)str); } while (*str++); return (NULL); } static int g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, size_t len) { while (len--) { if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS) return (0); } return (1); } #ifdef DEBUG static void qprintf(const char *str, Char *s) { Char *p; (void)printf("%s:\n", str); for (p = s; *p; p++) (void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p)); (void)printf("\n"); for (p = s; *p; p++) (void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' '); (void)printf("\n"); for (p = s; *p; p++) (void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' '); (void)printf("\n"); } #endif #endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/glob.h010064400017500001750000000111141362136622600154660ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.14 2019/02/04 16:45:40 millert Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by * Guido van Rossum. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */ #if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \ !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \ defined(BROKEN_GLOB) #ifndef _COMPAT_GLOB_H_ #define _COMPAT_GLOB_H_ #include #include # define glob_t _ssh_compat_glob_t # define glob(a, b, c, d) _ssh__compat_glob(a, b, c, d) # define globfree(a) _ssh__compat_globfree(a) struct stat; typedef struct { size_t gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */ size_t gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */ size_t gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */ int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */ char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */ struct stat **gl_statv; /* Stat entries corresponding to gl_pathv */ /* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */ int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int); /* * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2) * and lstat(2). */ void (*gl_closedir)(void *); struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *); void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *); int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *); int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *); } glob_t; #define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */ #define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */ #define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */ #define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */ #define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */ #define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */ #define GLOB_NOESCAPE 0x1000 /* Disable backslash escaping. */ #define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */ #define GLOB_ABORTED (-2) /* Unignored error. */ #define GLOB_NOMATCH (-3) /* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */ #define GLOB_NOSYS (-4) /* Function not supported. */ #define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */ #define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */ #define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */ #define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */ #define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */ #define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */ #define GLOB_LIMIT 0x2000 /* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */ #define GLOB_KEEPSTAT 0x4000 /* Retain stat data for paths in gl_statv. */ #define GLOB_ABEND GLOB_ABORTED /* backward compatibility */ int glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); void globfree(glob_t *); #endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */ #endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOH_HAS_GL_STATV) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c010064400017500001750000000123501362136622600165210ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.9 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * - * Portions Copyright (c) 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, and that * the name of Digital Equipment Corporation not be used in advertising or * publicity pertaining to distribution of the document or software without * specific, written prior permission. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. DISCLAIMS ALL * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL DIGITAL EQUIPMENT * CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS * SOFTWARE. * - * --Copyright-- */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_addr.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) #include #include #include #include #include #if 0 /* * Ascii internet address interpretation routine. * The value returned is in network order. */ in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp) { struct in_addr val; if (inet_aton(cp, &val)) return (val.s_addr); return (INADDR_NONE); } #endif /* * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address. * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not. * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address. */ int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr) { u_int32_t val; int base, n; char c; u_int parts[4]; u_int *pp = parts; c = *cp; for (;;) { /* * Collect number up to ``.''. * Values are specified as for C: * 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal. */ if (!isdigit(c)) return (0); val = 0; base = 10; if (c == '0') { c = *++cp; if (c == 'x' || c == 'X') base = 16, c = *++cp; else base = 8; } for (;;) { if (isascii(c) && isdigit(c)) { val = (val * base) + (c - '0'); c = *++cp; } else if (base == 16 && isascii(c) && isxdigit(c)) { val = (val << 4) | (c + 10 - (islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A')); c = *++cp; } else break; } if (c == '.') { /* * Internet format: * a.b.c.d * a.b.c (with c treated as 16 bits) * a.b (with b treated as 24 bits) */ if (pp >= parts + 3) return (0); *pp++ = val; c = *++cp; } else break; } /* * Check for trailing characters. */ if (c != '\0' && (!isascii(c) || !isspace(c))) return (0); /* * Concoct the address according to * the number of parts specified. */ n = pp - parts + 1; switch (n) { case 0: return (0); /* initial nondigit */ case 1: /* a -- 32 bits */ break; case 2: /* a.b -- 8.24 bits */ if ((val > 0xffffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff)) return (0); val |= parts[0] << 24; break; case 3: /* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */ if ((val > 0xffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff)) return (0); val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16); break; case 4: /* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */ if ((val > 0xff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff)) return (0); val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8); break; } if (addr) addr->s_addr = htonl(val); return (1); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c010064400017500001750000000043271362136622600165260ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: inet_ntoa.c,v 1.6 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_ntoa.c */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) /* * Convert network-format internet address * to base 256 d.d.d.d representation. */ #include #include #include #include char * inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in) { static char b[18]; char *p; p = (char *)∈ #define UC(b) (((int)b)&0xff) (void)snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%u.%u.%u.%u", UC(p[0]), UC(p[1]), UC(p[2]), UC(p[3])); return (b); } #endif /* defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c010064400017500001750000000126621362136622600165460ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.8 2008/12/09 19:38:38 otto Exp $ */ /* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS * SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_ntop.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef IN6ADDRSZ #define IN6ADDRSZ 16 /* IPv6 T_AAAA */ #endif #ifndef INT16SZ #define INT16SZ 2 /* for systems without 16-bit ints */ #endif /* * WARNING: Don't even consider trying to compile this on a system where * sizeof(int) < 4. sizeof(int) > 4 is fine; all the world's not a VAX. */ static const char *inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size); static const char *inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size); /* char * * inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size) * convert a network format address to presentation format. * return: * pointer to presentation format address (`dst'), or NULL (see errno). * author: * Paul Vixie, 1996. */ const char * inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size) { switch (af) { case AF_INET: return (inet_ntop4(src, dst, (size_t)size)); case AF_INET6: return (inet_ntop6(src, dst, (size_t)size)); default: errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; return (NULL); } /* NOTREACHED */ } /* const char * * inet_ntop4(src, dst, size) * format an IPv4 address, more or less like inet_ntoa() * return: * `dst' (as a const) * notes: * (1) uses no statics * (2) takes a u_char* not an in_addr as input * author: * Paul Vixie, 1996. */ static const char * inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size) { static const char fmt[] = "%u.%u.%u.%u"; char tmp[sizeof "255.255.255.255"]; int l; l = snprintf(tmp, size, fmt, src[0], src[1], src[2], src[3]); if (l <= 0 || l >= size) { errno = ENOSPC; return (NULL); } strlcpy(dst, tmp, size); return (dst); } /* const char * * inet_ntop6(src, dst, size) * convert IPv6 binary address into presentation (printable) format * author: * Paul Vixie, 1996. */ static const char * inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size) { /* * Note that int32_t and int16_t need only be "at least" large enough * to contain a value of the specified size. On some systems, like * Crays, there is no such thing as an integer variable with 16 bits. * Keep this in mind if you think this function should have been coded * to use pointer overlays. All the world's not a VAX. */ char tmp[sizeof "ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:255.255.255.255"]; char *tp, *ep; struct { int base, len; } best, cur; u_int words[IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ]; int i; int advance; /* * Preprocess: * Copy the input (bytewise) array into a wordwise array. * Find the longest run of 0x00's in src[] for :: shorthanding. */ memset(words, '\0', sizeof words); for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++) words[i / 2] |= (src[i] << ((1 - (i % 2)) << 3)); best.base = -1; cur.base = -1; for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ); i++) { if (words[i] == 0) { if (cur.base == -1) cur.base = i, cur.len = 1; else cur.len++; } else { if (cur.base != -1) { if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len) best = cur; cur.base = -1; } } } if (cur.base != -1) { if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len) best = cur; } if (best.base != -1 && best.len < 2) best.base = -1; /* * Format the result. */ tp = tmp; ep = tmp + sizeof(tmp); for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ) && tp < ep; i++) { /* Are we inside the best run of 0x00's? */ if (best.base != -1 && i >= best.base && i < (best.base + best.len)) { if (i == best.base) { if (tp + 1 >= ep) return (NULL); *tp++ = ':'; } continue; } /* Are we following an initial run of 0x00s or any real hex? */ if (i != 0) { if (tp + 1 >= ep) return (NULL); *tp++ = ':'; } /* Is this address an encapsulated IPv4? */ if (i == 6 && best.base == 0 && (best.len == 6 || (best.len == 5 && words[5] == 0xffff))) { if (!inet_ntop4(src+12, tp, (size_t)(ep - tp))) return (NULL); tp += strlen(tp); break; } advance = snprintf(tp, ep - tp, "%x", words[i]); if (advance <= 0 || advance >= ep - tp) return (NULL); tp += advance; } /* Was it a trailing run of 0x00's? */ if (best.base != -1 && (best.base + best.len) == (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ)) { if (tp + 1 >= ep) return (NULL); *tp++ = ':'; } if (tp + 1 >= ep) return (NULL); *tp++ = '\0'; /* * Check for overflow, copy, and we're done. */ if ((size_t)(tp - tmp) > size) { errno = ENOSPC; return (NULL); } strlcpy(dst, tmp, size); return (dst); } #endif /* !HAVE_INET_NTOP */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c010064400017500001750000000015621362136622600172610ustar00djmdjm/* Placed in the public domain. */ /* * _FORTIFY_SOURCE includes a misguided check for FD_SET(n)/FD_ISSET(b) * where n > FD_SETSIZE. This breaks OpenSSH and other programs that * explicitly allocate fd_sets. To avoid this, we wrap FD_SET in a * function compiled without _FORTIFY_SOURCE. */ #include "config.h" #if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) # include # if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) # if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) # undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE # undef __USE_FORTIFY_LEVEL # include void kludge_FD_SET(int n, fd_set *set) { FD_SET(n, set); } int kludge_FD_ISSET(int n, fd_set *set) { return FD_ISSET(n, set); } # endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */ # endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */ #endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c010064400017500001750000000404221362136622600204110ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: dsa_lib.c,v 1.29 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: rsa_lib.c,v 1.37 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: evp_lib.c,v 1.17 2018/09/12 06:35:38 djm Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: dh_lib.c,v 1.32 2018/05/02 15:48:38 tb Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: p_lib.c,v 1.24 2018/05/30 15:40:50 tb Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.30 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* $OpenBSD: dsa_asn1.c,v 1.22 2018/06/14 17:03:19 jsing Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: ecs_asn1.c,v 1.9 2018/03/17 15:24:44 tb Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.30 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL * project 2000. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* $OpenBSD: rsa_meth.c,v 1.2 2018/09/12 06:35:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2018 Theo Buehler * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #include #endif #include #ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) { if (p != NULL) *p = d->p; if (q != NULL) *q = d->q; if (g != NULL) *g = d->g; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) { if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL) || (d->g == NULL && g == NULL)) return 0; if (p != NULL) { BN_free(d->p); d->p = p; } if (q != NULL) { BN_free(d->q); d->q = q; } if (g != NULL) { BN_free(d->g); d->g = g; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) { if (pub_key != NULL) *pub_key = d->pub_key; if (priv_key != NULL) *priv_key = d->priv_key; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) { if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL) return 0; if (pub_key != NULL) { BN_free(d->pub_key); d->pub_key = pub_key; } if (priv_key != NULL) { BN_free(d->priv_key); d->priv_key = priv_key; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) { if (n != NULL) *n = r->n; if (e != NULL) *e = r->e; if (d != NULL) *d = r->d; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) { if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) return 0; if (n != NULL) { BN_free(r->n); r->n = n; } if (e != NULL) { BN_free(r->e); r->e = e; } if (d != NULL) { BN_free(r->d); r->d = d; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp) { if (dmp1 != NULL) *dmp1 = r->dmp1; if (dmq1 != NULL) *dmq1 = r->dmq1; if (iqmp != NULL) *iqmp = r->iqmp; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) { if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) return 0; if (dmp1 != NULL) { BN_free(r->dmp1); r->dmp1 = dmp1; } if (dmq1 != NULL) { BN_free(r->dmq1); r->dmq1 = dmq1; } if (iqmp != NULL) { BN_free(r->iqmp); r->iqmp = iqmp; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) { if (p != NULL) *p = r->p; if (q != NULL) *q = r->q; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) { if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) return 0; if (p != NULL) { BN_free(r->p); r->p = p; } if (q != NULL) { BN_free(r->q); r->q = q; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t len) { if (ctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) < 0) return 0; if (len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) return 0; if (len > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) return 0; /* sanity check; shouldn't happen */ /* * Skip the memcpy entirely when the requested IV length is zero, * since the iv pointer may be NULL or invalid. */ if (len != 0) { if (iv == NULL) return 0; # ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx), len); # else memcpy(iv, ctx->iv, len); # endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV */ } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t len) { if (ctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) < 0) return 0; if (len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) return 0; if (len > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) return 0; /* sanity check; shouldn't happen */ /* * Skip the memcpy entirely when the requested IV length is zero, * since the iv pointer may be NULL or invalid. */ if (len != 0) { if (iv == NULL) return 0; # ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, len); # else memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len); # endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST */ } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) { if (pr != NULL) *pr = sig->r; if (ps != NULL) *ps = sig->s; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) { if (r == NULL || s == NULL) return 0; BN_clear_free(sig->r); sig->r = r; BN_clear_free(sig->s); sig->s = s; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) { if (pr != NULL) *pr = sig->r; if (ps != NULL) *ps = sig->s; } #endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */ #ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) { if (r == NULL || s == NULL) return 0; BN_clear_free(sig->r); BN_clear_free(sig->s); sig->r = r; sig->s = s; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) { if (p != NULL) *p = dh->p; if (q != NULL) *q = dh->q; if (g != NULL) *g = dh->g; } #endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) { if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) return 0; if (p != NULL) { BN_free(dh->p); dh->p = p; } if (q != NULL) { BN_free(dh->q); dh->q = q; } if (g != NULL) { BN_free(dh->g); dh->g = g; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) { if (pub_key != NULL) *pub_key = dh->pub_key; if (priv_key != NULL) *priv_key = dh->priv_key; } #endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) { if (pub_key != NULL) { BN_free(dh->pub_key); dh->pub_key = pub_key; } if (priv_key != NULL) { BN_free(dh->priv_key); dh->priv_key = priv_key; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length) { if (length < 0 || length > INT_MAX) return 0; dh->length = length; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth) { if (meth != NULL) { free((char *)meth->name); free(meth); } } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP RSA_METHOD * RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth) { RSA_METHOD *copy; if ((copy = calloc(1, sizeof(*copy))) == NULL) return NULL; memcpy(copy, meth, sizeof(*copy)); if ((copy->name = strdup(meth->name)) == NULL) { free(copy); return NULL; } return copy; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name) { char *copy; if ((copy = strdup(name)) == NULL) return 0; free((char *)meth->name); meth->name = copy; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa) { return meth->finish; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc)(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)) { meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec)(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)) { meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish)(RSA *rsa)) { meth->finish = finish; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA RSA * EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { /* EVPerror(EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY); */ return NULL; } return pkey->pkey.rsa; } #endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW EVP_MD_CTX * EVP_MD_CTX_new(void) { return calloc(1, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); } #endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); free(ctx); } #endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/md5.c010064400017500001750000000175161362136622600152370ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: md5.c,v 1.9 2014/01/08 06:14:57 tedu Exp $ */ /* * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm. * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest. This code was * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed. * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish. * * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc. * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent, * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese * with every copy. * * To compute the message digest of a chunk of bytes, declare an * MD5Context structure, pass it to MD5Init, call MD5Update as * needed on buffers full of bytes, and then call MD5Final, which * will fill a supplied 16-byte array with the digest. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include "md5.h" #define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \ (cp)[7] = (value) >> 56; \ (cp)[6] = (value) >> 48; \ (cp)[5] = (value) >> 40; \ (cp)[4] = (value) >> 32; \ (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \ (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \ (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \ (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0) #define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \ (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \ (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \ (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \ (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0) static u_int8_t PADDING[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH] = { 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* * Start MD5 accumulation. Set bit count to 0 and buffer to mysterious * initialization constants. */ void MD5Init(MD5_CTX *ctx) { ctx->count = 0; ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; ctx->state[1] = 0xefcdab89; ctx->state[2] = 0x98badcfe; ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; } /* * Update context to reflect the concatenation of another buffer full * of bytes. */ void MD5Update(MD5_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t len) { size_t have, need; /* Check how many bytes we already have and how many more we need. */ have = (size_t)((ctx->count >> 3) & (MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - 1)); need = MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - have; /* Update bitcount */ ctx->count += (u_int64_t)len << 3; if (len >= need) { if (have != 0) { memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need); MD5Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer); input += need; len -= need; have = 0; } /* Process data in MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH-byte chunks. */ while (len >= MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH) { MD5Transform(ctx->state, input); input += MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH; len -= MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH; } } /* Handle any remaining bytes of data. */ if (len != 0) memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, len); } /* * Pad pad to 64-byte boundary with the bit pattern * 1 0* (64-bit count of bits processed, MSB-first) */ void MD5Pad(MD5_CTX *ctx) { u_int8_t count[8]; size_t padlen; /* Convert count to 8 bytes in little endian order. */ PUT_64BIT_LE(count, ctx->count); /* Pad out to 56 mod 64. */ padlen = MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - ((ctx->count >> 3) & (MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - 1)); if (padlen < 1 + 8) padlen += MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH; MD5Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8); /* padlen - 8 <= 64 */ MD5Update(ctx, count, 8); } /* * Final wrapup--call MD5Pad, fill in digest and zero out ctx. */ void MD5Final(unsigned char digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], MD5_CTX *ctx) { int i; MD5Pad(ctx); for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i * 4, ctx->state[i]); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); } /* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */ /* #define F1(x, y, z) (x & y | ~x & z) */ #define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) #define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y) #define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z) #define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z)) /* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */ #define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \ ( w += f(x, y, z) + data, w = w<>(32-s), w += x ) /* * The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to * reflect the addition of 16 longwords of new data. MD5Update blocks * the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine. */ void MD5Transform(u_int32_t state[4], const u_int8_t block[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH]) { u_int32_t a, b, c, d, in[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH / 4]; #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN memcpy(in, block, sizeof(in)); #else for (a = 0; a < MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH / 4; a++) { in[a] = (u_int32_t)( (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 0]) | (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 1]) << 8 | (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 2]) << 16 | (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 3]) << 24); } #endif a = state[0]; b = state[1]; c = state[2]; d = state[3]; MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + 0xd76aa478, 7); MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12); MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + 0x242070db, 17); MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22); MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7); MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + 0x4787c62a, 12); MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + 0xa8304613, 17); MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + 0xfd469501, 22); MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + 0x698098d8, 7); MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12); MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17); MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22); MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7); MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12); MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17); MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22); MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + 0xf61e2562, 5); MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + 0xc040b340, 9); MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14); MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20); MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 5] + 0xd62f105d, 5); MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9); MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14); MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20); MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5); MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9); MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14); MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + 0x455a14ed, 20); MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5); MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9); MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 7] + 0x676f02d9, 14); MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20); MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 5] + 0xfffa3942, 4); MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 8] + 0x8771f681, 11); MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16); MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23); MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + 0xa4beea44, 4); MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11); MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16); MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23); MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4); MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11); MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16); MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 6] + 0x04881d05, 23); MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4); MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11); MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16); MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2 ] + 0xc4ac5665, 23); MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + 0xf4292244, 6); MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7 ] + 0x432aff97, 10); MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15); MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5 ] + 0xfc93a039, 21); MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6); MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3 ] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10); MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15); MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1 ] + 0x85845dd1, 21); MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8 ] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6); MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10); MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6 ] + 0xa3014314, 15); MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21); MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4 ] + 0xf7537e82, 6); MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10); MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2 ] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15); MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9 ] + 0xeb86d391, 21); state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d; } #endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/md5.h010064400017500001750000000035431362136622600152370ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: md5.h,v 1.17 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm. * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest. This code was * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed. * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish. * * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc. * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent, * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese * with every copy. */ #ifndef _MD5_H_ #define _MD5_H_ #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL #define MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH 64 #define MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH 16 #define MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) typedef struct MD5Context { u_int32_t state[4]; /* state */ u_int64_t count; /* number of bits, mod 2^64 */ u_int8_t buffer[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* input buffer */ } MD5_CTX; void MD5Init(MD5_CTX *); void MD5Update(MD5_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); void MD5Pad(MD5_CTX *); void MD5Final(u_int8_t [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], MD5_CTX *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH))); void MD5Transform(u_int32_t [4], const u_int8_t [MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,4))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH))); char *MD5End(MD5_CTX *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *MD5File(const char *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *MD5FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *MD5Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); #endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ #endif /* _MD5_H_ */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/memmem.c010064400017500001750000000045311362136622600160200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: memmem.c,v 1.4 2015/08/31 02:53:57 guenther Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 2005 Pascal Gloor * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote * products derived from this software without specific prior written * permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_MEMMEM #include /* * Find the first occurrence of the byte string s in byte string l. */ void * memmem(const void *l, size_t l_len, const void *s, size_t s_len) { const char *cur, *last; const char *cl = l; const char *cs = s; /* a zero length needle should just return the haystack */ if (s_len == 0) return (void *)cl; /* "s" must be smaller or equal to "l" */ if (l_len < s_len) return NULL; /* special case where s_len == 1 */ if (s_len == 1) return memchr(l, *cs, l_len); /* the last position where its possible to find "s" in "l" */ last = cl + l_len - s_len; for (cur = cl; cur <= last; cur++) if (cur[0] == cs[0] && memcmp(cur, cs, s_len) == 0) return (void *)cur; return NULL; } DEF_WEAK(memmem); #endif /* HAVE_MEMMEM */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c010064400017500001750000000062201362136622600160350ustar00djmdjm/* THIS FILE HAS BEEN MODIFIED FROM THE ORIGINAL OPENBSD SOURCE */ /* Changes: Removed mktemp */ /* $OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.30 2010/03/21 23:09:30 schwarze Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1996-1998, 2008 Theo de Raadt * Copyright (c) 1997, 2008-2009 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdio/mktemp.c */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) #define MKTEMP_NAME 0 #define MKTEMP_FILE 1 #define MKTEMP_DIR 2 #define TEMPCHARS "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" #define NUM_CHARS (sizeof(TEMPCHARS) - 1) static int mktemp_internal(char *path, int slen, int mode) { char *start, *cp, *ep; const char *tempchars = TEMPCHARS; unsigned int r, tries; struct stat sb; size_t len; int fd; len = strlen(path); if (len == 0 || slen < 0 || (size_t)slen >= len) { errno = EINVAL; return(-1); } ep = path + len - slen; tries = 1; for (start = ep; start > path && start[-1] == 'X'; start--) { if (tries < INT_MAX / NUM_CHARS) tries *= NUM_CHARS; } tries *= 2; do { for (cp = start; cp != ep; cp++) { r = arc4random_uniform(NUM_CHARS); *cp = tempchars[r]; } switch (mode) { case MKTEMP_NAME: if (lstat(path, &sb) != 0) return(errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -1); break; case MKTEMP_FILE: fd = open(path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR); if (fd != -1 || errno != EEXIST) return(fd); break; case MKTEMP_DIR: if (mkdir(path, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR) == 0) return(0); if (errno != EEXIST) return(-1); break; } } while (--tries); errno = EEXIST; return(-1); } #if 0 char *_mktemp(char *); char * _mktemp(char *path) { if (mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_NAME) == -1) return(NULL); return(path); } __warn_references(mktemp, "warning: mktemp() possibly used unsafely; consider using mkstemp()"); char * mktemp(char *path) { return(_mktemp(path)); } #endif int mkstemp(char *path) { return(mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_FILE)); } int mkstemps(char *path, int slen) { return(mktemp_internal(path, slen, MKTEMP_FILE)); } char * mkdtemp(char *path) { int error; error = mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_DIR); return(error ? NULL : path); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h010064400017500001750000000213671362136622600174710ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H #define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include /* for wchar_t */ /* OpenBSD function replacements */ #include "base64.h" #include "sigact.h" #include "readpassphrase.h" #include "vis.h" #include "getrrsetbyname.h" #include "sha1.h" #include "sha2.h" #include "md5.h" #include "blf.h" #include "fnmatch.h" #ifndef HAVE_BASENAME char *basename(const char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa); #endif #ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM void closefrom(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETLINE #include ssize_t getline(char **, size_t *, FILE *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE int getpagesize(void); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETCWD char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size); #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM) && HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM == 0 void *memmem(const void *, size_t, const void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY void *recallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRCASESTR char *strcasestr(const char *, const char *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRNLEN size_t strnlen(const char *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRNDUP char *strndup(const char *s, size_t n); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETENV int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRMODE void strmode(int mode, char *p); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME #include char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) int mkstemps(char *path, int slen); int mkstemp(char *path); char *mkdtemp(char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_DAEMON int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose); #endif #ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME char *dirname(const char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED #define FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE 7 int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED int scan_scaled(char *, long long *); #endif #if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in); #endif #ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size); #endif #ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRSEP char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...); void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts); #include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h" #endif #if ((defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0) || \ (defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0)) # include # include # if defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0 int readv(int, struct iovec *, int); # endif # if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0 int writev(int, struct iovec *, int); # endif #endif /* Home grown routines */ #include "bsd-misc.h" #include "bsd-setres_id.h" #include "bsd-signal.h" #include "bsd-statvfs.h" #include "bsd-waitpid.h" #include "bsd-poll.h" #ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *); #endif #ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM # ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR # define arc4random_stir() # endif #else unsigned int arc4random(void); void arc4random_stir(void); #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...); #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY # include /* for struct winsize */ int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *); #endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */ #ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **); #endif /* multibyte character support */ #ifndef HAVE_MBLEN # define mblen(x, y) (1) #endif #ifndef HAVE_WCWIDTH # define wcwidth(x) (((x) >= 0x20 && (x) <= 0x7e) ? 1 : -1) /* force our no-op nl_langinfo and mbtowc */ # undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO # undef HAVE_MBTOWC # undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H #endif #ifndef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO # define nl_langinfo(x) "" #endif #ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC int mbtowc(wchar_t *, const char*, size_t); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) # include #endif /* * Some platforms unconditionally undefine va_copy() so we define VA_COPY() * instead. This is known to be the case on at least some configurations of * AIX with the xlc compiler. */ #ifndef VA_COPY # ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY # define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src) # else # ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY # define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src) # else # define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src) # endif # endif #endif #ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list); #endif #ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list); #endif #ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t, u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n); #endif #ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO void freezero(void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R struct tm *localtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *); #endif char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt); char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw); /* rfc2553 socket API replacements */ #include "fake-rfc2553.h" /* Routines for a single OS platform */ #include "bsd-cygwin_util.h" #include "port-aix.h" #include "port-irix.h" #include "port-linux.h" #include "port-solaris.h" #include "port-net.h" #include "port-uw.h" /* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */ #if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) # include # if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) # if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) # include /* Ensure include guard is defined */ # undef FD_SET # undef FD_ISSET # define FD_SET(n, set) kludge_FD_SET(n, set) # define FD_ISSET(n, set) kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set) void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *); int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *); # endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */ # endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */ #endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */ #endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c010064400017500001750000000312101362136622600163000ustar00djmdjm/* * * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003,2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef _AIX #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh_api.h" #include "log.h" #include #if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H) # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE # include # include # if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG) # include # endif # include #endif #include "port-aix.h" static char *lastlogin_msg = NULL; # ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB static char old_registry[REGISTRY_SIZE] = ""; # endif /* * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and other stuff is stored - * a few applications actually use this and die if it's not set * * NOTE: TTY= should be set, but since no one uses it and it's hard to * acquire due to privsep code. We will just drop support. */ void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw) { u_int i; size_t len; char *cp; len = sizeof("LOGNAME= NAME= ") + (2 * strlen(pw->pw_name)); cp = xmalloc(len); i = snprintf(cp, len, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%c", pw->pw_name, '\0', pw->pw_name, '\0'); if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1) fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s", strerror(errno)); debug3("AIX/UsrInfo: set len %d", i); free(cp); } # ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE /* * Remove embedded newlines in string (if any). * Used before logging messages returned by AIX authentication functions * so the message is logged on one line. */ void aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *p) { if (p == NULL) return; for (; *p; p++) { if (*p == '\n') *p = ' '; } /* Remove trailing whitespace */ if (*--p == ' ') *p = '\0'; } /* * Test specifically for the case where SYSTEM == NONE and AUTH1 contains * anything other than NONE or SYSTEM, which indicates that the admin has * configured the account for purely AUTH1-type authentication. * * Since authenticate() doesn't check AUTH1, and sshd can't sanely support * AUTH1 itself, in such a case authenticate() will allow access without * authentation, which is almost certainly not what the admin intends. * * (The native tools, eg login, will process the AUTH1 list in addition to * the SYSTEM list by using ckuserID(), however ckuserID() and AUTH1 methods * have been deprecated since AIX 4.2.x and would be very difficult for sshd * to support. * * Returns 0 if an unsupportable combination is found, 1 otherwise. */ static int aix_valid_authentications(const char *user) { char *auth1, *sys, *p; int valid = 1; if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTHSYSTEM, &sys, SEC_CHAR) != 0) { logit("Can't retrieve attribute SYSTEM for %s: %.100s", user, strerror(errno)); return 0; } debug3("AIX SYSTEM attribute %s", sys); if (strcmp(sys, "NONE") != 0) return 1; /* not "NONE", so is OK */ if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTH1, &auth1, SEC_LIST) != 0) { logit("Can't retrieve attribute auth1 for %s: %.100s", user, strerror(errno)); return 0; } p = auth1; /* A SEC_LIST is concatenated strings, ending with two NULs. */ while (p[0] != '\0' && p[1] != '\0') { debug3("AIX auth1 attribute list member %s", p); if (strcmp(p, "NONE") != 0 && strcmp(p, "SYSTEM")) { logit("Account %s has unsupported auth1 value '%s'", user, p); valid = 0; } p += strlen(p) + 1; } return (valid); } /* * Do authentication via AIX's authenticate routine. We loop until the * reenter parameter is 0, but normally authenticate is called only once. * * Note: this function returns 1 on success, whereas AIX's authenticate() * returns 0. */ int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password) { Authctxt *ctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *authmsg = NULL, *msg = NULL, *name = ctxt->pw->pw_name; int r, authsuccess = 0, expired, reenter, result; do { result = authenticate((char *)name, (char *)password, &reenter, &authmsg); aix_remove_embedded_newlines(authmsg); debug3("AIX/authenticate result %d, authmsg %.100s", result, authmsg); } while (reenter); if (!aix_valid_authentications(name)) result = -1; if (result == 0) { authsuccess = 1; /* * Record successful login. We don't have a pty yet, so just * label the line as "ssh" */ aix_setauthdb(name); /* * Check if the user's password is expired. */ expired = passwdexpired(name, &msg); if (msg && *msg) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(ctxt->loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg); } debug3("AIX/passwdexpired returned %d msg %.100s", expired, msg); switch (expired) { case 0: /* password not expired */ break; case 1: /* expired, password change required */ ctxt->force_pwchange = 1; break; default: /* user can't change(2) or other error (-1) */ logit("Password can't be changed for user %s: %.100s", name, msg); free(msg); authsuccess = 0; } aix_restoreauthdb(); } free(authmsg); return authsuccess; } /* * Check if specified account is permitted to log in. * Returns 1 if login is allowed, 0 if not allowed. */ int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *loginmsg) { char *msg = NULL; int r, result, permitted = 0; struct stat st; /* * Don't perform checks for root account (PermitRootLogin controls * logins via ssh) or if running as non-root user (since * loginrestrictions will always fail due to insufficient privilege). */ if (pw->pw_uid == 0 || geteuid() != 0) { debug3("%s: not checking", __func__); return 1; } result = loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &msg); if (result == 0) permitted = 1; /* * If restricted because /etc/nologin exists, the login will be denied * in session.c after the nologin message is sent, so allow for now * and do not append the returned message. */ if (result == -1 && errno == EPERM && stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0) permitted = 1; else if (msg != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (msg == NULL) msg = xstrdup("(none)"); aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg); debug3("AIX/loginrestrictions returned %d msg %.100s", result, msg); if (!permitted) logit("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, msg); free(msg); return permitted; } int sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm, struct sshbuf *loginmsg) { char *msg = NULL; int success = 0; aix_setauthdb(user); if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) { success = 1; if (msg != NULL) { debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg); if (lastlogin_msg == NULL) lastlogin_msg = msg; } } aix_restoreauthdb(); return (success); } char * sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *user, uid_t uid) { char *msg = lastlogin_msg; lastlogin_msg = NULL; return msg; } # ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN /* * record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function */ void record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user, const char *hostname, const char *ttyname) { if (geteuid() != 0) return; aix_setauthdb(user); # ifdef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname, AUDIT_FAIL_AUTH); # else loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname); # endif aix_restoreauthdb(); } # endif /* CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN */ /* * If we have setauthdb, retrieve the password registry for the user's * account then feed it to setauthdb. This will mean that subsequent AIX auth * functions will only use the specified loadable module. If we don't have * setauthdb this is a no-op. */ void aix_setauthdb(const char *user) { # ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB char *registry; if (setuserdb(S_READ) == -1) { debug3("%s: Could not open userdb to read", __func__); return; } if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_REGISTRY, ®istry, SEC_CHAR) == 0) { if (setauthdb(registry, old_registry) == 0) debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s'", registry); else debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s' failed: %s", registry, strerror(errno)); } else debug3("%s: Could not read S_REGISTRY for user: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); enduserdb(); # endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */ } /* * Restore the user's registry settings from old_registry. * Note that if the first aix_setauthdb fails, setauthdb("") is still safe * (it restores the system default behaviour). If we don't have setauthdb, * this is a no-op. */ void aix_restoreauthdb(void) { # ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB if (setauthdb(old_registry, NULL) == 0) debug3("%s: restoring old registry '%s'", __func__, old_registry); else debug3("%s: failed to restore old registry %s", __func__, old_registry); # endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */ } # endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ # ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME /* * aix_krb5_get_principal_name: returns the user's kerberos client principal name if * configured, otherwise NULL. Caller must free returned string. */ char * aix_krb5_get_principal_name(char *pw_name) { char *authname = NULL, *authdomain = NULL, *principal = NULL; setuserdb(S_READ); if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHDOMAIN, &authdomain, SEC_CHAR) != 0) debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHDOMAIN: %s", strerror(errno)); if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHNAME, &authname, SEC_CHAR) != 0) debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHNAME: %s", strerror(errno)); if (authdomain != NULL) xasprintf(&principal, "%s@%s", authname ? authname : pw_name, authdomain); else if (authname != NULL) principal = xstrdup(authname); enduserdb(); return principal; } # endif /* USE_AIX_KRB_NAME */ # if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_ADDRINFO) # undef getnameinfo /* * For some reason, AIX's getnameinfo will refuse to resolve the all-zeros * IPv6 address into its textual representation ("::"), so we wrap it * with a function that will. */ int sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags) { struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; u_int32_t *a6; if (flags & (NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) && sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) { sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; a6 = sa6->sin6_addr.u6_addr.u6_addr32; if (a6[0] == 0 && a6[1] == 0 && a6[2] == 0 && a6[3] == 0) { strlcpy(host, "::", hostlen); snprintf(serv, servlen, "%d", sa6->sin6_port); return 0; } } return getnameinfo(sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags); } # endif /* AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */ # if defined(USE_GETGRSET) # include int getgrouplist(const char *user, gid_t pgid, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt) { char *cp, *grplist, *grp; gid_t gid; int ret = 0, ngroups = 0, maxgroups; long l; maxgroups = *grpcnt; if ((cp = grplist = getgrset(user)) == NULL) return -1; /* handle zero-length case */ if (maxgroups <= 0) { *grpcnt = 0; return -1; } /* copy primary group */ groups[ngroups++] = pgid; /* copy each entry from getgrset into group list */ while ((grp = strsep(&grplist, ",")) != NULL) { l = strtol(grp, NULL, 10); if (ngroups >= maxgroups || l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) { ret = -1; goto out; } gid = (gid_t)l; if (gid == pgid) continue; /* we have already added primary gid */ groups[ngroups++] = gid; } out: free(cp); *grpcnt = ngroups; return ret; } # endif /* USE_GETGRSET */ #endif /* _AIX */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c010064400017500001750000000055221362136622600175100ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE # include # include #endif #include "log.h" #include "openssl-compat.h" /* * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0. * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed * within a patch series. */ int ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver) { long mask, hfix, lfix; /* exact match is always OK */ if (headerver == libver) return 1; /* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */ if (headerver < 0x1000000f) { mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */ return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask); } /* * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header. */ mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */ hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12; lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12; if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix) return 1; return 0; } void ssh_libcrypto_init(void) { #if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO) && \ defined(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS) && \ defined(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS) OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL); #elif defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS) OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif #ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE /* Enable use of crypto hardware */ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); /* Load the libcrypto config file to pick up engines defined there */ # if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO) && defined(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG) OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL); # else OPENSSL_config(NULL); # endif #endif /* USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE */ } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h010064400017500001750000000155031362136622600175150ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H #define _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #include #endif #include int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long); void ssh_libcrypto_init(void); #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000100fL) # error OpenSSL 1.0.1 or greater is required #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION # define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION # define OpenSSL_version(x) SSLeay_version(x) #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM # define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L # define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE unsigned int #else # define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS # define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS # define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR # define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr # define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr # define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void); void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t); #endif /* Avoid some #ifdef. Code that uses these is unreachable without GCM */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM) && !defined(EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED) # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED -1 # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN -1 # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG -1 # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG -1 #endif /* Replace missing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with something that returns failure */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL # ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM # error AES-GCM enabled without EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl /* shouldn't happen */ # else # define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(a,b,c,d) (0) # endif #endif /* LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API compat */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); #endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); #endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t len); #endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t len); #endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS */ #ifndef DSA_SIG_GET0 void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); #endif /* DSA_SIG_GET0 */ #ifndef DSA_SIG_SET0 int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); #endif /* DSA_SIG_SET0 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); #endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */ #ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); #endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); #endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); #endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); #endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); #endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length); #endif /* HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc)(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec)(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish)(RSA *rsa)); #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); #endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_new EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void); #endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_new */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_free void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); #endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_free */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #endif /* _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h010064400017500001750000000103541362136622600163130ustar00djmdjm/* * * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifdef _AIX #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H # include #endif struct ssh; struct sshbuf; /* These should be in the system headers but are not. */ int usrinfo(int, char *, int); #if defined(HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB) && (HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB == 0) int setauthdb(const char *, char *); #endif /* these may or may not be in the headers depending on the version */ #if defined(HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE) && (HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE == 0) int authenticate(char *, char *, int *, char **); #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED == 0) int loginfailed(char *, char *, char *); #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS == 0) int loginrestrictions(char *, int, char *, char **); #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS == 0) int loginsuccess(char *, char *, char *, char **); #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED) && (HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED == 0) int passwdexpired(char *, char **); #endif /* Some versions define r_type in the above headers, which causes a conflict */ #ifdef r_type # undef r_type #endif /* AIX 4.2.x doesn't have nanosleep but does have nsleep which is equivalent */ #if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && defined(HAVE_NSLEEP) # define nanosleep(a,b) nsleep(a,b) #endif /* For struct timespec on AIX 4.2.x */ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H # include #endif /* for setpcred and friends */ #ifdef HAVE_USERSEC_H # include #endif /* * According to the setauthdb man page, AIX password registries must be 15 * chars or less plus terminating NUL. */ #ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB # define REGISTRY_SIZE 16 #endif void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *); #ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1 # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER 1 int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *, struct sshbuf *); # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN 1 int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshbuf *); # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG char *sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *, uid_t); # define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1 # if defined(S_AUTHDOMAIN) && defined (S_AUTHNAME) # define USE_AIX_KRB_NAME char *aix_krb5_get_principal_name(char *); # endif #endif void aix_setauthdb(const char *); void aix_restoreauthdb(void); void aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *); #if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) # ifdef getnameinfo # undef getnameinfo # endif int sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t, char *, size_t, int); # define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (sshaix_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g)) #endif /* * We use getgrset in preference to multiple getgrent calls for efficiency * plus it supports NIS and LDAP groups. */ #if !defined(HAVE_GETGROUPLIST) && defined(HAVE_GETGRSET) # define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST # define USE_GETGRSET int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); #endif #endif /* _AIX */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c010064400017500001750000000057271362136622600165100ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \ defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \ defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT # include #endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ #ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS # include #endif #ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT # include #endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */ #include "log.h" void irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { #ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT prid_t projid; #endif #ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS jid_t jid = 0; #elif defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) int jid = 0; #endif #ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS jid = jlimit_startjob(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, "interactive"); if (jid == -1) fatal("Failed to create job container: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */ #ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY /* initialize array session */ if (jid == 0 && newarraysess() != 0) fatal("Failed to set up new array session: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */ #ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT /* initialize irix project info */ if ((projid = getdfltprojuser(pw->pw_name)) == -1) { debug("Failed to get project id, using projid 0"); projid = 0; } if (setprid(projid)) fatal("Failed to initialize project %d for %s: %.100s", (int)projid, pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); #endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ #ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT if (sysconf(_SC_AUDIT)) { debug("Setting sat id to %d", (int) pw->pw_uid); if (satsetid(pw->pw_uid)) debug("error setting satid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } #endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */ } #endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h010064400017500001750000000032271362136622600165060ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _PORT_IRIX_H #define _PORT_IRIX_H #if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \ defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \ defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) void irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw); #endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */ #endif /* ! _PORT_IRIX_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c010064400017500001750000000172441362136622600166710ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST) #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "port-linux.h" #ifdef WITH_SELINUX #include #include #ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE # define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:" #endif /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void) { static int enabled = -1; if (enabled == -1) { enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1); debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); } return (enabled); } /* Return the default security context for the given username */ static security_context_t ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) { security_context_t sc = NULL; char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL; int r; #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0) return NULL; #else sename = pwname; lvl = NULL; #endif #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc); #else r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc); #endif if (r != 0) { switch (security_getenforce()) { case -1: fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: " "security_getenforce() failed", __func__); case 0: error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " "context for %s", __func__, pwname); sc = NULL; break; default: fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " "context for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); } } #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME free(sename); free(lvl); #endif return sc; } /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) { security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) return; debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) { switch (security_getenforce()) { case -1: fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); case 0: error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution " "context for %s", __func__, pwname); break; default: fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context " "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); } } if (user_ctx != NULL) freecon(user_ctx); debug3("%s: done", __func__); } /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty) { security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL; security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; security_context_t old_tty_ctx = NULL; security_class_t chrclass; if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) return; debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty); user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */ if (getfilecon(tty, &old_tty_ctx) == -1) { error("%s: getfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if ((chrclass = string_to_security_class("chr_file")) == 0) { error("%s: couldn't get security class for chr_file", __func__); goto out; } if (security_compute_relabel(user_ctx, old_tty_ctx, chrclass, &new_tty_ctx) != 0) { error("%s: security_compute_relabel: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (setfilecon(tty, new_tty_ctx) != 0) error("%s: setfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); out: if (new_tty_ctx != NULL) freecon(new_tty_ctx); if (old_tty_ctx != NULL) freecon(old_tty_ctx); if (user_ctx != NULL) freecon(user_ctx); debug3("%s: done", __func__); } void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname) { int len, newlen; char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx; void (*switchlog) (const char *fmt,...) = logit; if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) return; if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) { logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return; } if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) == NULL) { logit ("%s: unparseable context %s", __func__, oldctx); return; } /* * Check whether we are attempting to switch away from an unconfined * security context. */ if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE, sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0) switchlog = debug3; newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1; newctx = xmalloc(newlen); len = cx - oldctx + 1; memcpy(newctx, oldctx, len); strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len); if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':'))) strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen); debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__, oldctx, newctx); if (setcon(newctx) < 0) switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno)); free(oldctx); free(newctx); } void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path) { security_context_t context; if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) return; if (path == NULL) { setfscreatecon(NULL); return; } if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0) setfscreatecon(context); } #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST /* * The magic "don't kill me" values, old and new, as documented in eg: * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.32/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.36/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt */ static int oom_adj_save = INT_MIN; static char *oom_adj_path = NULL; struct { char *path; int value; } oom_adjust[] = { {"/proc/self/oom_score_adj", -1000}, /* kernels >= 2.6.36 */ {"/proc/self/oom_adj", -17}, /* kernels <= 2.6.35 */ {NULL, 0}, }; /* * Tell the kernel's out-of-memory killer to avoid sshd. * Returns the previous oom_adj value or zero. */ void oom_adjust_setup(void) { int i, value; FILE *fp; debug3("%s", __func__); for (i = 0; oom_adjust[i].path != NULL; i++) { oom_adj_path = oom_adjust[i].path; value = oom_adjust[i].value; if ((fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "r+")) != NULL) { if (fscanf(fp, "%d", &oom_adj_save) != 1) verbose("error reading %s: %s", oom_adj_path, strerror(errno)); else { rewind(fp); if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", value) <= 0) verbose("error writing %s: %s", oom_adj_path, strerror(errno)); else debug("Set %s from %d to %d", oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save, value); } fclose(fp); return; } } oom_adj_path = NULL; } /* Restore the saved OOM adjustment */ void oom_adjust_restore(void) { FILE *fp; debug3("%s", __func__); if (oom_adj_save == INT_MIN || oom_adj_path == NULL || (fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "w")) == NULL) return; if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", oom_adj_save) <= 0) verbose("error writing %s: %s", oom_adj_path, strerror(errno)); else debug("Set %s to %d", oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save); fclose(fp); return; } #endif /* LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h010064400017500001750000000022651362136622600166730ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H #define _PORT_LINUX_H #ifdef WITH_SELINUX int ssh_selinux_enabled(void); void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); #endif #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST void oom_adjust_restore(void); void oom_adjust_setup(void); #endif #endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-net.c010064400017500001750000000206111362136622600163100ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "channels.h" #include "ssherr.h" /* * This file contains various portability code for network support, * including tun/tap forwarding and routing domains. */ #if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) #include #endif #if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX) char * sys_get_rdomain(int fd) { char dev[IFNAMSIZ + 1]; socklen_t len = sizeof(dev) - 1; if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE, dev, &len) == -1) { error("%s: cannot determine VRF for fd=%d : %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } dev[len] = '\0'; return strdup(dev); } int sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name) { if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE, name, strlen(name)) == -1) { error("%s: setsockopt(%d, SO_BINDTODEVICE, %s): %s", __func__, fd, name, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return 0; } int sys_valid_rdomain(const char *name) { int fd; /* * This is a pretty crappy way to test. It would be better to * check whether "name" represents a VRF device, but apparently * that requires an rtnetlink transaction. */ if ((fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) return 0; if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE, name, strlen(name)) == -1) { close(fd); return 0; } close(fd); return 1; } #elif defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX) /* XXX examples */ char * sys_get_rdomain(int fd) { return NULL; } int sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name) { return -1; } int valid_rdomain(const char *name) { return 0; } void sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name) { fatal("%s: not supported", __func__); } #endif /* defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX) */ /* * This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it * uses some preprocessor definitions for various platform-specific * settings. * * SSH_TUN_LINUX Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device * SSH_TUN_FREEBSD Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device * SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF Translate the OpenBSD address family * SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF Prepend/remove the address family */ /* * System-specific tunnel open function */ #if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) #include #define TUN_CTRL_DEV "/dev/net/tun" int sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname) { struct ifreq ifr; int fd = -1; const char *name = NULL; if (ifname != NULL) *ifname = NULL; if ((fd = open(TUN_CTRL_DEV, O_RDWR)) == -1) { debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control device \"%s\": %s", __func__, TUN_CTRL_DEV, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } bzero(&ifr, sizeof(ifr)); if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) { ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP; name = "tap%d"; } else { ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TUN; name = "tun%d"; } ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NO_PI; if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY) { if (tun > SSH_TUNID_MAX) { debug("%s: invalid tunnel id %x: %s", __func__, tun, strerror(errno)); goto failed; } snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), name, tun); } if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &ifr) == -1) { debug("%s: failed to configure tunnel (mode %d): %s", __func__, mode, strerror(errno)); goto failed; } if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) debug("%s: tunnel mode %d fd %d", __func__, mode, fd); else debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, mode, fd); if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL) goto failed; return (fd); failed: close(fd); return (-1); } #endif /* SSH_TUN_LINUX */ #ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD #include #include #ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H #include #endif int sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname) { struct ifreq ifr; char name[100]; int fd = -1, sock, flag; const char *tunbase = "tun"; if (ifname != NULL) *ifname = NULL; if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) { #ifdef SSH_TUN_NO_L2 debug("%s: no layer 2 tunnelling support", __func__); return (-1); #else tunbase = "tap"; #endif } /* Open the tunnel device */ if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun); fd = open(name, O_RDWR); } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) { for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun); if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0) break; } } else { debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u\n", __func__, tun); return (-1); } if (fd < 0) { debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } /* Turn on tunnel headers */ flag = 1; #if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) if (mode != SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET && ioctl(fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &flag) == -1) { debug("%s: ioctl(%d, TUNSIFHEAD, 1): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno)); close(fd); } #endif debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd); /* Set the tunnel device operation mode */ snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) goto failed; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) goto failed; if ((ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) { ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) goto failed; } if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL) goto failed; close(sock); return (fd); failed: if (fd >= 0) close(fd); if (sock >= 0) close(sock); debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name, mode, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } #endif /* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */ /* * System-specific channel filters */ #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) /* * The tunnel forwarding protocol prepends the address family of forwarded * IP packets using OpenBSD's numbers. */ #define OPENBSD_AF_INET 2 #define OPENBSD_AF_INET6 24 int sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c, char *buf, int _len) { int r; size_t len; char *ptr = buf; #if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF]; struct ip iph; #endif #if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) u_int32_t af; #endif /* XXX update channel input filter API to use unsigned length */ if (_len < 0) return -1; len = _len; #if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) if (len <= sizeof(iph) || len > sizeof(rbuf) - 4) return -1; /* Determine address family from packet IP header. */ memcpy(&iph, buf, sizeof(iph)); af = iph.ip_v == 6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET; /* Prepend address family to packet using OpenBSD constants */ memcpy(rbuf + 4, buf, len); len += 4; POKE_U32(rbuf, af); ptr = rbuf; #elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) /* Convert existing address family header to OpenBSD value */ if (len <= 4) return -1; af = PEEK_U32(buf); /* Put it back */ POKE_U32(buf, af == AF_INET6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET); #endif if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, ptr, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return (0); } u_char * sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c, u_char **data, size_t *dlen) { u_char *buf; u_int32_t af; int r; /* XXX new API is incompatible with this signature. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, data, dlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (*dlen < sizeof(af)) return (NULL); buf = *data; #if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) /* skip address family */ *dlen -= sizeof(af); buf = *data + sizeof(af); #elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) /* translate address family */ af = (PEEK_U32(buf) == OPENBSD_AF_INET6) ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET; POKE_U32(buf, af); #endif return (buf); } #endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-net.h010064400017500001750000000031161362136622600163160ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _PORT_TUN_H #define _PORT_TUN_H struct Channel; struct ssh; #if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_FREEBSD) # define CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN int sys_tun_open(int, int, char **); #endif #if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) # define SSH_TUN_FILTER int sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int); u_char *sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, u_char **, size_t *); #endif #if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX) # define HAVE_SYS_GET_RDOMAIN # define HAVE_SYS_SET_RDOMAIN # define HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN char *sys_get_rdomain(int fd); int sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name); int sys_valid_rdomain(const char *name); #endif #if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX) # define HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN void sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name); #endif #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c010064400017500001750000000227301362136622600172020ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "config.h" #include "includes.h" #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #define CT_TEMPLATE CTFS_ROOT "/process/template" #define CT_LATEST CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest" static int tmpl_fd = -1; /* Lookup the latest process contract */ static ctid_t get_active_process_contract_id(void) { int stat_fd; ctid_t ctid = -1; ct_stathdl_t stathdl; if ((stat_fd = open64(CT_LATEST, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { error("%s: Error opening 'latest' process " "contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (ct_status_read(stat_fd, CTD_COMMON, &stathdl) != 0) { error("%s: Error reading process contract " "status: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if ((ctid = ct_status_get_id(stathdl)) < 0) { error("%s: Error getting process contract id: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } ct_status_free(stathdl); out: close(stat_fd); return ctid; } void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void) { if ((tmpl_fd = open64(CT_TEMPLATE, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, CT_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno)); return; } debug2("%s: setting up process contract template on fd %d", __func__, tmpl_fd); /* First we set the template parameters and event sets. */ if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_param(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_PGRPONLY) != 0) { error("%s: Error setting process contract parameter set " "(pgrponly): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) { error("%s: Error setting process contract template " "fatal events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (ct_tmpl_set_critical(tmpl_fd, 0) != 0) { error("%s: Error setting process contract template " "critical events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (ct_tmpl_set_informative(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) { error("%s: Error setting process contract template " "informative events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } /* Now make this the active template for this process. */ if (ct_tmpl_activate(tmpl_fd) != 0) { error("%s: Error activating process contract " "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } return; fail: if (tmpl_fd != -1) { close(tmpl_fd); tmpl_fd = -1; } } void solaris_contract_post_fork_child() { debug2("%s: clearing process contract template on fd %d", __func__, tmpl_fd); /* Clear the active template. */ if (ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd) != 0) error("%s: Error clearing active process contract " "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(tmpl_fd); tmpl_fd = -1; } void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid) { ctid_t ctid; char ctl_path[256]; int r, ctl_fd = -1, stat_fd = -1; debug2("%s: clearing template (fd %d)", __func__, tmpl_fd); if (tmpl_fd == -1) return; /* First clear the active template. */ if ((r = ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd)) != 0) error("%s: Error clearing active process contract " "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(tmpl_fd); tmpl_fd = -1; /* * If either the fork didn't succeed (pid < 0), or clearing * th active contract failed (r != 0), then we have nothing * more do. */ if (r != 0 || pid <= 0) return; /* Now lookup and abandon the contract we've created. */ ctid = get_active_process_contract_id(); debug2("%s: abandoning contract id %ld", __func__, ctid); snprintf(ctl_path, sizeof(ctl_path), CTFS_ROOT "/process/%ld/ctl", ctid); if ((ctl_fd = open64(ctl_path, O_WRONLY)) < 0) { error("%s: Error opening process contract " "ctl file: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (ct_ctl_abandon(ctl_fd) < 0) { error("%s: Error abandoning process contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } close(ctl_fd); return; fail: if (tmpl_fd != -1) { close(tmpl_fd); tmpl_fd = -1; } if (stat_fd != -1) close(stat_fd); if (ctl_fd != -1) close(ctl_fd); } #endif #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS #include #include /* * Get/set solaris default project. * If we fail, just run along gracefully. */ void solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *pw) { struct project *defaultproject; struct project tempproject; char buf[1024]; /* get default project, if we fail just return gracefully */ if ((defaultproject = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &tempproject, &buf, sizeof(buf))) != NULL) { /* set default project */ if (setproject(defaultproject->pj_name, pw->pw_name, TASK_NORMAL) != 0) debug("setproject(%s): %s", defaultproject->pj_name, strerror(errno)); } else { /* debug on getdefaultproj() error */ debug("getdefaultproj(%s): %s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); } } #endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */ #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS # ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H # include # endif priv_set_t * solaris_basic_privset(void) { priv_set_t *pset; #ifdef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) { error("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno)); return NULL; } priv_basicset(pset); #else if ((pset = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL)) == NULL) { error("priv_str_to_set: %s", strerror(errno)); return NULL; } #endif return pset; } void solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void) { priv_set_t *pset = NULL, *npset = NULL; /* * Note: this variant avoids dropping DAC filesystem rights, in case * the process calling it is running as root and should have the * ability to read/write/chown any file on the system. * * We start with the basic set, then *add* the DAC rights to it while * taking away other parts of BASIC we don't need. Then we intersect * this with our existing PERMITTED set. In this way we keep any * DAC rights we had before, while otherwise reducing ourselves to * the minimum set of privileges we need to proceed. * * This also means we drop any other parts of "root" that we don't * need (e.g. the ability to kill any process, create new device nodes * etc etc). */ if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) fatal("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno)); if ((npset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL) fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno)); if (priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_CHOWN) != 0 || priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_READ) != 0 || priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_SEARCH) != 0 || priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_WRITE) != 0 || priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_OWNER) != 0) fatal("priv_addset: %s", strerror(errno)); if (priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 || #ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS priv_delset(npset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || #endif priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 || priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno)); if (getppriv(PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0) fatal("getppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); priv_intersect(pset, npset); if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, npset) != 0 || setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, npset) != 0 || setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, npset) != 0) fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); priv_freeset(pset); priv_freeset(npset); } void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void) { priv_set_t *pset = NULL; /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */ if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL) fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno)); if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || #ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || #endif priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno)); if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 || setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 || setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0) fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); priv_freeset(pset); } void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void) { priv_set_t *pset = NULL; /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */ if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL) fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno)); if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || #ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || #endif priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 || priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0) fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno)); if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 || setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 || setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0) fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); priv_freeset(pset); } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h010064400017500001750000000024221362136622600172030ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _PORT_SOLARIS_H #include #include void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void); void solaris_contract_post_fork_child(void); void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid); void solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *); # ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS #include priv_set_t *solaris_basic_privset(void); void solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void); void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void); void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void); # endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS */ #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c010064400017500001750000000102461362136622600161600ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2005 The SCO Group. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) #include #ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ #include "servconf.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh_api.h" int nischeck(char *); int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; char *salt; int result; /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */ char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd; if (pw_password == NULL) return 0; /* Check for users with no password. */ if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0) return (1); /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */ salt = (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx"; /* * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords * are identical. */ #ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS if (!nischeck(pw->pw_name)) { result = ((strcmp(bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0) || (strcmp(osr5bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0)); } else #endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */ result = (strcmp(xcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0); #ifdef USE_LIBIAF if (authctxt->valid) free(pw_password); #endif return(result); } #ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS int nischeck(char *namep) { char password_file[] = "/etc/passwd"; FILE *fd; struct passwd *ent = NULL; if ((fd = fopen (password_file, "r")) == NULL) { /* * If the passwd file has disappeared we are in a bad state. * However, returning 0 will send us back through the * authentication scheme that has checked the ia database for * passwords earlier. */ return(0); } /* * fgetpwent() only reads from password file, so we know for certain * that the user is local. */ while (ent = fgetpwent(fd)) { if (strcmp (ent->pw_name, namep) == 0) { /* Local user */ fclose (fd); return(0); } } fclose (fd); return (1); } #endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */ /* NOTE: ia_get_logpwd() allocates memory for arg 2 functions that call shadow_pw() will need to free */ #ifdef USE_LIBIAF char * get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw) { char *pw_password = NULL; uinfo_t uinfo; if (!ia_openinfo(pw->pw_name,&uinfo)) { ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &pw_password); if (pw_password == NULL) fatal("ia_get_logpwd: Unable to get the shadow passwd"); ia_closeinfo(uinfo); return pw_password; } else fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file"); } #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ #endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF and not HAVE_SECUREWARE */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h010064400017500001750000000025751362136622600161730ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef USE_LIBIAF char * get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw); #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c010064400017500001750000000063641362136622600161630ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: pwcache.c,v 1.9 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/pwcache.c */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #define NCACHE 64 /* power of 2 */ #define MASK (NCACHE - 1) /* bits to store with */ #ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID char * user_from_uid(uid_t uid, int nouser) { static struct ncache { uid_t uid; char *name; } c_uid[NCACHE]; static int pwopen; static char nbuf[15]; /* 32 bits == 10 digits */ struct passwd *pw; struct ncache *cp; cp = c_uid + (uid & MASK); if (cp->uid != uid || cp->name == NULL) { if (pwopen == 0) { #ifdef HAVE_SETPASSENT setpassent(1); #endif pwopen = 1; } if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) { if (nouser) return (NULL); (void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%lu", (u_long)uid); } cp->uid = uid; if (cp->name != NULL) free(cp->name); cp->name = strdup(pw ? pw->pw_name : nbuf); } return (cp->name); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID char * group_from_gid(gid_t gid, int nogroup) { static struct ncache { gid_t gid; char *name; } c_gid[NCACHE]; static int gropen; static char nbuf[15]; /* 32 bits == 10 digits */ struct group *gr; struct ncache *cp; cp = c_gid + (gid & MASK); if (cp->gid != gid || cp->name == NULL) { if (gropen == 0) { #ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPENT setgroupent(1); #endif gropen = 1; } if ((gr = getgrgid(gid)) == NULL) { if (nogroup) return (NULL); (void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%lu", (u_long)gid); } cp->gid = gid; if (cp->name != NULL) free(cp->name); cp->name = strdup(gr ? gr->gr_name : nbuf); } return (cp->name); } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c010064400017500001750000000134561362136622600175560ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.26 2016/10/18 12:47:18 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000-2002, 2007, 2010 * Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. * * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/readpassphrase.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef TCSASOFT /* If we don't have TCSASOFT define it so that ORing it it below is a no-op. */ # define TCSASOFT 0 #endif /* SunOS 4.x which lacks _POSIX_VDISABLE, but has VDISABLE */ #if !defined(_POSIX_VDISABLE) && defined(VDISABLE) # define _POSIX_VDISABLE VDISABLE #endif static volatile sig_atomic_t signo[_NSIG]; static void handler(int); char * readpassphrase(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int flags) { ssize_t nr; int input, output, save_errno, i, need_restart; char ch, *p, *end; struct termios term, oterm; struct sigaction sa, savealrm, saveint, savehup, savequit, saveterm; struct sigaction savetstp, savettin, savettou, savepipe; /* I suppose we could alloc on demand in this case (XXX). */ if (bufsiz == 0) { errno = EINVAL; return(NULL); } restart: for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++) signo[i] = 0; nr = -1; save_errno = 0; need_restart = 0; /* * Read and write to /dev/tty if available. If not, read from * stdin and write to stderr unless a tty is required. */ if ((flags & RPP_STDIN) || (input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) { if (flags & RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) { errno = ENOTTY; return(NULL); } input = STDIN_FILENO; output = STDERR_FILENO; } /* * Turn off echo if possible. * If we are using a tty but are not the foreground pgrp this will * generate SIGTTOU, so do it *before* installing the signal handlers. */ if (input != STDIN_FILENO && tcgetattr(input, &oterm) == 0) { memcpy(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)); if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON)) term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHONL); #ifdef VSTATUS if (term.c_cc[VSTATUS] != _POSIX_VDISABLE) term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = _POSIX_VDISABLE; #endif (void)tcsetattr(input, TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT, &term); } else { memset(&term, 0, sizeof(term)); term.c_lflag |= ECHO; memset(&oterm, 0, sizeof(oterm)); oterm.c_lflag |= ECHO; } /* * Catch signals that would otherwise cause the user to end * up with echo turned off in the shell. Don't worry about * things like SIGXCPU and SIGVTALRM for now. */ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); sa.sa_flags = 0; /* don't restart system calls */ sa.sa_handler = handler; (void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &sa, &savealrm); (void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, &savehup); (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saveint); (void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, &savepipe); (void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &savequit); (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, &saveterm); (void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &savetstp); (void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &sa, &savettin); (void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &sa, &savettou); if (!(flags & RPP_STDIN)) (void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt)); end = buf + bufsiz - 1; p = buf; while ((nr = read(input, &ch, 1)) == 1 && ch != '\n' && ch != '\r') { if (p < end) { if ((flags & RPP_SEVENBIT)) ch &= 0x7f; if (isalpha((unsigned char)ch)) { if ((flags & RPP_FORCELOWER)) ch = (char)tolower((unsigned char)ch); if ((flags & RPP_FORCEUPPER)) ch = (char)toupper((unsigned char)ch); } *p++ = ch; } } *p = '\0'; save_errno = errno; if (!(term.c_lflag & ECHO)) (void)write(output, "\n", 1); /* Restore old terminal settings and signals. */ if (memcmp(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)) != 0) { const int sigttou = signo[SIGTTOU]; /* Ignore SIGTTOU generated when we are not the fg pgrp. */ while (tcsetattr(input, TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT, &oterm) == -1 && errno == EINTR && !signo[SIGTTOU]) continue; signo[SIGTTOU] = sigttou; } (void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &savealrm, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &savehup, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &saveint, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &savequit, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &savepipe, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &saveterm, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &savetstp, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &savettin, NULL); (void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &savettou, NULL); if (input != STDIN_FILENO) (void)close(input); /* * If we were interrupted by a signal, resend it to ourselves * now that we have restored the signal handlers. */ for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++) { if (signo[i]) { kill(getpid(), i); switch (i) { case SIGTSTP: case SIGTTIN: case SIGTTOU: need_restart = 1; } } } if (need_restart) goto restart; if (save_errno) errno = save_errno; return(nr == -1 ? NULL : buf); } DEF_WEAK(readpassphrase); #if 0 char * getpass(const char *prompt) { static char buf[_PASSWORD_LEN + 1]; return(readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof(buf), RPP_ECHO_OFF)); } #endif static void handler(int s) { signo[s] = 1; } #endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h010064400017500001750000000034031362136622600175520ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.h,v 1.5 2003/06/17 21:56:23 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2002 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. * * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/readpassphrase.h */ #ifndef _READPASSPHRASE_H_ #define _READPASSPHRASE_H_ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE #define RPP_ECHO_OFF 0x00 /* Turn off echo (default). */ #define RPP_ECHO_ON 0x01 /* Leave echo on. */ #define RPP_REQUIRE_TTY 0x02 /* Fail if there is no tty. */ #define RPP_FORCELOWER 0x04 /* Force input to lower case. */ #define RPP_FORCEUPPER 0x08 /* Force input to upper case. */ #define RPP_SEVENBIT 0x10 /* Strip the high bit from input. */ #define RPP_STDIN 0x20 /* Read from stdin, not /dev/tty */ char * readpassphrase(const char *, char *, size_t, int); #endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */ #endif /* !_READPASSPHRASE_H_ */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c010064400017500001750000000027641362136622600172310ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: reallocarray.c,v 1.2 2014/12/08 03:45:00 bcook Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2008 Otto Moerbeek * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/reallocarray.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include /* * This is sqrt(SIZE_MAX+1), as s1*s2 <= SIZE_MAX * if both s1 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW and s2 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW */ #define MUL_NO_OVERFLOW ((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 4)) void * reallocarray(void *optr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) { if ((nmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) && nmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) { errno = ENOMEM; return NULL; } return realloc(optr, size * nmemb); } #endif /* HAVE_REALLOCARRAY */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c010064400017500001750000000046341362136622600173720ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: recallocarray.c,v 1.1 2017/03/06 18:44:21 otto Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2008, 2017 Otto Moerbeek * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/recallocarray.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include /* * This is sqrt(SIZE_MAX+1), as s1*s2 <= SIZE_MAX * if both s1 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW and s2 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW */ #define MUL_NO_OVERFLOW ((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 4)) void * recallocarray(void *ptr, size_t oldnmemb, size_t newnmemb, size_t size) { size_t oldsize, newsize; void *newptr; if (ptr == NULL) return calloc(newnmemb, size); if ((newnmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) && newnmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / newnmemb < size) { errno = ENOMEM; return NULL; } newsize = newnmemb * size; if ((oldnmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) && oldnmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / oldnmemb < size) { errno = EINVAL; return NULL; } oldsize = oldnmemb * size; /* * Don't bother too much if we're shrinking just a bit, * we do not shrink for series of small steps, oh well. */ if (newsize <= oldsize) { size_t d = oldsize - newsize; if (d < oldsize / 2 && d < (size_t)getpagesize()) { memset((char *)ptr + newsize, 0, d); return ptr; } } newptr = malloc(newsize); if (newptr == NULL) return NULL; if (newsize > oldsize) { memcpy(newptr, ptr, oldsize); memset((char *)newptr + oldsize, 0, newsize - oldsize); } else memcpy(newptr, ptr, newsize); explicit_bzero(ptr, oldsize); free(ptr); return newptr; } /* DEF_WEAK(recallocarray); */ #endif /* HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/regress004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600157725ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in010064400017500001750000000015211362136622600201120ustar00djmdjmsysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ srcdir=@srcdir@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ VPATH=@srcdir@ CC=@CC@ LD=@LD@ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a LIBS=@LIBS@ LDFLAGS=@LDFLAGS@ $(LIBCOMPAT) TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \ strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) opensslvertest$(EXEEXT) utimensattest$(EXEEXT) all: t-exec ${OTHERTESTS} %$(EXEEXT): %.c $(LIBCOMPAT) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBS) t-exec: $(TESTPROGS) @echo running compat regress tests @for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ ./$${TEST}$(EXEEXT) || exit $$? ; \ done @echo finished compat regress tests clean: rm -f *.o *.a core $(TESTPROGS) valid.out distclean: clean rm -f Makefile *~ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c010064400017500001750000000032131362136622600211020ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #define NUM_OPENS 10 int closefrom(int); void fail(char *msg) { fprintf(stderr, "closefrom: %s\n", msg); exit(1); } int main(void) { int i, max, fds[NUM_OPENS]; char buf[512]; for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++) if ((fds[i] = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY)) == -1) exit(0); /* can't test */ max = i - 1; /* should close last fd only */ closefrom(fds[max]); if (close(fds[max]) != -1) fail("failed to close highest fd"); /* make sure we can still use remaining descriptors */ for (i = 0; i < max; i++) if (read(fds[i], buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1) fail("closed descriptors it should not have"); /* should close all fds */ closefrom(fds[0]); for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++) if (close(fds[i]) != -1) fail("failed to close from lowest fd"); return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c010064400017500001750000000047301362136622600213160ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2014 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long); struct version_test { long headerver; long libver; int result; } version_tests[] = { /* built with 0.9.8b release headers */ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090802fL, 1}, /* exact match */ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090804fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090801fL, 1}, /* older library fix version: ok */ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090702fL, 0}, /* older library minor version: NO */ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090902fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0080802fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */ { 0x0090802fL, 0x1000100fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */ /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000001fL, 0}, /* older library fix version: NO */ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1010101fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */ { 0x1000101fL, 0x0000101fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */ { 0x1000101fL, 0x2000101fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */ }; void fail(long hver, long lver, int result) { fprintf(stderr, "opensslver: header %lx library %lx != %d \n", hver, lver, result); exit(1); } int main(void) { unsigned int i; int res; long hver, lver; for (i = 0; i < sizeof(version_tests) / sizeof(version_tests[0]); i++) { hver = version_tests[i].headerver; lver = version_tests[i].libver; res = version_tests[i].result; if (ssh_compatible_openssl(hver, lver) != res) fail(hver, lver, res); } exit(0); } openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c010064400017500001750000000036471362136622600207670ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #define BUFSZ 2048 #include #include #include #include #include static int failed = 0; static void fail(const char *m) { fprintf(stderr, "snprintftest: %s\n", m); failed = 1; } int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...) { size_t ret; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } int main(void) { char b[5]; char *src = NULL; snprintf(b,5,"123456789"); if (b[4] != '\0') fail("snprintf does not correctly terminate long strings"); /* check for read overrun on unterminated string */ if ((src = malloc(BUFSZ)) == NULL) { fail("malloc failed"); } else { memset(src, 'a', BUFSZ); snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%.*s", 1, src); if (strcmp(b, "a") != 0) fail("failed with length limit '%%.s'"); } /* check that snprintf and vsnprintf return sane values */ if (snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) fail("snprintf does not return required length"); if (x_snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) fail("vsnprintf does not return required length"); free(src); return failed; } openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c010064400017500001750000000020751362136622600204370ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include static int fail = 0; void test(const char *a) { char *b; b = strdup(a); if (b == 0) { fail = 1; return; } if (strcmp(a, b) != 0) fail = 1; free(b); } int main(void) { test(""); test("a"); test("\0"); test("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"); return fail; } openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c010064400017500001750000000047141362136622600210130ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strtonumtest.c,v 1.1 2004/08/03 20:38:36 otto Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004 Otto Moerbeek * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: regress/lib/libc/strtonum/strtonumtest.c */ #include #include #include /* LLONG_MAX is known as LONGLONG_MAX on AIX */ #if defined(LONGLONG_MAX) && !defined(LLONG_MAX) # define LLONG_MAX LONGLONG_MAX # define LLONG_MIN LONGLONG_MIN #endif /* LLONG_MAX is known as LONG_LONG_MAX on HP-UX */ #if defined(LONG_LONG_MAX) && !defined(LLONG_MAX) # define LLONG_MAX LONG_LONG_MAX # define LLONG_MIN LONG_LONG_MIN #endif long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **); int fail; void test(const char *p, long long lb, long long ub, int ok) { long long val; const char *q; val = strtonum(p, lb, ub, &q); if (ok && q != NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] ", p, lb, ub); fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER NOT ACCEPTED %s\n", q); fail = 1; } else if (!ok && q == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] %lld ", p, lb, ub, val); fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER ACCEPTED\n"); fail = 1; } } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { test("1", 0, 10, 1); test("0", -2, 5, 1); test("0", 2, 5, 0); test("0", 2, LLONG_MAX, 0); test("-2", 0, LLONG_MAX, 0); test("0", -5, LLONG_MAX, 1); test("-3", -3, LLONG_MAX, 1); test("-9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1); test("9223372036854775807", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1); test("-9223372036854775809", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0); test("9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0); test("1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0); test("-1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0); test("-2", 10, -1, 0); test("-2", -10, -1, 1); test("-20", -10, -1, 0); test("20", -10, -1, 0); return (fail); } openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/regress/utimensattest.c010064400017500001750000000062371362136622600211330ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2019 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define TMPFILE "utimensat.tmp" #define TMPFILE2 "utimensat.tmp2" #ifndef AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW # define AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x80000000 #endif int utimensat(int, const char *, const struct timespec[2], int); static void cleanup(void) { (void)unlink(TMPFILE); (void)unlink(TMPFILE2); } static void fail(char *msg, long expect, long got) { int saved_errno = errno; if (expect == got && got == 0) fprintf(stderr, "utimensat: %s: %s\n", msg, strerror(saved_errno)); else fprintf(stderr, "utimensat: %s: expected %ld got %ld\n", msg, expect, got); cleanup(); exit(1); } int main(void) { int fd; struct stat sb; struct timespec ts[2]; cleanup(); if ((fd = open(TMPFILE, O_CREAT, 0600)) == -1) fail("open", 0, 0); close(fd); ts[0].tv_sec = 12345678; ts[0].tv_nsec = 23456789; ts[1].tv_sec = 34567890; ts[1].tv_nsec = 45678901; if (utimensat(AT_FDCWD, TMPFILE, ts, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1) fail("utimensat", 0, 0); if (stat(TMPFILE, &sb) == -1) fail("stat", 0, 0 ); if (sb.st_atime != 12345678) fail("st_atime", 0, 0 ); if (sb.st_mtime != 34567890) fail("st_mtime", 0, 0 ); #if 0 /* * Results expected to be rounded to the nearest microsecond. * Depends on timestamp precision in kernel and filesystem so * disabled by default. */ if (sb.st_atim.tv_nsec != 23456000) fail("atim.tv_nsec", 23456000, sb.st_atim.tv_nsec); if (sb.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 45678000) fail("mtim.tv_nsec", 45678000, sb.st_mtim.tv_nsec); #endif /* * POSIX specifies that when given a symlink, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW * should update the symlink and not the destination. The compat * code doesn't have a way to do this, so where possible it fails * with instead of following a symlink when explicitly asked not to. * Here we just test that it does not update the destination. */ if (rename(TMPFILE, TMPFILE2) == -1) fail("rename", 0, 0); if (symlink(TMPFILE2, TMPFILE) == -1) fail("symlink", 0, 0); ts[0].tv_sec = 11223344; ts[1].tv_sec = 55667788; (void)utimensat(AT_FDCWD, TMPFILE, ts, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); if (stat(TMPFILE2, &sb) == -1) fail("stat", 0, 0 ); if (sb.st_atime == 11223344) fail("utimensat symlink st_atime", 0, 0 ); if (sb.st_mtime == 55667788) fail("utimensat symlink st_mtime", 0, 0 ); cleanup(); exit(0); } openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c010064400017500001750000000057441362136622600166200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: rresvport.c,v 1.9 2005/11/10 10:00:17 espie Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1998 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/rresvport.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if 0 int rresvport(int *alport) { return rresvport_af(alport, AF_INET); } #endif int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af) { struct sockaddr_storage ss; struct sockaddr *sa; u_int16_t *portp; int s; socklen_t salen; memset(&ss, '\0', sizeof ss); sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss; switch (af) { case AF_INET: salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); portp = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_port; break; case AF_INET6: salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); portp = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_port; break; default: errno = EPFNOSUPPORT; return (-1); } sa->sa_family = af; s = socket(af, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (s < 0) return (-1); *portp = htons(*alport); if (*alport < IPPORT_RESERVED - 1) { if (bind(s, sa, salen) >= 0) return (s); if (errno != EADDRINUSE) { (void)close(s); return (-1); } } *portp = 0; sa->sa_family = af; if (bindresvport_sa(s, sa) == -1) { (void)close(s); return (-1); } *alport = ntohs(*portp); return (s); } #endif /* HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/setenv.c010064400017500001750000000134141362136622600160470ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: setenv.c,v 1.13 2010/08/23 22:31:50 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1987 Regents of the University of California. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/setenv.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) #include #include #include extern char **environ; static char **lastenv; /* last value of environ */ /* OpenSSH Portable: __findenv is from getenv.c rev 1.8, made static */ /* * __findenv -- * Returns pointer to value associated with name, if any, else NULL. * Starts searching within the environmental array at offset. * Sets offset to be the offset of the name/value combination in the * environmental array, for use by putenv(3), setenv(3) and unsetenv(3). * Explicitly removes '=' in argument name. * * This routine *should* be a static; don't use it. */ static char * __findenv(const char *name, int len, int *offset) { extern char **environ; int i; const char *np; char **p, *cp; if (name == NULL || environ == NULL) return (NULL); for (p = environ + *offset; (cp = *p) != NULL; ++p) { for (np = name, i = len; i && *cp; i--) if (*cp++ != *np++) break; if (i == 0 && *cp++ == '=') { *offset = p - environ; return (cp); } } return (NULL); } #if 0 /* nothing uses putenv */ /* * putenv -- * Add a name=value string directly to the environmental, replacing * any current value. */ int putenv(char *str) { char **P, *cp; size_t cnt; int offset = 0; for (cp = str; *cp && *cp != '='; ++cp) ; if (*cp != '=') { errno = EINVAL; return (-1); /* missing `=' in string */ } if (__findenv(str, (int)(cp - str), &offset) != NULL) { environ[offset++] = str; /* could be set multiple times */ while (__findenv(str, (int)(cp - str), &offset)) { for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P) if (!(*P = *(P + 1))) break; } return (0); } /* create new slot for string */ for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++) ; cnt = P - environ; P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2)); if (!P) return (-1); if (lastenv != environ) memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *)); lastenv = environ = P; environ[cnt] = str; environ[cnt + 1] = NULL; return (0); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETENV /* * setenv -- * Set the value of the environmental variable "name" to be * "value". If rewrite is set, replace any current value. */ int setenv(const char *name, const char *value, int rewrite) { char *C, **P; const char *np; int l_value, offset = 0; for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np) ; #ifdef notyet if (*np) { errno = EINVAL; return (-1); /* has `=' in name */ } #endif l_value = strlen(value); if ((C = __findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &offset)) != NULL) { int tmpoff = offset + 1; if (!rewrite) return (0); #if 0 /* XXX - existing entry may not be writable */ if (strlen(C) >= l_value) { /* old larger; copy over */ while ((*C++ = *value++)) ; return (0); } #endif /* could be set multiple times */ while (__findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &tmpoff)) { for (P = &environ[tmpoff];; ++P) if (!(*P = *(P + 1))) break; } } else { /* create new slot */ size_t cnt; for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++) ; cnt = P - environ; P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2)); if (!P) return (-1); if (lastenv != environ) memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *)); lastenv = environ = P; offset = cnt; environ[cnt + 1] = NULL; } if (!(environ[offset] = /* name + `=' + value */ malloc((size_t)((int)(np - name) + l_value + 2)))) return (-1); for (C = environ[offset]; (*C = *name++) && *C != '='; ++C) ; for (*C++ = '='; (*C++ = *value++); ) ; return (0); } #endif /* HAVE_SETENV */ #ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV /* * unsetenv(name) -- * Delete environmental variable "name". */ int unsetenv(const char *name) { char **P; const char *np; int offset = 0; if (!name || !*name) { errno = EINVAL; return (-1); } for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np) ; if (*np) { errno = EINVAL; return (-1); /* has `=' in name */ } /* could be set multiple times */ while (__findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &offset)) { for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P) if (!(*P = *(P + 1))) break; } return (0); } #endif /* HAVE_UNSETENV */ #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c010064400017500001750000000111021362136622600172540ustar00djmdjm/* Based on conf.c from UCB sendmail 8.8.8 */ /* * Copyright 2003 Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 1983, 1995-1997 Eric P. Allman * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H #include #endif #include #include #define SPT_NONE 0 /* don't use it at all */ #define SPT_PSTAT 1 /* use pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, ...) */ #define SPT_REUSEARGV 2 /* cover argv with title information */ #ifndef SPT_TYPE # define SPT_TYPE SPT_NONE #endif #ifndef SPT_PADCHAR # define SPT_PADCHAR '\0' #endif #if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV static char *argv_start = NULL; static size_t argv_env_len = 0; #endif #endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]) { #if !defined(HAVE_SETPROCTITLE) && \ defined(SPT_TYPE) && SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV extern char **environ; char *lastargv = NULL; char **envp = environ; int i; /* * NB: This assumes that argv has already been copied out of the * way. This is true for sshd, but may not be true for other * programs. Beware. */ if (argc == 0 || argv[0] == NULL) return; /* Fail if we can't allocate room for the new environment */ for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++) ; if ((environ = calloc(i + 1, sizeof(*environ))) == NULL) { environ = envp; /* put it back */ return; } /* * Find the last argv string or environment variable within * our process memory area. */ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (lastargv == NULL || lastargv + 1 == argv[i]) lastargv = argv[i] + strlen(argv[i]); } for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++) { if (lastargv + 1 == envp[i]) lastargv = envp[i] + strlen(envp[i]); } argv[1] = NULL; argv_start = argv[0]; argv_env_len = lastargv - argv[0] - 1; /* * Copy environment * XXX - will truncate env on strdup fail */ for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++) environ[i] = strdup(envp[i]); environ[i] = NULL; #endif /* SPT_REUSEARGV */ } #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...) { #if SPT_TYPE != SPT_NONE va_list ap; char buf[1024], ptitle[1024]; size_t len = 0; int r; extern char *__progname; #if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT union pstun pst; #endif #if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV if (argv_env_len <= 0) return; #endif strlcpy(buf, __progname, sizeof(buf)); r = -1; va_start(ap, fmt); if (fmt != NULL) { len = strlcat(buf, ": ", sizeof(buf)); if (len < sizeof(buf)) r = vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof(buf) - len , fmt, ap); } va_end(ap); if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) - len) return; strnvis(ptitle, buf, sizeof(ptitle), VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL); #if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT pst.pst_command = ptitle; pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, pst, strlen(ptitle), 0, 0); #elif SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV /* debug("setproctitle: copy \"%s\" into len %d", buf, argv_env_len); */ len = strlcpy(argv_start, ptitle, argv_env_len); for(; len < argv_env_len; len++) argv_start[len] = SPT_PADCHAR; #endif #endif /* SPT_NONE */ } #endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/sha1.c010064400017500001750000000124621362136622600154010ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sha1.c,v 1.27 2019/06/07 22:56:36 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * SHA-1 in C * By Steve Reid * 100% Public Domain * * Test Vectors (from FIPS PUB 180-1) * "abc" * A9993E36 4706816A BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D * "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" * 84983E44 1C3BD26E BAAE4AA1 F95129E5 E54670F1 * A million repetitions of "a" * 34AA973C D4C4DAA4 F61EEB2B DBAD2731 6534016F */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #define rol(value, bits) (((value) << (bits)) | ((value) >> (32 - (bits)))) /* * blk0() and blk() perform the initial expand. * I got the idea of expanding during the round function from SSLeay */ #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN # define blk0(i) (block->l[i] = (rol(block->l[i],24)&0xFF00FF00) \ |(rol(block->l[i],8)&0x00FF00FF)) #else # define blk0(i) block->l[i] #endif #define blk(i) (block->l[i&15] = rol(block->l[(i+13)&15]^block->l[(i+8)&15] \ ^block->l[(i+2)&15]^block->l[i&15],1)) /* * (R0+R1), R2, R3, R4 are the different operations (rounds) used in SHA1 */ #define R0(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk0(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30); #define R1(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30); #define R2(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0x6ED9EBA1+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30); #define R3(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(((w|x)&y)|(w&x))+blk(i)+0x8F1BBCDC+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30); #define R4(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0xCA62C1D6+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30); typedef union { u_int8_t c[64]; u_int32_t l[16]; } CHAR64LONG16; /* * Hash a single 512-bit block. This is the core of the algorithm. */ void SHA1Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH]) { u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e; u_int8_t workspace[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH]; CHAR64LONG16 *block = (CHAR64LONG16 *)workspace; (void)memcpy(block, buffer, SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH); /* Copy context->state[] to working vars */ a = state[0]; b = state[1]; c = state[2]; d = state[3]; e = state[4]; /* 4 rounds of 20 operations each. Loop unrolled. */ R0(a,b,c,d,e, 0); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 1); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 2); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 3); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 4); R0(a,b,c,d,e, 5); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 6); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 7); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 8); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 9); R0(a,b,c,d,e,10); R0(e,a,b,c,d,11); R0(d,e,a,b,c,12); R0(c,d,e,a,b,13); R0(b,c,d,e,a,14); R0(a,b,c,d,e,15); R1(e,a,b,c,d,16); R1(d,e,a,b,c,17); R1(c,d,e,a,b,18); R1(b,c,d,e,a,19); R2(a,b,c,d,e,20); R2(e,a,b,c,d,21); R2(d,e,a,b,c,22); R2(c,d,e,a,b,23); R2(b,c,d,e,a,24); R2(a,b,c,d,e,25); R2(e,a,b,c,d,26); R2(d,e,a,b,c,27); R2(c,d,e,a,b,28); R2(b,c,d,e,a,29); R2(a,b,c,d,e,30); R2(e,a,b,c,d,31); R2(d,e,a,b,c,32); R2(c,d,e,a,b,33); R2(b,c,d,e,a,34); R2(a,b,c,d,e,35); R2(e,a,b,c,d,36); R2(d,e,a,b,c,37); R2(c,d,e,a,b,38); R2(b,c,d,e,a,39); R3(a,b,c,d,e,40); R3(e,a,b,c,d,41); R3(d,e,a,b,c,42); R3(c,d,e,a,b,43); R3(b,c,d,e,a,44); R3(a,b,c,d,e,45); R3(e,a,b,c,d,46); R3(d,e,a,b,c,47); R3(c,d,e,a,b,48); R3(b,c,d,e,a,49); R3(a,b,c,d,e,50); R3(e,a,b,c,d,51); R3(d,e,a,b,c,52); R3(c,d,e,a,b,53); R3(b,c,d,e,a,54); R3(a,b,c,d,e,55); R3(e,a,b,c,d,56); R3(d,e,a,b,c,57); R3(c,d,e,a,b,58); R3(b,c,d,e,a,59); R4(a,b,c,d,e,60); R4(e,a,b,c,d,61); R4(d,e,a,b,c,62); R4(c,d,e,a,b,63); R4(b,c,d,e,a,64); R4(a,b,c,d,e,65); R4(e,a,b,c,d,66); R4(d,e,a,b,c,67); R4(c,d,e,a,b,68); R4(b,c,d,e,a,69); R4(a,b,c,d,e,70); R4(e,a,b,c,d,71); R4(d,e,a,b,c,72); R4(c,d,e,a,b,73); R4(b,c,d,e,a,74); R4(a,b,c,d,e,75); R4(e,a,b,c,d,76); R4(d,e,a,b,c,77); R4(c,d,e,a,b,78); R4(b,c,d,e,a,79); /* Add the working vars back into context.state[] */ state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d; state[4] += e; /* Wipe variables */ a = b = c = d = e = 0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA1Transform); /* * SHA1Init - Initialize new context */ void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *context) { /* SHA1 initialization constants */ context->count = 0; context->state[0] = 0x67452301; context->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; context->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; context->state[3] = 0x10325476; context->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA1Init); /* * Run your data through this. */ void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len) { size_t i, j; j = (size_t)((context->count >> 3) & 63); context->count += ((u_int64_t)len << 3); if ((j + len) > 63) { (void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], data, (i = 64-j)); SHA1Transform(context->state, context->buffer); for ( ; i + 63 < len; i += 64) SHA1Transform(context->state, (u_int8_t *)&data[i]); j = 0; } else { i = 0; } (void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], &data[i], len - i); } DEF_WEAK(SHA1Update); /* * Add padding and return the message digest. */ void SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *context) { u_int8_t finalcount[8]; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { finalcount[i] = (u_int8_t)((context->count >> ((7 - (i & 7)) * 8)) & 255); /* Endian independent */ } SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\200", 1); while ((context->count & 504) != 448) SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\0", 1); SHA1Update(context, finalcount, 8); /* Should cause a SHA1Transform() */ } DEF_WEAK(SHA1Pad); void SHA1Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *context) { u_int i; SHA1Pad(context); for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) { digest[i] = (u_int8_t) ((context->state[i>>2] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255); } explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context)); } DEF_WEAK(SHA1Final); #endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/sha1.h010064400017500001750000000043561362136622600154110ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sha1.h,v 1.24 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * SHA-1 in C * By Steve Reid * 100% Public Domain */ #ifndef _SHA1_H #define _SHA1_H #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL #define SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH 64 #define SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH 20 #define SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) typedef struct { u_int32_t state[5]; u_int64_t count; u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH]; } SHA1_CTX; void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *); void SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *); void SHA1Transform(u_int32_t [5], const u_int8_t [SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,5))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH))); void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); void SHA1Final(u_int8_t [SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH))); char *SHA1End(SHA1_CTX *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA1File(const char *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA1FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA1Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); #define HTONDIGEST(x) do { \ x[0] = htonl(x[0]); \ x[1] = htonl(x[1]); \ x[2] = htonl(x[2]); \ x[3] = htonl(x[3]); \ x[4] = htonl(x[4]); } while (0) #define NTOHDIGEST(x) do { \ x[0] = ntohl(x[0]); \ x[1] = ntohl(x[1]); \ x[2] = ntohl(x[2]); \ x[3] = ntohl(x[3]); \ x[4] = ntohl(x[4]); } while (0) #endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ #endif /* _SHA1_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.c010064400017500001750000000673271362136622600154140ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.28 2019/07/23 12:35:22 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * FILE: sha2.c * AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford * * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * $From: sha2.c,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:01:51 adg Exp adg $ */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/hash/sha2.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_SHA256UPDATE) || !defined(HAVE_SHA384UPDATE) || \ !defined(HAVE_SHA512UPDATE) /* no-op out, similar to DEF_WEAK but only needed here */ #define MAKE_CLONE(x, y) void __ssh_compat_make_clone_##x_##y(void) #include #include /* * UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE: * You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform * loop version for the hash transform rounds (defined using macros * later in this file). Either define on the command line, for example: * * cc -DSHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM -o sha2 sha2.c sha2prog.c * * or define below: * * #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM * */ #ifndef SHA2_SMALL #if defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__) #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM #endif #endif /*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/ /* * BYTE_ORDER NOTE: * * Please make sure that your system defines BYTE_ORDER. If your * architecture is little-endian, make sure it also defines * LITTLE_ENDIAN and that the two (BYTE_ORDER and LITTLE_ENDIAN) are * equivalent. * * If your system does not define the above, then you can do so by * hand like this: * * #define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234 * #define BIG_ENDIAN 4321 * * And for little-endian machines, add: * * #define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN * * Or for big-endian machines: * * #define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN * * The FreeBSD machine this was written on defines BYTE_ORDER * appropriately by including (which in turn includes * where the appropriate definitions are actually * made). */ #if !defined(BYTE_ORDER) || (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN) #error Define BYTE_ORDER to be equal to either LITTLE_ENDIAN or BIG_ENDIAN #endif /*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/ /* NOTE: Most of these are in sha2.h */ #define SHA224_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8) #define SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8) #define SHA384_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16) #define SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16) /*** ENDIAN SPECIFIC COPY MACROS **************************************/ #define BE_8_TO_32(dst, cp) do { \ (dst) = (u_int32_t)(cp)[3] | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[2] << 8) | \ ((u_int32_t)(cp)[1] << 16) | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[0] << 24); \ } while(0) #define BE_8_TO_64(dst, cp) do { \ (dst) = (u_int64_t)(cp)[7] | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[6] << 8) | \ ((u_int64_t)(cp)[5] << 16) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[4] << 24) | \ ((u_int64_t)(cp)[3] << 32) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[2] << 40) | \ ((u_int64_t)(cp)[1] << 48) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[0] << 56); \ } while (0) #define BE_64_TO_8(cp, src) do { \ (cp)[0] = (src) >> 56; \ (cp)[1] = (src) >> 48; \ (cp)[2] = (src) >> 40; \ (cp)[3] = (src) >> 32; \ (cp)[4] = (src) >> 24; \ (cp)[5] = (src) >> 16; \ (cp)[6] = (src) >> 8; \ (cp)[7] = (src); \ } while (0) #define BE_32_TO_8(cp, src) do { \ (cp)[0] = (src) >> 24; \ (cp)[1] = (src) >> 16; \ (cp)[2] = (src) >> 8; \ (cp)[3] = (src); \ } while (0) /* * Macro for incrementally adding the unsigned 64-bit integer n to the * unsigned 128-bit integer (represented using a two-element array of * 64-bit words): */ #define ADDINC128(w,n) do { \ (w)[0] += (u_int64_t)(n); \ if ((w)[0] < (n)) { \ (w)[1]++; \ } \ } while (0) /*** THE SIX LOGICAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************/ /* * Bit shifting and rotation (used by the six SHA-XYZ logical functions: * * NOTE: The naming of R and S appears backwards here (R is a SHIFT and * S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-224/256/384/512 description document * (see http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf) uses this * same "backwards" definition. */ /* Shift-right (used in SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */ #define R(b,x) ((x) >> (b)) /* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-224 and SHA-256): */ #define S32(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (32 - (b)))) /* 64-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-384 and SHA-512): */ #define S64(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (64 - (b)))) /* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */ #define Ch(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z))) #define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z))) /* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-224 and SHA-256: */ #define Sigma0_256(x) (S32(2, (x)) ^ S32(13, (x)) ^ S32(22, (x))) #define Sigma1_256(x) (S32(6, (x)) ^ S32(11, (x)) ^ S32(25, (x))) #define sigma0_256(x) (S32(7, (x)) ^ S32(18, (x)) ^ R(3 , (x))) #define sigma1_256(x) (S32(17, (x)) ^ S32(19, (x)) ^ R(10, (x))) /* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-384 and SHA-512: */ #define Sigma0_512(x) (S64(28, (x)) ^ S64(34, (x)) ^ S64(39, (x))) #define Sigma1_512(x) (S64(14, (x)) ^ S64(18, (x)) ^ S64(41, (x))) #define sigma0_512(x) (S64( 1, (x)) ^ S64( 8, (x)) ^ R( 7, (x))) #define sigma1_512(x) (S64(19, (x)) ^ S64(61, (x)) ^ R( 6, (x))) /*** SHA-XYZ INITIAL HASH VALUES AND CONSTANTS ************************/ /* Hash constant words K for SHA-224 and SHA-256: */ static const u_int32_t K256[64] = { 0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL, 0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL, 0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL, 0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL, 0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL, 0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL, 0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL, 0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL, 0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL, 0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL, 0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL, 0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL, 0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL, 0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL, 0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL, 0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL }; /* Initial hash value H for SHA-256: */ static const u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = { 0x6a09e667UL, 0xbb67ae85UL, 0x3c6ef372UL, 0xa54ff53aUL, 0x510e527fUL, 0x9b05688cUL, 0x1f83d9abUL, 0x5be0cd19UL }; /* Hash constant words K for SHA-384 and SHA-512: */ static const u_int64_t K512[80] = { 0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL, 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL, 0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL, 0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL, 0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, 0x12835b0145706fbeULL, 0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL, 0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL, 0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL, 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL, 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL, 0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL, 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL, 0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL, 0xb00327c898fb213fULL, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL, 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL, 0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL, 0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL, 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL, 0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL, 0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, 0x92722c851482353bULL, 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL, 0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL, 0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, 0xd69906245565a910ULL, 0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL, 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL, 0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL, 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL, 0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL, 0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL, 0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL, 0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL, 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, 0xc67178f2e372532bULL, 0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL, 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL, 0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL, 0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL, 0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL, 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL, 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL, 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL }; /* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */ static const u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = { 0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL, 0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL, 0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL, 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL, 0x510e527fade682d1ULL, 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL, 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL, 0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL }; #if !defined(SHA2_SMALL) #if 0 /* Initial hash value H for SHA-224: */ static const u_int32_t sha224_initial_hash_value[8] = { 0xc1059ed8UL, 0x367cd507UL, 0x3070dd17UL, 0xf70e5939UL, 0xffc00b31UL, 0x68581511UL, 0x64f98fa7UL, 0xbefa4fa4UL }; #endif /* 0 */ /* Initial hash value H for SHA-384 */ static const u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = { 0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL, 0x629a292a367cd507ULL, 0x9159015a3070dd17ULL, 0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL, 0x67332667ffc00b31ULL, 0x8eb44a8768581511ULL, 0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL, 0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL }; #if 0 /* Initial hash value H for SHA-512-256 */ static const u_int64_t sha512_256_initial_hash_value[8] = { 0x22312194fc2bf72cULL, 0x9f555fa3c84c64c2ULL, 0x2393b86b6f53b151ULL, 0x963877195940eabdULL, 0x96283ee2a88effe3ULL, 0xbe5e1e2553863992ULL, 0x2b0199fc2c85b8aaULL, 0x0eb72ddc81c52ca2ULL }; /*** SHA-224: *********************************************************/ void SHA224Init(SHA2_CTX *context) { memcpy(context->state.st32, sha224_initial_hash_value, sizeof(sha224_initial_hash_value)); memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer)); context->bitcount[0] = 0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA224Init); MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Transform, SHA256Transform); MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Update, SHA256Update); MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Pad, SHA256Pad); DEF_WEAK(SHA224Transform); DEF_WEAK(SHA224Update); DEF_WEAK(SHA224Pad); void SHA224Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context) { SHA224Pad(context); #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN int i; /* Convert TO host byte order */ for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state.st32[i]); #else memcpy(digest, context->state.st32, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH); #endif explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context)); } DEF_WEAK(SHA224Final); #endif /* !defined(SHA2_SMALL) */ #endif /* 0 */ /*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/ void SHA256Init(SHA2_CTX *context) { memcpy(context->state.st32, sha256_initial_hash_value, sizeof(sha256_initial_hash_value)); memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer)); context->bitcount[0] = 0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA256Init); #ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM /* Unrolled SHA-256 round macros: */ #define ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \ BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data); \ data += 4; \ T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + W256[j]; \ (d) += T1; \ (h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \ j++; \ } while(0) #define ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \ s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f]; \ s0 = sigma0_256(s0); \ s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f]; \ s1 = sigma1_256(s1); \ T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + \ (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \ (d) += T1; \ (h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \ j++; \ } while(0) void SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]) { u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1; u_int32_t T1, W256[16]; int j; /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */ a = state[0]; b = state[1]; c = state[2]; d = state[3]; e = state[4]; f = state[5]; g = state[6]; h = state[7]; j = 0; do { /* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */ ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h); ROUND256_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g); ROUND256_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f); ROUND256_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e); ROUND256_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d); ROUND256_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c); ROUND256_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b); ROUND256_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a); } while (j < 16); /* Now for the remaining rounds up to 63: */ do { ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h); ROUND256(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g); ROUND256(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f); ROUND256(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e); ROUND256(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d); ROUND256(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c); ROUND256(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b); ROUND256(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a); } while (j < 64); /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */ state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d; state[4] += e; state[5] += f; state[6] += g; state[7] += h; /* Clean up */ a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0; } #else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */ void SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]) { u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1; u_int32_t T1, T2, W256[16]; int j; /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */ a = state[0]; b = state[1]; c = state[2]; d = state[3]; e = state[4]; f = state[5]; g = state[6]; h = state[7]; j = 0; do { BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data); data += 4; /* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */ T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + W256[j]; T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c); h = g; g = f; f = e; e = d + T1; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = T1 + T2; j++; } while (j < 16); do { /* Part of the message block expansion: */ s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f]; s0 = sigma0_256(s0); s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f]; s1 = sigma1_256(s1); /* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */ T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c); h = g; g = f; f = e; e = d + T1; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = T1 + T2; j++; } while (j < 64); /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */ state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d; state[4] += e; state[5] += f; state[6] += g; state[7] += h; /* Clean up */ a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0; } #endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */ DEF_WEAK(SHA256Transform); void SHA256Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len) { u_int64_t freespace, usedspace; /* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */ if (len == 0) return; usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH; if (usedspace > 0) { /* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */ freespace = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace; if (len >= freespace) { /* Fill the buffer completely and process it */ memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace); context->bitcount[0] += freespace << 3; len -= freespace; data += freespace; SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer); } else { /* The buffer is not yet full */ memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len); context->bitcount[0] += (u_int64_t)len << 3; /* Clean up: */ usedspace = freespace = 0; return; } } while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) { /* Process as many complete blocks as we can */ SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, data); context->bitcount[0] += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3; len -= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH; data += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH; } if (len > 0) { /* There's left-overs, so save 'em */ memcpy(context->buffer, data, len); context->bitcount[0] += len << 3; } /* Clean up: */ usedspace = freespace = 0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA256Update); void SHA256Pad(SHA2_CTX *context) { unsigned int usedspace; usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH; if (usedspace > 0) { /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */ context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80; if (usedspace <= SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) { /* Set-up for the last transform: */ memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace); } else { if (usedspace < SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) { memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace); } /* Do second-to-last transform: */ SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer); /* Prepare for last transform: */ memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH); } } else { /* Set-up for the last transform: */ memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH); /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */ *context->buffer = 0x80; } /* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */ BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH], context->bitcount[0]); /* Final transform: */ SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer); /* Clean up: */ usedspace = 0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA256Pad); void SHA256Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context) { SHA256Pad(context); #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN int i; /* Convert TO host byte order */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state.st32[i]); #else memcpy(digest, context->state.st32, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); #endif explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context)); } DEF_WEAK(SHA256Final); /*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/ void SHA512Init(SHA2_CTX *context) { memcpy(context->state.st64, sha512_initial_hash_value, sizeof(sha512_initial_hash_value)); memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer)); context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA512Init); #ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM /* Unrolled SHA-512 round macros: */ #define ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \ BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data); \ data += 8; \ T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + W512[j]; \ (d) += T1; \ (h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \ j++; \ } while(0) #define ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \ s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f]; \ s0 = sigma0_512(s0); \ s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f]; \ s1 = sigma1_512(s1); \ T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + \ (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \ (d) += T1; \ (h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \ j++; \ } while(0) void SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]) { u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1; u_int64_t T1, W512[16]; int j; /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */ a = state[0]; b = state[1]; c = state[2]; d = state[3]; e = state[4]; f = state[5]; g = state[6]; h = state[7]; j = 0; do { /* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */ ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h); ROUND512_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g); ROUND512_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f); ROUND512_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e); ROUND512_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d); ROUND512_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c); ROUND512_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b); ROUND512_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a); } while (j < 16); /* Now for the remaining rounds up to 79: */ do { ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h); ROUND512(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g); ROUND512(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f); ROUND512(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e); ROUND512(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d); ROUND512(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c); ROUND512(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b); ROUND512(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a); } while (j < 80); /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */ state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d; state[4] += e; state[5] += f; state[6] += g; state[7] += h; /* Clean up */ a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0; } #else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */ void SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]) { u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1; u_int64_t T1, T2, W512[16]; int j; /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */ a = state[0]; b = state[1]; c = state[2]; d = state[3]; e = state[4]; f = state[5]; g = state[6]; h = state[7]; j = 0; do { BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data); data += 8; /* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */ T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + W512[j]; T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c); h = g; g = f; f = e; e = d + T1; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = T1 + T2; j++; } while (j < 16); do { /* Part of the message block expansion: */ s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f]; s0 = sigma0_512(s0); s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f]; s1 = sigma1_512(s1); /* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */ T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c); h = g; g = f; f = e; e = d + T1; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = T1 + T2; j++; } while (j < 80); /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */ state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d; state[4] += e; state[5] += f; state[6] += g; state[7] += h; /* Clean up */ a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0; } #endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */ DEF_WEAK(SHA512Transform); void SHA512Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len) { size_t freespace, usedspace; /* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */ if (len == 0) return; usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH; if (usedspace > 0) { /* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */ freespace = SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace; if (len >= freespace) { /* Fill the buffer completely and process it */ memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace); ADDINC128(context->bitcount, freespace << 3); len -= freespace; data += freespace; SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer); } else { /* The buffer is not yet full */ memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len); ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3); /* Clean up: */ usedspace = freespace = 0; return; } } while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) { /* Process as many complete blocks as we can */ SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, data); ADDINC128(context->bitcount, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3); len -= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH; data += SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH; } if (len > 0) { /* There's left-overs, so save 'em */ memcpy(context->buffer, data, len); ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3); } /* Clean up: */ usedspace = freespace = 0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA512Update); void SHA512Pad(SHA2_CTX *context) { unsigned int usedspace; usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH; if (usedspace > 0) { /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */ context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80; if (usedspace <= SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) { /* Set-up for the last transform: */ memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace); } else { if (usedspace < SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) { memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace); } /* Do second-to-last transform: */ SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer); /* And set-up for the last transform: */ memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 2); } } else { /* Prepare for final transform: */ memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH); /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */ *context->buffer = 0x80; } /* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */ BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH], context->bitcount[1]); BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH + 8], context->bitcount[0]); /* Final transform: */ SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer); /* Clean up: */ usedspace = 0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA512Pad); void SHA512Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context) { SHA512Pad(context); #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN int i; /* Convert TO host byte order */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]); #else memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); #endif explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context)); } DEF_WEAK(SHA512Final); #if !defined(SHA2_SMALL) /*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/ void SHA384Init(SHA2_CTX *context) { memcpy(context->state.st64, sha384_initial_hash_value, sizeof(sha384_initial_hash_value)); memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer)); context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA384Init); MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Transform, SHA512Transform); MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Update, SHA512Update); MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Pad, SHA512Pad); DEF_WEAK(SHA384Transform); DEF_WEAK(SHA384Update); DEF_WEAK(SHA384Pad); /* Equivalent of MAKE_CLONE (which is a no-op) for SHA384 funcs */ void SHA384Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]) { SHA512Transform(state, data); } void SHA384Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len) { SHA512Update(context, data, len); } void SHA384Pad(SHA2_CTX *context) { SHA512Pad(context); } void SHA384Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context) { SHA384Pad(context); #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN int i; /* Convert TO host byte order */ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]); #else memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH); #endif /* Zero out state data */ explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context)); } DEF_WEAK(SHA384Final); #if 0 /*** SHA-512/256: *********************************************************/ void SHA512_256Init(SHA2_CTX *context) { memcpy(context->state.st64, sha512_256_initial_hash_value, sizeof(sha512_256_initial_hash_value)); memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer)); context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0; } DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Init); MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Transform, SHA512Transform); MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Update, SHA512Update); MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Pad, SHA512Pad); DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Transform); DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Update); DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Pad); void SHA512_256Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context) { SHA512_256Pad(context); #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN int i; /* Convert TO host byte order */ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]); #else memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH); #endif /* Zero out state data */ explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context)); } DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Final); #endif /* !defined(SHA2_SMALL) */ #endif /* 0 */ #endif /* HAVE_SHA{256,384,512}UPDATE */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.h010064400017500001750000000172311362136622600154060ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sha2.h,v 1.10 2016/09/03 17:00:29 tedu Exp $ */ /* * FILE: sha2.h * AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford * * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * $From: sha2.h,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:02:01 adg Exp adg $ */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/sha2.h */ #ifndef _SSHSHA2_H #define _SSHSHA2_H #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_SHA256UPDATE) || !defined(HAVE_SHA384UPDATE) || \ !defined(HAVE_SHA512UPDATE) /*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/ #define SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH 64 #define SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH 28 #define SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) #define SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH 64 #define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32 #define SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) #define SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH 128 #define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH 48 #define SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) #define SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH 128 #define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH 64 #define SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) #define SHA512_256_BLOCK_LENGTH 128 #define SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32 #define SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) /*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Context Structure *******************************/ typedef struct _SHA2_CTX { union { u_int32_t st32[8]; u_int64_t st64[8]; } state; u_int64_t bitcount[2]; u_int8_t buffer[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]; } SHA2_CTX; #if 0 __BEGIN_DECLS void SHA224Init(SHA2_CTX *); void SHA224Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH]); void SHA224Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); void SHA224Pad(SHA2_CTX *); void SHA224Final(u_int8_t [SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH))); char *SHA224End(SHA2_CTX *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA224File(const char *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA224FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA224Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); #endif /* 0 */ #ifndef HAVE_SHA256UPDATE void SHA256Init(SHA2_CTX *); void SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]); void SHA256Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); void SHA256Pad(SHA2_CTX *); void SHA256Final(u_int8_t [SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH))); char *SHA256End(SHA2_CTX *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA256File(const char *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA256FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA256Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); #endif /* HAVE_SHA256UPDATE */ #ifndef HAVE_SHA384UPDATE void SHA384Init(SHA2_CTX *); void SHA384Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH]); void SHA384Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); void SHA384Pad(SHA2_CTX *); void SHA384Final(u_int8_t [SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH))); char *SHA384End(SHA2_CTX *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA384File(const char *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA384FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA384Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); #endif /* HAVE_SHA384UPDATE */ #ifndef HAVE_SHA512UPDATE void SHA512Init(SHA2_CTX *); void SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]); void SHA512Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); void SHA512Pad(SHA2_CTX *); void SHA512Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH))); char *SHA512End(SHA2_CTX *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA512File(const char *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA512FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA512Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); #endif /* HAVE_SHA512UPDATE */ #if 0 void SHA512_256Init(SHA2_CTX *); void SHA512_256Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_256_BLOCK_LENGTH]); void SHA512_256Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); void SHA512_256Pad(SHA2_CTX *); void SHA512_256Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH))); char *SHA512_256End(SHA2_CTX *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA512_256File(const char *, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA512_256FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); char *SHA512_256Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); __END_DECLS #endif /* 0 */ #endif /* HAVE_SHA{256,384,512}UPDATE */ #endif /* _SSHSHA2_H */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/sigact.c010064400017500001750000000075131362136622600160200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sigaction.c,v 1.4 2001/01/22 18:01:48 millert Exp $ */ /**************************************************************************** * Copyright (c) 1998,2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * * * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a * * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the * * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including * * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, * * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell * * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is * * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: * * * * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included * * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. * * * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS * * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF * * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. * * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, * * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR * * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR * * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. * * * * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright * * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the * * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written * * authorization. * ****************************************************************************/ /**************************************************************************** * Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim 1992,1995 * * and: Eric S. Raymond * ****************************************************************************/ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libcurses/base/sigaction.c */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include "sigact.h" /* This file provides sigaction() emulation using sigvec() */ /* Use only if this is non POSIX system */ #if !HAVE_SIGACTION && HAVE_SIGVEC int sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact) { return sigvec(sig, sigact ? &sigact->sv : NULL, osigact ? &osigact->sv : NULL); } int sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask) { if (!mask) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } *mask = 0; return 0; } int sigprocmask (int mode, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask) { sigset_t current = sigsetmask(0); if (!mask) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } if (omask) *omask = current; if (mode == SIG_BLOCK) current |= *mask; else if (mode == SIG_UNBLOCK) current &= ~*mask; else if (mode == SIG_SETMASK) current = *mask; sigsetmask(current); return 0; } int sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask) { if (!mask) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } return sigpause(*mask); } int sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig) { if (!mask) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } *mask &= ~sigmask(sig); return 0; } int sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig) { if (!mask) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } *mask |= sigmask(sig); return 0; } int sigismember (sigset_t *mask, int sig) { if (!mask) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } return (*mask & sigmask(sig)) != 0; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/sigact.h010064400017500001750000000072501362136622600160230ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: SigAction.h,v 1.3 2001/01/22 18:01:32 millert Exp $ */ /**************************************************************************** * Copyright (c) 1998,2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * * * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a * * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the * * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including * * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, * * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell * * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is * * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: * * * * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included * * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. * * * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS * * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF * * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. * * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, * * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR * * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR * * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. * * * * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright * * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the * * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written * * authorization. * ****************************************************************************/ /**************************************************************************** * Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim 1992,1995 * * and: Eric S. Raymond * ****************************************************************************/ /* * $From: SigAction.h,v 1.6 2000/12/10 02:36:10 tom Exp $ * * This file exists to handle non-POSIX systems which don't have , * and usually no sigaction() nor */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libcurses/SigAction.h */ #ifndef _SIGACTION_H #define _SIGACTION_H #if !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC) #undef SIG_BLOCK #define SIG_BLOCK 00 #undef SIG_UNBLOCK #define SIG_UNBLOCK 01 #undef SIG_SETMASK #define SIG_SETMASK 02 /* * is in the Linux 1.2.8 + gcc 2.7.0 configuration, * and is useful for testing this header file. */ #if HAVE_BSD_SIGNAL_H # include #endif struct sigaction { struct sigvec sv; }; typedef unsigned long sigset_t; #undef sa_mask #define sa_mask sv.sv_mask #undef sa_handler #define sa_handler sv.sv_handler #undef sa_flags #define sa_flags sv.sv_flags int sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact); int sigprocmask (int how, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask); int sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask); int sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask); int sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig); int sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig); #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC) */ #endif /* !defined(_SIGACTION_H) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strcasestr.c010064400017500001750000000045531362136622600167440ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strcasestr.c,v 1.4 2015/08/31 02:53:57 guenther Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: strcasestr.c,v 1.2 2005/02/09 21:35:47 kleink Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by * Chris Torek. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strcasestr.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRCASESTR #include #include /* * Find the first occurrence of find in s, ignore case. */ char * strcasestr(const char *s, const char *find) { char c, sc; size_t len; if ((c = *find++) != 0) { c = (char)tolower((unsigned char)c); len = strlen(find); do { do { if ((sc = *s++) == 0) return (NULL); } while ((char)tolower((unsigned char)sc) != c); } while (strncasecmp(s, find, len) != 0); s--; } return ((char *)s); } DEF_WEAK(strcasestr); #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c010064400017500001750000000034161362136622600162200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strlcat.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strlcat.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT #include #include /* * Appends src to string dst of size siz (unlike strncat, siz is the * full size of dst, not space left). At most siz-1 characters * will be copied. Always NUL terminates (unless siz <= strlen(dst)). * Returns strlen(src) + MIN(siz, strlen(initial dst)). * If retval >= siz, truncation occurred. */ size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz) { char *d = dst; const char *s = src; size_t n = siz; size_t dlen; /* Find the end of dst and adjust bytes left but don't go past end */ while (n-- != 0 && *d != '\0') d++; dlen = d - dst; n = siz - dlen; if (n == 0) return(dlen + strlen(s)); while (*s != '\0') { if (n != 1) { *d++ = *s; n--; } s++; } *d = '\0'; return(dlen + (s - src)); /* count does not include NUL */ } #endif /* !HAVE_STRLCAT */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c010064400017500001750000000032241362136622600162410ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strlcpy.c,v 1.11 2006/05/05 15:27:38 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strlcpy.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY #include #include /* * Copy src to string dst of size siz. At most siz-1 characters * will be copied. Always NUL terminates (unless siz == 0). * Returns strlen(src); if retval >= siz, truncation occurred. */ size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz) { char *d = dst; const char *s = src; size_t n = siz; /* Copy as many bytes as will fit */ if (n != 0) { while (--n != 0) { if ((*d++ = *s++) == '\0') break; } } /* Not enough room in dst, add NUL and traverse rest of src */ if (n == 0) { if (siz != 0) *d = '\0'; /* NUL-terminate dst */ while (*s++) ; } return(s - src - 1); /* count does not include NUL */ } #endif /* !HAVE_STRLCPY */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strmode.c010064400017500001750000000066031362136622600162220ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strmode.c,v 1.7 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strmode.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRMODE #include #include #include /* XXX mode should be mode_t */ void strmode(int mode, char *p) { /* print type */ switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFDIR: /* directory */ *p++ = 'd'; break; case S_IFCHR: /* character special */ *p++ = 'c'; break; case S_IFBLK: /* block special */ *p++ = 'b'; break; case S_IFREG: /* regular */ *p++ = '-'; break; case S_IFLNK: /* symbolic link */ *p++ = 'l'; break; #ifdef S_IFSOCK case S_IFSOCK: /* socket */ *p++ = 's'; break; #endif #ifdef S_IFIFO case S_IFIFO: /* fifo */ *p++ = 'p'; break; #endif default: /* unknown */ *p++ = '?'; break; } /* usr */ if (mode & S_IRUSR) *p++ = 'r'; else *p++ = '-'; if (mode & S_IWUSR) *p++ = 'w'; else *p++ = '-'; switch (mode & (S_IXUSR | S_ISUID)) { case 0: *p++ = '-'; break; case S_IXUSR: *p++ = 'x'; break; case S_ISUID: *p++ = 'S'; break; case S_IXUSR | S_ISUID: *p++ = 's'; break; } /* group */ if (mode & S_IRGRP) *p++ = 'r'; else *p++ = '-'; if (mode & S_IWGRP) *p++ = 'w'; else *p++ = '-'; switch (mode & (S_IXGRP | S_ISGID)) { case 0: *p++ = '-'; break; case S_IXGRP: *p++ = 'x'; break; case S_ISGID: *p++ = 'S'; break; case S_IXGRP | S_ISGID: *p++ = 's'; break; } /* other */ if (mode & S_IROTH) *p++ = 'r'; else *p++ = '-'; if (mode & S_IWOTH) *p++ = 'w'; else *p++ = '-'; switch (mode & (S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX)) { case 0: *p++ = '-'; break; case S_IXOTH: *p++ = 'x'; break; case S_ISVTX: *p++ = 'T'; break; case S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX: *p++ = 't'; break; } *p++ = ' '; /* will be a '+' if ACL's implemented */ *p = '\0'; } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strndup.c010064400017500001750000000024241362136622600162410ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strndup.c,v 1.2 2015/08/31 02:53:57 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_STRNDUP) || defined(BROKEN_STRNDUP) #include #include #include #include char * strndup(const char *str, size_t maxlen) { char *copy; size_t len; len = strnlen(str, maxlen); copy = malloc(len + 1); if (copy != NULL) { (void)memcpy(copy, str, len); copy[len] = '\0'; } return copy; } DEF_WEAK(strndup); #endif /* HAVE_STRNDUP */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strnlen.c010064400017500001750000000022721362136622600162300ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strnlen.c,v 1.3 2010/06/02 12:58:12 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strnlen.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_STRNLEN) || defined(BROKEN_STRNLEN) #include #include size_t strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen) { const char *cp; for (cp = str; maxlen != 0 && *cp != '\0'; cp++, maxlen--) ; return (size_t)(cp - str); } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strptime.c010064400017500001750000000224411362136622600164120ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strptime.c,v 1.12 2008/06/26 05:42:05 ray Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: strptime.c,v 1.12 1998/01/20 21:39:40 mycroft Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This code was contributed to The NetBSD Foundation by Klaus Klein. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/time/strptime.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME #define TM_YEAR_BASE 1900 /* from tzfile.h */ #include #include #include #include /* #define _ctloc(x) (_CurrentTimeLocale->x) */ /* * We do not implement alternate representations. However, we always * check whether a given modifier is allowed for a certain conversion. */ #define _ALT_E 0x01 #define _ALT_O 0x02 #define _LEGAL_ALT(x) { if (alt_format & ~(x)) return (0); } static int _conv_num(const unsigned char **, int *, int, int); static char *_strptime(const char *, const char *, struct tm *, int); char * strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm) { return(_strptime(buf, fmt, tm, 1)); } static char * _strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm, int initialize) { unsigned char c; const unsigned char *bp; size_t len; int alt_format, i; static int century, relyear; if (initialize) { century = TM_YEAR_BASE; relyear = -1; } bp = (unsigned char *)buf; while ((c = *fmt) != '\0') { /* Clear `alternate' modifier prior to new conversion. */ alt_format = 0; /* Eat up white-space. */ if (isspace(c)) { while (isspace(*bp)) bp++; fmt++; continue; } if ((c = *fmt++) != '%') goto literal; again: switch (c = *fmt++) { case '%': /* "%%" is converted to "%". */ literal: if (c != *bp++) return (NULL); break; /* * "Alternative" modifiers. Just set the appropriate flag * and start over again. */ case 'E': /* "%E?" alternative conversion modifier. */ _LEGAL_ALT(0); alt_format |= _ALT_E; goto again; case 'O': /* "%O?" alternative conversion modifier. */ _LEGAL_ALT(0); alt_format |= _ALT_O; goto again; /* * "Complex" conversion rules, implemented through recursion. */ #if 0 case 'c': /* Date and time, using the locale's format. */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E); if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(d_t_fmt), tm, 0))) return (NULL); break; #endif case 'D': /* The date as "%m/%d/%y". */ _LEGAL_ALT(0); if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%m/%d/%y", tm, 0))) return (NULL); break; case 'R': /* The time as "%H:%M". */ _LEGAL_ALT(0); if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%H:%M", tm, 0))) return (NULL); break; case 'r': /* The time as "%I:%M:%S %p". */ _LEGAL_ALT(0); if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%I:%M:%S %p", tm, 0))) return (NULL); break; case 'T': /* The time as "%H:%M:%S". */ _LEGAL_ALT(0); if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%H:%M:%S", tm, 0))) return (NULL); break; #if 0 case 'X': /* The time, using the locale's format. */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E); if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(t_fmt), tm, 0))) return (NULL); break; case 'x': /* The date, using the locale's format. */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E); if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(d_fmt), tm, 0))) return (NULL); break; #endif /* * "Elementary" conversion rules. */ #if 0 case 'A': /* The day of week, using the locale's form. */ case 'a': _LEGAL_ALT(0); for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { /* Full name. */ len = strlen(_ctloc(day[i])); if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(day[i]), bp, len) == 0) break; /* Abbreviated name. */ len = strlen(_ctloc(abday[i])); if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(abday[i]), bp, len) == 0) break; } /* Nothing matched. */ if (i == 7) return (NULL); tm->tm_wday = i; bp += len; break; case 'B': /* The month, using the locale's form. */ case 'b': case 'h': _LEGAL_ALT(0); for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) { /* Full name. */ len = strlen(_ctloc(mon[i])); if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(mon[i]), bp, len) == 0) break; /* Abbreviated name. */ len = strlen(_ctloc(abmon[i])); if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(abmon[i]), bp, len) == 0) break; } /* Nothing matched. */ if (i == 12) return (NULL); tm->tm_mon = i; bp += len; break; #endif case 'C': /* The century number. */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 99))) return (NULL); century = i * 100; break; case 'd': /* The day of month. */ case 'e': _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_mday, 1, 31))) return (NULL); break; case 'k': /* The hour (24-hour clock representation). */ _LEGAL_ALT(0); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'H': _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_hour, 0, 23))) return (NULL); break; case 'l': /* The hour (12-hour clock representation). */ _LEGAL_ALT(0); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'I': _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_hour, 1, 12))) return (NULL); break; case 'j': /* The day of year. */ _LEGAL_ALT(0); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_yday, 1, 366))) return (NULL); tm->tm_yday--; break; case 'M': /* The minute. */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_min, 0, 59))) return (NULL); break; case 'm': /* The month. */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_mon, 1, 12))) return (NULL); tm->tm_mon--; break; #if 0 case 'p': /* The locale's equivalent of AM/PM. */ _LEGAL_ALT(0); /* AM? */ len = strlen(_ctloc(am_pm[0])); if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(am_pm[0]), bp, len) == 0) { if (tm->tm_hour > 12) /* i.e., 13:00 AM ?! */ return (NULL); else if (tm->tm_hour == 12) tm->tm_hour = 0; bp += len; break; } /* PM? */ len = strlen(_ctloc(am_pm[1])); if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(am_pm[1]), bp, len) == 0) { if (tm->tm_hour > 12) /* i.e., 13:00 PM ?! */ return (NULL); else if (tm->tm_hour < 12) tm->tm_hour += 12; bp += len; break; } /* Nothing matched. */ return (NULL); #endif case 'S': /* The seconds. */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_sec, 0, 61))) return (NULL); break; case 'U': /* The week of year, beginning on sunday. */ case 'W': /* The week of year, beginning on monday. */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); /* * XXX This is bogus, as we can not assume any valid * information present in the tm structure at this * point to calculate a real value, so just check the * range for now. */ if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 53))) return (NULL); break; case 'w': /* The day of week, beginning on sunday. */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_wday, 0, 6))) return (NULL); break; case 'Y': /* The year. */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 9999))) return (NULL); relyear = -1; tm->tm_year = i - TM_YEAR_BASE; break; case 'y': /* The year within the century (2 digits). */ _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E | _ALT_O); if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &relyear, 0, 99))) return (NULL); break; /* * Miscellaneous conversions. */ case 'n': /* Any kind of white-space. */ case 't': _LEGAL_ALT(0); while (isspace(*bp)) bp++; break; default: /* Unknown/unsupported conversion. */ return (NULL); } } /* * We need to evaluate the two digit year spec (%y) * last as we can get a century spec (%C) at any time. */ if (relyear != -1) { if (century == TM_YEAR_BASE) { if (relyear <= 68) tm->tm_year = relyear + 2000 - TM_YEAR_BASE; else tm->tm_year = relyear + 1900 - TM_YEAR_BASE; } else { tm->tm_year = relyear + century - TM_YEAR_BASE; } } return ((char *)bp); } static int _conv_num(const unsigned char **buf, int *dest, int llim, int ulim) { int result = 0; int rulim = ulim; if (**buf < '0' || **buf > '9') return (0); /* we use rulim to break out of the loop when we run out of digits */ do { result *= 10; result += *(*buf)++ - '0'; rulim /= 10; } while ((result * 10 <= ulim) && rulim && **buf >= '0' && **buf <= '9'); if (result < llim || result > ulim) return (0); *dest = result; return (1); } #endif /* HAVE_STRPTIME */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strsep.c010064400017500001750000000051351362136622600160640ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strsep.c,v 1.6 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strsep.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) #include #include /* * Get next token from string *stringp, where tokens are possibly-empty * strings separated by characters from delim. * * Writes NULs into the string at *stringp to end tokens. * delim need not remain constant from call to call. * On return, *stringp points past the last NUL written (if there might * be further tokens), or is NULL (if there are definitely no more tokens). * * If *stringp is NULL, strsep returns NULL. */ char * strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim) { char *s; const char *spanp; int c, sc; char *tok; if ((s = *stringp) == NULL) return (NULL); for (tok = s;;) { c = *s++; spanp = delim; do { if ((sc = *spanp++) == c) { if (c == 0) s = NULL; else s[-1] = 0; *stringp = s; return (tok); } } while (sc != 0); } /* NOTREACHED */ } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c010064400017500001750000000104461362136622600162500ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strtoll.c,v 1.6 2005/11/10 10:00:17 espie Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1992 The Regents of the University of California. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoll.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL #include #include #include #include #include /* * Convert a string to a long long. * * Ignores `locale' stuff. Assumes that the upper and lower case * alphabets and digits are each contiguous. */ long long strtoll(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base) { const char *s; long long acc, cutoff; int c; int neg, any, cutlim; /* * Skip white space and pick up leading +/- sign if any. * If base is 0, allow 0x for hex and 0 for octal, else * assume decimal; if base is already 16, allow 0x. */ s = nptr; do { c = (unsigned char) *s++; } while (isspace(c)); if (c == '-') { neg = 1; c = *s++; } else { neg = 0; if (c == '+') c = *s++; } if ((base == 0 || base == 16) && c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) { c = s[1]; s += 2; base = 16; } if (base == 0) base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10; /* * Compute the cutoff value between legal numbers and illegal * numbers. That is the largest legal value, divided by the * base. An input number that is greater than this value, if * followed by a legal input character, is too big. One that * is equal to this value may be valid or not; the limit * between valid and invalid numbers is then based on the last * digit. For instance, if the range for long longs is * [-9223372036854775808..9223372036854775807] and the input base * is 10, cutoff will be set to 922337203685477580 and cutlim to * either 7 (neg==0) or 8 (neg==1), meaning that if we have * accumulated a value > 922337203685477580, or equal but the * next digit is > 7 (or 8), the number is too big, and we will * return a range error. * * Set any if any `digits' consumed; make it negative to indicate * overflow. */ cutoff = neg ? LLONG_MIN : LLONG_MAX; cutlim = cutoff % base; cutoff /= base; if (neg) { if (cutlim > 0) { cutlim -= base; cutoff += 1; } cutlim = -cutlim; } for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) { if (isdigit(c)) c -= '0'; else if (isalpha(c)) c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10; else break; if (c >= base) break; if (any < 0) continue; if (neg) { if (acc < cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) { any = -1; acc = LLONG_MIN; errno = ERANGE; } else { any = 1; acc *= base; acc -= c; } } else { if (acc > cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) { any = -1; acc = LLONG_MAX; errno = ERANGE; } else { any = 1; acc *= base; acc += c; } } } if (endptr != 0) *endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr); return (acc); } #endif /* HAVE_STRTOLL */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c010064400017500001750000000035461362136622600164430ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strtonum.c,v 1.6 2004/08/03 19:38:01 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004 Ted Unangst and Todd Miller * All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtonum.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM #include #include #include #define INVALID 1 #define TOOSMALL 2 #define TOOLARGE 3 long long strtonum(const char *numstr, long long minval, long long maxval, const char **errstrp) { long long ll = 0; char *ep; int error = 0; struct errval { const char *errstr; int err; } ev[4] = { { NULL, 0 }, { "invalid", EINVAL }, { "too small", ERANGE }, { "too large", ERANGE }, }; ev[0].err = errno; errno = 0; if (minval > maxval) error = INVALID; else { ll = strtoll(numstr, &ep, 10); if (numstr == ep || *ep != '\0') error = INVALID; else if ((ll == LLONG_MIN && errno == ERANGE) || ll < minval) error = TOOSMALL; else if ((ll == LLONG_MAX && errno == ERANGE) || ll > maxval) error = TOOLARGE; } if (errstrp != NULL) *errstrp = ev[error].errstr; errno = ev[error].err; if (error) ll = 0; return (ll); } #endif /* HAVE_STRTONUM */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c010064400017500001750000000061071362136622600162600ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strtoul.c,v 1.7 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1990 Regents of the University of California. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoul.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL #include #include #include #include /* * Convert a string to an unsigned long integer. * * Ignores `locale' stuff. Assumes that the upper and lower case * alphabets and digits are each contiguous. */ unsigned long strtoul(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base) { const char *s; unsigned long acc, cutoff; int c; int neg, any, cutlim; /* * See strtol for comments as to the logic used. */ s = nptr; do { c = (unsigned char) *s++; } while (isspace(c)); if (c == '-') { neg = 1; c = *s++; } else { neg = 0; if (c == '+') c = *s++; } if ((base == 0 || base == 16) && c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) { c = s[1]; s += 2; base = 16; } if (base == 0) base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10; cutoff = ULONG_MAX / (unsigned long)base; cutlim = ULONG_MAX % (unsigned long)base; for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) { if (isdigit(c)) c -= '0'; else if (isalpha(c)) c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10; else break; if (c >= base) break; if (any < 0) continue; if (acc > cutoff || acc == cutoff && c > cutlim) { any = -1; acc = ULONG_MAX; errno = ERANGE; } else { any = 1; acc *= (unsigned long)base; acc += c; } } if (neg && any > 0) acc = -acc; if (endptr != 0) *endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr); return (acc); } #endif /* !HAVE_STRTOUL */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c010064400017500001750000000062051362136622600164330ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: strtoull.c,v 1.5 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1992 The Regents of the University of California. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoull.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL #include #include #include #include #include /* * Convert a string to an unsigned long long. * * Ignores `locale' stuff. Assumes that the upper and lower case * alphabets and digits are each contiguous. */ unsigned long long strtoull(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base) { const char *s; unsigned long long acc, cutoff; int c; int neg, any, cutlim; /* * See strtoq for comments as to the logic used. */ s = nptr; do { c = (unsigned char) *s++; } while (isspace(c)); if (c == '-') { neg = 1; c = *s++; } else { neg = 0; if (c == '+') c = *s++; } if ((base == 0 || base == 16) && c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) { c = s[1]; s += 2; base = 16; } if (base == 0) base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10; cutoff = ULLONG_MAX / (unsigned long long)base; cutlim = ULLONG_MAX % (unsigned long long)base; for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) { if (isdigit(c)) c -= '0'; else if (isalpha(c)) c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10; else break; if (c >= base) break; if (any < 0) continue; if (acc > cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) { any = -1; acc = ULLONG_MAX; errno = ERANGE; } else { any = 1; acc *= (unsigned long long)base; acc += c; } } if (neg && any > 0) acc = -acc; if (endptr != 0) *endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr); return (acc); } #endif /* !HAVE_STRTOULL */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h010064400017500001750000000521031362136622600165060ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.36 2012/04/11 13:29:14 naddy Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * @(#)queue.h 8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94 */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/queue.h */ #ifndef _FAKE_QUEUE_H_ #define _FAKE_QUEUE_H_ /* * Require for OS/X and other platforms that have old/broken/incomplete * . */ #undef SLIST_HEAD #undef SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER #undef SLIST_ENTRY #undef SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR #undef SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE #undef SLIST_FIRST #undef SLIST_END #undef SLIST_EMPTY #undef SLIST_NEXT #undef SLIST_FOREACH #undef SLIST_INIT #undef SLIST_INSERT_AFTER #undef SLIST_INSERT_HEAD #undef SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD #undef SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER #undef SLIST_REMOVE #undef SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT #undef LIST_HEAD #undef LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER #undef LIST_ENTRY #undef LIST_FIRST #undef LIST_END #undef LIST_EMPTY #undef LIST_NEXT #undef LIST_FOREACH #undef LIST_FOREACH_SAFE #undef LIST_INIT #undef LIST_INSERT_AFTER #undef LIST_INSERT_BEFORE #undef LIST_INSERT_HEAD #undef LIST_REMOVE #undef LIST_REPLACE #undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD #undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER #undef SIMPLEQ_ENTRY #undef SIMPLEQ_FIRST #undef SIMPLEQ_END #undef SIMPLEQ_EMPTY #undef SIMPLEQ_NEXT #undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH #undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE #undef SIMPLEQ_INIT #undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD #undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL #undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER #undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD #undef TAILQ_HEAD #undef TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER #undef TAILQ_ENTRY #undef TAILQ_FIRST #undef TAILQ_END #undef TAILQ_NEXT #undef TAILQ_LAST #undef TAILQ_PREV #undef TAILQ_EMPTY #undef TAILQ_FOREACH #undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE #undef TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE #undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE #undef TAILQ_INIT #undef TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD #undef TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL #undef TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER #undef TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE #undef TAILQ_REMOVE #undef TAILQ_REPLACE #undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD #undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER #undef CIRCLEQ_ENTRY #undef CIRCLEQ_FIRST #undef CIRCLEQ_LAST #undef CIRCLEQ_END #undef CIRCLEQ_NEXT #undef CIRCLEQ_PREV #undef CIRCLEQ_EMPTY #undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH #undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE #undef CIRCLEQ_INIT #undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER #undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE #undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD #undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL #undef CIRCLEQ_REMOVE #undef CIRCLEQ_REPLACE /* * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists, * lists, simple queues, tail queues, and circular queues. * * * A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements * are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at * the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be * added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list. * Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit * macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may * only be traversed in the forward direction. Singly-linked lists are ideal * for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for * implementing a LIFO queue. * * A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward * pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked * so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before * or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list * may only be traversed in the forward direction. * * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one the head of the * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are singly * linked to save space, so elements can only be removed from the * head of the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the * list. A simple queue may only be traversed in the forward direction. * * A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or * after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of * the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction. * * A circle queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the list. * A circle queue may be traversed in either direction, but has a more * complex end of list detection. * * For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page. */ #if defined(QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG) || (defined(_KERNEL) && defined(DIAGNOSTIC)) #define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) (a) = ((void *)-1) #else #define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) #endif /* * Singly-linked List definitions. */ #define SLIST_HEAD(name, type) \ struct name { \ struct type *slh_first; /* first element */ \ } #define SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ { NULL } #define SLIST_ENTRY(type) \ struct { \ struct type *sle_next; /* next element */ \ } /* * Singly-linked List access methods. */ #define SLIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->slh_first) #define SLIST_END(head) NULL #define SLIST_EMPTY(head) (SLIST_FIRST(head) == SLIST_END(head)) #define SLIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sle_next) #define SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ for((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \ (var) != SLIST_END(head); \ (var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field)) #define SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ for ((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \ (var) && ((tvar) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field), 1); \ (var) = (tvar)) /* * Singly-linked List functions. */ #define SLIST_INIT(head) { \ SLIST_FIRST(head) = SLIST_END(head); \ } #define SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.sle_next = (slistelm)->field.sle_next; \ (slistelm)->field.sle_next = (elm); \ } while (0) #define SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.sle_next = (head)->slh_first; \ (head)->slh_first = (elm); \ } while (0) #define SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER(elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.sle_next = (elm)->field.sle_next->field.sle_next; \ } while (0) #define SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \ (head)->slh_first = (head)->slh_first->field.sle_next; \ } while (0) #define SLIST_REMOVE(head, elm, type, field) do { \ if ((head)->slh_first == (elm)) { \ SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD((head), field); \ } else { \ struct type *curelm = (head)->slh_first; \ \ while (curelm->field.sle_next != (elm)) \ curelm = curelm->field.sle_next; \ curelm->field.sle_next = \ curelm->field.sle_next->field.sle_next; \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.sle_next); \ } \ } while (0) /* * List definitions. */ #define LIST_HEAD(name, type) \ struct name { \ struct type *lh_first; /* first element */ \ } #define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ { NULL } #define LIST_ENTRY(type) \ struct { \ struct type *le_next; /* next element */ \ struct type **le_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ } /* * List access methods */ #define LIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->lh_first) #define LIST_END(head) NULL #define LIST_EMPTY(head) (LIST_FIRST(head) == LIST_END(head)) #define LIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.le_next) #define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ for((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \ (var)!= LIST_END(head); \ (var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field)) #define LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ for ((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \ (var) && ((tvar) = LIST_NEXT(var, field), 1); \ (var) = (tvar)) /* * List functions. */ #define LIST_INIT(head) do { \ LIST_FIRST(head) = LIST_END(head); \ } while (0) #define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do { \ if (((elm)->field.le_next = (listelm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \ (listelm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ &(elm)->field.le_next; \ (listelm)->field.le_next = (elm); \ (elm)->field.le_prev = &(listelm)->field.le_next; \ } while (0) #define LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev; \ (elm)->field.le_next = (listelm); \ *(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm); \ (listelm)->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next; \ } while (0) #define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ if (((elm)->field.le_next = (head)->lh_first) != NULL) \ (head)->lh_first->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;\ (head)->lh_first = (elm); \ (elm)->field.le_prev = &(head)->lh_first; \ } while (0) #define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do { \ if ((elm)->field.le_next != NULL) \ (elm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ (elm)->field.le_prev; \ *(elm)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_next; \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev); \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next); \ } while (0) #define LIST_REPLACE(elm, elm2, field) do { \ if (((elm2)->field.le_next = (elm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \ (elm2)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ &(elm2)->field.le_next; \ (elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_prev; \ *(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm2); \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev); \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next); \ } while (0) /* * Simple queue definitions. */ #define SIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \ struct name { \ struct type *sqh_first; /* first element */ \ struct type **sqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ } #define SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ { NULL, &(head).sqh_first } #define SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type) \ struct { \ struct type *sqe_next; /* next element */ \ } /* * Simple queue access methods. */ #define SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->sqh_first) #define SIMPLEQ_END(head) NULL #define SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head) (SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == SIMPLEQ_END(head)) #define SIMPLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sqe_next) #define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ for((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \ (var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head); \ (var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field)) #define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ for ((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \ (var) && ((tvar) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \ (var) = (tvar)) /* * Simple queue functions. */ #define SIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do { \ (head)->sqh_first = NULL; \ (head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \ } while (0) #define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (head)->sqh_first) == NULL) \ (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ (head)->sqh_first = (elm); \ } while (0) #define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.sqe_next = NULL; \ *(head)->sqh_last = (elm); \ (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ } while (0) #define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (listelm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL)\ (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ (listelm)->field.sqe_next = (elm); \ } while (0) #define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \ if (((head)->sqh_first = (head)->sqh_first->field.sqe_next) == NULL) \ (head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \ } while (0) #define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do { \ if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (elm)->field.sqe_next->field.sqe_next) \ == NULL) \ (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ } while (0) /* * Tail queue definitions. */ #define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type) \ struct name { \ struct type *tqh_first; /* first element */ \ struct type **tqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ } #define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ { NULL, &(head).tqh_first } #define TAILQ_ENTRY(type) \ struct { \ struct type *tqe_next; /* next element */ \ struct type **tqe_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ } /* * tail queue access methods */ #define TAILQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->tqh_first) #define TAILQ_END(head) NULL #define TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.tqe_next) #define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname) \ (*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last)) /* XXX */ #define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field) \ (*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last)) #define TAILQ_EMPTY(head) \ (TAILQ_FIRST(head) == TAILQ_END(head)) #define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ for((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \ (var) != TAILQ_END(head); \ (var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field)) #define TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ for ((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \ (var) != TAILQ_END(head) && \ ((tvar) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \ (var) = (tvar)) #define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, headname, field) \ for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \ (var) != TAILQ_END(head); \ (var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field)) #define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar) \ for ((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \ (var) != TAILQ_END(head) && \ ((tvar) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1); \ (var) = (tvar)) /* * Tail queue functions. */ #define TAILQ_INIT(head) do { \ (head)->tqh_first = NULL; \ (head)->tqh_last = &(head)->tqh_first; \ } while (0) #define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (head)->tqh_first) != NULL) \ (head)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = \ &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ else \ (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ (head)->tqh_first = (elm); \ (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(head)->tqh_first; \ } while (0) #define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.tqe_next = NULL; \ (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last; \ *(head)->tqh_last = (elm); \ (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ } while (0) #define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)\ (elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ else \ (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ (listelm)->field.tqe_next = (elm); \ (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(listelm)->field.tqe_next; \ } while (0) #define TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev; \ (elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm); \ *(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm); \ (listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ } while (0) #define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \ if (((elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \ (elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ else \ (head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ *(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_next; \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev); \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next); \ } while (0) #define TAILQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \ if (((elm2)->field.tqe_next = (elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \ (elm2)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \ else \ (head)->tqh_last = &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \ (elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ *(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm2); \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev); \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next); \ } while (0) /* * Circular queue definitions. */ #define CIRCLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \ struct name { \ struct type *cqh_first; /* first element */ \ struct type *cqh_last; /* last element */ \ } #define CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ { CIRCLEQ_END(&head), CIRCLEQ_END(&head) } #define CIRCLEQ_ENTRY(type) \ struct { \ struct type *cqe_next; /* next element */ \ struct type *cqe_prev; /* previous element */ \ } /* * Circular queue access methods */ #define CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->cqh_first) #define CIRCLEQ_LAST(head) ((head)->cqh_last) #define CIRCLEQ_END(head) ((void *)(head)) #define CIRCLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_next) #define CIRCLEQ_PREV(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_prev) #define CIRCLEQ_EMPTY(head) \ (CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) #define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ for((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \ (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ (var) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field)) #define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \ (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) && \ ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \ (var) = (tvar)) #define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field) \ for((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head); \ (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ (var) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, field)) #define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar) \ for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head, headname); \ (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) && \ ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1); \ (var) = (tvar)) /* * Circular queue functions. */ #define CIRCLEQ_INIT(head) do { \ (head)->cqh_first = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ (head)->cqh_last = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ } while (0) #define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm)->field.cqe_next; \ (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm); \ if ((listelm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ else \ (listelm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ (listelm)->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ } while (0) #define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm); \ (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm)->field.cqe_prev; \ if ((listelm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ else \ (listelm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ (listelm)->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ } while (0) #define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.cqe_next = (head)->cqh_first; \ (elm)->field.cqe_prev = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ if ((head)->cqh_last == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ else \ (head)->cqh_first->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ } while (0) #define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ (elm)->field.cqe_next = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (head)->cqh_last; \ if ((head)->cqh_first == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ else \ (head)->cqh_last->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ } while (0) #define CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \ if ((elm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ (head)->cqh_last = (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \ else \ (elm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = \ (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \ if ((elm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ (head)->cqh_first = (elm)->field.cqe_next; \ else \ (elm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = \ (elm)->field.cqe_next; \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev); \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next); \ } while (0) #define CIRCLEQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \ if (((elm2)->field.cqe_next = (elm)->field.cqe_next) == \ CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ (head).cqh_last = (elm2); \ else \ (elm2)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm2); \ if (((elm2)->field.cqe_prev = (elm)->field.cqe_prev) == \ CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ (head).cqh_first = (elm2); \ else \ (elm2)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm2); \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev); \ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next); \ } while (0) #endif /* !_FAKE_QUEUE_H_ */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h010064400017500001750000000612651362136622600163320ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.13 2011/07/09 00:19:45 pirofti Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/tree.h */ #include "config.h" #ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE # define __attribute__(x) #endif #ifndef _SYS_TREE_H_ #define _SYS_TREE_H_ /* * This file defines data structures for different types of trees: * splay trees and red-black trees. * * A splay tree is a self-organizing data structure. Every operation * on the tree causes a splay to happen. The splay moves the requested * node to the root of the tree and partly rebalances it. * * This has the benefit that request locality causes faster lookups as * the requested nodes move to the top of the tree. On the other hand, * every lookup causes memory writes. * * The Balance Theorem bounds the total access time for m operations * and n inserts on an initially empty tree as O((m + n)lg n). The * amortized cost for a sequence of m accesses to a splay tree is O(lg n); * * A red-black tree is a binary search tree with the node color as an * extra attribute. It fulfills a set of conditions: * - every search path from the root to a leaf consists of the * same number of black nodes, * - each red node (except for the root) has a black parent, * - each leaf node is black. * * Every operation on a red-black tree is bounded as O(lg n). * The maximum height of a red-black tree is 2lg (n+1). */ #define SPLAY_HEAD(name, type) \ struct name { \ struct type *sph_root; /* root of the tree */ \ } #define SPLAY_INITIALIZER(root) \ { NULL } #define SPLAY_INIT(root) do { \ (root)->sph_root = NULL; \ } while (0) #define SPLAY_ENTRY(type) \ struct { \ struct type *spe_left; /* left element */ \ struct type *spe_right; /* right element */ \ } #define SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) (elm)->field.spe_left #define SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) (elm)->field.spe_right #define SPLAY_ROOT(head) (head)->sph_root #define SPLAY_EMPTY(head) (SPLAY_ROOT(head) == NULL) /* SPLAY_ROTATE_{LEFT,RIGHT} expect that tmp hold SPLAY_{RIGHT,LEFT} */ #define SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, field) do { \ SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ (head)->sph_root = tmp; \ } while (0) #define SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, field) do { \ SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field); \ SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ (head)->sph_root = tmp; \ } while (0) #define SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, tmp, field) do { \ SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ tmp = (head)->sph_root; \ (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ } while (0) #define SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, tmp, field) do { \ SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ tmp = (head)->sph_root; \ (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ } while (0) #define SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, node, left, right, field) do { \ SPLAY_RIGHT(left, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ SPLAY_LEFT(right, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(node, field); \ SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(node, field); \ } while (0) /* Generates prototypes and inline functions */ #define SPLAY_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp) \ void name##_SPLAY(struct name *, struct type *); \ void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *, int); \ struct type *name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *); \ struct type *name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *); \ \ /* Finds the node with the same key as elm */ \ static __inline struct type * \ name##_SPLAY_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ { \ if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) \ return(NULL); \ name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) \ return (head->sph_root); \ return (NULL); \ } \ \ static __inline struct type * \ name##_SPLAY_NEXT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ { \ name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ if (SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) != NULL) { \ elm = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field); \ while (SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) != NULL) { \ elm = SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field); \ } \ } else \ elm = NULL; \ return (elm); \ } \ \ static __inline struct type * \ name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(struct name *head, int val) \ { \ name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(head, val); \ return (SPLAY_ROOT(head)); \ } /* Main splay operation. * Moves node close to the key of elm to top */ #define SPLAY_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp) \ struct type * \ name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ { \ if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) { \ SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL; \ } else { \ int __comp; \ name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ __comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root); \ if(__comp < 0) { \ SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\ SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL; \ } else if (__comp > 0) { \ SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL; \ } else \ return ((head)->sph_root); \ } \ (head)->sph_root = (elm); \ return (NULL); \ } \ \ struct type * \ name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ { \ struct type *__tmp; \ if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) \ return (NULL); \ name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) { \ if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL) { \ (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ } else { \ __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\ name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = __tmp; \ } \ return (elm); \ } \ return (NULL); \ } \ \ void \ name##_SPLAY(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ { \ struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp; \ int __comp; \ \ SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\ __left = __right = &__node; \ \ while ((__comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root))) { \ if (__comp < 0) { \ __tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ if (__tmp == NULL) \ break; \ if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) < 0){ \ SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field); \ if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ break; \ } \ SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field); \ } else if (__comp > 0) { \ __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ if (__tmp == NULL) \ break; \ if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) > 0){ \ SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field); \ if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ break; \ } \ SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field); \ } \ } \ SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field); \ } \ \ /* Splay with either the minimum or the maximum element \ * Used to find minimum or maximum element in tree. \ */ \ void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *head, int __comp) \ { \ struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp; \ \ SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\ __left = __right = &__node; \ \ while (1) { \ if (__comp < 0) { \ __tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ if (__tmp == NULL) \ break; \ if (__comp < 0){ \ SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field); \ if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ break; \ } \ SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field); \ } else if (__comp > 0) { \ __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ if (__tmp == NULL) \ break; \ if (__comp > 0) { \ SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field); \ if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ break; \ } \ SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field); \ } \ } \ SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field); \ } #define SPLAY_NEGINF -1 #define SPLAY_INF 1 #define SPLAY_INSERT(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_INSERT(x, y) #define SPLAY_REMOVE(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(x, y) #define SPLAY_FIND(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_FIND(x, y) #define SPLAY_NEXT(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_NEXT(x, y) #define SPLAY_MIN(name, x) (SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL \ : name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_NEGINF)) #define SPLAY_MAX(name, x) (SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL \ : name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_INF)) #define SPLAY_FOREACH(x, name, head) \ for ((x) = SPLAY_MIN(name, head); \ (x) != NULL; \ (x) = SPLAY_NEXT(name, head, x)) /* Macros that define a red-black tree */ #define RB_HEAD(name, type) \ struct name { \ struct type *rbh_root; /* root of the tree */ \ } #define RB_INITIALIZER(root) \ { NULL } #define RB_INIT(root) do { \ (root)->rbh_root = NULL; \ } while (0) #define RB_BLACK 0 #define RB_RED 1 #define RB_ENTRY(type) \ struct { \ struct type *rbe_left; /* left element */ \ struct type *rbe_right; /* right element */ \ struct type *rbe_parent; /* parent element */ \ int rbe_color; /* node color */ \ } #define RB_LEFT(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_left #define RB_RIGHT(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_right #define RB_PARENT(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_parent #define RB_COLOR(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_color #define RB_ROOT(head) (head)->rbh_root #define RB_EMPTY(head) (RB_ROOT(head) == NULL) #define RB_SET(elm, parent, field) do { \ RB_PARENT(elm, field) = parent; \ RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL; \ RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_RED; \ } while (0) #define RB_SET_BLACKRED(black, red, field) do { \ RB_COLOR(black, field) = RB_BLACK; \ RB_COLOR(red, field) = RB_RED; \ } while (0) #ifndef RB_AUGMENT #define RB_AUGMENT(x) do {} while (0) #endif #define RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, elm, tmp, field) do { \ (tmp) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ if ((RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = RB_LEFT(tmp, field))) { \ RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = (elm); \ } \ RB_AUGMENT(elm); \ if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) { \ if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)) \ RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ else \ RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ } else \ (head)->rbh_root = (tmp); \ RB_LEFT(tmp, field) = (elm); \ RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp); \ RB_AUGMENT(tmp); \ if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field))) \ RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field)); \ } while (0) #define RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, elm, tmp, field) do { \ (tmp) = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ if ((RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field))) { \ RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = (elm); \ } \ RB_AUGMENT(elm); \ if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) { \ if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)) \ RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ else \ RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ } else \ (head)->rbh_root = (tmp); \ RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (elm); \ RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp); \ RB_AUGMENT(tmp); \ if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field))) \ RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field)); \ } while (0) /* Generates prototypes and inline functions */ #define RB_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp) \ RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,) #define RB_PROTOTYPE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp) \ RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __attribute__((__unused__)) static) #define RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ attr void name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *); \ attr void name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *, struct type *);\ attr struct type *name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *); \ attr struct type *name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *); \ attr struct type *name##_RB_FIND(struct name *, struct type *); \ attr struct type *name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *, struct type *); \ attr struct type *name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *); \ attr struct type *name##_RB_PREV(struct type *); \ attr struct type *name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *, int); \ \ /* Main rb operation. * Moves node close to the key of elm to top */ #define RB_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp) \ RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,) #define RB_GENERATE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp) \ RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __attribute__((__unused__)) static) #define RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ attr void \ name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ { \ struct type *parent, *gparent, *tmp; \ while ((parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field)) && \ RB_COLOR(parent, field) == RB_RED) { \ gparent = RB_PARENT(parent, field); \ if (parent == RB_LEFT(gparent, field)) { \ tmp = RB_RIGHT(gparent, field); \ if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK; \ RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\ elm = gparent; \ continue; \ } \ if (RB_RIGHT(parent, field) == elm) { \ RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ tmp = parent; \ parent = elm; \ elm = tmp; \ } \ RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field); \ RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, gparent, tmp, field); \ } else { \ tmp = RB_LEFT(gparent, field); \ if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK; \ RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\ elm = gparent; \ continue; \ } \ if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) { \ RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ tmp = parent; \ parent = elm; \ elm = tmp; \ } \ RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field); \ RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, gparent, tmp, field); \ } \ } \ RB_COLOR(head->rbh_root, field) = RB_BLACK; \ } \ \ attr void \ name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *parent, struct type *elm) \ { \ struct type *tmp; \ while ((elm == NULL || RB_COLOR(elm, field) == RB_BLACK) && \ elm != RB_ROOT(head)) { \ if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) { \ tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field); \ if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field); \ RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field); \ } \ if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\ (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\ RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ elm = parent; \ parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ } else { \ if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\ struct type *oleft; \ if ((oleft = RB_LEFT(tmp, field)))\ RB_COLOR(oleft, field) = RB_BLACK;\ RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, oleft, field);\ tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field); \ } \ RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\ RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK; \ if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field)) \ RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\ RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ elm = RB_ROOT(head); \ break; \ } \ } else { \ tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field); \ if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field); \ RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field); \ } \ if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\ (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\ RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ elm = parent; \ parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ } else { \ if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\ struct type *oright; \ if ((oright = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field)))\ RB_COLOR(oright, field) = RB_BLACK;\ RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, oright, field);\ tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field); \ } \ RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\ RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK; \ if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field)) \ RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\ RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ elm = RB_ROOT(head); \ break; \ } \ } \ } \ if (elm) \ RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_BLACK; \ } \ \ attr struct type * \ name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ { \ struct type *child, *parent, *old = elm; \ int color; \ if (RB_LEFT(elm, field) == NULL) \ child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ else if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field) == NULL) \ child = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ else { \ struct type *left; \ elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ while ((left = RB_LEFT(elm, field))) \ elm = left; \ child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ color = RB_COLOR(elm, field); \ if (child) \ RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent; \ if (parent) { \ if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) \ RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child; \ else \ RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child; \ RB_AUGMENT(parent); \ } else \ RB_ROOT(head) = child; \ if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) == old) \ parent = elm; \ (elm)->field = (old)->field; \ if (RB_PARENT(old, field)) { \ if (RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) == old)\ RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\ else \ RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\ RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(old, field)); \ } else \ RB_ROOT(head) = elm; \ RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(old, field), field) = elm; \ if (RB_RIGHT(old, field)) \ RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(old, field), field) = elm; \ if (parent) { \ left = parent; \ do { \ RB_AUGMENT(left); \ } while ((left = RB_PARENT(left, field))); \ } \ goto color; \ } \ parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ color = RB_COLOR(elm, field); \ if (child) \ RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent; \ if (parent) { \ if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) \ RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child; \ else \ RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child; \ RB_AUGMENT(parent); \ } else \ RB_ROOT(head) = child; \ color: \ if (color == RB_BLACK) \ name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(head, parent, child); \ return (old); \ } \ \ /* Inserts a node into the RB tree */ \ attr struct type * \ name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ { \ struct type *tmp; \ struct type *parent = NULL; \ int comp = 0; \ tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ while (tmp) { \ parent = tmp; \ comp = (cmp)(elm, parent); \ if (comp < 0) \ tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ else if (comp > 0) \ tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ else \ return (tmp); \ } \ RB_SET(elm, parent, field); \ if (parent != NULL) { \ if (comp < 0) \ RB_LEFT(parent, field) = elm; \ else \ RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = elm; \ RB_AUGMENT(parent); \ } else \ RB_ROOT(head) = elm; \ name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(head, elm); \ return (NULL); \ } \ \ /* Finds the node with the same key as elm */ \ attr struct type * \ name##_RB_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ { \ struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ int comp; \ while (tmp) { \ comp = cmp(elm, tmp); \ if (comp < 0) \ tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ else if (comp > 0) \ tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ else \ return (tmp); \ } \ return (NULL); \ } \ \ /* Finds the first node greater than or equal to the search key */ \ attr struct type * \ name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ { \ struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ struct type *res = NULL; \ int comp; \ while (tmp) { \ comp = cmp(elm, tmp); \ if (comp < 0) { \ res = tmp; \ tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ } \ else if (comp > 0) \ tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ else \ return (tmp); \ } \ return (res); \ } \ \ /* ARGSUSED */ \ attr struct type * \ name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *elm) \ { \ if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) { \ elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ while (RB_LEFT(elm, field)) \ elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ } else { \ if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))) \ elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ else { \ while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\ elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ } \ } \ return (elm); \ } \ \ /* ARGSUSED */ \ attr struct type * \ name##_RB_PREV(struct type *elm) \ { \ if (RB_LEFT(elm, field)) { \ elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ while (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) \ elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ } else { \ if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))) \ elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ else { \ while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\ elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ } \ } \ return (elm); \ } \ \ attr struct type * \ name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *head, int val) \ { \ struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ struct type *parent = NULL; \ while (tmp) { \ parent = tmp; \ if (val < 0) \ tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ else \ tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ } \ return (parent); \ } #define RB_NEGINF -1 #define RB_INF 1 #define RB_INSERT(name, x, y) name##_RB_INSERT(x, y) #define RB_REMOVE(name, x, y) name##_RB_REMOVE(x, y) #define RB_FIND(name, x, y) name##_RB_FIND(x, y) #define RB_NFIND(name, x, y) name##_RB_NFIND(x, y) #define RB_NEXT(name, x, y) name##_RB_NEXT(y) #define RB_PREV(name, x, y) name##_RB_PREV(y) #define RB_MIN(name, x) name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_NEGINF) #define RB_MAX(name, x) name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_INF) #define RB_FOREACH(x, name, head) \ for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head); \ (x) != NULL; \ (x) = name##_RB_NEXT(x)) #define RB_FOREACH_SAFE(x, name, head, y) \ for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head); \ ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_NEXT(x), 1); \ (x) = (y)) #define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE(x, name, head) \ for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head); \ (x) != NULL; \ (x) = name##_RB_PREV(x)) #define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(x, name, head, y) \ for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head); \ ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_PREV(x), 1); \ (x) = (y)) #endif /* _SYS_TREE_H_ */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c010064400017500001750000000022551362136622600176730ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: timingsafe_bcmp.c,v 1.1 2010/09/24 13:33:00 matthew Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/timingsafe_bcmp.c */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *b1, const void *b2, size_t n) { const unsigned char *p1 = b1, *p2 = b2; int ret = 0; for (; n > 0; n--) ret |= *p1++ ^ *p2++; return (ret != 0); } #endif /* TIMINGSAFE_BCMP */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/vis.c010064400017500001750000000137431362136622600153510ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: vis.c,v 1.25 2015/09/13 11:32:51 guenther Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/vis.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "vis.h" #define isoctal(c) (((u_char)(c)) >= '0' && ((u_char)(c)) <= '7') #define isvisible(c,flag) \ (((c) == '\\' || (flag & VIS_ALL) == 0) && \ (((u_int)(c) <= UCHAR_MAX && isascii((u_char)(c)) && \ (((c) != '*' && (c) != '?' && (c) != '[' && (c) != '#') || \ (flag & VIS_GLOB) == 0) && isgraph((u_char)(c))) || \ ((flag & VIS_SP) == 0 && (c) == ' ') || \ ((flag & VIS_TAB) == 0 && (c) == '\t') || \ ((flag & VIS_NL) == 0 && (c) == '\n') || \ ((flag & VIS_SAFE) && ((c) == '\b' || \ (c) == '\007' || (c) == '\r' || \ isgraph((u_char)(c)))))) /* * vis - visually encode characters */ char * vis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc) { if (isvisible(c, flag)) { if ((c == '"' && (flag & VIS_DQ) != 0) || (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)) *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = c; *dst = '\0'; return (dst); } if (flag & VIS_CSTYLE) { switch(c) { case '\n': *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'n'; goto done; case '\r': *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'r'; goto done; case '\b': *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'b'; goto done; case '\a': *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'a'; goto done; case '\v': *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'v'; goto done; case '\t': *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 't'; goto done; case '\f': *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 'f'; goto done; case ' ': *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = 's'; goto done; case '\0': *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = '0'; if (isoctal(nextc)) { *dst++ = '0'; *dst++ = '0'; } goto done; } } if (((c & 0177) == ' ') || (flag & VIS_OCTAL) || ((flag & VIS_GLOB) && (c == '*' || c == '?' || c == '[' || c == '#'))) { *dst++ = '\\'; *dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 6 & 07) + '0'; *dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 3 & 07) + '0'; *dst++ = ((u_char)c & 07) + '0'; goto done; } if ((flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0) *dst++ = '\\'; if (c & 0200) { c &= 0177; *dst++ = 'M'; } if (iscntrl((u_char)c)) { *dst++ = '^'; if (c == 0177) *dst++ = '?'; else *dst++ = c + '@'; } else { *dst++ = '-'; *dst++ = c; } done: *dst = '\0'; return (dst); } DEF_WEAK(vis); /* * strvis, strnvis, strvisx - visually encode characters from src into dst * * Dst must be 4 times the size of src to account for possible * expansion. The length of dst, not including the trailing NULL, * is returned. * * Strnvis will write no more than siz-1 bytes (and will NULL terminate). * The number of bytes needed to fully encode the string is returned. * * Strvisx encodes exactly len bytes from src into dst. * This is useful for encoding a block of data. */ int strvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag) { char c; char *start; for (start = dst; (c = *src);) dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src); *dst = '\0'; return (dst - start); } DEF_WEAK(strvis); int strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz, int flag) { char *start, *end; char tbuf[5]; int c, i; i = 0; for (start = dst, end = start + siz - 1; (c = *src) && dst < end; ) { if (isvisible(c, flag)) { if ((c == '"' && (flag & VIS_DQ) != 0) || (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)) { /* need space for the extra '\\' */ if (dst + 1 >= end) { i = 2; break; } *dst++ = '\\'; } i = 1; *dst++ = c; src++; } else { i = vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf; if (dst + i <= end) { memcpy(dst, tbuf, i); dst += i; } else { src--; break; } } } if (siz > 0) *dst = '\0'; if (dst + i > end) { /* adjust return value for truncation */ while ((c = *src)) dst += vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf; } return (dst - start); } int stravis(char **outp, const char *src, int flag) { char *buf; int len, serrno; buf = reallocarray(NULL, 4, strlen(src) + 1); if (buf == NULL) return -1; len = strvis(buf, src, flag); serrno = errno; *outp = realloc(buf, len + 1); if (*outp == NULL) { *outp = buf; errno = serrno; } return (len); } int strvisx(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len, int flag) { char c; char *start; for (start = dst; len > 1; len--) { c = *src; dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src); } if (len) dst = vis(dst, *src, flag, '\0'); *dst = '\0'; return (dst - start); } #endif openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/vis.h010064400017500001750000000071131362136622600153500ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: vis.h,v 1.15 2015/07/20 01:52:27 millert Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: vis.h,v 1.4 1994/10/26 00:56:41 cgd Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * @(#)vis.h 5.9 (Berkeley) 4/3/91 */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/vis.h */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #ifndef _VIS_H_ #define _VIS_H_ #include #include /* * to select alternate encoding format */ #define VIS_OCTAL 0x01 /* use octal \ddd format */ #define VIS_CSTYLE 0x02 /* use \[nrft0..] where appropriate */ /* * to alter set of characters encoded (default is to encode all * non-graphic except space, tab, and newline). */ #define VIS_SP 0x04 /* also encode space */ #define VIS_TAB 0x08 /* also encode tab */ #define VIS_NL 0x10 /* also encode newline */ #define VIS_WHITE (VIS_SP | VIS_TAB | VIS_NL) #define VIS_SAFE 0x20 /* only encode "unsafe" characters */ #define VIS_DQ 0x200 /* backslash-escape double quotes */ #define VIS_ALL 0x400 /* encode all characters */ /* * other */ #define VIS_NOSLASH 0x40 /* inhibit printing '\' */ #define VIS_GLOB 0x100 /* encode glob(3) magics and '#' */ /* * unvis return codes */ #define UNVIS_VALID 1 /* character valid */ #define UNVIS_VALIDPUSH 2 /* character valid, push back passed char */ #define UNVIS_NOCHAR 3 /* valid sequence, no character produced */ #define UNVIS_SYNBAD -1 /* unrecognized escape sequence */ #define UNVIS_ERROR -2 /* decoder in unknown state (unrecoverable) */ /* * unvis flags */ #define UNVIS_END 1 /* no more characters */ char *vis(char *, int, int, int); int strvis(char *, const char *, int); int stravis(char **, const char *, int); int strnvis(char *, const char *, size_t, int) __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3))); int strvisx(char *, const char *, size_t, int) __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3))); int strunvis(char *, const char *); int unvis(char *, char, int *, int); ssize_t strnunvis(char *, const char *, size_t) __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3))); #endif /* !_VIS_H_ */ #endif /* !HAVE_STRNVIS || BROKEN_STRNVIS */ openssh-8.2p1/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c010064400017500001750000000104121362136622600160670ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include # if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) # include # endif # ifdef __hpux # include # include # endif # ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE # include # include # include # endif # if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) # include # endif # if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) # include # include # include # endif # if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) # include "md5crypt.h" # endif # if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(HAVE_DES_CRYPT) # include # define crypt DES_crypt # endif /* * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running * system by searching through accounts until we find one that has a valid * salt. Usually this will be root unless the root account is locked out. * If we don't find one we return a traditional DES-based salt. */ static const char * pick_salt(void) { struct passwd *pw; char *passwd, *p; size_t typelen; static char salt[32]; if (salt[0] != '\0') return salt; strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt)); setpwent(); while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) { if ((passwd = shadow_pw(pw)) == NULL) continue; if (passwd[0] == '$' && (p = strrchr(passwd+1, '$')) != NULL) { typelen = p - passwd + 1; strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt))); explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); goto out; } } out: endpwent(); return salt; } char * xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt) { char *crypted; /* * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for * for timing purposes. Pick an appropriate salt. */ if (salt == NULL) salt = pick_salt(); # ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS if (is_md5_salt(salt)) crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt); else crypted = crypt(password, salt); # elif defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) if (iscomsec()) crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt); else crypted = crypt(password, salt); # elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt); # else crypted = crypt(password, salt); # endif return crypted; } /* * Handle shadowed password systems in a cleaner way for portable * version. */ char * shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw) { char *pw_password = pw->pw_passwd; # if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) struct spwd *spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); if (spw != NULL) pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp; # endif #ifdef USE_LIBIAF return(get_iaf_password(pw)); #endif # if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) struct passwd_adjunct *spw; if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL) pw_password = spw->pwa_passwd; # elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) struct pr_passwd *spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name); if (spw != NULL) pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt; # endif return pw_password; } openssh-8.2p1/openssh.xml.in010064400017500001750000000054271362136622600142770ustar00djmdjm openssh-8.2p1/opensshd.init.in010075500017500001750000000035551362136622600146110ustar00djmdjm#!@STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL@ # Donated code that was put under PD license. # # Stripped PRNGd out of it for the time being. umask 022 CAT=@CAT@ KILL=@KILL@ prefix=@prefix@ sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ SSHD=$prefix/sbin/sshd PIDFILE=$piddir/sshd.pid PidFile=`grep "^PidFile" ${sysconfdir}/sshd_config | tr "=" " " | awk '{print $2}'` [ X$PidFile = X ] || PIDFILE=$PidFile SSH_KEYGEN=$prefix/bin/ssh-keygen HOST_KEY_DSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key HOST_KEY_RSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key @COMMENT_OUT_ECC@HOST_KEY_ECDSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ecdsa_key HOST_KEY_ED25519=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ed25519_key checkkeys() { if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_DSA ]; then ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t dsa -f ${HOST_KEY_DSA} -N "" fi if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA ]; then ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA} -N "" fi @COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ECDSA ]; then @COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ecdsa -f ${HOST_KEY_ECDSA} -N "" @COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ fi if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ED25519 ]; then ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f ${HOST_KEY_ED25519} -N "" fi } stop_service() { if [ -r $PIDFILE -a ! -z ${PIDFILE} ]; then PID=`${CAT} ${PIDFILE}` fi if [ ${PID:=0} -gt 1 -a ! "X$PID" = "X " ]; then ${KILL} ${PID} else echo "Unable to read PID file" fi } start_service() { # XXX We really should check if the service is already going, but # XXX we will opt out at this time. - Bal # Check to see if we have keys that need to be made checkkeys # Start SSHD echo "starting $SSHD... \c" ; $SSHD sshd_rc=$? if [ $sshd_rc -ne 0 ]; then echo "$0: Error ${sshd_rc} starting ${SSHD}... bailing." exit $sshd_rc fi echo done. } case $1 in 'start') start_service ;; 'stop') stop_service ;; 'restart') stop_service start_service ;; *) echo "$0: usage: $0 {start|stop|restart}" ;; esac openssh-8.2p1/packet.c010064400017500001750000002174721362136622600131110ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.290 2020/01/30 07:20:05 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include /* * Explicitly include OpenSSL before zlib as some versions of OpenSSL have * "free_func" in their headers, which zlib typedefs. */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # include # include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # endif #endif #ifdef WITH_ZLIB #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "digest.h" #include "mac.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG #define DBG(x) x #else #define DBG(x) #endif #define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024) struct packet_state { u_int32_t seqnr; u_int32_t packets; u_int64_t blocks; u_int64_t bytes; }; struct packet { TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next; u_char type; struct sshbuf *payload; }; struct session_state { /* * This variable contains the file descriptors used for * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket. */ int connection_in; int connection_out; /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */ u_int remote_protocol_flags; /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */ struct sshcipher_ctx *receive_context; /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */ struct sshcipher_ctx *send_context; /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */ struct sshbuf *input; /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */ struct sshbuf *output; /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */ struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet; /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */ struct sshbuf *incoming_packet; /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */ struct sshbuf *compression_buffer; #ifdef WITH_ZLIB /* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */ z_stream compression_in_stream; z_stream compression_out_stream; #endif int compression_in_started; int compression_out_started; int compression_in_failures; int compression_out_failures; /* default maximum packet size */ u_int max_packet_size; /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */ int initialized; /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */ int interactive_mode; /* Set to true if we are the server side. */ int server_side; /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */ int after_authentication; int keep_alive_timeouts; /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */ int packet_timeout_ms; /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */ struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; struct packet_state p_read, p_send; /* Volume-based rekeying */ u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit; /* Time-based rekeying */ u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */ time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */ /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */ u_char extra_pad; /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */ u_int packet_discard; size_t packet_discard_mac_already; struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac; /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */ u_int packlen; /* Used in packet_send2 */ int rekeying; /* Used in ssh_packet_send_mux() */ int mux; /* Used in packet_set_interactive */ int set_interactive_called; /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */ int set_maxsize_called; /* One-off warning about weak ciphers */ int cipher_warning_done; /* Hook for fuzzing inbound packets */ ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook_in; void *hook_in_ctx; TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; }; struct ssh * ssh_alloc_session_state(void) { struct ssh *ssh = NULL; struct session_state *state = NULL; if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL || (state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL || (ssh->kex = kex_new()) == NULL || (state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) goto fail; TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing); TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys); TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys); state->connection_in = -1; state->connection_out = -1; state->max_packet_size = 32768; state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0; state->initialized = 1; /* * ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until * we've done the initial key exchange. */ state->rekeying = 1; ssh->state = state; return ssh; fail: if (ssh) { kex_free(ssh->kex); free(ssh); } if (state) { sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); free(state); } return NULL; } void ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook, void *ctx) { ssh->state->hook_in = hook; ssh->state->hook_in_ctx = ctx; } /* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */ int ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->rekeying || ssh->kex->done == 0; } /* * Sets the descriptors used for communication. */ struct ssh * ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out) { struct session_state *state; const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); int r; if (none == NULL) { error("%s: cannot load cipher 'none'", __func__); return NULL; } if (ssh == NULL) ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state(); if (ssh == NULL) { error("%s: could not allocate state", __func__); return NULL; } state = ssh->state; state->connection_in = fd_in; state->connection_out = fd_out; if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) { error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */ return NULL; } state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; /* * Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error * messages that might be generated after the connection has closed. */ (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); return ssh; } void ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) { state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; return; } if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout) state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX; else state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000; } void ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh->state->mux = 1; ssh->state->rekeying = 0; } int ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->mux; } int ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; int r; free(ssh->log_preamble); if (fmt == NULL) ssh->log_preamble = NULL; else { va_start(args, fmt); r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args); va_end(args); if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } return 0; } int ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (state->packet_discard_mac) { char buf[1024]; size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE; if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already) dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already; memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf)); while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < dlen) if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) return r; (void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), dlen, NULL, 0); } logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; } static int ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc, struct sshmac *mac, size_t mac_already, u_int discard) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; } /* * Record number of bytes over which the mac has already * been computed in order to minimize timing attacks. */ if (mac && mac->enabled) { state->packet_discard_mac = mac; state->packet_discard_mac_already = mac_already; } if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard) return ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh); state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input); return 0; } /* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */ int ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state; struct sockaddr_storage from, to; socklen_t fromlen, tolen; if (ssh == NULL || ssh->state == NULL) return 0; state = ssh->state; if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1) return 0; /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */ if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) return 1; fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) return 0; tolen = sizeof(to); memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) == -1) return 0; if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0) return 0; if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6) return 0; return 1; } void ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes) { if (ibytes) *ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes; if (obytes) *obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes; } int ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sockaddr_storage to; socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to); memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); if (getsockname(ssh->state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) == -1) return 0; #ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6 if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr)) return AF_INET; #endif return to.ss_family; } /* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */ void ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh) { /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */ set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in); if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in) set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out); } /* Returns the socket used for reading. */ int ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->connection_in; } /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */ int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->connection_out; } /* * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned * string must not be freed. */ const char * ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh) { int sock; /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */ if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) { if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { sock = ssh->state->connection_in; ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock); ssh->remote_port = get_peer_port(sock); ssh->local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock); ssh->local_port = get_local_port(sock); } else { ssh->remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); ssh->remote_port = 65535; ssh->local_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); ssh->local_port = 65535; } } return ssh->remote_ipaddr; } /* Returns the port number of the remote host. */ int ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh) { (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */ return ssh->remote_port; } /* * Returns the IP-address of the local host as a string. The returned * string must not be freed. */ const char * ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh) { (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */ return ssh->local_ipaddr; } /* Returns the port number of the local host. */ int ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh) { (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */ return ssh->local_port; } /* Returns the routing domain of the input socket, or NULL if unavailable */ const char * ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->rdomain_in != NULL) return ssh->rdomain_in; if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) return NULL; ssh->rdomain_in = get_rdomain(ssh->state->connection_in); return ssh->rdomain_in; } /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ static void ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int mode; if (!state->initialized) return; state->initialized = 0; if (do_close) { if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { close(state->connection_out); } else { close(state->connection_in); close(state->connection_out); } } sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */ state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, mode); /* next keys */ } #ifdef WITH_ZLIB /* compression state is in shared mem, so we can only release it once */ if (do_close && state->compression_buffer) { sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer); if (state->compression_out_started) { z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream; debug("compress outgoing: " "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 : (double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in); if (state->compression_out_failures == 0) deflateEnd(stream); } if (state->compression_in_started) { z_streamp stream = &state->compression_in_stream; debug("compress incoming: " "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 : (double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out); if (state->compression_in_failures == 0) inflateEnd(stream); } } #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */ cipher_free(state->send_context); cipher_free(state->receive_context); state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL; if (do_close) { free(ssh->local_ipaddr); ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL; free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; free(ssh->state); ssh->state = NULL; } } void ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 1); } void ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0); } /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags) { ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags; } /* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */ u_int ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags; } /* * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions. * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip. */ static int ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh) { if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer && ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } #ifdef WITH_ZLIB static int start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level) { if (level < 1 || level > 9) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level); if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1) deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream); switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) { case Z_OK: ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1; break; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; default: return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } static int start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1) inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream); switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) { case Z_OK: ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1; break; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; default: return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } /* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */ static int compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { u_char buf[4096]; int r, status; if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* This case is not handled below. */ if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0) return 0; /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */ if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in); /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */ do { /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */ status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); switch (status) { case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; case Z_OK: /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) - ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0) return r; break; case Z_STREAM_ERROR: default: ssh->state->compression_out_failures++; return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } } while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0); return 0; } static int uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { u_char buf[4096]; int r, status; if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in); for (;;) { /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); switch (status) { case Z_OK: if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) - ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0) return r; break; case Z_BUF_ERROR: /* * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to * be the error that we get. */ return 0; case Z_DATA_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; case Z_STREAM_ERROR: default: ssh->state->compression_in_failures++; return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } } /* NOTREACHED */ } #else /* WITH_ZLIB */ static int start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level) { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } static int start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh) { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } static int compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } static int uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */ void ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) { kex_free_newkeys(ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]); ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; } } int ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp; struct packet_state *ps; u_int64_t *max_blocks; const char *wmsg; int r, crypt_type; const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in"; debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode); if (mode == MODE_OUT) { ccp = &state->send_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT; ps = &state->p_send; max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out; } else { ccp = &state->receive_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT; ps = &state->p_read; max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in; } if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { debug("%s: rekeying %s, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, " "output %llu bytes %llu blocks", __func__, dir, (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes, (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks, (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes, (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks); kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; } /* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */ ps->packets = ps->blocks = 0; /* move newkeys from kex to state */ if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0) return r; } mac->enabled = 1; DBG(debug("%s: cipher_init_context: %s", __func__, dir)); cipher_free(*ccp); *ccp = NULL; if ((r = cipher_init(ccp, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len, enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0) return r; if (!state->cipher_warning_done && (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(*ccp)) != NULL) { error("Warning: %s", wmsg); state->cipher_warning_done = 1; } /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */ /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size); explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */ if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB || (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) { if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0) return r; if (mode == MODE_OUT) { if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0) return r; } comp->enabled = 1; } /* * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. * See RFC4344 section 3.2. */ if (enc->block_size >= 16) *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2); else *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size; if (state->rekey_limit) *max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks, state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size); debug("rekey %s after %llu blocks", dir, (unsigned long long)*max_blocks); return 0; } #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) static int ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int32_t out_blocks; /* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */ if (!state->after_authentication) return 0; /* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */ if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) return 0; /* Peer can't rekey */ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) return 0; /* * Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to * make progress when rekey limits are very small. */ if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0) return 0; /* Time-based rekeying */ if (state->rekey_interval != 0 && (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()) return 1; /* * Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction * As per RFC4344 section 3.1 we do this after 2^31 packets. */ if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS || state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) return 1; /* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maximum blocks */ out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len, state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size); return (state->max_blocks_out && (state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) || (state->max_blocks_in && (state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in)); } /* * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication: * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent, * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received. */ static int ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r, mode; /* * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately. */ state->after_authentication = 1; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */ if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) continue; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) { if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (mode == MODE_OUT) { if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0) return r; } comp->enabled = 1; } } return 0; } /* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */ int ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type) { switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST: return 0; default: return 1; } } /* * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue) */ int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; u_char tmp, padlen, pad = 0; u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0; u_int len; struct sshenc *enc = NULL; struct sshmac *mac = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r, block_size; if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) { enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp; /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) mac = NULL; } block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5]; if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) debug3("send packet: type %u", type); #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "plain: "); sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr); #endif if (comp && comp->enabled) { len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); /* skip header, compress only payload */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet))); } /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); /* * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data, * minimum padding is 4 bytes */ len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */ padlen = block_size - (len % block_size); if (padlen < 4) padlen += block_size; if (state->extra_pad) { tmp = state->extra_pad; state->extra_pad = ROUNDUP(state->extra_pad, block_size); /* check if roundup overflowed */ if (state->extra_pad < tmp) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; tmp = (len + padlen) % state->extra_pad; /* Check whether pad calculation below will underflow */ if (tmp > state->extra_pad) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; pad = state->extra_pad - tmp; DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)", __func__, pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad)); tmp = padlen; padlen += pad; /* Check whether padlen calculation overflowed */ if (padlen < tmp) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* overflow */ state->extra_pad = 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if (enc && !cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->send_context)) { /* random padding */ arc4random_buf(cp, padlen); } else { /* clear padding */ explicit_bzero(cp, padlen); } /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); if (cp == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */ POKE_U32(cp, len - 4); cp[4] = padlen; DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)", len, padlen, aadlen)); /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */ if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) { if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr)); } /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* append unencrypted MAC */ if (mac && mac->enabled) { if (mac->etm) { /* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */ if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr)); } if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0) goto out; } #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); #endif /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */ if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around"); if (++state->p_send.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size; state->p_send.bytes += len; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side) r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh); else r = 0; out: return r; } /* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */ static int ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type) { return type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN && type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX && type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST && type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT && type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO; } int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct packet *p; u_char type; int r, need_rekey; if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5]; need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) && ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)); /* * During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages. * Queue everything else. */ if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) { if (need_rekey) debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__); debug("enqueue packet: %u", type); p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); if (p == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; p->type = type; p->payload = state->outgoing_packet; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next); state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new(); if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (need_rekey) { /* * This packet triggered a rekey, so send the * KEXINIT now. * NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex(). */ return kex_start_rekex(ssh); } return 0; } /* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) state->rekeying = 1; if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0) return r; /* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) { state->rekeying = 0; state->rekey_time = monotime(); while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) { type = p->type; /* * If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the * remaining packets in the queue for now. * NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex. */ if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(p->payload))) { debug3("%s: queued packet triggered rekex", __func__); return kex_start_rekex(ssh); } debug("dequeue packet: %u", type); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); state->outgoing_packet = p->payload; TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next); memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p)); free(p); if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0) return r; } } return 0; } /* * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not * be used during the interactive session. */ int ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int len, r, ms_remain; fd_set *setp; char buf[8192]; struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL; DBG(debug("packet_read()")); setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); if (setp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* * Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have * been sent. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) goto out; /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ for (;;) { /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) break; /* If we got a packet, return it. */ if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE) break; /* * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the * buffer, and try again. */ memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp); if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms; timeoutp = &timeout; } /* Wait for some data to arrive. */ for (;;) { if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) { ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain); monotime_tv(&start); } if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp, NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0) break; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1) continue; ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); if (ms_remain <= 0) { r = 0; break; } } if (r == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; goto out; } /* Read data from the socket. */ len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; goto out; } if (len == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } /* Append it to the buffer. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) goto out; } out: free(setp); return r; } int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh) { u_char type; int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return type; } /* * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch. */ int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type) { int r; u_char type; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) return r; if (type != expected_type) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d", expected_type, type)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; } return 0; } static int ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; const u_char *cp; size_t need; int r; if (ssh->kex) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->input); if (state->packlen == 0) { if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 1) return 0; /* packet is incomplete */ state->packlen = PEEK_U32(cp); if (state->packlen < 4 + 1 || state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; } need = state->packlen + 4; if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < need) return 0; /* packet is incomplete */ sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, cp + 4, state->packlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, need)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) return r; if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep)) debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, *typep); /* sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); */ /* reset for next packet */ state->packlen = 0; return r; } int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int padlen, need; u_char *cp; u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size; struct sshenc *enc = NULL; struct sshmac *mac = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r; if (state->mux) return ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; if (state->packet_discard) return 0; if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) { enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp; /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) mac = NULL; } maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0; block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) { if (cipher_get_length(state->receive_context, &state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0) return 0; if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); #endif logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); } else if (state->packlen == 0) { /* * check if input size is less than the cipher block size, * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size) return 0; sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), block_size, 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)); if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "input: \n"); sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n"); sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); #endif logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0, PACKET_MAX_SIZE); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0) goto out; } DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4)); if (aadlen) { /* only the payload is encrypted */ need = state->packlen; } else { /* * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we * have a partial packet of block_size bytes */ need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size; } DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d," " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen)); if (need % block_size != 0) { logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d", need, block_size, need % block_size); return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size); } /* * check if the entire packet has been received and * decrypt into incoming_packet: * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated. * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code. */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen) return 0; /* packet is incomplete */ #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: "); sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); #endif /* EtM: check mac over encrypted input */ if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) { if ((r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need, sshbuf_ptr(state->input) + aadlen + need + authlen, maclen)) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) logit("Corrupted MAC on input."); goto out; } } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0) goto out; if (mac && mac->enabled) { /* Not EtM: check MAC over cleartext */ if (!mac->etm && (r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet), sshbuf_ptr(state->input), maclen)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) goto out; logit("Corrupted MAC on input."); if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet), PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size); } /* Remove MAC from input buffer */ DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr)); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0) goto out; } if (seqnr_p != NULL) *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr; if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) logit("incoming seqnr wraps around"); if (++state->p_read.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size; state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4; /* get padlen */ padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4]; DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen)); if (padlen < 4) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 || ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0)) goto out; DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd", sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet))); if (comp && comp->enabled) { sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd", sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet))); } /* * get packet type, implies consume. * return length of payload (without type field) */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) goto out; if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep)) debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep); if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; } if (state->hook_in != NULL && (r = state->hook_in(ssh, state->incoming_packet, typep, state->hook_in_ctx)) != 0) return r; if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side) r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh); else r = 0; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep); sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); #endif /* reset for next packet */ state->packlen = 0; /* do we need to rekey? */ if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) { debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__); if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0) return r; } out: return r; } int ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int reason, seqnr; int r; u_char *msg; for (;;) { msg = NULL; r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) return r; if (*typep) { state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); } switch (*typep) { case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); break; case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { free(msg); return r; } debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); free(msg); break; case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) return r; /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); free(msg); return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) return r; debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u", seqnr); break; default: return 0; } } } /* * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used * together with packet_read_poll. */ int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (state->packet_discard) { state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */ if (len >= state->packet_discard) { if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0) return r; } state->packet_discard -= len; return 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh->state->input, buf, len)) != 0) return r; return 0; } int ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh) { return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet); } /* * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait. */ void ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; int r; if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG)) return; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); debug3("sending debug message: %s", buf); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } void sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l) { snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d", ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "", ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); } /* * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit. */ static void sshpkt_vfatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, va_list ap) { char *tag = NULL, remote_id[512]; int oerrno = errno; sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); switch (r) { case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Connection %s %s timed out", ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: if (errno == ECONNRESET) { ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id); } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH: if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) { ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); errno = oerrno; logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. " "Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r), ssh->kex->failed_choice); } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: if (vasprintf(&tag, fmt, ap) == -1) { ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("%s: could not allocate failure message", __func__); } ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); errno = oerrno; logdie("%s%sConnection %s %s: %s", tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "", ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id, ssh_err(r)); } } void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); sshpkt_vfatal(ssh, r, fmt, ap); /* NOTREACHED */ va_end(ap); logdie("%s: should have exited", __func__); } /* * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must * not exceed 1024 bytes. */ void ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024], remote_id[512]; va_list args; static int disconnecting = 0; int r; if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */ fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively."); disconnecting = 1; /* * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the * message is of limited size. */ sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); /* Display the error locally */ logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf); /* * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait * for it to get sent. */ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__); if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__); /* Close the connection. */ ssh_packet_close(ssh); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of * the output. */ int ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int len = sshbuf_len(state->output); int r; if (len > 0) { len = write(state->connection_out, sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len); if (len == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) return 0; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (len == 0) return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been * written. */ int ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh) { fd_set *setp; int ret, r, ms_remain = 0; struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL; struct session_state *state = ssh->state; setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); if (setp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { free(setp); return r; } while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) { memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp); if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms; timeoutp = &timeout; } for (;;) { if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) { ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain); monotime_tv(&start); } if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1, NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0) break; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) break; if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1) continue; ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); if (ms_remain <= 0) { ret = 0; break; } } if (ret == 0) { free(setp); return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; } if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { free(setp); return r; } } free(setp); return 0; } /* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */ int ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh) { return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0; } /* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */ int ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state->interactive_mode) return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384; else return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024; } void ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos) { #ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) || tos == INT_MAX) return; switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) { # ifdef IP_TOS case AF_INET: debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos); if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1) error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:", tos, strerror(errno)); break; # endif /* IP_TOS */ # ifdef IPV6_TCLASS case AF_INET6: debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos); if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1) error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:", tos, strerror(errno)); break; # endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */ } #endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */ } /* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */ void ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (state->set_interactive_called) return; state->set_interactive_called = 1; /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */ state->interactive_mode = interactive; /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */ if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) return; set_nodelay(state->connection_in); ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive : qos_bulk); } /* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */ int ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->interactive_mode; } int ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (state->set_maxsize_called) { logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d", state->max_packet_size, s); return -1; } if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) { logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s); return -1; } state->set_maxsize_called = 1; debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s); state->max_packet_size = s; return s; } int ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh) { return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts; } void ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka) { ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka; } u_int ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->max_packet_size; } void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds) { debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes, (unsigned int)seconds); ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes; ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds; } time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh) { time_t seconds; seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval - monotime(); return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds); } void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh->state->server_side = 1; ssh->kex->server = 1; /* XXX unify? */ } void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; } void * ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh) { return (void *)ssh->state->input; } void * ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) { return (void *)ssh->state->output; } /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ static int ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; debug("%s: called", __func__); /* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */ ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; ssh->state->rekeying = 0; if ((r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */ /* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */ static int kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */ static int newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshcipher_ctx *cc; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct newkeys *newkey; int r; if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; enc = &newkey->enc; mac = &newkey->mac; comp = &newkey->comp; cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? ssh->state->send_context : ssh->state->receive_context; if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0) return r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0) goto out; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0) goto out; r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b); out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* serialize packet state into a blob */ int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */ static int newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct newkeys *newkey = NULL; size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen; int r; if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif enc = &newkey->enc; mac = &newkey->mac; comp = &newkey->comp; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0) goto out; if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(enc->name)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0) goto out; if (maclen > mac->key_len) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } mac->key_len = maclen; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } enc->key_len = keylen; enc->iv_len = ivlen; ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey; newkey = NULL; r = 0; out: free(newkey); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */ static int kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp) { struct kex *kex; int r; if ((kex = kex_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &kex->session_id, &kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->hostkey_alg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0) goto out; kex->server = 1; kex->done = 1; r = 0; out: if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) { kex_free(kex); if (kexp != NULL) *kexp = NULL; } else { kex_free(*kexp); *kexp = kex; } return r; } /* * Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization). * Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors. */ int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; const u_char *input, *output; size_t ilen, olen; int r; if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0) return r; /* * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we * count from the completion of the authentication. */ state->rekey_time = monotime(); /* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */ if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0) return r; if ((r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0) return r; sshbuf_reset(state->input); sshbuf_reset(state->output); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0) return r; if (sshbuf_len(m)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; debug3("%s: done", __func__); return 0; } /* NEW API */ /* put data to the outgoing packet */ int sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len) { return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len); } int sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b) { return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b); } int sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val) { return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val) { return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val) { return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len) { return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len); } int sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v) { return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } int sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v) { return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } int sshpkt_getb_froms(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **valp) { return sshbuf_froms(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) { return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* fetch data from the incoming packet */ int sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len) { return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len); } int sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } int sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } int sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_peek_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM **valp) { return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh) { if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0) return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; return 0; } const u_char * sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp) { if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet); return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet); } /* start a new packet */ int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type) { u_char buf[6]; /* u32 packet length, u8 pad len, u8 type */ DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type)); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = type; sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet); return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, sizeof(buf)); } static int ssh_packet_send_mux(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_char type, *cp; size_t len; int r; if (ssh->kex) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); if (len < 6) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); type = cp[5]; if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, type); /* drop everything, but the connection protocol */ if (type >= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN && type <= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX) { POKE_U32(cp, len - 4); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->output, state->outgoing_packet)) != 0) return r; /* sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); */ } sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); return 0; } /* * 9.2. Ignored Data Message * * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE * string data * * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques. */ int sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, u_int nbytes) { u_int32_t rnd = 0; int r; u_int i; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0) return r; for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0) return r; rnd >>= 8; } return 0; } /* send it */ int sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state && ssh->state->mux) return ssh_packet_send_mux(ssh); return ssh_packet_send2(ssh); } int sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* roundup current message to pad bytes */ int sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad) { ssh->state->extra_pad = pad; return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/packet.h010064400017500001750000000166671362136622600131210ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.91 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Interface for the packet protocol functions. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef PACKET_H #define PACKET_H #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ # define BIGNUM void # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" struct kex; struct sshkey; struct sshbuf; struct session_state; /* private session data */ #include "dispatch.h" /* typedef, DISPATCH_MAX */ struct key_entry { TAILQ_ENTRY(key_entry) next; struct sshkey *key; }; struct ssh { /* Session state */ struct session_state *state; /* Key exchange */ struct kex *kex; /* cached local and remote ip addresses and ports */ char *remote_ipaddr; int remote_port; char *local_ipaddr; int local_port; char *rdomain_in; /* Optional preamble for log messages (e.g. username) */ char *log_preamble; /* Dispatcher table */ dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX]; /* number of packets to ignore in the dispatcher */ int dispatch_skip_packets; /* datafellows */ int compat; /* Lists for private and public keys */ TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) private_keys; TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) public_keys; /* Client/Server authentication context */ void *authctxt; /* Channels context */ struct ssh_channels *chanctxt; /* APP data */ void *app_data; }; typedef int (ssh_packet_hook_fn)(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *, u_char *, void *); struct ssh *ssh_alloc_session_state(void); struct ssh *ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *, int, int); void ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *, int, int); int ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *, ssh_packet_hook_fn *, void *); void ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *); void ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *, int); int ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *, u_int); u_int ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *, int); void ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *, int, int, int); int ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); int ssh_packet_log_type(u_char); int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type); int ssh_packet_read_poll(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len); int ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); int ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); const void *ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr); void ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((noreturn)); void ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); int ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *, int mode); void ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *, u_int64_t *, u_int64_t *); int ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *); void ssh_tty_make_modes(struct ssh *, int, struct termios *); void ssh_tty_parse_modes(struct ssh *, int); void ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *, int); int ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int); u_int ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *); int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *); const char *ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *); int ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *); const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *); int ssh_local_port(struct ssh *); const char *ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, u_int32_t); time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *); void *ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *); void *ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *); /* new API */ int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type); int sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh); int sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); int sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *, u_char); void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4))); int sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *, u_int); int sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len); int sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b); int sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val); int sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val); int sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val); int sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len); int sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v); int sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v); int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v); int sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len); int sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp); int sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp); int sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp); int sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshpkt_getb_froms(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **valp); int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM **valp); int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh); void sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l); const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp); #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) # undef BIGNUM # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #endif #endif /* PACKET_H */ openssh-8.2p1/pathnames.h010064400017500001750000000137471362136622600136260ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.31 2019/11/12 19:33:08 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #define ETCDIR "/etc" #ifndef SSHDIR #define SSHDIR ETCDIR "/ssh" #endif #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR #define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run" #endif /* * System-wide file containing host keys of known hosts. This file should be * world-readable. */ #define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts" /* backward compat for protocol 2 */ #define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2 SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts2" /* * Of these, ssh_host_key must be readable only by root, whereas ssh_config * should be world-readable. */ #define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/sshd_config" #define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_config" #define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key" #define _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ecdsa_key" #define _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ed25519_key" #define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key" #define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key" #define _PATH_DH_MODULI SSHDIR "/moduli" #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh" #endif /* * The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to * make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary. */ #define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid" /* * The directory in user's home directory in which the files reside. The * directory should be world-readable (though not all files are). */ #define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR ".ssh" /* * Per-user file containing host keys of known hosts. This file need not be * readable by anyone except the user him/herself, though this does not * contain anything particularly secret. */ #define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts" /* backward compat for protocol 2 */ #define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2 "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts2" /* * Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This * file should only be readable by the user him/herself. */ #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_dsa" #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa" #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_rsa" #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519" #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_xmss" #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa_sk" #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519_sk" /* * Configuration file in user's home directory. This file need not be * readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything * particularly secret. If the user's home directory resides on an NFS * volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable. */ #define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/config" /* * File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this * user. This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself, * but does not contain anything particularly secret. If the user's home * directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this * may need to be world-readable. (This file is read by the daemon which is * running as root.) */ #define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys" /* backward compat for protocol v2 */ #define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys2" /* * Per-user and system-wide ssh "rc" files. These files are executed with * /bin/sh before starting the shell or command if they exist. They will be * passed "proto cookie" as arguments if X11 forwarding with spoofing is in * use. xauth will be run if neither of these exists. */ #define _PATH_SSH_USER_RC _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/rc" #define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC SSHDIR "/sshrc" /* * Ssh-only version of /etc/hosts.equiv. Additionally, the daemon may use * ~/.rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv if rhosts authentication is enabled. */ #define _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV SSHDIR "/shosts.equiv" #define _PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv" /* * Default location of askpass */ #ifndef _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT #define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT "/usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass" #endif /* Location of ssh-keysign for hostbased authentication */ #ifndef _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN #define _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN "/usr/libexec/ssh-keysign" #endif /* Location of ssh-pkcs11-helper to support keys in tokens */ #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER #define _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER "/usr/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper" #endif /* Location of ssh-sk-helper to support keys in security keys */ #ifndef _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER #define _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER "/usr/libexec/ssh-sk-helper" #endif /* xauth for X11 forwarding */ #ifndef _PATH_XAUTH #define _PATH_XAUTH "/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth" #endif /* UNIX domain socket for X11 server; displaynum will replace %u */ #ifndef _PATH_UNIX_X #define _PATH_UNIX_X "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u" #endif /* for scp */ #ifndef _PATH_CP #define _PATH_CP "cp" #endif /* for sftp */ #ifndef _PATH_SFTP_SERVER #define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER "/usr/libexec/sftp-server" #endif /* chroot directory for unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes */ #ifndef _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR #define _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR "/var/empty" #endif /* for passwd change */ #ifndef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG #define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd" #endif #ifndef _PATH_LS #define _PATH_LS "ls" #endif /* Askpass program define */ #ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM #define ASKPASS_PROGRAM "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass" #endif /* ASKPASS_PROGRAM */ openssh-8.2p1/pkcs11.h010064400017500001750000001225761362136622600127510ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: pkcs11.h,v 1.3 2013/11/26 19:15:09 deraadt Exp $ */ /* pkcs11.h Copyright 2006, 2007 g10 Code GmbH Copyright 2006 Andreas Jellinghaus This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. */ /* Please submit changes back to the Scute project at http://www.scute.org/ (or send them to marcus@g10code.com), so that they can be picked up by other projects from there as well. */ /* This file is a modified implementation of the PKCS #11 standard by RSA Security Inc. It is mostly a drop-in replacement, with the following change: This header file does not require any macro definitions by the user (like CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION etc). In fact, it defines those macros for you (if useful, some are missing, let me know if you need more). There is an additional API available that does comply better to the GNU coding standard. It can be switched on by defining CRYPTOKI_GNU before including this header file. For this, the following changes are made to the specification: All structure types are changed to a "struct ck_foo" where CK_FOO is the type name in PKCS #11. All non-structure types are changed to ck_foo_t where CK_FOO is the lowercase version of the type name in PKCS #11. The basic types (CK_ULONG et al.) are removed without substitute. All members of structures are modified in the following way: Type indication prefixes are removed, and underscore characters are inserted before words. Then the result is lowercased. Note that function names are still in the original case, as they need for ABI compatibility. CK_FALSE, CK_TRUE and NULL_PTR are removed without substitute. Use . If CRYPTOKI_COMPAT is defined before including this header file, then none of the API changes above take place, and the API is the one defined by the PKCS #11 standard. */ #ifndef PKCS11_H #define PKCS11_H 1 #if defined(__cplusplus) extern "C" { #endif /* The version of cryptoki we implement. The revision is changed with each modification of this file. If you do not use the "official" version of this file, please consider deleting the revision macro (you may use a macro with a different name to keep track of your versions). */ #define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2 #define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20 #define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_REVISION 6 /* Compatibility interface is default, unless CRYPTOKI_GNU is given. */ #ifndef CRYPTOKI_GNU #ifndef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT 1 #endif #endif /* System dependencies. */ #if defined(_WIN32) || defined(CRYPTOKI_FORCE_WIN32) /* There is a matching pop below. */ #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) #ifdef CRYPTOKI_EXPORTS #define CK_SPEC __declspec(dllexport) #else #define CK_SPEC __declspec(dllimport) #endif #else #define CK_SPEC #endif #ifdef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT /* If we are in compatibility mode, switch all exposed names to the PKCS #11 variant. There are corresponding #undefs below. */ #define ck_flags_t CK_FLAGS #define ck_version _CK_VERSION #define ck_info _CK_INFO #define cryptoki_version cryptokiVersion #define manufacturer_id manufacturerID #define library_description libraryDescription #define library_version libraryVersion #define ck_notification_t CK_NOTIFICATION #define ck_slot_id_t CK_SLOT_ID #define ck_slot_info _CK_SLOT_INFO #define slot_description slotDescription #define hardware_version hardwareVersion #define firmware_version firmwareVersion #define ck_token_info _CK_TOKEN_INFO #define serial_number serialNumber #define max_session_count ulMaxSessionCount #define session_count ulSessionCount #define max_rw_session_count ulMaxRwSessionCount #define rw_session_count ulRwSessionCount #define max_pin_len ulMaxPinLen #define min_pin_len ulMinPinLen #define total_public_memory ulTotalPublicMemory #define free_public_memory ulFreePublicMemory #define total_private_memory ulTotalPrivateMemory #define free_private_memory ulFreePrivateMemory #define utc_time utcTime #define ck_session_handle_t CK_SESSION_HANDLE #define ck_user_type_t CK_USER_TYPE #define ck_state_t CK_STATE #define ck_session_info _CK_SESSION_INFO #define slot_id slotID #define device_error ulDeviceError #define ck_object_handle_t CK_OBJECT_HANDLE #define ck_object_class_t CK_OBJECT_CLASS #define ck_hw_feature_type_t CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE #define ck_key_type_t CK_KEY_TYPE #define ck_certificate_type_t CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE #define ck_attribute_type_t CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE #define ck_attribute _CK_ATTRIBUTE #define value pValue #define value_len ulValueLen #define ck_date _CK_DATE #define ck_mechanism_type_t CK_MECHANISM_TYPE #define ck_mechanism _CK_MECHANISM #define parameter pParameter #define parameter_len ulParameterLen #define ck_mechanism_info _CK_MECHANISM_INFO #define min_key_size ulMinKeySize #define max_key_size ulMaxKeySize #define ck_rv_t CK_RV #define ck_notify_t CK_NOTIFY #define ck_function_list _CK_FUNCTION_LIST #define ck_createmutex_t CK_CREATEMUTEX #define ck_destroymutex_t CK_DESTROYMUTEX #define ck_lockmutex_t CK_LOCKMUTEX #define ck_unlockmutex_t CK_UNLOCKMUTEX #define ck_c_initialize_args _CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS #define create_mutex CreateMutex #define destroy_mutex DestroyMutex #define lock_mutex LockMutex #define unlock_mutex UnlockMutex #define reserved pReserved #endif /* CRYPTOKI_COMPAT */ typedef unsigned long ck_flags_t; struct ck_version { unsigned char major; unsigned char minor; }; struct ck_info { struct ck_version cryptoki_version; unsigned char manufacturer_id[32]; ck_flags_t flags; unsigned char library_description[32]; struct ck_version library_version; }; typedef unsigned long ck_notification_t; #define CKN_SURRENDER (0) typedef unsigned long ck_slot_id_t; struct ck_slot_info { unsigned char slot_description[64]; unsigned char manufacturer_id[32]; ck_flags_t flags; struct ck_version hardware_version; struct ck_version firmware_version; }; #define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT (1 << 0) #define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE (1 << 1) #define CKF_HW_SLOT (1 << 2) #define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE (1 << 30) struct ck_token_info { unsigned char label[32]; unsigned char manufacturer_id[32]; unsigned char model[16]; unsigned char serial_number[16]; ck_flags_t flags; unsigned long max_session_count; unsigned long session_count; unsigned long max_rw_session_count; unsigned long rw_session_count; unsigned long max_pin_len; unsigned long min_pin_len; unsigned long total_public_memory; unsigned long free_public_memory; unsigned long total_private_memory; unsigned long free_private_memory; struct ck_version hardware_version; struct ck_version firmware_version; unsigned char utc_time[16]; }; #define CKF_RNG (1 << 0) #define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED (1 << 1) #define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED (1 << 2) #define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED (1 << 3) #define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED (1 << 5) #define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN (1 << 6) #define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH (1 << 8) #define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS (1 << 9) #define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED (1 << 10) #define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION (1 << 11) #define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW (1 << 16) #define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY (1 << 17) #define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED (1 << 18) #define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED (1 << 19) #define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW (1 << 20) #define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY (1 << 21) #define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED (1 << 22) #define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED (1 << 23) #define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION ((unsigned long) -1) #define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE (0) typedef unsigned long ck_session_handle_t; #define CK_INVALID_HANDLE (0) typedef unsigned long ck_user_type_t; #define CKU_SO (0) #define CKU_USER (1) #define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC (2) typedef unsigned long ck_state_t; #define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION (0) #define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS (1) #define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION (2) #define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS (3) #define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS (4) struct ck_session_info { ck_slot_id_t slot_id; ck_state_t state; ck_flags_t flags; unsigned long device_error; }; #define CKF_RW_SESSION (1 << 1) #define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION (1 << 2) typedef unsigned long ck_object_handle_t; typedef unsigned long ck_object_class_t; #define CKO_DATA (0) #define CKO_CERTIFICATE (1) #define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY (2) #define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY (3) #define CKO_SECRET_KEY (4) #define CKO_HW_FEATURE (5) #define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS (6) #define CKO_MECHANISM (7) #define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) typedef unsigned long ck_hw_feature_type_t; #define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER (1) #define CKH_CLOCK (2) #define CKH_USER_INTERFACE (3) #define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) typedef unsigned long ck_key_type_t; #define CKK_RSA (0) #define CKK_DSA (1) #define CKK_DH (2) #define CKK_ECDSA (3) #define CKK_EC (3) #define CKK_X9_42_DH (4) #define CKK_KEA (5) #define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET (0x10) #define CKK_RC2 (0x11) #define CKK_RC4 (0x12) #define CKK_DES (0x13) #define CKK_DES2 (0x14) #define CKK_DES3 (0x15) #define CKK_CAST (0x16) #define CKK_CAST3 (0x17) #define CKK_CAST128 (0x18) #define CKK_RC5 (0x19) #define CKK_IDEA (0x1a) #define CKK_SKIPJACK (0x1b) #define CKK_BATON (0x1c) #define CKK_JUNIPER (0x1d) #define CKK_CDMF (0x1e) #define CKK_AES (0x1f) #define CKK_BLOWFISH (0x20) #define CKK_TWOFISH (0x21) #define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) typedef unsigned long ck_certificate_type_t; #define CKC_X_509 (0) #define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT (1) #define CKC_WTLS (2) #define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) typedef unsigned long ck_attribute_type_t; #define CKA_CLASS (0) #define CKA_TOKEN (1) #define CKA_PRIVATE (2) #define CKA_LABEL (3) #define CKA_APPLICATION (0x10) #define CKA_VALUE (0x11) #define CKA_OBJECT_ID (0x12) #define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE (0x80) #define CKA_ISSUER (0x81) #define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER (0x82) #define CKA_AC_ISSUER (0x83) #define CKA_OWNER (0x84) #define CKA_ATTR_TYPES (0x85) #define CKA_TRUSTED (0x86) #define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY (0x87) #define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN (0x88) #define CKA_URL (0x89) #define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY (0x8a) #define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY (0x8b) #define CKA_CHECK_VALUE (0x90) #define CKA_KEY_TYPE (0x100) #define CKA_SUBJECT (0x101) #define CKA_ID (0x102) #define CKA_SENSITIVE (0x103) #define CKA_ENCRYPT (0x104) #define CKA_DECRYPT (0x105) #define CKA_WRAP (0x106) #define CKA_UNWRAP (0x107) #define CKA_SIGN (0x108) #define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER (0x109) #define CKA_VERIFY (0x10a) #define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER (0x10b) #define CKA_DERIVE (0x10c) #define CKA_START_DATE (0x110) #define CKA_END_DATE (0x111) #define CKA_MODULUS (0x120) #define CKA_MODULUS_BITS (0x121) #define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT (0x122) #define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT (0x123) #define CKA_PRIME_1 (0x124) #define CKA_PRIME_2 (0x125) #define CKA_EXPONENT_1 (0x126) #define CKA_EXPONENT_2 (0x127) #define CKA_COEFFICIENT (0x128) #define CKA_PRIME (0x130) #define CKA_SUBPRIME (0x131) #define CKA_BASE (0x132) #define CKA_PRIME_BITS (0x133) #define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS (0x134) #define CKA_VALUE_BITS (0x160) #define CKA_VALUE_LEN (0x161) #define CKA_EXTRACTABLE (0x162) #define CKA_LOCAL (0x163) #define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE (0x164) #define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE (0x165) #define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM (0x166) #define CKA_MODIFIABLE (0x170) #define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS (0x180) #define CKA_EC_PARAMS (0x180) #define CKA_EC_POINT (0x181) #define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH (0x200) #define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS (0x201) #define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE (0x202) #define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED (0x210) #define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE (0x300) #define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT (0x301) #define CKA_HAS_RESET (0x302) #define CKA_PIXEL_X (0x400) #define CKA_PIXEL_Y (0x401) #define CKA_RESOLUTION (0x402) #define CKA_CHAR_ROWS (0x403) #define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS (0x404) #define CKA_COLOR (0x405) #define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL (0x406) #define CKA_CHAR_SETS (0x480) #define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS (0x481) #define CKA_MIME_TYPES (0x482) #define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE (0x500) #define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES (0x501) #define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES (0x502) #define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES (0x503) #define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x211) #define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x212) #define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x600) #define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) struct ck_attribute { ck_attribute_type_t type; void *value; unsigned long value_len; }; struct ck_date { unsigned char year[4]; unsigned char month[2]; unsigned char day[2]; }; typedef unsigned long ck_mechanism_type_t; #define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0) #define CKM_RSA_PKCS (1) #define CKM_RSA_9796 (2) #define CKM_RSA_X_509 (3) #define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS (4) #define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS (5) #define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS (6) #define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS (7) #define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS (8) #define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP (9) #define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0xa) #define CKM_RSA_X9_31 (0xb) #define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 (0xc) #define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0xd) #define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0xe) #define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x10) #define CKM_DSA (0x11) #define CKM_DSA_SHA1 (0x12) #define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x20) #define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE (0x21) #define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x30) #define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE (0x31) #define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE (0x32) #define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE (0x33) #define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS (0x40) #define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS (0x41) #define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS (0x42) #define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0x43) #define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0x44) #define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0x45) #define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN (0x100) #define CKM_RC2_ECB (0x101) #define CKM_RC2_CBC (0x102) #define CKM_RC2_MAC (0x103) #define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL (0x104) #define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD (0x105) #define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN (0x110) #define CKM_RC4 (0x111) #define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN (0x120) #define CKM_DES_ECB (0x121) #define CKM_DES_CBC (0x122) #define CKM_DES_MAC (0x123) #define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL (0x124) #define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD (0x125) #define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN (0x130) #define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN (0x131) #define CKM_DES3_ECB (0x132) #define CKM_DES3_CBC (0x133) #define CKM_DES3_MAC (0x134) #define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL (0x135) #define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD (0x136) #define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN (0x140) #define CKM_CDMF_ECB (0x141) #define CKM_CDMF_CBC (0x142) #define CKM_CDMF_MAC (0x143) #define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL (0x144) #define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD (0x145) #define CKM_MD2 (0x200) #define CKM_MD2_HMAC (0x201) #define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL (0x202) #define CKM_MD5 (0x210) #define CKM_MD5_HMAC (0x211) #define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL (0x212) #define CKM_SHA_1 (0x220) #define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC (0x221) #define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL (0x222) #define CKM_RIPEMD128 (0x230) #define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC (0x231) #define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL (0x232) #define CKM_RIPEMD160 (0x240) #define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC (0x241) #define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL (0x242) #define CKM_SHA256 (0x250) #define CKM_SHA256_HMAC (0x251) #define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL (0x252) #define CKM_SHA384 (0x260) #define CKM_SHA384_HMAC (0x261) #define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL (0x262) #define CKM_SHA512 (0x270) #define CKM_SHA512_HMAC (0x271) #define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL (0x272) #define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN (0x300) #define CKM_CAST_ECB (0x301) #define CKM_CAST_CBC (0x302) #define CKM_CAST_MAC (0x303) #define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL (0x304) #define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD (0x305) #define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN (0x310) #define CKM_CAST3_ECB (0x311) #define CKM_CAST3_CBC (0x312) #define CKM_CAST3_MAC (0x313) #define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL (0x314) #define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD (0x315) #define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN (0x320) #define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN (0x320) #define CKM_CAST5_ECB (0x321) #define CKM_CAST128_ECB (0x321) #define CKM_CAST5_CBC (0x322) #define CKM_CAST128_CBC (0x322) #define CKM_CAST5_MAC (0x323) #define CKM_CAST128_MAC (0x323) #define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL (0x324) #define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL (0x324) #define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD (0x325) #define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD (0x325) #define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN (0x330) #define CKM_RC5_ECB (0x331) #define CKM_RC5_CBC (0x332) #define CKM_RC5_MAC (0x333) #define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL (0x334) #define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD (0x335) #define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN (0x340) #define CKM_IDEA_ECB (0x341) #define CKM_IDEA_CBC (0x342) #define CKM_IDEA_MAC (0x343) #define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL (0x344) #define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD (0x345) #define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN (0x350) #define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY (0x360) #define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA (0x362) #define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE (0x363) #define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA (0x364) #define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY (0x365) #define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN (0x370) #define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE (0x371) #define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE (0x372) #define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH (0x373) #define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN (0x374) #define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE (0x375) #define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE (0x376) #define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH (0x377) #define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC (0x380) #define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC (0x381) #define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION (0x390) #define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION (0x391) #define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION (0x392) #define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC (0x3a0) #define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC (0x3a1) #define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC (0x3a2) #define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC (0x3a3) #define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC (0x3a4) #define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC (0x3a4) #define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC (0x3a5) #define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC (0x3a5) #define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 (0x3a6) #define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 (0x3a7) #define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC (0x3a8) #define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC (0x3a9) #define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC (0x3aa) #define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC (0x3ab) #define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 (0x3b0) #define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC (0x3c0) #define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS (0x400) #define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP (0x401) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN (0x1000) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 (0x1001) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 (0x1002) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 (0x1003) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 (0x1004) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 (0x1005) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 (0x1006) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 (0x1007) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP (0x1008) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP (0x1009) #define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX (0x100a) #define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x1010) #define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE (0x1011) #define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP (0x1020) #define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN (0x1030) #define CKM_BATON_ECB128 (0x1031) #define CKM_BATON_ECB96 (0x1032) #define CKM_BATON_CBC128 (0x1033) #define CKM_BATON_COUNTER (0x1034) #define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE (0x1035) #define CKM_BATON_WRAP (0x1036) #define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x1040) #define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x1040) #define CKM_ECDSA (0x1041) #define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 (0x1042) #define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE (0x1050) #define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE (0x1051) #define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE (0x1052) #define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN (0x1060) #define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 (0x1061) #define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 (0x1062) #define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER (0x1063) #define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE (0x1064) #define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP (0x1065) #define CKM_FASTHASH (0x1070) #define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN (0x1080) #define CKM_AES_ECB (0x1081) #define CKM_AES_CBC (0x1082) #define CKM_AES_MAC (0x1083) #define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL (0x1084) #define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD (0x1085) #define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN (0x2000) #define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN (0x2001) #define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN (0x2002) #define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) struct ck_mechanism { ck_mechanism_type_t mechanism; void *parameter; unsigned long parameter_len; }; struct ck_mechanism_info { unsigned long min_key_size; unsigned long max_key_size; ck_flags_t flags; }; #define CKF_HW (1 << 0) #define CKF_ENCRYPT (1 << 8) #define CKF_DECRYPT (1 << 9) #define CKF_DIGEST (1 << 10) #define CKF_SIGN (1 << 11) #define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER (1 << 12) #define CKF_VERIFY (1 << 13) #define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER (1 << 14) #define CKF_GENERATE (1 << 15) #define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR (1 << 16) #define CKF_WRAP (1 << 17) #define CKF_UNWRAP (1 << 18) #define CKF_DERIVE (1 << 19) #define CKF_EXTENSION (1U << 31) /* Flags for C_WaitForSlotEvent. */ #define CKF_DONT_BLOCK (1) typedef unsigned long ck_rv_t; typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_notify_t) (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_notification_t event, void *application); /* Forward reference. */ struct ck_function_list; #define _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(name, args) \ typedef ck_rv_t (*CK_ ## name) args; \ ck_rv_t CK_SPEC name args _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Initialize, (void *init_args)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Finalize, (void *reserved)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetInfo, (struct ck_info *info)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetFunctionList, (struct ck_function_list **function_list)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSlotList, (unsigned char token_present, ck_slot_id_t *slot_list, unsigned long *count)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSlotInfo, (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, struct ck_slot_info *info)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetTokenInfo, (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, struct ck_token_info *info)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_WaitForSlotEvent, (ck_flags_t flags, ck_slot_id_t *slot, void *reserved)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetMechanismList, (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_mechanism_type_t *mechanism_list, unsigned long *count)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetMechanismInfo, (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_mechanism_type_t type, struct ck_mechanism_info *info)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_InitToken, (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, unsigned char *pin, unsigned long pin_len, unsigned char *label)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_InitPIN, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *pin, unsigned long pin_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetPIN, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *old_pin, unsigned long old_len, unsigned char *new_pin, unsigned long new_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_OpenSession, (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_flags_t flags, void *application, ck_notify_t notify, ck_session_handle_t *session)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CloseSession, (ck_session_handle_t session)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CloseAllSessions, (ck_slot_id_t slot_id)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSessionInfo, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_session_info *info)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetOperationState, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *operation_state, unsigned long *operation_state_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetOperationState, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *operation_state, unsigned long operation_state_len, ck_object_handle_t encryption_key, ck_object_handle_t authentiation_key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Login, (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_user_type_t user_type, unsigned char *pin, unsigned long pin_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Logout, (ck_session_handle_t session)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CreateObject, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count, ck_object_handle_t *object)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CopyObject, (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t object, struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count, ck_object_handle_t *new_object)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DestroyObject, (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t object)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetObjectSize, (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t object, unsigned long *size)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetAttributeValue, (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t object, struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetAttributeValue, (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t object, struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjectsInit, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjects, (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t *object, unsigned long max_object_count, unsigned long *object_count)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjectsFinal, (ck_session_handle_t session)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptInit, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, ck_object_handle_t key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Encrypt, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *encrypted_data, unsigned long *encrypted_data_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptUpdate, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len, unsigned char *encrypted_part, unsigned long *encrypted_part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptFinal, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *last_encrypted_part, unsigned long *last_encrypted_part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptInit, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, ck_object_handle_t key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Decrypt, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *encrypted_data, unsigned long encrypted_data_len, unsigned char *data, unsigned long *data_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptUpdate, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *encrypted_part, unsigned long encrypted_part_len, unsigned char *part, unsigned long *part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptFinal, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *last_part, unsigned long *last_part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestInit, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Digest, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *digest, unsigned long *digest_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestUpdate, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestKey, (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestFinal, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *digest, unsigned long *digest_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignInit, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, ck_object_handle_t key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Sign, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *signature, unsigned long *signature_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignUpdate, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignFinal, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *signature, unsigned long *signature_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignRecoverInit, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, ck_object_handle_t key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignRecover, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *signature, unsigned long *signature_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyInit, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, ck_object_handle_t key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Verify, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *signature, unsigned long signature_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyUpdate, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyFinal, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *signature, unsigned long signature_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyRecoverInit, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, ck_object_handle_t key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyRecover, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *signature, unsigned long signature_len, unsigned char *data, unsigned long *data_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestEncryptUpdate, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len, unsigned char *encrypted_part, unsigned long *encrypted_part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptDigestUpdate, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *encrypted_part, unsigned long encrypted_part_len, unsigned char *part, unsigned long *part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignEncryptUpdate, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len, unsigned char *encrypted_part, unsigned long *encrypted_part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptVerifyUpdate, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *encrypted_part, unsigned long encrypted_part_len, unsigned char *part, unsigned long *part_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateKey, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count, ck_object_handle_t *key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateKeyPair, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, struct ck_attribute *public_key_template, unsigned long public_key_attribute_count, struct ck_attribute *private_key_template, unsigned long private_key_attribute_count, ck_object_handle_t *public_key, ck_object_handle_t *private_key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_WrapKey, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, ck_object_handle_t wrapping_key, ck_object_handle_t key, unsigned char *wrapped_key, unsigned long *wrapped_key_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_UnwrapKey, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, ck_object_handle_t unwrapping_key, unsigned char *wrapped_key, unsigned long wrapped_key_len, struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long attribute_count, ck_object_handle_t *key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DeriveKey, (ck_session_handle_t session, struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, ck_object_handle_t base_key, struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long attribute_count, ck_object_handle_t *key)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SeedRandom, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *seed, unsigned long seed_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateRandom, (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *random_data, unsigned long random_len)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetFunctionStatus, (ck_session_handle_t session)); _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CancelFunction, (ck_session_handle_t session)); struct ck_function_list { struct ck_version version; CK_C_Initialize C_Initialize; CK_C_Finalize C_Finalize; CK_C_GetInfo C_GetInfo; CK_C_GetFunctionList C_GetFunctionList; CK_C_GetSlotList C_GetSlotList; CK_C_GetSlotInfo C_GetSlotInfo; CK_C_GetTokenInfo C_GetTokenInfo; CK_C_GetMechanismList C_GetMechanismList; CK_C_GetMechanismInfo C_GetMechanismInfo; CK_C_InitToken C_InitToken; CK_C_InitPIN C_InitPIN; CK_C_SetPIN C_SetPIN; CK_C_OpenSession C_OpenSession; CK_C_CloseSession C_CloseSession; CK_C_CloseAllSessions C_CloseAllSessions; CK_C_GetSessionInfo C_GetSessionInfo; CK_C_GetOperationState C_GetOperationState; CK_C_SetOperationState C_SetOperationState; CK_C_Login C_Login; CK_C_Logout C_Logout; CK_C_CreateObject C_CreateObject; CK_C_CopyObject C_CopyObject; CK_C_DestroyObject C_DestroyObject; CK_C_GetObjectSize C_GetObjectSize; CK_C_GetAttributeValue C_GetAttributeValue; CK_C_SetAttributeValue C_SetAttributeValue; CK_C_FindObjectsInit C_FindObjectsInit; CK_C_FindObjects C_FindObjects; CK_C_FindObjectsFinal C_FindObjectsFinal; CK_C_EncryptInit C_EncryptInit; CK_C_Encrypt C_Encrypt; CK_C_EncryptUpdate C_EncryptUpdate; CK_C_EncryptFinal C_EncryptFinal; CK_C_DecryptInit C_DecryptInit; CK_C_Decrypt C_Decrypt; CK_C_DecryptUpdate C_DecryptUpdate; CK_C_DecryptFinal C_DecryptFinal; CK_C_DigestInit C_DigestInit; CK_C_Digest C_Digest; CK_C_DigestUpdate C_DigestUpdate; CK_C_DigestKey C_DigestKey; CK_C_DigestFinal C_DigestFinal; CK_C_SignInit C_SignInit; CK_C_Sign C_Sign; CK_C_SignUpdate C_SignUpdate; CK_C_SignFinal C_SignFinal; CK_C_SignRecoverInit C_SignRecoverInit; CK_C_SignRecover C_SignRecover; CK_C_VerifyInit C_VerifyInit; CK_C_Verify C_Verify; CK_C_VerifyUpdate C_VerifyUpdate; CK_C_VerifyFinal C_VerifyFinal; CK_C_VerifyRecoverInit C_VerifyRecoverInit; CK_C_VerifyRecover C_VerifyRecover; CK_C_DigestEncryptUpdate C_DigestEncryptUpdate; CK_C_DecryptDigestUpdate C_DecryptDigestUpdate; CK_C_SignEncryptUpdate C_SignEncryptUpdate; CK_C_DecryptVerifyUpdate C_DecryptVerifyUpdate; CK_C_GenerateKey C_GenerateKey; CK_C_GenerateKeyPair C_GenerateKeyPair; CK_C_WrapKey C_WrapKey; CK_C_UnwrapKey C_UnwrapKey; CK_C_DeriveKey C_DeriveKey; CK_C_SeedRandom C_SeedRandom; CK_C_GenerateRandom C_GenerateRandom; CK_C_GetFunctionStatus C_GetFunctionStatus; CK_C_CancelFunction C_CancelFunction; CK_C_WaitForSlotEvent C_WaitForSlotEvent; }; typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_createmutex_t) (void **mutex); typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_destroymutex_t) (void *mutex); typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_lockmutex_t) (void *mutex); typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_unlockmutex_t) (void *mutex); struct ck_c_initialize_args { ck_createmutex_t create_mutex; ck_destroymutex_t destroy_mutex; ck_lockmutex_t lock_mutex; ck_unlockmutex_t unlock_mutex; ck_flags_t flags; void *reserved; }; #define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS (1 << 0) #define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK (1 << 1) #define CKR_OK (0) #define CKR_CANCEL (1) #define CKR_HOST_MEMORY (2) #define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID (3) #define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR (5) #define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED (6) #define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD (7) #define CKR_NO_EVENT (8) #define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS (9) #define CKR_CANT_LOCK (0xa) #define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY (0x10) #define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE (0x11) #define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID (0x12) #define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID (0x13) #define CKR_DATA_INVALID (0x20) #define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE (0x21) #define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR (0x30) #define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY (0x31) #define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED (0x32) #define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID (0x40) #define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE (0x41) #define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED (0x50) #define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL (0x51) #define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED (0x54) #define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID (0x60) #define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE (0x62) #define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT (0x63) #define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED (0x64) #define CKR_KEY_CHANGED (0x65) #define CKR_KEY_NEEDED (0x66) #define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE (0x67) #define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED (0x68) #define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE (0x69) #define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE (0x6a) #define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID (0x70) #define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID (0x71) #define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID (0x82) #define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE (0x90) #define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED (0x91) #define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT (0xa0) #define CKR_PIN_INVALID (0xa1) #define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE (0xa2) #define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED (0xa3) #define CKR_PIN_LOCKED (0xa4) #define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED (0xb0) #define CKR_SESSION_COUNT (0xb1) #define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID (0xb3) #define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED (0xb4) #define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY (0xb5) #define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS (0xb6) #define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS (0xb7) #define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS (0xb8) #define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (0xc0) #define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE (0xc1) #define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE (0xd0) #define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT (0xd1) #define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT (0xe0) #define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED (0xe1) #define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED (0xe2) #define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID (0xf0) #define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE (0xf1) #define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT (0xf2) #define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN (0x100) #define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN (0x101) #define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED (0x102) #define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID (0x103) #define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN (0x104) #define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES (0x105) #define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID (0x110) #define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE (0x112) #define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID (0x113) #define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE (0x114) #define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT (0x115) #define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED (0x120) #define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG (0x121) #define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID (0x130) #define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL (0x150) #define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID (0x160) #define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE (0x170) #define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE (0x180) #define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED (0x190) #define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED (0x191) #define CKR_MUTEX_BAD (0x1a0) #define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED (0x1a1) #define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED (0x200) #define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) /* Compatibility layer. */ #ifdef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT #undef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(retval, name) retval CK_SPEC name /* For NULL. */ #include typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; typedef unsigned char CK_CHAR; typedef unsigned char CK_UTF8CHAR; typedef unsigned char CK_BBOOL; typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; typedef long int CK_LONG; typedef CK_BYTE *CK_BYTE_PTR; typedef CK_CHAR *CK_CHAR_PTR; typedef CK_UTF8CHAR *CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; typedef CK_ULONG *CK_ULONG_PTR; typedef void *CK_VOID_PTR; typedef void **CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; #define CK_FALSE 0 #define CK_TRUE 1 #ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE #ifndef FALSE #define FALSE 0 #endif #ifndef TRUE #define TRUE 1 #endif #endif typedef struct ck_version CK_VERSION; typedef struct ck_version *CK_VERSION_PTR; typedef struct ck_info CK_INFO; typedef struct ck_info *CK_INFO_PTR; typedef ck_slot_id_t *CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; typedef struct ck_slot_info CK_SLOT_INFO; typedef struct ck_slot_info *CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; typedef struct ck_token_info CK_TOKEN_INFO; typedef struct ck_token_info *CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; typedef ck_session_handle_t *CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; typedef struct ck_session_info CK_SESSION_INFO; typedef struct ck_session_info *CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; typedef ck_object_handle_t *CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; typedef ck_object_class_t *CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; typedef struct ck_attribute CK_ATTRIBUTE; typedef struct ck_attribute *CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; typedef struct ck_date CK_DATE; typedef struct ck_date *CK_DATE_PTR; typedef ck_mechanism_type_t *CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; typedef struct ck_mechanism CK_MECHANISM; typedef struct ck_mechanism *CK_MECHANISM_PTR; typedef struct ck_mechanism_info CK_MECHANISM_INFO; typedef struct ck_mechanism_info *CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; typedef struct ck_function_list CK_FUNCTION_LIST; typedef struct ck_function_list *CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; typedef struct ck_function_list **CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; typedef struct ck_c_initialize_args CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; typedef struct ck_c_initialize_args *CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; #define NULL_PTR NULL /* Delete the helper macros defined at the top of the file. */ #undef ck_flags_t #undef ck_version #undef ck_info #undef cryptoki_version #undef manufacturer_id #undef library_description #undef library_version #undef ck_notification_t #undef ck_slot_id_t #undef ck_slot_info #undef slot_description #undef hardware_version #undef firmware_version #undef ck_token_info #undef serial_number #undef max_session_count #undef session_count #undef max_rw_session_count #undef rw_session_count #undef max_pin_len #undef min_pin_len #undef total_public_memory #undef free_public_memory #undef total_private_memory #undef free_private_memory #undef utc_time #undef ck_session_handle_t #undef ck_user_type_t #undef ck_state_t #undef ck_session_info #undef slot_id #undef device_error #undef ck_object_handle_t #undef ck_object_class_t #undef ck_hw_feature_type_t #undef ck_key_type_t #undef ck_certificate_type_t #undef ck_attribute_type_t #undef ck_attribute #undef value #undef value_len #undef ck_date #undef ck_mechanism_type_t #undef ck_mechanism #undef parameter #undef parameter_len #undef ck_mechanism_info #undef min_key_size #undef max_key_size #undef ck_rv_t #undef ck_notify_t #undef ck_function_list #undef ck_createmutex_t #undef ck_destroymutex_t #undef ck_lockmutex_t #undef ck_unlockmutex_t #undef ck_c_initialize_args #undef create_mutex #undef destroy_mutex #undef lock_mutex #undef unlock_mutex #undef reserved #endif /* CRYPTOKI_COMPAT */ /* System dependencies. */ #if defined(_WIN32) || defined(CRYPTOKI_FORCE_WIN32) #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) #endif #if defined(__cplusplus) } #endif #endif /* PKCS11_H */ openssh-8.2p1/platform-misc.c010064400017500001750000000021371362136622600144050ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" /* * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory * otherwise 0. */ int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid) { if (uid == 0) return 1; #ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID) return 1; #endif return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/platform-pledge.c010064400017500001750000000035651362136622600147200ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2015 Joyent, Inc * Author: Alex Wilson * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "platform.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" /* * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for post-startup * operation of ssh-agent * * Should be as close as possible to pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", ...) */ void platform_pledge_agent(void) { #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS /* * Note: Solaris priv dropping is closer to tame() than pledge(), but * we will use what we have. */ solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(); #endif } /* * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for post-startup * operation of sftp-server */ void platform_pledge_sftp_server(void) { #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(); #endif } /* * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for the post-startup * operation of the SSH client mux * * Should be as close as possible to pledge("stdio proc tty", ...) */ void platform_pledge_mux(void) { #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(); #endif } openssh-8.2p1/platform-tracing.c010064400017500001750000000033051362136622600150770ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2016 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) #include /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H #include /* For setpflags() and __PROC_PROTECT */ #endif #include #include "log.h" void platform_disable_tracing(int strict) { #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */ if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) != 0 && strict) fatal("unable to make the process undumpable"); #endif #if defined(HAVE_SETPFLAGS) && defined(__PROC_PROTECT) /* On Solaris, we should make this process untraceable */ if (setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, 1) != 0 && strict) fatal("unable to make the process untraceable"); #endif #ifdef PT_DENY_ATTACH /* Mac OS X */ if (ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0) == -1 && strict) fatal("unable to set PT_DENY_ATTACH"); #endif } openssh-8.2p1/platform.c010064400017500001750000000113531362136622600134540ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "platform.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" extern int use_privsep; extern ServerOptions options; void platform_pre_listen(void) { #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST /* Adjust out-of-memory killer so listening process is not killed */ oom_adjust_setup(); #endif } void platform_pre_fork(void) { #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS solaris_contract_pre_fork(); #endif } void platform_pre_restart(void) { #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST oom_adjust_restore(); #endif } void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid) { #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(child_pid); #endif } void platform_post_fork_child(void) { #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS solaris_contract_post_fork_child(); #endif #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST oom_adjust_restore(); #endif } /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */ int platform_privileged_uidswap(void) { #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN /* uid 0 is not special on Cygwin so always try */ return 1; #else return (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0); #endif } /* * This gets called before switching UIDs, and is called even when sshd is * not running as root. */ void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { #ifdef WITH_SELINUX /* Cache selinux status for later use */ (void)ssh_selinux_enabled(); #endif #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS /* * If solaris projects were detected, set the default now, unless * we are using PAM in which case it is the responsibility of the * PAM stack. */ if (!options.use_pam && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)) solaris_set_default_project(pw); #endif #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined (__bsdi__) if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) setpgid(0, 0); # endif #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM) /* * If we have both LOGIN_CAP and PAM, we want to establish creds * before calling setusercontext (in session.c:do_setusercontext). */ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { if (options.use_pam) { do_pam_setcred(use_privsep); } } # endif /* USE_PAM */ #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID) if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { /* Sets login uid for accounting */ if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno)); } #endif } /* * This gets called after we've established the user's groups, and is only * called if sshd is running as root. */ void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw) { #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM) /* * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups. * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call. * Reestablish them here. */ if (options.use_pam) { do_pam_setcred(use_privsep); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && (defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \ defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)) irix_setusercontext(pw); #endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */ #ifdef _AIX aix_usrinfo(pw); #endif /* _AIX */ #ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED /* * If we have a chroot directory, we set all creds except real * uid which we will need for chroot. If we don't have a * chroot directory, we don't override anything. */ { char **creds = NULL, *chroot_creds[] = { "REAL_USER=root", NULL }; if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) creds = chroot_creds; if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, creds) == -1) fatal("Failed to set process credentials"); } #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); #endif } char * platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name) { #ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME return aix_krb5_get_principal_name(pw_name); #else return NULL; #endif } openssh-8.2p1/platform.h010064400017500001750000000026741362136622600134670ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include void platform_pre_listen(void); void platform_pre_fork(void); void platform_pre_restart(void); void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid); void platform_post_fork_child(void); int platform_privileged_uidswap(void); void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *); void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *); char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *); char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *); int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t); void platform_disable_tracing(int); /* in platform-pledge.c */ void platform_pledge_agent(void); void platform_pledge_sftp_server(void); void platform_pledge_mux(void); openssh-8.2p1/poly1305.c010064400017500001750000000110551362136622600131230ustar00djmdjm/* * Public Domain poly1305 from Andrew Moon * poly1305-donna-unrolled.c from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna */ /* $OpenBSD: poly1305.c,v 1.3 2013/12/19 22:57:13 djm Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include "poly1305.h" #define mul32x32_64(a,b) ((uint64_t)(a) * (b)) #define U8TO32_LE(p) \ (((uint32_t)((p)[0])) | \ ((uint32_t)((p)[1]) << 8) | \ ((uint32_t)((p)[2]) << 16) | \ ((uint32_t)((p)[3]) << 24)) #define U32TO8_LE(p, v) \ do { \ (p)[0] = (uint8_t)((v)); \ (p)[1] = (uint8_t)((v) >> 8); \ (p)[2] = (uint8_t)((v) >> 16); \ (p)[3] = (uint8_t)((v) >> 24); \ } while (0) void poly1305_auth(unsigned char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const unsigned char *m, size_t inlen, const unsigned char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) { uint32_t t0,t1,t2,t3; uint32_t h0,h1,h2,h3,h4; uint32_t r0,r1,r2,r3,r4; uint32_t s1,s2,s3,s4; uint32_t b, nb; size_t j; uint64_t t[5]; uint64_t f0,f1,f2,f3; uint32_t g0,g1,g2,g3,g4; uint64_t c; unsigned char mp[16]; /* clamp key */ t0 = U8TO32_LE(key+0); t1 = U8TO32_LE(key+4); t2 = U8TO32_LE(key+8); t3 = U8TO32_LE(key+12); /* precompute multipliers */ r0 = t0 & 0x3ffffff; t0 >>= 26; t0 |= t1 << 6; r1 = t0 & 0x3ffff03; t1 >>= 20; t1 |= t2 << 12; r2 = t1 & 0x3ffc0ff; t2 >>= 14; t2 |= t3 << 18; r3 = t2 & 0x3f03fff; t3 >>= 8; r4 = t3 & 0x00fffff; s1 = r1 * 5; s2 = r2 * 5; s3 = r3 * 5; s4 = r4 * 5; /* init state */ h0 = 0; h1 = 0; h2 = 0; h3 = 0; h4 = 0; /* full blocks */ if (inlen < 16) goto poly1305_donna_atmost15bytes; poly1305_donna_16bytes: m += 16; inlen -= 16; t0 = U8TO32_LE(m-16); t1 = U8TO32_LE(m-12); t2 = U8TO32_LE(m-8); t3 = U8TO32_LE(m-4); h0 += t0 & 0x3ffffff; h1 += ((((uint64_t)t1 << 32) | t0) >> 26) & 0x3ffffff; h2 += ((((uint64_t)t2 << 32) | t1) >> 20) & 0x3ffffff; h3 += ((((uint64_t)t3 << 32) | t2) >> 14) & 0x3ffffff; h4 += (t3 >> 8) | (1 << 24); poly1305_donna_mul: t[0] = mul32x32_64(h0,r0) + mul32x32_64(h1,s4) + mul32x32_64(h2,s3) + mul32x32_64(h3,s2) + mul32x32_64(h4,s1); t[1] = mul32x32_64(h0,r1) + mul32x32_64(h1,r0) + mul32x32_64(h2,s4) + mul32x32_64(h3,s3) + mul32x32_64(h4,s2); t[2] = mul32x32_64(h0,r2) + mul32x32_64(h1,r1) + mul32x32_64(h2,r0) + mul32x32_64(h3,s4) + mul32x32_64(h4,s3); t[3] = mul32x32_64(h0,r3) + mul32x32_64(h1,r2) + mul32x32_64(h2,r1) + mul32x32_64(h3,r0) + mul32x32_64(h4,s4); t[4] = mul32x32_64(h0,r4) + mul32x32_64(h1,r3) + mul32x32_64(h2,r2) + mul32x32_64(h3,r1) + mul32x32_64(h4,r0); h0 = (uint32_t)t[0] & 0x3ffffff; c = (t[0] >> 26); t[1] += c; h1 = (uint32_t)t[1] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[1] >> 26); t[2] += b; h2 = (uint32_t)t[2] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[2] >> 26); t[3] += b; h3 = (uint32_t)t[3] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[3] >> 26); t[4] += b; h4 = (uint32_t)t[4] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[4] >> 26); h0 += b * 5; if (inlen >= 16) goto poly1305_donna_16bytes; /* final bytes */ poly1305_donna_atmost15bytes: if (!inlen) goto poly1305_donna_finish; for (j = 0; j < inlen; j++) mp[j] = m[j]; mp[j++] = 1; for (; j < 16; j++) mp[j] = 0; inlen = 0; t0 = U8TO32_LE(mp+0); t1 = U8TO32_LE(mp+4); t2 = U8TO32_LE(mp+8); t3 = U8TO32_LE(mp+12); h0 += t0 & 0x3ffffff; h1 += ((((uint64_t)t1 << 32) | t0) >> 26) & 0x3ffffff; h2 += ((((uint64_t)t2 << 32) | t1) >> 20) & 0x3ffffff; h3 += ((((uint64_t)t3 << 32) | t2) >> 14) & 0x3ffffff; h4 += (t3 >> 8); goto poly1305_donna_mul; poly1305_donna_finish: b = h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff; h1 += b; b = h1 >> 26; h1 = h1 & 0x3ffffff; h2 += b; b = h2 >> 26; h2 = h2 & 0x3ffffff; h3 += b; b = h3 >> 26; h3 = h3 & 0x3ffffff; h4 += b; b = h4 >> 26; h4 = h4 & 0x3ffffff; h0 += b * 5; b = h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff; h1 += b; g0 = h0 + 5; b = g0 >> 26; g0 &= 0x3ffffff; g1 = h1 + b; b = g1 >> 26; g1 &= 0x3ffffff; g2 = h2 + b; b = g2 >> 26; g2 &= 0x3ffffff; g3 = h3 + b; b = g3 >> 26; g3 &= 0x3ffffff; g4 = h4 + b - (1 << 26); b = (g4 >> 31) - 1; nb = ~b; h0 = (h0 & nb) | (g0 & b); h1 = (h1 & nb) | (g1 & b); h2 = (h2 & nb) | (g2 & b); h3 = (h3 & nb) | (g3 & b); h4 = (h4 & nb) | (g4 & b); f0 = ((h0 ) | (h1 << 26)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[16]); f1 = ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[20]); f2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[24]); f3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[28]); U32TO8_LE(&out[ 0], f0); f1 += (f0 >> 32); U32TO8_LE(&out[ 4], f1); f2 += (f1 >> 32); U32TO8_LE(&out[ 8], f2); f3 += (f2 >> 32); U32TO8_LE(&out[12], f3); } openssh-8.2p1/poly1305.h010064400017500001750000000012051362136622600131240ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.h,v 1.4 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain poly1305 from Andrew Moon * poly1305-donna-unrolled.c from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna */ #ifndef POLY1305_H #define POLY1305_H #include #define POLY1305_KEYLEN 32 #define POLY1305_TAGLEN 16 void poly1305_auth(u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen, const u_char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, POLY1305_TAGLEN))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 4, POLY1305_KEYLEN))); #endif /* POLY1305_H */ openssh-8.2p1/progressmeter.c010064400017500001750000000164161362136622600145360ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.50 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "progressmeter.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "utf8.h" #define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80 #define MAX_WINSIZE 512 #define PADDING 1 /* padding between the progress indicators */ #define UPDATE_INTERVAL 1 /* update the progress meter every second */ #define STALL_TIME 5 /* we're stalled after this many seconds */ /* determines whether we can output to the terminal */ static int can_output(void); /* formats and inserts the specified size into the given buffer */ static void format_size(char *, int, off_t); static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t); /* window resizing */ static void sig_winch(int); static void setscreensize(void); /* signal handler for updating the progress meter */ static void sig_alarm(int); static double start; /* start progress */ static double last_update; /* last progress update */ static const char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */ static off_t start_pos; /* initial position of transfer */ static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */ static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */ static volatile off_t *counter; /* progress counter */ static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */ static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */ static int win_size; /* terminal window size */ static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */ static volatile sig_atomic_t alarm_fired; /* units for format_size */ static const char unit[] = " KMGT"; static int can_output(void) { return (getpgrp() == tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO)); } static void format_rate(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes) { int i; bytes *= 100; for (i = 0; bytes >= 100*1000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++) bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024; if (i == 0) { i++; bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024; } snprintf(buf, size, "%3lld.%1lld%c%s", (long long) (bytes + 5) / 100, (long long) (bytes + 5) / 10 % 10, unit[i], i ? "B" : " "); } static void format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes) { int i; for (i = 0; bytes >= 10000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++) bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024; snprintf(buf, size, "%4lld%c%s", (long long) bytes, unit[i], i ? "B" : " "); } void refresh_progress_meter(int force_update) { char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1]; off_t transferred; double elapsed, now; int percent; off_t bytes_left; int cur_speed; int hours, minutes, seconds; int file_len; if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output()) return; alarm_fired = 0; if (win_resized) { setscreensize(); win_resized = 0; } transferred = *counter - (cur_pos ? cur_pos : start_pos); cur_pos = *counter; now = monotime_double(); bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos; if (bytes_left > 0) elapsed = now - last_update; else { elapsed = now - start; /* Calculate true total speed when done */ transferred = end_pos - start_pos; bytes_per_second = 0; } /* calculate speed */ if (elapsed != 0) cur_speed = (transferred / elapsed); else cur_speed = transferred; #define AGE_FACTOR 0.9 if (bytes_per_second != 0) { bytes_per_second = (bytes_per_second * AGE_FACTOR) + (cur_speed * (1.0 - AGE_FACTOR)); } else bytes_per_second = cur_speed; /* filename */ buf[0] = '\0'; file_len = win_size - 36; if (file_len > 0) { buf[0] = '\r'; snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s", file_len, file); } /* percent of transfer done */ if (end_pos == 0 || cur_pos == end_pos) percent = 100; else percent = ((float)cur_pos / end_pos) * 100; snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), " %3d%% ", percent); /* amount transferred */ format_size(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), cur_pos); strlcat(buf, " ", win_size); /* bandwidth usage */ format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), (off_t)bytes_per_second); strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size); /* ETA */ if (!transferred) stalled += elapsed; else stalled = 0; if (stalled >= STALL_TIME) strlcat(buf, "- stalled -", win_size); else if (bytes_per_second == 0 && bytes_left) strlcat(buf, " --:-- ETA", win_size); else { if (bytes_left > 0) seconds = bytes_left / bytes_per_second; else seconds = elapsed; hours = seconds / 3600; seconds -= hours * 3600; minutes = seconds / 60; seconds -= minutes * 60; if (hours != 0) snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), "%d:%02d:%02d", hours, minutes, seconds); else snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), " %02d:%02d", minutes, seconds); if (bytes_left > 0) strlcat(buf, " ETA", win_size); else strlcat(buf, " ", win_size); } atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1); last_update = now; } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sig_alarm(int ignore) { alarm_fired = 1; alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL); } void start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr) { start = last_update = monotime_double(); file = f; start_pos = *ctr; end_pos = filesize; cur_pos = 0; counter = ctr; stalled = 0; bytes_per_second = 0; setscreensize(); refresh_progress_meter(1); ssh_signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm); ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch); alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL); } void stop_progress_meter(void) { alarm(0); if (!can_output()) return; /* Ensure we complete the progress */ if (cur_pos != end_pos) refresh_progress_meter(1); atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sig_winch(int sig) { win_resized = 1; } static void setscreensize(void) { struct winsize winsize; if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 && winsize.ws_col != 0) { if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE) win_size = MAX_WINSIZE; else win_size = winsize.ws_col; } else win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE; win_size += 1; /* trailing \0 */ } openssh-8.2p1/progressmeter.h010064400017500001750000000027471362136622600145450ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.5 2019/01/24 16:52:17 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ void start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *); void refresh_progress_meter(int); void stop_progress_meter(void); openssh-8.2p1/readconf.c010064400017500001750000002445571362136622600134270ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.326 2020/02/06 22:46:31 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for reading the configuration files. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB # include #else # include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" /* Format of the configuration file: # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order # that they are given in. Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi User foo Host fake.com Hostname another.host.name.real.org User blaah Port 34289 ForwardX11 no ForwardAgent no Host books.com RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999 Ciphers 3des-cbc Host fascist.blob.com Port 23123 User tylonen PasswordAuthentication no Host puukko.hut.fi User t35124p ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p Host *.fr PublicKeyAuthentication no Host *.su Ciphers aes128-ctr PasswordAuthentication no Host vpn.fake.com Tunnel yes TunnelDevice 3 # Defaults for various options Host * ForwardAgent no ForwardX11 no PasswordAuthentication yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes TcpKeepAlive no IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity Port 22 EscapeChar ~ */ static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth); static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int *want_final_pass, int depth); /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { oBadOption, oHost, oMatch, oInclude, oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout, oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure, oPasswordAuthentication, oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation, oIdentityFile, oHostname, oPort, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward, oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oIdentityAgent, oUser, oEscapeChar, oProxyCommand, oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts, oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oMacs, oPubkeyAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oBindInterface, oPKCS11Provider, oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand, oVisualHostKey, oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys, oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes, oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump, oSecurityKeyProvider, oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported } OpCodes; /* Textual representations of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; OpCodes opcode; } keywords[] = { /* Deprecated options */ { "protocol", oIgnore }, /* NB. silently ignored */ { "cipher", oDeprecated }, { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated }, { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "useroaming", oDeprecated }, { "usersh", oDeprecated }, { "useprivilegedport", oDeprecated }, /* Unsupported options */ { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported }, { "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "compressionlevel", oUnsupported }, /* Sometimes-unsupported options */ #if defined(GSSAPI) { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, # else { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, #endif #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, # else { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, #endif { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent }, { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 }, { "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted }, { "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout }, { "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure }, { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation }, { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts }, { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices }, { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, { "skeyauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "identityfile", oIdentityFile }, { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */ { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly }, { "certificatefile", oCertificateFile }, { "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent }, { "identityagent", oIdentityAgent }, { "hostname", oHostname }, { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand }, { "port", oPort }, { "ciphers", oCiphers }, { "macs", oMacs }, { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward }, { "localforward", oLocalForward }, { "user", oUser }, { "host", oHost }, { "match", oMatch }, { "escapechar", oEscapeChar }, { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile }, { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile }, { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts }, { "batchmode", oBatchMode }, { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP }, { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking }, { "compression", oCompression }, { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */ { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts }, { "syslogfacility", oLogFacility }, { "loglevel", oLogLevel }, { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward }, { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms }, { "casignaturealgorithms", oCASignatureAlgorithms }, { "bindaddress", oBindAddress }, { "bindinterface", oBindInterface }, { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS }, { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost }, { "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit }, { "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout }, { "addressfamily", oAddressFamily }, { "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval }, { "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax }, { "sendenv", oSendEnv }, { "setenv", oSetEnv }, { "controlpath", oControlPath }, { "controlmaster", oControlMaster }, { "controlpersist", oControlPersist }, { "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts }, { "include", oInclude }, { "tunnel", oTunnel }, { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice }, { "localcommand", oLocalCommand }, { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand }, { "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand }, { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, { "requesttty", oRequestTTY }, { "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass }, { "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains }, { "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal }, { "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname }, { "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots }, { "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs }, { "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask }, { "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink }, { "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys }, { "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash }, { "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys }, { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes }, { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown }, { "proxyjump", oProxyJump }, { "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider }, { NULL, oBadOption } }; static char *kex_default_pk_alg_filtered; const char * kex_default_pk_alg(void) { if (kex_default_pk_alg_filtered == NULL) fatal("kex_default_pk_alg not initialized."); return kex_default_pk_alg_filtered; } /* * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an * error. */ void add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; int i; /* Don't add duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->local_forwards + i)) return; } options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards, options->num_local_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->local_forwards)); fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; } /* * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is * an error. */ void add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; int i; /* Don't add duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->remote_forwards + i)) return; } options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards, options->num_remote_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->remote_forwards)); fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; fwd->handle = newfwd->handle; fwd->allocated_port = 0; } static void clear_forwardings(Options *options) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host); free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) { free(options->local_forwards); options->local_forwards = NULL; } options->num_local_forwards = 0; for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host); free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) { free(options->remote_forwards); options->remote_forwards = NULL; } options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; } void add_certificate_file(Options *options, const char *path, int userprovided) { int i; if (options->num_certificate_files >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) fatal("Too many certificate files specified (max %d)", SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES); /* Avoid registering duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_certificate_files; i++) { if (options->certificate_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && strcmp(options->certificate_files[i], path) == 0) { debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path); return; } } options->certificate_file_userprovided[options->num_certificate_files] = userprovided; options->certificate_files[options->num_certificate_files++] = xstrdup(path); } void add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename, int userprovided) { char *path; int i; if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)", SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */ path = xstrdup(filename); else if (xasprintf(&path, "%s%s", dir, filename) >= PATH_MAX) fatal("Identity file path %s too long", path); /* Avoid registering duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) { if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) { debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path); free(path); return; } } options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] = userprovided; options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path; } int default_ssh_port(void) { static int port; struct servent *sp; if (port == 0) { sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; } return port; } /* * Execute a command in a shell. * Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit. */ static int execute_in_shell(const char *cmd) { char *shell; pid_t pid; int devnull, status; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if (access(shell, X_OK) == -1) { fatal("Shell \"%s\" is not executable: %s", shell, strerror(errno)); } /* Need this to redirect subprocess stdin/out */ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd); /* Fork and execute the command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[4]; /* Redirect child stdin and stdout. Leave stderr */ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = xstrdup(cmd); argv[3] = NULL; execv(argv[0], argv); error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno)); /* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); kill(getpid(), SIGTERM); _exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid == -1) fatal("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(devnull); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd); return -1; } debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); return WEXITSTATUS(status); } /* * Parse and execute a Match directive. */ static int match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw, const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int final_pass, int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum) { char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria; const char *ruser; int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; char uidstr[32]; /* * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we * must be prepared to use default values. */ port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port; ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user; if (final_pass) { host = xstrdup(options->hostname); } else if (options->hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */ host = percent_expand(options->hostname, "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL); } else { host = xstrdup(host_arg); } debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s", cp, host, original_host); while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { criteria = NULL; this_result = 1; if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!')) attrib++; /* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) { error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined " "with other Match attributes", filename, linenum, oattrib); result = -1; goto out; } if (result) result = negate ? 0 : 1; goto out; } attributes++; if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0 || strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0) { /* * If the config requests "Match final" then remember * this so we can perform a second pass later. */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0 && want_final_pass != NULL) *want_final_pass = 1; r = !!final_pass; /* force bitmask member to boolean */ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'", filename, linenum, this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib); continue; } /* All other criteria require an argument */ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(host); r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(original_host); r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(ruser); r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) { if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port); snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); cmd = percent_expand(arg, "L", shorthost, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "l", thishost, "n", original_host, "p", portstr, "r", ruser, "u", pw->pw_name, "i", uidstr, (char *)NULL); if (result != 1) { /* skip execution if prior predicate failed */ debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec " "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd); free(cmd); continue; } r = execute_in_shell(cmd); if (r == -1) { fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec " "'%.100s' error", filename, linenum, cmd); } criteria = xstrdup(cmd); free(cmd); /* Force exit status to boolean */ r = r == 0; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ", filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ", oattrib, criteria); free(criteria); } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); result = -1; goto out; } out: if (result != -1) debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; free(host); return result; } /* Remove environment variable by pattern */ static void rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum) { int i, j; char *cp; /* Remove an environment variable */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_send_env; ) { cp = xstrdup(options->send_env[i]); if (!match_pattern(cp, arg + 1)) { free(cp); i++; continue; } debug3("%s line %d: removing environment %s", filename, linenum, cp); free(cp); free(options->send_env[i]); options->send_env[i] = NULL; for (j = i; j < options->num_send_env - 1; j++) { options->send_env[j] = options->send_env[j + 1]; options->send_env[j + 1] = NULL; } options->num_send_env--; /* NB. don't increment i */ } } /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. */ static OpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, const char *ignored_unknown) { int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) return keywords[i].opcode; if (ignored_unknown != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1) return oIgnoredUnknownOption; error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return oBadOption; } /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { "ask", 2 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_strict_hostkey[] = { { "true", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES }, { "false", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, { "yes", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES }, { "no", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, { "ask", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK }, { "off", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, { "accept-new", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { "ask", 2 }, { "confirm", 3 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = { { "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO }, { "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK }, { "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = { { "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET }, { "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT }, { "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = { { "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE }, { "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = { { "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = { #ifdef WITH_ZLIB { "yes", COMP_ZLIB }, #endif { "no", COMP_NONE }, { NULL, -1 } }; /* * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This * only sets those values that have not already been set. */ int process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags) { return process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host, line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, NULL, 0); } #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int *want_final_pass, int depth) { char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2; char **cpptr, fwdarg[256]; u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0; int r, oactive, negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0; int remotefwd, dynamicfwd; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; long long val64; size_t len; struct Forward fwd; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; struct allowed_cname *cname; glob_t gl; const char *errstr; if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } /* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */ if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) return 0; for (len--; len > 0; len--) { if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; } s = line; /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ if (*keyword == '\0') keyword = strdelim(&s); if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') return 0; /* Match lowercase keyword */ lowercase(keyword); opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, options->ignored_unknown); switch (opcode) { case oBadOption: /* don't panic, but count bad options */ return -1; case oIgnore: return 0; case oIgnoredUnknownOption: debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; case oConnectTimeout: intptr = &options->connection_timeout; parse_time: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) value = -1; else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardAgent: intptr = &options->forward_agent; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value != -1) { if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; } /* ForwardAgent wasn't 'yes' or 'no', assume a path */ if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = 1; charptr = &options->forward_agent_sock_path; goto parse_agent_path; case oForwardX11: intptr = &options->forward_x11; parse_flag: multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; parse_multistate: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardX11Trusted: intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted; goto parse_flag; case oForwardX11Timeout: intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout; goto parse_time; case oGatewayPorts: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; goto parse_flag; case oExitOnForwardFailure: intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure; goto parse_flag; case oPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveDevices: charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices; goto parse_string; case oPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oChallengeResponseAuthentication: intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssDelegateCreds: intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; goto parse_flag; case oBatchMode: intptr = &options->batch_mode; goto parse_flag; case oCheckHostIP: intptr = &options->check_host_ip; goto parse_flag; case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oStrictHostKeyChecking: intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking; multistate_ptr = multistate_strict_hostkey; goto parse_multistate; case oCompression: intptr = &options->compression; multistate_ptr = multistate_compression; goto parse_multistate; case oTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost: intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost; goto parse_flag; case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts: intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts; goto parse_int; case oRekeyLimit: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", filename, linenum); } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = val64; if (s != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(s, "none") == 0) { (void)strdelim(&s); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case oIdentityFile: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { intptr = &options->num_identity_files; if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); add_identity_file(options, NULL, arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); } break; case oCertificateFile: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { intptr = &options->num_certificate_files; if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) { fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate " "files specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES); } add_certificate_file(options, arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); } break; case oXAuthLocation: charptr=&options->xauth_location; goto parse_string; case oUser: charptr = &options->user; parse_string: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oGlobalKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; parse_char_array: if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries) fatal("%s line %d: " "too many authorized keys files.", filename, linenum); cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg); } } return 0; case oUserKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; goto parse_char_array; case oHostname: charptr = &options->hostname; goto parse_string; case oHostKeyAlias: charptr = &options->host_key_alias; goto parse_string; case oPreferredAuthentications: charptr = &options->preferred_authentications; goto parse_string; case oBindAddress: charptr = &options->bind_address; goto parse_string; case oBindInterface: charptr = &options->bind_interface; goto parse_string; case oPKCS11Provider: charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider; goto parse_string; case oSecurityKeyProvider: charptr = &options->sk_provider; goto parse_string; case oProxyCommand: charptr = &options->proxy_command; /* Ignore ProxyCommand if ProxyJump already specified */ if (options->jump_host != NULL) charptr = &options->jump_host; /* Skip below */ parse_command: if (s == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "="); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(s + len); return 0; case oProxyJump: if (s == NULL) { fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); } len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "="); if (parse_jump(s + len, options, *activep) == -1) { fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid ProxyJump \"%s\"", filename, linenum, s + len); } return 0; case oPort: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = a2port(arg); if (value <= 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad port '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && options->port == -1) options->port = value; break; case oConnectionAttempts: intptr = &options->connection_attempts; parse_int: arg = strdelim(&s); if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: integer value %s.", filename, linenum, errstr); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oCiphers: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case oMacs: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 MAC spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case oKexAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case oHostKeyAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; parse_keytypes: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oCASignatureAlgorithms: charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms; goto parse_keytypes; case oLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = strdelim(&s); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case oLogFacility: log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; arg = strdelim(&s); value = log_facility_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; break; case oLocalForward: case oRemoteForward: case oDynamicForward: arg = strdelim(&s); if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.", filename, linenum); remotefwd = (opcode == oRemoteForward); dynamicfwd = (opcode == oDynamicForward); if (!dynamicfwd) { arg2 = strdelim(&s); if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') { if (remotefwd) dynamicfwd = 1; else fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target " "argument.", filename, linenum); } else { /* construct a string for parse_forward */ snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2); } } if (dynamicfwd) strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg)); if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, dynamicfwd, remotefwd) == 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { if (remotefwd) { add_remote_forward(options, &fwd); } else { add_local_forward(options, &fwd); } } break; case oClearAllForwardings: intptr = &options->clear_forwardings; goto parse_flag; case oHost: if (cmdline) fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); *activep = 0; arg2 = NULL; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if ((flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) != 0) break; negated = *arg == '!'; if (negated) arg++; if (match_pattern(host, arg)) { if (negated) { debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host " "block because of negated match " "for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg); *activep = 0; break; } if (!*activep) arg2 = arg; /* logged below */ *activep = 1; } } if (*activep) debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg2); /* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */ return 0; case oMatch: if (cmdline) fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); value = match_cfg_line(options, &s, pw, host, original_host, flags & SSHCONF_FINAL, want_final_pass, filename, linenum); if (value < 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); *activep = (flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value; break; case oEscapeChar: intptr = &options->escape_char; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else if (arg[1] == '\0') value = (u_char) arg[0]; else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128) value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31; else { fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.", filename, linenum); /* NOTREACHED */ value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */ } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; goto parse_multistate; case oEnableSSHKeysign: intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign; goto parse_flag; case oIdentitiesOnly: intptr = &options->identities_only; goto parse_flag; case oServerAliveInterval: intptr = &options->server_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case oServerAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case oSendEnv: while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; if (*arg == '-') { /* Removing an env var */ rm_env(options, arg, filename, linenum); continue; } else { /* Adding an env var */ if (options->num_send_env >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.", filename, linenum); options->send_env = xrecallocarray( options->send_env, options->num_send_env, options->num_send_env + 1, sizeof(*options->send_env)); options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] = xstrdup(arg); } } break; case oSetEnv: value = options->num_setenv; while ((arg = strdelimw(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid SetEnv.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep || value != 0) continue; /* Adding a setenv var */ if (options->num_setenv >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s line %d: too many SetEnv.", filename, linenum); options->setenv = xrecallocarray( options->setenv, options->num_setenv, options->num_setenv + 1, sizeof(*options->setenv)); options->setenv[options->num_setenv++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oControlPath: charptr = &options->control_path; goto parse_string; case oControlMaster: intptr = &options->control_master; multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster; goto parse_multistate; case oControlPersist: /* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */ intptr = &options->control_persist; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist" " argument.", filename, linenum); value = 0; value2 = 0; /* timeout */ if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0) value = 0; else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0) value = 1; else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0) value = 1; else fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { *intptr = value; options->control_persist_timeout = value2; } break; case oHashKnownHosts: intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts; goto parse_flag; case oTunnel: intptr = &options->tun_open; multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel; goto parse_multistate; case oTunnelDevice: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = a2tun(arg, &value2); if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { options->tun_local = value; options->tun_remote = value2; } break; case oLocalCommand: charptr = &options->local_command; goto parse_command; case oPermitLocalCommand: intptr = &options->permit_local_command; goto parse_flag; case oRemoteCommand: charptr = &options->remote_command; goto parse_command; case oVisualHostKey: intptr = &options->visual_host_key; goto parse_flag; case oInclude: if (cmdline) fatal("Include directive not supported as a " "command-line option"); value = 0; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { /* * Ensure all paths are anchored. User configuration * files may begin with '~/' but system configurations * must not. If the path is relative, then treat it * as living in ~/.ssh for user configurations or * /etc/ssh for system ones. */ if (*arg == '~' && (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) == 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: bad include path %s.", filename, linenum, arg); if (!path_absolute(arg) && *arg != '~') { xasprintf(&arg2, "%s/%s", (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) ? "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR : SSHDIR, arg); } else arg2 = xstrdup(arg); memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); r = glob(arg2, GLOB_TILDE, NULL, &gl); if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) { debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no " "files",filename, linenum, arg2); free(arg2); continue; } else if (r != 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.", filename, linenum, arg2); free(arg2); oactive = *activep; for (i = 0; i < gl.gl_pathc; i++) { debug3("%.200s line %d: Including file %s " "depth %d%s", filename, linenum, gl.gl_pathv[i], depth, oactive ? "" : " (parse only)"); r = read_config_file_depth(gl.gl_pathv[i], pw, host, original_host, options, flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | (oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH), activep, want_final_pass, depth + 1); if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) { fatal("Can't open user config file " "%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno)); } /* * don't let Match in includes clobber the * containing file's Match state. */ *activep = oactive; if (r != 1) value = -1; } globfree(&gl); } if (value != 0) return value; break; case oIPQoS: arg = strdelim(&s); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); arg = strdelim(&s); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case oRequestTTY: intptr = &options->request_tty; multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty; goto parse_multistate; case oIgnoreUnknown: charptr = &options->ignored_unknown; goto parse_string; case oProxyUseFdpass: intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass; goto parse_flag; case oCanonicalDomains: value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if (!valid_domain(arg, 1, &errstr)) { fatal("%s line %d: %s", filename, linenum, errstr); } if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.", filename, linenum); options->canonical_domains[ options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs: value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { /* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */ if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0) arg2 = arg; else { lowercase(arg); if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL || arg2[1] == '\0') { fatal("%s line %d: " "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"", filename, linenum, arg); } *arg2 = '\0'; arg2++; } if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.", filename, linenum); cname = options->permitted_cnames + options->num_permitted_cnames++; cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg); cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2); } break; case oCanonicalizeHostname: intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname; multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname; goto parse_multistate; case oCanonicalizeMaxDots: intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots; goto parse_int; case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal: intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local; goto parse_flag; case oStreamLocalBindMask: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", filename, linenum); /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8); if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case oStreamLocalBindUnlink: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; goto parse_flag; case oRevokedHostKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys; goto parse_string; case oFingerprintHash: intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oUpdateHostkeys: intptr = &options->update_hostkeys; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oHostbasedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types; goto parse_keytypes; case oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types; goto parse_keytypes; case oAddKeysToAgent: intptr = &options->add_keys_to_agent; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoaskconfirm; goto parse_multistate; case oIdentityAgent: charptr = &options->identity_agent; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); parse_agent_path: /* Extra validation if the string represents an env var. */ if (arg[0] == '$' && !valid_env_name(arg + 1)) { fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment name %s.", filename, linenum, arg); } if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oDeprecated: debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; case oUnsupported: error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; default: fatal("%s: Unimplemented opcode %d", __func__, opcode); } /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", filename, linenum, arg); } return 0; } /* * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. */ int read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags, int *want_final_pass) { int active = 1; return read_config_file_depth(filename, pw, host, original_host, options, flags, &active, want_final_pass, 0); } #define READCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16 static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; int linenum; int bad_options = 0; if (depth < 0 || depth > READCONF_MAX_DEPTH) fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes"); if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return 0; if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) { struct stat sb; if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); } debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); /* * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned * on/off by Host specifications. */ linenum = 0; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { /* Update line number counter. */ linenum++; if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host, line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, want_final_pass, depth) != 0) bad_options++; } free(line); fclose(f); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); return 1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } /* * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. */ void initialize_options(Options * options) { memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options)); options->forward_agent = -1; options->forward_agent_sock_path = NULL; options->forward_x11 = -1; options->forward_x11_trusted = -1; options->forward_x11_timeout = -1; options->stdio_forward_host = NULL; options->stdio_forward_port = 0; options->clear_forwardings = -1; options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->batch_mode = -1; options->check_host_ip = -1; options->strict_host_key_checking = -1; options->compression = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->port = -1; options->address_family = -1; options->connection_attempts = -1; options->connection_timeout = -1; options->number_of_password_prompts = -1; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL; options->num_identity_files = 0; options->num_certificate_files = 0; options->hostname = NULL; options->host_key_alias = NULL; options->proxy_command = NULL; options->jump_user = NULL; options->jump_host = NULL; options->jump_port = -1; options->jump_extra = NULL; options->user = NULL; options->escape_char = -1; options->num_system_hostfiles = 0; options->num_user_hostfiles = 0; options->local_forwards = NULL; options->num_local_forwards = 0; options->remote_forwards = NULL; options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->preferred_authentications = NULL; options->bind_address = NULL; options->bind_interface = NULL; options->pkcs11_provider = NULL; options->sk_provider = NULL; options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1; options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; options->identities_only = - 1; options->rekey_limit = - 1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->verify_host_key_dns = -1; options->server_alive_interval = -1; options->server_alive_count_max = -1; options->send_env = NULL; options->num_send_env = 0; options->setenv = NULL; options->num_setenv = 0; options->control_path = NULL; options->control_master = -1; options->control_persist = -1; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; options->hash_known_hosts = -1; options->tun_open = -1; options->tun_local = -1; options->tun_remote = -1; options->local_command = NULL; options->permit_local_command = -1; options->remote_command = NULL; options->add_keys_to_agent = -1; options->identity_agent = NULL; options->visual_host_key = -1; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->request_tty = -1; options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1; options->ignored_unknown = NULL; options->num_canonical_domains = 0; options->num_permitted_cnames = 0; options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1; options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1; options->canonicalize_hostname = -1; options->revoked_host_keys = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; options->update_hostkeys = -1; options->hostbased_key_types = NULL; options->pubkey_key_types = NULL; } /* * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed. */ void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options) { if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; } /* * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. */ void fill_default_options(Options * options) { char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig; char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig; int r; if (options->forward_agent == -1) options->forward_agent = 0; if (options->forward_x11 == -1) options->forward_x11 = 0; if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1) options->forward_x11_trusted = 0; if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1) options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200; /* * stdio forwarding (-W) changes the default for these but we defer * setting the values so they can be overridden. */ if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1) options->exit_on_forward_failure = options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0; if (options->clear_forwardings == -1) options->clear_forwardings = options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0; if (options->clear_forwardings == 1) clear_forwardings(options); if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH; if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->batch_mode == -1) options->batch_mode = 0; if (options->check_host_ip == -1) options->check_host_ip = 1; if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1) options->strict_host_key_checking = SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK; if (options->compression == -1) options->compression = 0; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->port == -1) options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */ if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->connection_attempts == -1) options->connection_attempts = 1; if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) options->add_keys_to_agent = 0; if (options->num_identity_files == 0) { add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK, 0); #endif add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, 0); } if (options->escape_char == -1) options->escape_char = '~'; if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) { options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE); options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->update_hostkeys == -1) options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO; if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) { options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER; if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1) options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; if (options->identities_only == -1) options->identities_only = 0; if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1) options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0; if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) options->verify_host_key_dns = 0; if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) options->server_alive_interval = 0; if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1) options->server_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->control_master == -1) options->control_master = 0; if (options->control_persist == -1) { options->control_persist = 0; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; } if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1) options->hash_known_hosts = 0; if (options->tun_open == -1) options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->tun_local == -1) options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->tun_remote == -1) options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->permit_local_command == -1) options->permit_local_command = 0; if (options->visual_host_key == -1) options->visual_host_key = 0; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; if (options->request_tty == -1) options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO; if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1) options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0; if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; #ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL if (options->sk_provider == NULL) options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal"); #else if (options->sk_provider == NULL) options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER"); #endif /* Expand KEX name lists */ all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0); all_mac = mac_alg_list(','); all_kex = kex_alg_list(','); all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */ def_cipher = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); def_mac = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac); def_kex = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex); def_key = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); def_sig = match_filter_whitelist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ do { \ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \ defaults, all)) != 0) \ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \ } while (0) ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher); ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac); ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex); ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig); #undef ASSEMBLE free(all_cipher); free(all_mac); free(all_kex); free(all_key); free(all_sig); free(def_cipher); free(def_mac); free(def_kex); kex_default_pk_alg_filtered = def_key; /* save for later use */ free(def_sig); #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->remote_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pkcs11_provider); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider); if (options->jump_host != NULL && strcmp(options->jump_host, "none") == 0 && options->jump_port == 0 && options->jump_user == NULL) { free(options->jump_host); options->jump_host = NULL; } /* options->identity_agent distinguishes NULL from 'none' */ /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */ /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */ } struct fwdarg { char *arg; int ispath; }; /* * parse_fwd_field * parses the next field in a port forwarding specification. * sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon * or sets it to NULL at end of string. * returns 0 on success, else non-zero. */ static int parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd) { char *ep, *cp = *p; int ispath = 0; if (*cp == '\0') { *p = NULL; return -1; /* end of string */ } /* * A field escaped with square brackets is used literally. * XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash? */ if (*cp == '[') { /* find matching ']' */ for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) { if (*ep == '/') ispath = 1; } /* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */ if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0')) return -1; /* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */ *ep++ = '\0'; if (*ep != '\0') *ep++ = '\0'; fwd->arg = cp + 1; fwd->ispath = ispath; *p = ep; return 0; } for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { switch (*cp) { case '\\': memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1); if (*cp == '\0') return -1; break; case '/': ispath = 1; break; case ':': *cp++ = '\0'; goto done; } } done: fwd->arg = *p; fwd->ispath = ispath; *p = cp; return 0; } /* * parse_forward * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form: * dynamicfwd == 0 * [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath * listenpath:connectpath * dynamicfwd == 1 * [listenhost:]listenport * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error */ int parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd) { struct fwdarg fwdargs[4]; char *p, *cp; int i; memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd)); memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs)); cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec); /* skip leading spaces */ while (isspace((u_char)*cp)) cp++; for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0) break; } /* Check for trailing garbage */ if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') { i = 0; /* failure */ } switch (i) { case 1: if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); } fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); break; case 2: if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); } break; case 3: if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); } else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) { fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); } break; case 4: fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg); break; default: i = 0; /* failure */ } free(p); if (dynamicfwd) { if (!(i == 1 || i == 2)) goto fail_free; } else { if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) { if (fwd->connect_path == NULL && fwd->listen_path == NULL) goto fail_free; } if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL) goto fail_free; } if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) || (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0)) goto fail_free; if (fwd->connect_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; /* XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not match this host */ if (fwd->connect_path != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_path != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) goto fail_free; return (i); fail_free: free(fwd->connect_host); fwd->connect_host = NULL; free(fwd->connect_path); fwd->connect_path = NULL; free(fwd->listen_host); fwd->listen_host = NULL; free(fwd->listen_path); fwd->listen_path = NULL; return (0); } int parse_jump(const char *s, Options *o, int active) { char *orig, *sdup, *cp; char *host = NULL, *user = NULL; int ret = -1, port = -1, first; active &= o->proxy_command == NULL && o->jump_host == NULL; orig = sdup = xstrdup(s); first = active; do { if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) break; if ((cp = strrchr(sdup, ',')) == NULL) cp = sdup; /* last */ else *cp++ = '\0'; if (first) { /* First argument and configuration is active */ if (parse_ssh_uri(cp, &user, &host, &port) == -1 || parse_user_host_port(cp, &user, &host, &port) != 0) goto out; } else { /* Subsequent argument or inactive configuration */ if (parse_ssh_uri(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) == -1 || parse_user_host_port(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0) goto out; } first = 0; /* only check syntax for subsequent hosts */ } while (cp != sdup); /* success */ if (active) { if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) { o->jump_host = xstrdup("none"); o->jump_port = 0; } else { o->jump_user = user; o->jump_host = host; o->jump_port = port; o->proxy_command = xstrdup("none"); user = host = NULL; if ((cp = strrchr(s, ',')) != NULL && cp != s) { o->jump_extra = xstrdup(s); o->jump_extra[cp - s] = '\0'; } } } ret = 0; out: free(orig); free(user); free(host); return ret; } int parse_ssh_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp) { char *path; int r; r = parse_uri("ssh", uri, userp, hostp, portp, &path); if (r == 0 && path != NULL) r = -1; /* path not allowed */ return r; } /* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */ static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case oAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: case oUpdateHostkeys: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask); case oStrictHostKeyChecking: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_strict_hostkey); case oControlMaster: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster); case oTunnel: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel); case oRequestTTY: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty); case oCanonicalizeHostname: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname); case oAddKeysToAgent: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoaskconfirm); case oFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static const char * lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } static void dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val) { if (val == NULL) return; printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); printf("\n"); } static void dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds) { const struct Forward *fwd; u_int i; /* oDynamicForward */ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { fwd = &fwds[i]; if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0) continue; if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0) continue; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path); else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL) printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port); else { printf(" [%s]:%d", fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); } if (code != oDynamicForward) { if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path); else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port); else { printf(" [%s]:%d", fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); } } printf("\n"); } } void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) { int i, r; char buf[8], *all_key; /* * Expand HostKeyAlgorithms name lists. This isn't handled in * fill_default_options() like the other algorithm lists because * the host key algorithms are by default dynamically chosen based * on the host's keys found in known_hosts. */ all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->hostkeyalgorithms, kex_default_pk_alg(), all_key)) != 0) fatal("%s: expand HostKeyAlgorithms: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(all_key); /* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */ dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user); dump_cfg_string(oHostname, host); dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port); /* Flag options */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddKeysToAgent, o->add_keys_to_agent); dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family); dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname); dump_cfg_fmtint(oChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master); dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign); dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings); dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure); dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds); #endif /* GSSAPI */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command); dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open); dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key); dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys); /* Integer options */ dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots); dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts); dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout); dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts); dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max); dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval); /* String options */ dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address); dump_cfg_string(oBindInterface, o->bind_interface); dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers); dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path); dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms); dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias); dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types); dump_cfg_string(oIdentityAgent, o->identity_agent); dump_cfg_string(oIgnoreUnknown, o->ignored_unknown); dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices); dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(oCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command); dump_cfg_string(oRemoteCommand, o->remote_command); dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider); #endif dump_cfg_string(oSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider); dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications); dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types); dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys); dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); /* Forwards */ dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards); /* String array options */ dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains); dump_cfg_strarray(oCertificateFile, o->num_certificate_files, o->certificate_files); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles); dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env); dump_cfg_strarray(oSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv); /* Special cases */ /* oForwardAgent */ if (o->forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent); else dump_cfg_string(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent_sock_path); /* oConnectTimeout */ if (o->connection_timeout == -1) printf("connecttimeout none\n"); else dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout); /* oTunnelDevice */ printf("tunneldevice"); if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY) printf(" any"); else printf(" %d", o->tun_local); if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY) printf(":any"); else printf(":%d", o->tun_remote); printf("\n"); /* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */ if ( o->num_permitted_cnames > 0) { printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames"); for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) { printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list, o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list); } printf("\n"); } /* oControlPersist */ if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0) dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist); else dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout); /* oEscapeChar */ if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) printf("escapechar none\n"); else { vis(buf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0); printf("escapechar %s\n", buf); } /* oIPQoS */ printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); /* oRekeyLimit */ printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); /* oStreamLocalBindMask */ printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n", o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); /* oLogFacility */ printf("syslogfacility %s\n", log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); /* oProxyCommand / oProxyJump */ if (o->jump_host == NULL) dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command); else { /* Check for numeric addresses */ i = strchr(o->jump_host, ':') != NULL || strspn(o->jump_host, "1234567890.") == strlen(o->jump_host); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", o->jump_port); printf("proxyjump %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", /* optional additional jump spec */ o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : o->jump_extra, o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : ",", /* optional user */ o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : o->jump_user, o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : "@", /* opening [ if hostname is numeric */ i ? "[" : "", /* mandatory hostname */ o->jump_host, /* closing ] if hostname is numeric */ i ? "]" : "", /* optional port number */ o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : ":", o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : buf); } } openssh-8.2p1/readconf.h010064400017500001750000000176631362136622600134300ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.132 2020/01/23 02:46:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for reading the configuration file. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef READCONF_H #define READCONF_H /* Data structure for representing option data. */ #define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32 #define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32 #define PATH_MAX_SUN (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path) struct allowed_cname { char *source_list; char *target_list; }; typedef struct { int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */ char *forward_agent_sock_path; /* Optional path of the agent. */ int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */ int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */ int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */ int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */ char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */ struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */ int challenge_response_authentication; /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ int password_authentication; /* Try password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */ int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */ int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */ int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */ int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */ int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */ int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */ int port; /* Port to connect. */ int address_family; int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before * giving up */ int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before * aborting connection attempt */ int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password * prompts. */ char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */ char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */ char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */ char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */ char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */ char *user; /* User to log in as. */ int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */ u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */ char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES]; u_int num_user_hostfiles; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */ char *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES]; char *preferred_authentications; char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */ char *bind_interface; /* local interface for bind address */ char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */ char *sk_provider; /* Security key provider */ int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */ int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */ char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; int num_certificate_files; /* Number of extra certificates for ssh. */ char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; int add_keys_to_agent; char *identity_agent; /* Optional path to ssh-agent socket */ /* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */ int num_local_forwards; struct Forward *local_forwards; /* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */ int num_remote_forwards; struct Forward *remote_forwards; int clear_forwardings; /* stdio forwarding (-W) host and port */ char *stdio_forward_host; int stdio_forward_port; int enable_ssh_keysign; int64_t rekey_limit; int rekey_interval; int no_host_authentication_for_localhost; int identities_only; int server_alive_interval; int server_alive_count_max; int num_send_env; char **send_env; int num_setenv; char **setenv; char *control_path; int control_master; int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */ int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */ int hash_known_hosts; int tun_open; /* tun(4) */ int tun_local; /* force tun device (optional) */ int tun_remote; /* force tun device (optional) */ char *local_command; int permit_local_command; char *remote_command; int visual_host_key; int request_tty; int proxy_use_fdpass; int num_canonical_domains; char *canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS]; int canonicalize_hostname; int canonicalize_max_dots; int canonicalize_fallback_local; int num_permitted_cnames; struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS]; char *revoked_host_keys; int fingerprint_hash; int update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */ char *hostbased_key_types; char *pubkey_key_types; char *jump_user; char *jump_host; int jump_port; char *jump_extra; char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */ } Options; #define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0 #define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES 1 #define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS 2 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4 #define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO 0 #define REQUEST_TTY_NO 1 #define REQUEST_TTY_YES 2 #define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE 3 #define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */ #define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */ #define SSHCONF_FINAL 4 /* Final pass over config, after canon. */ #define SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH 8 /* Match/Host never matches; internal only */ #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO 0 #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1 #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2 #define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF 0 #define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW 1 #define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES 2 #define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK 3 const char *kex_default_pk_alg(void); void initialize_options(Options *); void fill_default_options(Options *); void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *); int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int); int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, Options *, int, int *); int parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int); int parse_jump(const char *, Options *, int); int parse_ssh_uri(const char *, char **, char **, int *); int default_ssh_port(void); int option_clear_or_none(const char *); void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host); void add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *); void add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *); void add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int); void add_certificate_file(Options *, const char *, int); #endif /* READCONF_H */ openssh-8.2p1/readpass.c010064400017500001750000000172561362136622600134420ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.61 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "misc.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "uidswap.h" static char * ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg, const char *env_hint) { pid_t pid, ret; size_t len; char *pass; int p[2], status; char buf[1024]; void (*osigchld)(int); if (fflush(stdout) != 0) error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (askpass == NULL) fatal("internal error: askpass undefined"); if (pipe(p) == -1) { error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); return NULL; } if (pid == 0) { close(p[0]); if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (env_hint != NULL) setenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT", env_hint, 1); execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *)NULL); fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, askpass, strerror(errno)); } close(p[1]); len = 0; do { ssize_t r = read(p[0], buf + len, sizeof(buf) - 1 - len); if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR) continue; if (r <= 0) break; len += r; } while (sizeof(buf) - 1 - len > 0); buf[len] = '\0'; close(p[0]); while ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) break; ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); if (ret == -1 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); return NULL; } buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; pass = xstrdup(buf); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); return pass; } /* private/internal read_passphrase flags */ #define RP_ASK_PERMISSION 0x8000 /* pass hint to askpass for confirm UI */ /* * Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on. Returns the * passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered. If * RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no * tty is available */ char * read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags) { char cr = '\r', *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024]; int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd; const char *askpass_hint = NULL; rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF; if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) use_askpass = 1; else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) { if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { debug("read_passphrase: stdin is not a tty"); use_askpass = 1; } } else { rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY; ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR); if (ttyfd >= 0) { /* * If we're on a tty, ensure that show the prompt at * the beginning of the line. This will hopefully * clobber any password characters the user has * optimistically typed before echo is disabled. */ (void)write(ttyfd, &cr, 1); close(ttyfd); } else { debug("read_passphrase: can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY, strerror(errno)); use_askpass = 1; } } if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL) return (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) ? NULL : xstrdup(""); if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) { if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV)) askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV); else askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT; if ((flags & RP_ASK_PERMISSION) != 0) askpass_hint = "confirm"; if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt, askpass_hint)) == NULL) if (!(flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF)) return xstrdup(""); return ret; } if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) { if (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) return NULL; return xstrdup(""); } ret = xstrdup(buf); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); return ret; } int ask_permission(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; char *p, prompt[1024]; int allowed = 0; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), fmt, args); va_end(args); p = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ASK_PERMISSION); if (p != NULL) { /* * Accept empty responses and responses consisting * of the word "yes" as affirmative. */ if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' || strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0) allowed = 1; free(p); } return (allowed); } struct notifier_ctx { pid_t pid; void (*osigchld)(int); }; struct notifier_ctx * notify_start(int force_askpass, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; char *prompt = NULL; int devnull; pid_t pid; void (*osigchld)(int); const char *askpass; struct notifier_ctx *ret; va_start(args, fmt); xvasprintf(&prompt, fmt, args); va_end(args); if (fflush(NULL) != 0) error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (!force_askpass && isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) { (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r", 1); (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, prompt, strlen(prompt)); (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r\n", 2); free(prompt); return NULL; } if ((askpass = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS")) == NULL) askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT; if (getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL || *askpass == '\0') { debug3("%s: cannot notify", __func__); free(prompt); return NULL; } osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); free(prompt); return NULL; } if (pid == 0) { if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) fatal("%s: open %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); setenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT", "none", 1); /* hint to UI */ execlp(askpass, askpass, prompt, (char *)NULL); error("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, askpass, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); /* NOTREACHED */ } if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) { kill(pid, SIGTERM); fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__); } ret->pid = pid; ret->osigchld = osigchld; free(prompt); return ret; } void notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *ctx) { int ret; if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pid <= 0) { free(ctx); return; } kill(ctx->pid, SIGTERM); while ((ret = waitpid(ctx->pid, NULL, 0)) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) break; } if (ret == -1) fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, ctx->osigchld); free(ctx); } openssh-8.2p1/regress004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600130575ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/Makefile010064400017500001750000000164561362136622600146070ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.106 2020/01/31 23:25:08 djm Exp $ tests: prep file-tests t-exec unit REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 # File based tests file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS) # Interop tests are not run by default interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop prep: test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out clean: for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done rm -rf $(OBJ).putty distclean: clean LTESTS= connect \ proxy-connect \ connect-privsep \ connect-uri \ proto-version \ proto-mismatch \ exit-status \ envpass \ transfer \ banner \ rekey \ dhgex \ stderr-data \ stderr-after-eof \ broken-pipe \ try-ciphers \ yes-head \ login-timeout \ agent \ agent-getpeereid \ agent-timeout \ agent-ptrace \ keyscan \ keygen-change \ keygen-convert \ keygen-moduli \ key-options \ scp \ scp-uri \ sftp \ sftp-chroot \ sftp-cmds \ sftp-badcmds \ sftp-batch \ sftp-glob \ sftp-perm \ sftp-uri \ reconfigure \ dynamic-forward \ forwarding \ multiplex \ reexec \ brokenkeys \ sshcfgparse \ cfgparse \ cfgmatch \ cfgmatchlisten \ addrmatch \ localcommand \ forcecommand \ portnum \ keytype \ kextype \ cert-hostkey \ cert-userkey \ host-expand \ keys-command \ forward-control \ integrity \ krl \ multipubkey \ limit-keytype \ hostkey-agent \ keygen-knownhosts \ hostkey-rotate \ principals-command \ cert-file \ cfginclude \ servcfginclude \ allow-deny-users \ authinfo \ sshsig INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp EXTRA_TESTS= agent-pkcs11 #EXTRA_TESTS+= cipher-speed USERNAME= ${LOGNAME} CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \ authorized_keys_${USERNAME}.* \ authorized_principals_${USERNAME} \ banner.in banner.out cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \ copy.1 copy.2 data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent* \ ed25519-agent.pub ed25519 ed25519.pub empty.in \ expect failed-regress.log failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log \ hkr.* host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 host.ssh-dss host.ssh-ed25519 \ host.ssh-rsa host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \ key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 \ key.ed25519-512.pub key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* \ known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \ modpipe netcat no_identity_config \ pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \ revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \ rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \ scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \ sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \ ssh-rsa_oldfmt \ ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \ ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \ sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \ sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \ t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \ t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \ user_*key* user_ca* user_key* # Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=CFGJRSUX" TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen CPPFLAGS=-I.. t1: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv t2: cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t3: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t4: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok t5: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok t6: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2 chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2 $(OBJ)/t7.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@ t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t8.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@ t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t9.out: test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@ t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t10.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@ t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null t11: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok $(OBJ)/t12.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@ t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ skip=no; \ for t in ""$${SKIP_LTESTS}; do \ if [ "x$${t}.sh" = "x$${TEST}" ]; then skip=yes; fi; \ done; \ if [ "x$${skip}" = "xno" ]; then \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ else \ echo skip test $${TEST} 1>&2; \ fi; \ done t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done t-extra: ${EXTRA_TESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done # Not run by default interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS} # Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile unit: set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \ V="" ; \ test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \ V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/match/test_match ; \ if test "x${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" = "xyes" ; then \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 ; \ fi \ fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/README.regress010064400017500001750000000133271362136622600154720ustar00djmdjmOverview. $ ./configure && make tests You'll see some progress info. A failure will cause either the make to abort or the driver script to report a "FATAL" failure. The test consists of 2 parts. The first is the file-based tests which is driven by the Makefile, and the second is a set of network or proxycommand based tests, which are driven by a driver script (test-exec.sh) which is called multiple times by the Makefile. Failures in the first part will cause the Makefile to return an error. Failures in the second part will print a "FATAL" message for the failed test and continue. OpenBSD has a system-wide regression test suite. OpenSSH Portable's test suite is based on OpenBSD's with modifications. Environment variables. SKIP_UNIT: Skip unit tests. SUDO: path to sudo/doas command, if desired. Note that some systems (notably systems using PAM) require sudo to execute some tests. LTESTS: Whitespace separated list of tests (filenames without the .sh extension) to run. SKIP_LTESTS: Whitespace separated list of tests to skip. OBJ: used by test scripts to access build dir. TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts. TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL: set to "yes" to make any failure abort the test currently in progress. TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests. TEST_SSH_QUIET: set to "yes" to suppress non-fatal output. TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config before running each test. TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to ssh_config before running each test. TEST_SSH_TRACE: set to "yes" for verbose output from tests TEST_SSH_x: path to "ssh" command under test, where x is one of SSH, SSHD, SSHAGENT, SSHADD, SSHKEYGEN, SSHKEYSCAN, SFTP or SFTPSERVER USE_VALGRIND: Run the tests under valgrind memory checker. Individual tests. You can run an individual test from the top-level Makefile, eg: $ make tests LTESTS=agent-timeout If you need to manipulate the environment more you can invoke test-exec.sh directly if you set up the path to find the binaries under test and the test scripts themselves, for example: $ cd regress $ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. TEST_SHELL=/bin/sh sh test-exec.sh `pwd` \ agent-timeout.sh ok agent timeout test Files. test-exec.sh: the main test driver. Sets environment, creates config files and keys and runs the specified test. At the time of writing, the individual tests are: connect.sh: simple connect proxy-connect.sh: proxy connect connect-privsep.sh: proxy connect with privsep connect-uri.sh: uri connect proto-version.sh: sshd version with different protocol combinations proto-mismatch.sh: protocol version mismatch exit-status.sh: remote exit status envpass.sh: environment passing transfer.sh: transfer data banner.sh: banner rekey.sh: rekey stderr-data.sh: stderr data transfer stderr-after-eof.sh: stderr data after eof broken-pipe.sh: broken pipe test try-ciphers.sh: try ciphers yes-head.sh: yes pipe head login-timeout.sh: connect after login grace timeout agent.sh: simple connect via agent agent-getpeereid.sh: disallow agent attach from other uid agent-timeout.sh: agent timeout test agent-ptrace.sh: disallow agent ptrace attach keyscan.sh: keyscan keygen-change.sh: change passphrase for key keygen-convert.sh: convert keys keygen-moduli.sh: keygen moduli key-options.sh: key options scp.sh: scp scp-uri.sh: scp-uri sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get sftp-chroot.sh: sftp in chroot sftp-cmds.sh: sftp command sftp-badcmds.sh: sftp invalid commands sftp-batch.sh: sftp batchfile sftp-glob.sh: sftp glob sftp-perm.sh: sftp permissions sftp-uri.sh: sftp-uri ssh-com-client.sh: connect with ssh.com client ssh-com-keygen.sh: ssh.com key import ssh-com-sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server ssh-com.sh: connect to ssh.com server reconfigure.sh: simple connect after reconfigure dynamic-forward.sh: dynamic forwarding forwarding.sh: local and remote forwarding multiplex.sh: connection multiplexing reexec.sh: reexec tests brokenkeys.sh: broken keys sshcfgparse.sh: ssh config parse cfgparse.sh: sshd config parse cfgmatch.sh: sshd_config match cfgmatchlisten.sh: sshd_config matchlisten addrmatch.sh: address match localcommand.sh: localcommand forcecommand.sh: forced command portnum.sh: port number parsing keytype.sh: login with different key types kextype.sh: login with different key exchange algorithms cert-hostkey.sh certified host keys cert-userkey.sh: certified user keys host-expand.sh: expand %h and %n keys-command.sh: authorized keys from command forward-control.sh: sshd control of local and remote forwarding integrity.sh: integrity krl.sh: key revocation lists multipubkey.sh: multiple pubkey limit-keytype.sh: restrict pubkey type hostkey-agent.sh: hostkey agent keygen-knownhosts.sh: ssh-keygen known_hosts hostkey-rotate.sh: hostkey rotate principals-command.sh: authorized principals command cert-file.sh: ssh with certificates cfginclude.sh: config include allow-deny-users.sh: AllowUsers/DenyUsers authinfo.sh: authinfo Problems? Run the failing test with shell tracing (-x) turned on: $ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. sh -x test-exec.sh `pwd` agent-timeout.sh Failed tests can be difficult to diagnose. Suggestions: - run the individual test via ./test-exec.sh `pwd` [testname] - set LogLevel to VERBOSE in test-exec.sh and enable syslogging of auth.debug (eg to /var/log/authlog). Known Issues. - Similarly, if you do not have "scp" in your system's $PATH then the multiplex scp tests will fail (since the system's shell startup scripts will determine where the shell started by sshd will look for scp). - Recent GNU coreutils deprecate "head -[n]": this will cause the yes-head test to fail. The old behaviour can be restored by setting (and exporting) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 before running the tests. openssh-8.2p1/regress/addrmatch.sh010064400017500001750000000041001362136622600154110ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: addrmatch.sh,v 1.4 2012/05/13 01:42:32 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="address match" mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak run_trial() { user="$1"; addr="$2"; host="$3"; laddr="$4"; lport="$5" expected="$6"; descr="$7" verbose "test $descr for $user $addr $host" result=`${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy -T \ -C user=${user},addr=${addr},host=${host},laddr=${laddr},lport=${lport} | \ awk '/^forcecommand/ {print $2}'` if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then fail "failed '$descr' expected $expected got $result" fi } cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy cat >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy < /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" else chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK} ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1" fi if test -z "$sudo" ; then # doas ${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null else # sudo < /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null fi r=$? if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then fail "ssh-add did not fail for ${UNPRIV}: $r < 2" fi trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null fi rm -f ${OBJ}/agent openssh-8.2p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh010064400017500001750000000062621362136622600156730ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.7 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="pkcs11 agent test" try_token_libs() { for _lib in "$@" ; do if test -f "$_lib" ; then verbose "Using token library $_lib" TEST_SSH_PKCS11="$_lib" return fi done echo "skipped: Unable to find PKCS#11 token library" exit 0 } try_token_libs \ /usr/local/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so \ /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so \ /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so TEST_SSH_PIN=1234 TEST_SSH_SOPIN=12345678 if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER" != "x" ]; then SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER fi test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist" # setup environment for softhsm2 token DIR=$OBJ/SOFTHSM rm -rf $DIR TOKEN=$DIR/tokendir mkdir -p $TOKEN SOFTHSM2_CONF=$DIR/softhsm2.conf export SOFTHSM2_CONF cat > $SOFTHSM2_CONF << EOF # SoftHSM v2 configuration file directories.tokendir = ${TOKEN} objectstore.backend = file # ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG log.level = DEBUG # If CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE flag should be set slots.removable = false EOF out=$(softhsm2-util --init-token --free --label token-slot-0 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --so-pin "$TEST_SSH_SOPIN") slot=$(echo -- $out | sed 's/.* //') # prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true export SSH_ASKPASS unset DISPLAY # start command w/o tty, so ssh-add accepts pin from stdin notty() { perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid(); if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@" } trace "generating keys" RSA=${DIR}/RSA EC=${DIR}/EC openssl genpkey -algorithm rsa > $RSA openssl pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $RSA |\ softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label 01 --id 01 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin openssl genpkey \ -genparam \ -algorithm ec \ -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 |\ openssl genpkey \ -paramfile /dev/stdin > $EC openssl pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $EC |\ softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label 02 --id 02 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin trace "start agent" eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" else trace "add pkcs11 key to agent" echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -s ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -s failed: exit code $r" fi trace "pkcs11 list via agent" ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r" fi for k in $RSA $EC; do trace "testing $k" chmod 600 $k ssh-keygen -y -f $k > $k.pub pub=$(cat $k.pub) ${SSHADD} -L | grep -q "$pub" || fail "key $k missing in ssh-add -L" ${SSHADD} -T $k.pub || fail "ssh-add -T with $k failed" # add to authorized keys cat $k.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER trace "pkcs11 connect via agent ($k)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 r=$? if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then fail "ssh connect failed (exit code $r)" fi done trace "remove pkcs11 keys" echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r" fi trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/agent-ptrace.sh010064400017500001750000000025161362136622600160450ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.3 2015/09/11 04:55:01 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="disallow agent ptrace attach" if have_prog uname ; then case `uname` in AIX|CYGWIN*|OSF1) echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)" exit 0 ;; esac fi if [ "x$USER" = "xroot" ]; then echo "Skipped: running as root" exit 0 fi if have_prog gdb ; then : ok else echo "skipped (gdb not found)" exit 0 fi if $OBJ/setuid-allowed ${SSHAGENT} ; then : ok else echo "skipped (${SSHAGENT} is mounted on a no-setuid filesystem)" exit 0 fi if test -z "$SUDO" ; then echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" exit 0 else $SUDO chown 0 ${SSHAGENT} $SUDO chgrp 0 ${SSHAGENT} $SUDO chmod 2755 ${SSHAGENT} fi trace "start agent" eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" else # ls -l ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK} gdb ${SSHAGENT} ${SSH_AGENT_PID} > ${OBJ}/gdb.out 2>&1 << EOF quit EOF r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "gdb failed: exit code $r" fi egrep 'ptrace: Operation not permitted.|procfs:.*Permission denied.|ttrace.*Permission denied.|procfs:.*: Invalid argument.|Unable to access task ' >/dev/null ${OBJ}/gdb.out r=$? rm -f ${OBJ}/gdb.out if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ptrace succeeded?: exit code $r" fi trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/agent-timeout.sh010064400017500001750000000017321362136622600162540ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: agent-timeout.sh,v 1.6 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="agent timeout test" SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT=10 trace "start agent" eval `${SSHAGENT} -s ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS}` > /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" else trace "add keys with timeout" keys=0 for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do ${SSHADD} -kt ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} $OBJ/$t > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0" fi keys=$((${keys} + 1)) done n=`${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | wc -l` trace "agent has $n keys" if [ $n -ne $keys ]; then fail "ssh-add -l did not return $keys keys: $n" fi trace "sleeping 2*${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} seconds" sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} ${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | grep 'The agent has no identities.' >/dev/null if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l still returns keys after timeout" fi trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/agent.sh010064400017500001750000000112141362136622600145640ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.17 2019/12/21 02:33:07 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="simple agent test" SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2" fi trace "start agent, args ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s" eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" fi eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s | sed 's/SSH_/FW_SSH_/g'` > /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fatal "could not start second ssh-agent: exit code $r" fi ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1" fi rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key \ || fatal "ssh-keygen failed" trace "overwrite authorized keys" printf '' > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do # generate user key for agent rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent.pub* ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-agent ||\ fatal "ssh-keygen for $t-agent failed" # Make a certificate for each too. ${SSHKEYGEN} -qs $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "$t cert" \ -n estragon $OBJ/$t-agent.pub || fatal "ca sign failed" # add to authorized keys cat $OBJ/$t-agent.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # add private key to agent ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent #> /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?" fi # add private key to second agent SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent #> /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?" fi # Remove private key to ensure that we aren't accidentally using it. rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent done # Remove explicit identity directives from ssh_proxy mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak grep -vi identityfile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak > $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r" fi # the same for full pubkey output ${SSHADD} -L > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -L failed: exit code $r" fi trace "simple connect via agent" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)" fi for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do trace "connect via agent using $t key" if [ "$t" = "ssh-dss" ]; then echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy fi ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)" fi done trace "agent forwarding" ${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd failed (exit code $r)" fi ${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd failed (exit code $r)" fi ${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \ "${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52" r=$? if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then fail "agent fwd failed (exit code $r)" fi trace "agent forwarding different agent" ${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)" fi ${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l via agent path env fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)" fi # Remove keys from forwarded agent, ssh-add on remote machine should now fail. SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r" fi ${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l with different agent did not fail with exit code 1 (exit code $r)" fi (printf 'cert-authority,principals="estragon" '; cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub) \ > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do if [ "$t" != "ssh-dss" ]; then trace "connect via agent using $t key" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub \ -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub \ -oIdentitiesOnly=yes somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)" fi fi done trace "delete all agent keys" ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r" fi trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null SSH_AGENT_PID=$FW_SSH_AGENT_PID ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null openssh-8.2p1/regress/allow-deny-users.sh010064400017500001750000000027101362136622600167010ustar00djmdjm# Public Domain # Zev Weiss, 2016 # $OpenBSD: allow-deny-users.sh,v 1.5 2018/07/13 02:13:50 djm Exp $ tid="AllowUsers/DenyUsers" me="$LOGNAME" if [ "x$me" = "x" ]; then me=`whoami` fi other="nobody" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig test_auth() { deny="$1" allow="$2" should_succeed="$3" failmsg="$4" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo DenyUsers="$deny" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo AllowUsers="$allow" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy start_sshd -oDenyUsers="$deny" -oAllowUsers="$allow" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$me@somehost" true status=$? if (test $status -eq 0 && ! $should_succeed) \ || (test $status -ne 0 && $should_succeed); then fail "$failmsg" fi } # DenyUsers AllowUsers should_succeed failure_message test_auth "" "" true "user in neither DenyUsers nor AllowUsers denied" test_auth "$other $me" "" false "user in DenyUsers allowed" test_auth "$me $other" "" false "user in DenyUsers allowed" test_auth "" "$other" false "user not in AllowUsers allowed" test_auth "" "$other $me" true "user in AllowUsers denied" test_auth "" "$me $other" true "user in AllowUsers denied" test_auth "$me $other" "$me $other" false "user in both DenyUsers and AllowUsers allowed" test_auth "$other $me" "$other $me" false "user in both DenyUsers and AllowUsers allowed" openssh-8.2p1/regress/authinfo.sh010064400017500001750000000010761362136622600153100ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: authinfo.sh,v 1.3 2018/04/10 00:13:27 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="authinfo" # Ensure the environment variable doesn't leak when ExposeAuthInfo=no. verbose "ExposeAuthInfo=no" env SSH_USER_AUTH=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x \ 'env | grep SSH_USER_AUTH >/dev/null' && fail "SSH_USER_AUTH present" verbose "ExposeAuthInfo=yes" echo ExposeAuthInfo=yes >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x \ 'grep ^publickey "$SSH_USER_AUTH" /dev/null >/dev/null' || fail "ssh with ExposeAuthInfo failed" # XXX test multiple auth and key contents openssh-8.2p1/regress/banner.sh010064400017500001750000000023631362136622600147400ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: banner.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="banner" echo "Banner $OBJ/banner.in" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy rm -f $OBJ/banner.out $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/empty.in touch $OBJ/empty.in trace "test missing banner file" verbose "test $tid: missing banner file" ( ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \ fail "missing banner file" for s in 0 10 100 1000 10000 100000 ; do if [ "$s" = "0" ]; then # create empty banner touch $OBJ/banner.in elif [ "$s" = "10" ]; then # create 10-byte banner file echo "abcdefghi" >$OBJ/banner.in else # increase size 10x cp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ; do cat $OBJ/banner.out >> $OBJ/banner.in done fi trace "test banner size $s" verbose "test $tid: size $s" ( ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ cmp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \ fail "banner size $s mismatch" done trace "test suppress banner (-q)" verbose "test $tid: suppress banner (-q)" ( ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \ fail "suppress banner (-q)" rm -f $OBJ/banner.out $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/empty.in openssh-8.2p1/regress/broken-pipe.sh010064400017500001750000000004311362136622600157000ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: broken-pipe.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="broken pipe test" for i in 1 2 3 4; do ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config_config nexthost echo $i 2> /dev/null | true r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "broken pipe returns $r" fi done openssh-8.2p1/regress/brokenkeys.sh010064400017500001750000000007161362136622600156470ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: brokenkeys.sh,v 1.2 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="broken keys" KEYS="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}" start_sshd mv ${KEYS} ${KEYS}.bak # Truncated key echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAIEABTM= bad key" > $KEYS cat ${KEYS}.bak >> ${KEYS} cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connect with failed" fi mv ${KEYS}.bak ${KEYS} openssh-8.2p1/regress/cert-file.sh010064400017500001750000000124201362136622600153400ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.8 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="ssh with certificates" rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key* # Create a CA key ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key1 ||\ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key2 ||\ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" # Make some keys and certificates. ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" # Move the certificate to a different address to better control # when it is offered. ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \ -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 || fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1" mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key2 -I "regress user key for $USER" \ -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 || fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2" mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \ -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key3 || fatal "couldn't sign user_key3 with user_ca_key1" rm $OBJ/user_key3.pub # to test use of private key w/o public half. ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \ -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key4 || fatal "couldn't sign user_key4 with user_ca_key1" rm $OBJ/user_key4 $OBJ/user_key4.pub # to test no matching pub/private key case. trace 'try with identity files' opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes" opts2="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2" echo "cert-authority $(cat $OBJ/user_ca_key1.pub)" > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Make a clean config that doesn't have any pre-added identities. cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy | grep -v IdentityFile > $OBJ/no_identity_config # XXX: verify that certificate used was what we expect. Needs exposure of # keys via environment variable or similar. # Key with no .pub should work - finding the equivalent *-cert.pub. verbose "identity cert with no plain public file" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52 [ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed" # CertificateFile matching private key with no .pub file should work. verbose "CertificateFile with no plain public file" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub \ -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52 [ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed" # Just keys should fail verbose "plain keys" ${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then fail "ssh succeeded with no certs" fi # Keys with untrusted cert should fail. verbose "untrusted cert" opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then fail "ssh succeeded with bad cert" fi # Good cert with bad key should fail. verbose "good cert, bad key" opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2" opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then fail "ssh succeeded with no matching key" fi # Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed. verbose "single trusted" opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then fail "ssh failed with trusted cert and key" fi # Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed. verbose "multiple trusted" opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then fail "ssh failed with multiple certs" fi #next, using an agent in combination with the keys SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then fatal "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2" fi trace "start agent" eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" fi # add private keys to agent ${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key2 > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0" fi ${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key1 > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0" fi # try ssh with the agent and certificates opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" # with no certificates, should fail ${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52 if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with no cert" fi #with an untrusted certificate, should fail opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" ${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52 if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with bad cert" fi #with an additional trusted certificate, should succeed opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" ${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52 if [ $? -ne 52 ]; then fail "ssh connect with agent in failed with good cert" fi trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null #cleanup rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key* openssh-8.2p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh010064400017500001750000000246701362136622600161210ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.23 2020/01/03 03:02:26 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="certified host keys" rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/host_revoked_* rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key* $OBJ/host_krl_* # Allow all hostkey/pubkey types, prefer certs for the client rsa=0 types="" for i in `$SSH -Q key | maybe_filter_sk`; do if [ -z "$types" ]; then types="$i" continue fi case "$i" in # Special treatment for RSA keys. *rsa*cert*) types="rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,$i,$types" types="rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,$types";; *rsa*) rsa=1 types="$types,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,$i";; # Prefer certificate to plain keys. *cert*) types="$i,$types";; *) types="$types,$i";; esac done ( echo "HostKeyAlgorithms ${types}" echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *" ) >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak ( echo "HostKeyAlgorithms *" echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *" ) >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak HOSTS='localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1' kh_ca() { for k in "$@" ; do printf "@cert-authority $HOSTS " cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k" done } kh_revoke() { for k in "$@" ; do printf "@revoked * " cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k" done } # Create a CA key and add it to known hosts. Ed25519 chosen for speed. # RSA for testing RSA/SHA2 signatures if supported. ktype2=ed25519 [ "x$rsa" = "x1" ] && ktype2=rsa ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/host_ca_key ||\ fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/host_ca_key2 ||\ fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed" kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert # Plain text revocation files touch $OBJ/host_revoked_empty touch $OBJ/host_revoked_plain touch $OBJ/host_revoked_cert cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/host_revoked_ca PLAIN_TYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'` if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512" fi # Prepare certificate, plain key and CA KRLs ${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_empty || fatal "KRL init failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_plain || fatal "KRL init failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_cert || fatal "KRL init failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_ca $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub \ || fatal "KRL init failed" # Generate and sign host keys serial=1 for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do verbose "$tid: sign host ${ktype} cert" # Generate and sign a host key ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \ -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \ fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_plain \ $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub || fatal "KRL update failed" cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_plain case $ktype in rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;; *) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;; esac ${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q -s $ca -z $serial $tflag \ -I "regress host key for $USER" \ -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}" ${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_cert \ $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub || \ fatal "KRL update failed" cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_cert serial=`expr $serial + 1` done attempt_connect() { _ident="$1" _expect_success="$2" shift; shift verbose "$tid: $_ident expect success $_expect_success" cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ "$@" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true _r=$? if [ "x$_expect_success" = "xyes" ] ; then if [ $_r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect $_ident failed" fi else if [ $_r -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect $_ident succeeded unexpectedly" fi fi } # Basic connect and revocation tests. for privsep in yes ; do for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} cert connect privsep $privsep" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # test name expect success attempt_connect "$ktype basic connect" "yes" attempt_connect "$ktype empty KRL" "yes" \ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_empty attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ plain key revoked" "no" \ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_plain attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ cert revoked" "no" \ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_cert attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ CA revoked" "no" \ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_ca attempt_connect "$ktype empty plaintext revocation" "yes" \ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_empty attempt_connect "$ktype plain key plaintext revocation" "no" \ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_plain attempt_connect "$ktype cert plaintext revocation" "no" \ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_cert attempt_connect "$ktype CA plaintext revocation" "no" \ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_ca done done # Revoked certificates with key present kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do test -f "$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub" || fatal "no pubkey" kh_revoke cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig done cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert for privsep in yes ; do for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert privsep $privsep" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi done done # Revoked CA kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig kh_revoke host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi done # Create a CA key and add it to known hosts kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert test_one() { ident=$1 result=$2 sign_opts=$3 for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES; do case $ktype in rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;; *) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;; esac ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $ca $tflag -I "regress host key for $USER" \ $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 rc=$? if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect $ident failed unexpectedly" fi else if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly" fi fi done } test_one "user-certificate" failure "-n $HOSTS" test_one "empty principals" success "-h" test_one "wrong principals" failure "-h -n foo" test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-h -V20300101:20320101" test_one "cert expired" failure "-h -V19800101:19900101" test_one "cert valid interval" success "-h -V-1w:+2w" test_one "cert has constraints" failure "-h -Oforce-command=false" # Check downgrade of cert to raw key when no CA found for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/cert_host_key* verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} ${v} cert downgrade to raw key" # Generate and sign a host key ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \ fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed" case $ktype in rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;; *) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;; esac ${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q $tflag -s $ca $tflag \ -I "regress host key for $USER" \ -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}" ( printf "$HOSTS " cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub ) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi done # Wrong certificate kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do verbose "$tid: host ${kt} connect wrong cert" rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key* # Self-sign key ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${kt} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || \ fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${kt} failed" case $kt in rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $kt" ;; *) tflag="" ;; esac ${SSHKEYGEN} $tflag -h -q -s $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} \ -I "regress host key for $USER" \ -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly" fi done rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_host_key* openssh-8.2p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh010064400017500001750000000302501362136622600161110ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.25 2020/01/03 03:02:26 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="certified user keys" rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key* cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'` EXTRA_TYPES="" rsa="" if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then rsa=rsa PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512" fi kname() { case $1 in rsa-sha2-*) n="$1" ;; sk-ecdsa-*) n="sk-ecdsa" ;; sk-ssh-ed25519*) n="sk-ssh-ed25519" ;; # subshell because some seds will add a newline *) n=$(echo $1 | sed 's/^dsa/ssh-dss/;s/^rsa/ssh-rsa/;s/^ed/ssh-ed/') ;; esac if [ -z "$rsa" ]; then echo "$n*,ssh-ed25519*" else echo "$n*,ssh-rsa*,ssh-ed25519*" fi } # Create a CA key if [ ! -z "$rsa" ]; then catype=rsa else catype=ed25519 fi ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $catype -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\ fail "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed" # Generate and sign user keys for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES $EXTRA_TYPES ; do verbose "$tid: sign user ${ktype} cert" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \ -f $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \ fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key_${ktype} failed" # Generate RSA/SHA2 certs for rsa-sha2* keys. case $ktype in rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype" ;; *) tflag="" ;; esac ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -z $$ \ -I "regress user key for $USER" \ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $tflag $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \ fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}" done # Test explicitly-specified principals for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do t=$(kname $ktype) for privsep in yes ; do _prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep" # Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile " \ "$OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy ( cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy # Missing authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} missing authorized_principals" rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # Empty authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals" echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # Wrong authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals" echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # Correct authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals" echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi # authorized_principals with bad key option verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt" echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # authorized_principals with command=false verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false" echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # authorized_principals with command=true verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true" echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi # Setup for principals= key option rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy ( cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy # Wrong principals list verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option" ( printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # Correct principals list verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option" ( printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi done done basic_tests() { auth=$1 if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then # Add CA to authorized_keys ( printf 'cert-authority ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER else echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER extra_sshd="TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" fi for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do t=$(kname $ktype) for privsep in yes ; do _prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep $auth" # Simple connect verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} connect" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" echo "$extra_sshd" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy ( cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi # Revoked keys verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked key" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked" echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" echo "$extra_sshd" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub \ $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly" fi verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked via KRL" rm $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked ${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked \ $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly" fi verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty KRL" ${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi done # Revoked CA verbose "$tid: ${ktype} $auth revoked CA key" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" echo "$extra_sshd" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly" fi done verbose "$tid: $auth CA does not authenticate" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" echo "$extra_sshd" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy verbose "$tid: ensure CA key does not authenticate user" ${SSH} -i $OBJ/user_ca_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect with CA key succeeded unexpectedly" fi } basic_tests authorized_keys basic_tests TrustedUserCAKeys test_one() { ident=$1 result=$2 sign_opts=$3 auth_choice=$4 auth_opt=$5 if test "x$auth_choice" = "x" ; then auth_choice="authorized_keys TrustedUserCAKeys" fi for auth in $auth_choice ; do for ktype in $rsa ed25519 ; do cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then # Add CA to authorized_keys ( printf "cert-authority${auth_opt} " cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER else echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" \ >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}*" \ >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy if test "x$auth_opt" != "x" ; then echo $auth_opt >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy fi fi verbose "$tid: $ident auth $auth expect $result $ktype" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key \ -I "regress user key for $USER" \ $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}" ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 rc=$? if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then fail "$ident failed unexpectedly" fi else if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then fail "$ident succeeded unexpectedly" fi fi done done } test_one "correct principal" success "-n ${USER}" test_one "host-certificate" failure "-n ${USER} -h" test_one "wrong principals" failure "-n foo" test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-n ${USER} -V20300101:20320101" test_one "cert expired" failure "-n ${USER} -V19800101:19900101" test_one "cert valid interval" success "-n ${USER} -V-1w:+2w" test_one "wrong source-address" failure "-n ${USER} -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8" test_one "force-command" failure "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" # Behaviour is different here: TrustedUserCAKeys doesn't allow empty principals test_one "empty principals" success "" authorized_keys test_one "empty principals" failure "" TrustedUserCAKeys # Check explicitly-specified principals: an empty principals list in the cert # should always be refused. # AuthorizedPrincipalsFile rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \ TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile no principals" failure "" \ TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" # principals= key option rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER test_one "principals key option principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \ authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"' test_one "principals key option no principals" failure "" \ authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"' # command= options vs. force-command in key test_one "force-command match true" success \ "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=true" \ authorized_keys ',command="true"' test_one "force-command match true" failure \ "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" \ authorized_keys ',command="false"' test_one "force-command mismatch 1" failure \ "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" \ authorized_keys ',command="true"' test_one "force-command mismatch 2" failure \ "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=true" \ authorized_keys ',command="false"' # Wrong certificate cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do t=$(kname $ktype) # Self-sign ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -I \ "regress user key for $USER" \ -n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}" verbose "$tid: user ${ktype} connect wrong cert" ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly" fi done rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key* rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER openssh-8.2p1/regress/cfginclude.sh010064400017500001750000000106151362136622600155750ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.2 2016/05/03 15:30:46 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="config include" # to appease StrictModes umask 022 cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF Match host a Hostname aa Match host b Hostname bb Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Match host c Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Hostname cc Match host m Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Host d Hostname dd Host e Hostname ee Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Host f Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Hostname ff Host n Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* _EOF cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.0 << _EOF Match host xxxxxx _EOF cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF Match host a Hostname aaa Match host b Hostname bbb Match host c Hostname ccc Host d Hostname ddd Host e Hostname eee Host f Hostname fff _EOF cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF Match host a Hostname aaaa Match host b Hostname bbbb Match host c Hostname cccc Host d Hostname dddd Host e Hostname eeee Host f Hostname ffff Match all Hostname xxxx _EOF trial() { _host="$1" _exp="$2" ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G "$_host" > $OBJ/ssh_config.out || fatal "ssh config parse failed" _got=`grep -i '^hostname ' $OBJ/ssh_config.out | awk '{print $2}'` if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then fail "host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got" fi } trial a aa trial b bb trial c ccc trial d dd trial e ee trial f fff trial m xxxx trial n xxxx trial x x # Prepare an included config with an error. cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.3 << _EOF Hostname xxxx Junk _EOF ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \ fail "ssh include allowed invalid config" ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G x 2>/dev/null && \ fail "ssh include allowed invalid config" rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* # Ensure that a missing include is not fatal. cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Hostname aa _EOF trial a aa # Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent. cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF Match host x _EOF trial a aa cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF Host x _EOF trial a aa # cleanup rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out # $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.2 2016/05/03 15:30:46 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="config include" cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF Match host a Hostname aa Match host b Hostname bb Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Match host c Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Hostname cc Match host m Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Host d Hostname dd Host e Hostname ee Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Host f Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Hostname ff Host n Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* _EOF cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.0 << _EOF Match host xxxxxx _EOF cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF Match host a Hostname aaa Match host b Hostname bbb Match host c Hostname ccc Host d Hostname ddd Host e Hostname eee Host f Hostname fff _EOF cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF Match host a Hostname aaaa Match host b Hostname bbbb Match host c Hostname cccc Host d Hostname dddd Host e Hostname eeee Host f Hostname ffff Match all Hostname xxxx _EOF trial() { _host="$1" _exp="$2" ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G "$_host" > $OBJ/ssh_config.out || fatal "ssh config parse failed" _got=`grep -i '^hostname ' $OBJ/ssh_config.out | awk '{print $2}'` if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then fail "host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got" fi } trial a aa trial b bb trial c ccc trial d dd trial e ee trial f fff trial m xxxx trial n xxxx trial x x # Prepare an included config with an error. cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.3 << _EOF Hostname xxxx Junk _EOF ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \ fail "ssh include allowed invalid config" ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G x 2>/dev/null && \ fail "ssh include allowed invalid config" rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* # Ensure that a missing include is not fatal. cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* Hostname aa _EOF trial a aa # Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent. cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF Match host x _EOF trial a aa cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF Host x _EOF trial a aa # Ensure that recursive includes are bounded. cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i _EOF ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \ fail "ssh include allowed infinite recursion?" # or hang... # cleanup rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out openssh-8.2p1/regress/cfgmatch.sh010064400017500001750000000115141362136622600152450ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.12 2019/04/18 18:57:16 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sshd_config match" pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid fwdport=3301 fwd="-L $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT" echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_config echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy start_client() { rm -f $pidfile ${SSH} -q $fwd "$@" somehost \ exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & client_pid=$! # Wait for remote end n=0 while test ! -f $pidfile ; do sleep 1 n=`expr $n + 1` if test $n -gt 60; then kill $client_pid fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh" fi done } stop_client() { pid=`cat $pidfile` if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then kill $pid fi wait } cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_config grep -v AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Match user $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy ${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \ fail "config w/match fails config test" start_sshd # Test Match + PermitOpen in sshd_config. This should be permitted trace "match permitopen localhost" start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ fail "match permitopen permit" stop_client # Same but from different source. This should not be permitted trace "match permitopen proxy" start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ fail "match permitopen deny" stop_client # Retry previous with key option, should also be denied. cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do printf 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts" start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ fail "match permitopen deny w/key opt" stop_client # Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair. # Should be permitted. trace "match permitopen localhost" start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ fail "match permitopen permit" stop_client cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy # Test that a Match overrides a PermitOpen in the global section trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts" start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ fail "match override permitopen" stop_client cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Match User NoSuchUser" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy # Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a # PermitOpen entry that's not at the start of the list trace "nomatch permitopen proxy w/key opts" start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ fail "nomatch override permitopen" stop_client # Test parsing of available Match criteria (with the exception of Group which # requires knowledge of actual group memberships user running the test). params="user:user:u1 host:host:h1 address:addr:1.2.3.4 \ localaddress:laddr:5.6.7.8 rdomain:rdomain:rdom1" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_config echo 'Banner /nomatch' >>$OBJ/sshd_config for i in $params; do config=`echo $i | cut -f1 -d:` criteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:` value=`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:` cat >>$OBJ/sshd_config </dev/null || \ fail "validate config for w/out spec" # Test matching each criteria. for i in $params; do testcriteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:` expected=/`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:` spec="" for j in $params; do config=`echo $j | cut -f1 -d:` criteria=`echo $j | cut -f2 -d:` value=`echo $j | cut -f3 -d:` if [ "$criteria" = "$testcriteria" ]; then spec="$criteria=$value,$spec" else spec="$criteria=1$value,$spec" fi done trace "test spec $spec" result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \ awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'` if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then fail "match $config expected $expected got $result" fi done openssh-8.2p1/regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh010064400017500001750000000145401362136622600164660ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: cfgmatchlisten.sh,v 1.3 2018/07/02 14:13:30 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sshd_config matchlisten" pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid fwdport=3301 fwdspec="localhost:${fwdport}" fwd="-R $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT" echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_config echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy start_client() { rm -f $pidfile ${SSH} -vvv $fwd "$@" somehost true >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then return $r fi ${SSH} -vvv $fwd "$@" somehost \ exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & client_pid=$! # Wait for remote end n=0 while test ! -f $pidfile ; do sleep 1 n=`expr $n + 1` if test $n -gt 60; then kill $client_pid fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh" fi done return $r } expect_client_ok() { start_client "$@" || fail "client did not start" } expect_client_fail() { local failmsg="$1" shift start_client "$@" && fail $failmsg } stop_client() { pid=`cat $pidfile` if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then kill $pid fi wait } cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 $fwdspec" >>$OBJ/sshd_config grep -v AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Match user $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 $fwdspec" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy start_sshd #set -x # Test Match + PermitListen in sshd_config. This should be permitted trace "match permitlisten localhost" expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_config ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ fail "match permitlisten permit" stop_client # Same but from different source. This should not be permitted trace "match permitlisten proxy" expect_client_fail "match permitlisten deny" \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy # Retry previous with key option, should also be denied. cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdspec'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done trace "match permitlisten proxy w/key opts" expect_client_fail "match permitlisten deny w/key opt"\ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy # Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair. # Should be permitted. trace "match permitlisten localhost" expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_config ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ fail "match permitlisten permit" stop_client # Test that a bare port number is accepted in PermitListen cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdport 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy trace "match permitlisten bare" expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_config ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ fail "match permitlisten bare" stop_client # Test that an incorrect bare port number is denied as expected cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitListen 1 2 99" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy trace "match permitlisten bare" expect_client_fail -F $OBJ/ssh_config cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdspec 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy # Test that a Match overrides a PermitListen in the global section trace "match permitlisten proxy w/key opts" expect_client_fail "match override permitlisten" \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdspec 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Match User NoSuchUser" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy # Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a # PermitListen entry that's not at the start of the list trace "nomatch permitlisten proxy w/key opts" expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ fail "nomatch override permitlisten" stop_client # bind to 127.0.0.1 instead of default localhost fwdspec2="127.0.0.1:${fwdport}" fwd="-R ${fwdspec2}:127.0.0.1:$PORT" # first try w/ old fwdspec both in server config and key opts cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdspec 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdspec'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done trace "nomatch permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config and userkey" expect_client_fail "nomatch 127.0.0.1 server config and userkey" \ -F $OBJ/ssh_config # correct server config, denied by key opts cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 ${fwdspec2} 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy trace "nomatch permitlisten 127.0.0.1 w/key opts" expect_client_fail "nomatch 127.0.0.1 w/key opts" \ -F $OBJ/ssh_config # fix key opts cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdspec2'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done trace "match permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts" expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ fail "match 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts" stop_client # key opts with bare port number cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdport'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done trace "match permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts (bare)" expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ fail "match 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts (bare)" stop_client # key opts with incorrect bare port number cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do printf 'permitlisten="99" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done trace "match permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts (wrong bare)" expect_client_fail "nomatch 127.0.0.1 w/key opts (wrong bare)" \ -F $OBJ/ssh_config openssh-8.2p1/regress/cfgparse.sh010064400017500001750000000042531362136622600152650ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: cfgparse.sh,v 1.7 2018/05/11 03:51:06 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sshd config parse" # This is a reasonable proxy for IPv6 support. if ! config_defined HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR ; then SKIP_IPV6=yes fi # We need to use the keys generated for the regression test because sshd -T # will fail if we're not running with SUDO (no permissions for real keys) or # if we are running tests on a system that has never had sshd installed # because the keys won't exist. grep "HostKey " $OBJ/sshd_config > $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal SSHD_KEYS="`cat $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal`" verbose "reparse minimal config" ($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 && $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config" verbose "reparse regress config" ($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 && $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse regress config" verbose "listenaddress order" # expected output cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <> $OBJ/sshd_config.0 < $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \ fail "listenaddress order 1" # test 2: listenaddress first cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \ fail "listenaddress order 2" # cleanup rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.[012] openssh-8.2p1/regress/krl.sh010064400017500001750000000157201362136622600142640ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.11 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="key revocation lists" # Use ed25519 by default since it's fast and it's supported when building # w/out OpenSSL. Populate ktype[2-4] with the other types if supported. ktype1=ed25519; ktype2=ed25519; ktype3=ed25519; ktype4=ed25519; ktype5=ed25519; ktype6=ed25519; for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do case "$t" in ecdsa*) ktype2=ecdsa ;; ssh-rsa) ktype3=rsa ;; ssh-dss) ktype4=dsa ;; sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) ktype5=ed25519-sk ;; sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com) ktype6=ecdsa-sk ;; esac done # Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd. # Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen. rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-* # Generate a CA key $SSHKEYGEN -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca -C "" -N "" > /dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed" $SSHKEYGEN -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca2 -C "" -N "" > /dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA2 failed" # A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers # The serial pattern is chosen to ensure the KRL includes list, range and # bitmap sections. cat << EOF >> $OBJ/revoked-serials serial: 1-4 serial: 10 serial: 15 serial: 30 serial: 50 serial: 90 serial: 999 # The following sum to 500-799 serial: 500 serial: 501 serial: 502 serial: 503-600 serial: 700-797 serial: 798 serial: 799 serial: 599-701 # Some multiple consecutive serial number ranges serial: 10000-20000 serial: 30000-40000 EOF # A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID. touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 90 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do test "x$n" = "x499" && continue # Fill in by-ID revocation spec. echo "id: revoked $n" >> $OBJ/revoked-keyid done keygen() { N=$1 f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N` # Vary the keytype. We use mostly ed25519 since this is fast and well # supported. keytype=$ktype1 case $N in 2 | 10 | 510 | 1001) keytype=$ktype2 ;; 4 | 30 | 520 | 1002) keytype=$ktype3 ;; 8 | 50 | 530 | 1003) keytype=$ktype4 ;; 16 | 70 | 540 | 1004) keytype=$ktype5 ;; 32 | 90 | 550 | 1005) keytype=$ktype6 ;; esac $SSHKEYGEN -t $keytype -f $f -C "" -N "" > /dev/null \ || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN failed" # Sign cert $SSHKEYGEN -s $OBJ/revoked-ca -z $n -I "revoked $N" $f >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN sign failed" echo $f } # Generate some keys. verbose "$tid: generating test keys" REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 90 500 510 520 550 799 999" for n in $REVOKED_SERIALS ; do f=`keygen $n` RKEYS="$RKEYS ${f}.pub" RCERTS="$RCERTS ${f}-cert.pub" done UNREVOKED_SERIALS="5 9 14 16 29 49 51 499 800 1010 1011" UNREVOKED="" for n in $UNREVOKED_SERIALS ; do f=`keygen $n` UKEYS="$UKEYS ${f}.pub" UCERTS="$UCERTS ${f}-cert.pub" done # Specifications that revoke keys by hash. touch $OBJ/revoked-sha1 $OBJ/revoked-sha256 $OBJ/revoked-hash for rkey in $RKEYS; do (printf "sha1: "; cat $rkey) >> $OBJ/revoked-sha1 (printf "sha256: "; cat $rkey) >> $OBJ/revoked-sha256 (printf "hash: "; $SSHKEYGEN -lf $rkey | \ awk '{ print $2 }') >> $OBJ/revoked-hash done genkrls() { OPTS=$1 $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-empty - /dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keys $RKEYS \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-cert $RCERTS \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-all $RKEYS $RCERTS \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-sha1 $OBJ/revoked-sha1 \ >/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-sha256 $OBJ/revoked-sha256 \ >/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-hash $OBJ/revoked-hash \ >/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" # This should fail as KRLs from serial/key-id spec need the CA specified. $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/revoked-serials \ >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid $OBJ/revoked-keyid \ >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly" # These should succeed; they specify an explicit CA key. $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -s $OBJ/revoked-ca \ $OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid -s $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \ $OBJ/revoked-keyid >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" # These should succeed; they specify an wildcard CA key. $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-serials \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-keyid \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" # Revoke the same serials with the second CA key to ensure a multi-CA # KRL is generated. $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -u -s $OBJ/revoked-ca2 \ $OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" } ## XXX dump with trace and grep for set cert serials ## XXX test ranges near (u64)-1, etc. verbose "$tid: generating KRLs" genkrls check_krl() { KEY=$1 KRL=$2 EXPECT_REVOKED=$3 TAG=$4 $SSHKEYGEN -Qf $KRL $KEY >/dev/null result=$? if test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xy" -a $result -eq 0 ; then fatal "key $KEY not revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG" elif test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xn" -a $result -ne 0 ; then fatal "key $KEY unexpectedly revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG" fi } test_rev() { FILES=$1 TAG=$2 KEYS_RESULT=$3 ALL_RESULT=$4 HASH_RESULT=$5 SERIAL_RESULT=$6 KEYID_RESULT=$7 CERTS_RESULT=$8 CA_RESULT=$9 SERIAL_WRESULT=$10 KEYID_WRESULT=$11 verbose "$tid: checking revocations for $TAG" for f in $FILES ; do check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-empty no "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keys $KEYS_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-all $ALL_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-sha1 $HASH_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-sha256 $HASH_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-hash $HASH_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial $SERIAL_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid $KEYID_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-cert $CERTS_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-ca $CA_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial-wild $SERIAL_WRESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild $KEYID_WRESULT "$TAG" done } test_all() { # wildcard # keys all hash sr# ID cert CA srl ID test_rev "$RKEYS" "revoked keys" y y y n n n n n n test_rev "$UKEYS" "unrevoked keys" n n n n n n n n n test_rev "$RCERTS" "revoked certs" y y y y y y y y y test_rev "$UCERTS" "unrevoked certs" n n n n n n y n n } test_all # Check update. Results should be identical. verbose "$tid: testing KRL update" for f in $OBJ/krl-keys $OBJ/krl-cert $OBJ/krl-all \ $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/krl-keyid \ $OBJ/krl-serial-wild $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild; do cp -f $OBJ/krl-empty $f genkrls -u done test_all openssh-8.2p1/regress/check-perm.c010064400017500001750000000105231362136622600153160ustar00djmdjm/* * Placed in the public domain */ /* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include #endif static void fatal(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); fputc('\n', stderr); va_end(args); exit(1); } /* Based on session.c. NB. keep tests in sync */ static void safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid) { const char *cp; char component[PATH_MAX]; struct stat st; if (*path != '/') fatal("chroot path does not begin at root"); if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component)) fatal("chroot path too long"); /* * Descend the path, checking that each component is a * root-owned directory with strict permissions. */ for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) { if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL) strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component)); else { cp++; memcpy(component, path, cp - path); component[cp - path] = '\0'; } /* debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); */ if (stat(component, &st) != 0) fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, component, strerror(errno)); if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot " "directory %s\"%s\"", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); } if (chdir(path) == -1) fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": " "%s", path, strerror(errno)); } /* from platform.c */ int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid) { if (uid == 0) return 1; #ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID) return 1; #endif return 0; } /* from auth.c */ int auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) { char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX]; char *cp; int comparehome = 0; struct stat st; if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) comparehome = 1; if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); return -1; } if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", buf); return -1; } /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ for (;;) { if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); return -1; } strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); return -1; } /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) break; /* * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too */ if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) break; } return 0; } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "check-perm -m [chroot | keys-command] [path]\n"); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { const char *path = "."; char errmsg[256]; int ch, mode = -1; extern char *optarg; extern int optind; struct stat st; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hm:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'm': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "chroot") == 0) mode = 1; else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "keys-command") == 0) mode = 2; else { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid -m option\n"), usage(); } break; default: usage(); } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (argc > 1) usage(); else if (argc == 1) path = argv[0]; if (mode == 1) safely_chroot(path, getuid()); else if (mode == 2) { if (stat(path, &st) < 0) fatal("Could not stat %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (auth_secure_path(path, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) fatal("Unsafe %s: %s", path, errmsg); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mode\n"); usage(); } return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/regress/cipher-speed.sh010064400017500001750000000014371362136622600160440ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.14 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="cipher speed" getbytes () { sed -n -e '/transferred/s/.*secs (\(.* bytes.sec\).*/\1/p' \ -e '/copied/s/.*s, \(.* MB.s\).*/\1/p' } tries="1 2" for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do trace "cipher $c mac $m" for x in $tries; do printf "%-60s" "$c/$m:" ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -m $m -c $c somehost \ exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \ < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed with mac $m cipher $c" fi done # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they are ignored. if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then break fi n=`expr $n + 1` done; done openssh-8.2p1/regress/conch-ciphers.sh010064400017500001750000000014371362136622600162210ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: conch-ciphers.sh,v 1.4 2019/07/05 04:12:46 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="conch ciphers" if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH" != "xyes" ; then echo "conch interop tests not enabled" exit 0 fi start_sshd for c in aes256-ctr aes256-cbc aes192-ctr aes192-cbc aes128-ctr aes128-cbc \ cast128-cbc blowfish 3des-cbc ; do verbose "$tid: cipher $c" rm -f ${COPY} # XXX the 2nd "cat" seems to be needed because of buggy FD handling # in conch ${CONCH} --identity $OBJ/ssh-rsa --port $PORT --user $USER -e none \ --known-hosts $OBJ/known_hosts --notty --noagent --nox11 -n \ 127.0.0.1 "cat ${DATA}" 2>/dev/null | cat > ${COPY} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" done rm -f ${COPY} openssh-8.2p1/regress/connect-privsep.sh010064400017500001750000000020311362136622600166020ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.9 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="proxy connect with privsep" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh privsep+proxyconnect failed" fi cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then # XXX replace this with fail once sandbox has stabilised warn "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect failed" fi # Because sandbox is sensitive to changes in libc, especially malloc, retest # with every malloc.conf option (and none). if [ -z "TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS" ]; then mopts="C F G J R S U X < >" else mopts=`echo $TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS | sed 's/./& /g'` fi for m in '' $mopts ; do env MALLOC_OPTIONS="$m" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect mopt '$m' failed" fi done openssh-8.2p1/regress/connect-uri.sh010064400017500001750000000014601362136622600157160ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: connect-uri.sh,v 1.1 2017/10/24 19:33:32 millert Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="uri connect" # Remove Port and User from ssh_config, we want to rely on the URI cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig egrep -v '^ +(Port|User) +.*$' $OBJ/ssh_config.orig > $OBJ/ssh_config start_sshd verbose "$tid: no trailing slash" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config "ssh://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}" true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connection failed" fi verbose "$tid: trailing slash" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config "ssh://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/" true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connection failed" fi verbose "$tid: with path name" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config "ssh://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" true \ > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh connection succeeded, expected failure" fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/connect.sh010064400017500001750000000006271362136622600151250ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.8 2020/01/25 02:57:53 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="simple connect" start_sshd trace "direct connect" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh direct connect failed" fi trace "proxy connect" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -o "proxycommand $NC %h %p" somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh proxycommand connect failed" fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/dhgex.sh010064400017500001750000000030271362136622600145700ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.6 2019/10/06 11:49:50 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="dhgex" LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} rm -f ${LOG} cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange` ssh_test_dhgex() { bits="$1"; shift cipher="$1"; shift kex="$1"; shift cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "KexAlgorithms=$kex" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Ciphers=$cipher" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy rm -f ${LOG} opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher" min=2048 max=8192 groupsz="$min<$bits<$max" verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher" ${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed ($@)" fi # check what we request grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null if [ $? != 0 ]; then got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}` fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got" fi # check what we got. gotbits="`awk 'BEGIN{FS="/"}/bits set:/{print $2}' ${LOG} | head -1 | tr -d '\r\n'`" trace "expected '$bits' got '$gotbits'" if [ -z "$gotbits" ] || [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits" fi } check() { bits="$1"; shift for c in $@; do for k in $kexs; do ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k done done } check 3072 3des-cbc # 112 bits. check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128` check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192` check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256` check 8192 rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com openssh-8.2p1/regress/dsa_ssh2.prv010064400017500001750000000015371362136622600154000ustar00djmdjm---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ---- Subject: ssh-keygen test Comment: "1024-bit dsa, Tue Jan 08 2002 22:00:23 +0100" P2/56wAAAgIAAAAmZGwtbW9kcHtzaWdue2RzYS1uaXN0LXNoYTF9LGRoe3BsYWlufX0AAA AEbm9uZQAAAcQAAAHAAAAAAAAABACwUfm3AxZTut3icBmwCcD48nY64HzuELlQ+vEqjIcR Lo49es/DQTeLNQ+kdKRCfouosGNv0WqxRtF0tUsWdXxS37oHGa4QPugBdHRd7YlZGZv8kg x7FsoepY7v7E683/97dv2zxL3AGagTEzWr7fl0yPexAaZoDvtQrrjX44BLmwAABACWQkvv MxnD8eFkS1konFfMJ1CkuRfTN34CBZ6dY7VTSGemy4QwtFdMKmoufD0eKgy3p5WOeWCYKt F4FhjHKZk/aaxFjjIbtkrnlvXg64QI11dSZyBN6/ViQkHPSkUDF+A6AAEhrNbQbAFSvao1 kTvNtPCtL0AkUIduEMzGQfLCTAAAAKDeC043YVo9Zo0zAEeIA4uZh4LBCQAAA/9aj7Y5ik ehygJ4qTDSlVypsPuV+n59tMS0e2pfrSG87yf5r94AKBmJeho5OO6wYaXCxsVB7AFbSUD6 75AK8mHF4v1/+7SWKk5f8xlMCMSPZ9K0+j/W1d/q2qkhnnDZolOHDomLA+U00i5ya/jnTV zyDPWLFpWK8u3xGBPAYX324gAAAKDHFvooRnaXdZbeWGTTqmgHB1GU9A== ---- END SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ---- openssh-8.2p1/regress/dsa_ssh2.pub010064400017500001750000000013341362136622600153520ustar00djmdjm---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ---- Subject: ssh-keygen test Comment: "1024-bit dsa, Tue Jan 08 2002 22:00:23 +0100" AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBALBR+bcDFlO63eJwGbAJwPjydjrgfO4QuVD68SqMhxEujj16z8 NBN4s1D6R0pEJ+i6iwY2/RarFG0XS1SxZ1fFLfugcZrhA+6AF0dF3tiVkZm/ySDHsWyh6l ju/sTrzf/3t2/bPEvcAZqBMTNavt+XTI97EBpmgO+1CuuNfjgEubAAAAFQDeC043YVo9Zo 0zAEeIA4uZh4LBCQAAAIEAlkJL7zMZw/HhZEtZKJxXzCdQpLkX0zd+AgWenWO1U0hnpsuE MLRXTCpqLnw9HioMt6eVjnlgmCrReBYYxymZP2msRY4yG7ZK55b14OuECNdXUmcgTev1Yk JBz0pFAxfgOgABIazW0GwBUr2qNZE7zbTwrS9AJFCHbhDMxkHywkwAAACAWo+2OYpHocoC eKkw0pVcqbD7lfp+fbTEtHtqX60hvO8n+a/eACgZiXoaOTjusGGlwsbFQewBW0lA+u+QCv JhxeL9f/u0lipOX/MZTAjEj2fStPo/1tXf6tqpIZ5w2aJThw6JiwPlNNIucmv4501c8gz1 ixaVivLt8RgTwGF99uI= ---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ---- openssh-8.2p1/regress/dynamic-forward.sh010064400017500001750000000027561362136622600165670ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: dynamic-forward.sh,v 1.13 2017/09/21 19:18:12 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="dynamic forwarding" FWDPORT=`expr $PORT + 1` if have_prog nc && nc -h 2>&1 | grep "proxy address" >/dev/null; then proxycmd="nc -x 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -X" elif have_prog connect; then proxycmd="connect -S 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -" else echo "skipped (no suitable ProxyCommand found)" exit 0 fi trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd" start_sshd for d in D R; do n=0 error="1" trace "start dynamic forwarding, fork to background" while [ "$error" -ne 0 -a "$n" -lt 3 ]; do n=`expr $n + 1` ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f -$d $FWDPORT -q \ -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost exec sh -c \ \'"echo \$\$ > $OBJ/remote_pid; exec sleep 444"\' error=$? if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then trace "forward failed attempt $n err $error" sleep $n fi done if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then fatal "failed to start dynamic forwarding" fi for s in 4 5; do for h in 127.0.0.1 localhost; do trace "testing ssh socks version $s host $h (-$d)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ -o "ProxyCommand ${proxycmd}${s} $h $PORT" \ somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -f ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" done done if [ -f $OBJ/remote_pid ]; then remote=`cat $OBJ/remote_pid` trace "terminate remote shell, pid $remote" if [ $remote -gt 1 ]; then kill -HUP $remote fi else fail "no pid file: $OBJ/remote_pid" fi done openssh-8.2p1/regress/envpass.sh010064400017500001750000000030531362136622600151470ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: envpass.sh,v 1.4 2005/03/04 08:48:46 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="environment passing" # NB accepted env vars are in test-exec.sh (_XXX_TEST_* and _XXX_TEST) # Prepare a custom config to test for a configuration parsing bug fixed in 4.0 cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass Host test-sendenv-confparse-bug SendEnv * EOF cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass trace "pass env, don't accept" verbose "test $tid: pass env, don't accept" _TEST_ENV=blah ${SSH} -oSendEnv="*" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \ sh << 'EOF' test -z "$_TEST_ENV" EOF r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "environment found" fi trace "don't pass env, accept" verbose "test $tid: don't pass env, accept" _XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \ sh << 'EOF' test -z "$_XXX_TEST_A" && test -z "$_XXX_TEST_B" EOF r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "environment found" fi trace "pass single env, accept single env" verbose "test $tid: pass single env, accept single env" _XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass \ otherhost sh << 'EOF' test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah" EOF r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "environment not found" fi trace "pass multiple env, accept multiple env" verbose "test $tid: pass multiple env, accept multiple env" _XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2 ${SSH} -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST_*" \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \ sh << 'EOF' test X"$_XXX_TEST_A" = X"1" -a X"$_XXX_TEST_B" = X"2" EOF r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "environment not found" fi rm -f $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass openssh-8.2p1/regress/exit-status.sh010064400017500001750000000010621362136622600157600ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: exit-status.sh,v 1.8 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="remote exit status" for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do trace "status $s" verbose "test $tid: status $s" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exit $s r=$? if [ $r -ne $s ]; then fail "exit code mismatch for: $r != $s" fi # same with early close of stdout/err ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -n otherhost exec \ sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\' r=$? if [ $r -ne $s ]; then fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for: $r != $s" fi done openssh-8.2p1/regress/forcecommand.sh010064400017500001750000000021421362136622600161230ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: forcecommand.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="forced command" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do printf 'command="true" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done trace "forced command in key option" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key" cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do printf 'command="false" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy trace "forced command in sshd_config overrides key option" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "ForceCommand false" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Match User $USER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo " ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy trace "forced command with match" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key" openssh-8.2p1/regress/forward-control.sh010064400017500001750000000173241362136622600166200ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.7 2018/06/07 14:29:43 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sshd control of local and remote forwarding" LFWD_PORT=3320 RFWD_PORT=3321 CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock READY=$OBJ/ready wait_for_file_to_appear() { _path=$1 _n=0 while test ! -f $_path ; do test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_path to appear" _n=`expr $_n + 1` test $_n -ge 20 && return 1 sleep 1 done return 0 } wait_for_process_to_exit() { _pid=$1 _n=0 while kill -0 $_pid 2>/dev/null ; do test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_pid to exit" _n=`expr $_n + 1` test $_n -ge 20 && return 1 sleep 1 done return 0 } # usage: check_lfwd Y|N message check_lfwd() { _expected=$1 _message=$2 rm -f $READY ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -L$LFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \ -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \ >/dev/null 2>&1 & _sshpid=$! wait_for_file_to_appear $READY || \ fatal "check_lfwd ssh fail: $_message" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $LFWD_PORT \ -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1 _result=$? kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then fail "check_lfwd failed (expecting success): $_message" elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then fail "check_lfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message" elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then fatal "check_lfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\"" else verbose "check_lfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message" fi } # usage: check_rfwd Y|N message check_rfwd() { _expected=$1 _message=$2 rm -f $READY ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -R127.0.0.1:$RFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \ -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \ >/dev/null 2>&1 & _sshpid=$! wait_for_file_to_appear $READY _result=$? if test $_result -eq 0 ; then ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $RFWD_PORT \ -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1 _result=$? kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid fi if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then fail "check_rfwd failed (expecting success): $_message" elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then fail "check_rfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message" elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then fatal "check_rfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\"" else verbose "check_rfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message" fi } start_sshd cp ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak # Sanity check: ensure the default config allows forwarding check_lfwd Y "default configuration" check_rfwd Y "default configuration" # Usage: lperm_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N lperm_tests() { _tcpfwd=$1 _plain_lfwd=$2 _plain_rfwd=$3 _nopermit_lfwd=$4 _nopermit_rfwd=$5 _permit_lfwd=$6 _permit_rfwd=$7 _badfwd1=127.0.0.1:22 _badfwd2=127.0.0.2:22 _goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${PORT} cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} _prefix="AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd" # No PermitOpen ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix" check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix" # PermitOpen via sshd_config that doesn't match ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd1 $_badfwd2" ) \ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen" check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen" # PermitOpen via sshd_config that does match ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd1 $_goodfwd $_badfwd2" ) \ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, PermitOpen" check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, PermitOpen" # permitopen keys option. # NB. permitopen via authorized_keys should have same # success/fail as via sshd_config # permitopen via authorized_keys that doesn't match sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd1\",permitopen=\"$_badfwd2\" /" \ < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 1 fail" ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen" check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen" # permitopen via authorized_keys that does match sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd1\",permitopen=\"$_goodfwd\" /" \ < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 2 fail" ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy check_lfwd $_permit_lfwd "$_prefix, permitopen" check_rfwd $_permit_rfwd "$_prefix, permitopen" # Check port-forwarding flags in authorized_keys. # These two should refuse all. sed "s/^/no-port-forwarding /" \ < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 3 fail" ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy check_lfwd N "$_prefix, no-port-forwarding" check_rfwd N "$_prefix, no-port-forwarding" sed "s/^/restrict /" \ < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 4 fail" ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy check_lfwd N "$_prefix, restrict" check_rfwd N "$_prefix, restrict" # This should pass the same cases as _nopermit* sed "s/^/restrict,port-forwarding /" \ < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 5 fail" ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, restrict,port-forwarding" check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, restrict,port-forwarding" } # permit-open none mismatch match # AllowTcpForwarding local remote local remote local remote lperm_tests yes Y Y N Y Y Y lperm_tests local Y N N N Y N lperm_tests remote N Y N Y N Y lperm_tests no N N N N N N # Usage: rperm_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N rperm_tests() { _tcpfwd=$1 _plain_lfwd=$2 _plain_rfwd=$3 _nopermit_lfwd=$4 _nopermit_rfwd=$5 _permit_lfwd=$6 _permit_rfwd=$7 _badfwd1=127.0.0.1:22 _badfwd2=127.0.0.2:${RFWD_PORT} _goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${RFWD_PORT} cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} _prefix="AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd" # PermitListen via sshd_config that doesn't match ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; echo "PermitListen $_badfwd1 $_badfwd2" ) \ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitListen" check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitListen" # PermitListen via sshd_config that does match ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; echo "PermitListen $_badfwd1 $_goodfwd $_badfwd2" ) \ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, PermitListen" check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, PermitListen" } # permit-remote-open none mismatch match # AllowTcpForwarding local remote local remote local remote rperm_tests yes Y Y Y N Y Y rperm_tests local Y N Y N Y N rperm_tests remote N Y N N N Y rperm_tests no N N N N N N openssh-8.2p1/regress/forwarding.sh010064400017500001750000000104221362136622600156300ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.23 2019/07/20 09:50:58 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="local and remote forwarding" DATA=/bin/ls${EXEEXT} start_sshd base=33 last=$PORT fwd="" make_tmpdir CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock for j in 0 1 2; do for i in 0 1 2; do a=$base$j$i b=`expr $a + 50` c=$last # fwd chain: $a -> $b -> $c fwd="$fwd -L$a:127.0.0.1:$b -R$b:127.0.0.1:$c" last=$a done done trace "start forwarding, fork to background" rm -f $CTL ${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null for d in L R; do trace "exit on -$d forward failure" # this one should succeed ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true if [ $? != 0 ]; then fatal "connection failed, should not" else # this one should fail ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}01:localhost:$PORT \ -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true r=$? if [ $r != 255 ]; then fail "connection not termintated, but should ($r)" fi fi done trace "simple clear forwarding" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true trace "clear local forward" rm -f $CTL ${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost if [ $? != 0 ]; then fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding" else # this one should fail ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ fail "local forwarding not cleared" fi ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null trace "clear remote forward" rm -f $CTL ${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost if [ $? != 0 ]; then fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding" else # this one should fail ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ fail "remote forwarding not cleared" fi ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null trace "stdio forwarding" cmd="${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config" $cmd -o "ProxyCommand $cmd -q -W localhost:$PORT somehost" somehost true if [ $? != 0 ]; then fail "stdio forwarding" fi echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background" rm -f $CTL ${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result" rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123] ${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost ${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost ${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost ${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null openssh-8.2p1/regress/host-expand.sh010064400017500001750000000006001362136622600157150ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: host-expand.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="expand %h and %n" echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy printf 'LocalCommand printf "%%%%s\\n" "%%n" "%%h"\n' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy cat >$OBJ/expect <$OBJ/actual diff $OBJ/expect $OBJ/actual || fail "$tid" openssh-8.2p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh010064400017500001750000000031461362136622600162550ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.11 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="hostkey agent" rm -f $OBJ/agent-key.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig $OBJ/known_hosts.orig trace "start agent" eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null r=$? [ $r -ne 0 ] && fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig trace "load hostkeys" for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" ( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts.orig ${SSHADD} $OBJ/agent-key.$k >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fatal "couldn't load key $OBJ/agent-key.$k" echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig # Remove private key so the server can't use it. rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k || fatal "couldn't rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k" done cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK for ps in yes; do for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do verbose "key type $k privsep=$ps" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "privsep=$ps failed" fi if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION key type $k privsep=$ps" fi done done trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null openssh-8.2p1/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh010064400017500001750000000102761362136622600164570ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.8 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="hostkey rotate" rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig echo "UpdateHostkeys=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy rm $OBJ/known_hosts # The "primary" key type is ed25519 since it's supported even when built # without OpenSSL. The secondary is RSA if it's supported. primary="ssh-ed25519" secondary="$primary" trace "prepare hostkeys" nkeys=0 all_algs="" for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1` test "x$all_algs" = "x" || all_algs="${all_algs}," all_algs="${all_algs}$k" case "$k" in ssh-rsa) secondary="ssh-rsa" ;; esac done dossh() { # All ssh should succeed in this test ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" x true || fail "ssh $@ failed" } expect_nkeys() { _expected=$1 _message=$2 _n=`wc -l $OBJ/known_hosts | awk '{ print $1 }'` || fatal "wc failed" [ "x$_n" = "x$_expected" ] || fail "$_message (got $_n wanted $_expected)" } check_key_present() { _type=$1 _kfile=$2 test "x$_kfile" = "x" && _kfile="$OBJ/hkr.${_type}.pub" _kpub=`awk "/$_type /"' { print $2 }' < $_kfile` || \ fatal "awk failed" fgrep "$_kpub" $OBJ/known_hosts > /dev/null } cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Connect to sshd with StrictHostkeyChecking=no verbose "learn hostkey with StrictHostKeyChecking=no" >$OBJ/known_hosts dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$primary -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no # Verify no additional keys learned expect_nkeys 1 "unstrict connect keys" check_key_present $primary || fail "unstrict didn't learn key" # Connect to sshd as usual verbose "learn additional hostkeys" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs # Check that other keys learned expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn keytype $k" done # Check each key type for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k" check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k correctly" done # Change one hostkey (non primary) and relearn if [ "$primary" != "$secondary" ]; then verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey type=${secondary}" mv $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub.old rm -f $OBJ/hkr.${secondary} ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ${secondary} -f $OBJ/hkr.${secondary} -N '' || \ fatal "ssh-keygen $secondary" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs # Check that the key was replaced expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ${secondary} $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub.old && \ fail "old key present" check_key_present ${secondary} || fail "didn't learn changed key" fi # Add new hostkey (primary type) to sshd and connect verbose "learn new primary hostkey" ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ${primary} -f $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen ed25519" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new ) \ > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Check new hostkey added dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary},$all_algs expect_nkeys `expr $nkeys + 1` "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ${primary} || fail "current key missing" check_key_present ${primary} $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new.pub || fail "new key missing" # Remove old hostkey (primary type) from sshd verbose "rotate primary hostkey" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub.old mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new $OBJ/hkr.${primary} # Check old hostkey removed dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary},$all_algs expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ${primary} $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub.old && fail "old key present" check_key_present ${primary} || fail "didn't learn changed key" # Connect again, forcing rotated key verbose "check rotate primary hostkey" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary} expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ${primary} || fail "didn't learn changed key" openssh-8.2p1/regress/integrity.sh010064400017500001750000000045311362136622600155100ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.24 2020/01/21 08:06:27 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="integrity" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak # start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets tries=10 startoffset=2900 macs=`${SSH} -Q mac` # The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are # handled specially below. macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`" # avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the # offset into the stream right. #echo "KexAlgorithms -diffie-hellman-group*" \ # >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy # sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh) cmd="$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" for m in $macs; do trace "test $tid: mac $m" elen=0 epad=0 emac=0 etmo=0 ecnt=0 skip=0 for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do skip=`expr $skip - 1` if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then # avoid modifying the high bytes of the length continue fi cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy # modify output from sshd at offset $off pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1" if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy macopt="-c $m" else echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr" fi verbose "test $tid: $m @$off" ${SSH} $macopt -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \ -oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \ 999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off" fi ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1` out=$(egrep -v "^debug" $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | tail -2 | \ tr -s '\r\n' '.') case "$out" in Bad?packet*) elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;; Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*) emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;; padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;; *Timeout,?server*) etmo=`expr $etmo + 1`; skip=0;; *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";; esac done verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen timeout $etmo" if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then fail "$m: no mac errors" fi expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen - $etmo` if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac" fi done openssh-8.2p1/regress/kextype.sh010064400017500001750000000011131362136622600151540ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.6 2015/03/24 20:19:15 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="login with different key exchange algorithms" TIME=/usr/bin/time cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak # Make server accept all key exchanges. ALLKEX=`${SSH} -Q kex` KEXOPT=`echo $ALLKEX | tr ' ' ,` echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy tries="1 2 3 4" for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do verbose "kex $k" for i in $tries; do ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh kex $k" fi done done openssh-8.2p1/regress/key-options.sh010064400017500001750000000063371362136622600157610ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: key-options.sh,v 1.9 2018/07/03 13:53:26 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="key options" origkeys="$OBJ/authkeys_orig" authkeys="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}" cp $authkeys $origkeys # Test command= forced command for c in 'command="echo bar"' 'no-pty,command="echo bar"'; do sed "s/.*/$c &/" $origkeys >$authkeys verbose "key option $c" r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost echo foo` if [ "$r" = "foo" ]; then fail "key option forced command not restricted" fi if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then fail "key option forced command not executed" fi done # Test no-pty expect_pty_succeed() { which=$1 opts=$2 rm -f $OBJ/data sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys verbose "key option pty $which" config_defined HAVE_OPENPTY || verbose "skipped for no openpty(3)" ${SSH} -ttq -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "tty > $OBJ/data; exit 0" if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then fail "key option failed $which" else r=`cat $OBJ/data` case "$r" in /dev/*) ;; *) fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)" ;; esac fi } expect_pty_fail() { which=$1 opts=$2 rm -f $OBJ/data sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys verbose "key option pty $which" config_defined HAVE_OPENPTY || verbose "skipped for no openpty(3)" ${SSH} -ttq -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "tty > $OBJ/data; exit 0" if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then r=`cat $OBJ/data` if [ -e "$r" ]; then fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)" fi case "$r" in /dev/*) fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)" ;; *) ;; esac fi } # First ensure that we can allocate a pty by default. expect_pty_succeed "default" "" expect_pty_fail "no-pty" "no-pty" expect_pty_fail "restrict" "restrict" expect_pty_succeed "restrict,pty" "restrict,pty" # Test environment= # XXX this can fail if ~/.ssh/environment exists for the user running the test echo 'PermitUserEnvironment yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy sed 's/.*/environment="FOO=bar" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys verbose "key option environment" r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $FOO'` if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then fail "key option environment not set" fi # Test from= restriction start_sshd for f in 127.0.0.1 '127.0.0.0\/8'; do cat $origkeys >$authkeys ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "key option failed without restriction" fi sed 's/.*/from="'"$f"'" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys from=`head -1 $authkeys | cut -f1 -d ' '` verbose "key option $from" r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo true'` if [ "$r" = "true" ]; then fail "key option $from not restricted" fi r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost 'echo true'` if [ "$r" != "true" ]; then fail "key option $from not allowed but should be" fi done check_valid_before() { which=$1 opts=$2 expect=$3 sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys verbose "key option expiry-time $which" ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true r=$? case "$expect" in fail) test $r -eq 0 && fail "key option succeeded $which" ;; pass) test $r -ne 0 && fail "key option failed $which" ;; *) fatal "unknown expectation $expect" ;; esac } check_valid_before "default" "" "pass" check_valid_before "invalid" 'expiry-time="INVALID"' "fail" check_valid_before "expired" 'expiry-time="19990101"' "fail" check_valid_before "valid" 'expiry-time="20380101"' "pass" openssh-8.2p1/regress/keygen-change.sh010064400017500001750000000010121362136622600161660ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.9 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="change passphrase for key" S1="secret1" S2="2secret" for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do trace "generating $t key" rm -f $OBJ/$t-key ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N ${S1} -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -P ${S1} -N ${S2} -f $OBJ/$t-key > /dev/null if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-keygen -p failed for $t-key" fi else fail "ssh-keygen for $t-key failed" fi rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub done openssh-8.2p1/regress/keygen-convert.sh010064400017500001750000000023301362136622600164250ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: keygen-convert.sh,v 1.2 2019/07/23 07:55:29 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="convert keys" types="" for i in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do case "$i" in ssh-dss) types="$types dsa" ;; ssh-rsa) types="$types rsa" ;; esac done for t in $types; do # generate user key for agent trace "generating $t key" rm -f $OBJ/$t-key ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N "" -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key trace "export $t private to rfc4716 public" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc || \ fail "export $t private to rfc4716 public" trace "export $t public to rfc4716 public" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \ fail "$t public to rfc4716 public" cmp $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \ fail "$t rfc4716 exports differ between public and private" trace "import $t rfc4716 public" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -i -f $OBJ/$t-key-rfc >$OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \ fail "$t import rfc4716 public" cut -f1,2 -d " " $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub cmp $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub $OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \ fail "$t imported differs from original" rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub \ $OBJ/$t-rfc-imported $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub done openssh-8.2p1/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh010064400017500001750000000146541362136622600171760ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: keygen-knownhosts.sh,v 1.4 2018/06/01 03:52:37 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="ssh-keygen known_hosts" rm -f $OBJ/kh.* # Generate some keys for testing (just ed25519 for speed) and make a hosts file. for x in host-a host-b host-c host-d host-e host-f host-a2 host-b2; do ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/kh.$x -C "$x" -N "" || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" # Add a comment that we expect should be preserved. echo "# $x" >> $OBJ/kh.hosts ( case "$x" in host-a|host-b) printf "$x " ;; host-c) printf "@cert-authority $x " ;; host-d) printf "@revoked $x " ;; host-e) printf "host-e* " ;; host-f) printf "host-f,host-g,host-h " ;; host-a2) printf "host-a " ;; host-b2) printf "host-b " ;; esac cat $OBJ/kh.${x}.pub # Blank line should be preserved. echo "" >> $OBJ/kh.hosts ) >> $OBJ/kh.hosts done # Generate a variant with an invalid line. We'll use this for most tests, # because keygen should be able to cope and it should be preserved in any # output file. cat $OBJ/kh.hosts >> $OBJ/kh.invalid echo "host-i " >> $OBJ/kh.invalid cp $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig cp $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig expect_key() { _host=$1 _hosts=$2 _key=$3 _line=$4 _mark=$5 _marker="" test "x$_mark" = "xCA" && _marker="@cert-authority " test "x$_mark" = "xREVOKED" && _marker="@revoked " test "x$_line" != "x" && echo "# Host $_host found: line $_line $_mark" >> $OBJ/kh.expect printf "${_marker}$_hosts " >> $OBJ/kh.expect cat $OBJ/kh.${_key}.pub >> $OBJ/kh.expect || fatal "${_key}.pub missing" } check_find() { _host=$1 _name=$2 shift; shift ${SSHKEYGEN} "$@" -f $OBJ/kh.invalid -F $_host > $OBJ/kh.result if ! diff -w $OBJ/kh.expect $OBJ/kh.result ; then fail "didn't find $_name" fi } check_find_exit_code() { _host=$1 _name=$2 _keygenopt=$3 _exp_exit_code=$4 ${SSHKEYGEN} $_keygenopt -f $OBJ/kh.invalid -F $_host > /dev/null if [ "$?" != "$_exp_exit_code" ] ; then fail "Unexpected exit code $_name" fi } # Find key rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-a host-a host-a 2 expect_key host-a host-a host-a2 20 check_find host-a "simple find" # find CA key rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-c host-c host-c 8 CA check_find host-c "find CA key" # find revoked key rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-d host-d host-d 11 REVOKED check_find host-d "find revoked key" # find key with wildcard rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-e.somedomain "host-e*" host-e 14 check_find host-e.somedomain "find wildcard key" # find key among multiple hosts rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-h "host-f,host-g,host-h " host-f 17 check_find host-h "find multiple hosts" # Check exit code, known host check_find_exit_code host-a "known host" "-q" "0" # Check exit code, unknown host check_find_exit_code host-aa "unknown host" "-q" "1" # Check exit code, the hash mode, known host check_find_exit_code host-a "known host" "-q -H" "0" # Check exit code, the hash mode, unknown host check_find_exit_code host-aa "unknown host" "-q -H" "1" check_hashed_find() { _host=$1 _name=$2 _file=$3 test "x$_file" = "x" && _file=$OBJ/kh.invalid ${SSHKEYGEN} -f $_file -HF $_host | grep '|1|' | \ sed "s/^[^ ]*/$_host/" > $OBJ/kh.result if ! diff -w $OBJ/kh.expect $OBJ/kh.result ; then fail "didn't find $_name" fi } # Find key and hash rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-a host-a host-a expect_key host-a host-a host-a2 check_hashed_find host-a "find simple and hash" # Find CA key and hash rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-c host-c host-c "" CA # CA key output is not hashed. check_find host-c "find simple and hash" -Hq # Find revoked key and hash rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-d host-d host-d "" REVOKED # Revoked key output is not hashed. check_find host-d "find simple and hash" -Hq # find key with wildcard and hash rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-e "host-e*" host-e "" # Key with wildcard hostname should not be hashed. check_find host-e "find wildcard key" -Hq # find key among multiple hosts rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect # Comma-separated hostnames should be expanded and hashed. expect_key host-f "host-h " host-f expect_key host-g "host-h " host-f expect_key host-h "host-h " host-f check_hashed_find host-h "find multiple hosts" # Attempt remove key on invalid file. cp $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig $OBJ/kh.invalid ${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.invalid -R host-a 2>/dev/null diff $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig || fail "remove on invalid succeeded" # Remove key cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts ${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-a 2>/dev/null grep -v "^host-a " $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove simple" # Remove CA key cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts ${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-c 2>/dev/null # CA key should not be removed. diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "remove CA" # Remove revoked key cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts ${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-d 2>/dev/null # revoked key should not be removed. diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "remove revoked" # Remove wildcard cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts ${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-e.blahblah 2>/dev/null grep -v "^host-e[*] " $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove wildcard" # Remove multiple cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts ${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-h 2>/dev/null grep -v "^host-f," $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove wildcard" # Attempt hash on invalid file cp $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig $OBJ/kh.invalid ${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.invalid -H 2>/dev/null && fail "hash invalid succeeded" diff $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig || fail "invalid file modified" # Hash valid file cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts ${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -H 2>/dev/null || fail "hash failed" diff $OBJ/kh.hosts.old $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "backup differs" grep "^host-[abfgh]" $OBJ/kh.hosts && fail "original hostnames persist" cp $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hashed.orig # Test lookup rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-a host-a host-a expect_key host-a host-a host-a2 check_hashed_find host-a "find simple in hashed" $OBJ/kh.hosts # Test multiple expanded rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect expect_key host-h host-h host-f check_hashed_find host-h "find simple in hashed" $OBJ/kh.hosts # Test remove cp $OBJ/kh.hashed.orig $OBJ/kh.hashed ${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hashed -R host-a 2>/dev/null ${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hashed -F host-a && fail "found key after hashed remove" openssh-8.2p1/regress/keygen-moduli.sh010064400017500001750000000016041362136622600162410ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: keygen-moduli.sh,v 1.4 2020/01/02 13:25:38 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="keygen moduli" dhgex=0 for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do case $kex in diffie-hellman-group*) dhgex=1 ;; esac done # Try "start at the beginning and stop after 1", "skip 1 then stop after 1" # and "skip 2 and run to the end with checkpointing". Since our test data # file has 3 lines, these should always result in 1 line of output. if [ "x$dhgex" = "x1" ]; then for i in "-O lines=1" "-O start-line=1 -O lines=1" "-O start-line=2 -O checkpoint=$OBJ/moduli.ckpt"; do trace "keygen $i" rm -f $OBJ/moduli.out $OBJ/moduli.ckpt ${SSHKEYGEN} -M screen -f ${SRC}/moduli.in $i $OBJ/moduli.out 2>/dev/null || \ fail "keygen screen failed $i" lines=`wc -l <$OBJ/moduli.out` test "$lines" -eq "1" || fail "expected 1 line, got $lines" done fi rm -f $OBJ/moduli.out $OBJ/moduli.ckpt openssh-8.2p1/regress/keys-command.sh010064400017500001750000000046571362136622600160720ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.6 2019/07/25 08:48:11 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="authorized keys from command" if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" exit 0 fi rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args touch $OBJ/keys-command-args chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519.pub` expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/ssh-ed25519.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` # Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have # acceptable directory permissions. KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}.$$" trap "${SUDO} rm -f ${KEY_COMMAND}" 0 cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'" #!/bin/sh echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7 test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 if test $# -eq 6 ; then test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2 test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3 test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4 test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5 test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6 fi exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}" _EOF $SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND" if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $KEY_COMMAND ; then echo "skipping: $KEY_COMMAND is unsuitable as AuthorizedKeysCommand" $SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND exit 0 fi if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments" ( grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak echo AuthorizedKeysFile none echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "connect failed" fi verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments" # Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed. ( grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak echo AuthorizedKeysFile none echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "connect failed" fi else echo "SKIPPED: $KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)" fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/keyscan.sh010064400017500001750000000007541362136622600151320ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.13 2020/01/22 07:31:27 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="keyscan" for i in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do if [ -z "$algs" ]; then algs="$i" else algs="$algs,$i" fi done echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $algs" >> $OBJ/sshd_config start_sshd for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do trace "keyscan type $t" ${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -T 15 -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \ > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-keyscan -t $t failed with: $r" fi done openssh-8.2p1/regress/keytype.sh010064400017500001750000000046071362136622600151700ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.10 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="login with different key types" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak # Construct list of key types based on what the built binaries support. ktypes="" for i in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do case "$i" in ssh-dss) ktypes="$ktypes dsa-1024" ;; ssh-rsa) ktypes="$ktypes rsa-2048 rsa-3072" ;; ssh-ed25519) ktypes="$ktypes ed25519-512" ;; ecdsa-sha2-nistp256) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-256" ;; ecdsa-sha2-nistp384) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-384" ;; ecdsa-sha2-nistp521) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-521" ;; sk-ssh-ed25519*) ktypes="$ktypes ed25519-sk" ;; sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256*) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-sk" ;; esac done for kt in $ktypes; do rm -f $OBJ/key.$kt xbits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'` xtype=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $1}'` case "$kt" in *sk) type="$kt"; bits="n/a"; bits_arg="";; *) type=$xtype; bits=$xbits; bits_arg="-b $bits";; esac verbose "keygen $type, $bits bits" ${SSHKEYGEN} $bits_arg -q -N '' -t $type -f $OBJ/key.$kt || \ fail "ssh-keygen for type $type, $bits bits failed" done kname_to_ktype() { case $1 in dsa-1024) echo ssh-dss;; ecdsa-256) echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp256;; ecdsa-384) echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp384;; ecdsa-521) echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp521;; ed25519-512) echo ssh-ed25519;; rsa-*) echo rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa;; ed25519-sk) echo sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com;; ecdsa-sk) echo sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com;; esac } tries="1 2 3" for ut in $ktypes; do user_type=`kname_to_ktype "$ut"` htypes="$ut" #htypes=$ktypes for ht in $htypes; do host_type=`kname_to_ktype "$ht"` trace "ssh connect, userkey $ut, hostkey $ht" ( grep -v HostKey $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo HostKey $OBJ/key.$ht echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $user_type echo HostKeyAlgorithms $host_type ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy ( grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak echo IdentityFile $OBJ/key.$ut echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $user_type echo HostKeyAlgorithms $host_type ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy ( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' cat $OBJ/key.$ht.pub ) > $OBJ/known_hosts cat $OBJ/key.$ut.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for i in $tries; do verbose "userkey $ut, hostkey ${ht}" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh userkey $ut, hostkey $ht failed" fi done done done openssh-8.2p1/regress/limit-keytype.sh010064400017500001750000000112341362136622600162760ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.9 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="restrict pubkey type" # XXX sk-* keys aren't actually tested ATM. rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key* mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig ktype1=ed25519; ktype2=ed25519; ktype3=ed25519; ktype4=ed25519; ktype5=ed25519; ktype6=ed25519; for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do case "$t" in ssh-rsa) ktype2=rsa ;; ecdsa*) ktype3=ecdsa ;; # unused ssh-dss) ktype4=dsa ;; sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) ktype5=ed25519-sk ;; sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com) ktype6=ecdsa-sk ;; esac done # Create a CA key ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" # Make some keys and a certificate. ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype4 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype5 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype6 -f $OBJ/user_key6 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \ -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key3 || fatal "couldn't sign user_key1" # Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when # it is offered. mv $OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes" certopts="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub" echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER prepare_config() { ( grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig echo "Protocol 2" echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey" echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" for x in "$@" ; do echo "$x" done ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy } # Return the required parameter for PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes corresponding to # the supplied key type. keytype() { case "$1" in ecdsa) printf "ecdsa-sha2-*" ;; ed25519) printf "ssh-ed25519" ;; dsa) printf "ssh-dss" ;; rsa) printf "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512,ssh-rsa" ;; sk-ecdsa) printf "sk-ecdsa-*" ;; sk-ssh-ed25519) printf "sk-ssh-ed25519-*" ;; esac } prepare_config # Check we can log in with all key types. ${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed" # Allow plain Ed25519 and RSA. The certificate should fail. verbose "allow $ktype2,$ktype1" prepare_config \ "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes `keytype $ktype2`,`keytype $ktype1`" ${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed" # Allow Ed25519 only. verbose "allow $ktype1" prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes `keytype $ktype1`" ${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" if [ "$ktype1" != "$ktype2" ]; then ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded" fi # Allow all certs. Plain keys should fail. verbose "allow cert only" prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *-cert-v01@openssh.com" ${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded" # Allow RSA in main config, Ed25519 for non-existent user. verbose "match w/ no match" prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes `keytype $ktype2`" \ "Match user x$USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +`keytype $ktype1`" ${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" if [ "$ktype1" != "$ktype2" ]; then ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded" fi ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed" # Allow only DSA in main config, Ed25519 for user. verbose "match w/ matching" prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes `keytype $ktype4`" \ "Match user $USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +`keytype $ktype1`" ${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key4 proxy true && fatal "key4 succeeded" openssh-8.2p1/regress/localcommand.sh010064400017500001750000000005371362136622600161250ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: localcommand.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="localcommand" echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy echo 'LocalCommand echo foo' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy verbose "test $tid: proto $p localcommand" a=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true` if [ "$a" != "foo" ] ; then fail "$tid proto $p" fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/login-timeout.sh010064400017500001750000000011141362136622600162600ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.9 2017/08/07 00:53:51 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="connect after login grace timeout" trace "test login grace with privsep" cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig grep -vi LoginGraceTime $OBJ/sshd_config.orig > $OBJ/sshd_config echo "LoginGraceTime 10s" >> $OBJ/sshd_config echo "MaxStartups 1" >> $OBJ/sshd_config start_sshd (echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 & sleep 15 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed" fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600140125ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/Makefile010064400017500001750000000000641362136622600155260ustar00djmdjmSUBDIR= kexfuzz sk-dummy .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/fuzz-harness004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600164515ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile010064400017500001750000000024161362136622600201700ustar00djmdjm# NB. libssh and libopenbsd-compat should be built with the same sanitizer opts. CXX=clang++-6.0 FUZZ_FLAGS=-fsanitize=address,undefined -fsanitize-coverage=edge,trace-pc FUZZ_LIBS=-lFuzzer CXXFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -I ../../.. $(FUZZ_FLAGS) LDFLAGS=-L ../../.. -L ../../../openbsd-compat -g $(FUZZ_FLAGS) LIBS=-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto -lfido2 -lcbor $(FUZZ_LIBS) COMMON_OBJS=ssh-sk-null.o TARGETS=pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz authopt_fuzz sshsig_fuzz \ sshsigopt_fuzz privkey_fuzz all: $(TARGETS) .cc.o: $(CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ pubkey_fuzz: pubkey_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(CXX) -o $@ pubkey_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) sig_fuzz: sig_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(CXX) -o $@ sig_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) authopt_fuzz: authopt_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(CXX) -o $@ authopt_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) ../../../auth-options.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) sshsig_fuzz: sshsig_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(CXX) -o $@ sshsig_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) ../../../sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) sshsigopt_fuzz: sshsigopt_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(CXX) -o $@ sshsigopt_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) ../../../sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) privkey_fuzz: privkey_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(CXX) -o $@ privkey_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) clean: -rm -f *.o $(TARGETS) openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README010064400017500001750000000001121362136622600173770ustar00djmdjmThis directory contains fuzzing harnesses for use with clang's libfuzzer. openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/authopt_fuzz.cc010064400017500001750000000012171362136622600215770ustar00djmdjm#include #include #include #include #include extern "C" { #include "auth-options.h" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) { char *cp = (char *)malloc(size + 1); struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL, *merge = NULL, *add = sshauthopt_new(); if (cp == NULL || add == NULL) goto out; memcpy(cp, data, size); cp[size] = '\0'; if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(cp, NULL)) == NULL) goto out; if ((merge = sshauthopt_merge(opts, add, NULL)) == NULL) goto out; out: free(cp); sshauthopt_free(add); sshauthopt_free(opts); sshauthopt_free(merge); return 0; } } // extern "C" openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/privkey_fuzz.cc010064400017500001750000000005561362136622600216110ustar00djmdjm#include #include #include extern "C" { #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) { struct sshkey *k = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = sshbuf_from(data, size); int r = sshkey_private_deserialize(b, &k); if (r == 0) sshkey_free(k); sshbuf_free(b); return 0; } } // extern openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc010064400017500001750000000004331362136622600214110ustar00djmdjm#include #include #include extern "C" { #include "sshkey.h" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) { struct sshkey *k = NULL; int r = sshkey_from_blob(data, size, &k); if (r == 0) sshkey_free(k); return 0; } } // extern openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc010064400017500001750000000037701362136622600207030ustar00djmdjm// cc_fuzz_target test for public key parsing. #include #include #include #include #include extern "C" { #include "includes.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" static struct sshkey *generate_or_die(int type, unsigned bits) { int r; struct sshkey *ret; if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &ret)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "generate(%d, %u): %s", type, bits, ssh_err(r)); abort(); } return ret; } int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static struct sshkey *rsa = generate_or_die(KEY_RSA, 2048); static struct sshkey *dsa = generate_or_die(KEY_DSA, 1024); static struct sshkey *ecdsa256 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 256); static struct sshkey *ecdsa384 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 384); static struct sshkey *ecdsa521 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 521); #endif struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL; static struct sshkey *ed25519 = generate_or_die(KEY_ED25519, 0); static const char *data = "If everyone started announcing his nose had " "run away, I don’t know how it would all end"; static const size_t dlen = strlen(data); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL sshkey_verify(rsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details); sshkey_sig_details_free(details); details = NULL; sshkey_verify(dsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details); sshkey_sig_details_free(details); details = NULL; sshkey_verify(ecdsa256, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details); sshkey_sig_details_free(details); details = NULL; sshkey_verify(ecdsa384, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details); sshkey_sig_details_free(details); details = NULL; sshkey_verify(ecdsa521, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details); sshkey_sig_details_free(details); details = NULL; #endif sshkey_verify(ed25519, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details); sshkey_sig_details_free(details); return 0; } } // extern openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/ssh-sk-null.cc010064400017500001750000000030211362136622600212100ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD$ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ extern "C" { #include "includes.h" #include #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" int sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device, const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf, struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest) { return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; } int sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *pin) { return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; } int sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device, const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp) { return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; } }; openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc010064400017500001750000000016661362136622600214230ustar00djmdjm// cc_fuzz_target test for sshsig verification. #include #include #include #include #include extern "C" { #include "includes.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshsig.h" #include "log.h" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen) { static const char *data = "If everyone started announcing his nose had " "run away, I don’t know how it would all end"; struct sshbuf *signature = sshbuf_from(sig, slen); struct sshbuf *message = sshbuf_from(data, strlen(data)); struct sshkey *k = NULL; struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL; extern char *__progname; log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); sshsig_verifyb(signature, message, "castle", &k, &details); sshkey_sig_details_free(details); sshkey_free(k); sshbuf_free(signature); sshbuf_free(message); return 0; } } // extern openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsigopt_fuzz.cc010064400017500001750000000007511362136622600221400ustar00djmdjm#include #include #include #include #include extern "C" { #include "sshsig.h" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) { char *cp = (char *)malloc(size + 1); struct sshsigopt *opts = NULL; if (cp == NULL) goto out; memcpy(cp, data, size); cp[size] = '\0'; if ((opts = sshsigopt_parse(cp, "libfuzzer", 0, NULL)) == NULL) goto out; out: free(cp); sshsigopt_free(opts); return 0; } } // extern "C" openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/kexfuzz004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600155205ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile010064400017500001750000000043401362136622600172350ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ .include .include # XXX detect from ssh binary? SSH1?= no OPENSSL?= yes PROG= kexfuzz SRCS= kexfuzz.c SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh .PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} # From usr.bin/ssh SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c packet.c dispatch.c canohost.c ssh_api.c SRCS+=compat.c ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-ed25519-sk.c msg.c ssh-sk-client.c SRCS+= kex.c SRCS+= dh.c SRCS+= kexdh.c SRCS+= kexecdh.c SRCS+= kexgex.c SRCS+= kexgexc.c SRCS+= kexgexs.c SRCS+= kexc25519.c SRCS+= smult_curve25519_ref.c SRCS+= kexgen.c SRCS+= kexsntrup4591761x25519.c SRCS+= sntrup4591761.c SRCS+=digest-openssl.c #SRCS+=digest-libc.c NOMAN= 1 .if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes") CFLAGS+= -DWITH_OPENSSL .else # SSH v.1 requires OpenSSL. SSH1= no .endif .if (${SSH1:L} == "yes") CFLAGS+= -DWITH_SSH1 .endif LDADD+= -lfido2 -lcbor -lusbhid DPADD+= ${LIBFIDO2} ${LIBCBOR} ${LIBUSBHID} # enable warnings WARNINGS=Yes DEBUG=-g CFLAGS+= -fstack-protector-all CDIAGFLAGS= -Wall CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wextra CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wcomment CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat-security CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wimplicit CDIAGFLAGS+= -Winline CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-declarations CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wparentheses CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-arith CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wshadow CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wsign-compare CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-aliasing CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wno-unused-parameter .if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3" CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition .endif CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} LDADD+= -lutil -lz DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL} ${LIBZ} .if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes") LDADD+= -lcrypto DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO} .endif .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/kexfuzz/README010064400017500001750000000020771362136622600164620ustar00djmdjmThis is a harness to help with fuzzing KEX. To use it, you first set it to count packets in each direction: ./kexfuzz -K diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -k host_ed25519_key -c S2C: 29 C2S: 31 Then get it to record a particular packet (in this case the 4th packet from client->server): ./kexfuzz -K diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -k host_ed25519_key \ -d -D C2S -i 3 -f packet_3 Fuzz the packet somehow: dd if=/dev/urandom of=packet_3 bs=32 count=1 # Just for example Then re-run the key exchange substituting the modified packet in its original sequence: ./kexfuzz -K diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -k host_ed25519_key \ -r -D C2S -i 3 -f packet_3 A comprehensive KEX fuzz run would fuzz every packet in both directions for each key exchange type and every hostkey type. This will take some time. Limitations: kexfuzz can't change the ordering of packets at present. It is limited to replacing individual packets with fuzzed variants with the same type. It really should allow insertion, deletion on replacement of packets too. $OpenBSD: README,v 1.3 2017/10/20 02:13:41 djm Exp $ openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c010064400017500001750000000277031362136622600174570ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: kexfuzz.c,v 1.6 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ */ /* * Fuzz harness for KEX code * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_ERR_H # include #endif #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh_api.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "log.h" void kex_tests(void); static int do_debug = 0; enum direction { S2C, C2S }; struct hook_ctx { struct ssh *client, *server, *server2; int *c2s, *s2c; int trigger_direction, packet_index; const char *dump_path; struct sshbuf *replace_data; }; static int packet_hook(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *packet, u_char *typep, void *_ctx) { struct hook_ctx *ctx = (struct hook_ctx *)_ctx; int mydirection = ssh == ctx->client ? S2C : C2S; int *packet_count = mydirection == S2C ? ctx->s2c : ctx->c2s; FILE *dumpfile; int r; if (do_debug) { printf("%s packet %d type %u:\n", mydirection == S2C ? "s2c" : "c2s", *packet_count, *typep); sshbuf_dump(packet, stdout); } if (mydirection == ctx->trigger_direction && ctx->packet_index == *packet_count) { if (ctx->replace_data != NULL) { sshbuf_reset(packet); /* Type is first byte of packet */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(ctx->replace_data, typep)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(packet, ctx->replace_data)) != 0) return r; if (do_debug) { printf("***** replaced packet type %u\n", *typep); sshbuf_dump(packet, stdout); } } else if (ctx->dump_path != NULL) { if ((dumpfile = fopen(ctx->dump_path, "w+")) == NULL) err(1, "fopen %s", ctx->dump_path); /* Write { type, packet } */ if (fwrite(typep, 1, 1, dumpfile) != 1) err(1, "fwrite type %s", ctx->dump_path); if (sshbuf_len(packet) != 0 && fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(packet), sshbuf_len(packet), 1, dumpfile) != 1) err(1, "fwrite body %s", ctx->dump_path); if (do_debug) { printf("***** dumped packet type %u len %zu\n", *typep, sshbuf_len(packet)); } fclose(dumpfile); /* No point in continuing */ exit(0); } } (*packet_count)++; return 0; } static int do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to) { u_char type; size_t len; const u_char *buf; int r; for (;;) { if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "ssh_packet_next: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); return r; } if (type != 0) return 0; buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len); if (len == 0) return 0; if ((r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0) { debug("ssh_input_append: %s", ssh_err(r)); return r; } if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0) { debug("ssh_output_consume: %s", ssh_err(r)); return r; } } } /* Minimal test_helper.c scaffholding to make this standalone */ const char *in_test = NULL; #define TEST_START(a) \ do { \ in_test = (a); \ if (do_debug) \ fprintf(stderr, "test %s starting\n", in_test); \ } while (0) #define TEST_DONE() \ do { \ if (do_debug) \ fprintf(stderr, "test %s done\n", \ in_test ? in_test : "???"); \ in_test = NULL; \ } while(0) #define ASSERT_INT_EQ(a, b) \ do { \ if ((int)(a) != (int)(b)) { \ fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \ "%s (%d) != expected %s (%d)\n", \ in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \ __func__, __LINE__, #a, (int)(a), #b, (int)(b)); \ exit(2); \ } \ } while (0) #define ASSERT_INT_GE(a, b) \ do { \ if ((int)(a) < (int)(b)) { \ fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \ "%s (%d) < expected %s (%d)\n", \ in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \ __func__, __LINE__, #a, (int)(a), #b, (int)(b)); \ exit(2); \ } \ } while (0) #define ASSERT_PTR_NE(a, b) \ do { \ if ((a) == (b)) { \ fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \ "%s (%p) != expected %s (%p)\n", \ in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \ __func__, __LINE__, #a, (a), #b, (b)); \ exit(2); \ } \ } while (0) static void run_kex(struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server) { int r = 0; while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) { if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client)) != 0) { debug("do_send_and_receive S2C: %s", ssh_err(r)); break; } if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server)) != 0) { debug("do_send_and_receive C2S: %s", ssh_err(r)); break; } } if (do_debug) printf("done: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(server->kex->done, 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(client->kex->done, 1); } static void do_kex_with_key(const char *kex, struct sshkey *prvkey, int *c2s, int *s2c, int direction, int packet_index, const char *dump_path, struct sshbuf *replace_data) { struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL, *server2 = NULL; struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL; struct sshbuf *state; struct kex_params kex_params; char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; char *keyname = NULL; struct hook_ctx hook_ctx; TEST_START("sshkey_from_private"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(prvkey, &pubkey), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ssh_init"); memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal)); if (kex != NULL) kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = strdup(kex); keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(prvkey)); ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL); kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname; ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server2, 1, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(client, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(server, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2, NULL); TEST_DONE(); hook_ctx.c2s = c2s; hook_ctx.s2c = s2c; hook_ctx.trigger_direction = direction; hook_ctx.packet_index = packet_index; hook_ctx.dump_path = dump_path; hook_ctx.replace_data = replace_data; hook_ctx.client = client; hook_ctx.server = server; hook_ctx.server2 = server2; ssh_packet_set_input_hook(client, packet_hook, &hook_ctx); ssh_packet_set_input_hook(server, packet_hook, &hook_ctx); ssh_packet_set_input_hook(server2, packet_hook, &hook_ctx); TEST_START("ssh_add_hostkey"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server, prvkey), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(client, pubkey), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("kex"); run_kex(client, server); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("rekeying client"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0); run_kex(client, server); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("rekeying server"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server), 0); run_kex(client, server); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ssh_packet_get_state"); state = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(state, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_get_state(server, state), 0); ASSERT_INT_GE(sshbuf_len(state), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ssh_packet_set_state"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server2, prvkey), 0); kex_free(server2->kex); /* XXX or should ssh_packet_set_state()? */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_set_state(server2, state), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(state), 0); sshbuf_free(state); ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2->kex, NULL); /* XXX we need to set the callbacks */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC server2->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; # endif #endif server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key; server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key; server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign; TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("rekeying server2"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server2), 0); run_kex(client, server2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0); run_kex(client, server2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("cleanup"); sshkey_free(pubkey); ssh_free(client); ssh_free(server); ssh_free(server2); free(keyname); TEST_DONE(); } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: kexfuzz [-hcdrv] [-D direction] [-f data_file]\n" " [-K kex_alg] [-k private_key] [-i packet_index]\n" "\n" "Options:\n" " -h Display this help\n" " -c Count packets sent during KEX\n" " -d Dump mode: record KEX packet to data file\n" " -r Replace mode: replace packet with data file\n" " -v Turn on verbose logging\n" " -D S2C|C2S Packet direction for replacement or dump\n" " -f data_file Path to data file for replacement or dump\n" " -K kex_alg Name of KEX algorithm to test (see below)\n" " -k private_key Path to private key file\n" " -i packet_index Index of packet to replace or dump (from 0)\n" "\n" "Available KEX algorithms: %s\n", kex_alg_list(' ')); } static void badusage(const char *bad) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid options\n"); fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", bad); usage(); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ch, fd, r; int count_flag = 0, dump_flag = 0, replace_flag = 0; int packet_index = -1, direction = -1; int s2c = 0, c2s = 0; /* packet counts */ const char *kex = NULL, *kpath = NULL, *data_path = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct sshbuf *replace_data = NULL; setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hcdrvD:f:K:k:i:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'h': usage(); return 0; case 'c': count_flag = 1; break; case 'd': dump_flag = 1; break; case 'r': replace_flag = 1; break; case 'v': do_debug = 1; break; case 'D': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "s2c") == 0) direction = S2C; else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "c2s") == 0) direction = C2S; else badusage("Invalid direction (-D)"); break; case 'f': data_path = optarg; break; case 'K': kex = optarg; break; case 'k': kpath = optarg; break; case 'i': packet_index = atoi(optarg); if (packet_index < 0) badusage("Invalid packet index"); break; default: badusage("unsupported flag"); } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; log_init(argv[0], do_debug ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); /* Must select a single mode */ if ((count_flag + dump_flag + replace_flag) != 1) badusage("Must select one mode: -c, -d or -r"); /* KEX type is mandatory */ if (kex == NULL || !kex_names_valid(kex) || strchr(kex, ',') != NULL) badusage("Missing or invalid kex type (-K flag)"); /* Valid key is mandatory */ if (kpath == NULL) badusage("Missing private key (-k flag)"); if ((fd = open(kpath, O_RDONLY)) == -1) err(1, "open %s", kpath); if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, &key, NULL)) != 0) errx(1, "Unable to load key %s: %s", kpath, ssh_err(r)); close(fd); /* XXX check that it is a private key */ /* XXX support certificates */ if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC) badusage("Invalid key file (-k flag)"); /* Replace (fuzz) mode */ if (replace_flag) { if (packet_index == -1 || direction == -1 || data_path == NULL) badusage("Replace (-r) mode must specify direction " "(-D) packet index (-i) and data path (-f)"); if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(data_path, &replace_data)) != 0) errx(1, "read %s: %s", data_path, ssh_err(r)); } /* Dump mode */ if (dump_flag) { if (packet_index == -1 || direction == -1 || data_path == NULL) badusage("Dump (-d) mode must specify direction " "(-D), packet index (-i) and data path (-f)"); } /* Count mode needs no further flags */ do_kex_with_key(kex, key, &c2s, &s2c, direction, packet_index, dump_flag ? data_path : NULL, replace_flag ? replace_data : NULL); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(replace_data); if (count_flag) { printf("S2C: %d\n", s2c); printf("C2S: %d\n", c2s); } return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/sk-dummy004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600155605ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/sk-dummy/Makefile010064400017500001750000000024761362136622600173050ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2019/11/29 00:13:29 djm Exp $ .include .include PROG= sk-dummy.so NOMAN= SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh .PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} SRCS=sk-dummy.c # From usr.bin/ssh SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c OPENSSL?= yes CFLAGS+= -fPIC .if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes") CFLAGS+= -DWITH_OPENSSL .endif # enable warnings WARNINGS=Yes DEBUG=-g CFLAGS+= -fstack-protector-all CDIAGFLAGS= -Wall CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wextra CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wcomment CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat-security CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wimplicit CDIAGFLAGS+= -Winline CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-declarations CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wparentheses CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-arith CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wshadow CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wsign-compare CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-aliasing CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wno-unused-parameter .if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3" CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition .endif CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} .if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes") LDADD+= -lcrypto DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO} .endif $(PROG): $(OBJS) $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -shared -o $@ $(OBJS) $(LDADD) .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c010064400017500001750000000004151362136622600170670ustar00djmdjm/* public domain */ #include #include #include #include void fatal(char *fmt, ...); void fatal(char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); fputc('\n', stderr); _exit(1); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c010064400017500001750000000335621362136622600175570ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "crypto_api.h" #include "sk-api.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* #define SK_DEBUG 1 */ /* Compatibility with OpenSSH 1.0.x */ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) #define ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, pr, ps) \ do { \ (*pr) = sig->r; \ (*ps) = sig->s; \ } while (0) #endif #if SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR != 0x00040000 # error SK API has changed, sk-dummy.c needs an update #endif static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))); static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...) { #if defined(SK_DEBUG) va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); fprintf(stderr, "sk-dummy %s: ", func); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); fputc('\n', stderr); va_end(ap); #else (void)func; /* XXX */ (void)fmt; /* XXX */ #endif } uint32_t sk_api_version(void) { return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR; } static int pack_key_ecdsa(struct sk_enroll_response *response) { #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC EC_KEY *key = NULL; const EC_GROUP *g; const EC_POINT *q; int ret = -1; long privlen; BIO *bio = NULL; char *privptr; response->public_key = NULL; response->public_key_len = 0; response->key_handle = NULL; response->key_handle_len = 0; if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name"); goto out; } if (EC_KEY_generate_key(key) != 1) { skdebug(__func__, "EC_KEY_generate_key"); goto out; } EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(key, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || (g = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL || (q = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "couldn't get key parameters"); goto out; } response->public_key_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); if (response->public_key_len == 0 || response->public_key_len > 2048) { skdebug(__func__, "bad pubkey length %zu", response->public_key_len); goto out; } if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed"); goto out; } if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, response->public_key, response->public_key_len, NULL) == 0) { skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_point2oct failed"); goto out; } /* Key handle contains PEM encoded private key */ if (!PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) { skdebug(__func__, "PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey failed"); goto out; } if ((privlen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &privptr)) <= 0) { skdebug(__func__, "BIO_get_mem_data failed"); goto out; } if ((response->key_handle = malloc(privlen)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "malloc key_handle failed"); goto out; } response->key_handle_len = (size_t)privlen; memcpy(response->key_handle, privptr, response->key_handle_len); /* success */ ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0) { if (response->public_key != NULL) { memset(response->public_key, 0, response->public_key_len); free(response->public_key); response->public_key = NULL; } if (response->key_handle != NULL) { memset(response->key_handle, 0, response->key_handle_len); free(response->key_handle); response->key_handle = NULL; } } BIO_free(bio); EC_KEY_free(key); return ret; #else return -1; #endif } static int pack_key_ed25519(struct sk_enroll_response *response) { int ret = -1; u_char pk[crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES]; u_char sk[crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES]; response->public_key = NULL; response->public_key_len = 0; response->key_handle = NULL; response->key_handle_len = 0; memset(pk, 0, sizeof(pk)); memset(sk, 0, sizeof(sk)); crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(pk, sk); response->public_key_len = sizeof(pk); if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed"); goto out; } memcpy(response->public_key, pk, sizeof(pk)); /* Key handle contains sk */ response->key_handle_len = sizeof(sk); if ((response->key_handle = malloc(response->key_handle_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "malloc key_handle failed"); goto out; } memcpy(response->key_handle, sk, sizeof(sk)); /* success */ ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0) free(response->public_key); return ret; } static int check_options(struct sk_option **options) { size_t i; if (options == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) { skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s", options[i]->name); if (options[i]->required) { skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option"); return -1; } } return 0; } int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response) { struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL; int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL; (void)flags; /* XXX; unused */ if (enroll_response == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "enroll_response == NULL"); goto out; } *enroll_response = NULL; if (check_options(options) != 0) goto out; /* error already logged */ if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed"); goto out; } switch(alg) { case SSH_SK_ECDSA: if (pack_key_ecdsa(response) != 0) goto out; break; case SSH_SK_ED25519: if (pack_key_ed25519(response) != 0) goto out; break; default: skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg); return -1; } /* Have to return something here */ if ((response->signature = calloc(1, 1)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed"); goto out; } response->signature_len = 0; *enroll_response = response; response = NULL; ret = 0; out: if (response != NULL) { free(response->public_key); free(response->key_handle); free(response->signature); free(response->attestation_cert); free(response); } return ret; } static void dump(const char *preamble, const void *sv, size_t l) { #ifdef SK_DEBUG const u_char *s = (const u_char *)sv; size_t i; fprintf(stderr, "%s (len %zu):\n", preamble, l); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { if (i % 16 == 0) fprintf(stderr, "%04zu: ", i); fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s[i]); if (i % 16 == 15 || i == l - 1) fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif } static int sig_ecdsa(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, uint32_t counter, uint8_t flags, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, struct sk_sign_response *response) { #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; int ret = -1; BIO *bio = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; EC_KEY *ec = NULL; SHA256_CTX ctx; uint8_t apphash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; uint8_t sighash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; uint8_t countbuf[4]; /* Decode EC_KEY from key handle */ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || BIO_write(bio, key_handle, key_handle_len) != (int)key_handle_len) { skdebug(__func__, "BIO setup failed"); goto out; } if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, "")) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey failed"); goto out; } if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) != EVP_PKEY_EC) { skdebug(__func__, "Not an EC key: %d", EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk)); goto out; } if ((ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY failed"); goto out; } /* Expect message to be pre-hashed */ if (message_len != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { skdebug(__func__, "bad message len %zu", message_len); goto out; } /* Prepare data to be signed */ dump("message", message, message_len); SHA256_Init(&ctx); SHA256_Update(&ctx, application, strlen(application)); SHA256_Final(apphash, &ctx); dump("apphash", apphash, sizeof(apphash)); countbuf[0] = (counter >> 24) & 0xff; countbuf[1] = (counter >> 16) & 0xff; countbuf[2] = (counter >> 8) & 0xff; countbuf[3] = counter & 0xff; dump("countbuf", countbuf, sizeof(countbuf)); dump("flags", &flags, sizeof(flags)); SHA256_Init(&ctx); SHA256_Update(&ctx, apphash, sizeof(apphash)); SHA256_Update(&ctx, &flags, sizeof(flags)); SHA256_Update(&ctx, countbuf, sizeof(countbuf)); SHA256_Update(&ctx, message, message_len); SHA256_Final(sighash, &ctx); dump("sighash", sighash, sizeof(sighash)); /* create and encode signature */ if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(sighash, sizeof(sighash), ec)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "ECDSA_do_sign failed"); goto out; } ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s); response->sig_r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r); response->sig_s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s); if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL || (response->sig_s = calloc(1, response->sig_s_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed"); goto out; } BN_bn2bin(sig_r, response->sig_r); BN_bn2bin(sig_s, response->sig_s); ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx)); explicit_bzero(&apphash, sizeof(apphash)); explicit_bzero(&sighash, sizeof(sighash)); ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); if (ret != 0) { free(response->sig_r); free(response->sig_s); response->sig_r = NULL; response->sig_s = NULL; } BIO_free(bio); EC_KEY_free(ec); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); return ret; #else return -1; #endif } static int sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, uint32_t counter, uint8_t flags, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, struct sk_sign_response *response) { size_t o; int ret = -1; SHA256_CTX ctx; uint8_t apphash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; uint8_t signbuf[sizeof(apphash) + sizeof(flags) + sizeof(counter) + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; uint8_t sig[crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES + sizeof(signbuf)]; unsigned long long smlen; if (key_handle_len != crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES) { skdebug(__func__, "bad key handle length %zu", key_handle_len); goto out; } /* Expect message to be pre-hashed */ if (message_len != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { skdebug(__func__, "bad message len %zu", message_len); goto out; } /* Prepare data to be signed */ dump("message", message, message_len); SHA256_Init(&ctx); SHA256_Update(&ctx, application, strlen(application)); SHA256_Final(apphash, &ctx); dump("apphash", apphash, sizeof(apphash)); memcpy(signbuf, apphash, sizeof(apphash)); o = sizeof(apphash); signbuf[o++] = flags; signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 24) & 0xff; signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 16) & 0xff; signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 8) & 0xff; signbuf[o++] = counter & 0xff; memcpy(signbuf + o, message, message_len); o += message_len; if (o != sizeof(signbuf)) { skdebug(__func__, "bad sign buf len %zu, expected %zu", o, sizeof(signbuf)); goto out; } dump("signbuf", signbuf, sizeof(signbuf)); /* create and encode signature */ smlen = sizeof(signbuf); if (crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, signbuf, sizeof(signbuf), key_handle) != 0) { skdebug(__func__, "crypto_sign_ed25519 failed"); goto out; } if (smlen <= sizeof(signbuf)) { skdebug(__func__, "bad sign smlen %llu, expected min %zu", smlen, sizeof(signbuf) + 1); goto out; } response->sig_r_len = (size_t)(smlen - sizeof(signbuf)); if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed"); goto out; } memcpy(response->sig_r, sig, response->sig_r_len); dump("sig_r", response->sig_r, response->sig_r_len); ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx)); explicit_bzero(&apphash, sizeof(apphash)); explicit_bzero(&signbuf, sizeof(signbuf)); explicit_bzero(&sig, sizeof(sig)); if (ret != 0) { free(response->sig_r); response->sig_r = NULL; } return ret; } int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_sign_response **sign_response) { struct sk_sign_response *response = NULL; int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL; if (sign_response == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "sign_response == NULL"); goto out; } *sign_response = NULL; if (check_options(options) != 0) goto out; /* error already logged */ if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed"); goto out; } response->flags = flags; response->counter = 0x12345678; switch(alg) { case SSH_SK_ECDSA: if (sig_ecdsa(message, message_len, application, response->counter, flags, key_handle, key_handle_len, response) != 0) goto out; break; case SSH_SK_ED25519: if (sig_ed25519(message, message_len, application, response->counter, flags, key_handle, key_handle_len, response) != 0) goto out; break; default: skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg); return -1; } *sign_response = response; response = NULL; ret = 0; out: if (response != NULL) { free(response->sig_r); free(response->sig_s); free(response); } return ret; } int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks) { return SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED; } openssh-8.2p1/regress/mkdtemp.c010064400017500001750000000030331362136622600147370ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2017 Colin Watson * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Roughly equivalent to "mktemp -d -t TEMPLATE", but portable. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "mkdtemp template\n"); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { const char *base; const char *tmpdir; char template[PATH_MAX]; int r; char *dir; if (argc != 2) usage(); base = argv[1]; if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL) tmpdir = "/tmp"; r = snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/%s", tmpdir, base); if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(template)) fatal("template string too long"); dir = mkdtemp(template); if (dir == NULL) { perror("mkdtemp"); exit(1); } puts(dir); return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/regress/modpipe.c010064400017500001750000000074751362136622600147510ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_ERR_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c" static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: modpipe -w [-m modspec ...] < in > out\n"); fprintf(stderr, "modspec is one of:\n"); fprintf(stderr, " xor:offset:value - XOR \"value\" at \"offset\"\n"); fprintf(stderr, " andor:offset:val1:val2 - AND \"val1\" then OR \"val2\" at \"offset\"\n"); exit(1); } #define MAX_MODIFICATIONS 256 struct modification { enum { MOD_XOR, MOD_AND_OR } what; unsigned long long offset; u_int8_t m1, m2; }; static void parse_modification(const char *s, struct modification *m) { char what[16+1]; int n, m1, m2; bzero(m, sizeof(*m)); if ((n = sscanf(s, "%16[^:]%*[:]%llu%*[:]%i%*[:]%i", what, &m->offset, &m1, &m2)) < 3) errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s); if (strcasecmp(what, "xor") == 0) { if (n > 3) errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s); if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff) errx(1, "Invalid XOR modification value"); m->what = MOD_XOR; m->m1 = m1; } else if (strcasecmp(what, "andor") == 0) { if (n != 4) errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s); if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff) errx(1, "Invalid AND modification value"); if (m2 < 0 || m2 > 0xff) errx(1, "Invalid OR modification value"); m->what = MOD_AND_OR; m->m1 = m1; m->m2 = m2; } else errx(1, "Invalid modification type \"%s\"", what); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ch; u_char buf[8192]; size_t total; ssize_t r, s, o; struct modification mods[MAX_MODIFICATIONS]; u_int i, wflag = 0, num_mods = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "wm:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'm': if (num_mods >= MAX_MODIFICATIONS) errx(1, "Too many modifications"); parse_modification(optarg, &(mods[num_mods++])); break; case 'w': wflag = 1; break; default: usage(); /* NOTREACHED */ } } for (total = 0;;) { r = s = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (r == 0) break; if (r < 0) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) continue; err(1, "read"); } for (i = 0; i < num_mods; i++) { if (mods[i].offset < total || mods[i].offset >= total + s) continue; switch (mods[i].what) { case MOD_XOR: buf[mods[i].offset - total] ^= mods[i].m1; break; case MOD_AND_OR: buf[mods[i].offset - total] &= mods[i].m1; buf[mods[i].offset - total] |= mods[i].m2; break; } } for (o = 0; o < s; o += r) { r = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, s - o); if (r == 0) break; if (r < 0) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) continue; err(1, "write"); } } total += s; } /* Warn if modifications not reached in input stream */ r = 0; for (i = 0; wflag && i < num_mods; i++) { if (mods[i].offset < total) continue; r = 1; fprintf(stderr, "modpipe: warning - mod %u not reached\n", i); } return r; } openssh-8.2p1/regress/moduli.in010064400017500001750000000031351362136622600147560ustar00djmdjm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openssh-8.2p1/regress/multiplex.sh010064400017500001750000000165341362136622600155230ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.32 2020/01/25 02:57:53 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. make_tmpdir CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock tid="connection multiplexing" trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd" if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)" exit 0 fi P=3301 # test port wait_for_mux_master_ready() { for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9; do ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \ >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 sleep $i done fatal "mux master never becomes ready" } start_sshd start_mux_master() { trace "start master, fork to background" ${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \ -E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & # NB. $SSH_PID will be killed by test-exec.sh:cleanup on fatal errors. SSH_PID=$! wait_for_mux_master_ready } start_mux_master verbose "test $tid: envpass" trace "env passing over multiplexed connection" _XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF' test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah" EOF if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "environment not found" fi verbose "test $tid: transfer" rm -f ${COPY} trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \ ${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 test -f ${COPY} || fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" ${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 test -f ${COPY} || fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} verbose "test $tid: forward" trace "forward over TCP/IP and check result" $NC -N -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} > /dev/null & netcat_pid=$! ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 2)):127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 1)) otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed $NC 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 2)) < /dev/null > ${COPY} cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd trace "forward over UNIX and check result" $NC -N -Ul $OBJ/unix-1.fwd < ${DATA} > /dev/null & netcat_pid=$! ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L$OBJ/unix-2.fwd:$OBJ/unix-1.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R$OBJ/unix-3.fwd:$OBJ/unix-2.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed $NC -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd < /dev/null > ${COPY} cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection" verbose "test $tid: status $s" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost exit $s r=$? if [ $r -ne $s ]; then fail "exit code mismatch: $r != $s" fi # same with early close of stdout/err trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n otherhost \ exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\' r=$? if [ $r -ne $s ]; then fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch: $r != $s" fi done verbose "test $tid: cmd check" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ || fail "check command failed" verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (TCP)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "request local forward failed" sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ || fail "connect to local forward port failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "cancel local forward failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ && fail "local forward port still listening" verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (TCP)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "request remote forward failed" sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ || fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "cancel remote forward failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ && fail "remote forward port still listening" verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (UNIX)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "request local forward failed" sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \ grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "connect to local forward path failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "cancel local forward failed" N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l) test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "local forward path still listening" rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (UNIX)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "request remote forward failed" sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \ grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "connect to remote forwarded path failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "cancel remote forward failed" N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l) test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "remote forward path still listening" rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd verbose "test $tid: cmd exit" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ || fail "send exit command failed" # Wait for master to exit wait $SSH_PID kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed" # Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N verbose "test $tid: cmd stop" trace "restart master, fork to background" start_mux_master # start a long-running command then immediately request a stop ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & SLEEP_PID=$! ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ || fail "send stop command failed" # wait until both long-running command and master have exited. wait $SLEEP_PID [ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command" wait $SSH_PID [ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop" kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "stop command failed" SSH_PID="" # Already gone, so don't kill in cleanup openssh-8.2p1/regress/multipubkey.sh010064400017500001750000000044751362136622600160530ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: multipubkey.sh,v 1.3 2019/12/11 18:47:14 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="multiple pubkey" rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key* mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig # Create a CA key ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" # Make some keys and a certificate. ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \ -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key1 || fail "couldn't sign user_key1" # Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when # it is offered. mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1.pub cp -p $OBJ/user_key1 $OBJ/cert_user_key1 grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes" opts="$opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2" for privsep in yes ; do ( grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig echo "Protocol 2" echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey,publickey" echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Single key should fail. rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key" # Single key with same-public cert should fail. echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key+cert" # Multiple plain keys should succeed. rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub $OBJ/user_key2.pub > \ $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with multiple keys" # Cert and different key should succeed # Key and different-public cert should succeed. echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with key/cert" done openssh-8.2p1/regress/netcat.c010064400017500001750000001177351362136622600145730ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.126 2014/10/30 16:08:31 tedu Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Eric Jackson * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Re-written nc(1) for OpenBSD. Original implementation by * *Hobbit* . */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_ERR_H # include #endif /* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */ #define IAC 255 #define DONT 254 #define DO 253 #define WONT 252 #define WILL 251 #ifndef SUN_LEN #define SUN_LEN(su) \ (sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path)) #endif #define PORT_MAX 65535 #define PORT_MAX_LEN 6 #define UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE 19 #define POLL_STDIN 0 #define POLL_NETOUT 1 #define POLL_NETIN 2 #define POLL_STDOUT 3 #define BUFSIZE 16384 /* Command Line Options */ int dflag; /* detached, no stdin */ int Fflag; /* fdpass sock to stdout */ unsigned int iflag; /* Interval Flag */ int kflag; /* More than one connect */ int lflag; /* Bind to local port */ int Nflag; /* shutdown() network socket */ int nflag; /* Don't do name look up */ char *Pflag; /* Proxy username */ char *pflag; /* Localport flag */ int rflag; /* Random ports flag */ char *sflag; /* Source Address */ int tflag; /* Telnet Emulation */ int uflag; /* UDP - Default to TCP */ int vflag; /* Verbosity */ int xflag; /* Socks proxy */ int zflag; /* Port Scan Flag */ int Dflag; /* sodebug */ int Iflag; /* TCP receive buffer size */ int Oflag; /* TCP send buffer size */ int Sflag; /* TCP MD5 signature option */ int Tflag = -1; /* IP Type of Service */ int rtableid = -1; int timeout = -1; int family = AF_UNSPEC; char *portlist[PORT_MAX+1]; char *unix_dg_tmp_socket; void atelnet(int, unsigned char *, unsigned int); void build_ports(char *); void help(void); int local_listen(char *, char *, struct addrinfo); void readwrite(int); void fdpass(int nfd) __attribute__((noreturn)); int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo); int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *); int udptest(int); int unix_bind(char *); int unix_connect(char *); int unix_listen(char *); void set_common_sockopts(int); int map_tos(char *, int *); void report_connect(const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); void usage(int); ssize_t drainbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *); ssize_t fillbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int ch, s, ret, socksv; char *host, *uport; struct addrinfo hints; struct servent *sv; socklen_t len; struct sockaddr_storage cliaddr; char *proxy = NULL; const char *errstr, *proxyhost = "", *proxyport = NULL; struct addrinfo proxyhints; char unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf[UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE]; ret = 1; s = 0; socksv = 5; host = NULL; uport = NULL; sv = NULL; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "46DdFhI:i:klNnO:P:p:rSs:tT:UuV:vw:X:x:z")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case '4': family = AF_INET; break; case '6': family = AF_INET6; break; case 'U': family = AF_UNIX; break; case 'X': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "connect") == 0) socksv = -1; /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */ else if (strcmp(optarg, "4") == 0) socksv = 4; /* SOCKS v.4 */ else if (strcmp(optarg, "5") == 0) socksv = 5; /* SOCKS v.5 */ else errx(1, "unsupported proxy protocol"); break; case 'd': dflag = 1; break; case 'F': Fflag = 1; break; case 'h': help(); break; case 'i': iflag = strtonum(optarg, 0, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "interval %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; case 'k': kflag = 1; break; case 'l': lflag = 1; break; case 'N': Nflag = 1; break; case 'n': nflag = 1; break; case 'P': Pflag = optarg; break; case 'p': pflag = optarg; break; case 'r': rflag = 1; break; case 's': sflag = optarg; break; case 't': tflag = 1; break; case 'u': uflag = 1; break; #ifdef SO_RTABLE case 'V': rtableid = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, RT_TABLEID_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "rtable %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; #endif case 'v': vflag = 1; break; case 'w': timeout = strtonum(optarg, 0, INT_MAX / 1000, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "timeout %s: %s", errstr, optarg); timeout *= 1000; break; case 'x': xflag = 1; if ((proxy = strdup(optarg)) == NULL) errx(1, "strdup"); break; case 'z': zflag = 1; break; case 'D': Dflag = 1; break; case 'I': Iflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) errx(1, "TCP receive window %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; case 'O': Oflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) errx(1, "TCP send window %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; case 'S': Sflag = 1; break; case 'T': errstr = NULL; errno = 0; if (map_tos(optarg, &Tflag)) break; if (strlen(optarg) > 1 && optarg[0] == '0' && optarg[1] == 'x') Tflag = (int)strtol(optarg, NULL, 16); else Tflag = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, 255, &errstr); if (Tflag < 0 || Tflag > 255 || errstr || errno) errx(1, "illegal tos value %s", optarg); break; default: usage(1); } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; /* Cruft to make sure options are clean, and used properly. */ if (argv[0] && !argv[1] && family == AF_UNIX) { host = argv[0]; uport = NULL; } else if (argv[0] && !argv[1]) { if (!lflag) usage(1); uport = argv[0]; host = NULL; } else if (argv[0] && argv[1]) { host = argv[0]; uport = argv[1]; } else usage(1); if (lflag && sflag) errx(1, "cannot use -s and -l"); if (lflag && pflag) errx(1, "cannot use -p and -l"); if (lflag && zflag) errx(1, "cannot use -z and -l"); if (!lflag && kflag) errx(1, "must use -l with -k"); /* Get name of temporary socket for unix datagram client */ if ((family == AF_UNIX) && uflag && !lflag) { if (sflag) { unix_dg_tmp_socket = sflag; } else { strlcpy(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf, "/tmp/nc.XXXXXXXXXX", UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE); if (mktemp(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf) == NULL) err(1, "mktemp"); unix_dg_tmp_socket = unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf; } } /* Initialize addrinfo structure. */ if (family != AF_UNIX) { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); hints.ai_family = family; hints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; if (nflag) hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST; } if (xflag) { if (uflag) errx(1, "no proxy support for UDP mode"); if (lflag) errx(1, "no proxy support for listen"); if (family == AF_UNIX) errx(1, "no proxy support for unix sockets"); /* XXX IPv6 transport to proxy would probably work */ if (family == AF_INET6) errx(1, "no proxy support for IPv6"); if (sflag) errx(1, "no proxy support for local source address"); proxyhost = strsep(&proxy, ":"); proxyport = proxy; memset(&proxyhints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); proxyhints.ai_family = family; proxyhints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; proxyhints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; if (nflag) proxyhints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST; } if (lflag) { int connfd; ret = 0; if (family == AF_UNIX) { if (uflag) s = unix_bind(host); else s = unix_listen(host); } /* Allow only one connection at a time, but stay alive. */ for (;;) { if (family != AF_UNIX) s = local_listen(host, uport, hints); if (s < 0) err(1, "local_listen"); /* * For UDP and -k, don't connect the socket, let it * receive datagrams from multiple socket pairs. */ if (uflag && kflag) readwrite(s); /* * For UDP and not -k, we will use recvfrom() initially * to wait for a caller, then use the regular functions * to talk to the caller. */ else if (uflag && !kflag) { int rv, plen; char buf[16384]; struct sockaddr_storage z; len = sizeof(z); plen = 2048; rv = recvfrom(s, buf, plen, MSG_PEEK, (struct sockaddr *)&z, &len); if (rv < 0) err(1, "recvfrom"); rv = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&z, len); if (rv < 0) err(1, "connect"); if (vflag) report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&z, len); readwrite(s); } else { len = sizeof(cliaddr); connfd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, &len); if (connfd == -1) { /* For now, all errnos are fatal */ err(1, "accept"); } if (vflag) report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, len); readwrite(connfd); close(connfd); } if (family != AF_UNIX) close(s); else if (uflag) { if (connect(s, NULL, 0) < 0) err(1, "connect"); } if (!kflag) break; } } else if (family == AF_UNIX) { ret = 0; if ((s = unix_connect(host)) > 0 && !zflag) { readwrite(s); close(s); } else ret = 1; if (uflag) unlink(unix_dg_tmp_socket); exit(ret); } else { int i = 0; /* Construct the portlist[] array. */ build_ports(uport); /* Cycle through portlist, connecting to each port. */ for (i = 0; portlist[i] != NULL; i++) { if (s) close(s); if (xflag) s = socks_connect(host, portlist[i], hints, proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints, socksv, Pflag); else s = remote_connect(host, portlist[i], hints); if (s < 0) continue; ret = 0; if (vflag || zflag) { /* For UDP, make sure we are connected. */ if (uflag) { if (udptest(s) == -1) { ret = 1; continue; } } /* Don't look up port if -n. */ if (nflag) sv = NULL; else { sv = getservbyport( ntohs(atoi(portlist[i])), uflag ? "udp" : "tcp"); } fprintf(stderr, "Connection to %s %s port [%s/%s] " "succeeded!\n", host, portlist[i], uflag ? "udp" : "tcp", sv ? sv->s_name : "*"); } if (Fflag) fdpass(s); else if (!zflag) readwrite(s); } } if (s) close(s); exit(ret); } /* * unix_bind() * Returns a unix socket bound to the given path */ int unix_bind(char *path) { struct sockaddr_un sun_sa; int s; /* Create unix domain socket. */ if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) return (-1); memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)); sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) { close(s); errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return (-1); } if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) { close(s); return (-1); } return (s); } /* * unix_connect() * Returns a socket connected to a local unix socket. Returns -1 on failure. */ int unix_connect(char *path) { struct sockaddr_un sun_sa; int s; if (uflag) { if ((s = unix_bind(unix_dg_tmp_socket)) < 0) return (-1); } else { if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) return (-1); } (void)fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)); sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) { close(s); errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return (-1); } if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) { close(s); return (-1); } return (s); } /* * unix_listen() * Create a unix domain socket, and listen on it. */ int unix_listen(char *path) { int s; if ((s = unix_bind(path)) < 0) return (-1); if (listen(s, 5) < 0) { close(s); return (-1); } return (s); } /* * remote_connect() * Returns a socket connected to a remote host. Properly binds to a local * port or source address if needed. Returns -1 on failure. */ int remote_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints) { struct addrinfo *res, *res0; int s, error; #if defined(SO_RTABLE) || defined(SO_BINDANY) int on = 1; #endif if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res))) errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); res0 = res; do { if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype, res0->ai_protocol)) < 0) continue; #ifdef SO_RTABLE if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1)) err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE"); #endif /* Bind to a local port or source address if specified. */ if (sflag || pflag) { struct addrinfo ahints, *ares; #ifdef SO_BINDANY /* try SO_BINDANY, but don't insist */ setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDANY, &on, sizeof(on)); #endif memset(&ahints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); ahints.ai_family = res0->ai_family; ahints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; ahints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; ahints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; if ((error = getaddrinfo(sflag, pflag, &ahints, &ares))) errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)ares->ai_addr, ares->ai_addrlen) < 0) err(1, "bind failed"); freeaddrinfo(ares); } set_common_sockopts(s); if (timeout_connect(s, res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0) break; else if (vflag) warn("connect to %s port %s (%s) failed", host, port, uflag ? "udp" : "tcp"); close(s); s = -1; } while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL); freeaddrinfo(res); return (s); } int timeout_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen) { struct pollfd pfd; socklen_t optlen; int flags = 0, optval; int ret; if (timeout != -1) { flags = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0); if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1) err(1, "set non-blocking mode"); } if ((ret = connect(s, name, namelen)) != 0 && errno == EINPROGRESS) { pfd.fd = s; pfd.events = POLLOUT; if ((ret = poll(&pfd, 1, timeout)) == 1) { optlen = sizeof(optval); if ((ret = getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen)) == 0) { errno = optval; ret = optval == 0 ? 0 : -1; } } else if (ret == 0) { errno = ETIMEDOUT; ret = -1; } else err(1, "poll failed"); } if (timeout != -1 && fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags) == -1) err(1, "restoring flags"); return (ret); } /* * local_listen() * Returns a socket listening on a local port, binds to specified source * address. Returns -1 on failure. */ int local_listen(char *host, char *port, struct addrinfo hints) { struct addrinfo *res, *res0; int s, ret, x = 1; int error; /* Allow nodename to be null. */ hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE; /* * In the case of binding to a wildcard address * default to binding to an ipv4 address. */ if (host == NULL && hints.ai_family == AF_UNSPEC) hints.ai_family = AF_INET; if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res))) errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); res0 = res; do { if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype, res0->ai_protocol)) < 0) continue; #ifdef SO_RTABLE if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1)) err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE"); #endif #ifdef SO_REUSEPORT ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &x, sizeof(x)); if (ret == -1) err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEPORT"); #endif #ifdef SO_REUSEADDR ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &x, sizeof(x)); if (ret == -1) err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR"); #endif set_common_sockopts(s); if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0) break; close(s); s = -1; } while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL); if (!uflag && s != -1) { if (listen(s, 1) < 0) err(1, "listen"); } freeaddrinfo(res); return (s); } /* * readwrite() * Loop that polls on the network file descriptor and stdin. */ void readwrite(int net_fd) { struct pollfd pfd[4]; int stdin_fd = STDIN_FILENO; int stdout_fd = STDOUT_FILENO; unsigned char netinbuf[BUFSIZE]; size_t netinbufpos = 0; unsigned char stdinbuf[BUFSIZE]; size_t stdinbufpos = 0; int n, num_fds; ssize_t ret; /* don't read from stdin if requested */ if (dflag) stdin_fd = -1; /* stdin */ pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = stdin_fd; pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN; /* network out */ pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = net_fd; pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0; /* network in */ pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = net_fd; pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN; /* stdout */ pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = stdout_fd; pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0; while (1) { /* both inputs are gone, buffers are empty, we are done */ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) { close(net_fd); return; } /* both outputs are gone, we can't continue */ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) { close(net_fd); return; } /* listen and net in gone, queues empty, done */ if (lflag && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) { close(net_fd); return; } /* help says -i is for "wait between lines sent". We read and * write arbitrary amounts of data, and we don't want to start * scanning for newlines, so this is as good as it gets */ if (iflag) sleep(iflag); /* poll */ num_fds = poll(pfd, 4, timeout); /* treat poll errors */ if (num_fds == -1) { close(net_fd); err(1, "polling error"); } /* timeout happened */ if (num_fds == 0) return; /* treat socket error conditions */ for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) { if (pfd[n].revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)) { pfd[n].fd = -1; } } /* reading is possible after HUP */ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].events & POLLIN && pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLHUP && ! (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN)) pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1; if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].events & POLLIN && pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLHUP && ! (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN)) pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLHUP) { if (Nflag) shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR); pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1; } /* if HUP, stop watching stdout */ if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLHUP) pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1; /* if no net out, stop watching stdin */ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1) pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1; /* if no stdout, stop watching net in */ if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) { if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd != -1) shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD); pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; } /* try to read from stdin */ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN && stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) { ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd, stdinbuf, &stdinbufpos); /* error or eof on stdin - remove from pfd */ if (ret == 0 || ret == -1) pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1; /* read something - poll net out */ if (stdinbufpos > 0) pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = POLLOUT; /* filled buffer - remove self from polling */ if (stdinbufpos == BUFSIZE) pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = 0; } /* try to write to network */ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLOUT && stdinbufpos > 0) { ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, stdinbuf, &stdinbufpos); if (ret == -1) pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1; /* buffer empty - remove self from polling */ if (stdinbufpos == 0) pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0; /* buffer no longer full - poll stdin again */ if (stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN; } /* try to read from network */ if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN && netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) { ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf, &netinbufpos); if (ret == -1) pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; /* eof on net in - remove from pfd */ if (ret == 0) { shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD); pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; } /* read something - poll stdout */ if (netinbufpos > 0) pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = POLLOUT; /* filled buffer - remove self from polling */ if (netinbufpos == BUFSIZE) pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = 0; /* handle telnet */ if (tflag) atelnet(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf, netinbufpos); } /* try to write to stdout */ if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLOUT && netinbufpos > 0) { ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd, netinbuf, &netinbufpos); if (ret == -1) pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1; /* buffer empty - remove self from polling */ if (netinbufpos == 0) pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0; /* buffer no longer full - poll net in again */ if (netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN; } /* stdin gone and queue empty? */ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0) { if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd != -1 && Nflag) shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR); pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1; } /* net in gone and queue empty? */ if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && netinbufpos == 0) { pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1; } } } ssize_t drainbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos) { ssize_t n; ssize_t adjust; n = write(fd, buf, *bufpos); /* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */ if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) n = -2; if (n <= 0) return n; /* adjust buffer */ adjust = *bufpos - n; if (adjust > 0) memmove(buf, buf + n, adjust); *bufpos -= n; return n; } ssize_t fillbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos) { size_t num = BUFSIZE - *bufpos; ssize_t n; n = read(fd, buf + *bufpos, num); /* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */ if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) n = -2; if (n <= 0) return n; *bufpos += n; return n; } /* * fdpass() * Pass the connected file descriptor to stdout and exit. */ void fdpass(int nfd) { #if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR)) struct msghdr msg; #ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR union { struct cmsghdr hdr; char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; } cmsgbuf; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; #endif struct iovec vec; char ch = '\0'; struct pollfd pfd; ssize_t r; memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); #ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&nfd; msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(nfd); #else memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf)); msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf); cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)); cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = nfd; #endif vec.iov_base = &ch; vec.iov_len = 1; msg.msg_iov = &vec; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd)); pfd.fd = STDOUT_FILENO; for (;;) { r = sendmsg(STDOUT_FILENO, &msg, 0); if (r == -1) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) { pfd.events = POLLOUT; if (poll(&pfd, 1, -1) == -1) err(1, "poll"); continue; } err(1, "sendmsg"); } else if (r == -1) errx(1, "sendmsg: unexpected return value %zd", r); else break; } exit(0); #else errx(1, "%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__); #endif } /* Deal with RFC 854 WILL/WONT DO/DONT negotiation. */ void atelnet(int nfd, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int size) { unsigned char *p, *end; unsigned char obuf[4]; if (size < 3) return; end = buf + size - 2; for (p = buf; p < end; p++) { if (*p != IAC) continue; obuf[0] = IAC; p++; if ((*p == WILL) || (*p == WONT)) obuf[1] = DONT; else if ((*p == DO) || (*p == DONT)) obuf[1] = WONT; else continue; p++; obuf[2] = *p; if (atomicio(vwrite, nfd, obuf, 3) != 3) warn("Write Error!"); } } /* * build_ports() * Build an array of ports in portlist[], listing each port * that we should try to connect to. */ void build_ports(char *p) { const char *errstr; char *n; int hi, lo, cp; int x = 0; if ((n = strchr(p, '-')) != NULL) { *n = '\0'; n++; /* Make sure the ports are in order: lowest->highest. */ hi = strtonum(n, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, n); lo = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p); if (lo > hi) { cp = hi; hi = lo; lo = cp; } /* Load ports sequentially. */ for (cp = lo; cp <= hi; cp++) { portlist[x] = calloc(1, PORT_MAX_LEN); if (portlist[x] == NULL) errx(1, "calloc"); snprintf(portlist[x], PORT_MAX_LEN, "%d", cp); x++; } /* Randomly swap ports. */ if (rflag) { int y; char *c; for (x = 0; x <= (hi - lo); x++) { y = (arc4random() & 0xFFFF) % (hi - lo); c = portlist[x]; portlist[x] = portlist[y]; portlist[y] = c; } } } else { hi = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p); portlist[0] = strdup(p); if (portlist[0] == NULL) errx(1, "strdup"); } } /* * udptest() * Do a few writes to see if the UDP port is there. * Fails once PF state table is full. */ int udptest(int s) { int i, ret; for (i = 0; i <= 3; i++) { if (write(s, "X", 1) == 1) ret = 1; else ret = -1; } return (ret); } void set_common_sockopts(int s) { int x = 1; #ifdef TCP_MD5SIG if (Sflag) { if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG, &x, sizeof(x)) == -1) err(1, "setsockopt"); } #endif if (Dflag) { if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, &x, sizeof(x)) == -1) err(1, "setsockopt"); } #ifdef IP_TOS if (Tflag != -1) { if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1) err(1, "set IP ToS"); } #endif if (Iflag) { if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &Iflag, sizeof(Iflag)) == -1) err(1, "set TCP receive buffer size"); } if (Oflag) { if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, &Oflag, sizeof(Oflag)) == -1) err(1, "set TCP send buffer size"); } } int map_tos(char *s, int *val) { #ifdef IP_TOS /* DiffServ Codepoints and other TOS mappings */ const struct toskeywords { const char *keyword; int val; } *t, toskeywords[] = { { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 }, { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 }, { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 }, { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 }, { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 }, { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 }, { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 }, { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 }, { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 }, { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 }, { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 }, { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 }, { "critical", IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP }, { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 }, { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 }, { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 }, { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 }, { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 }, { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 }, { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 }, { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 }, { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF }, { "inetcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL }, { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY }, { "netcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL }, { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY }, { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT }, { NULL, -1 }, }; for (t = toskeywords; t->keyword != NULL; t++) { if (strcmp(s, t->keyword) == 0) { *val = t->val; return (1); } } #endif return (0); } void report_connect(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen) { char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST]; char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV]; int herr; int flags = NI_NUMERICSERV; if (nflag) flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST; if ((herr = getnameinfo(sa, salen, remote_host, sizeof(remote_host), remote_port, sizeof(remote_port), flags)) != 0) { if (herr == EAI_SYSTEM) err(1, "getnameinfo"); else errx(1, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(herr)); } fprintf(stderr, "Connection from %s %s " "received!\n", remote_host, remote_port); } void help(void) { usage(0); fprintf(stderr, "\tCommand Summary:\n\ \t-4 Use IPv4\n\ \t-6 Use IPv6\n\ \t-D Enable the debug socket option\n\ \t-d Detach from stdin\n\ \t-F Pass socket fd\n\ \t-h This help text\n\ \t-I length TCP receive buffer length\n\ \t-i secs\t Delay interval for lines sent, ports scanned\n\ \t-k Keep inbound sockets open for multiple connects\n\ \t-l Listen mode, for inbound connects\n\ \t-N Shutdown the network socket after EOF on stdin\n\ \t-n Suppress name/port resolutions\n\ \t-O length TCP send buffer length\n\ \t-P proxyuser\tUsername for proxy authentication\n\ \t-p port\t Specify local port for remote connects\n\ \t-r Randomize remote ports\n\ \t-S Enable the TCP MD5 signature option\n\ \t-s addr\t Local source address\n\ \t-T toskeyword\tSet IP Type of Service\n\ \t-t Answer TELNET negotiation\n\ \t-U Use UNIX domain socket\n\ \t-u UDP mode\n\ \t-V rtable Specify alternate routing table\n\ \t-v Verbose\n\ \t-w secs\t Timeout for connects and final net reads\n\ \t-X proto Proxy protocol: \"4\", \"5\" (SOCKS) or \"connect\"\n\ \t-x addr[:port]\tSpecify proxy address and port\n\ \t-z Zero-I/O mode [used for scanning]\n\ Port numbers can be individual or ranges: lo-hi [inclusive]\n"); exit(1); } void usage(int ret) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: nc [-46DdFhklNnrStUuvz] [-I length] [-i interval] [-O length]\n" "\t [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T ToS]\n" "\t [-V rtable] [-w timeout] [-X proxy_protocol]\n" "\t [-x proxy_address[:port]] [destination] [port]\n"); if (ret) exit(1); } /* *** src/usr.bin/nc/socks.c *** */ /* $OpenBSD: socks.c,v 1.20 2012/03/08 09:56:28 espie Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define SOCKS_PORT "1080" #define HTTP_PROXY_PORT "3128" #define HTTP_MAXHDRS 64 #define SOCKS_V5 5 #define SOCKS_V4 4 #define SOCKS_NOAUTH 0 #define SOCKS_NOMETHOD 0xff #define SOCKS_CONNECT 1 #define SOCKS_IPV4 1 #define SOCKS_DOMAIN 3 #define SOCKS_IPV6 4 int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo); int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *); static int decode_addrport(const char *h, const char *p, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen, int v4only, int numeric) { int r; struct addrinfo hints, *res; bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = v4only ? PF_INET : PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_flags = numeric ? AI_NUMERICHOST : 0; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; r = getaddrinfo(h, p, &hints, &res); /* Don't fatal when attempting to convert a numeric address */ if (r != 0) { if (!numeric) { errx(1, "getaddrinfo(\"%.64s\", \"%.64s\"): %s", h, p, gai_strerror(r)); } return (-1); } if (addrlen < res->ai_addrlen) { freeaddrinfo(res); errx(1, "internal error: addrlen < res->ai_addrlen"); } memcpy(addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); freeaddrinfo(res); return (0); } static int proxy_read_line(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsz) { size_t off; for(off = 0;;) { if (off >= bufsz) errx(1, "proxy read too long"); if (atomicio(read, fd, buf + off, 1) != 1) err(1, "proxy read"); /* Skip CR */ if (buf[off] == '\r') continue; if (buf[off] == '\n') { buf[off] = '\0'; break; } off++; } return (off); } static const char * getproxypass(const char *proxyuser, const char *proxyhost) { char prompt[512]; static char pw[256]; snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Proxy password for %s@%s: ", proxyuser, proxyhost); if (readpassphrase(prompt, pw, sizeof(pw), RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL) errx(1, "Unable to read proxy passphrase"); return (pw); } int socks_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints __attribute__ ((__unused__)), const char *proxyhost, const char *proxyport, struct addrinfo proxyhints, int socksv, const char *proxyuser) { int proxyfd, r, authretry = 0; size_t hlen, wlen = 0; unsigned char buf[1024]; size_t cnt; struct sockaddr_storage addr; struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr; struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr; in_port_t serverport; const char *proxypass = NULL; if (proxyport == NULL) proxyport = (socksv == -1) ? HTTP_PROXY_PORT : SOCKS_PORT; /* Abuse API to lookup port */ if (decode_addrport("0.0.0.0", port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr), 1, 1) == -1) errx(1, "unknown port \"%.64s\"", port); serverport = in4->sin_port; again: if (authretry++ > 3) errx(1, "Too many authentication failures"); proxyfd = remote_connect(proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints); if (proxyfd < 0) return (-1); if (socksv == 5) { if (decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr), 0, 1) == -1) addr.ss_family = 0; /* used in switch below */ /* Version 5, one method: no authentication */ buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; buf[1] = 1; buf[2] = SOCKS_NOAUTH; cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, 3); if (cnt != 3) err(1, "write failed (%zu/3)", cnt); cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 2); if (cnt != 2) err(1, "read failed (%zu/3)", cnt); if (buf[1] == SOCKS_NOMETHOD) errx(1, "authentication method negotiation failed"); switch (addr.ss_family) { case 0: /* Version 5, connect: domain name */ /* Max domain name length is 255 bytes */ hlen = strlen(host); if (hlen > 255) errx(1, "host name too long for SOCKS5"); buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; buf[2] = 0; buf[3] = SOCKS_DOMAIN; buf[4] = hlen; memcpy(buf + 5, host, hlen); memcpy(buf + 5 + hlen, &serverport, sizeof serverport); wlen = 7 + hlen; break; case AF_INET: /* Version 5, connect: IPv4 address */ buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; buf[2] = 0; buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV4; memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr); memcpy(buf + 8, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port); wlen = 10; break; case AF_INET6: /* Version 5, connect: IPv6 address */ buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; buf[2] = 0; buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV6; memcpy(buf + 4, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof in6->sin6_addr); memcpy(buf + 20, &in6->sin6_port, sizeof in6->sin6_port); wlen = 22; break; default: errx(1, "internal error: silly AF"); } cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen); if (cnt != wlen) err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen); cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 4); if (cnt != 4) err(1, "read failed (%zu/4)", cnt); if (buf[1] != 0) errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]); switch (buf[3]) { case SOCKS_IPV4: cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 6); if (cnt != 6) err(1, "read failed (%zu/6)", cnt); break; case SOCKS_IPV6: cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 18); if (cnt != 18) err(1, "read failed (%zu/18)", cnt); break; default: errx(1, "connection failed, unsupported address type"); } } else if (socksv == 4) { /* This will exit on lookup failure */ decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr), 1, 0); /* Version 4 */ buf[0] = SOCKS_V4; buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; /* connect */ memcpy(buf + 2, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port); memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr); buf[8] = 0; /* empty username */ wlen = 9; cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen); if (cnt != wlen) err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen); cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 8); if (cnt != 8) err(1, "read failed (%zu/8)", cnt); if (buf[1] != 90) errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]); } else if (socksv == -1) { /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */ /* Disallow bad chars in hostname */ if (strcspn(host, "\r\n\t []:") != strlen(host)) errx(1, "Invalid hostname"); /* Try to be sane about numeric IPv6 addresses */ if (strchr(host, ':') != NULL) { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT [%s]:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n", host, ntohs(serverport)); } else { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n", host, ntohs(serverport)); } if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf)) errx(1, "hostname too long"); r = strlen(buf); cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r); if (cnt != (size_t)r) err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r); if (authretry > 1) { char resp[1024]; proxypass = getproxypass(proxyuser, proxyhost); r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s:%s", proxyuser, proxypass); if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) || b64_ntop(buf, strlen(buf), resp, sizeof(resp)) == -1) errx(1, "Proxy username/password too long"); r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: " "Basic %s\r\n", resp); if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf)) errx(1, "Proxy auth response too long"); r = strlen(buf); if ((cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r)) != (size_t)r) err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r); } /* Terminate headers */ if ((r = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, "\r\n", 2)) != 2) err(1, "write failed (2/%d)", r); /* Read status reply */ proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (proxyuser != NULL && strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 407 ", 12) == 0) { if (authretry > 1) { fprintf(stderr, "Proxy authentication " "failed\n"); } close(proxyfd); goto again; } else if (strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 200 ", 12) != 0 && strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.1 200 ", 12) != 0) errx(1, "Proxy error: \"%s\"", buf); /* Headers continue until we hit an empty line */ for (r = 0; r < HTTP_MAXHDRS; r++) { proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (*buf == '\0') break; } if (*buf != '\0') errx(1, "Too many proxy headers received"); } else errx(1, "Unknown proxy protocol %d", socksv); return (proxyfd); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/portnum.sh010064400017500001750000000011601362136622600151710ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: portnum.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 10:34:30 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="port number parsing" badport() { port=$1 verbose "$tid: invalid port $port" if ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -p $port somehost true 2>/dev/null ; then fail "$tid accepted invalid port $port" fi } goodport() { port=$1 verbose "$tid: valid port $port" if ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -p $port somehost true 2>/dev/null ; then : else fail "$tid rejected valid port $port" fi } badport 0 badport 65536 badport 131073 badport 2000blah badport blah2000 goodport 1 goodport 22 goodport 2222 goodport 22222 goodport 65535 openssh-8.2p1/regress/principals-command.sh010064400017500001750000000132121362136622600172460ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.11 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="authorized principals command" rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key* cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" exit 0 fi case "$SSH_KEYTYPES" in *ssh-rsa*) userkeytype=rsa ;; *) userkeytype=ed25519 ;; esac SERIAL=$$ # Create a CA key and a user certificate. ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \ fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${userkeytype} -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \ fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "Joanne User" \ -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \ fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key" CERT_BODY=`cat $OBJ/cert_user_key-cert.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` CA_BODY=`cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` CERT_FP=`${SSHKEYGEN} -lf $OBJ/cert_user_key-cert.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` CA_FP=`${SSHKEYGEN} -lf $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` # Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have # acceptable directory permissions. PRINCIPALS_COMMAND="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}.$$" trap "$SUDO rm -f ${PRINCIPALS_COMMAND}" 0 cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND'" #!/bin/sh test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 test "x\$2" != "xssh-${userkeytype}-cert-v01@openssh.com" && exit 1 test "x\$3" != "xssh-ed25519" && exit 1 test "x\$4" != "xJoanne User" && exit 1 test "x\$5" != "x${SERIAL}" && exit 1 test "x\$6" != "x${CA_FP}" && exit 1 test "x\$7" != "x${CERT_FP}" && exit 1 test "x\$8" != "x${CERT_BODY}" && exit 1 test "x\$9" != "x${CA_BODY}" && exit 1 test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" && exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" _EOF test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command" $SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND" if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ; then echo "skipping: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND is unsuitable as " \ "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand" $SUDO rm -f $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND exit 0 fi if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then # Test explicitly-specified principals for privsep in yes ; do _prefix="privsep $privsep" # Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none" echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND" \ "%u %t %T %i %s %F %f %k %K" echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}" echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # XXX test missing command # XXX test failing command # Empty authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals" echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # Wrong authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals" echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # Correct authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals" echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi # authorized_principals with bad key option verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt" echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # authorized_principals with command=false verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false" echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # authorized_principals with command=true verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true" echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi # Setup for principals= key option rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Wrong principals list verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option" ( printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # Correct principals list verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option" ( printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi done else echo "SKIPPED: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND not executable " \ "(/var/run mounted noexec?)" fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/proto-mismatch.sh010064400017500001750000000005601362136622600164360ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: proto-mismatch.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="protocol version mismatch" mismatch () { client=$2 banner=`echo ${client} | ${SSHD} -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy` r=$? trace "sshd prints ${banner}" if [ $r -ne 255 ]; then fail "sshd prints ${banner} but accepts version ${client}" fi } mismatch SSH-1.5-HALLO openssh-8.2p1/regress/proto-version.sh010064400017500001750000000010171362136622600163140ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: proto-version.sh,v 1.7 2017/06/07 01:48:15 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sshd version with different protocol combinations" # we just start sshd in inetd mode and check the banner check_version () { expect=$1 banner=`printf '' | ${SSHD} -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy` case ${banner} in SSH-1.99-*) proto=199 ;; SSH-2.0-*) proto=20 ;; SSH-1.5-*) proto=15 ;; *) proto=0 ;; esac if [ ${expect} -ne ${proto} ]; then fail "wrong protocol version ${banner}" fi } check_version 20 openssh-8.2p1/regress/proxy-connect.sh010064400017500001750000000013021362136622600162730ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.12 2020/01/23 11:19:12 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="proxy connect" if [ "`${SSH} -Q compression`" = "none" ]; then comp="no" else comp="no yes" fi for c in $comp; do verbose "plain username comp=$c" opts="-oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh proxyconnect comp=$c failed" fi if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION comp=$c: " \ "$SSH_CONNECTION" fi done verbose "username with style" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style@999.999.999.999 true || \ fail "ssh proxyconnect failed" openssh-8.2p1/regress/putty-ciphers.sh010064400017500001750000000012631362136622600163110ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.7 2020/01/23 03:35:07 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="putty ciphers" if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then echo "putty interop tests not enabled" exit 0 fi for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr chacha20 ; do verbose "$tid: cipher $c" cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c echo "Cipher=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c rm -f ${COPY} env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" done rm -f ${COPY} openssh-8.2p1/regress/putty-kex.sh010064400017500001750000000010561362136622600154430ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: putty-kex.sh,v 1.5 2020/01/23 03:24:38 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="putty KEX" if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then echo "putty interop tests not enabled" exit 0 fi for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ecdh ; do verbose "$tid: kex $k" cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k echo "KEX=$k" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load kex_$k -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "KEX $k failed" fi done openssh-8.2p1/regress/putty-transfer.sh010064400017500001750000000021211362136622600164720ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.7 2020/01/23 11:19:12 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="putty transfer data" if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then echo "putty interop tests not enabled" exit 0 fi if [ "`${SSH} -Q compression`" = "none" ]; then comp="0" else comp="0 1" fi for c in $comp; do verbose "$tid: compression $c" rm -f ${COPY} cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \ -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do trace "compression $c dd-size ${s}" rm -f ${COPY} dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \ -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ "cat > ${COPY}" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" done done rm -f ${COPY} openssh-8.2p1/regress/reconfigure.sh010064400017500001750000000015271362136622600160040ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: reconfigure.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="simple connect after reconfigure" # we need the full path to sshd for -HUP if test "x$USE_VALGRIND" = "x" ; then case $SSHD in /*) # full path is OK ;; *) # otherwise make fully qualified SSHD=$OBJ/$SSHD esac fi start_sshd trace "connect before restart" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connect with failed before reconfigure" fi PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE` rm -f $PIDFILE $SUDO kill -HUP $PID trace "wait for sshd to restart" i=0; while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "sshd did not restart" trace "connect after restart" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connect with failed after reconfigure" fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/reexec.sh010064400017500001750000000015561362136622600147510ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: reexec.sh,v 1.12 2017/08/07 03:52:55 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="reexec tests" SSHD_ORIG=$SSHD SSHD_COPY=$OBJ/sshd # Start a sshd and then delete it start_sshd_copy () { cp $SSHD_ORIG $SSHD_COPY SSHD=$SSHD_COPY start_sshd SSHD=$SSHD_ORIG } # Do basic copy tests copy_tests () { rm -f ${COPY} ${SSH} -nq -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost \ cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" rm -f ${COPY} } verbose "test config passing" cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig start_sshd echo "InvalidXXX=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config copy_tests stop_sshd cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config # cygwin can't fork a deleted binary if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then verbose "test reexec fallback" start_sshd_copy rm -f $SSHD_COPY copy_tests stop_sshd fi openssh-8.2p1/regress/rekey.sh010064400017500001750000000101731362136622600146100ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.18 2018/04/10 00:14:10 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="rekey" LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} rm -f ${LOG} cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak # Test rekeying based on data volume only. # Arguments will be passed to ssh. ssh_data_rekeying() { _kexopt=$1 ; shift _opts="$@" if ! test -z "$_kexopts" ; then cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "$_kexopt" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy _opts="$_opts -o$_kexopt" fi rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} _opts="$_opts -oCompression=no" ${SSH} <${DATA} $_opts -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed ($@)" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy ($@)" n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occurred ($@)" fi } increase_datafile_size 300 opts="" for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i" done for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do opts="$opts Ciphers=$i" done for i in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do opts="$opts MACs=$i" done for opt in $opts; do verbose "client rekey $opt" ssh_data_rekeying "$opt" -oRekeyLimit=256k done # AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do verbose "client rekey $c $kex" ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c done done fi for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}" ssh_data_rekeying "" -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s done for s in 5 10; do verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s}" rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} < ${DATA} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \ $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat >${COPY};sleep $s;sleep 3" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occurred" fi done for s in 5 10; do verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s} no data" rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \ $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occurred" fi done for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do verbose "server rekeylimit ${s}" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "rekeylimit ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat ${DATA}" \ > ${COPY} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occurred" fi done for s in 5 10; do verbose "server rekeylimit default ${s} no data" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "rekeylimit default ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occurred" fi done verbose "rekeylimit parsing" for size in 16 1k 1K 1m 1M 1g 1G 4G 8G; do for time in 1 1m 1M 1h 1H 1d 1D 1w 1W; do case $size in 16) bytes=16 ;; 1k|1K) bytes=1024 ;; 1m|1M) bytes=1048576 ;; 1g|1G) bytes=1073741824 ;; 4g|4G) bytes=4294967296 ;; 8g|8G) bytes=8589934592 ;; esac case $time in 1) seconds=1 ;; 1m|1M) seconds=60 ;; 1h|1H) seconds=3600 ;; 1d|1D) seconds=86400 ;; 1w|1W) seconds=604800 ;; esac b=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \ awk '/rekeylimit/{print $2}'` s=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \ awk '/rekeylimit/{print $3}'` if [ "$bytes" != "$b" ]; then fatal "rekeylimit size: expected $bytes bytes got $b" fi if [ "$seconds" != "$s" ]; then fatal "rekeylimit time: expected $time seconds got $s" fi done done rm -f ${COPY} ${DATA} openssh-8.2p1/regress/rsa_openssh.prv010064400017500001750000000015631362136622600162150ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICWgIBAAKBgQDsilwKcaKN6wSMNd1WgQ9+HRqQEkD0kCTVttrazGu0OhBU3Uko +dFD1Ip0CxdXmN25JQWxOYF7h/Ocu8P3jzv3RTX87xKR0YzlXTLX+SLtF/ySebS3 xWPrlfRUDhh03hR5V+8xxvvy9widPYKw/oItwGSueOsEq1LTczCDv2dAjQIDAQAB An8nH5VzvHkMbSqJ6eOYDsVwomRvYbH5IEaYl1x6VATITNvAu9kUdQ4NsSpuMc+7 Jj9gKZvmO1y2YCKc0P/iO+i/eV0L+yQh1Rw18jQZll+12T+LZrKRav03YNvMx0gN wqWY48Kt6hv2/N/ebQzKRe79+D0t2cTh92hT7xENFLIBAkEBGnoGKFjAUkJCwO1V mzpUqMHpRZVOrqP9hUmPjzNJ5oBPFGe4+h1hoSRFOAzaNuZt8ssbqaLCkzB8bfzj qhZqAQJBANZekuUpp8iBLeLSagw5FkcPwPzq6zfExbhvsZXb8Bo/4SflNs4JHXwI 7SD9Z8aJLvM4uQ/5M70lblDMQ40i3o0CQQDIJvBYBFL5tlOgakq/O7yi+wt0L5BZ 9H79w5rCSAA0IHRoK/qI1urHiHC3f3vbbLk5UStfrqEaND/mm0shyNIBAkBLsYdC /ctt5Bc0wUGK4Vl5bBmj9LtrrMJ4FpBpLwj/69BwCuKoK9XKZ0h73p6XHveCEGRg PIlFX4MtaoLrwgU9AkBV2k4dgIws+X8YX65EsyyFjnlDqX4x0nSOjQB1msIKfHBr dh5XLDBTTCxnKhMJ0Yx/opgOvf09XHBFwaQntR5i -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/rsa_openssh.pub010064400017500001750000000003251362136622600161670ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDsilwKcaKN6wSMNd1WgQ9+HRqQEkD0kCTVttrazGu0OhBU3Uko+dFD1Ip0CxdXmN25JQWxOYF7h/Ocu8P3jzv3RTX87xKR0YzlXTLX+SLtF/ySebS3xWPrlfRUDhh03hR5V+8xxvvy9widPYKw/oItwGSueOsEq1LTczCDv2dAjQ== openssh-8.2p1/regress/rsa_ssh2.prv010064400017500001750000000016341362136622600154140ustar00djmdjm---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ---- Subject: ssh-keygen test Comment: "1024-bit rsa, Sat Jun 23 2001 12:21:26 -0400" P2/56wAAAi4AAAA3aWYtbW9kbntzaWdue3JzYS1wa2NzMS1zaGExfSxlbmNyeXB0e3JzYS 1wa2NzMXYyLW9hZXB9fQAAAARub25lAAAB3wAAAdsAAAARAQABAAAD9icflXO8eQxtKonp 45gOxXCiZG9hsfkgRpiXXHpUBMhM28C72RR1Dg2xKm4xz7smP2Apm+Y7XLZgIpzQ/+I76L 95XQv7JCHVHDXyNBmWX7XZP4tmspFq/Tdg28zHSA3CpZjjwq3qG/b8395tDMpF7v34PS3Z xOH3aFPvEQ0UsgEAAAQA7IpcCnGijesEjDXdVoEPfh0akBJA9JAk1bba2sxrtDoQVN1JKP nRQ9SKdAsXV5jduSUFsTmBe4fznLvD948790U1/O8SkdGM5V0y1/ki7Rf8knm0t8Vj65X0 VA4YdN4UeVfvMcb78vcInT2CsP6CLcBkrnjrBKtS03Mwg79nQI0AAAH/VdpOHYCMLPl/GF +uRLMshY55Q6l+MdJ0jo0AdZrCCnxwa3YeVywwU0wsZyoTCdGMf6KYDr39PVxwRcGkJ7Ue YgAAAgDWXpLlKafIgS3i0moMORZHD8D86us3xMW4b7GV2/AaP+En5TbOCR18CO0g/WfGiS 7zOLkP+TO9JW5QzEONIt6NAAACAQEaegYoWMBSQkLA7VWbOlSowelFlU6uo/2FSY+PM0nm gE8UZ7j6HWGhJEU4DNo25m3yyxuposKTMHxt/OOqFmoB ---- END SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ---- --- openssh-8.2p1/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh010064400017500001750000000020401362136622600165210ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # $OpenBSD: scp-ssh-wrapper.sh,v 1.4 2019/07/19 03:45:44 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. printname () { NAME=$1 save_IFS=$IFS IFS=/ set -- `echo "$NAME"` IFS="$save_IFS" while [ $# -ge 1 ] ; do if [ "x$1" != "x" ]; then echo "D0755 0 $1" fi shift; done } # Discard all but last argument. We use arg later. while test "x$1" != "x"; do arg="$1" shift done BAD="../../../../../../../../../../../../../${DIR}/dotpathdir" case "$SCPTESTMODE" in badserver_0) echo "D0755 0 /${DIR}/rootpathdir" echo "C755 2 rootpathfile" echo "X" ;; badserver_1) echo "D0755 0 $BAD" echo "C755 2 file" echo "X" ;; badserver_2) echo "D0755 0 $BAD" echo "C755 2 file" echo "X" ;; badserver_3) printname $BAD echo "C755 2 file" echo "X" ;; badserver_4) printname $BAD echo "D0755 0 .." echo "C755 2 file" echo "X" ;; badserver_5) echo "D0555 0 " echo "X" ;; badserver_6) echo "D0555 0 ." echo "X" ;; badserver_7) echo "C0755 2 extrafile" echo "X" ;; *) set -- $arg shift exec $SCP "$@" ;; esac openssh-8.2p1/regress/scp-uri.sh010064400017500001750000000040131362136622600150470ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: scp-uri.sh,v 1.2 2017/12/11 11:41:56 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="scp-uri" #set -x COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2 DIR=${COPY}.dd DIR2=${COPY}.dd2 SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp scpopts="-q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp" export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp scpclean() { rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2} mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2} } # Remove Port and User from ssh_config, we want to rely on the URI cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig egrep -v '^ +(Port|User) +.*$' $OBJ/ssh_config.orig > $OBJ/ssh_config verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote file" scpclean $SCP $scpopts ${DATA} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" || fail "copy failed" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local file" scpclean $SCP $scpopts "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" ${COPY} || fail "copy failed" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote dir" scpclean cp ${DATA} ${COPY} $SCP $scpopts ${COPY} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" || fail "copy failed" cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local dir" scpclean cp ${DATA} ${COPY} $SCP $scpopts "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" ${DIR} || fail "copy failed" cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to remote dir" scpclean rm -rf ${DIR2} cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy $SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR2}" || fail "copy failed" for i in $(cd ${DIR} && echo *); do cmp ${DIR}/$i ${DIR2}/$i || fail "corrupted copy" done verbose "$tid: recursive remote dir to local dir" scpclean rm -rf ${DIR2} cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy $SCP $scpopts -r "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed" for i in $(cd ${DIR} && echo *); do cmp ${DIR}/$i ${DIR2}/$i || fail "corrupted copy" done # TODO: scp -3 scpclean rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.exe openssh-8.2p1/regress/scp.sh010064400017500001750000000075231362136622600142630ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: scp.sh,v 1.11 2019/07/19 03:45:44 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="scp" #set -x # Figure out if diff understands "-N" if diff -N ${SRC}/scp.sh ${SRC}/scp.sh 2>/dev/null; then DIFFOPT="-rN" else DIFFOPT="-r" fi COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2 DIR=${COPY}.dd DIR2=${COPY}.dd2 SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp scpopts="-q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp" export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp scpclean() { rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2} mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2} chmod 755 ${DIR} ${DIR2} } verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local file" scpclean $SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote file" scpclean $SCP $scpopts ${DATA} somehost:${COPY} || fail "copy failed" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local file" scpclean $SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote dir" scpclean cp ${DATA} ${COPY} $SCP $scpopts ${COPY} somehost:${DIR} || fail "copy failed" cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local dir" scpclean cp ${DATA} ${COPY} $SCP $scpopts ${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed" cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local dir" scpclean cp ${DATA} ${COPY} $SCP $scpopts somehost:${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed" cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to remote dir" scpclean rm -rf ${DIR2} cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy $SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} somehost:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed" diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to local dir" scpclean rm -rf ${DIR2} cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy $SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed" diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: recursive remote dir to local dir" scpclean rm -rf ${DIR2} cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy $SCP $scpopts -r somehost:${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed" diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: shell metacharacters" scpclean (cd ${DIR} && \ touch '`touch metachartest`' && \ $SCP $scpopts *metachar* ${DIR2} 2>/dev/null; \ [ ! -f metachartest ] ) || fail "shell metacharacters" if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then verbose "$tid: skipped file after scp -p with failed chown+utimes" scpclean cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy2 cp ${DATA} ${DIR2}/copy chmod 660 ${DIR2}/copy $SUDO chown root ${DIR2}/copy $SCP -p $scpopts somehost:${DIR}/\* ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>&1 $SUDO diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy" $SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy fi for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; do verbose "$tid: disallow bad server #$i" SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i export DIR SCPTESTMODE scpclean $SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null [ -d {$DIR}/rootpathdir ] && fail "allows dir relative to root dir" [ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation in non-recursive mode" scpclean $SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null [ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of subdir" scpclean $SCP -pr $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null [ ! -w ${DIR2} ] && fail "allows target root attribute change" scpclean $SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null [ -e ${DIR2}/extrafile ] && fail "allows unauth object creation" rm -f ${DIR2}/extrafile done verbose "$tid: detect non-directory target" scpclean echo a > ${COPY} echo b > ${COPY2} $SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} ${COPY2} cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target" scpclean rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp openssh-8.2p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh010064400017500001750000000054451362136622600165020ustar00djmdjm# Placed in the Public Domain. tid="server config include" cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519 Match host a Banner /aa Match host b Banner /bb Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* Match host c Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* Banner /cc Match host m Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* Match Host d Banner /dd Match Host e Banner /ee Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* Match Host f Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* Banner /ff Match Host n Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* _EOF cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.0 << _EOF Match host xxxxxx _EOF cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.1 << _EOF Match host a Banner /aaa Match host b Banner /bbb Match host c Banner /ccc Match Host d Banner /ddd Match Host e Banner /eee Match Host f Banner /fff _EOF cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF Match host a Banner /aaaa Match host b Banner /bbbb Match host c Banner /cccc Match Host d Banner /dddd Match Host e Banner /eeee Match Host f Banner /ffff Match all Banner /xxxx _EOF trial() { _host="$1" _exp="$2" _desc="$3" test -z "$_desc" && _desc="test match" trace "$_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp" ${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \ -C "host=$_host,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out || fatal "ssh config parse failed: $_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp" _got=`grep -i '^banner ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'` if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then fail "$desc_ host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got" fi } trial a /aa trial b /bb trial c /ccc trial d /dd trial e /ee trial f /fff trial m /xxxx trial n /xxxx trial x none # Prepare an included config with an error. cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.3 << _EOF Banner xxxx Junk _EOF trace "disallow invalid config host=a" ${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \ -C "host=a,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \ fail "sshd include allowed invalid config" trace "disallow invalid config host=x" ${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \ fail "sshd include allowed invalid config" rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # Ensure that a missing include is not fatal. cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519 Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* Banner /aa _EOF trial a /aa "missing include non-fatal" # Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent. cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF Match host x _EOF trial a /aa "included file does not affect match state" # Ensure the empty include directive is not accepted cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF Include _EOF trace "disallow invalid with no argument" ${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x \ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \ fail "sshd allowed Include with no argument" # cleanup rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* $OBJ/sshd_config.out openssh-8.2p1/regress/setuid-allowed.c010064400017500001750000000027161362136622600162270ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* $OpenBSD$ */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "check-setuid [path]\n"); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { const char *path = "."; struct statvfs sb; if (argc > 2) usage(); else if (argc == 2) path = argv[1]; if (statvfs(path, &sb) != 0) { /* Don't return an error if the host doesn't support statvfs */ if (errno == ENOSYS) return 0; fprintf(stderr, "statvfs for \"%s\" failed: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); } return (sb.f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? 1 : 0; } openssh-8.2p1/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh010064400017500001750000000043451362136622600160440ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sftp-badcmds.sh,v 1.6 2013/05/17 10:26:26 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sftp invalid commands" DATA2=/bin/sh${EXEEXT} NONEXIST=/NONEXIST.$$ GLOBFILES=`(cd /bin;echo l*)` rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd rm -f ${COPY} verbose "$tid: get nonexistent" echo "get $NONEXIST $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "get nonexistent failed" test -f ${COPY} && fail "existing copy after get nonexistent" rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* verbose "$tid: glob get to nonexistent directory" echo "get /bin/l* $NONEXIST" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "get nonexistent failed" for x in $GLOBFILES; do test -f ${COPY}.dd/$x && fail "existing copy after get nonexistent" done rm -f ${COPY} verbose "$tid: put nonexistent" echo "put $NONEXIST $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "put nonexistent failed" test -f ${COPY} && fail "existing copy after put nonexistent" rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* verbose "$tid: glob put to nonexistent directory" echo "put /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "put nonexistent failed" for x in $GLOBFILES; do test -f ${COPY}.dd/$x && fail "existing copy after nonexistent" done rm -f ${COPY} verbose "$tid: rename nonexistent" echo "rename $NONEXIST ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "rename nonexist failed" test -f ${COPY}.1 && fail "file exists after rename nonexistent" rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.dd cp $DATA $COPY mkdir ${COPY}.dd verbose "$tid: rename target exists (directory)" echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "rename target exists (directory) failed" test -f ${COPY} || fail "oldname missing after rename target exists (directory)" test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "newname missing after rename target exists (directory)" cmp $DATA ${COPY} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted oldname after rename target exists (directory)" rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* rm -rf ${COPY} cp ${DATA2} ${COPY} verbose "$tid: glob put files to local file" echo "put /bin/l* $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 cmp ${DATA2} ${COPY} || fail "put successed when it should have failed" rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd openssh-8.2p1/regress/sftp-batch.sh010064400017500001750000000022451362136622600155250ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sftp-batch.sh,v 1.5 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sftp batchfile" BATCH=${OBJ}/sftp.bb rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${BATCH}.* cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.pass.1 get $DATA $COPY put ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 rm ${COPY} -put ${COPY} ${COPY}.2 EOF cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.pass.2 # This is a comment # That was a blank line ls EOF cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.fail.1 get $DATA $COPY put ${COPY} ${COPY}.3 rm ${COPY}.* # The next command should fail put ${COPY}.3 ${COPY}.4 EOF cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.fail.2 # The next command should fail jajajajaja EOF verbose "$tid: good commands" ${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.pass.1 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "good commands failed" verbose "$tid: bad commands" ${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.fail.1 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && fail "bad commands succeeded" verbose "$tid: comments and blanks" ${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.pass.2 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "comments & blanks failed" verbose "$tid: junk command" ${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.fail.2 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && fail "junk command succeeded" rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${BATCH}.* openssh-8.2p1/regress/sftp-chroot.sh010064400017500001750000000015371362136622600157450ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.7 2018/11/22 08:48:32 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sftp in chroot" CHROOT=/var/run FILENAME=testdata_${USER}.$$ PRIVDATA=${CHROOT}/${FILENAME} trap "${SUDO} rm -f ${PRIVDATA}" 0 if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" echo SKIPPED exit 0 fi if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m chroot "$CHROOT" ; then echo "skipped: $CHROOT is unsuitable as ChrootDirectory" exit 0 fi $SUDO sh -c "echo mekmitastdigoat > $PRIVDATA" || \ fatal "create $PRIVDATA failed" start_sshd -oChrootDirectory=$CHROOT -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /" verbose "test $tid: get" ${SFTP} -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 || \ fatal "Fetch ${FILENAME} failed" cmp $PRIVDATA $COPY || fail "$PRIVDATA $COPY differ" openssh-8.2p1/regress/sftp-cmds.sh010064400017500001750000000163451362136622600154000ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sftp-cmds.sh,v 1.14 2013/06/21 02:26:26 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. # XXX - TODO: # - chmod / chown / chgrp # - -p flag for get & put tid="sftp commands" # test that these files are readable! for i in `(cd /bin;echo l*)` do if [ -r $i ]; then GLOBFILES="$GLOBFILES $i" fi done # Path with embedded quote QUOTECOPY=${COPY}".\"blah\"" QUOTECOPY_ARG=${COPY}'.\"blah\"' # File with spaces SPACECOPY="${COPY} this has spaces.txt" SPACECOPY_ARG="${COPY}\ this\ has\ spaces.txt" # File with glob metacharacters GLOBMETACOPY="${COPY} [metachar].txt" rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 mkdir ${COPY}.dd verbose "$tid: lls" (echo "lcd ${OBJ}" ; echo "lls") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \ grep copy.dd >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "lls failed" verbose "$tid: lls w/path" echo "lls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \ grep copy.dd >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "lls w/path failed" verbose "$tid: ls" echo "ls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "ls failed" # XXX always successful verbose "$tid: shell" echo "!echo hi there" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "shell failed" # XXX always successful verbose "$tid: pwd" echo "pwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "pwd failed" # XXX always successful verbose "$tid: lpwd" echo "lpwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "lpwd failed" # XXX always successful verbose "$tid: quit" echo "quit" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "quit failed" # XXX always successful verbose "$tid: help" echo "help" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "help failed" # XXX always successful rm -f ${COPY} verbose "$tid: get" echo "get $DATA $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "get failed" cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get" rm -f ${COPY} verbose "$tid: get quoted" echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "get failed" cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get" rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} cp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY} verbose "$tid: get filename with quotes" echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "get failed" cmp ${COPY} ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get with quotes" rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} ${COPY} rm -f "$SPACECOPY" ${COPY} cp $DATA "$SPACECOPY" verbose "$tid: get filename with spaces" echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "get failed" cmp ${COPY} "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after get with spaces" rm -f "$GLOBMETACOPY" ${COPY} cp $DATA "$GLOBMETACOPY" verbose "$tid: get filename with glob metacharacters" echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | \ ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "get failed" cmp ${COPY} "$GLOBMETACOPY" || \ fail "corrupted copy after get with glob metacharacters" rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* verbose "$tid: get to directory" echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "get failed" cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after get" rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* verbose "$tid: glob get to directory" echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "get failed" for x in $GLOBFILES; do cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get" done rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* verbose "$tid: get to local dir" (echo "lcd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "get $DATA" ) | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "get failed" cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after get" rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* verbose "$tid: glob get to local dir" (echo "lcd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "get /bin/l*") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "get failed" for x in $GLOBFILES; do cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get" done rm -f ${COPY} verbose "$tid: put" echo "put $DATA $COPY" | \ ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed" cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put" rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} verbose "$tid: put filename with quotes" echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | \ ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed" cmp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put with quotes" rm -f "$SPACECOPY" verbose "$tid: put filename with spaces" echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | \ ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed" cmp $DATA "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after put with spaces" rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* verbose "$tid: put to directory" echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "put failed" cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after put" rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* verbose "$tid: glob put to directory" echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "put failed" for x in $GLOBFILES; do cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put" done rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* verbose "$tid: put to local dir" (echo "cd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "put $DATA") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "put failed" cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after put" rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* verbose "$tid: glob put to local dir" (echo "cd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "put /bin/l?") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "put failed" for x in $GLOBFILES; do cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put" done verbose "$tid: rename" echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "rename failed" test -f ${COPY}.1 || fail "missing file after rename" cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted copy after rename" verbose "$tid: rename directory" echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | \ ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fail "rename directory failed" test -d ${COPY}.dd && fail "oldname exists after rename directory" test -d ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "missing newname after rename directory" verbose "$tid: ln" echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln failed" test -f ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln" cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after ln" verbose "$tid: ln -s" rm -f ${COPY}.2 echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln -s failed" test -h ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln -s" verbose "$tid: mkdir" echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "mkdir failed" test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after mkdir" # XXX do more here verbose "$tid: chdir" echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "chdir failed" verbose "$tid: rmdir" echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "rmdir failed" test -d ${COPY}.1 && fail "present directory after rmdir" verbose "$tid: lmkdir" echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "lmkdir failed" test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after lmkdir" # XXX do more here verbose "$tid: lchdir" echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "lchdir failed" rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 rm -rf ${QUOTECOPY} "$SPACECOPY" "$GLOBMETACOPY" openssh-8.2p1/regress/sftp-glob.sh010064400017500001750000000047401362136622600153710ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.sh,v 1.4 2009/08/13 01:11:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sftp glob" config_defined FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH && nobs="not supported on this platform" sftp_ls() { target=$1 errtag=$2 expected=$3 unexpected=$4 skip=$5 if test "x$skip" != "x" ; then verbose "$tid: $errtag (skipped: $skip)" return fi verbose "$tid: $errtag" printf "ls -l %s" "${target}" | \ ${SFTP} -b - -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v "^sftp>" > ${RESULTS} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "$errtag failed" fi if test "x$expected" != "x" ; then if fgrep "$expected" ${RESULTS} >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then : else fail "$expected missing from $errtag results" fi fi if test "x$unexpected" != "x" && \ fgrep "$unexpected" ${RESULTS} >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then fail "$unexpected present in $errtag results" fi rm -f ${RESULTS} } BASE=${OBJ}/glob RESULTS=${OBJ}/results DIR=${BASE}/dir DATA=${DIR}/file GLOB1="${DIR}/g-wild*" GLOB2="${DIR}/g-wildx" QUOTE="${DIR}/g-quote\"" SLASH="${DIR}/g-sl\\ash" ESLASH="${DIR}/g-slash\\" QSLASH="${DIR}/g-qs\\\"" SPACE="${DIR}/g-q space" rm -rf ${BASE} mkdir -p ${DIR} touch "${DATA}" "${GLOB1}" "${GLOB2}" "${QUOTE}" "${SPACE}" test "x$nobs" = "x" && touch "${QSLASH}" "${ESLASH}" "${SLASH}" # target message expected unexpected sftp_ls "${DIR}/fil*" "file glob" "${DATA}" "" sftp_ls "${BASE}/d*" "dir glob" "`basename ${DATA}`" "" sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-wild\"*\"" "quoted glob" "g-wild*" "g-wildx" sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-wild\*" "escaped glob" "g-wild*" "g-wildx" sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-quote\\\"" "escaped quote" "g-quote\"" "" sftp_ls "\"${DIR}/g-quote\\\"\"" "quoted quote" "g-quote\"" "" sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-quote\"'" "single-quoted quote" "g-quote\"" "" sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-q\\ space" "escaped space" "g-q space" "" sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-q space'" "quoted space" "g-q space" "" sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-sl\\\\ash" "escaped slash" "g-sl\\ash" "" "$nobs" sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-sl\\\\ash'" "quoted slash" "g-sl\\ash" "" "$nobs" sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-slash\\\\" "escaped slash at EOL" "g-slash\\" "" "$nobs" sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-slash\\\\'" "quoted slash at EOL" "g-slash\\" "" "$nobs" sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-qs\\\\\\\"" "escaped slash+quote" "g-qs\\\"" "" "$nobs" sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-qs\\\\\"'" "quoted slash+quote" "g-qs\\\"" "" "$nobs" rm -rf ${BASE} openssh-8.2p1/regress/sftp-perm.sh010064400017500001750000000123561362136622600154130ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sftp-perm.sh,v 1.2 2013/10/17 22:00:18 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sftp permissions" SERVER_LOG=${OBJ}/sftp-server.log CLIENT_LOG=${OBJ}/sftp.log TEST_SFTP_SERVER=${OBJ}/sftp-server.sh prepare_server() { printf "#!/bin/sh\nexec $SFTPSERVER -el debug3 $* 2>$SERVER_LOG\n" \ > $TEST_SFTP_SERVER chmod a+x $TEST_SFTP_SERVER } run_client() { echo "$@" | ${SFTP} -D ${TEST_SFTP_SERVER} -vvvb - >$CLIENT_LOG 2>&1 } prepare_files() { _prep="$1" rm -f ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 test -d ${COPY}.dd && { rmdir ${COPY}.dd || fatal "rmdir ${COPY}.dd"; } test -z "$_prep" && return sh -c "$_prep" || fail "preparation failed: \"$_prep\"" } postcondition() { _title="$1" _check="$2" test -z "$_check" && return ${TEST_SHELL} -c "$_check" || fail "postcondition check failed: $_title" } ro_test() { _desc=$1 _cmd="$2" _prep="$3" _expect_success_post="$4" _expect_fail_post="$5" verbose "$tid: read-only $_desc" # Plain (no options, mostly to test that _cmd is good) prepare_files "$_prep" prepare_server run_client "$_cmd" || fail "plain $_desc failed" postcondition "$_desc no-readonly" "$_expect_success_post" # Read-only enabled prepare_files "$_prep" prepare_server -R run_client "$_cmd" && fail "read-only $_desc succeeded" postcondition "$_desc readonly" "$_expect_fail_post" } perm_test() { _op=$1 _whitelist_ops=$2 _cmd="$3" _prep="$4" _expect_success_post="$5" _expect_fail_post="$6" verbose "$tid: explicit $_op" # Plain (no options, mostly to test that _cmd is good) prepare_files "$_prep" prepare_server run_client "$_cmd" || fail "plain $_op failed" postcondition "$_op no white/blacklists" "$_expect_success_post" # Whitelist prepare_files "$_prep" prepare_server -p $_op,$_whitelist_ops run_client "$_cmd" || fail "whitelisted $_op failed" postcondition "$_op whitelisted" "$_expect_success_post" # Blacklist prepare_files "$_prep" prepare_server -P $_op run_client "$_cmd" && fail "blacklisted $_op succeeded" postcondition "$_op blacklisted" "$_expect_fail_post" # Whitelist with op missing. prepare_files "$_prep" prepare_server -p $_whitelist_ops run_client "$_cmd" && fail "no whitelist $_op succeeded" postcondition "$_op not in whitelist" "$_expect_fail_post" } ro_test \ "upload" \ "put $DATA $COPY" \ "" \ "cmp $DATA $COPY" \ "test ! -f $COPY" ro_test \ "setstat" \ "chmod 0700 $COPY" \ "touch $COPY; chmod 0400 $COPY" \ "test -x $COPY" \ "test ! -x $COPY" ro_test \ "rm" \ "rm $COPY" \ "touch $COPY" \ "test ! -f $COPY" \ "test -f $COPY" ro_test \ "mkdir" \ "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \ "" \ "test -d ${COPY}.dd" \ "test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" ro_test \ "rmdir" \ "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" \ "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \ "test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" \ "test -d ${COPY}.dd" ro_test \ "posix-rename" \ "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ "touch $COPY" \ "test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \ "test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1" ro_test \ "oldrename" \ "rename -l $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ "touch $COPY" \ "test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \ "test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1" ro_test \ "symlink" \ "ln -s $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ "touch $COPY" \ "test -h ${COPY}.1" \ "test ! -h ${COPY}.1" ro_test \ "hardlink" \ "ln $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ "touch $COPY" \ "test -f ${COPY}.1" \ "test ! -f ${COPY}.1" # Test explicit permissions perm_test \ "open" \ "realpath,stat,lstat,read,close" \ "get $DATA $COPY" \ "" \ "cmp $DATA $COPY" \ "! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null" perm_test \ "read" \ "realpath,stat,lstat,open,close" \ "get $DATA $COPY" \ "" \ "cmp $DATA $COPY" \ "! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null" perm_test \ "write" \ "realpath,stat,lstat,open,close" \ "put $DATA $COPY" \ "" \ "cmp $DATA $COPY" \ "! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null" perm_test \ "lstat" \ "realpath,stat,open,read,close" \ "get $DATA $COPY" \ "" \ "cmp $DATA $COPY" \ "! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null" perm_test \ "opendir" \ "realpath,readdir,stat,lstat" \ "ls -ln $OBJ" perm_test \ "readdir" \ "realpath,opendir,stat,lstat" \ "ls -ln $OBJ" perm_test \ "setstat" \ "realpath,stat,lstat" \ "chmod 0700 $COPY" \ "touch $COPY; chmod 0400 $COPY" \ "test -x $COPY" \ "test ! -x $COPY" perm_test \ "remove" \ "realpath,stat,lstat" \ "rm $COPY" \ "touch $COPY" \ "test ! -f $COPY" \ "test -f $COPY" perm_test \ "mkdir" \ "realpath,stat,lstat" \ "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \ "" \ "test -d ${COPY}.dd" \ "test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" perm_test \ "rmdir" \ "realpath,stat,lstat" \ "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" \ "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \ "test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" \ "test -d ${COPY}.dd" perm_test \ "posix-rename" \ "realpath,stat,lstat" \ "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ "touch $COPY" \ "test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \ "test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1" perm_test \ "rename" \ "realpath,stat,lstat" \ "rename -l $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ "touch $COPY" \ "test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \ "test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1" perm_test \ "symlink" \ "realpath,stat,lstat" \ "ln -s $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ "touch $COPY" \ "test -h ${COPY}.1" \ "test ! -h ${COPY}.1" perm_test \ "hardlink" \ "realpath,stat,lstat" \ "ln $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ "touch $COPY" \ "test -f ${COPY}.1" \ "test ! -f ${COPY}.1" perm_test \ "statvfs" \ "realpath,stat,lstat" \ "df /" # XXX need good tests for: # fstat # fsetstat # realpath # stat # readlink # fstatvfs rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.dd openssh-8.2p1/regress/sftp-uri.sh010064400017500001750000000031301362136622600152350ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sftp-uri.sh,v 1.1 2017/10/24 19:33:32 millert Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sftp-uri" #set -x COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2 DIR=${COPY}.dd DIR2=${COPY}.dd2 SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` sftpclean() { rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2} mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2} } start_sshd -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /" # Remove Port and User from ssh_config, we want to rely on the URI cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig egrep -v '^ +(Port|User) +.*$' $OBJ/ssh_config.orig > $OBJ/ssh_config verbose "$tid: non-interactive fetch to local file" sftpclean ${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" ${COPY} || fail "copy failed" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: non-interactive fetch to local dir" sftpclean cp ${DATA} ${COPY} ${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" ${DIR} || fail "copy failed" cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" verbose "$tid: put to remote directory (trailing slash)" sftpclean ${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config -b - \ "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}/" > /dev/null 2>&1 << EOF version put ${DATA} copy EOF r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "sftp failed with $r" else cmp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" fi verbose "$tid: put to remote directory (no slash)" sftpclean ${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config -b - \ "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" > /dev/null 2>&1 << EOF version put ${DATA} copy EOF r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "sftp failed with $r" else cmp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" fi sftpclean openssh-8.2p1/regress/sftp.sh010064400017500001750000000013411362136622600144420ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sftp.sh,v 1.6 2017/10/30 21:59:43 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="basic sftp put/get" SFTPCMDFILE=${OBJ}/batch cat >$SFTPCMDFILE < /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "sftp failed with $r" else cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 || fail "corrupted copy after get" cmp $DATA ${COPY}.2 || fail "corrupted copy after put" fi done done rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 rm -f $SFTPCMDFILE openssh-8.2p1/regress/ssh-com-client.sh010064400017500001750000000060271362136622600163210ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: ssh-com-client.sh,v 1.7 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="connect with ssh.com client" #TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set' fi VERSIONS=" 2.1.0 2.2.0 2.3.0 2.3.1 2.4.0 3.0.0 3.1.0 3.2.0 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.5 3.2.9 3.2.9.1 3.3.0" # 2.0.10 2.0.12 2.0.13 don't like the test setup # setup authorized keys SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` cp ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv ${OBJ}/id.com chmod 600 ${OBJ}/id.com ${SSHKEYGEN} -i -f ${OBJ}/id.com > $OBJ/id.openssh chmod 600 ${OBJ}/id.openssh ${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f ${OBJ}/id.openssh > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/id.openssh > $OBJ/id.com.pub echo IdKey ${OBJ}/id.com > ${OBJ}/id.list # we need a DSA host key t=dsa rm -f ${OBJ}/$t ${OBJ}/$t.pub ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f ${OBJ}/$t $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config # add hostkeys to known hosts mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER}/hostkeys HK=${OBJ}/${USER}/hostkeys/key_${PORT}_127.0.0.1 ${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/rsa.pub > ${HK}.ssh-rsa.pub ${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/dsa.pub > ${HK}.ssh-dss.pub cat > ${OBJ}/ssh2_config << EOF *: QuietMode yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes Port ${PORT} User ${USER} Host 127.0.0.1 IdentityFile ${OBJ}/id.list RandomSeedFile ${OBJ}/random_seed UserConfigDirectory ${OBJ}/%U AuthenticationSuccessMsg no BatchMode yes ForwardX11 no EOF # we need a real server (no ProxyConnect option) start_sshd # go for it for v in ${VERSIONS}; do ssh2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/ssh2 if [ ! -x ${ssh2} ]; then continue fi verbose "ssh2 ${v}" key=ssh-dss skipcat=0 case $v in 2.1.*|2.3.0) skipcat=1 ;; 3.0.*) key=ssh-rsa ;; esac cp ${HK}.$key.pub ${HK}.pub # check exit status ${ssh2} -q -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost exit 42 r=$? if [ $r -ne 42 ]; then fail "ssh2 ${v} exit code test failed (got $r, expected 42)" fi # data transfer rm -f ${COPY} ${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (receive) failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (receive) data mismatch" # data transfer, again if [ $skipcat -eq 0 ]; then rm -f ${COPY} cat ${DATA} | \ ${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config host "cat > ${COPY}" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (send) failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || \ fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (send) data mismatch" fi # no stderr after eof rm -f ${COPY} ${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost \ exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 1; echo bla 1>&2; exit 0"\' \ 2> /dev/null if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh2 ${v} stderr test failed" fi done rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER} for i in ssh2_config random_seed dsa.pub dsa host.dsa \ id.list id.com id.com.pub id.openssh; do rm -f ${OBJ}/$i done openssh-8.2p1/regress/ssh-com-keygen.sh010064400017500001750000000026051362136622600163230ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: ssh-com-keygen.sh,v 1.4 2004/02/24 17:06:52 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="ssh.com key import" #TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set' fi VERSIONS=" 2.0.10 2.0.12 2.0.13 2.1.0 2.2.0 2.3.0 2.3.1 2.4.0 3.0.0 3.1.0 3.2.0 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.5 3.2.9 3.2.9.1 3.3.0" COMPRV=${OBJ}/comkey COMPUB=${COMPRV}.pub OPENSSHPRV=${OBJ}/opensshkey OPENSSHPUB=${OPENSSHPRV}.pub # go for it for v in ${VERSIONS}; do keygen=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/ssh-keygen2 if [ ! -x ${keygen} ]; then continue fi types="dss" case $v in 2.3.1|3.*) types="$types rsa" ;; esac for t in $types; do verbose "ssh-keygen $v/$t" rm -f $COMPRV $COMPUB $OPENSSHPRV $OPENSSHPUB ${keygen} -q -P -t $t ${COMPRV} > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "${keygen} -t $t failed" continue fi ${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${COMPUB} > ${OPENSSHPUB} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "import public key ($v/$t) failed" continue fi ${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${COMPRV} > ${OPENSSHPRV} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "import private key ($v/$t) failed" continue fi chmod 600 ${OPENSSHPRV} ${SSHKEYGEN} -yf ${OPENSSHPRV} |\ diff - ${OPENSSHPUB} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "public keys ($v/$t) differ" fi done done rm -f $COMPRV $COMPUB $OPENSSHPRV $OPENSSHPUB openssh-8.2p1/regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh010064400017500001750000000023061362136622600160130ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: ssh-com-sftp.sh,v 1.7 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server" SFTPCMDFILE=${OBJ}/batch cat >$SFTPCMDFILE < /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "sftp failed with $r" else cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 || fail "corrupted copy after get" cmp $DATA ${COPY}.2 || fail "corrupted copy after put" fi done done done rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 rm -f $SFTPCMDFILE openssh-8.2p1/regress/ssh-com.sh010064400017500001750000000053301362136622600150410ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.10 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="connect to ssh.com server" #TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set' fi VERSIONS=" 2.0.12 2.0.13 2.1.0 2.2.0 2.3.0 2.4.0 3.0.0 3.1.0 3.2.0 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.5 3.2.9 3.2.9.1 3.3.0" # 2.0.10 does not support UserConfigDirectory # 2.3.1 requires a config in $HOME/.ssh2 SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` # ssh.com cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd2_config #*: # Port and ListenAddress are not used. QuietMode yes Port 4343 ListenAddress 127.0.0.1 UserConfigDirectory ${OBJ}/%U Ciphers AnyCipher PubKeyAuthentication yes #AllowedAuthentications publickey AuthorizationFile authorization HostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv PublicHostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub RandomSeedFile ${OBJ}/random_seed MaxConnections 0 PermitRootLogin yes VerboseMode no CheckMail no Ssh1Compatibility no EOF # create client config sed "s/HostKeyAlias.*/HostKeyAlias ssh2-localhost-with-alias/" \ < $OBJ/ssh_config > $OBJ/ssh_config_com # we need a DSA key for rm -f ${OBJ}/dsa ${OBJ}/dsa.pub ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f ${OBJ}/dsa # setup userdir, try rsa first mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER} cp /dev/null ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization for t in rsa dsa; do ${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/$t.pub > ${OBJ}/${USER}/$t.com echo Key $t.com >> ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization echo IdentityFile ${OBJ}/$t >> ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com done # convert and append DSA hostkey ( printf 'ssh2-localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts # go for it for v in ${VERSIONS}; do sshd2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/sshd2 if [ ! -x ${sshd2} ]; then continue fi trace "sshd2 ${v}" PROXY="proxycommand ${sshd2} -qif ${OBJ}/sshd2_config 2> /dev/null" ${SSH} -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} failed" fi ciphers="3des-cbc" macs="hmac-md5" case $v in 2.4.*) ciphers="$ciphers cast128-cbc" macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96" ;; 3.*) ciphers="$ciphers aes128-cbc cast128-cbc" macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96" ;; esac #ciphers="3des-cbc" for m in $macs; do for c in $ciphers; do trace "sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m" verbose "test ${tid}: sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m" ${SSH} -c $c -m $m -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} with $c/$m failed" fi done done done rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER} for i in sshd_config_proxy ssh_config_proxy random_seed \ sshd2_config dsa.pub dsa ssh_config_com; do rm -f ${OBJ}/$i done openssh-8.2p1/regress/ssh2putty.sh010075500017500001750000000012641362136622600154620ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.5 2019/11/21 05:18:47 tb Exp $ if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key" exit 1 fi HOST=$1 PORT=$2 KEYFILE=$3 # XXX - support DSA keys too if grep "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" $KEYFILE >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then : else echo "Unsupported private key format" exit 1 fi public_exponent=` openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent | sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//' ` test $? -ne 0 && exit 1 modulus=` openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= | sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z ` test $? -ne 0 && exit 1 echo "rsa2@$PORT:$HOST $public_exponent,$modulus" openssh-8.2p1/regress/sshcfgparse.sh010064400017500001750000000106201362136622600157760ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sshcfgparse.sh,v 1.6 2019/12/21 02:33:07 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="ssh config parse" dsa=0 for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do case "$t" in ssh-dss) dsa=1 ;; esac done expect_result_present() { _str="$1" ; shift for _expect in "$@" ; do echo "$f" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "^$_expect\$" >/dev/null if test $? -ne 0 ; then fail "missing expected \"$_expect\" from \"$_str\"" fi done } expect_result_absent() { _str="$1" ; shift for _expect in "$@" ; do echo "$f" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "^$_expect\$" >/dev/null if test $? -eq 0 ; then fail "unexpected \"$_expect\" present in \"$_str\"" fi done } verbose "reparse minimal config" (${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.1 && ${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config.1 somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.2 && diff $OBJ/ssh_config.1 $OBJ/ssh_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config" verbose "ssh -W opts" f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'` test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure default" f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'` test "$f" = "yes" || fail "exitonforwardfailure enable" f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o exitonforwardfailure=no h | \ awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'` test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure override" f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'` test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings default" f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'` test "$f" = "yes" || fail "clearallforwardings enable" f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o clearallforwardings=no h | \ awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'` test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings override" verbose "user first match" user=`awk '$1=="User" {print $2}' $OBJ/ssh_config` f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'` test "$f" = "$user" || fail "user from config, expected '$user' got '$f'" f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -o user=foo -l bar baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'` test "$f" = "foo" || fail "user first match -oUser, expected 'foo' got '$f' " f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -lbar baz@host user=foo baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'` test "$f" = "bar" || fail "user first match -l, expected 'bar' got '$f'" f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config baz@host -o user=foo -l bar baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'` test "$f" = "baz" || fail "user first match user@host, expected 'baz' got '$f'" verbose "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes" # Default set f=`${SSH} -GF none host | awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss" # Explicit override f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=ssh-ed25519 host | \ awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss" # Removal from default set f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=-ssh-ed25519-cert* host | \ awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss" f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=-ssh-ed25519 host | \ awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss" # Append to default set. # This is not tested when built !WITH_OPENSSL if [ "$dsa" = "1" ]; then f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=+ssh-dss-cert* host | \ awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*" expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss" f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=+ssh-dss host | \ awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss" expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*" fi verbose "agentforwarding" f=`${SSH} -GF none host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'` expect_result_present "$f" "no" f=`${SSH} -GF none -oforwardagent=no host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'` expect_result_present "$f" "no" f=`${SSH} -GF none -oforwardagent=yes host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'` expect_result_present "$f" "yes" f=`${SSH} -GF none '-oforwardagent=SSH_AUTH_SOCK.forward' host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'` expect_result_present "$f" "SSH_AUTH_SOCK.forward" # cleanup rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.[012] openssh-8.2p1/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh010064400017500001750000000004351362136622600166670ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # $OpenBSD: sshd-log-wrapper.sh,v 1.4 2016/11/25 02:56:49 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. # # simple wrapper for sshd proxy mode to catch stderr output # sh sshd-log-wrapper.sh /path/to/logfile /path/to/sshd [args...] log=$1 shift exec "$@" -E$log openssh-8.2p1/regress/sshsig.sh010064400017500001750000000153661362136622600150020ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sshsig.sh,v 1.3 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sshsig" DATA2=$OBJ/${DATANAME}.2 cat ${DATA} ${DATA} > ${DATA2} rm -f $OBJ/sshsig-*.sig $OBJ/wrong-key* $OBJ/sigca-key* sig_namespace="test-$$" sig_principal="user-$$@example.com" # Make a "wrong key" ${SSHKEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/wrong-key -C "wrong trousers, Grommit" -N '' \ || fatal "couldn't generate key" WRONG=$OBJ/wrong-key.pub # Make a CA key. ${SSHKEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/sigca-key -C "CA" -N '' \ || fatal "couldn't generate key" CA_PRIV=$OBJ/sigca-key CA_PUB=$OBJ/sigca-key.pub trace "start agent" eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" fi SIGNKEYS="$SSH_KEYTYPES" verbose "$tid: make certificates" for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $CA_PRIV -z $$ \ -I "regress signature key for $USER" \ -n $sig_principal $OBJ/${t} || \ fatal "couldn't sign ${t}" SIGNKEYS="$SIGNKEYS ${t}-cert.pub" done for t in $SIGNKEYS; do verbose "$tid: check signature for $t" keybase=`basename $t .pub` privkey=${OBJ}/`basename $t -cert.pub` sigfile=${OBJ}/sshsig-${keybase}.sig sigfile_agent=${OBJ}/sshsig-agent-${keybase}.sig pubkey=${OBJ}/${keybase}.pub ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y sign -f ${OBJ}/$t -n $sig_namespace \ < $DATA > $sigfile 2>/dev/null || fail "sign using $t failed" (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fail "failed signature for $t key" (printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"$sig_namespace,whatever\" "; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fail "failed signature for $t key w/ limited namespace" # Invalid option (printf "$sig_principal octopus " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "accepted signature for $t key with bad signers option" # Wrong key trusted. (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $WRONG) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong key trusted" # incorrect data (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA2 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "passed signature for wrong data with $t key" # wrong principal in signers (printf "josef.k@example.com " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong principal" # wrong namespace (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n COWS_COWS_COWS \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong namespace" # namespace excluded by option (printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"whatever\" " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "accepted signature for $t key with excluded namespace" # public key in revoked keys file cat $pubkey > $OBJ/revoked_keys (printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"whatever\" " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ -r $OBJ/revoked_keys \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "accepted signature for $t key, but key is in revoked_keys" # public key not revoked, but other are present in revoked_keysfile cat $WRONG > $OBJ/revoked_keys (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ -r $OBJ/revoked_keys \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fail "couldn't verify signature for $t key, but key not in revoked_keys" # check-novalidate with valid data ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fail "failed to check valid signature for $t key" # check-novalidate with invalid data ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ < $DATA2 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "sucessfully checked signature for $t key with invalid data" # Check signing keys using ssh-agent. ${SSHADD} -D >/dev/null 2>&1 # Remove all previously-loaded keys. ${SSHADD} ${privkey} > /dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ssh-add failed" # Move private key to ensure agent key is used mv ${privkey} ${privkey}.tmp ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y sign -f $pubkey -n $sig_namespace \ < $DATA > $sigfile_agent 2>/dev/null || \ fail "ssh-agent based sign using $pubkey failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile_agent \ -n $sig_namespace < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fail "failed to check valid signature for $t key" # Move private key back mv ${privkey}.tmp ${privkey} # Remaining tests are for certificates only. case "$keybase" in *-cert) ;; *) continue ;; esac # correct CA key (printf "$sig_principal cert-authority " ; cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fail "failed signature for $t cert" # signing key listed as cert-authority (printf "$sig_principal cert-authority" ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "accepted signature with $t key listed as CA" # CA key not flagged cert-authority (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "accepted signature for $t cert with CA not marked" # mismatch between cert principal and file (printf "josef.k@example.com cert-authority" ; cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ fail "accepted signature for $t cert with wrong principal" done trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null openssh-8.2p1/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh010064400017500001750000000011331362136622600166360ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: stderr-after-eof.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="stderr data after eof" # setup data rm -f ${DATA} ${COPY} cp /dev/null ${DATA} for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6; do (date;echo $i) | md5 >> ${DATA} done ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \ exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 2; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ 2> ${COPY} r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed with exit code $r" fi egrep 'Disconnecting: Received extended_data after EOF' ${COPY} && fail "ext data received after eof" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt" rm -f ${DATA} ${COPY} openssh-8.2p1/regress/stderr-data.sh010064400017500001750000000013051362136622600157000ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: stderr-data.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="stderr data transfer" for n in '' -n; do verbose "test $tid: ($n)" ${SSH} $n -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exec \ sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ 2> ${COPY} r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed with exit code $r" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt" rm -f ${COPY} ${SSH} $n -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exec \ sh -c \'"echo a; exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ > /dev/null 2> ${COPY} r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed with exit code $r" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt" rm -f ${COPY} done openssh-8.2p1/regress/t11.ok010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600140720ustar00djmdjmSHA256:4w1rnrek3klTJOTVhwuCIFd5k+pq9Bfo5KTxxb8BqbY openssh-8.2p1/regress/t4.ok010064400017500001750000000000641362136622600140150ustar00djmdjmMD5:3b:dd:44:e9:49:18:84:95:f1:e7:33:6b:9d:93:b1:36 openssh-8.2p1/regress/t5.ok010064400017500001750000000001021362136622600140070ustar00djmdjmxokes-lylis-byleh-zebib-kalus-bihas-tevah-haroz-suhar-foved-noxex openssh-8.2p1/regress/test-exec.sh010064400017500001750000000373351362136622600154030ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.75 2020/01/31 23:25:08 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. #SUDO=sudo # Unbreak GNU head(1) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 export _POSIX2_VERSION case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in OSF1*) BIN_SH=xpg4 export BIN_SH ;; CYGWIN*) os=cygwin ;; esac if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT" else PORT=4242 fi if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami` elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then USER=`whoami` elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then USER=`logname` else USER=`id -un` fi OBJ=$1 if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then echo '$OBJ not defined' exit 2 fi if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then echo "not a directory: $OBJ" exit 2 fi SCRIPT=$2 if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then echo '$SCRIPT not defined' exit 2 fi if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then echo "not a file: $SCRIPT" exit 2 fi if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then true else echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT" exit 2 fi unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` # defaults SSH=ssh SSHD=sshd SSHAGENT=ssh-agent SSHADD=ssh-add SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan SFTP=sftp SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server SCP=scp # Set by make_tmpdir() on demand (below). SSH_REGRESS_TMP= # Interop testing PLINK=plink PUTTYGEN=puttygen CONCH=conch # Tools used by multiple tests NC=$OBJ/netcat if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in /*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;; *) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in /*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;; *) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in /*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;; *) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER" != "x" ]; then SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER" != "x" ]; then SSH_SK_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER}" fi # Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec case "$SSHD" in /*) ;; *) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;; esac case "$SSHAGENT" in /*) ;; *) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;; esac # Record the actual binaries used. SSH_BIN=${SSH} SSHD_BIN=${SSHD} SSHAGENT_BIN=${SSHAGENT} SSHADD_BIN=${SSHADD} SSHKEYGEN_BIN=${SSHKEYGEN} SSHKEYSCAN_BIN=${SSHKEYSCAN} SFTP_BIN=${SFTP} SFTPSERVER_BIN=${SFTPSERVER} SCP_BIN=${SCP} if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then rm -rf $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb # When using sudo ensure low-priv tests can write pipes and logs. if [ "x$SUDO" != "x" ]; then chmod 777 $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb fi VG_TEST=`basename $SCRIPT .sh` # Some tests are difficult to fix. case "$VG_TEST" in reexec) VG_SKIP=1 ;; sftp-chroot) if [ "x${SUDO}" != "x" ]; then VG_SKIP=1 fi ;; esac if [ x"$VG_SKIP" = "x" ]; then VG_LEAK="--leak-check=no" if [ x"$VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS" != "x" ]; then VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full" fi VG_IGNORE="/bin/*,/sbin/*,/usr/*,/var/*" VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}." VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children-skip=${VG_IGNORE}" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --vgdb-prefix=$OBJ/valgrind-vgdb/" VG_PATH="valgrind" if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH" fi VG="$VG_PATH $VG_OPTS" SSH="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh.%p $SSH" SSHD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sshd.%p $SSHD" SSHAGENT="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-agent.%p $SSHAGENT" SSHADD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-add.%p $SSHADD" SSHKEYGEN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keygen.%p $SSHKEYGEN" SSHKEYSCAN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keyscan.%p $SSHKEYSCAN" SFTP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp.%p ${SFTP}" SCP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}scp.%p $SCP" cat > $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh << EOF #!/bin/sh exec $VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp-server.%p $SFTPSERVER "\$@" EOF chmod a+rx $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh SFTPSERVER="$OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh" fi fi # Logfiles. # SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only # SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only # REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log fi if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log fi if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log fi # truncate logfiles >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE # Create wrapper ssh with logging. We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..." # because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments. SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh echo "#!/bin/sh" > $SSHLOGWRAP echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "'"$@"' >>$SSHLOGWRAP chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh REAL_SSH="$SSH" REAL_SSHD="$SSHD" SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP" # Some test data. We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it. # The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does # not exist. Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size # [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large. DATANAME=data DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME} cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >${DATA} chmod u+w ${DATA} COPY=$OBJ/copy rm -f ${COPY} increase_datafile_size() { while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >>${DATA} done } # these should be used in tests export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER SSH_SK_HELPER #echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP # Portable specific functions have_prog() { saved_IFS="$IFS" IFS=":" for i in $PATH do if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then IFS="$saved_IFS" return 0 fi done IFS="$saved_IFS" return 1 } jot() { awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }" } # Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h. config_defined () { str=$1 while test "x$2" != "x" ; do str="$str|$2" shift done egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 } md5 () { if have_prog md5sum; then md5sum elif have_prog openssl; then openssl md5 elif have_prog cksum; then cksum elif have_prog sum; then sum else wc -c fi } # End of portable specific functions stop_sshd () { if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE` if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then echo no sshd running else if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then echo bad pid for sshd: $pid else $SUDO kill $pid trace "wait for sshd to exit" i=0; while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done if test -f $PIDFILE; then if $SUDO kill -0 $pid; then echo "sshd didn't exit " \ "port $PORT pid $pid" else echo "sshd died without cleanup" fi exit 1 fi fi fi fi } make_tmpdir () { SSH_REGRESS_TMP="$($OBJ/mkdtemp openssh-XXXXXXXX)" || \ fatal "failed to create temporary directory" } # helper cleanup () { if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID else kill $SSH_PID fi fi if [ "x$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" != "x" ]; then rm -rf "$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" fi stop_sshd } start_debug_log () { echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE } save_debug_log () { echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE (cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log (cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log (cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log } trace () { start_debug_log $@ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then echo "$@" fi } verbose () { start_debug_log $@ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then echo "$@" fi } warn () { echo "WARNING: $@" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo "WARNING: $@" } fail () { save_debug_log "FAIL: $@" RESULT=1 echo "$@" if test "x$TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL" != "x" ; then cleanup exit $RESULT fi } fatal () { save_debug_log "FATAL: $@" printf "FATAL: " fail "$@" cleanup exit $RESULT } RESULT=0 PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile trap fatal 3 2 # create server config cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config StrictModes no Port $PORT AddressFamily inet ListenAddress 127.0.0.1 #ListenAddress ::1 PidFile $PIDFILE AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u LogLevel DEBUG3 AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST_* AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST Subsystem sftp $SFTPSERVER EOF # This may be necessary if /usr/src and/or /usr/obj are group-writable, # but if you aren't careful with permissions then the unit tests could # be abused to locally escalate privileges. if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS" ]; then echo "StrictModes no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config else # check and warn if excessive permissions are likely to cause failures. unsafe="" dir="${OBJ}" while test ${dir} != "/"; do if test -d "${dir}" && ! test -h "${dir}"; then perms=`ls -ld ${dir}` case "${perms}" in ?????w????*|????????w?*) unsafe="${unsafe} ${dir}" ;; esac fi dir=`dirname ${dir}` done if ! test -z "${unsafe}"; then cat <> $OBJ/sshd_config fi # server config for proxy connects cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy # allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy # create client config cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config Host * Hostname 127.0.0.1 HostKeyAlias localhost-with-alias Port $PORT User $USER GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts PubkeyAuthentication yes ChallengeResponseAuthentication no HostbasedAuthentication no PasswordAuthentication no BatchMode yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes LogLevel DEBUG3 EOF if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config fi rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER SSH_SK_PROVIDER= if [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so" elif [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" fi export SSH_SK_PROVIDER if ! test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER"; then EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS='-P/*' # XXX want realpath(1)... echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/ssh_config echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_config echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy fi export EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS maybe_filter_sk() { if test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER" ; then grep -v ^sk else cat fi } SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk` SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk` for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do # generate user key trace "generating key type $t" if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN_BIN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then rm -f $OBJ/$t ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t ||\ fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed" fi # setup authorized keys cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config done for t in ${SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES}; do # known hosts file for client ( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' cat $OBJ/$t.pub ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts # use key as host key, too $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config # don't use SUDO for proxy connect echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy done chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no if test -x "$CONCH" ; then REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes fi # If PuTTY is present and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare keys and # configuration REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" ; then REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes fi case "$SCRIPT" in *putty*) ;; *) REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;; esac if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty # Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 if ! puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ --random-device=/dev/urandom \ --new-passphrase /dev/null < /dev/null > /dev/null; then echo "Your installed version of PuTTY is too old to support --new-passphrase; trying without (may require manual interaction) ..." >&2 puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 < /dev/null > /dev/null fi puttygen -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format cp $OBJ/ssh-rsa $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -N '' -m PEM -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >/dev/null ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt > \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >> \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys rm -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt # Setup proxied session mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "Protocol=ssh" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "HostName=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyLocalhost=1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy PUTTYDIR=${OBJ}/.putty export PUTTYDIR REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes fi # create a proxy version of the client config ( cat $OBJ/ssh_config echo proxycommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy # check proxy config ${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy || fatal "sshd_proxy broken" start_sshd () { # start sshd $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken" $SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" \ ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE trace "wait for sshd" i=0; while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT" } # source test body . $SCRIPT # kill sshd cleanup if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then # wait for any running process to complete wait; sleep 1 VG_RESULTS=$(find $OBJ/valgrind-out -type f -print) VG_RESULT_COUNT=0 VG_FAIL_COUNT=0 for i in $VG_RESULTS; do if grep "ERROR SUMMARY" $i >/dev/null; then VG_RESULT_COUNT=$(($VG_RESULT_COUNT + 1)) if ! grep "ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors" $i >/dev/null; then VG_FAIL_COUNT=$(($VG_FAIL_COUNT + 1)) RESULT=1 verbose valgrind failure $i cat $i fi fi done if [ x"$VG_SKIP" != "x" ]; then verbose valgrind skipped else verbose valgrind results $VG_RESULT_COUNT failures $VG_FAIL_COUNT fi fi if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then verbose ok $tid else echo failed $tid fi exit $RESULT openssh-8.2p1/regress/transfer.sh010064400017500001750000000011071362136622600153120ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: transfer.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="transfer data" rm -f ${COPY} ${SSH} -n -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do trace "dd-size ${s}" rm -f ${COPY} dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" done rm -f ${COPY} openssh-8.2p1/regress/try-ciphers.sh010064400017500001750000000013131362136622600157360ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.26 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="try ciphers" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0 for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do trace "cipher $c mac $m" verbose "test $tid: cipher $c mac $m" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Ciphers=$c" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -m $m -c $c somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed with mac $m cipher $c" fi # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they # are ignored. if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then break fi n=`expr $n + 1` done done openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600151215ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/Makefile010064400017500001750000000003231362136622600166330ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.11 2019/04/28 22:53:26 dtucker Exp $ REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?= yes SUBDIR= test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion SUBDIR+=authopt misc .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc010064400017500001750000000040611362136622600174060ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.14 2019/11/25 10:32:35 djm Exp $ REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?= yes .include .include # User-settable options UNITTEST_FAST?= no # Skip slow tests (e.g. less intensive fuzzing). UNITTEST_SLOW?= no # Include slower tests (e.g. more intensive fuzzing). UNITTEST_VERBOSE?= no # Verbose test output (inc. per-test names). MALLOC_OPTIONS?= CFGJRSUX TEST_ENV?= MALLOC_OPTIONS=${MALLOC_OPTIONS} # XXX detect from ssh binary? OPENSSL?= yes .if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes") CFLAGS+= -DWITH_OPENSSL .endif # enable warnings WARNINGS=Yes DEBUG=-g CFLAGS+= -fstack-protector-all CDIAGFLAGS= -Wall CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wextra CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wcomment CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat-security CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wimplicit CDIAGFLAGS+= -Winline CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-declarations CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wparentheses CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-arith CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wshadow CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wsign-compare CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-aliasing CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wno-unused-parameter .if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3" CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition .endif SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} .if exists(${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir}) LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir} -ltest_helper DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir}/libtest_helper.a .else LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -ltest_helper DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/libtest_helper.a .endif .PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} LDADD+= -lutil DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL} .if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes") LDADD+= -lcrypto DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO} .endif LDADD+= -lfido2 -lcbor -lusbhid DPADD+= ${LIBFIDO2} ${LIBCBOR} ${LIBUSBHID} UNITTEST_ARGS?= .if (${UNITTEST_VERBOSE:L} != "no") UNITTEST_ARGS+= -v .endif .if (${UNITTEST_FAST:L} != "no") UNITTEST_ARGS+= -f .elif (${UNITTEST_SLOW:L} != "no") UNITTEST_ARGS+= -F .endif openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600166055ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt/Makefile010064400017500001750000000014501362136622600203210ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ PROG=test_authopt SRCS=tests.c SRCS+=auth-options.c # From usr.bin/ssh SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c SRCS+=digest-openssl.c #SRCS+=digest-libc.c REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600204165ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/all_permit.cert010064400017500001750000000011671362136622600235060ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/bad_sourceaddr.cert010064400017500001750000000012371362136622600243150ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/force_command.cert010064400017500001750000000012331362136622600241440ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/host.cert010064400017500001750000000007131362136622600223270ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIFWMw3ftP29RSefnxQwdvK1KiE2G9Y7rPRrJ7ZsrDiOeAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAACAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAoVYLMLNBOH1SSgemFuDBprzpDXop6ufRSOo6vtD4mTwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAKTMqwPkaBg23RS7/aj347dc2kY4bWt/sHwzREYSrKRqZ5RNBnSvZOQ8m5euMCEuf92bZ8VJEdF653jRiW6VoBA== user key openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/mktestdata.sh010064400017500001750000000025141362136622600231710ustar00djmdjm#/bin/sh set -xe rm -f ca_key ca_key.pub rm -f user_key user_key.pub rm -f *.cert ssh-keygen -q -f ca_key -t ed25519 -C CA -N '' ssh-keygen -q -f user_key -t ed25519 -C "user key" -N '' sign() { output=$1 shift set -xe ssh-keygen -q -s ca_key -I user -n user \ -V 19990101:19991231 -z 1 "$@" user_key.pub mv user_key-cert.pub "$output" } sign all_permit.cert -Opermit-agent-forwarding -Opermit-port-forwarding \ -Opermit-pty -Opermit-user-rc -Opermit-X11-forwarding sign no_permit.cert -Oclear sign no_agentfwd.cert -Ono-agent-forwarding sign no_portfwd.cert -Ono-port-forwarding sign no_pty.cert -Ono-pty sign no_user_rc.cert -Ono-user-rc sign no_x11fwd.cert -Ono-X11-forwarding sign only_agentfwd.cert -Oclear -Opermit-agent-forwarding sign only_portfwd.cert -Oclear -Opermit-port-forwarding sign only_pty.cert -Oclear -Opermit-pty sign only_user_rc.cert -Oclear -Opermit-user-rc sign only_x11fwd.cert -Oclear -Opermit-X11-forwarding sign force_command.cert -Oforce-command="foo" sign sourceaddr.cert -Osource-address="127.0.0.1/32,::1/128" # ssh-keygen won't permit generation of certs with invalid source-address # values, so we do it as a custom extension. sign bad_sourceaddr.cert -Ocritical:source-address=xxxxx sign unknown_critical.cert -Ocritical:blah=foo sign host.cert -h rm -f user_key ca_key user_key.pub ca_key.pub openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_agentfwd.cert010064400017500001750000000011171362136622600236440ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_permit.cert010064400017500001750000000007131362136622600233460ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIGVQtVgp9sD4sc8esIhVWbZaM8d0NxpX3UbEVzTHm9feAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAoVYLMLNBOH1SSgemFuDBprzpDXop6ufRSOo6vtD4mTwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAIKlI0TqqraKjYTjIuKhwoxAV/XnzWRJHq8lNs4aj5yDb84un2xXDF/0vXoLjPgVcLgEbksBKKn0i4whp+xn9Ag== user key openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_portfwd.cert010064400017500001750000000011171362136622600235320ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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#include "auth-options.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" static struct sshkey * load_key(const char *name) { struct sshkey *ret; int r; r = sshkey_load_public(test_data_file(name), &ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL); return ret; } static struct sshauthopt * default_authkey_opts(void) { struct sshauthopt *ret = sshauthopt_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL); ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1; ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; ret->permit_pty_flag = 1; ret->permit_user_rc = 1; return ret; } static struct sshauthopt * default_authkey_restrict_opts(void) { struct sshauthopt *ret = sshauthopt_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL); ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0; ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; ret->permit_pty_flag = 0; ret->permit_user_rc = 0; ret->restricted = 1; return ret; } static char ** commasplit(const char *s, size_t *np) { char *ocp, *cp, *cp2, **ret = NULL; size_t n; ocp = cp = strdup(s); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); for (n = 0; (cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",")) != NULL;) { ret = recallocarray(ret, n, n + 1, sizeof(*ret)); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL); cp2 = strdup(cp2); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp2, NULL); ret[n++] = cp2; } free(ocp); *np = n; return ret; } static void compare_opts(const struct sshauthopt *opts, const struct sshauthopt *expected) { size_t i; ASSERT_PTR_NE(opts, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, opts); /* bozo :) */ #define FLAG_EQ(x) ASSERT_INT_EQ(opts->x, expected->x) FLAG_EQ(permit_port_forwarding_flag); FLAG_EQ(permit_agent_forwarding_flag); FLAG_EQ(permit_x11_forwarding_flag); FLAG_EQ(permit_pty_flag); FLAG_EQ(permit_user_rc); FLAG_EQ(restricted); FLAG_EQ(cert_authority); #undef FLAG_EQ #define STR_EQ(x) \ do { \ if (expected->x == NULL) \ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts->x, expected->x); \ else \ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(opts->x, expected->x); \ } while (0) STR_EQ(cert_principals); STR_EQ(force_command); STR_EQ(required_from_host_cert); STR_EQ(required_from_host_keys); #undef STR_EQ #define ARRAY_EQ(nx, x) \ do { \ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(opts->nx, expected->nx); \ if (expected->nx == 0) \ break; \ for (i = 0; i < expected->nx; i++) \ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(opts->x[i], expected->x[i]); \ } while (0) ARRAY_EQ(nenv, env); ARRAY_EQ(npermitopen, permitopen); #undef ARRAY_EQ } static void test_authkeys_parse(void) { struct sshauthopt *opts, *expected; const char *errstr; #define FAIL_TEST(label, keywords) \ do { \ TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse invalid " label); \ opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts, NULL); \ ASSERT_PTR_NE(errstr, NULL); \ TEST_DONE(); \ } while (0) #define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \ do { \ if (errstr != NULL) \ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \ compare_opts(opts, expected); \ sshauthopt_free(expected); \ sshauthopt_free(opts); \ } while (0) /* Basic tests */ TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse empty"); expected = default_authkey_opts(); opts = sshauthopt_parse("", &errstr); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse trailing whitespace"); expected = default_authkey_opts(); opts = sshauthopt_parse(" ", &errstr); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse restrict"); expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); opts = sshauthopt_parse("restrict", &errstr); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); /* Invalid syntax */ FAIL_TEST("trailing comma", "restrict,"); FAIL_TEST("bare comma", ","); FAIL_TEST("unknown option", "BLAH"); FAIL_TEST("unknown option with trailing comma", "BLAH,"); FAIL_TEST("unknown option with trailing whitespace", "BLAH "); /* force_tun_device */ TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse tunnel explicit"); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->force_tun_device = 1; opts = sshauthopt_parse("tunnel=\"1\"", &errstr); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse tunnel any"); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->force_tun_device = SSH_TUNID_ANY; opts = sshauthopt_parse("tunnel=\"any\"", &errstr); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); FAIL_TEST("tunnel", "tunnel=\"blah\""); /* Flag options */ #define FLAG_TEST(keyword, var, val) \ do { \ TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " keyword); \ expected = default_authkey_opts(); \ expected->var = val; \ opts = sshauthopt_parse(keyword, &errstr); \ CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \ expected->var = val; \ opts = sshauthopt_parse("restrict,"keyword, &errstr); \ CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ TEST_DONE(); \ } while (0) /* Positive flags */ FLAG_TEST("cert-authority", cert_authority, 1); FLAG_TEST("port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag, 1); FLAG_TEST("agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag, 1); FLAG_TEST("x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag, 1); FLAG_TEST("pty", permit_pty_flag, 1); FLAG_TEST("user-rc", permit_user_rc, 1); /* Negative flags */ FLAG_TEST("no-port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag, 0); FLAG_TEST("no-agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag, 0); FLAG_TEST("no-x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag, 0); FLAG_TEST("no-pty", permit_pty_flag, 0); FLAG_TEST("no-user-rc", permit_user_rc, 0); #undef FLAG_TEST FAIL_TEST("no-cert-authority", "no-cert-authority"); /* String options */ #define STRING_TEST(keyword, var, val) \ do { \ TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " keyword); \ expected = default_authkey_opts(); \ expected->var = strdup(val); \ ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \ opts = sshauthopt_parse(keyword "=" #val, &errstr); \ CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \ expected->var = strdup(val); \ ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \ opts = sshauthopt_parse( \ "restrict," keyword "=" #val ",restrict", &errstr); \ CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ TEST_DONE(); \ } while (0) STRING_TEST("command", force_command, "/bin/true"); STRING_TEST("principals", cert_principals, "gregor,josef,K"); STRING_TEST("from", required_from_host_keys, "127.0.0.0/8"); #undef STRING_TEST FAIL_TEST("unquoted command", "command=oops"); FAIL_TEST("unquoted principals", "principals=estragon"); FAIL_TEST("unquoted from", "from=127.0.0.1"); /* String array option tests */ #define ARRAY_TEST(label, keywords, var, nvar, val) \ do { \ TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " label); \ expected = default_authkey_opts(); \ expected->var = commasplit(val, &expected->nvar); \ ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \ opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \ CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \ expected->var = commasplit(val, &expected->nvar); \ ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \ opts = sshauthopt_parse( \ "restrict," keywords ",restrict", &errstr); \ CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ TEST_DONE(); \ } while (0) ARRAY_TEST("environment", "environment=\"foo=1\",environment=\"bar=2\"", env, nenv, "foo=1,bar=2"); ARRAY_TEST("permitopen", "permitopen=\"foo:123\",permitopen=\"bar:*\"", permitopen, npermitopen, "foo:123,bar:*"); #undef ARRAY_TEST FAIL_TEST("environment", "environment=\",=bah\""); FAIL_TEST("permitopen port", "foo:bar"); FAIL_TEST("permitopen missing port", "foo:"); FAIL_TEST("permitopen missing port specification", "foo"); FAIL_TEST("permitopen invalid host", "[:"); #undef CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP #undef FAIL_TEST } static void test_cert_parse(void) { struct sshkey *cert; struct sshauthopt *opts, *expected; #define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \ do { \ compare_opts(opts, expected); \ sshauthopt_free(expected); \ sshauthopt_free(opts); \ sshkey_free(cert); \ } while (0) #define FLAG_TEST(keybase, var) \ do { \ TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert no_" keybase); \ cert = load_key("no_" keybase ".cert"); \ expected = default_authkey_opts(); \ expected->var = 0; \ opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \ CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ TEST_DONE(); \ TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert only_" keybase); \ cert = load_key("only_" keybase ".cert"); \ expected = sshauthopt_new(); \ ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); \ expected->var = 1; \ opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \ CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ TEST_DONE(); \ } while (0) FLAG_TEST("agentfwd", permit_agent_forwarding_flag); FLAG_TEST("portfwd", permit_port_forwarding_flag); FLAG_TEST("pty", permit_pty_flag); FLAG_TEST("user_rc", permit_user_rc); FLAG_TEST("x11fwd", permit_x11_forwarding_flag); #undef FLAG_TEST TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert all permitted"); cert = load_key("all_permit.cert"); expected = default_authkey_opts(); opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert nothing permitted"); cert = load_key("no_permit.cert"); expected = sshauthopt_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert force-command"); cert = load_key("force_command.cert"); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->force_command = strdup("foo"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL); opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert source-address"); cert = load_key("sourceaddr.cert"); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL); opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); #undef CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP #define FAIL_TEST(keybase) \ do { \ TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert " keybase); \ cert = load_key(keybase ".cert"); \ opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts, NULL); \ sshkey_free(cert); \ TEST_DONE(); \ } while (0) FAIL_TEST("host"); FAIL_TEST("bad_sourceaddr"); FAIL_TEST("unknown_critical"); #undef FAIL_TEST } static void test_merge(void) { struct sshkey *cert; struct sshauthopt *key_opts, *cert_opts, *merge_opts, *expected; const char *errstr; /* * Prepare for a test by making some key and cert options and * attempting to merge them. */ #define PREPARE(label, keyname, keywords) \ do { \ expected = NULL; \ TEST_START("sshauthopt_merge " label); \ cert = load_key(keyname ".cert"); \ cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cert_opts, NULL); \ key_opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \ if (errstr != NULL) \ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \ ASSERT_PTR_NE(key_opts, NULL); \ merge_opts = sshauthopt_merge(key_opts, \ cert_opts, &errstr); \ } while (0) /* Cleanup stuff allocated by PREPARE() */ #define CLEANUP() \ do { \ sshauthopt_free(expected); \ sshauthopt_free(merge_opts); \ sshauthopt_free(key_opts); \ sshauthopt_free(cert_opts); \ sshkey_free(cert); \ } while (0) /* Check the results of PREPARE() against expectation; calls CLEANUP */ #define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \ do { \ if (errstr != NULL) \ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \ compare_opts(merge_opts, expected); \ CLEANUP(); \ } while (0) /* Check a single case of merging of flag options */ #define FLAG_CASE(keybase, label, keyname, keywords, mostly_off, var, val) \ do { \ PREPARE(keybase " " label, keyname, keywords); \ expected = mostly_off ? \ sshauthopt_new() : default_authkey_opts(); \ expected->var = val; \ ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); \ CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ TEST_DONE(); \ } while (0) /* * Fairly exhaustive exercise of a flag option. Tests * option both set and clear in certificate, set and clear in * authorized_keys and set and cleared via restrict keyword. */ #define FLAG_TEST(keybase, keyword, var) \ do { \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:default,no", \ "no_" keybase, keyword, 0, var, 0); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:default,no", \ "no_" keybase, "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 0); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:default,no", \ "no_" keybase, "no-" keyword, 0, var, 0); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:default,no", \ "no_" keybase, "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:-*,yes", \ "only_" keybase, keyword, 1, var, 1); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:-*,yes", \ "only_" keybase, "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 1); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:-*,yes", \ "only_" keybase, "no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:-*,yes", \ "only_" keybase, "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:-*", \ "no_permit", keyword, 1, var, 0); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:-*", \ "no_permit", "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 0); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:-*", \ "no_permit", "no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:-*", \ "no_permit", "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:*", \ "all_permit", keyword, 0, var, 1); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:*", \ "all_permit", "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 1); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:*", \ "all_permit", "no-" keyword, 0, var, 0); \ FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:*", \ "all_permit", "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ \ } while (0) FLAG_TEST("portfwd", "port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag); FLAG_TEST("agentfwd", "agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag); FLAG_TEST("pty", "pty", permit_pty_flag); FLAG_TEST("user_rc", "user-rc", permit_user_rc); FLAG_TEST("x11fwd", "x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag); #undef FLAG_TEST PREPARE("source-address both", "sourceaddr", "from=\"127.0.0.1\""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL); expected->required_from_host_keys = strdup("127.0.0.1"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_keys, NULL); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("source-address none", "all_permit", ""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("source-address keys", "all_permit", "from=\"127.0.0.1\""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->required_from_host_keys = strdup("127.0.0.1"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_keys, NULL); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("source-address cert", "sourceaddr", ""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("force-command both", "force_command", "command=\"foo\""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->force_command = strdup("foo"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("force-command none", "all_permit", ""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("force-command keys", "all_permit", "command=\"bar\""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->force_command = strdup("bar"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("force-command cert", "force_command", ""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->force_command = strdup("foo"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("force-command mismatch", "force_command", "command=\"bar\""); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(merge_opts, NULL); CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("tunnel", "all_permit", "tunnel=\"6\""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->force_tun_device = 6; CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("permitopen", "all_permit", "permitopen=\"127.0.0.1:*\",permitopen=\"127.0.0.1:123\""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->permitopen = commasplit("127.0.0.1:*,127.0.0.1:123", &expected->npermitopen); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); PREPARE("environment", "all_permit", "environment=\"foo=a\",environment=\"bar=b\""); expected = default_authkey_opts(); expected->env = commasplit("foo=a,bar=b", &expected->nenv); CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); TEST_DONE(); } void tests(void) { extern char *__progname; LogLevel ll = test_is_verbose() ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; /* test_cert_parse() are a bit spammy to error() by default... */ log_init(__progname, ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); test_authkeys_parse(); test_cert_parse(); test_merge(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/bitmap004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600163755ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/bitmap/Makefile010064400017500001750000000004001362136622600201030ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ PROG=test_bitmap SRCS=tests.c # From usr.sbin/ssh SRCS+=bitmap.c atomicio.c REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c010064400017500001750000000060561362136622600177660ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/01/15 07:36:28 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for bitmap.h bitmap API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #endif #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "bitmap.h" #define NTESTS 131 void tests(void) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL struct bitmap *b; BIGNUM *bn; size_t len; int i, j, k, n; u_char bbuf[1024], bnbuf[1024]; int r; TEST_START("bitmap_new"); b = bitmap_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL); bn = BN_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("bitmap_set_bit / bitmap_test_bit"); for (i = -1; i < NTESTS; i++) { for (j = -1; j < NTESTS; j++) { for (k = -1; k < NTESTS; k++) { bitmap_zero(b); BN_clear(bn); test_subtest_info("set %d/%d/%d", i, j, k); /* Set bits */ if (i >= 0) { ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, i), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, i), 1); } if (j >= 0) { ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, j), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, j), 1); } if (k >= 0) { ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, k), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, k), 1); } /* Check perfect match between bitmap and bn */ test_subtest_info("match %d/%d/%d", i, j, k); for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) { ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n), bitmap_test_bit(b, n)); } /* Test length calculations */ test_subtest_info("length %d/%d/%d", i, j, k); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(bn), (int)bitmap_nbits(b)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bytes(bn), (int)bitmap_nbytes(b)); /* Test serialisation */ test_subtest_info("serialise %d/%d/%d", i, j, k); len = bitmap_nbytes(b); memset(bbuf, 0xfc, sizeof(bbuf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_to_string(b, bbuf, sizeof(bbuf)), 0); for (n = len; n < (int)sizeof(bbuf); n++) ASSERT_U8_EQ(bbuf[n], 0xfc); r = BN_bn2bin(bn, bnbuf); ASSERT_INT_GE(r, 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, (int)len); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(bbuf, bnbuf, len); /* Test deserialisation */ test_subtest_info("deserialise %d/%d/%d", i, j, k); bitmap_zero(b); ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_from_string(b, bnbuf, len), 0); for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) { ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n), bitmap_test_bit(b, n)); } /* Test clearing bits */ test_subtest_info("clear %d/%d/%d", i, j, k); for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) { ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, n), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, n), 1); } if (i >= 0) { bitmap_clear_bit(b, i); BN_clear_bit(bn, i); } if (j >= 0) { bitmap_clear_bit(b, j); BN_clear_bit(bn, j); } if (k >= 0) { bitmap_clear_bit(b, k); BN_clear_bit(bn, k); } for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) { ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n), bitmap_test_bit(b, n)); } } } } bitmap_free(b); BN_free(bn); TEST_DONE(); #endif } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/conversion004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600173065ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile010064400017500001750000000006001362136622600210160ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ PROG=test_conversion SRCS=tests.c # From usr.bin/ssh SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c SRCS+=atomicio.c misc.c xmalloc.c log.c uidswap.c cleanup.c fatal.c ssherr.c REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c010064400017500001750000000024611362136622600206730ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.2 2019/06/14 04:03:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for conversions * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "misc.h" void tests(void) { char buf[1024]; TEST_START("conversion_convtime"); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("0"), 0); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1"), 1); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1S"), 1); /* from the examples in the comment above the function */ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("90m"), 5400); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 5400); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("2d"), 172800); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1w"), 604800); /* negative time is not allowed */ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-7"), -1); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-9d"), -1); /* overflow */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX + 1); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1); /* overflow with multiplier */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%lluM", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX/60 + 1); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1000000000000000000000w"), -1); TEST_DONE(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600167725ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile010064400017500001750000000014551362136622600205130ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ PROG=test_hostkeys SRCS=tests.c test_iterate.c # From usr.bin/ssh SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c hostfile.c SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c SRCS+=digest-openssl.c #SRCS+=digest-libc.c REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh010064400017500001750000000045541362136622600215530ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.2 2017/04/30 23:33:48 djm Exp $ set -ex cd testdata rm -f rsa* dsa* ecdsa* ed25519* rm -f known_hosts* gen_all() { _n=$1 _ecdsa_bits=256 test "x$_n" = "x1" && _ecdsa_bits=384 test "x$_n" = "x2" && _ecdsa_bits=521 ssh-keygen -qt rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA #$_n" -N "" -f rsa_$_n ssh-keygen -qt dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA #$_n" -N "" -f dsa_$_n ssh-keygen -qt ecdsa -b $_ecdsa_bits -C "ECDSA #$_n" -N "" -f ecdsa_$_n ssh-keygen -qt ed25519 -C "ED25519 #$_n" -N "" -f ed25519_$_n # Don't need private keys rm -f rsa_$_n dsa_$_n ecdsa_$_n ed25519_$_n } hentries() { _preamble=$1 _kspec=$2 for k in `ls -1 $_kspec | sort` ; do printf "$_preamble " cat $k done echo } gen_all 1 gen_all 2 gen_all 3 gen_all 4 gen_all 5 gen_all 6 # A section of known_hosts with hashed hostnames. ( hentries "sisyphus.example.com" "*_5.pub" hentries "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1" "*_6.pub" ) > known_hosts_hash_frag ssh-keygen -Hf known_hosts_hash_frag rm -f known_hosts_hash_frag.old # Populated known_hosts, including comments, hashed names and invalid lines ( echo "# Plain host keys, plain host names" hentries "sisyphus.example.com" "*_1.pub" echo "# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses" hentries "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1" "*_2.pub" echo "# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs" hentries "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*" "*_3.pub" echo "# Hashed hostname and address entries" cat known_hosts_hash_frag rm -f known_hosts_hash_frag echo echo "# Revoked and CA keys" printf "@revoked sisyphus.example.com " ; cat ed25519_4.pub printf "@cert-authority prometheus.example.com " ; cat ecdsa_4.pub printf "@cert-authority *.example.com " ; cat dsa_4.pub printf "\n" echo "# Some invalid lines" # Invalid marker printf "@what sisyphus.example.com " ; cat dsa_1.pub # Key missing echo "sisyphus.example.com " # Key blob missing echo "prometheus.example.com ssh-ed25519 " # Key blob truncated echo "sisyphus.example.com ssh-dsa AAAATgAAAAdz" # Invalid type echo "sisyphus.example.com ssh-XXX AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg==" # Type mismatch with blob echo "prometheus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg==" ) > known_hosts echo OK openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c010064400017500001750000000573411362136622600217200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.6 2018/07/16 03:09:59 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for hostfile.h hostkeys_foreach() * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "hostfile.h" struct expected { const char *key_file; /* Path for key, NULL for none */ int no_parse_status; /* Expected status w/o key parsing */ int no_parse_keytype; /* Expected keytype w/o key parsing */ int match_host_p; /* Match 'prometheus.example.com' */ int match_host_s; /* Match 'sisyphus.example.com' */ int match_ipv4; /* Match '192.0.2.1' */ int match_ipv6; /* Match '2001:db8::1' */ int match_flags; /* Expected flags from match */ struct hostkey_foreach_line l; /* Expected line contents */ }; struct cbctx { const struct expected *expected; size_t nexpected; size_t i; int flags; int match_host_p; int match_host_s; int match_ipv4; int match_ipv6; }; /* * hostkeys_foreach() iterator callback that verifies the line passed * against an array of expected entries. */ static int check(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct cbctx *ctx = (struct cbctx *)_ctx; const struct expected *expected; int parse_key = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0; const int matching = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0; u_int expected_status, expected_match; int expected_keytype, skip = 0; test_subtest_info("entry %zu/%zu, file line %ld", ctx->i + 1, ctx->nexpected, l->linenum); for (;;) { ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(ctx->i, ctx->nexpected); expected = ctx->expected + ctx->i++; /* If we are matching host/IP then skip entries that don't */ if (!matching) break; if (ctx->match_host_p && expected->match_host_p) break; if (ctx->match_host_s && expected->match_host_s) break; if (ctx->match_ipv4 && expected->match_ipv4) break; if (ctx->match_ipv6 && expected->match_ipv6) break; } expected_status = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_status < 0) ? expected->l.status : (u_int)expected->no_parse_status; expected_match = expected->l.match; #define UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(x) do { \ if (ctx->x && expected->x) { \ expected_match |= expected->x; \ if (expected_status == HKF_STATUS_OK) \ expected_status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; \ } \ } while (0) expected_keytype = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_keytype < 0) ? expected->l.keytype : expected->no_parse_keytype; #ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA || expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA) skip = 1; #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_DSA || expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_DSA || expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA || expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA || expected->l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA || expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA) skip = 1; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (skip) { expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID; expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; parse_key = 0; } UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_p); UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_s); UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv4); UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv6); ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->path, NULL); /* Don't care about path */ ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(l->linenum, expected->l.linenum); ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->status, expected_status); ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->match, expected_match); /* Not all test entries contain fulltext */ if (expected->l.line != NULL) ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->line, expected->l.line); ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->marker, expected->l.marker); /* XXX we skip hashed hostnames for now; implement checking */ if (expected->l.hosts != NULL) ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->hosts, expected->l.hosts); /* Not all test entries contain raw keys */ if (expected->l.rawkey != NULL) ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->rawkey, expected->l.rawkey); /* XXX synthesise raw key for cases lacking and compare */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->keytype, expected_keytype); if (parse_key) { if (expected->l.key == NULL) ASSERT_PTR_EQ(l->key, NULL); if (expected->l.key != NULL) { ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->key, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(l->key, expected->l.key), 1); } } if (parse_key && !(l->comment == NULL && expected->l.comment == NULL)) ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->comment, expected->l.comment); return 0; } /* Loads public keys for a set of expected results */ static void prepare_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if (expected[i].key_file == NULL) continue; #ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC if (expected[i].l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA) continue; #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL switch (expected[i].l.keytype) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: continue; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public( test_data_file(expected[i].key_file), &expected[i].l.key, NULL), 0); } } static void cleanup_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { sshkey_free(expected[i].l.key); expected[i].l.key = NULL; } } struct expected expected_full[] = { { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, /* path, don't care */ 1, /* line number */ HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, /* status */ 0, /* match flags */ "# Plain host keys, plain host names", /* full line, optional */ MRK_NONE, /* marker (CA / revoked) */ NULL, /* hosts text */ NULL, /* raw key, optional */ KEY_UNSPEC, /* key type */ NULL, /* deserialised key */ NULL, /* comment */ } }, { "dsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 2, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #1", } }, { "ecdsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 3, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #1", } }, { "ed25519_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 4, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #1", } }, { "rsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 5, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #1", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 6, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 7, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { "dsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 8, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #2", } }, { "ecdsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 9, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #2", } }, { "ed25519_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 10, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #2", } }, { "rsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 11, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #2", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 12, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 13, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { "dsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 14, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #3", } }, { "ecdsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 15, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #3", } }, { "ed25519_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 16, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #3", } }, { "rsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 17, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #3", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 18, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 19, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Hashed hostname and address entries", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { "dsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 20, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #5", } }, { "ecdsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 21, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #5", } }, { "ed25519_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 22, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #5", } }, { "rsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 23, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #5", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 24, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, /* * The next series have each key listed multiple times, as the * hostname and addresses in the pre-hashed known_hosts are split * to separate lines. */ { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 25, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #6", } }, { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, 26, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #6", } }, { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, 27, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #6", } }, { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 28, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #6", } }, { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, 29, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #6", } }, { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, 30, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #6", } }, { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 31, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #6", } }, { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, 32, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #6", } }, { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, 33, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #6", } }, { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 34, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #6", } }, { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, 35, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #6", } }, { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, 36, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #6", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 37, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 38, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 39, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Revoked and CA keys", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { "ed25519_4.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 40, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_REVOKE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #4", } }, { "ecdsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 41, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_CA, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #4", } }, { "dsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 42, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_CA, "*.example.com", NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #4", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 43, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 44, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Some invalid lines", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 45, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, MRK_ERROR, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 46, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 47, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 48, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 49, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ NULL, } }, { NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 50, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ NULL, } }, }; void test_iterate(void); void test_iterate(void) { struct cbctx ctx; TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all with key parse"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all without key parse"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 1"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; ctx.match_host_p = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; ctx.match_host_s = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; ctx.match_host_p = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 2"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; ctx.match_host_s = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host missing"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host missing"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv4"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv6"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv4"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv6"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify addr missing"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.168.0.1", ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match addr missing"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "::1", ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; ctx.match_host_s = 1; ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; ctx.match_host_p = 1; ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4 w/ key parse"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY; ctx.match_host_s = 1; ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6 w/ key parse"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY; ctx.match_host_p = 1; ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); TEST_DONE(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600206035ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_1.pub010064400017500001750000000011241362136622600223540ustar00djmdjmssh-dss 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 DSA #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_2.pub010064400017500001750000000011241362136622600223550ustar00djmdjmssh-dss 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 DSA #2 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_3.pub010064400017500001750000000011241362136622600223560ustar00djmdjmssh-dss 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 DSA #3 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_4.pub010064400017500001750000000011241362136622600223570ustar00djmdjmssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAKvjnFHm0VvMr5h2Zu3nURsxQKGoxm+DCzYDxRYcilK07Cm5c4XTrFbA2X86+9sGs++W7QRMcTJUYIg0a+UtIMtAjwORd6ZPXM2K5dBW+gh1oHyvKi767tWX7I2c+1ZPJDY95mUUfZQUEfdy9eGDSBmw/pSsveQ1ur6XNUh/MtP/AAAAFQDHnXk/9jBJAdce1pHtLWnbdPSGdQAAAIEAm2OLy8tZBfiEO3c3X1yyB/GTcDwrQCqRMDkhnsmrliec3dWkOfNTzu+MrdvF8ymTWLEqPpbMheYtvNyZ3TF0HO5W7aVBpdGZbOdOAIfB+6skqGbI8A5Up1d7dak/bSsqL2r5NjwbDOdq+1hBzzvbl/qjh+sQarV2zHrpKoQaV28AAACANtkBVedBbqIAdphCrN/LbUi9WlyuF9UZz+tlpVLYrj8GJVwnplV2tvOmUw6yP5/pzCimTsao8dpL5PWxm7fKxLWVxA+lEsA4WeC885CiZn8xhdaJOCN+NyJ2bqkz+4VPI7oDGBm0aFwUqJn+M1PiSgvI50XdF2dBsFRTRNY0wzA= DSA #4 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_5.pub010064400017500001750000000011241362136622600223600ustar00djmdjmssh-dss 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 DSA #5 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_6.pub010064400017500001750000000011241362136622600223610ustar00djmdjmssh-dss 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 DSA #6 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub010064400017500001750000000003261362136622600226670ustar00djmdjmecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBF6yQEtD9yBw9gmDRf477WBBzvWhAa0ioBI3nbA4emKykj0RbuQd5C4XdQAEOZGzE7v//FcCjwB2wi+JH5eKkxCtN6CjohDASZ1huoIV2UVyYIicZJEEOg1IWjjphvaxtw== ECDSA #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub010064400017500001750000000004061362136622600226670ustar00djmdjmecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAB8qVcXwgBM92NCmReQlPrZAoui4Bz/mW0VUBFOpHXXW1n+15b/Y7Pc6UBd/ITTZmaBciXY+PWaSBGdwc5GdqGdLgFyJ/QAGrFMPNpVutm/82gNQzlxpNwjbMcKyiZEXzSgnjS6DzMQ0WuSMdzIBXq8OW/Kafxg4ZkU6YqALUXxlQMZuQ== ECDSA #2 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_3.pub010064400017500001750000000002521362136622600226670ustar00djmdjmecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBIb3BhJZk+vUQPg5TQc1koIzuGqloCq7wjr9LjlhG24IBeiFHLsdWw74HDlH4DrOmlxToVYk2lTdnjARleRByjk= ECDSA #3 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_4.pub010064400017500001750000000002521362136622600226700ustar00djmdjmecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBHZd0OXHIWwK3xnjAdMZ1tojxWycdu38pORO/UX5cqsKMgGCKQVBWWO3TFk1ePkGIE9VMWT1hCGqWRRwYlH+dSE= ECDSA #4 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_5.pub010064400017500001750000000002521362136622600226710ustar00djmdjmecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPIudcagzq4QPtP1jkpje34+0POLB0jwT64hqrbCqhTH2T800KDZ0h2vwlJYa3OP3Oqru9AB5pnuHsKw7mAhUGY= ECDSA #5 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_6.pub010064400017500001750000000002521362136622600226720ustar00djmdjmecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_1.pub010064400017500001750000000001341362136622600226030ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIK9ks7jkua5YWIwByRnnnc6UPJQWI75O0e/UJdPYU1JI ED25519 #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_2.pub010064400017500001750000000001341362136622600226040ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIBp6PVW0z2o9C4Ukv/JOgmK7QMFe1pD1s3ADFF7IQob ED25519 #2 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_3.pub010064400017500001750000000001341362136622600226050ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBlYfExtYZAPqYvYdrlpGlSWhh/XNHcH3v3c2JzsVNbB ED25519 #3 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_4.pub010064400017500001750000000001341362136622600226060ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDFP8L9REfN/iYy1KIRtFqSCn3V2+vOCpoZYENFGLdOF ED25519 #4 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_5.pub010064400017500001750000000001341362136622600226070ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINf63qSV8rD57N+digID8t28WVhd3Yf2K2UhaoG8TsWQ ED25519 #5 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_6.pub010064400017500001750000000001341362136622600226100ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts010064400017500001750000000257251362136622600231710ustar00djmdjm# Plain host keys, plain host names sisyphus.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #1 sisyphus.example.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBF6yQEtD9yBw9gmDRf477WBBzvWhAa0ioBI3nbA4emKykj0RbuQd5C4XdQAEOZGzE7v//FcCjwB2wi+JH5eKkxCtN6CjohDASZ1huoIV2UVyYIicZJEEOg1IWjjphvaxtw== ECDSA #1 sisyphus.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIK9ks7jkua5YWIwByRnnnc6UPJQWI75O0e/UJdPYU1JI ED25519 #1 sisyphus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDg4hB4vAZHJ0PVRiJajOv/GlytFWNpv5/9xgB9+5BIbvp8LOrFZ5D9K0Gsmwpd4G4rfaAz8j896DhMArg0vtkilIPPGt/6VzWMERgvaIQPJ/IE99X3+fjcAG56oAWwy29JX10lQMzBPU6XJIaN/zqpkb6qUBiAHBdLpxrFBBU0/w== RSA #1 # Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-dss 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 DSA #2 prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAB8qVcXwgBM92NCmReQlPrZAoui4Bz/mW0VUBFOpHXXW1n+15b/Y7Pc6UBd/ITTZmaBciXY+PWaSBGdwc5GdqGdLgFyJ/QAGrFMPNpVutm/82gNQzlxpNwjbMcKyiZEXzSgnjS6DzMQ0WuSMdzIBXq8OW/Kafxg4ZkU6YqALUXxlQMZuQ== ECDSA #2 prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIBp6PVW0z2o9C4Ukv/JOgmK7QMFe1pD1s3ADFF7IQob ED25519 #2 prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDmbUhNabB5AmBDX6GNHZ3lbn7pRxqfpW+f53QqNGlK0sLV+0gkMIrOfUp1kdE2ZLE6tfzdicatj/RlH6/wuo4yyYb+Pyx3G0vxdmAIiA4aANq38XweDucBC0TZkRWVHK+Gs5V/uV0z7N0axJvkkJujMLvST3CRiiWwlficBc6yVQ== RSA #2 # Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs *.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-dss 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 DSA #3 *.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBIb3BhJZk+vUQPg5TQc1koIzuGqloCq7wjr9LjlhG24IBeiFHLsdWw74HDlH4DrOmlxToVYk2lTdnjARleRByjk= ECDSA #3 *.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBlYfExtYZAPqYvYdrlpGlSWhh/XNHcH3v3c2JzsVNbB ED25519 #3 *.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDX8F93W3SH4ZSus4XUQ2cw9dqcuyUETTlKEeGv3zlknV3YCoe2Mp04naDhiuwj8sOsytrZSESzLY1ZEyzrjxE6ZFVv8NKgck/AbRjcwlRFOcx9oKUxOrXRa0IoXlTq0kyjKCJfaHBKnGitZThknCPTbVmpATkm5xx6J0WEDozfoQ== RSA #3 # Hashed hostname and address entries |1|z3xOIdT5ue3Vuf3MzT67kaioqjw=|GZhhe5uwDOBQrC9N4cCjpbLpSn4= ssh-dss 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 DSA #5 |1|B7t/AYabn8zgwU47Cb4A/Nqt3eI=|arQPZyRphkzisr7w6wwikvhaOyE= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPIudcagzq4QPtP1jkpje34+0POLB0jwT64hqrbCqhTH2T800KDZ0h2vwlJYa3OP3Oqru9AB5pnuHsKw7mAhUGY= ECDSA #5 |1|JR81WxEocTP5d7goIRkl8fHBbno=|l6sj6FOsoXxgEZMzn/BnOfPKN68= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINf63qSV8rD57N+digID8t28WVhd3Yf2K2UhaoG8TsWQ ED25519 #5 |1|W7x4zY6KtTZJgsopyOusJqvVPag=|QauLt7hKezBZFZi2i4Xopho7Nsk= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQC/C15Q4sfnk7BZff1er8bscay+5s51oD4eWArlHWMK/ZfYeeTAccTy+7B7Jv+MS4nKCpflrvJI2RQz4kS8vF0ATdBbi4jeWefStlHNg0HLhnCY7NAfDIlRdaN9lm3Pqm2vmr+CkqwcJaSpycDg8nPN9yNAuD6pv7NDuUnECezojQ== RSA #5 |1|mxnU8luzqWLvfVi5qBm5xVIyCRM=|9Epopft7LBd80Bf6RmWPIpwa8yU= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 |1|klvLmvh2vCpkNMDEjVvrE8SJWTg=|e/dqEEBLnbgqmwEesl4cDRu/7TM= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 |1|wsk3ddB3UjuxEsoeNCeZjZ6NvZs=|O3O/q2Z/u7DrxoTiIq6kzCevQT0= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 |1|B8epmkLSni+vGZDijr/EwxeR2k4=|7ct8yzNOVJhKm3ZD2w0XIT7df8E= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 |1|JojD885UhYhbCu571rgyM/5PpYU=|BJaU2aE1FebQZy3B5tzTDRWFRG0= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 |1|5t7UDHDybVrDZVQPCpwdnr6nk4k=|EqJ73W/veIL3H2x+YWHcJxI5ETA= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 |1|OCcBfGc/b9+ip+W6Gp+3ftdluO4=|VbrKUdzOOtIBOOmEE+jlK4SD3Xc= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 |1|9fLN0YdP+BJ25lKuKvYuOdUo93w=|vZyr0rOiX01hv5XbghhHMW+Zb3U= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 |1|nc9RoaaQ0s5jdPxwlUmluGHU3uk=|un6OsJajokKQ3MgyS9mfDNeyP6U= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 |1|rsHB6juT9q6GOY91qOeOwL6TSJE=|ps/vXF9Izuues5PbOn887Gw/2Dg= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 |1|BsckdLH2aRyWQooRmv+Yo3t4dKg=|Lf3tJc5Iyx0KxNwAG89FsImsfEE= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 |1|plqkBA4hq7UATyd5+/Xl+zL7ghw=|stacofaUed46666mfqxp9gJFjt4= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 # Revoked and CA keys @revoked sisyphus.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDFP8L9REfN/iYy1KIRtFqSCn3V2+vOCpoZYENFGLdOF ED25519 #4 @cert-authority prometheus.example.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBHZd0OXHIWwK3xnjAdMZ1tojxWycdu38pORO/UX5cqsKMgGCKQVBWWO3TFk1ePkGIE9VMWT1hCGqWRRwYlH+dSE= ECDSA #4 @cert-authority *.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #4 # Some invalid lines @what sisyphus.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #1 sisyphus.example.com prometheus.example.com ssh-ed25519 sisyphus.example.com ssh-dsa AAAATgAAAAdz sisyphus.example.com ssh-XXX AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg== prometheus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg== openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_1.pub010064400017500001750000000005111362136622600224520ustar00djmdjm1024 65537 153895431603677073925890314548566704948446776958334195280085080329934839226701954473292358821568047724356487621573742372399387931887004184139835510820577359977148363519970774657801798872789118894962853659233045778161859413980935372685480527355016624825696983269800574755126132814333241868538220824608980319407 RSA1 #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_2.pub010064400017500001750000000005111362136622600224530ustar00djmdjm1024 65537 135970715082947442639683969597180728933388298633245835186618852623800675939308729462220235058285909679252157995530180587329132927339620517781785310829060832352381015614725360278571924286986474946772141568893116432268565829418506866604294073334978275702221949783314402806080929601995102334442541344606109853641 RSA1 #2 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_3.pub010064400017500001750000000005111362136622600224540ustar00djmdjm1024 65537 125895605498029643697051635076028105429632810811904702876152645261610759866299221305725069141163240694267669117205342283569102183636228981857946763978553664895308762890072813014496700601576921921752482059207749978374872713540759920335553799711267170948655579130584031555334229966603000896364091459595522912269 RSA1 #3 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_4.pub010064400017500001750000000005111362136622600224550ustar00djmdjm1024 65537 174143366122697048196335388217056770310345753698079464367148030836533360510864881734142526411160017107552815906024399248049666856133771656680462456979369587903909343046704480897527203474513676654933090991684252819423129896444427656841613263783484827101210734799449281639493127615902427443211183258155381810593 RSA1 #4 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_5.pub010064400017500001750000000005111362136622600224560ustar00djmdjm1024 65537 127931411493401587586867047972295564331543694182352197506125410692673654572057908999642645524647232712160516076508316152810117209181150078352725299319149726341058893406440426414316276977768958023952319602422835879783057966985348561111880658922724668687074412548487722084792283453716871417610020757212399252171 RSA1 #5 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_6.pub010064400017500001750000000005111362136622600224570ustar00djmdjm1024 65537 140883028436203600354693376066567741282115117509696517282419557936340193768851493584179972504103033755515036493433917203732876685813283050574208967197963391667532902202382549275760997891673884333346000558018002659506756213191532156293935482587878596032743105911487673274674568768638010598205190227631909167257 RSA1 #6 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_1.pub010064400017500001750000000003341362136622600223740ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDg4hB4vAZHJ0PVRiJajOv/GlytFWNpv5/9xgB9+5BIbvp8LOrFZ5D9K0Gsmwpd4G4rfaAz8j896DhMArg0vtkilIPPGt/6VzWMERgvaIQPJ/IE99X3+fjcAG56oAWwy29JX10lQMzBPU6XJIaN/zqpkb6qUBiAHBdLpxrFBBU0/w== RSA #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_2.pub010064400017500001750000000003341362136622600223750ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDmbUhNabB5AmBDX6GNHZ3lbn7pRxqfpW+f53QqNGlK0sLV+0gkMIrOfUp1kdE2ZLE6tfzdicatj/RlH6/wuo4yyYb+Pyx3G0vxdmAIiA4aANq38XweDucBC0TZkRWVHK+Gs5V/uV0z7N0axJvkkJujMLvST3CRiiWwlficBc6yVQ== RSA #2 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_3.pub010064400017500001750000000003341362136622600223760ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDX8F93W3SH4ZSus4XUQ2cw9dqcuyUETTlKEeGv3zlknV3YCoe2Mp04naDhiuwj8sOsytrZSESzLY1ZEyzrjxE6ZFVv8NKgck/AbRjcwlRFOcx9oKUxOrXRa0IoXlTq0kyjKCJfaHBKnGitZThknCPTbVmpATkm5xx6J0WEDozfoQ== RSA #3 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_4.pub010064400017500001750000000003341362136622600223770ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDI8AdjBAozcdRnIikVlt69iyDHKyrtxmpdkbRy9bWaL86OH+PTmLUk5e+T/ufiakpeE2pm0hkE3e4Sh/FsY+rsQdRoraWVNFfchcMeVlKvuy5RZN0ElvmaQebOJUeNeBn2LLw8aL8bJ4CP/bQRKrmrSSqjz3+4H9YNVyyk1OGBPQ== RSA #4 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_5.pub010064400017500001750000000003341362136622600224000ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQC/C15Q4sfnk7BZff1er8bscay+5s51oD4eWArlHWMK/ZfYeeTAccTy+7B7Jv+MS4nKCpflrvJI2RQz4kS8vF0ATdBbi4jeWefStlHNg0HLhnCY7NAfDIlRdaN9lm3Pqm2vmr+CkqwcJaSpycDg8nPN9yNAuD6pv7NDuUnECezojQ== RSA #5 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_6.pub010064400017500001750000000003341362136622600224010ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.c010064400017500001750000000003741362136622600203600ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/02/16 22:18:34 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for known_hosts-related API. * * Placed in the public domain */ void tests(void); void test_iterate(void); /* test_iterate.c */ void tests(void) { test_iterate(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/kex004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600157105ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile010064400017500001750000000020441362136622600174240ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ PROG=test_kex SRCS=tests.c test_kex.c # From usr.bin/ssh SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c packet.c dispatch.c canohost.c ssh_api.c SRCS+=compat.c ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c SRCS+= kex.c SRCS+= dh.c SRCS+= kexdh.c SRCS+= kexecdh.c SRCS+= kexgex.c SRCS+= kexgexc.c SRCS+= kexgexs.c SRCS+= kexc25519.c SRCS+= smult_curve25519_ref.c SRCS+= kexgen.c SRCS+= kexsntrup4591761x25519.c SRCS+= sntrup4591761.c SRCS+=digest-openssl.c #SRCS+=digest-libc.c REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} .include LDADD+=-lz openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c010064400017500001750000000121001362136622600177500ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_kex.c,v 1.4 2019/01/21 12:35:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test KEX * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh_api.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "myproposal.h" void kex_tests(void); static int do_debug = 0; static int do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to) { u_char type; size_t len; const u_char *buf; int r; for (;;) { if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "ssh_packet_next: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); return r; } if (type != 0) return 0; buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len); if (do_debug) printf("%zu", len); if (len == 0) return 0; if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0 || (r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0) return r; } } static void run_kex(struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server) { int r = 0; while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) { if (do_debug) printf(" S:"); if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client))) break; if (do_debug) printf(" C:"); if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server))) break; } if (do_debug) printf("done: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(server->kex->done, 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(client->kex->done, 1); } static void do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits) { struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL, *server2 = NULL; struct sshkey *private, *public; struct sshbuf *state; struct kex_params kex_params; char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; char *keyname = NULL; TEST_START("sshkey_generate"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(keytype, bits, &private), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshkey_from_private"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(private, &public), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ssh_init"); memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal)); if (kex != NULL) kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex; keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)); ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL); kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname; ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(client, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(server, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ssh_add_hostkey"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server, private), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(client, public), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("kex"); run_kex(client, server); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("rekeying client"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0); run_kex(client, server); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("rekeying server"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server), 0); run_kex(client, server); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ssh_packet_get_state"); state = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(state, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_get_state(server, state), 0); ASSERT_INT_GE(sshbuf_len(state), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ssh_packet_set_state"); server2 = NULL; ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server2, 1, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server2, private), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_set_state(server2, state), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(state), 0); sshbuf_free(state); ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2->kex, NULL); /* XXX we need to set the callbacks */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC server2->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key; server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key; server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign; TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("rekeying server2"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server2), 0); run_kex(client, server2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0); run_kex(client, server2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("cleanup"); sshkey_free(private); sshkey_free(public); ssh_free(client); ssh_free(server); ssh_free(server2); free(keyname); TEST_DONE(); } static void do_kex(char *kex) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048); do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ED25519, 256); } void kex_tests(void) { do_kex("curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp256"); do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp384"); do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp521"); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ do_kex("diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"); do_kex("diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"); do_kex("diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"); do_kex("diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c010064400017500001750000000003121362136622600172660ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/01/15 23:41:29 markus Exp $ */ /* * Placed in the public domain */ #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" void kex_tests(void); void tests(void) { kex_tests(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/match004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600162155ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/match/Makefile010064400017500001750000000006251362136622600177340ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2017/12/21 03:01:49 djm Exp $ PROG=test_match SRCS=tests.c # From usr.bin/ssh SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c SRCS+=match.c misc.c log.c uidswap.c fatal.c ssherr.c addrmatch.c xmalloc.c SRCS+=cleanup.c atomicio.c REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/match/tests.c010064400017500001750000000122161362136622600176010ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.5 2018/07/04 13:51:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for matching functions * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "match.h" void tests(void) { TEST_START("match_pattern"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", ""), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", "aaa"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaa", ""), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaa", "aaaa"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaaa", "aaa"), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("match_pattern wildcard"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", "*"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("a", "?"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "a?"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("a", "*"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "a*"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "?*"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "**"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "?a"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "*a"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ba", "a?"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ba", "a*"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ab", "?a"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ab", "*a"), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("match_pattern_list"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "", 0), 0); /* no patterns */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "*", 0), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!*", 0), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!a,*", 0), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "*,!a", 0), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "a,!*", 0), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!*,a", 0), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "", 0), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "*", 0), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!*", 0), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!a", 0), -1); /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!b", 0), 1); */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!a,*", 0), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "!a,*", 0), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "*,!a", 0), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "*,!a", 0), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "a,!*", 0), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "a,!*", 0), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "a,!a", 0), -1); /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "a,!a", 0), 1); */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!*,a", 0), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "!*,a", 0), -1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("match_pattern_list lowercase"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("abc", "ABC", 0), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("ABC", "abc", 0), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("abc", "ABC", 1), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("ABC", "abc", 1), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("addr_match_list"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1/44"), -2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list(NULL, "127.0.0.1/44"), -2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("a", "*"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "*"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list(NULL, "*"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.1"), -1); /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2"), 1); */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.255", "127.0.0.0/24"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.1.1", "127.0.0.0/24"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.0/24"), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.1.0/24"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.0/24"), -1); /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.1.0/24"), 1); */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,!127.0.0.1"), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.1,10.0.0.1"), -1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,127.0.0.2"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 0); /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,!127.0.0.2"), 1); */ /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 1); */ TEST_DONE(); #define CHECK_FILTER(string,filter,expected) \ do { \ char *result = match_filter_blacklist((string), (filter)); \ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, expected); \ free(result); \ } while (0) TEST_START("match_filter_list"); CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "", "a,b,c"); CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a", "b,c"); CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b", "a,c"); CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "c", "a,b"); CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b", "c"); CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,c", "b"); CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a"); CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b,c", ""); CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a"); CHECK_FILTER("", "a,b,c", ""); TEST_DONE(); /* * XXX TODO * int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *); * int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); * char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *); * int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *); */ } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/misc004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600160545ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/misc/Makefile010064400017500001750000000005751362136622600175770ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2019/04/28 22:53:26 dtucker Exp $ PROG=test_misc SRCS=tests.c # From usr.bin/ssh/Makefile.inc SRCS+=sshbuf.c sshbuf-getput-basic.c ssherr.c log.c xmalloc.c misc.c # From usr/bin/ssh/sshd/Makefile SRCS+=atomicio.c cleanup.c fatal.c REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c010064400017500001750000000042771362136622600174500ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2019/04/28 22:53:26 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for misc helper functions. * * Placed in the public domain. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "test_helper.h" #include "misc.h" void tests(void) { int port; char *user, *host, *path; TEST_START("misc_parse_user_host_path"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@some.host:some/path", &user, &host, &path), 0); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "some.host"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path"); free(user); free(host); free(path); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("misc_parse_user_ipv4_path"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@1.22.33.144:some/path", &user, &host, &path), 0); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path"); free(user); free(host); free(path); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("misc_parse_user_[ipv4]_path"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[1.22.33.144]:some/path", &user, &host, &path), 0); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path"); free(user); free(host); free(path); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("misc_parse_user_[ipv4]_nopath"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[1.22.33.144]:", &user, &host, &path), 0); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "."); free(user); free(host); free(path); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("misc_parse_user_ipv6_path"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[::1]:some/path", &user, &host, &path), 0); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "::1"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path"); free(user); free(host); free(path); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("misc_parse_uri"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_uri("ssh", "ssh://someuser@some.host:22/some/path", &user, &host, &port, &path), 0); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "some.host"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(port, 22); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path"); free(user); free(host); free(path); TEST_DONE(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshbuf004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600164135ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile010064400017500001750000000011151362136622600201250ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ # $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ PROG=test_sshbuf SRCS=tests.c SRCS+=test_sshbuf.c SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c SRCS+=test_sshbuf_misc.c SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fuzz.c SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fixed.c # From usr.bin/ssh SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c misc.c xmalloc.c log.c fatal.c ssherr.c cleanup.c run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS} openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c010064400017500001750000000144771362136622600212010ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API * * Placed in the public domain */ #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" void sshbuf_tests(void); void sshbuf_tests(void) { struct sshbuf *p1; const u_char *cdp; u_char *dp; size_t sz; int r; TEST_START("allocate sshbuf"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("max size on fresh buffer"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("available on fresh buffer"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("len = 0 on empty buffer"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("set valid max size"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 65536), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 65536); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("available on limited buffer"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 65536); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("free"); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("consume on empty buffer"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 0), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("consume_end on empty buffer"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 0), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("reserve space"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); *dp = 0x11; r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 3, &dp); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); *dp++ = 0x22; *dp++ = 0x33; *dp++ = 0x44; TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_len on filled buffer"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_ptr on filled buffer"); cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x11); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[1], 0x22); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[2], 0x33); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[3], 0x44); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("consume on filled buffer"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 0), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 64); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3); cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x22); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 2), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x44); r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("consume_end on filled buffer"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 4, &dp); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); *dp++ = 0x11; *dp++ = 0x22; *dp++ = 0x33; *dp++ = 0x44; ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); r = sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 5); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 3), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); ASSERT_U8_EQ(*cdp, 0x11); r = sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fill limited buffer"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1223), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 1223); r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1223, &dp); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); memset(dp, 0xd7, 1223); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0); r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("consume and force compaction"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 223), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1000); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 223); r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 224, &dp); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1000); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 223); r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 223, &dp); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); memset(dp, 0x7d, 223); cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp, 0xd7, 1000); ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1000, 0x7d, 223); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("resize full buffer"); r = sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1000); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); sz = roundup(1223 + SSHBUF_SIZE_INC * 3, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sz), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - 1223); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223); TEST_DONE(); /* NB. uses sshbuf internals */ TEST_START("alloc chunking"); r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); *dp = 0xff; cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp, 0xd7, 1000); ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1000, 0x7d, 223); ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1223, 0xff, 1); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_alloc(p1) % SSHBUF_SIZE_INC, 0); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("reset buffer"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1223), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223); r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1223, &dp); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); memset(dp, 0xd7, 1223); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 1223); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c010064400017500001750000000074571362136622600223600ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fixed.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API * * Placed in the public domain */ #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" void sshbuf_fixed(void); const u_char test_buf[] = "\x01\x12\x34\x56\x78\x00\x00\x00\x05hello"; void sshbuf_fixed(void) { struct sshbuf *p1, *p2, *p3; u_char c; char *s; u_int i; size_t l; TEST_START("sshbuf_from"); p1 = sshbuf_from(test_buf, sizeof(test_buf)); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_check_reserve(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, NULL), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 200), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_from data"); p1 = sshbuf_from(test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &c), 0); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf + 1); ASSERT_U8_EQ(c, 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &i), 0); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf + 5); ASSERT_U32_EQ(i, 0x12345678); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s, &l), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s, "hello"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(l, 5); sshbuf_free(p1); free(s); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_fromb "); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 1); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p1), NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1), 0); p2 = sshbuf_fromb(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL); ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 2); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p1), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p2), p1); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1)); ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p2), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p2), NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sshbuf_len(p2)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p2, &c), 0); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 1); ASSERT_U8_EQ(c, 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p2, &i), 0); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5); ASSERT_U32_EQ(i, 0x12345678); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p2, &s, &l), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 0); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s, "hello"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(l, 5); sshbuf_free(p1); ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 1); sshbuf_free(p2); free(s); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_froms"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x01), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(p1, "hello"), 0); p2 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(test_buf) - 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(p2, p1), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), sizeof(test_buf) + 4 - 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_froms(p2, &p3), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p3, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p3), NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p3), sizeof(test_buf) - 1); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p3), test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1); sshbuf_free(p3); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(p2, p1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p2, 1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_froms(p2, &p3), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(p3, NULL); sshbuf_free(p2); sshbuf_free(p1); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c010064400017500001750000000065601362136622600222510ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fuzz.c,v 1.2 2018/10/17 23:28:05 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #define NUM_FUZZ_TESTS (1 << 18) void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void); void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void) { struct sshbuf *p1; u_char *dp; size_t sz, sz2, i, ntests = NUM_FUZZ_TESTS; u_int32_t r; int ret; if (test_is_fast()) ntests >>= 2; if (test_is_slow()) ntests <<= 2; /* NB. uses sshbuf internals */ TEST_START("fuzz alloc/dealloc"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 16 * 1024), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1)); for (i = 0; i < NUM_FUZZ_TESTS; i++) { r = arc4random_uniform(10); if (r == 0) { /* 10% chance: small reserve */ r = arc4random_uniform(10); fuzz_reserve: sz = sshbuf_avail(p1); sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1); ret = sshbuf_reserve(p1, r, &dp); if (ret < 0) { ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz, r); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2); } else { ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz, r); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - r); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 + r); memset(dp, arc4random_uniform(255) + 1, r); } } else if (r < 3) { /* 20% chance: big reserve */ r = arc4random_uniform(8 * 1024); goto fuzz_reserve; } else if (r == 3) { /* 10% chance: small consume */ r = arc4random_uniform(10); fuzz_consume: sz = sshbuf_avail(p1); sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1); /* 50% change consume from end, otherwise start */ ret = ((arc4random() & 1) ? sshbuf_consume : sshbuf_consume_end)(p1, r); if (ret < 0) { ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz2, r); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2); } else { ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz2, r); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz + r); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 - r); } } else if (r < 8) { /* 40% chance: big consume */ r = arc4random_uniform(2 * 1024); goto fuzz_consume; } else if (r == 8) { /* 10% chance: reset max size */ r = arc4random_uniform(16 * 1024); sz = sshbuf_max_size(p1); if (sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, r) < 0) ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz); else ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), r); } else { if (arc4random_uniform(8192) == 0) { /* tiny chance: new buffer */ ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1)); sshbuf_free(p1); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 16 * 1024), 0); } else { /* Almost 10%: giant reserve */ /* use arc4random_buf for r > 2^32 on 64 bit */ arc4random_buf(&r, sizeof(r)); while (r < SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 2) { r <<= 1; r |= arc4random() & 1; } goto fuzz_reserve; } } ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 16 * 1024); } ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1)); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c010064400017500001750000000524011362136622600237170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c,v 1.2 2019/07/14 23:33:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void); void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void) { struct sshbuf *p1, *p2; const u_char *cd; u_char *d, d2[32], x[] = { 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x00, 0x99 }; u_int64_t v64; u_int32_t v32; u_int16_t v16; u_char v8; size_t s; char *s2; int r; u_char bn1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; u_char bn2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02 }; u_char bn3[] = { 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 }; u_char bn_exp1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; u_char bn_exp2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 }; u_char bn_exp3[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 }; TEST_START("PEEK_U64"); ASSERT_U64_EQ(PEEK_U64(x), 0x1122334455667788ULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("PEEK_U32"); ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(x), 0x11223344); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("PEEK_U16"); ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(x), 0x1122); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("POKE_U64"); bzero(d2, sizeof(d2)); POKE_U64(d2, 0x1122334455667788ULL); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 8); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("POKE_U32"); bzero(d2, sizeof(d2)); POKE_U32(d2, 0x11223344); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("POKE_U16"); bzero(d2, sizeof(d2)); POKE_U16(d2, 0x1122); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5); cd = sshbuf_ptr(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cd, NULL); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[0], 0x11); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[1], 0x22); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[2], 0x33); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[3], 0x44); ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[4], 0x55); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4), 0); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get truncated"); r = sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put truncated"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0); r = sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64), 0); ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x1122334455667788ULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64 truncated"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); r = sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0); ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x11223344); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 6); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0); ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x55667788); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32 truncated"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); r = sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 9), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 9); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x1122); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 7); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x3344); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x5566); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x7788); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16 truncated"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); r = sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 2), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0); ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x11); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0); ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x22); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8 truncated"); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); r = sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 exact"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 8), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 limited"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 7), 0); r = sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 exact"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 limited"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 3), 0); r = sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 2), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16 limited"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1), 0); r = sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 + 4); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x)); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); free(d); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string exact"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x)); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); free(d); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string truncated"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3); r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string giant"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring giant"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring embedded \\0"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring trailing \\0"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x) - 1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x) - 1), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 - 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x) - 1); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(s2, x, s); free(s2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), sizeof(x)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, x, sizeof(x)); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string limited"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4 - 1), 0); r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string giant"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, (void *)0x01, 0xfffffffc); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_putf"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); r = sshbuf_putf(p1, "%s %d %x", "hello", 23, 0x5f); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 11); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), "hello 23 5f", 11); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_putb"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); p2 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "blahblahblah", 12), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(p2, p1), 0); sshbuf_free(p1); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 12); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), "blahblahblah", 12); sshbuf_free(p2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes empty buf"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, NULL, 0), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1)); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes all zeroes"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn1, sizeof(bn1)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1)); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes simple"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2+2, sizeof(bn2)-2), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2)); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes leading zero"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2, sizeof(bn2)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2)); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3+1, sizeof(bn3)-1), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3)); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg and leading zero"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3, sizeof(bn3)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3)); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u64"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 0, &v64), 0); ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x1122334455667788ULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 2, &v64), 0); ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x3344556677880099ULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 3, &v64), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, sizeof(x), &v64), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 1000, &v64), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u32"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 0, &v32), 0); ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x11223344); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 6, &v32), 0); ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x77880099); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 7, &v32), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, sizeof(x), &v32), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 1000, &v32), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u16"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 0, &v16), 0); ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x1122); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 8, &v16), 0); ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x99); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 9, &v16), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, sizeof(x), &v16), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 1000, &v16), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u8"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, 0, &v8), 0); ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x11); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, 9, &v8), 0); ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x99); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, sizeof(x), &v8), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, 1000, &v8), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u64"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke at start of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 0, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL), 0); s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1b2c3d4e5f607180000"); free(s2); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke aligned with end of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 2, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL), 0); s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "0000a1b2c3d4e5f60718"); free(s2); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke past end of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 3, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 10, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 1000, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); /* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000"); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u32"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke at start of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 0, 0xa1b2c3d4), 0); s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1b2c3d4000000000000"); free(s2); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke aligned with end of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 6, 0xa1b2c3d4), 0); s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "000000000000a1b2c3d4"); free(s2); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke past end of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 7, 0xa1b2c3d4), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 10, 0xa1b2c3d4), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 1000, 0xa1b2c3d4), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); /* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000"); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u16"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke at start of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 0, 0xa1b2), 0); s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1b20000000000000000"); free(s2); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke aligned with end of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 8, 0xa1b2), 0); s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "0000000000000000a1b2"); free(s2); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke past end of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 9, 0xa1b2), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 10, 0xa1b2), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 1000, 0xa1b2), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); /* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000"); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u8"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke at start of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 0, 0xa1), 0); s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1000000000000000000"); free(s2); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke aligned with end of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 9, 0xa1), 0); s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "000000000000000000a1"); free(s2); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke past end of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 10, 0xa1), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 1000, 0xa1), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); /* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000"); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_poke"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke at start of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 0, "hello!", 6), 0); s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "68656c6c6f2100000000"); free(s2); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke aligned with end of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 4, "hello!", 6), 0); s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "0000000068656c6c6f21"); free(s2); sshbuf_reset(p1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0); /* poke past end of buffer */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 7, "hello!", 6), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 10, "hello!", 6), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 1000, "hello!", 6), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); /* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000"); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c010064400017500001750000000176741362136622600241730ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c,v 1.2 2019/01/21 12:29:35 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 # include #endif #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void); void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void) { struct sshbuf *p1; BIGNUM *bn, *bn2; const char *hexbn1 = "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10"; /* This one has MSB set to test bignum2 encoding negative-avoidance */ const char *hexbn2 = "f0e0d0c0b0a0908070605040302010007fff11"; u_char expbn1[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, }; u_char expbn2[] = { 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80, 0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00, 0x7f, 0xff, 0x11 }; #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) const u_char *d; size_t s; BIGNUM *bn_x, *bn_y; int ec256_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; char *ec256_x = "0C828004839D0106AA59575216191357" "34B451459DADB586677EF9DF55784999"; char *ec256_y = "4D196B50F0B4E94B3C73E3A9D4CD9DF2" "C8F9A35E42BDD047550F69D80EC23CD4"; u_char expec256[] = { 0x04, 0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06, 0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86, 0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99, 0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b, 0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2, 0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47, 0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4 }; EC_KEY *eck; EC_POINT *ecp; #endif int r; #define MKBN(b, bnn) \ do { \ bnn = NULL; \ ASSERT_INT_GT(BN_hex2bn(&bnn, b), 0); \ } while (0) TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2"); MKBN(hexbn1, bn); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 4); ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)); BN_free(bn); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 limited"); MKBN(hexbn1, bn); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 3), 0); r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); BN_free(bn); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2"); MKBN(hexbn2, bn); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4 + 1); /* MSB */ ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1); ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4), 0x00); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)); BN_free(bn); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2 limited"); MKBN(hexbn2, bn); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn2) + 3), 0); r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); BN_free(bn); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2"); MKBN(hexbn1, bn); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + sizeof(expbn1)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0); bn2 = NULL; ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2), 0); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); BN_free(bn); BN_free(bn2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 truncated"); MKBN(hexbn1, bn); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1) - 1), 0); bn2 = NULL; r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 3); BN_free(bn); BN_free(bn2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 giant"); MKBN(hexbn1, bn); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 65536), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 65536, NULL), 0); bn2 = NULL; r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 65536 + 4); BN_free(bn); BN_free(bn2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2"); MKBN(hexbn2, bn); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0); /* MSB */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + 1 + sizeof(expbn2)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0); bn2 = NULL; ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2), 0); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); BN_free(bn); BN_free(bn2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 truncated"); MKBN(hexbn2, bn); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2) - 1), 0); bn2 = NULL; r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 1 + 4 - 1); BN_free(bn); BN_free(bn2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 negative"); MKBN(hexbn2, bn); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0); bn2 = NULL; r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4); BN_free(bn); BN_free(bn2); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) TEST_START("sshbuf_put_ec"); eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid); ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL); ecp = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(eck)); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ecp, NULL); MKBN(ec256_x, bn_x); MKBN(ec256_y, bn_y); ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp( EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), ecp, bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_KEY_set_public_key(eck, ecp), 1); BN_free(bn_x); BN_free(bn_y); EC_POINT_free(ecp); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_eckey(p1, eck), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string_direct(p1, &d, &s), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(expec256)); ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, expec256, sizeof(expec256)); sshbuf_free(p1); EC_KEY_free(eck); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_get_ec"); eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid); ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, expec256, sizeof(expec256)), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expec256) + 4); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck), 0); bn_x = BN_new(); bn_y = BN_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_x, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_y, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp( EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eck), bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1); MKBN(ec256_x, bn); MKBN(ec256_y, bn2); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_x, bn), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_y, bn2), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); sshbuf_free(p1); EC_KEY_free(eck); BN_free(bn_x); BN_free(bn_y); BN_free(bn); BN_free(bn2); TEST_DONE(); #endif } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c010064400017500001750000000061131362136622600236330ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c,v 1.4 2019/01/21 12:29:35 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 # include #endif #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void); static void attempt_parse_blob(u_char *blob, size_t len) { struct sshbuf *p1; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL BIGNUM *bn; #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) EC_KEY *eck; #endif /* defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ u_char *s; size_t l; u_int8_t u8; u_int16_t u16; u_int32_t u32; u_int64_t u64; p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, blob, len), 0); sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &u8); sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &u16); sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &u32); sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &u64); if (sshbuf_get_string(p1, &s, &l) == 0) { bzero(s, l); free(s); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL bn = NULL; sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn); BN_clear_free(bn); #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL); sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck); EC_KEY_free(eck); #endif /* defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ sshbuf_free(p1); } static void onerror(void *fuzz) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n"); fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz); } void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void) { u_char blob[] = { /* u8 */ 0xd0, /* u16 */ 0xc0, 0xde, /* u32 */ 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, /* u64 */ 0xfe, 0xed, 0xac, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x1c, 0xbe, 0xef, /* string */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, 'O', ' ', 'G', 'o', 'r', 'g', 'o', 'n', '!', /* bignum2 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80, 0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00, 0x7f, 0xff, 0x11, /* EC point (NIST-256 curve) */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0x04, 0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06, 0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86, 0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99, 0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b, 0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2, 0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47, 0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4, }; struct fuzz *fuzz; u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END; if (test_is_fast()) fuzzers &= ~(FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP|FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP); TEST_START("fuzz blob parsing"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, blob, sizeof(blob)); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) attempt_parse_blob(blob, sizeof(blob)); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_ONERROR(NULL, NULL); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c010064400017500001750000000142041362136622600222000ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_misc.c,v 1.4 2019/07/16 22:16:49 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" void sshbuf_misc_tests(void); void sshbuf_misc_tests(void) { struct sshbuf *p1; char tmp[512], msg[] = "imploring ping silence ping over", *p; FILE *out; size_t sz; TEST_START("sshbuf_dump"); out = tmpfile(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(out, NULL); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0); sshbuf_dump(p1, out); fflush(out); rewind(out); sz = fread(tmp, 1, sizeof(tmp), out); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ferror(out), 0); ASSERT_INT_NE(feof(out), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sz, 0); tmp[sz] = '\0'; ASSERT_PTR_NE(strstr(tmp, "12 34 56 78"), NULL); fclose(out); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob16"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0); p = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "12345678"); free(p); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 1"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0); p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "EQ=="); free(p); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 2"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0); p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESI="); free(p); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 3"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x33), 0); p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESIz"); free(p); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 8191"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 8192, NULL), 0); bzero(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), 8192); p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), ((8191 + 2) / 3) * 4); free(p); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 1"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A=="), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); ASSERT_U8_EQ(*sshbuf_ptr(p1), 0xd0); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 2"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A8="), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00f); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 4"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A/QDw=="), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00fd00f); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_dup_string"); p1 = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); /* Check empty buffer */ p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), 0); free(p); /* Check buffer with string */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "quad1", strlen("quad1")), 0); p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), strlen("quad1")); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "quad1"); free(p); /* Check buffer with terminating nul */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "\0", 1), 0); p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), strlen("quad1")); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "quad1"); free(p); /* Check buffer with data after nul (expect failure) */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "quad2", strlen("quad2")), 0); p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(p, NULL); sshbuf_free(p1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_cmp"); p1 = sshbuf_from(msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "i", 1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "j", 1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "imploring", 9), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "implored", 9), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 10, "ping", 4), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 10, "ring", 4), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 28, "over", 4), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 28, "rove", 4), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 28, "overt", 5), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 32, "ping", 4), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 1000, "silence", 7), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sshbuf_find"); p1 = sshbuf_from(msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "i", 1, &sz), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "j", 1, &sz), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "imploring", 9, &sz), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "implored", 9, &sz), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 3, "ping", 4, &sz), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 10); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 11, "ping", 4, &sz), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 23); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 20, "over", 4, &sz), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 28); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 28, "over", 4, &sz), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 28); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 28, "rove", 4, &sz), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 28, "overt", 5, &sz), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 32, "ping", 4, &sz), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 1000, "silence", 7, &sz), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, msg + 1, sizeof(msg) - 2, &sz), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 1); TEST_DONE(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c010064400017500001750000000011611362136622600177740ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" void sshbuf_tests(void); void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void); void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void); void sshbuf_misc_tests(void); void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void); void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void); void sshbuf_fixed(void); void tests(void) { sshbuf_tests(); sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(); #endif sshbuf_misc_tests(); sshbuf_fuzz_tests(); sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(); sshbuf_fixed(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600164275ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile010064400017500001750000000015221362136622600201430ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ PROG=test_sshkey SRCS=tests.c test_sshkey.c test_file.c test_fuzz.c common.c # From usr.bin/ssh SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c SRCS+=digest-openssl.c #SRCS+=digest-libc.c REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c010064400017500001750000000056641362136622600201520ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: common.c,v 1.4 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ */ /* * Helpers for key API tests * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 # include #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "common.h" struct sshbuf * load_file(const char *name) { struct sshbuf *ret = NULL; ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_load_file(test_data_file(name), &ret), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL); return ret; } struct sshbuf * load_text_file(const char *name) { struct sshbuf *ret = load_file(name); const u_char *p; /* Trim whitespace at EOL */ for (p = sshbuf_ptr(ret); sshbuf_len(ret) > 0;) { if (p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\r' || p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\t' || p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == ' ' || p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\n') ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(ret, 1), 0); else break; } /* \0 terminate */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(ret, 0), 0); return ret; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL BIGNUM * load_bignum(const char *name) { BIGNUM *ret = NULL; struct sshbuf *buf; buf = load_text_file(name); ASSERT_INT_NE(BN_hex2bn(&ret, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); return ret; } const BIGNUM * rsa_n(struct sshkey *k) { const BIGNUM *n = NULL; ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL); RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL); return n; } const BIGNUM * rsa_e(struct sshkey *k) { const BIGNUM *e = NULL; ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL); RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, &e, NULL); return e; } const BIGNUM * rsa_p(struct sshkey *k) { const BIGNUM *p = NULL; ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL); RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, NULL); return p; } const BIGNUM * rsa_q(struct sshkey *k) { const BIGNUM *q = NULL; ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL); RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, NULL, &q); return q; } const BIGNUM * dsa_g(struct sshkey *k) { const BIGNUM *g = NULL; ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL); DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, NULL, NULL, &g); return g; } const BIGNUM * dsa_pub_key(struct sshkey *k) { const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL; ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL); DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub_key, NULL); return pub_key; } const BIGNUM * dsa_priv_key(struct sshkey *k) { const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL; ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL); DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key); return priv_key; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h010064400017500001750000000012721362136622600201460ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: common.h,v 1.2 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Helpers for key API tests * * Placed in the public domain */ /* Load a binary file into a buffer */ struct sshbuf *load_file(const char *name); /* Load a text file into a buffer */ struct sshbuf *load_text_file(const char *name); /* Load a bignum from a file */ BIGNUM *load_bignum(const char *name); /* Accessors for key components */ const BIGNUM *rsa_n(struct sshkey *k); const BIGNUM *rsa_e(struct sshkey *k); const BIGNUM *rsa_p(struct sshkey *k); const BIGNUM *rsa_q(struct sshkey *k); const BIGNUM *dsa_g(struct sshkey *k); const BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key(struct sshkey *k); const BIGNUM *dsa_priv_key(struct sshkey *k); openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh010075500017500001750000000136701362136622600212120ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.7 2018/09/12 01:36:45 djm Exp $ PW=mekmitasdigoat rsa_params() { _in="$1" _outbase="$2" set -e openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ awk '/^modulus:$/,/^publicExponent:/' | \ grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.n openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ awk '/^prime1:$/,/^prime2:/' | \ grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.p openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ awk '/^prime2:$/,/^exponent1:/' | \ grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.q for x in n p q ; do echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x cat ${_outbase}.$x echo ============ done } dsa_params() { _in="$1" _outbase="$2" set -e openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \ grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ awk '/^pub:/,/^P:/' | #\ grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ awk '/^G:/,0' | \ grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.g for x in priv pub g ; do echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x cat ${_outbase}.$x echo ============ done } ecdsa_params() { _in="$1" _outbase="$2" set -e openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \ awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \ grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \ awk '/^pub:/,/^ASN1 OID:/' | #\ grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \ grep "ASN1 OID:" | tr -d '\n' | \ sed 's/.*: //;s/ *$//' > ${_outbase}.curve for x in priv pub curve ; do echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x cat ${_outbase}.$x echo ============ done } set -ex cd testdata rm -f rsa_1 dsa_1 ecdsa_1 ed25519_1 rm -f rsa_2 dsa_2 ecdsa_2 ed25519_2 rm -f rsa_n dsa_n ecdsa_n # new-format keys rm -f rsa_1_pw dsa_1_pw ecdsa_1_pw ed25519_1_pw rm -f rsa_n_pw dsa_n_pw ecdsa_n_pw rm -f pw *.pub *.bn.* *.param.* *.fp *.fp.bb ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA test key #1" -N "" -f rsa_1 ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #1" -N "" -f dsa_1 ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256 -C "ECDSA test key #1" -N "" -f ecdsa_1 ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_1 ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -C "RSA test key #2" -N "" -f rsa_2 ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #2" -N "" -f dsa_2 ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 521 -C "ECDSA test key #2" -N "" -f ecdsa_2 ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_2 cp rsa_1 rsa_n cp dsa_1 dsa_n cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n cp rsa_1 rsa_1_pw cp dsa_1 dsa_1_pw cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1_pw cp ed25519_1 ed25519_1_pw cp rsa_1 rsa_n_pw cp dsa_1 dsa_n_pw cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n_pw ssh-keygen -pf rsa_1_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -pf dsa_1_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_1_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -pf ed25519_1_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -opf rsa_n_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -opf dsa_n_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -opf ecdsa_n_pw -N "$PW" rsa_params rsa_1 rsa_1.param rsa_params rsa_2 rsa_2.param dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param ecdsa_params ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1.param ecdsa_params ecdsa_2 ecdsa_2.param # XXX ed25519 params ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1.pub ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 2 dsa_1.pub ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 3 ecdsa_1.pub ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ed25519_1.pub # Make a few RSA variant signature too. cp rsa_1 rsa_1_sha1 cp rsa_1 rsa_1_sha512 cp rsa_1.pub rsa_1_sha1.pub cp rsa_1.pub rsa_1_sha512.pub ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 -t ssh-rsa \ -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1_sha1.pub ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 -t rsa-sha2-512 \ -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1_sha512.pub ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 5 rsa_1.pub ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 6 dsa_1.pub ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 7 ecdsa_1.pub ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_1.pub ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp ssh-keygen -lf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp ssh-keygen -lf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1-cert.fp ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1-cert.fp ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1-cert.fp ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1-cert.fp ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp.bb # XXX Extend ssh-keygen to do detached signatures (better to test/fuzz against) echo "$PW" > pw openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c010064400017500001750000000274231362136622600206350ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.8 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 # include #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #include "common.h" void sshkey_file_tests(void); void sshkey_file_tests(void) { struct sshkey *k1, *k2; struct sshbuf *buf, *pw; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL BIGNUM *a, *b, *c; #endif char *cp; TEST_START("load passphrase"); pw = load_text_file("pw"); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL TEST_START("parse RSA from private"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n"); b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p"); c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q"); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_n(k1), a); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_p(k1), b); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_q(k1), c); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse RSA from private w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("rsa_1_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format"); buf = load_file("rsa_n"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("rsa_n_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load RSA from public"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa"); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "rsa-sha2-512"); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load RSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("RSA key hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("RSA cert hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("rsa_1-cert.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("RSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp.bb"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_START("parse DSA from private"); buf = load_file("dsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g"); b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv"); c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub"); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_g(k1), a); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), b); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_pub_key(k1), c); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse DSA from private w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("dsa_1_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format"); buf = load_file("dsa_n"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("dsa_n_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load DSA from public"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load DSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_DSA_CERT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("DSA key hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("DSA cert hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("dsa_1-cert.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("DSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp.bb"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(k1); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.param.curve"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf), OBJ_nid2sn(k1->ecdsa_nid)); sshbuf_free(buf); a = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.priv"); b = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.pub"); c = EC_POINT_point2bn(EC_KEY_get0_group(k1->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k1->ecdsa), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(c, NULL); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), a); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(b, c); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_1_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_n"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_n_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load ECDSA from public"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load ECDSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_CERT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ECDSA key hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ECDSA cert hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1-cert.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ECDSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp.bb"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(k1); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private"); buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519); /* XXX check key contents */ TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("ed25519_1_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load Ed25519 from public"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load Ed25519 cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_CERT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("Ed25519 key hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("Ed25519 cert hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1-cert.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("Ed25519 key bubblebabble fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp.bb"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(pw); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c010064400017500001750000000244631362136622600207150ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.11 2019/11/25 10:32:35 djm Exp $ */ /* * Fuzz tests for key parsing * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 # include #endif #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "common.h" void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void); static void onerror(void *fuzz) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n"); fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz); } static void public_fuzz(struct sshkey *k) { struct sshkey *k1; struct sshbuf *buf; struct fuzz *fuzz; u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END; if (test_is_fast()) fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP; if (test_is_slow()) fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP; ASSERT_PTR_NE(buf = sshbuf_new(), NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k, buf), 0); fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), &k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { if (sshkey_from_blob(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), &k1) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); } fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); } static void sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k, const char *sig_alg) { struct fuzz *fuzz; u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed"; size_t l; u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END; if (test_is_fast()) fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP; if (test_is_slow()) fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP; ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c), sig_alg, NULL, 0), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0); fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sig, l); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0, NULL), 0); free(sig); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { /* Ensure 1-bit difference at least */ if (fuzz_matches_original(fuzz)) continue; ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0, NULL), 0); } fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); } #define NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS 1024 void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void) { struct sshkey *k1; struct sshbuf *buf, *fuzzed; struct fuzz *fuzz; int r, i; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL TEST_START("fuzz RSA private"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS) break; } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz RSA new-format private"); buf = load_file("rsa_n"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS) break; } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz DSA private"); buf = load_file("dsa_1"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS) break; } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz DSA new-format private"); buf = load_file("dsa_n"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS) break; } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA private"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS) break; } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA new-format private"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_n"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS) break; } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 private"); buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS) break; } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL TEST_START("fuzz RSA public"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz RSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz DSA public"); buf = load_file("dsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz DSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k1), 0); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA public"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k1), 0); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 public"); buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k1), 0); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa"); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-256"); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA512 sig"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-512"); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig"); buf = load_file("dsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); sig_fuzz(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); sig_fuzz(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 sig"); buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); sig_fuzz(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); /* XXX fuzz decoded new-format blobs too */ /* XXX fuzz XMSS too */ } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c010064400017500001750000000352661362136622600212300ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.20 2019/11/25 10:32:35 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) # include #endif #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "common.h" #include "ssh2.h" void sshkey_tests(void); static void put_opt(struct sshbuf *b, const char *name, const char *value) { struct sshbuf *sect; sect = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(sect, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, name), 0); if (value != NULL) ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, value), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, sect), 0); sshbuf_free(sect); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static void build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type, struct sshkey *sign_key, struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *sig_alg) { struct sshbuf *ca_buf, *pk, *principals, *critopts, *exts; u_char *sigblob; size_t siglen; ca_buf = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0); /* * Get the public key serialisation by rendering the key and skipping * the type string. This is a bit of a hack :/ */ pk = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(pk, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb_plain(k, pk), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_skip_string(pk), 0); principals = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(principals, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gsamsa"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gregor"), 0); critopts = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(critopts, NULL); put_opt(critopts, "force-command", "/usr/local/bin/nethack"); put_opt(critopts, "source-address", "192.168.0.0/24,127.0.0.1,::1"); exts = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(exts, NULL); put_opt(critopts, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, type), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "noncenoncenonce!"), 0); /* nonce */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(b, pk), 0); /* public key serialisation */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 1234), 0); /* serial */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(b, SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER), 0); /* type */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "gregor"), 0); /* key ID */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, principals), 0); /* principals */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0), 0); /* start */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0xffffffffffffffffULL), 0); /* end */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, critopts), 0); /* options */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, exts), 0); /* extensions */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, 0), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */ free(sigblob); sshbuf_free(ca_buf); sshbuf_free(exts); sshbuf_free(critopts); sshbuf_free(principals); sshbuf_free(pk); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ static void signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg, const u_char *d, size_t l) { size_t len; u_char *sig; ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, 0), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8); ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0); ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0); /* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */ sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10; ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0); free(sig); } static void banana(u_char *s, size_t l) { size_t o; const u_char the_banana[] = { 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a' }; for (o = 0; o < l; o += sizeof(the_banana)) { if (l - o < sizeof(the_banana)) { memcpy(s + o, "nanananana", l - o); break; } memcpy(s + o, banana, sizeof(the_banana)); } } static void signature_tests(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg) { u_char i, buf[2049]; size_t lens[] = { 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 127, 128, 129, 255, 256, 257, 1023, 1024, 1025, 2047, 2048, 2049 }; for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(lens)/sizeof(lens[0])); i++) { test_subtest_info("%s key, banana length %zu", sshkey_type(k), lens[i]); banana(buf, lens[i]); signature_test(k, bad, sig_alg, buf, lens[i]); } } static struct sshkey * get_private(const char *n) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *ret; b = load_file(n); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &ret, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } void sshkey_tests(void) { struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *kf; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL struct sshkey *k4, *kr, *kd; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC struct sshkey *ke; #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ struct sshbuf *b; TEST_START("new invalid"); k1 = sshkey_new(-42); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new/free KEY_UNSPEC"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new/free KEY_DSA"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("new/free KEY_ECDSA"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ecdsa, NULL); /* Can't allocate without NID */ sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("new/free KEY_ED25519"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); /* These should be blank until key loaded or generated */ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1), SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1), SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1), SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1), SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 767, &kr), SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(kr), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(kr), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_p(kr), NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(rsa_n(kr)), 1024); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(kd), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_priv_key(kd), NULL); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &ke), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke->ecdsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); TEST_DONE(); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ TEST_START("generate KEY_ED25519"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &kf), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kf->type, KEY_ED25519); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_pk, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_sk, NULL); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL TEST_START("demote KEY_RSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kr, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(k1), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(k1), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(rsa_p(k1), NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("demote KEY_DSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kd, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(k1), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("demote KEY_ECDSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(ke, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ecdsa, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->ecdsa_nid, ke->ecdsa_nid); ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_ECDSA/demoted KEY_ECDSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ TEST_START("demote KEY_ED25519"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kf, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_ED25519/demoted KEY_ED25519"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL TEST_START("equal mismatched key types"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kr), 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, ke), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, ke), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, kf), 0); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kf), 0); TEST_DONE(); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ TEST_START("equal different keys"); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL sshkey_free(kr); sshkey_free(kd); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sshkey_free(ke); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ sshkey_free(kf); TEST_START("certify key"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k1, NULL), 0); k2 = get_private("ed25519_2"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_certified(k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert, NULL); k1->cert->type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; k1->cert->serial = 1234; k1->cert->key_id = strdup("estragon"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->key_id, NULL); k1->cert->principals = calloc(4, sizeof(*k1->cert->principals)); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals, NULL); k1->cert->principals[0] = strdup("estragon"); k1->cert->principals[1] = strdup("vladimir"); k1->cert->principals[2] = strdup("pozzo"); k1->cert->principals[3] = strdup("lucky"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[0], NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[1], NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[2], NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[3], NULL); k1->cert->nprincipals = 4; k1->cert->valid_after = 0; k1->cert->valid_before = (u_int64_t)-1; sshbuf_free(k1->cert->critical); k1->cert->critical = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->critical, NULL); sshbuf_free(k1->cert->extensions); k1->cert->extensions = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->extensions, NULL); put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "force-command", "/usr/bin/true"); put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "source-address", "127.0.0.1"); put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL); put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-agent-forwarding", NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(k2, &k1->cert->signature_key), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2, NULL, NULL), 0); b = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k1, b), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k3), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); sshkey_free(k3); sshbuf_reset(b); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL TEST_START("sign and verify RSA"); k1 = get_private("rsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); signature_tests(k1, k2, "ssh-rsa"); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA256"); k1 = get_private("rsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-256"); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA512"); k1 = get_private("rsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-512"); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sign and verify DSA"); k1 = get_private("dsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("sign and verify ECDSA"); k1 = get_private("ecdsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ TEST_START("sign and verify ED25519"); k1 = get_private("ed25519_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL TEST_START("nested certificate"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); k3 = get_private("rsa_1"); build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4), SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); sshkey_free(k3); sshbuf_free(b); TEST_DONE(); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600202405ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1010064400017500001750000000012401362136622600212230ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBvAIBAAKBgQD6kutNFRsHTwEAv6d39Lhsqy1apdHBZ9c2HfyRr7WmypyGIy2m Ka43vzXI8CNwmRSYs+A6d0vJC7Pl+f9QzJ/04NWOA+MiwfurwrR3CRe61QRYb8Py mcHOxueHs95IcjrbIPNn86cjnPP5qvv/guUzCjuww4zBdJOXpligrGt2XwIVAKMD /50qQy7j8JaMk+1+Xtg1pK01AoGBAO7l9QVVbSSoy5lq6cOtvpf8UlwOa6+zBwbl o4gmFd1RwX1yWkA8kQ7RrhCSg8Hc6mIGnKRgKRli/3LgbSfZ0obFJehkRtEWtN4P h8fVUeS74iQbIwFQeKlYHIlNTRoGtAbdi3nHdV+BBkEQc1V3rjqYqhjOoz/yNsgz LND26HrdAoGBAOdXpyfmobEBaOqZAuvgj1P0uhjG2P31Ufurv22FWPBU3A9qrkxb OXwE0LwvjCvrsQV/lrYhJz/tiys40VeahulWZE5SAHMXGIf95LiLSgaXMjko7joo t+LK84ltLymwZ4QMnYjnZSSclf1UuyQMcUtb34+I0u9Ycnyhp2mSFsQtAhRYIbQ5 KfXsZuBPuWe5FJz3ldaEgw== -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600225640ustar00djmdjmSHA256:kOLgXSoAT8O5T6r36n5NJUYigbux1d7gdH/rmWiJm6s openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub010064400017500001750000000017361362136622600227550ustar00djmdjmssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 DSA test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600216310ustar00djmdjmSHA256:kOLgXSoAT8O5T6r36n5NJUYigbux1d7gdH/rmWiJm6s openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb010064400017500001750000000001021362136622600222050ustar00djmdjmxetag-todiz-mifah-torec-mynyv-cyvit-gopon-pygag-rupic-cenav-bexax openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g010064400017500001750000000004031362136622600225470ustar00djmdjm00eee5f505556d24a8cb996ae9c3adbe97fc525c0e6bafb30706e5a3882615dd51c17d725a403c910ed1ae109283c1dcea62069ca460291962ff72e06d27d9d286c525e86446d116b4de0f87c7d551e4bbe2241b23015078a9581c894d4d1a06b406dd8b79c7755f81064110735577ae3a98aa18cea33ff236c8332cd0f6e87add openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv010064400017500001750000000000511362136622600233000ustar00djmdjm5821b43929f5ec66e04fb967b9149cf795d68483 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub010064400017500001750000000004031362136622600231070ustar00djmdjm00e757a727e6a1b10168ea9902ebe08f53f4ba18c6d8fdf551fbabbf6d8558f054dc0f6aae4c5b397c04d0bc2f8c2bebb1057f96b621273fed8b2b38d1579a86e956644e520073171887fde4b88b4a0697323928ee3a28b7e2caf3896d2f29b067840c9d88e765249c95fd54bb240c714b5bdf8f88d2ef58727ca1a7699216c42d openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub010064400017500001750000000011351362136622600220130ustar00djmdjmssh-dss 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 DSA test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw010064400017500001750000000014031362136622600217320ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,BC8386C373B22EB7F00ADC821D5D8BE9 +HDV2DQ09sxrIAeXTz9r3YFuPRa2hk1+NGcr3ETkXbC6KiZ14wpTnGTloKwaQjIW eXTa9mpCOWAoohgvsVb+hOuOlP7AfeHu1IXV4EAS+GDpkiV5UxlCXXwqlD75Buu4 wwDd/p4SWzILH3WGjDk5JIXoxWNY13LHwC7Q6gtGJx4AicUG7YBRTXMIBDa/Kh77 6o2rFETKmp4VHBvHbakmiETfptdM8bbWxKWeY2vakThyESgeofsLoTOQCIwlEfJC s2D/KYL65C8VbHYgIoSLTQnooO45DDyxIuhCqP+H23mhv9vB1Od3nc2atgHj/XFs dcOPFkF/msDRYqxY3V0AS6+jpKwFodZ7g/hyGcyPxOkzlJVuKoKuH6P5PyQ69Gx0 iqri0xEPyABr7kGlXNrjjctojX+B4WwSnjg/2euXXWFXCRalIdA7ErATTiQbGOx7 Vd6Gn8PZbSy1MkqEDrZRip0pfAFJYI/8GXPC75BpnRsrVlfhtrngbW+kBP35LzaN l2K+RQ3gSB3iFoqNb1Kuu6T5MZlyVl5H2dVlJSeb1euQ2OycXdDoFTyJ4AiyWS7w Vlh8zeJnso5QRDjMwx99pZilbbuFGSLsahiGEveFc6o= -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2010064400017500001750000000012401362136622600212240ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBvQIBAAKBgQCbyPXNdHeLsjpobPVCMkfagBkt15Zsltqf/PGNP1y1cuz7rsTX ZekQwUkSTNm5coqXe+ZOw2O4tjobJDd60I1/VPgaB0NYlQR9Hn87M284WD4f6VY+ aunHmP134a8ybG5G4NqVNF3ihvxAR2pVITqb7kE46r2uYZNcNlHI8voRCwIVAMcP bwqFNsQbH5pJyZW30wj4KVZ3AoGBAIK98BVeKQVf8qDFqx9ovMuNgVSxpd+N0Yta 5ZEy1OI2ziu5RhjueIM2K7Gq2Mnp38ob1AM53BUxqlcBJaHEDa6rj6yvuMgW9oCJ dImBM8sIFxfBbXNbpJiMaDwa6WyT84OkpDE6uuAepTMnWOUWkUVkAiyokHDUGXkG GyoQblbXAoGBAIsf7TaZ804sUWwRV0wI8DYx+hxD5QdrfYPYMtL2fHn3lICimGt0 FTtUZ25jKg0E0DMBPdET6ZEHB3ZZkR8hFoUzZhdnyJMu3UjVtgaV88Ue3PrXxchk 0W2jHPaAgQU3JIWzo8HFIFqvC/HEL+EyW3rBTY2uXM3XGI+YcWSA4ZrZAhUAsY2f bDFNzgZ4DaZ9wLRzTgOswPU= -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600216320ustar00djmdjmSHA256:ecwhWcXgpdBxZ2e+OjpRRY7dqXHHCD62BGtoVQQBwCk openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb010064400017500001750000000001021362136622600222060ustar00djmdjmxeser-megad-pocan-rozit-belup-tapoh-fapif-kyvit-vonav-cehab-naxax openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub010064400017500001750000000011351362136622600220140ustar00djmdjmssh-dss 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 DSA test key #2 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n010064400017500001750000000012401362136622600213200ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBvAIBAAKBgQD6kutNFRsHTwEAv6d39Lhsqy1apdHBZ9c2HfyRr7WmypyGIy2m Ka43vzXI8CNwmRSYs+A6d0vJC7Pl+f9QzJ/04NWOA+MiwfurwrR3CRe61QRYb8Py mcHOxueHs95IcjrbIPNn86cjnPP5qvv/guUzCjuww4zBdJOXpligrGt2XwIVAKMD /50qQy7j8JaMk+1+Xtg1pK01AoGBAO7l9QVVbSSoy5lq6cOtvpf8UlwOa6+zBwbl o4gmFd1RwX1yWkA8kQ7RrhCSg8Hc6mIGnKRgKRli/3LgbSfZ0obFJehkRtEWtN4P h8fVUeS74iQbIwFQeKlYHIlNTRoGtAbdi3nHdV+BBkEQc1V3rjqYqhjOoz/yNsgz LND26HrdAoGBAOdXpyfmobEBaOqZAuvgj1P0uhjG2P31Ufurv22FWPBU3A9qrkxb OXwE0LwvjCvrsQV/lrYhJz/tiys40VeahulWZE5SAHMXGIf95LiLSgaXMjko7joo t+LK84ltLymwZ4QMnYjnZSSclf1UuyQMcUtb34+I0u9Ycnyhp2mSFsQtAhRYIbQ5 KfXsZuBPuWe5FJz3ldaEgw== -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw010064400017500001750000000026111362136622600220310ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABCVs+LsMJ wnB5zM9U9pTXrGAAAAEAAAAAEAAAGzAAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAPqS600VGwdPAQC/p3f0 uGyrLVql0cFn1zYd/JGvtabKnIYjLaYprje/NcjwI3CZFJiz4Dp3S8kLs+X5/1DMn/Tg1Y 4D4yLB+6vCtHcJF7rVBFhvw/KZwc7G54ez3khyOtsg82fzpyOc8/mq+/+C5TMKO7DDjMF0 k5emWKCsa3ZfAAAAFQCjA/+dKkMu4/CWjJPtfl7YNaStNQAAAIEA7uX1BVVtJKjLmWrpw6 2+l/xSXA5rr7MHBuWjiCYV3VHBfXJaQDyRDtGuEJKDwdzqYgacpGApGWL/cuBtJ9nShsUl 6GRG0Ra03g+Hx9VR5LviJBsjAVB4qVgciU1NGga0Bt2Lecd1X4EGQRBzVXeuOpiqGM6jP/ I2yDMs0Pboet0AAACBAOdXpyfmobEBaOqZAuvgj1P0uhjG2P31Ufurv22FWPBU3A9qrkxb OXwE0LwvjCvrsQV/lrYhJz/tiys40VeahulWZE5SAHMXGIf95LiLSgaXMjko7joot+LK84 ltLymwZ4QMnYjnZSSclf1UuyQMcUtb34+I0u9Ycnyhp2mSFsQtAAAB4HiOcRW4w+sIqBL0 TPVbf0glN1hUi0rcE63Pqxmvxb8LkldC4IxAUagPrjhNAEW2AY42+CvPrtGB1z7gDADAIW xZX6wKwIcXP0Qh+xHE12F4u6mwfasssnAp4t1Ki8uCjMjnimgb3KdWpp0kiUV0oR062TXV PAdfrWjaq4fw0KOqbHIAG/v36AqzuqjSTfDbqvLZM3y0gp2Q1RxaQVJA5ZIKKyqRyFX7sr BaEIyCgeE3hM0EB7BycY1oIcS/eNxrACBWVJCENl5N7LtEYXNX7TANFniztfXzwaqGTT6A fCfbW4gz1UKldLUBzbIrPwMWlirAstbHvOf/2Iay2pNAs/SHhI0aF2jsGfvv5/D6N+r9dG B2SgDKBg7pywMH1DTvg6YT3P4GjCx0GUHqRCFLvD1rDdk4KSjvaRMpVq1PJ0/Wv6UGtsMS TR0PaEHDRNZqAX4YxqujnWrGKuRJhuz0eUvp7fZvbWHtiAMKV7368kkeUmkOHanb+TS+zs KINX8ev8zJZ6WVr8Vl+IQavpv0i2bXwS6QqbEuifpv/+uBb7pqRiU4u8en0eMdX1bZoTPM R6xHCnGD/Jpb3zS91Ya57T6CiXZ12KCaL6nWGnCkZVpzkfJ2HjFklWSWBQ6uyaosDQ== -----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1010064400017500001750000000003431362136622600215360ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- MHcCAQEEIPPNyUAnjvFr+eT/7t/IyjuQQd/aLFiTY92LB9gIjyrMoAoGCCqGSM49 AwEHoUQDQgAEDFlblkOrW9ydKVhtM+9AY3c9saBE7SG3lFx38nBavkADDaI9jh3/ kvG/Jt9vpm22qwoklTCGDfzCkXkIKaWlBw== -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600230740ustar00djmdjmSHA256:8ty77fOpABat1y88aNdclQTfU+lVvWe7jYZGw8VYtfg openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub010064400017500001750000000012201362136622600232510ustar00djmdjmecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 ECDSA test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600221410ustar00djmdjmSHA256:8ty77fOpABat1y88aNdclQTfU+lVvWe7jYZGw8VYtfg openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb010064400017500001750000000001021362136622600225150ustar00djmdjmxibah-vocun-sogyn-byhen-rivem-hegyh-luneh-dozyr-vatyf-dufid-myxyx openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve010064400017500001750000000000131362136622600237520ustar00djmdjmprime256v1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2010064400017500001750000000005551362136622600215440ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- MIHcAgEBBEIBqBtN7e6Essd3dlsgISViPCXXC0atlNkGtoMgSQdBTKVUfeJOi4lc RZaXJdXnqWUqI/KEsH8h8QN4YcB8ugmAcc+gBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAHZ2VNy oDedBwqsdzY+kkNptc9DrtRCVmO6cULLj+691MhItqVqTMJbTFlI4MnAg9PoGTF/ 0KmLJfy8vSffXGKqqwGKcFNtd1XCo+7Qu9tXbxron9g6Dmu7y8jaLkixcwZwnwLs 6GmA9qZGuiAfOGV0Gf9/u98sr+vikOa4Ow5JFDTw5g== -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv010064400017500001750000000001031362136622600236060ustar00djmdjm00f3cdc940278ef16bf9e4ffeedfc8ca3b9041dfda2c589363dd8b07d8088f2acc openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub010064400017500001750000000002031362136622600234150ustar00djmdjm040c595b9643ab5bdc9d29586d33ef4063773db1a044ed21b7945c77f2705abe40030da23d8e1dff92f1bf26df6fa66db6ab0a249530860dfcc291790829a5a507 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub010064400017500001750000000002631362136622600223240ustar00djmdjmecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBAxZW5ZDq1vcnSlYbTPvQGN3PbGgRO0ht5Rcd/JwWr5AAw2iPY4d/5Lxvybfb6ZttqsKJJUwhg38wpF5CCmlpQc= ECDSA test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw010064400017500001750000000004721362136622600222470ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,7BA38DE00F67851E4207216809C3BB15 8QkFoZHQkj9a2mt032sp+WKaJ1fwteqWDd4RpAW9OzDgqzMx1QO43qJgBDTfhzjt M2Q8YfiGjfBEYpg4kCbacfcV68DEV4z6Ll7rIzzzO7OfWUNL++brD64vKx4z6f46 +sn4nbZTXilpkzi/nmPDVzrNmTSywA8T7Yf0QcBUxks= -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600221420ustar00djmdjmSHA256:ed8YniRHA6qCrErCRnzrWxPHxYuA62a+CAFYUVxJgaI openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb010064400017500001750000000001021362136622600225160ustar00djmdjmxufag-danul-putub-mokin-pugaz-covid-dofag-nihuz-sysab-genar-zaxyx openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve010064400017500001750000000000121362136622600237520ustar00djmdjmsecp521r1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv010064400017500001750000000002051362136622600236120ustar00djmdjm01a81b4dedee84b2c777765b202125623c25d70b46ad94d906b683204907414ca5547de24e8b895c45969725d5e7a9652a23f284b07f21f1037861c07cba098071cf openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub010064400017500001750000000004131362136622600234210ustar00djmdjm0401d9d95372a0379d070aac77363e924369b5cf43aed4425663ba7142cb8feebdd4c848b6a56a4cc25b4c5948e0c9c083d3e819317fd0a98b25fcbcbd27df5c62aaab018a70536d7755c2a3eed0bbdb576f1ae89fd83a0e6bbbcbc8da2e48b17306709f02ece86980f6a646ba201f38657419ff7fbbdf2cafebe290e6b83b0e491434f0e6 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub010064400017500001750000000004171362136622600223260ustar00djmdjmecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAHZ2VNyoDedBwqsdzY+kkNptc9DrtRCVmO6cULLj+691MhItqVqTMJbTFlI4MnAg9PoGTF/0KmLJfy8vSffXGKqqwGKcFNtd1XCo+7Qu9tXbxron9g6Dmu7y8jaLkixcwZwnwLs6GmA9qZGuiAfOGV0Gf9/u98sr+vikOa4Ow5JFDTw5g== ECDSA test key #2 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n010064400017500001750000000003431362136622600216330ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- MHcCAQEEIPPNyUAnjvFr+eT/7t/IyjuQQd/aLFiTY92LB9gIjyrMoAoGCCqGSM49 AwEHoUQDQgAEDFlblkOrW9ydKVhtM+9AY3c9saBE7SG3lFx38nBavkADDaI9jh3/ kvG/Jt9vpm22qwoklTCGDfzCkXkIKaWlBw== -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw010064400017500001750000000010311362136622600223340ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABC4UwEov5 z0RrCm7AMCxbuiAAAAEAAAAAEAAABoAAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlz dHAyNTYAAABBBAxZW5ZDq1vcnSlYbTPvQGN3PbGgRO0ht5Rcd/JwWr5AAw2iPY4d/5Lxvy bfb6ZttqsKJJUwhg38wpF5CCmlpQcAAACgbCnAklQTHrf5qiHiMxKYwQJ7k/X9mp4fXD4v xUbgNZiXSxN26mn8mC2rH+WA6Lk3CexR/hrtLI2ndpBsYu1h6HhVkOwwm3Kd/PMKArCupW l6sYEabrT0EghXR/3aDEZvj79hgKSdu3RpayLvMdbCR8k1cg0/mDmR9hicWfeJ61n/IH05 tUR268+0BVRW9kDhh/cuv8tVY4L09jCCQ6CpsA== -----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1010064400017500001750000000006331362136622600214570ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW QyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQAAAJjnj4Ao54+A KAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQ AAAED3KgoDbjR54V7bdNpfKlQY5m20UK1QaHytkCR+6rZEDFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/Bz tXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAE0VEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAg== -----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600230130ustar00djmdjmSHA256:L3k/oJubblSY0lB9Ulsl7emDMnRPKm/8udf2ccwk560 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub010064400017500001750000000007461362136622600232040ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIIxzuxl4z3uwAIslne8Huft+1n1IhHAlNbWZkQyyECCGAAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAAAAAAAgAAAACAAAABmp1bGl1cwAAABIAAAAFaG9zdDEAAAAFaG9zdDIAAAAANowB8AAAAABNHmBwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABABGTn+Bmz86Ajk+iqKCSdP5NClsYzn4alJd0V5bizhP0Kumc/HbqQfSt684J1WdSzih+EjvnTgBhK9jTBKb90AQ== ED25519 test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600220600ustar00djmdjmSHA256:L3k/oJubblSY0lB9Ulsl7emDMnRPKm/8udf2ccwk560 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb010064400017500001750000000001021362136622600224340ustar00djmdjmxubop-rekyd-bakal-nubuf-pahaf-gicuh-logeb-gocif-petod-galip-fuxux openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub010064400017500001750000000001451362136622600222420ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZ ED25519 test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw010064400017500001750000000007201362136622600221620ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jdHIAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABDKT56mBA tXIMsWqmuuA2gdAAAAEAAAAAEAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFv PwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAoC13U47yfUOSZJePNUAwWXuFOk3aOKwPM5PMvK 0zwRnMZZjgn+tsMAYPwhsT3Mx3h5QzvVGFyFEqsiK7j4vAotD+LVQeBN5TwWbUBx4lnoGs 3iAfYVDakO/gNvVBDDGOqv5kdCc4cgn5HacjHQLKOAx6KzHe7JFn7uCywMdVVQjlpI6LHb mHkaKiVX/C2oiRnsoe17HZ8Fxyt3vd1qNM8BE= -----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2010064400017500001750000000006331362136622600214600ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW QyNTUxOQAAACDPVKyLnm3eZE0lm0IfM3Uy9AsdGSBtozcoCt21blYBCwAAAJix1mBGsdZg RgAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDPVKyLnm3eZE0lm0IfM3Uy9AsdGSBtozcoCt21blYBCw AAAECZEQHXs18o3DKjhUYaTyt+bUbhqfMeqmsKjYyFvzGVgs9UrIuebd5kTSWbQh8zdTL0 Cx0ZIG2jNygK3bVuVgELAAAAE0VEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAg== -----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600220610ustar00djmdjmSHA256:vMbaARqVciRgXyZPNHDo+P5p5WK5yWG1Oo6VC35Bomw openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw010064400017500001750000000000171362136622600206630ustar00djmdjmmekmitasdigoat openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb010064400017500001750000000001021362136622600224350ustar00djmdjmxuces-bapyb-vikob-zesyv-budod-nupip-kebon-tacyc-fofed-lezic-soxax openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub010064400017500001750000000001451362136622600222430ustar00djmdjmssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIM9UrIuebd5kTSWbQh8zdTL0Cx0ZIG2jNygK3bVuVgEL ED25519 test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1010064400017500001750000000010251362136622600213230ustar00djmdjmSSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1 ÎŒ§zUnºˆš†lJdxST¨…M41ú 5#¦_™‘_„3ÑœAg}0|ã˜e¸>qrÒÁØx3<˜8ÖäF! \×\þ§Ê!S‹òô?*ôœ¬îQ².;ÜÅè{YÌi|iB§~ñ;ýû$0w·'4 §  kˆg)RSA1 test key #1é©é©þ.;C]YtbJS2Ü ÄçúêÎ3Øÿ£Õ lu“ï0dÂ*<$À¦Ï1cÀ°„rø+YßV—6騦>lg5eÍ’UÏLu>0 ±‘¼c•ôçÆ&‡ôâ„®B¨IÃa½RP…HÀn•ÿ_oÑÙqq`gKfêS€Õ@ÑTþ)±íùþ•à@ O;nzvj=²qrÒÁØx3<˜8ÖäF! \×\þ§Ê!S‹òô?*ôœ¬îQ².;ÜÅè{YÌi|iB§~ñ;ýû$0w·'4 §  kˆg)RSA1 test key #1qÞ­miÏ&Ëü¢: ;÷CÓž_ÞrØHNÜìPUŸt¢‹›Ò¡š»zTKŽ‘88‹Ù|âžx#i´ŒÙ§]Ó_é´v.½ûyÅ8'-¡ß üx@ܶûÝÀ£‡š“Ñäú"5Ë·=rñ[Æpk’"XÝÆœjNpƒ{mìdŒÈ`UW8<󔉹®ÔJ(È‚Ðœyæ} `îNUò1ÖØ(÷ZË4¾™ÐÁáž'JpôÖÜ¢–ñ×€«ÎtT iª#éÓzI˜¡Dßaopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2010064400017500001750000000017251362136622600213330ustar00djmdjmSSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1 Ê°‘µzG@Á»p ôj!¡Äd}²ª±º½0ʾ$79h7k£^HÆ$¸êöµ”$ÔÁ¨HÉýõÍÇÁ·õåß#·­Q;y†ÓŒRýúãVVež†I²¿‹í÷É–däU4{ÑÅÜ=áÚýòÓJЇYQª=P 6ÐØ»ÌÞñZ³£Ý@½õ`e©9~õvÊÿ¶¾‚2öàaJê—›•„)fsú»½Ÿ2I\BˆB¢«hÝBO¶ýÎî«‘&ÊÍüƒO ºs­ƒ`уº…»eU\Æ¥6ëß„À!®(¢Ø³F_‹Xï@E®¡Ä­‹ö9WMk*ö{N³RSA1 test key #2é¡é¡‹EG^'"¨S-§PW.q®Ç [»-/ *ÚZŒ8æu‹ ×NF6ÅGÈ©i\A)íâbÎaâGvM,FüÖa»v­ á+LÙz_ý·ŒNyqõÇá/÷è¢;_k`±À¾ªÿ2’||Ù åúǕʯ2YyG`¹oó*·—äí¥$å îq}LòTWŸ3÷§íÔYšÎ—ù q°ÃAD¤gàþ¥Ï,Ý»/éI ÚõǤmºÏµò‡r ^¯÷^ˆß“=+Ò!ZA÷[a»µv`ú7þ˜¼ÙË‘'3M6ÝÝ~E½F(€¬9º€àòP [G6fa·« /+Ë\xè\Ã@ ‚xûÎK~a w=!B§½´ˆ=”ïYÆïñp(s*Nå“ÖðuÍÿ(püÖ„·V:¡÷ø­¿å¹"×Mm.Å…Žð|?—Š°a[\M:Ž›N‰]¯O»…V.² YâgJËOMÔA÷#B®"iÑÆ=ÄiÊô+H,ôÛnŸ8Ú ‹ðð1žHkƒh;.ÎÍ…ÔÎ-"%Ɇ¤±ª‹GH oZú[6I™…ùÓþ¨¬OCÊÉ¢î½E²­$¡Û–êµú+<ž„$ß’ÝzÇÊE?Þ{U>‚먔¨+u}çM©ŠD%¸ çÃy÷ZЉ5CÙQ¹ˆO롼CÇ·!?DôÝ'×êÖâzñ¾PìRq]çòÑ%äÔ{pæMRŽÒ(µœÀû*Æ΄’ +>'ÉJˆpz•o,Gm™\ï7ØÒøA$r¥„¹h€®¿[½õâh÷Ýͪ=>é~Œ‹openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600217310ustar00djmdjmSHA256:JaOeRCnLl/TLe7vn1+aQ4ONyKZCUhK5x3k4VHilmbpE openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb010064400017500001750000000001021362136622600223050ustar00djmdjmxipag-zohut-zepuk-pisyv-kamog-pupus-netud-tudis-melup-cynov-gaxox openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n010064400017500001750000000010031362136622600226530ustar00djmdjm00cab091b57a154740c1bb7020f46a21a19dc40f647db2aab1babd30cabe241f0437391e68376ba35e48c624b8eaf6b59424d4c1a848c9fd1ef5cdc7c1b7f5e5df23b7ad513b79021286d38c52fdfae35656659e8649b2bf8bedf7c99664e45534007bd1c5dc3de1dafdf2d34ad087155951aa0f3d500b36d0d804bbccdef15ab31ca3dd40bdf5196065a97f397ef576caffb606be8232f6e0614aea0e979b9584296673fabb1dbd9f3212495c428842a2ab1f1768dd424fb6fdceeeab9126cacdfc834f0a0d09ba73ad8360d183ba85bb1565555cc6a536eb8d06df1a1e841107c021ae28a2d8b3465f9d8b58ef4045aea1c4ad7f8bf639574d6b142af67b4eb3 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub010064400017500001750000000012061362136622600221120ustar00djmdjm2048 65537 25587207108642486834576012232250034427766229965612147538722032399009467293691448851087324679403117563681753304072089087252850866332601294130674473984011813227791089686736237645788471744456489819306046398653719249100878753563464696688916667605969658659855996383142110932332560049231682024775766802333675397528993897914717996946881193454997890776063024953924432026083898531677702536941151535135950834711001926404724453460085864892836473957600610133803037286539329764689125111700732309717375455919436557475211197800228646235077584780367991159670572954337165006813357814232200750568307753718414790655085790471723847208627 RSA1 test key #2 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1010064400017500001750000000015671362136622600212550ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXAIBAAKBgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18u d6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKd NSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wIDAQAB 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 RSA test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600216470ustar00djmdjmSHA256:l6itGumSMcRBBAFteCgmjQBIXqLK/jFGUH3viHX1RmE openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb010064400017500001750000000001021362136622600222230ustar00djmdjmxosis-fodod-votot-dibum-ryvac-rediz-naruf-votun-kevis-halis-gexux openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n010064400017500001750000000004031362136622600225740ustar00djmdjm00cb5799544edec5ac00ec781fc21a1119ce9a288e3116e72f3e78fbcba6998adcc98c235f2e77abf1ce92b76f064b624552c9f2582341e622e1a176eef232b5bac1bf3881babc0b7d57a1ef4439170852e192bc329d3523354a39610eab916e50c507c913a2a5f2c7596aad779c5f297121438bd2313ebb4ad4d7debba43271fb openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p010064400017500001750000000002031362136622600225740ustar00djmdjm00f56077ef05be4574906f52175ed8897e8da1626bc9b055534d6a20f6102c57c7a0b31b3e7864b101f4d3d57c35192bc949e14243a9e956361de23c5dd179f583 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q010064400017500001750000000002031362136622600225750ustar00djmdjm00d42541cc014be26370a657953f3adfcbaf713f781639adba33133f184eb3c7d8c2ec7810dca3da58a746fc5b87b34f396934436832e619c67c22f32ebbb36029 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub010064400017500001750000000003451362136622600220330ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+w== RSA test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw010064400017500001750000000017321362136622600217550ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,0C3F819F6EEA66A471BAEEDDA8171606 AhQNxgw7Z2un3dpm6KPHF1u5qVvOczm0yiTyPK4U11B3TTRhXOHdzPLAcKMX71Xq fmLm2/JIZATUbLTaysLKIQlmAgtpmXoKLv9b90R3AXLophgToZzOLpvlQTCt+y9G 0E3QQZG/LFy9BLNyw6uD5cy0RHT3FQb5VQDwfBvR/I+K3qWBFLlb7Rw9bCujYczu D3bimcDj/k6YkrWVsEa81Ch5RF2RClOYufti6bsvc4xIsB0Kd++vokER+kXFuQqf Tl0Jz+SG0kr9QtjVvkhBtSxzJ6/olAosoUySQ5hqsB8iECufBgp1KelXqsHFJQXy gCvVmGiivFUinX0rKOuWCHTplsSKQ9BnPSwDAAs8A7ZLcTXcLs/hMQ5r6fmOYfNN 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RSA test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1.pub010064400017500001750000000003451362136622600227470ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+w== RSA test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512010064400017500001750000000015671362136622600223400ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXAIBAAKBgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18u d6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKd NSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wIDAQAB AoGAXyj5mpjmbD+YlxGIWz/zrM4hGsWgd4VteKEJxT6MMI4uzCRpkMd0ck8oHiwZ GAI/SwUzIsgtONQuH3AXVsUgghW4Ynn+8ksEv0IZ918WDMDwqvqkyrVzsOsZzqYj Pf8DUDKCpwFjnlknJ04yvWBZvVhWtY4OiZ8GV0Ttsu3k+GECQQD1YHfvBb5FdJBv Uhde2Il+jaFia8mwVVNNaiD2ECxXx6CzGz54ZLEB9NPVfDUZK8lJ4UJDqelWNh3i 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RSA test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512.pub010064400017500001750000000003451362136622600231160ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+w== RSA test key #1 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2010064400017500001750000000032171362136622600212500ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA9NEUXp78SAkmL4+eAj4mBzPOjk+ccCPVzkTR+mZJdyTwkJAB HUN4cn4a2kTmh7Er+N8CXCsiqxIOV1GfH2fwaCiBlOEXeQJi/cMjxr9kVWO4FhC6 l1UqbvPUdrUCUZjFTA9/Ah9MKgk7qGYq5SjE3p+sn4GLhRKbqmq9LjiHgMmkBuv/ a1Slit+rXHzO2F8fH5hkjeHivyYVgw45aNvGCe2RRfbpoeW2mRtgIv7y9wSewt6a mhEDXSo/F6mkqA7xVinzro5NettEXLo91tA9Hb6f6x/Mc/GJDNXTKhpWCGeJ6xeW nAefDZORWAY7Y9YbuAxhEJVi9QL5NWoFOA0C6wIDAQABAoIBAQDtRGVVfwhKWHOl zK76xXjdqhwaWJXpKRHiI1jOMawpyKdNtAMgdW+apxUnTXePMurG/HuxEC09VvaH 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ldQAPjkCgYBwjSm5eDUtK2eEPaBtbJykV05CTv5rn6CKC9L7ZBTkCcdU1hxeqe99 wb22decnNawGRP1a5cGwqKJPOfkgybJVkdr6aqQW8ClzdFSaenjzs+nVW+T9JTXf 9lFpIZg5kN/geld3B9B4C99riTM0jg9hbe2RQvpLRTrZbnWMA1XoRw== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp010064400017500001750000000000631362136622600216500ustar00djmdjmSHA256:NoQh0XBUuYUSWqnzOzOBnfpgJTRWLMj7BlWAb8IbjeE openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb010064400017500001750000000001021362136622600222240ustar00djmdjmxogit-gupof-mydon-hocep-zuval-feson-rarif-cefar-tobar-ryvap-kuxex openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n010064400017500001750000000010031362136622600225720ustar00djmdjm00f4d1145e9efc4809262f8f9e023e260733ce8e4f9c7023d5ce44d1fa66497724f09090011d4378727e1ada44e687b12bf8df025c2b22ab120e57519f1f67f068288194e117790262fdc323c6bf645563b81610ba97552a6ef3d476b5025198c54c0f7f021f4c2a093ba8662ae528c4de9fac9f818b85129baa6abd2e388780c9a406ebff6b54a58adfab5c7cced85f1f1f98648de1e2bf2615830e3968dbc609ed9145f6e9a1e5b6991b6022fef2f7049ec2de9a9a11035d2a3f17a9a4a80ef15629f3ae8e4d7adb445cba3dd6d03d1dbe9feb1fcc73f1890cd5d32a1a56086789eb17969c079f0d939158063b63d61bb80c61109562f502f9356a05380d02eb openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p010064400017500001750000000004031362136622600225770ustar00djmdjm00fb82dee3474e88898acebcf23b8a970737490ea07abe5f7c0837c9a36111ca4792f3ad759945fc27d7f78c5accca2ffd8a85c24be949274ab17f8f797b9aaa76f584f28d617e6de3953d46307fa31ec12108ffdab3f105fb3df54156f4728fe07b1598bbb5c5e260d4f73d8b29532bfc6b9f07d8899f87ec819571c8b38e7a87 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q010064400017500001750000000004031362136622600226000ustar00djmdjm00f92f9f57e501dc41cc91ff3b4ad7a2283612d66c0d130f639d4c18376a54e5b5e1939f4d5966bb43929e448a426dadc1fae84cf0d56f64d8df04d1badcfc1fdc8e156d5cd4dcf860ec936fc166261136156010f6df10a70525867d7989fef6752fd8db6faf3fe018bbbc1fa862fb4155445e1a398468d78b4e77884bdf5c197d openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub010064400017500001750000000006151362136622600220340ustar00djmdjmssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQD00RRenvxICSYvj54CPiYHM86OT5xwI9XORNH6Zkl3JPCQkAEdQ3hyfhraROaHsSv43wJcKyKrEg5XUZ8fZ/BoKIGU4Rd5AmL9wyPGv2RVY7gWELqXVSpu89R2tQJRmMVMD38CH0wqCTuoZirlKMTen6yfgYuFEpuqar0uOIeAyaQG6/9rVKWK36tcfM7YXx8fmGSN4eK/JhWDDjlo28YJ7ZFF9umh5baZG2Ai/vL3BJ7C3pqaEQNdKj8XqaSoDvFWKfOujk1620Rcuj3W0D0dvp/rH8xz8YkM1dMqGlYIZ4nrF5acB58Nk5FYBjtj1hu4DGEQlWL1Avk1agU4DQLr RSA test key #2 openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n010064400017500001750000000015671362136622600213520ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXAIBAAKBgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18u d6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKd NSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wIDAQAB AoGAXyj5mpjmbD+YlxGIWz/zrM4hGsWgd4VteKEJxT6MMI4uzCRpkMd0ck8oHiwZ GAI/SwUzIsgtONQuH3AXVsUgghW4Ynn+8ksEv0IZ918WDMDwqvqkyrVzsOsZzqYj Pf8DUDKCpwFjnlknJ04yvWBZvVhWtY4OiZ8GV0Ttsu3k+GECQQD1YHfvBb5FdJBv Uhde2Il+jaFia8mwVVNNaiD2ECxXx6CzGz54ZLEB9NPVfDUZK8lJ4UJDqelWNh3i PF3RefWDAkEA1CVBzAFL4mNwpleVPzrfy69xP3gWOa26MxM/GE6zx9jC7HgQ3KPa WKdG/FuHs085aTRDaDLmGcZ8IvMuu7NgKQJAcIOKmxR0Gd8IN7NZugjqixggb0Pj mLKXXwESGiJyYtHL0zTj4Uqyi6Ya2GJ66o7UXscmnmYz828fJtTtZBdbRwJBALfi C2QvA32Zv/0PEXibKXy996WSC4G3ShwXZKtHHKHvCxY5BDSbehk59VesZrVPyG2e NYdOBxD0cIlCzJE56/ECQAndVkxvO8hwyEFGGwF3faHIAe/OxVb+MjaU25//Pe1/ h/e6tlCk4w9CODpyV685gV394eYwMcGDcIkipTNUDZs= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw010064400017500001750000000020651362136622600220520ustar00djmdjm-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABAFw/Wg/V I5SAXWj/HJr9qeAAAAEAAAAAEAAACXAAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7F rADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu 7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylx IUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wAAAgD1iSGiMlMJt2VH4kx5yr0wCJS+4UOmX0bxKO7UH5Jcul K5eaSe5ZoKE7hTYBaz0K5dRF/0fqLsvVZlE4quDjFLN6Hyavgn2W/QM7SUqBHgRMal9pgH LnxX6mFNWJ+4yb7f3bcbVIdgmMm3sT9Xjwaf5xgzNlR2mkUWtFwjyQh6FxUo5apNzqNBwO l2Q4xfmyZTp1s++pStQ/su6obXpxnE2Nx5G/D84ZL5iWl+njUy/MvJTazHRbiTSyihU+UA mUr5ZNuP3WUYY+h3KVlHpYHJYB7l3AMTKuPMFLhY9V7BJ+DuKPaqBgX4hvRzY0eVQiFr61 ovjWjvfu1ulx550JqdYCgH2PpP0E89OQne35Cxs9QPThfe8DKojC9YquYh9zmVTvr7kNiE Soluk/7oKpQIDaC+/SRk7AJ2e3Cbt1lXyGNn37PuqaaC/apaF/DOD6Yig9aClS7jOUrT96 56trFAYfHEIKbRCUSMCiM1+x6HOLYf5ROrGE9KxT3kUD9XMsMpTva+cPpHUpbGpXcYE10N MyYDz+V5M2/ZoIdEhscJNQ3UnhaZpeEaqcOyNyo90n3Dnaw/WpMDD/kNMGfm8daTaYInnQ QnwA2gwlYfpTAqxE71oXgOuGmtA0yqJB4778Xq26Pb+B7/mZZZe6n0FVmiNC+ZG37ZGOw/ iGL9e2Sxzw== -----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c010064400017500001750000000005671362136622600200210ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" void sshkey_tests(void); void sshkey_file_tests(void); void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void); void tests(void) { sshkey_tests(); sshkey_file_tests(); sshkey_fuzz_tests(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/test_helper004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600174375ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile010064400017500001750000000003661362136622600211600ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 2016/07/04 18:01:44 guenther Exp $ LIB= test_helper SRCS= test_helper.c fuzz.c NOPROFILE= yes NOPIC= yes # Hack to allow building with SUBDIR in ../../Makefile regress: all install: @echo -n .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c010064400017500001750000000242361362136622600206640ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: fuzz.c,v 1.8 2015/03/03 20:42:49 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Utility functions/framework for fuzz tests */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include "test_helper.h" #include "atomicio.h" /* #define FUZZ_DEBUG */ #ifdef FUZZ_DEBUG # define FUZZ_DBG(x) do { \ printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \ printf x; \ printf("\n"); \ fflush(stdout); \ } while (0) #else # define FUZZ_DBG(x) #endif /* For brevity later */ typedef unsigned long long fuzz_ullong; /* For base-64 fuzzing */ static const char fuzz_b64chars[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; struct fuzz { /* Fuzz method currently in use */ int strategy; /* Fuzz methods remaining */ int strategies; /* Original seed data blob */ void *seed; size_t slen; /* Current working copy of seed with fuzz mutations applied */ u_char *fuzzed; /* Used by fuzz methods */ size_t o1, o2; }; static const char * fuzz_ntop(u_int n) { switch (n) { case 0: return "NONE"; case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: return "FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP"; case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: return "FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP"; case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: return "FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP"; case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: return "FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP"; case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: return "FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START"; case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: return "FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END"; case FUZZ_BASE64: return "FUZZ_BASE64"; default: abort(); } } static int fuzz_fmt(struct fuzz *fuzz, char *s, size_t n) { if (fuzz == NULL) return -1; switch (fuzz->strategy) { case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (bit: %zu)\n", fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen * 8, fuzz->o1); return 0; case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (bits: %zu, %zu)\n", fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), (((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->o2) * fuzz->slen * 8) + fuzz->o1, ((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->slen * 8) * fuzz->slen * 8, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2); return 0; case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (byte: %zu)\n", fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1); return 0; case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (bytes: %zu, %zu)\n", fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), (((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->o2) * fuzz->slen) + fuzz->o1, ((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->slen) * fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2); return 0; case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (offset: %zu)\n", fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1); return 0; case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (offset: %zu)\n", fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1); return 0; case FUZZ_BASE64: assert(fuzz->o2 < sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1); snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (offset: %zu char: %c)\n", fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), (fuzz->o1 * (fuzz_ullong)64) + fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen * (fuzz_ullong)64, fuzz->o1, fuzz_b64chars[fuzz->o2]); return 0; default: return -1; abort(); } } static void dump(u_char *p, size_t len) { size_t i, j; for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) { fprintf(stderr, "%.4zd: ", i); for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { if (j < len) fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", p[j]); else fprintf(stderr, " "); } fprintf(stderr, " "); for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { if (j < len) { if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j])) fprintf(stderr, "%c", p[j]); else fprintf(stderr, "."); } } fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } } void fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz) { char buf[256]; if (fuzz_fmt(fuzz, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: fuzz invalid\n", __func__); abort(); } fputs(buf, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "fuzz original %p len = %zu\n", fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); dump(fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); fprintf(stderr, "fuzz context %p len = %zu\n", fuzz, fuzz_len(fuzz)); dump(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); } static struct fuzz *last_fuzz; static void siginfo(int unused __attribute__((__unused__))) { char buf[256]; test_info(buf, sizeof(buf)); atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf)); if (last_fuzz != NULL) { fuzz_fmt(last_fuzz, buf, sizeof(buf)); atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf)); } } struct fuzz * fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l) { struct fuzz *ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1); assert(p != NULL); assert(ret != NULL); ret->seed = malloc(l); assert(ret->seed != NULL); memcpy(ret->seed, p, l); ret->slen = l; ret->strategies = strategies; assert(ret->slen < SIZE_MAX / 8); assert(ret->strategies <= (FUZZ_MAX|(FUZZ_MAX-1))); FUZZ_DBG(("begin, ret = %p", ret)); fuzz_next(ret); last_fuzz = ret; #ifdef SIGINFO signal(SIGINFO, siginfo); #endif signal(SIGUSR1, siginfo); return ret; } void fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz) { FUZZ_DBG(("cleanup, fuzz = %p", fuzz)); last_fuzz = NULL; #ifdef SIGINFO signal(SIGINFO, SIG_DFL); #endif signal(SIGUSR1, SIG_DFL); assert(fuzz != NULL); assert(fuzz->seed != NULL); assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); free(fuzz->seed); free(fuzz->fuzzed); free(fuzz); } static int fuzz_strategy_done(struct fuzz *fuzz) { FUZZ_DBG(("fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen)); switch (fuzz->strategy) { case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: return fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen * 8; case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: return fuzz->o2 >= fuzz->slen * 8; case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: return fuzz->o2 >= fuzz->slen; case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: case FUZZ_BASE64: return fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen; default: abort(); } } void fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz) { u_int i; FUZZ_DBG(("start, fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, strategies = 0x%lx, " "o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), (u_long)fuzz->strategies, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen)); if (fuzz->strategy == 0 || fuzz_strategy_done(fuzz)) { /* If we are just starting out, we need to allocate too */ if (fuzz->fuzzed == NULL) { FUZZ_DBG(("alloc")); fuzz->fuzzed = calloc(fuzz->slen, 1); } /* Pick next strategy */ FUZZ_DBG(("advance")); for (i = 1; i <= FUZZ_MAX; i <<= 1) { if ((fuzz->strategies & i) != 0) { fuzz->strategy = i; break; } } FUZZ_DBG(("selected = %u", fuzz->strategy)); if (fuzz->strategy == 0) { FUZZ_DBG(("done, no more strategies")); return; } fuzz->strategies &= ~(fuzz->strategy); fuzz->o1 = fuzz->o2 = 0; } assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); switch (fuzz->strategy) { case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: assert(fuzz->o1 / 8 < fuzz->slen); memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o1 % 8); fuzz->o1++; break; case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: assert(fuzz->o1 / 8 < fuzz->slen); assert(fuzz->o2 / 8 < fuzz->slen); memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o1 % 8); fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o2 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o2 % 8); fuzz->o1++; if (fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen * 8) { fuzz->o1 = 0; fuzz->o2++; } break; case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] ^= 0xff; fuzz->o1++; break; case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); assert(fuzz->o2 < fuzz->slen); memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] ^= 0xff; fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o2] ^= 0xff; fuzz->o1++; if (fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen) { fuzz->o1 = 0; fuzz->o2++; } break; case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); fuzz->o1++; break; case FUZZ_BASE64: assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); assert(fuzz->o2 < sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1); memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] = fuzz_b64chars[fuzz->o2]; fuzz->o2++; if (fuzz->o2 >= sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1) { fuzz->o2 = 0; fuzz->o1++; } break; default: abort(); } FUZZ_DBG(("done, fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, strategies = 0x%lx, " "o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), (u_long)fuzz->strategies, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen)); } int fuzz_matches_original(struct fuzz *fuzz) { if (fuzz_len(fuzz) != fuzz->slen) return 0; return memcmp(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen) == 0; } int fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz) { FUZZ_DBG(("fuzz = %p, strategies = 0x%lx", fuzz, (u_long)fuzz->strategies)); return fuzz_strategy_done(fuzz) && fuzz->strategies == 0; } size_t fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz) { assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); switch (fuzz->strategy) { case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: case FUZZ_BASE64: return fuzz->slen; case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen); return fuzz->slen - fuzz->o1; default: abort(); } } u_char * fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz) { assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); switch (fuzz->strategy) { case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: case FUZZ_BASE64: return fuzz->fuzzed; case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen); return fuzz->fuzzed + fuzz->o1; case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen); return fuzz->fuzzed; default: abort(); } } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c010064400017500001750000000325631362136622600222060ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.12 2019/08/02 01:41:24 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) # include #endif #include "entropy.h" #include "test_helper.h" #include "atomicio.h" #define TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred) do { \ switch (pred) { \ case TEST_EQ: \ if (r == 0) \ return; \ break; \ case TEST_NE: \ if (r != 0) \ return; \ break; \ case TEST_LT: \ if (r < 0) \ return; \ break; \ case TEST_LE: \ if (r <= 0) \ return; \ break; \ case TEST_GT: \ if (r > 0) \ return; \ break; \ case TEST_GE: \ if (r >= 0) \ return; \ break; \ default: \ abort(); \ } \ } while (0) #define TEST_CHECK(x1, x2, pred) do { \ switch (pred) { \ case TEST_EQ: \ if (x1 == x2) \ return; \ break; \ case TEST_NE: \ if (x1 != x2) \ return; \ break; \ case TEST_LT: \ if (x1 < x2) \ return; \ break; \ case TEST_LE: \ if (x1 <= x2) \ return; \ break; \ case TEST_GT: \ if (x1 > x2) \ return; \ break; \ case TEST_GE: \ if (x1 >= x2) \ return; \ break; \ default: \ abort(); \ } \ } while (0) extern char *__progname; static int verbose_mode = 0; static int quiet_mode = 0; static char *active_test_name = NULL; static u_int test_number = 0; static test_onerror_func_t *test_onerror = NULL; static void *onerror_ctx = NULL; static const char *data_dir = NULL; static char subtest_info[512]; static int fast = 0; static int slow = 0; int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ch; seed_rng(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(); #endif /* Handle systems without __progname */ if (__progname == NULL) { __progname = strrchr(argv[0], '/'); if (__progname == NULL || __progname[1] == '\0') __progname = argv[0]; else __progname++; if ((__progname = strdup(__progname)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "strdup failed\n"); exit(1); } } while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "Ffvqd:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'F': slow = 1; break; case 'f': fast = 1; break; case 'd': data_dir = optarg; break; case 'q': verbose_mode = 0; quiet_mode = 1; break; case 'v': verbose_mode = 1; quiet_mode = 0; break; default: fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognised command line option\n"); fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname); exit(1); } } setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); if (!quiet_mode) printf("%s: ", __progname); if (verbose_mode) printf("\n"); tests(); if (!quiet_mode) printf(" %u tests ok\n", test_number); return 0; } int test_is_verbose(void) { return verbose_mode; } int test_is_quiet(void) { return quiet_mode; } int test_is_fast(void) { return fast; } int test_is_slow(void) { return slow; } const char * test_data_file(const char *name) { static char ret[PATH_MAX]; if (data_dir != NULL) snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", data_dir, name); else strlcpy(ret, name, sizeof(ret)); if (access(ret, F_OK) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Cannot access data file %s: %s\n", ret, strerror(errno)); exit(1); } return ret; } void test_info(char *s, size_t len) { snprintf(s, len, "In test %u: \"%s\"%s%s\n", test_number, active_test_name == NULL ? "" : active_test_name, *subtest_info != '\0' ? " - " : "", subtest_info); } static void siginfo(int unused __attribute__((__unused__))) { char buf[256]; test_info(buf, sizeof(buf)); atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf)); } void test_start(const char *n) { assert(active_test_name == NULL); assert((active_test_name = strdup(n)) != NULL); *subtest_info = '\0'; if (verbose_mode) printf("test %u - \"%s\": ", test_number, active_test_name); test_number++; #ifdef SIGINFO signal(SIGINFO, siginfo); #endif signal(SIGUSR1, siginfo); } void set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx) { test_onerror = f; onerror_ctx = ctx; } void test_done(void) { *subtest_info = '\0'; assert(active_test_name != NULL); free(active_test_name); active_test_name = NULL; if (verbose_mode) printf("OK\n"); else if (!quiet_mode) { printf("."); fflush(stdout); } } void test_subtest_info(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); vsnprintf(subtest_info, sizeof(subtest_info), fmt, ap); va_end(ap); } void ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL long openssl_error = ERR_get_error(); if (openssl_error == 0) return; fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d: uncaught OpenSSL error: %s", file, line, ERR_error_string(openssl_error, NULL)); #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d: uncaught OpenSSL error ", file, line); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ abort(); } static const char * pred_name(enum test_predicate p) { switch (p) { case TEST_EQ: return "EQ"; case TEST_NE: return "NE"; case TEST_LT: return "LT"; case TEST_LE: return "LE"; case TEST_GT: return "GT"; case TEST_GE: return "GE"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } static void test_die(void) { if (test_onerror != NULL) test_onerror(onerror_ctx); abort(); } static void test_header(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, const char *name, enum test_predicate pred) { fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d test #%u \"%s\"%s%s\n", file, line, test_number, active_test_name, *subtest_info != '\0' ? " - " : "", subtest_info); fprintf(stderr, "ASSERT_%s_%s(%s%s%s) failed:\n", name, pred_name(pred), a1, a2 != NULL ? ", " : "", a2 != NULL ? a2 : ""); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL void assert_bignum(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { int r = BN_cmp(aa1, aa2); TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "BIGNUM", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a1, BN_bn2hex(aa1)); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a2, BN_bn2hex(aa2)); test_die(); } #endif void assert_string(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { int r; /* Verify pointers are not NULL */ assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE); assert_ptr(file, line, a2, "NULL", aa2, NULL, TEST_NE); r = strcmp(aa1, aa2); TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, aa1, strlen(aa1)); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, aa2, strlen(aa2)); test_die(); } static char * tohex(const void *_s, size_t l) { u_int8_t *s = (u_int8_t *)_s; size_t i, j; const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef"; char *r = malloc((l * 2) + 1); assert(r != NULL); for (i = j = 0; i < l; i++) { r[j++] = hex[(s[i] >> 4) & 0xf]; r[j++] = hex[s[i] & 0xf]; } r[j] = '\0'; return r; } void assert_mem(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred) { int r; char *aa1_tohex = NULL; char *aa2_tohex = NULL; if (l == 0) return; /* If length is >0, then verify pointers are not NULL */ assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE); assert_ptr(file, line, a2, "NULL", aa2, NULL, TEST_NE); r = memcmp(aa1, aa2, l); TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred); aa1_tohex = tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 256)); aa2_tohex = tohex(aa2, MIN(l, 256)); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, aa1_tohex, l); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, aa2_tohex, l); free(aa1_tohex); free(aa2_tohex); test_die(); } static int memvalcmp(const u_int8_t *s, u_char v, size_t l, size_t *where) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { if (s[i] != v) { *where = i; return 1; } } return 0; } void assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred) { size_t where = -1; int r; char tmp[64]; char *aa1_tohex = NULL; if (l == 0) return; /* If length is >0, then verify the pointer is not NULL */ assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE); r = memvalcmp(aa1, v, l, &where); TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, NULL, "MEM_ZERO", pred); aa1_tohex = tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 20)); fprintf(stderr, "%20s = %s%s (len %zu)\n", a1, aa1_tohex, l > 20 ? "..." : "", l); free(aa1_tohex); snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "(%s)[%zu]", a1, where); fprintf(stderr, "%20s = 0x%02x (expected 0x%02x)\n", tmp, ((u_char *)aa1)[where], v); test_die(); } void assert_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "INT", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a1, aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a2, aa2); test_die(); } void assert_size_t(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "SIZE_T", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a1, aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a2, aa2); test_die(); } void assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U_INT", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a1, aa1, aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a2, aa2, aa2); test_die(); } void assert_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a1, aa1, aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a2, aa2, aa2); test_die(); } void assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG LONG", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a1, aa1, aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a2, aa2, aa2); test_die(); } void assert_char(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { char buf[8]; TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "CHAR", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1, vis(buf, aa1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1, vis(buf, aa2, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa2); test_die(); } void assert_u8(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U8", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2); test_die(); } void assert_u16(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U16", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2); test_die(); } void assert_u32(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U32", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2); test_die(); } void assert_u64(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U64", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a1, (unsigned long long)aa1, (unsigned long long)aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a2, (unsigned long long)aa2, (unsigned long long)aa2); test_die(); } void assert_ptr(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred) { TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "PTR", pred); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a1, aa1); fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a2, aa2); test_die(); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h010064400017500001750000000325651362136622600222150ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.9 2018/10/17 23:28:05 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */ #ifndef _TEST_HELPER_H #define _TEST_HELPER_H #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif enum test_predicate { TEST_EQ, TEST_NE, TEST_LT, TEST_LE, TEST_GT, TEST_GE }; typedef void (test_onerror_func_t)(void *); /* Supplied by test suite */ void tests(void); const char *test_data_file(const char *name); void test_start(const char *n); void test_info(char *s, size_t len); void set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx); void test_done(void); int test_is_verbose(void); int test_is_quiet(void); int test_is_fast(void); int test_is_slow(void); void test_subtest_info(const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL void assert_bignum(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred); #endif void assert_string(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_mem(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_size_t(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_char(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_ptr(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_u8(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_u16(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_u32(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); void assert_u64(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); #define TEST_START(n) test_start(n) #define TEST_DONE() test_done() #define TEST_ONERROR(f, c) set_onerror_func(f, c) #define SSL_ERR_CHECK() ssl_err_check(__FILE__, __LINE__) #define ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_MEM_EQ(a1, a2, l) \ assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(a1, c, l) \ assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, c, l, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_EQ(a1, l) \ assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_CHAR_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_U8_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_U16_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_U32_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_U64_EQ(a1, a2) \ assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) #define ASSERT_BIGNUM_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_STRING_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_MEM_NE(a1, a2, l) \ assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(a1, l) \ assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_INT_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_SIZE_T_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_U_INT_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_CHAR_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_PTR_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_U8_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_U16_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_U32_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_U64_NE(a1, a2) \ assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) #define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_STRING_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_MEM_LT(a1, a2, l) \ assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_INT_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_U_INT_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_CHAR_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_PTR_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_U8_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_U16_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_U32_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_U64_LT(a1, a2) \ assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) #define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_STRING_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_MEM_LE(a1, a2, l) \ assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_INT_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_U_INT_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_CHAR_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_PTR_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_U8_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_U16_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_U32_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_U64_LE(a1, a2) \ assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) #define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_STRING_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_MEM_GT(a1, a2, l) \ assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_INT_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_U_INT_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_CHAR_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_PTR_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_U8_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_U16_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_U32_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_U64_GT(a1, a2) \ assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) #define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_STRING_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_MEM_GE(a1, a2, l) \ assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_INT_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_U_INT_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_CHAR_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_PTR_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_U8_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_U16_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_U32_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) #define ASSERT_U64_GE(a1, a2) \ assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) /* Fuzzing support */ struct fuzz; #define FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP 0x00000001 /* Flip one bit at a time */ #define FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP 0x00000002 /* Flip two bits at a time */ #define FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP 0x00000004 /* Flip one byte at a time */ #define FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP 0x00000008 /* Flip two bytes at a time */ #define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START 0x00000010 /* Truncate from beginning */ #define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END 0x00000020 /* Truncate from end */ #define FUZZ_BASE64 0x00000040 /* Try all base64 chars */ #define FUZZ_MAX FUZZ_BASE64 /* Start fuzzing a blob of data with selected strategies (bitmask) */ struct fuzz *fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l); /* Free a fuzz context */ void fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz); /* Prepare the next fuzz case in the series */ void fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz); /* * Check whether this fuzz case is identical to the original * This is slow, but useful if the caller needs to ensure that all tests * generated change the input (e.g. when fuzzing signatures). */ int fuzz_matches_original(struct fuzz *fuzz); /* Determine whether the current fuzz sequence is exhausted (nonzero = yes) */ int fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz); /* Return the length and a pointer to the current fuzzed case */ size_t fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz); u_char *fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz); /* Dump the current fuzz case to stderr */ void fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz); #endif /* _TEST_HELPER_H */ openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/utf8004075500017500001750000000000001362136622600160075ustar00djmdjmopenssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/utf8/Makefile010064400017500001750000000003731362136622600175260ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ PROG=test_utf8 SRCS=tests.c # From usr.bin/ssh SRCS+=utf8.c atomicio.c REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} .include openssh-8.2p1/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c010064400017500001750000000057161362136622600174020ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/19 00:11:29 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for the utf8.h *mprintf() API * * Written by Ingo Schwarze in 2016 * and placed in the public domain. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "utf8.h" static void badarg(void) { char buf[16]; int len, width; width = 1; TEST_START("utf8_badarg"); len = snmprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), &width, "\377"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(len, -1); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(buf, ""); ASSERT_INT_EQ(width, 0); TEST_DONE(); } static void one(int utf8, const char *name, const char *mbs, int width, int wantwidth, int wantlen, const char *wants) { char buf[16]; int *wp; int len; if (wantlen == -2) wantlen = strlen(wants); (void)strlcpy(buf, utf8 ? "utf8_" : "c_", sizeof(buf)); (void)strlcat(buf, name, sizeof(buf)); TEST_START(buf); wp = wantwidth == -2 ? NULL : &width; len = snmprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), wp, "%s", mbs); ASSERT_INT_EQ(len, wantlen); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(buf, wants); ASSERT_INT_EQ(width, wantwidth); TEST_DONE(); } void tests(void) { char *loc; TEST_START("utf8_setlocale"); loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL); TEST_DONE(); badarg(); one(1, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, ""); one(1, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x"); one(1, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb"); one(1, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb"); one(1, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb"); one(1, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x"); one(1, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x"); one(1, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x"); one(1, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b"); one(1, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345"); one(1, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012"); one(1, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12"); one(1, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a"); one(1, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 3, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201"); one(1, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 4, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201"); TEST_START("C_setlocale"); loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL); TEST_DONE(); badarg(); one(0, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, ""); one(0, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x"); one(0, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb"); one(0, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb"); one(0, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb"); one(0, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x"); one(0, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x"); one(0, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x"); one(0, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b"); one(0, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345"); one(0, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012"); one(0, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12"); one(0, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a"); one(0, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 7, 5, -1, "a\\343"); one(0, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 13, 13, 13, "a\\343\\201\\201"); } openssh-8.2p1/regress/valgrind-unit.sh010075500017500001750000000011421362136622600162530ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh UNIT_BINARY="$1" shift UNIT_ARGS="$@" test "x$OBJ" = "x" && OBJ=$PWD # This mostly replicates the logic in test-exec.sh for running the # regress tests under valgrind, except that we unconditionally enable # leak checking because the unit tests should be clean. VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full" VG_TEST=`basename $UNIT_BINARY` VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}.%p" VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK --log-file=${VG_LOG}" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes" VG_PATH="valgrind" if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH" fi exec $VG_PATH $VG_OPTS $UNIT_BINARY $UNIT_ARGS openssh-8.2p1/regress/yes-head.sh010064400017500001750000000006211362136622600151650ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: yes-head.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="yes pipe head" lines=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy thishost 'sh -c "while true;do echo yes;done | _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 head -2000"' | (sleep 3 ; wc -l)` if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "yes|head test failed" lines = 0; fi if [ $lines -ne 2000 ]; then fail "yes|head returns $lines lines instead of 2000" fi openssh-8.2p1/rijndael.c010064400017500001750000001471121362136622600134230ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.20 2015/03/16 11:09:52 djm Exp $ */ /** * rijndael-alg-fst.c * * @version 3.0 (December 2000) * * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) * * @author Vincent Rijmen * @author Antoon Bosselaers * @author Paulo Barreto * * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include "rijndael.h" #undef FULL_UNROLL /* Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01]; Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02]; Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d]; Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09]; Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e]; Td4[x] = Si[x].[01]; */ static const u32 Te0[256] = { 0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU, 0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U, 0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU, 0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU, 0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U, 0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU, 0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU, 0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU, 0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU, 0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU, 0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U, 0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU, 0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU, 0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U, 0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU, 0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU, 0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU, 0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU, 0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU, 0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U, 0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU, 0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU, 0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU, 0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU, 0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U, 0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U, 0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U, 0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U, 0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU, 0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U, 0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U, 0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU, 0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU, 0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U, 0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U, 0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U, 0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU, 0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U, 0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU, 0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U, 0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU, 0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U, 0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U, 0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU, 0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U, 0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U, 0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U, 0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U, 0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U, 0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U, 0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U, 0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U, 0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU, 0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U, 0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U, 0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U, 0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U, 0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U, 0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U, 0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU, 0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U, 0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U, 0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U, 0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU, }; static const u32 Te1[256] = { 0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU, 0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U, 0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU, 0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U, 0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU, 0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U, 0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU, 0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U, 0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U, 0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU, 0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U, 0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U, 0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U, 0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU, 0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U, 0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U, 0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU, 0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U, 0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U, 0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U, 0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU, 0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU, 0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U, 0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU, 0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU, 0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U, 0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU, 0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U, 0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU, 0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U, 0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U, 0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U, 0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU, 0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U, 0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU, 0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U, 0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU, 0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U, 0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U, 0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU, 0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU, 0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU, 0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U, 0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U, 0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU, 0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U, 0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU, 0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U, 0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU, 0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U, 0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU, 0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU, 0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U, 0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU, 0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U, 0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU, 0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U, 0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U, 0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U, 0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU, 0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU, 0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U, 0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU, 0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U, }; static const u32 Te2[256] = { 0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU, 0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U, 0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU, 0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U, 0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU, 0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U, 0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU, 0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U, 0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U, 0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU, 0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U, 0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U, 0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U, 0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU, 0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U, 0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U, 0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU, 0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U, 0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U, 0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U, 0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU, 0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU, 0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U, 0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU, 0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU, 0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U, 0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU, 0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U, 0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU, 0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U, 0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U, 0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U, 0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU, 0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U, 0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU, 0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U, 0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU, 0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U, 0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U, 0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU, 0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU, 0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU, 0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U, 0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U, 0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU, 0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U, 0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU, 0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U, 0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU, 0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U, 0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU, 0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU, 0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U, 0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU, 0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U, 0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU, 0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U, 0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U, 0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U, 0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU, 0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU, 0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U, 0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU, 0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U, }; static const u32 Te3[256] = { 0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U, 0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U, 0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U, 0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU, 0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU, 0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU, 0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U, 0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU, 0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU, 0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U, 0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U, 0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU, 0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU, 0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU, 0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU, 0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU, 0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U, 0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU, 0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU, 0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U, 0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U, 0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U, 0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U, 0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U, 0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU, 0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U, 0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU, 0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU, 0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U, 0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U, 0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U, 0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU, 0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U, 0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU, 0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU, 0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U, 0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U, 0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU, 0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U, 0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU, 0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U, 0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U, 0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U, 0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U, 0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU, 0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U, 0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU, 0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U, 0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU, 0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U, 0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU, 0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU, 0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU, 0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU, 0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U, 0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U, 0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U, 0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U, 0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U, 0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U, 0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU, 0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U, 0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU, 0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU, }; #if 0 static const u32 Td0[256] = { 0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U, 0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U, 0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U, 0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU, 0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U, 0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U, 0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU, 0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U, 0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU, 0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U, 0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U, 0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U, 0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U, 0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU, 0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U, 0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU, 0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U, 0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU, 0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U, 0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U, 0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U, 0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU, 0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U, 0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU, 0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U, 0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU, 0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U, 0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU, 0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU, 0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U, 0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU, 0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U, 0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU, 0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U, 0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U, 0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U, 0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU, 0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U, 0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U, 0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU, 0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U, 0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U, 0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U, 0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U, 0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U, 0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU, 0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U, 0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U, 0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U, 0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U, 0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U, 0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU, 0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU, 0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU, 0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU, 0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U, 0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U, 0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU, 0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU, 0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U, 0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU, 0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U, 0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U, 0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U, }; static const u32 Td1[256] = { 0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU, 0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U, 0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU, 0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U, 0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U, 0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U, 0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U, 0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U, 0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U, 0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU, 0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU, 0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU, 0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U, 0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU, 0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U, 0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U, 0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U, 0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU, 0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU, 0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U, 0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU, 0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U, 0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU, 0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU, 0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U, 0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U, 0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U, 0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU, 0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U, 0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU, 0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U, 0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U, 0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U, 0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU, 0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U, 0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U, 0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U, 0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U, 0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U, 0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U, 0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU, 0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU, 0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U, 0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU, 0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U, 0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU, 0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU, 0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U, 0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU, 0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U, 0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U, 0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U, 0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U, 0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U, 0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U, 0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U, 0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU, 0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U, 0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U, 0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU, 0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U, 0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U, 0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U, 0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U, }; static const u32 Td2[256] = { 0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U, 0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U, 0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U, 0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U, 0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU, 0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U, 0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U, 0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U, 0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U, 0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU, 0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U, 0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U, 0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU, 0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U, 0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U, 0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U, 0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U, 0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U, 0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U, 0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU, 0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U, 0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U, 0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U, 0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U, 0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U, 0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU, 0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU, 0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U, 0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU, 0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U, 0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU, 0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU, 0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU, 0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU, 0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U, 0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U, 0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U, 0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U, 0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U, 0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U, 0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U, 0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU, 0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU, 0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U, 0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U, 0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU, 0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU, 0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U, 0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U, 0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U, 0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U, 0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U, 0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U, 0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U, 0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU, 0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U, 0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U, 0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U, 0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U, 0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U, 0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U, 0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU, 0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U, 0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U, }; static const u32 Td3[256] = { 0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU, 0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU, 0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U, 0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U, 0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU, 0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU, 0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U, 0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU, 0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U, 0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU, 0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U, 0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U, 0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U, 0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U, 0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U, 0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU, 0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU, 0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U, 0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U, 0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU, 0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU, 0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U, 0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U, 0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U, 0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U, 0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU, 0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U, 0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U, 0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU, 0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU, 0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U, 0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U, 0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U, 0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU, 0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U, 0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U, 0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U, 0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U, 0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U, 0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U, 0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U, 0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU, 0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U, 0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U, 0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU, 0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU, 0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U, 0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU, 0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U, 0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U, 0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U, 0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U, 0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U, 0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U, 0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU, 0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU, 0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU, 0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU, 0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U, 0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U, 0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U, 0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU, 0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U, 0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U, }; static const u8 Td4[256] = { 0x52U, 0x09U, 0x6aU, 0xd5U, 0x30U, 0x36U, 0xa5U, 0x38U, 0xbfU, 0x40U, 0xa3U, 0x9eU, 0x81U, 0xf3U, 0xd7U, 0xfbU, 0x7cU, 0xe3U, 0x39U, 0x82U, 0x9bU, 0x2fU, 0xffU, 0x87U, 0x34U, 0x8eU, 0x43U, 0x44U, 0xc4U, 0xdeU, 0xe9U, 0xcbU, 0x54U, 0x7bU, 0x94U, 0x32U, 0xa6U, 0xc2U, 0x23U, 0x3dU, 0xeeU, 0x4cU, 0x95U, 0x0bU, 0x42U, 0xfaU, 0xc3U, 0x4eU, 0x08U, 0x2eU, 0xa1U, 0x66U, 0x28U, 0xd9U, 0x24U, 0xb2U, 0x76U, 0x5bU, 0xa2U, 0x49U, 0x6dU, 0x8bU, 0xd1U, 0x25U, 0x72U, 0xf8U, 0xf6U, 0x64U, 0x86U, 0x68U, 0x98U, 0x16U, 0xd4U, 0xa4U, 0x5cU, 0xccU, 0x5dU, 0x65U, 0xb6U, 0x92U, 0x6cU, 0x70U, 0x48U, 0x50U, 0xfdU, 0xedU, 0xb9U, 0xdaU, 0x5eU, 0x15U, 0x46U, 0x57U, 0xa7U, 0x8dU, 0x9dU, 0x84U, 0x90U, 0xd8U, 0xabU, 0x00U, 0x8cU, 0xbcU, 0xd3U, 0x0aU, 0xf7U, 0xe4U, 0x58U, 0x05U, 0xb8U, 0xb3U, 0x45U, 0x06U, 0xd0U, 0x2cU, 0x1eU, 0x8fU, 0xcaU, 0x3fU, 0x0fU, 0x02U, 0xc1U, 0xafU, 0xbdU, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x13U, 0x8aU, 0x6bU, 0x3aU, 0x91U, 0x11U, 0x41U, 0x4fU, 0x67U, 0xdcU, 0xeaU, 0x97U, 0xf2U, 0xcfU, 0xceU, 0xf0U, 0xb4U, 0xe6U, 0x73U, 0x96U, 0xacU, 0x74U, 0x22U, 0xe7U, 0xadU, 0x35U, 0x85U, 0xe2U, 0xf9U, 0x37U, 0xe8U, 0x1cU, 0x75U, 0xdfU, 0x6eU, 0x47U, 0xf1U, 0x1aU, 0x71U, 0x1dU, 0x29U, 0xc5U, 0x89U, 0x6fU, 0xb7U, 0x62U, 0x0eU, 0xaaU, 0x18U, 0xbeU, 0x1bU, 0xfcU, 0x56U, 0x3eU, 0x4bU, 0xc6U, 0xd2U, 0x79U, 0x20U, 0x9aU, 0xdbU, 0xc0U, 0xfeU, 0x78U, 0xcdU, 0x5aU, 0xf4U, 0x1fU, 0xddU, 0xa8U, 0x33U, 0x88U, 0x07U, 0xc7U, 0x31U, 0xb1U, 0x12U, 0x10U, 0x59U, 0x27U, 0x80U, 0xecU, 0x5fU, 0x60U, 0x51U, 0x7fU, 0xa9U, 0x19U, 0xb5U, 0x4aU, 0x0dU, 0x2dU, 0xe5U, 0x7aU, 0x9fU, 0x93U, 0xc9U, 0x9cU, 0xefU, 0xa0U, 0xe0U, 0x3bU, 0x4dU, 0xaeU, 0x2aU, 0xf5U, 0xb0U, 0xc8U, 0xebU, 0xbbU, 0x3cU, 0x83U, 0x53U, 0x99U, 0x61U, 0x17U, 0x2bU, 0x04U, 0x7eU, 0xbaU, 0x77U, 0xd6U, 0x26U, 0xe1U, 0x69U, 0x14U, 0x63U, 0x55U, 0x21U, 0x0cU, 0x7dU, }; #endif static const u32 rcon[] = { 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000, 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000, 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */ }; #define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3])) #define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); } /** * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule. * * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. */ int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) { int i = 0; u32 temp; rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey ); rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey + 4); rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey + 8); rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12); if (keyBits == 128) { for (;;) { temp = rk[3]; rk[4] = rk[0] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6]; if (++i == 10) { return 10; } rk += 4; } } rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16); rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20); if (keyBits == 192) { for (;;) { temp = rk[ 5]; rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8]; if (++i == 8) { return 12; } rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10]; rk += 6; } } rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24); rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28); if (keyBits == 256) { for (;;) { temp = rk[ 7]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10]; if (++i == 7) { return 14; } temp = rk[11]; rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; rk += 8; } } return 0; } #if 0 /** * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule. * * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. */ int rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) { int Nr, i, j; u32 temp; /* expand the cipher key: */ Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits); /* invert the order of the round keys: */ for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) { temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp; temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp; temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp; temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp; } /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */ for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) { rk += 4; rk[0] = Td0[Te1[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[1] = Td0[Te1[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[2] = Td0[Te1[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[3] = Td0[Te1[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; } return Nr; } #endif void rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]) { u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; #ifndef FULL_UNROLL int r; #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * map byte array block to cipher state * and add initial round key: */ s0 = GETU32(pt ) ^ rk[0]; s1 = GETU32(pt + 4) ^ rk[1]; s2 = GETU32(pt + 8) ^ rk[2]; s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3]; #ifdef FULL_UNROLL /* round 1: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; /* round 2: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; /* round 3: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; /* round 4: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; /* round 5: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; /* round 6: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; /* round 7: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; /* round 8: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; /* round 9: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; if (Nr > 10) { /* round 10: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; /* round 11: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; if (Nr > 12) { /* round 12: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; /* round 13: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; } } rk += Nr << 2; #else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ /* * Nr - 1 full rounds: */ r = Nr >> 1; for (;;) { t0 = Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[4]; t1 = Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[5]; t2 = Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[6]; t3 = Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[7]; rk += 8; if (--r == 0) { break; } s0 = Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[0]; s1 = Te0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[1]; s2 = Te0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[2]; s3 = Te0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[3]; } #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * apply last round and * map cipher state to byte array block: */ s0 = (Te2[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[0]; PUTU32(ct , s0); s1 = (Te2[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[1]; PUTU32(ct + 4, s1); s2 = (Te2[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[2]; PUTU32(ct + 8, s2); s3 = (Te2[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[3]; PUTU32(ct + 12, s3); } #if 0 static void rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], u8 pt[16]) { u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; #ifndef FULL_UNROLL int r; #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * map byte array block to cipher state * and add initial round key: */ s0 = GETU32(ct ) ^ rk[0]; s1 = GETU32(ct + 4) ^ rk[1]; s2 = GETU32(ct + 8) ^ rk[2]; s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3]; #ifdef FULL_UNROLL /* round 1: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; /* round 2: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; /* round 3: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; /* round 4: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; /* round 5: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; /* round 6: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; /* round 7: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; /* round 8: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; /* round 9: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; if (Nr > 10) { /* round 10: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; /* round 11: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; if (Nr > 12) { /* round 12: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; /* round 13: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; } } rk += Nr << 2; #else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ /* * Nr - 1 full rounds: */ r = Nr >> 1; for (;;) { t0 = Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[4]; t1 = Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[5]; t2 = Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[6]; t3 = Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[7]; rk += 8; if (--r == 0) { break; } s0 = Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[0]; s1 = Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[1]; s2 = Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[2]; s3 = Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[3]; } #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * apply last round and * map cipher state to byte array block: */ s0 = (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[0]; PUTU32(pt , s0); s1 = (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[1]; PUTU32(pt + 4, s1); s2 = (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[2]; PUTU32(pt + 8, s2); s3 = (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[3]; PUTU32(pt + 12, s3); } #endif openssh-8.2p1/rijndael.h010064400017500001750000000041051362136622600134220ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.h,v 1.14 2014/04/29 15:42:07 markus Exp $ */ /** * rijndael-alg-fst.h * * @version 3.0 (December 2000) * * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) * * @author Vincent Rijmen * @author Antoon Bosselaers * @author Paulo Barreto * * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H #define _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H #define AES_MAXKEYBITS (256) #define AES_MAXKEYBYTES (AES_MAXKEYBITS/8) /* for 256-bit keys, fewer for less */ #define AES_MAXROUNDS 14 typedef unsigned char u8; typedef unsigned short u16; typedef unsigned int u32; int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(unsigned int [], const unsigned char [], int); void rijndaelEncrypt(const unsigned int [], int, const unsigned char [], unsigned char []); /* The structure for key information */ typedef struct { int decrypt; int Nr; /* key-length-dependent number of rounds */ u32 ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */ u32 dk[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* decrypt key schedule */ } rijndael_ctx; void rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, int, int); void rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *); void rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *); #endif /* _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H */ openssh-8.2p1/sandbox-capsicum.c010064400017500001750000000065021362136622600150700ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2011 Dag-Erling Smorgrav * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* * Capsicum sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits, * limits rights on stdout, stdin, stderr, monitor and switches to * capability mode. */ struct ssh_sandbox { struct monitor *monitor; pid_t child_pid; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; /* * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. */ debug3("%s: preparing capsicum sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->monitor = monitor; box->child_pid = 0; return box; } void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { struct rlimit rl_zero; cap_rights_t rights; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #endif if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); cap_rights_init(&rights); if (cap_rights_limit(STDIN_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS) fatal("can't limit stdin: %m"); if (cap_rights_limit(STDOUT_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS) fatal("can't limit stdout: %m"); if (cap_rights_limit(STDERR_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS) fatal("can't limit stderr: %m"); cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE); if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_recvfd, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS) fatal("%s: failed to limit the network socket", __func__); cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_WRITE); if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_log_sendfd, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS) fatal("%s: failed to limit the logging socket", __func__); if (cap_enter() < 0 && errno != ENOSYS) fatal("%s: failed to enter capability mode", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { box->child_pid = child_pid; } #endif /* SANDBOX_CAPSICUM */ openssh-8.2p1/sandbox-darwin.c010064400017500001750000000047721362136622600145570ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_DARWIN #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* Darwin/OS X sandbox */ struct ssh_sandbox { pid_t child_pid; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; /* * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. */ debug3("%s: preparing Darwin sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->child_pid = 0; return box; } void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { char *errmsg; struct rlimit rl_zero; debug3("%s: starting Darwin sandbox", __func__); if (sandbox_init(kSBXProfilePureComputation, SANDBOX_NAMED, &errmsg) == -1) fatal("%s: sandbox_init: %s", __func__, errmsg); /* * The kSBXProfilePureComputation still allows sockets, so * we must disable these using rlimit. */ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { box->child_pid = child_pid; } #endif /* SANDBOX_DARWIN */ openssh-8.2p1/sandbox-null.c010064400017500001750000000031721362136622600142360ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD$ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_NULL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* dummy sandbox */ struct ssh_sandbox { int junk; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; /* * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. */ box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); return box; } void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { /* Nothing to do here */ } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { free(box); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { /* Nothing to do here */ } #endif /* SANDBOX_NULL */ openssh-8.2p1/sandbox-pledge.c010064400017500001750000000035231362136622600145240ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-pledge.c,v 1.1 2015/10/09 01:37:08 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2015 Theo de Raadt * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_PLEDGE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct ssh_sandbox { pid_t child_pid; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *m) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; debug3("%s: preparing pledge sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->child_pid = 0; return box; } void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { if (pledge("stdio", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: pledge()", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { box->child_pid = child_pid; /* Nothing to do here */ } #endif /* SANDBOX_PLEDGE */ openssh-8.2p1/sandbox-rlimit.c010064400017500001750000000046671362136622600145760ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-rlimit.c,v 1.4 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_RLIMIT #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* Minimal sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits */ struct ssh_sandbox { pid_t child_pid; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; /* * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. */ debug3("%s: preparing rlimit sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->child_pid = 0; return box; } void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { struct rlimit rl_zero; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; #ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #endif #ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #endif #ifdef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #endif } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { box->child_pid = child_pid; } #endif /* SANDBOX_RLIMIT */ openssh-8.2p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c010064400017500001750000000271531362136622600162050ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production, * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context. * * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures. * E.g. * auditctl -a task,always -F uid= */ /* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */ /* XXX it should be possible to do logging via the log socket safely */ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG /* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */ # include # define __have_siginfo_t 1 # define __have_sigval_t 1 # define __have_sigevent_t 1 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef __s390__ #include #endif #include #include #include #include /* for offsetof */ #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */ #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ #if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN # define ARG_LO_OFFSET 0 # define ARG_HI_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t) #elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN # define ARG_LO_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t) # define ARG_HI_OFFSET 0 #else #error "Unknown endianness" #endif /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */ #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)) #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \ /* load and test syscall argument, low word */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \ ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \ /* load and test syscall argument, high word */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \ (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) /* Allow if syscall argument contains only values in mask */ #define SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \ /* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 4), \ /* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \ ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), /* Load the syscall number for checking. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), /* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */ #ifdef __NR_lstat SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_lstat64 SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_fstat SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_fstat64 SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_open SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_openat SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_newfstatat SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_stat SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_stat64 SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_shmget SC_DENY(__NR_shmget, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_shmat SC_DENY(__NR_shmat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_shmdt SC_DENY(__NR_shmdt, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_ipc SC_DENY(__NR_ipc, EACCES), #endif /* Syscalls to permit */ #ifdef __NR_brk SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64 SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64), #endif #ifdef __NR_close SC_ALLOW(__NR_close), #endif #ifdef __NR_exit SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit), #endif #ifdef __NR_exit_group SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group), #endif #ifdef __NR_futex SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex), #endif #ifdef __NR_geteuid SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid), #endif #ifdef __NR_geteuid32 SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), #endif #ifdef __NR_getpgid SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid), #endif #ifdef __NR_getpid SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid), #endif #ifdef __NR_getrandom SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom), #endif #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday), #endif #ifdef __NR_getuid SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), #endif #ifdef __NR_getuid32 SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32), #endif #ifdef __NR_madvise SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap2 SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap2, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE), #endif #ifdef __NR_mprotect SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mprotect, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE), #endif #ifdef __NR_mremap SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap), #endif #ifdef __NR_munmap SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap), #endif #ifdef __NR_nanosleep SC_ALLOW(__NR_nanosleep), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep_time64 SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep_time64), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64 SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64), #endif #ifdef __NR__newselect SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect), #endif #ifdef __NR_poll SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll), #endif #ifdef __NR_pselect6 SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6), #endif #ifdef __NR_read SC_ALLOW(__NR_read), #endif #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask), #endif #ifdef __NR_select SC_ALLOW(__NR_select), #endif #ifdef __NR_shutdown SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown), #endif #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask), #endif #ifdef __NR_time SC_ALLOW(__NR_time), #endif #ifdef __NR_write SC_ALLOW(__NR_write), #endif #ifdef __NR_socketcall SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES), #endif #if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__) /* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK), SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO), SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT), SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB), /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB), #endif #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT) /* * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g. * https://bugs.debian.org/849923 */ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT), #endif /* Default deny */ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), }; static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = { .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])), .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns, }; struct ssh_sandbox { pid_t child_pid; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; /* * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. */ debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->child_pid = 0; return box; } #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG extern struct monitor *pmonitor; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx); static void ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) { char msg[256]; snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)", __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr); mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor); _exit(1); } static void ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void) { struct sigaction act; sigset_t mask; debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__); memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); sigemptyset(&mask); sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS); act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation; act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { struct rlimit rl_zero; int nnp_failed = 0; /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(); #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__); if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) { debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); nnp_failed = 1; } debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__); if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1) debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); else if (nnp_failed) fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but " "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { box->child_pid = child_pid; } #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */ openssh-8.2p1/sandbox-solaris.c010064400017500001750000000056271362136622600147470ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2015 Joyent, Inc * Author: Alex Wilson * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_SOLARIS #ifndef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS # error "--with-solaris-privs must be used with the Solaris sandbox" #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H # include #endif #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct ssh_sandbox { priv_set_t *pset; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */ box->pset = solaris_basic_privset(); if (box->pset == NULL) { free(box); return NULL; } /* Drop everything except the ability to use already-opened files */ if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || #ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || #endif #ifdef PRIV_DAX_ACCESS priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_DAX_ACCESS) != 0 || #endif #ifdef PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO) != 0 || #endif priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 || priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 || priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) { free(box); return NULL; } /* These may not be available on older Solaris-es */ # if defined(PRIV_FILE_READ) && defined(PRIV_FILE_WRITE) if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_READ) != 0 || priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_WRITE) != 0) { free(box); return NULL; } # endif return box; } void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, box->pset) != 0 || setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, box->pset) != 0 || setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, box->pset) != 0) fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { priv_freeset(box->pset); box->pset = NULL; free(box); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { /* Nothing to do here */ } #endif /* SANDBOX_SOLARIS */ openssh-8.2p1/sandbox-systrace.c010064400017500001750000000144111362136622600151170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.18 2015/10/02 01:39:26 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct sandbox_policy { int syscall; int action; }; /* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */ static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = { { SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #ifdef SYS_kbind { SYS_kbind, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #endif { SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_nanosleep, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #ifdef SYS_getentropy /* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */ { SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #else /* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */ { SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #endif #ifdef SYS_sendsyslog { SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #endif { SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER }, { -1, -1 } }; struct ssh_sandbox { int systrace_fd; pid_t child_pid; void (*osigchld)(int); }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->systrace_fd = -1; box->child_pid = 0; box->osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); return box; } void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { debug3("%s: ready", __func__); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld); if (kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP) != 0) fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGSTOP)", __func__, getpid()); debug3("%s: started", __func__); } static void ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid, const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls) { int dev_systrace, i, j, found, status; pid_t pid; struct systrace_policy policy; /* Wait for the child to send itself a SIGSTOP */ debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); do { pid = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED); } while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld); if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) { if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) fatal("%s: child terminated with signal %d", __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); if (WIFEXITED(status)) fatal("%s: child exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); fatal("%s: child not stopped", __func__); } debug3("%s: child %ld stopped", __func__, (long)child_pid); box->child_pid = child_pid; /* Set up systracing of child */ if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__, dev_systrace, strerror(errno)); close(dev_systrace); debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd); if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno)); /* Allocate and assign policy */ memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy)); policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW; policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL; if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN; policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid; if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); /* Set per-syscall policy */ for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) { found = 0; for (j = 0; allowed_syscalls[j].syscall != -1; j++) { if (allowed_syscalls[j].syscall == i) { found = 1; break; } } policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY; policy.strp_code = i; policy.strp_policy = found ? allowed_syscalls[j].action : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL; if (found) debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i); if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); } /* Signal the child to start running */ debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); if (kill(box->child_pid, SIGCONT) != 0) fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGCONT)", __func__, box->child_pid); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { /* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */ close(box->systrace_fd); free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy); } #endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */ openssh-8.2p1/sc25519.c010064400017500001750000000162441362136622600126470ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sc25519.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sc25519.c */ #include "includes.h" #include "sc25519.h" /*Arithmetic modulo the group order m = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 = 7237005577332262213973186563042994240857116359379907606001950938285454250989 */ static const crypto_uint32 m[32] = {0xED, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x5C, 0x1A, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, 0xD6, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10}; static const crypto_uint32 mu[33] = {0x1B, 0x13, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0x9C, 0xED, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x63, 0x08, 0x5D, 0x21, 0x06, 0x21, 0xEB, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x0F}; static crypto_uint32 lt(crypto_uint32 a,crypto_uint32 b) /* 16-bit inputs */ { unsigned int x = a; x -= (unsigned int) b; /* 0..65535: no; 4294901761..4294967295: yes */ x >>= 31; /* 0: no; 1: yes */ return x; } /* Reduce coefficients of r before calling reduce_add_sub */ static void reduce_add_sub(sc25519 *r) { crypto_uint32 pb = 0; crypto_uint32 b; crypto_uint32 mask; int i; unsigned char t[32]; for(i=0;i<32;i++) { pb += m[i]; b = lt(r->v[i],pb); t[i] = r->v[i]-pb+(b<<8); pb = b; } mask = b - 1; for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] ^= mask & (r->v[i] ^ t[i]); } /* Reduce coefficients of x before calling barrett_reduce */ static void barrett_reduce(sc25519 *r, const crypto_uint32 x[64]) { /* See HAC, Alg. 14.42 */ int i,j; crypto_uint32 q2[66]; crypto_uint32 *q3 = q2 + 33; crypto_uint32 r1[33]; crypto_uint32 r2[33]; crypto_uint32 carry; crypto_uint32 pb = 0; crypto_uint32 b; for (i = 0;i < 66;++i) q2[i] = 0; for (i = 0;i < 33;++i) r2[i] = 0; for(i=0;i<33;i++) for(j=0;j<33;j++) if(i+j >= 31) q2[i+j] += mu[i]*x[j+31]; carry = q2[31] >> 8; q2[32] += carry; carry = q2[32] >> 8; q2[33] += carry; for(i=0;i<33;i++)r1[i] = x[i]; for(i=0;i<32;i++) for(j=0;j<33;j++) if(i+j < 33) r2[i+j] += m[i]*q3[j]; for(i=0;i<32;i++) { carry = r2[i] >> 8; r2[i+1] += carry; r2[i] &= 0xff; } for(i=0;i<32;i++) { pb += r2[i]; b = lt(r1[i],pb); r->v[i] = r1[i]-pb+(b<<8); pb = b; } /* XXX: Can it really happen that r<0?, See HAC, Alg 14.42, Step 3 * If so: Handle it here! */ reduce_add_sub(r); reduce_add_sub(r); } void sc25519_from32bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32]) { int i; crypto_uint32 t[64]; for(i=0;i<32;i++) t[i] = x[i]; for(i=32;i<64;++i) t[i] = 0; barrett_reduce(r, t); } void shortsc25519_from16bytes(shortsc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[16]) { int i; for(i=0;i<16;i++) r->v[i] = x[i]; } void sc25519_from64bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[64]) { int i; crypto_uint32 t[64]; for(i=0;i<64;i++) t[i] = x[i]; barrett_reduce(r, t); } void sc25519_from_shortsc(sc25519 *r, const shortsc25519 *x) { int i; for(i=0;i<16;i++) r->v[i] = x->v[i]; for(i=0;i<16;i++) r->v[16+i] = 0; } void sc25519_to32bytes(unsigned char r[32], const sc25519 *x) { int i; for(i=0;i<32;i++) r[i] = x->v[i]; } int sc25519_iszero_vartime(const sc25519 *x) { int i; for(i=0;i<32;i++) if(x->v[i] != 0) return 0; return 1; } int sc25519_isshort_vartime(const sc25519 *x) { int i; for(i=31;i>15;i--) if(x->v[i] != 0) return 0; return 1; } int sc25519_lt_vartime(const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y) { int i; for(i=31;i>=0;i--) { if(x->v[i] < y->v[i]) return 1; if(x->v[i] > y->v[i]) return 0; } return 0; } void sc25519_add(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y) { int i, carry; for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = x->v[i] + y->v[i]; for(i=0;i<31;i++) { carry = r->v[i] >> 8; r->v[i+1] += carry; r->v[i] &= 0xff; } reduce_add_sub(r); } void sc25519_sub_nored(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y) { crypto_uint32 b = 0; crypto_uint32 t; int i; for(i=0;i<32;i++) { t = x->v[i] - y->v[i] - b; r->v[i] = t & 255; b = (t >> 8) & 1; } } void sc25519_mul(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y) { int i,j,carry; crypto_uint32 t[64]; for(i=0;i<64;i++)t[i] = 0; for(i=0;i<32;i++) for(j=0;j<32;j++) t[i+j] += x->v[i] * y->v[j]; /* Reduce coefficients */ for(i=0;i<63;i++) { carry = t[i] >> 8; t[i+1] += carry; t[i] &= 0xff; } barrett_reduce(r, t); } void sc25519_mul_shortsc(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const shortsc25519 *y) { sc25519 t; sc25519_from_shortsc(&t, y); sc25519_mul(r, x, &t); } void sc25519_window3(signed char r[85], const sc25519 *s) { char carry; int i; for(i=0;i<10;i++) { r[8*i+0] = s->v[3*i+0] & 7; r[8*i+1] = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 3) & 7; r[8*i+2] = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 6) & 7; r[8*i+2] ^= (s->v[3*i+1] << 2) & 7; r[8*i+3] = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 1) & 7; r[8*i+4] = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 4) & 7; r[8*i+5] = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 7) & 7; r[8*i+5] ^= (s->v[3*i+2] << 1) & 7; r[8*i+6] = (s->v[3*i+2] >> 2) & 7; r[8*i+7] = (s->v[3*i+2] >> 5) & 7; } r[8*i+0] = s->v[3*i+0] & 7; r[8*i+1] = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 3) & 7; r[8*i+2] = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 6) & 7; r[8*i+2] ^= (s->v[3*i+1] << 2) & 7; r[8*i+3] = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 1) & 7; r[8*i+4] = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 4) & 7; /* Making it signed */ carry = 0; for(i=0;i<84;i++) { r[i] += carry; r[i+1] += r[i] >> 3; r[i] &= 7; carry = r[i] >> 2; r[i] -= carry<<3; } r[84] += carry; } void sc25519_window5(signed char r[51], const sc25519 *s) { char carry; int i; for(i=0;i<6;i++) { r[8*i+0] = s->v[5*i+0] & 31; r[8*i+1] = (s->v[5*i+0] >> 5) & 31; r[8*i+1] ^= (s->v[5*i+1] << 3) & 31; r[8*i+2] = (s->v[5*i+1] >> 2) & 31; r[8*i+3] = (s->v[5*i+1] >> 7) & 31; r[8*i+3] ^= (s->v[5*i+2] << 1) & 31; r[8*i+4] = (s->v[5*i+2] >> 4) & 31; r[8*i+4] ^= (s->v[5*i+3] << 4) & 31; r[8*i+5] = (s->v[5*i+3] >> 1) & 31; r[8*i+6] = (s->v[5*i+3] >> 6) & 31; r[8*i+6] ^= (s->v[5*i+4] << 2) & 31; r[8*i+7] = (s->v[5*i+4] >> 3) & 31; } r[8*i+0] = s->v[5*i+0] & 31; r[8*i+1] = (s->v[5*i+0] >> 5) & 31; r[8*i+1] ^= (s->v[5*i+1] << 3) & 31; r[8*i+2] = (s->v[5*i+1] >> 2) & 31; /* Making it signed */ carry = 0; for(i=0;i<50;i++) { r[i] += carry; r[i+1] += r[i] >> 5; r[i] &= 31; carry = r[i] >> 4; r[i] -= carry<<5; } r[50] += carry; } void sc25519_2interleave2(unsigned char r[127], const sc25519 *s1, const sc25519 *s2) { int i; for(i=0;i<31;i++) { r[4*i] = ( s1->v[i] & 3) ^ (( s2->v[i] & 3) << 2); r[4*i+1] = ((s1->v[i] >> 2) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[i] >> 2) & 3) << 2); r[4*i+2] = ((s1->v[i] >> 4) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[i] >> 4) & 3) << 2); r[4*i+3] = ((s1->v[i] >> 6) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[i] >> 6) & 3) << 2); } r[124] = ( s1->v[31] & 3) ^ (( s2->v[31] & 3) << 2); r[125] = ((s1->v[31] >> 2) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[31] >> 2) & 3) << 2); r[126] = ((s1->v[31] >> 4) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[31] >> 4) & 3) << 2); } openssh-8.2p1/sc25519.h010064400017500001750000000055151362136622600126530ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sc25519.h,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sc25519.h */ #ifndef SC25519_H #define SC25519_H #include "crypto_api.h" #define sc25519 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519 #define shortsc25519 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519 #define sc25519_from32bytes crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes #define shortsc25519_from16bytes crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes #define sc25519_from64bytes crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes #define sc25519_from_shortsc crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from_shortsc #define sc25519_to32bytes crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes #define sc25519_iszero_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_iszero_vartime #define sc25519_isshort_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_isshort_vartime #define sc25519_lt_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_lt_vartime #define sc25519_add crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add #define sc25519_sub_nored crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_sub_nored #define sc25519_mul crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul #define sc25519_mul_shortsc crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul_shortsc #define sc25519_window3 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3 #define sc25519_window5 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window5 #define sc25519_2interleave2 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2 typedef struct { crypto_uint32 v[32]; } sc25519; typedef struct { crypto_uint32 v[16]; } shortsc25519; void sc25519_from32bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32]); void shortsc25519_from16bytes(shortsc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[16]); void sc25519_from64bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[64]); void sc25519_from_shortsc(sc25519 *r, const shortsc25519 *x); void sc25519_to32bytes(unsigned char r[32], const sc25519 *x); int sc25519_iszero_vartime(const sc25519 *x); int sc25519_isshort_vartime(const sc25519 *x); int sc25519_lt_vartime(const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y); void sc25519_add(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y); void sc25519_sub_nored(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y); void sc25519_mul(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y); void sc25519_mul_shortsc(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const shortsc25519 *y); /* Convert s into a representation of the form \sum_{i=0}^{84}r[i]2^3 * with r[i] in {-4,...,3} */ void sc25519_window3(signed char r[85], const sc25519 *s); /* Convert s into a representation of the form \sum_{i=0}^{50}r[i]2^5 * with r[i] in {-16,...,15} */ void sc25519_window5(signed char r[51], const sc25519 *s); void sc25519_2interleave2(unsigned char r[127], const sc25519 *s1, const sc25519 *s2); #endif openssh-8.2p1/scp.1010064400017500001750000000137251362136622600123400ustar00djmdjm.\" .\" scp.1 .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo .\" .\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.87 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $ .\" .Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $ .Dt SCP 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm scp .Nd OpenSSH secure file copy .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm scp .Op Fl 346BCpqrTv .Op Fl c Ar cipher .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl J Ar destination .Op Fl l Ar limit .Op Fl o Ar ssh_option .Op Fl P Ar port .Op Fl S Ar program .Ar source ... target .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm copies files between hosts on a network. It uses .Xr ssh 1 for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security as .Xr ssh 1 . .Nm will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for authentication. .Pp The .Ar source and .Ar target may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host with optional path in the form .Sm off .Oo user @ Oc host : Op path , .Sm on or a URI in the form .Sm off .No scp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path . .Sm on Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid .Nm treating file names containing .Sq :\& as host specifiers. .Pp When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a .Ar port may only be specified on the .Ar target if the .Fl 3 option is used. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host. Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the progress meter. .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases). .It Fl C Compression enable. Passes the .Fl C flag to .Xr ssh 1 to enable compression. .It Fl c Ar cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl F Ar ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for .Nm ssh . This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl J Ar destination Connect to the target host by first making an .Nm connection to the jump host described by .Ar destination and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This is a shortcut to specify a .Cm ProxyJump configuration directive. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl l Ar limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. .It Fl o Ar ssh_option Can be used to pass options to .Nm ssh in the format used in .Xr ssh_config 5 . This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate .Nm scp command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It BindInterface .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs .It CASignatureAlgorithms .It CertificateFile .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP .It Ciphers .It Compression .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostbasedKeyTypes .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It Hostname .It IdentitiesOnly .It IdentityAgent .It IdentityFile .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It LogLevel .It MACs .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyJump .It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It SetEnv .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It UpdateHostKeys .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .El .It Fl P Ar port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that this option is written with a capital .Sq P , because .Fl p is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file. .It Fl p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original file. .It Fl q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that .Nm follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. .It Fl S Ar program Name of .Ar program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand .Xr ssh 1 options. .It Fl T Disable strict filename checking. By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory .Nm checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files. Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected. This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that the server will not send unexpected filenames. .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm and .Xr ssh 1 to print debugging messages about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. .El .Sh EXIT STATUS .Ex -std scp .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh HISTORY .Nm is based on the rcp program in .Bx source code from the Regents of the University of California. .Sh AUTHORS .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi openssh-8.2p1/scp.c010064400017500001750000001165321362136622600124220ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.207 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). * * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.) * * 1995 Timo Rinne , Tatu Ylonen * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Parts from: * * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "progressmeter.h" #include "utf8.h" extern char *__progname; #define COPY_BUFLEN 16384 int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout); int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout); /* Struct for addargs */ arglist args; arglist remote_remote_args; /* Bandwidth limit */ long long limit_kbps = 0; struct bwlimit bwlimit; /* Name of current file being transferred. */ char *curfile; /* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */ int verbose_mode = 0; /* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* * This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped * through this process. */ int throughlocal = 0; /* Non-standard port to use for the ssh connection or -1. */ int sshport = -1; /* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */ char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM; /* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */ pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1; static void killchild(int signo) { if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); } if (signo) _exit(1); exit(1); } static void suspchild(int signo) { int status; if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid, signo); while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ; kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); } } static int do_local_cmd(arglist *a) { u_int i; int status; pid_t pid; if (a->num == 0) fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments"); if (verbose_mode) { fprintf(stderr, "Executing:"); for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { execvp(a->list[0], a->list); perror(a->list[0]); exit(1); } do_cmd_pid = pid; ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); do_cmd_pid = -1; if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) return (-1); return (0); } /* * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success. */ int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout) { int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2]; if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", ssh_program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); if (port == -1) port = sshport; /* * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below. */ if (pipe(reserved) == -1) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */ if (pipe(pin) == -1) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pipe(pout) == -1) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Free the reserved descriptors. */ close(reserved[0]); close(reserved[1]); ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ do_cmd_pid = fork(); if (do_cmd_pid == 0) { /* Child. */ close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); dup2(pin[0], 0); dup2(pout[1], 1); close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); if (port != -1) { addargs(&args, "-p"); addargs(&args, "%d", port); } if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(ssh_program, args.list); perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */ close(pin[0]); *fdout = pin[1]; close(pout[1]); *fdin = pout[0]; ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild); return 0; } /* * This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the * input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd(). * This way the input and output of two commands can be connected. */ int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout) { pid_t pid; int status; if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", ssh_program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); if (port == -1) port = sshport; /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { dup2(fdin, 0); dup2(fdout, 1); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); if (port != -1) { addargs(&args, "-p"); addargs(&args, "%d", port); } if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(ssh_program, args.list); perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } typedef struct { size_t cnt; char *buf; } BUF; BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int); void lostconn(int); int okname(char *); void run_err(const char *,...); void verifydir(char *); struct passwd *pwd; uid_t userid; int errs, remin, remout; int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; #define CMDNEEDS 64 char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ int response(void); void rsource(char *, struct stat *); void sink(int, char *[], const char *); void source(int, char *[]); void tolocal(int, char *[]); void toremote(int, char *[]); void usage(void); int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n; char **newargv; const char *errstr; extern char *optarg; extern int optind; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); seed_rng(); msetlocale(); /* Copy argv, because we modify it */ newargv = xcalloc(MAXIMUM(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv)); for (n = 0; n < argc; n++) newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]); argv = newargv; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args)); args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-x"); addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none"); addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no"); fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:J:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { /* User-visible flags. */ case '1': fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); break; case '2': /* Ignored */ break; case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); break; case '3': throughlocal = 1; break; case 'o': case 'c': case 'i': case 'F': case 'J': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg); addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'P': sshport = a2port(optarg); if (sshport <= 0) fatal("bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg); break; case 'B': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN); break; case 'p': pflag = 1; break; case 'r': iamrecursive = 1; break; case 'S': ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'v': addargs(&args, "-v"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v"); verbose_mode = 1; break; case 'q': addargs(&args, "-q"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q"); showprogress = 0; break; /* Server options. */ case 'd': targetshouldbedirectory = 1; break; case 'f': /* "from" */ iamremote = 1; fflag = 1; break; case 't': /* "to" */ iamremote = 1; tflag = 1; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(0, O_BINARY); #endif break; case 'T': Tflag = 1; break; default: usage(); } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL) fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid); if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; if (pflag) { /* Cannot pledge: -p allows setuid/setgid files... */ } else { if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec", NULL) == -1) { perror("pledge"); exit(1); } } remin = STDIN_FILENO; remout = STDOUT_FILENO; if (fflag) { /* Follow "protocol", send data. */ (void) response(); source(argc, argv); exit(errs != 0); } if (tflag) { /* Receive data. */ sink(argc, argv, NULL); exit(errs != 0); } if (argc < 2) usage(); if (argc > 2) targetshouldbedirectory = 1; remin = remout = -1; do_cmd_pid = -1; /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s", verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); (void) ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); if (colon(argv[argc - 1])) /* Dest is remote host. */ toremote(argc, argv); else { if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(argv[argc - 1]); tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */ } /* * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked * and no error has occurred yet */ if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) { if (remin != -1) (void) close(remin); if (remout != -1) (void) close(remout); if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1) errs = 1; else { if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) errs = 1; } } exit(errs != 0); } /* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */ static int scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s) { off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt; *cnt += s; refresh_progress_meter(0); if (limit_kbps > 0) bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s); return 0; } static int do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb) { /* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */ char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2]; (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n", (unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime), (unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime)); if (verb) { fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n", (long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime); fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf); } (void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf)); return (response()); } static int parse_scp_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp, char **pathp) { int r; r = parse_uri("scp", uri, userp, hostp, portp, pathp); if (r == 0 && *pathp == NULL) *pathp = xstrdup("."); return r; } /* Appends a string to an array; returns 0 on success, -1 on alloc failure */ static int append(char *cp, char ***ap, size_t *np) { char **tmp; if ((tmp = reallocarray(*ap, *np + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) return -1; tmp[(*np)] = cp; (*np)++; *ap = tmp; return 0; } /* * Finds the start and end of the first brace pair in the pattern. * returns 0 on success or -1 for invalid patterns. */ static int find_brace(const char *pattern, int *startp, int *endp) { int i; int in_bracket, brace_level; *startp = *endp = -1; in_bracket = brace_level = 0; for (i = 0; i < INT_MAX && *endp < 0 && pattern[i] != '\0'; i++) { switch (pattern[i]) { case '\\': /* skip next character */ if (pattern[i + 1] != '\0') i++; break; case '[': in_bracket = 1; break; case ']': in_bracket = 0; break; case '{': if (in_bracket) break; if (pattern[i + 1] == '}') { /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */ i++; /* skip */ break; } if (*startp == -1) *startp = i; brace_level++; break; case '}': if (in_bracket) break; if (*startp < 0) { /* Unbalanced brace */ return -1; } if (--brace_level <= 0) *endp = i; break; } } /* unbalanced brackets/braces */ if (*endp < 0 && (*startp >= 0 || in_bracket)) return -1; return 0; } /* * Assembles and records a successfully-expanded pattern, returns -1 on * alloc failure. */ static int emit_expansion(const char *pattern, int brace_start, int brace_end, int sel_start, int sel_end, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp) { char *cp; int o = 0, tail_len = strlen(pattern + brace_end + 1); if ((cp = malloc(brace_start + (sel_end - sel_start) + tail_len + 1)) == NULL) return -1; /* Pattern before initial brace */ if (brace_start > 0) { memcpy(cp, pattern, brace_start); o = brace_start; } /* Current braced selection */ if (sel_end - sel_start > 0) { memcpy(cp + o, pattern + sel_start, sel_end - sel_start); o += sel_end - sel_start; } /* Remainder of pattern after closing brace */ if (tail_len > 0) { memcpy(cp + o, pattern + brace_end + 1, tail_len); o += tail_len; } cp[o] = '\0'; if (append(cp, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) { free(cp); return -1; } return 0; } /* * Expand the first encountered brace in pattern, appending the expanded * patterns it yielded to the *patternsp array. * * Returns 0 on success or -1 on allocation failure. * * Signals whether expansion was performed via *expanded and whether * pattern was invalid via *invalid. */ static int brace_expand_one(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp, int *expanded, int *invalid) { int i; int in_bracket, brace_start, brace_end, brace_level; int sel_start, sel_end; *invalid = *expanded = 0; if (find_brace(pattern, &brace_start, &brace_end) != 0) { *invalid = 1; return 0; } else if (brace_start == -1) return 0; in_bracket = brace_level = 0; for (i = sel_start = brace_start + 1; i < brace_end; i++) { switch (pattern[i]) { case '{': if (in_bracket) break; brace_level++; break; case '}': if (in_bracket) break; brace_level--; break; case '[': in_bracket = 1; break; case ']': in_bracket = 0; break; case '\\': if (i < brace_end - 1) i++; /* skip */ break; } if (pattern[i] == ',' || i == brace_end - 1) { if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) continue; /* End of a selection, emit an expanded pattern */ /* Adjust end index for last selection */ sel_end = (i == brace_end - 1) ? brace_end : i; if (emit_expansion(pattern, brace_start, brace_end, sel_start, sel_end, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) return -1; /* move on to the next selection */ sel_start = i + 1; continue; } } if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) { *invalid = 1; return 0; } /* success */ *expanded = 1; return 0; } /* Expand braces from pattern. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure */ static int brace_expand(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp) { char *cp, *cp2, **active = NULL, **done = NULL; size_t i, nactive = 0, ndone = 0; int ret = -1, invalid = 0, expanded = 0; *patternsp = NULL; *npatternsp = 0; /* Start the worklist with the original pattern */ if ((cp = strdup(pattern)) == NULL) return -1; if (append(cp, &active, &nactive) != 0) { free(cp); return -1; } while (nactive > 0) { cp = active[nactive - 1]; nactive--; if (brace_expand_one(cp, &active, &nactive, &expanded, &invalid) == -1) { free(cp); goto fail; } if (invalid) fatal("%s: invalid brace pattern \"%s\"", __func__, cp); if (expanded) { /* * Current entry expanded to new entries on the * active list; discard the progenitor pattern. */ free(cp); continue; } /* * Pattern did not expand; append the finename component to * the completed list */ if ((cp2 = strrchr(cp, '/')) != NULL) *cp2++ = '\0'; else cp2 = cp; if (append(xstrdup(cp2), &done, &ndone) != 0) { free(cp); goto fail; } free(cp); } /* success */ *patternsp = done; *npatternsp = ndone; done = NULL; ndone = 0; ret = 0; fail: for (i = 0; i < nactive; i++) free(active[i]); free(active); for (i = 0; i < ndone; i++) free(done[i]); free(done); return ret; } void toremote(int argc, char **argv) { char *suser = NULL, *host = NULL, *src = NULL; char *bp, *tuser, *thost, *targ; int sport = -1, tport = -1; arglist alist; int i, r; u_int j; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; /* Parse target */ r = parse_scp_uri(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &tport, &targ); if (r == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[argc - 1]); ++errs; goto out; } if (r != 0) { if (parse_user_host_path(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &targ) == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target\n", argv[argc - 1]); ++errs; goto out; } } if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) { ++errs; goto out; } /* Parse source files */ for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { free(suser); free(host); free(src); r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src); if (r == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]); ++errs; continue; } if (r != 0) { parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src); } if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) { ++errs; continue; } if (host && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(host, suser, sport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); if (do_cmd2(thost, tuser, tport, bp, remin, remout) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); (void) close(remin); (void) close(remout); remin = remout = -1; } else if (host) { /* standard remote to remote */ if (tport != -1 && tport != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) { /* This would require the remote support URIs */ fatal("target port not supported with two " "remote hosts without the -3 option"); } freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&alist, "-x"); addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); addargs(&alist, "-n"); for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) { addargs(&alist, "%s", remote_remote_args.list[j]); } if (sport != -1) { addargs(&alist, "-p"); addargs(&alist, "%d", sport); } if (suser) { addargs(&alist, "-l"); addargs(&alist, "%s", suser); } addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", host); addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd); addargs(&alist, "%s", src); addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s", tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", thost, targ); if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0) errs = 1; } else { /* local to remote */ if (remin == -1) { xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); if (do_cmd(thost, tuser, tport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) exit(1); if (response() < 0) exit(1); free(bp); } source(1, argv + i); } } out: free(tuser); free(thost); free(targ); free(suser); free(host); free(src); } void tolocal(int argc, char **argv) { char *bp, *host = NULL, *src = NULL, *suser = NULL; arglist alist; int i, r, sport = -1; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { free(suser); free(host); free(src); r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src); if (r == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]); ++errs; continue; } if (r != 0) parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src); if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) { ++errs; continue; } if (!host) { /* Local to local. */ freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP); if (iamrecursive) addargs(&alist, "-r"); if (pflag) addargs(&alist, "-p"); addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]); if (do_local_cmd(&alist)) ++errs; continue; } /* Remote to local. */ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(host, suser, sport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) { free(bp); ++errs; continue; } free(bp); sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src); (void) close(remin); remin = remout = -1; } free(suser); free(host); free(src); } void source(int argc, char **argv) { struct stat stb; static BUF buffer; BUF *bp; off_t i, statbytes; size_t amt, nr; int fd = -1, haderr, indx; char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX]; int len; for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) { name = argv[indx]; statbytes = 0; len = strlen(name); while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/') name[--len] = '\0'; if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) == -1) goto syserr; if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) { strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL); name = encname; } if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) { syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); goto next; } if (stb.st_size < 0) { run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size"); goto next; } unset_nonblock(fd); switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFREG: break; case S_IFDIR: if (iamrecursive) { rsource(name, &stb); goto next; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: run_err("%s: not a regular file", name); goto next; } if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL) last = name; else ++last; curfile = last; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0) goto next; } #define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n", (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), (long long)stb.st_size, last); if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); if (response() < 0) goto next; if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { next: if (fd != -1) { (void) close(fd); fd = -1; } continue; } if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remout); for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size) amt = stb.st_size - i; if (!haderr) { if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt)) != amt) { haderr = errno; memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr); } } /* Keep writing after error to retain sync */ if (haderr) { (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt); memset(bp->buf, 0, amt); continue; } if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio, &statbytes) != amt) haderr = errno; } unset_nonblock(remout); if (fd != -1) { if (close(fd) == -1 && !haderr) haderr = errno; fd = -1; } if (!haderr) (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); else run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr)); (void) response(); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); } } void rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX]; if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) { run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return; } last = strrchr(name, '/'); if (last == NULL) last = name; else last++; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n", (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last); if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path)); if (response() < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, "..")) continue; if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) { run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name); continue; } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name); vect[0] = path; source(1, vect); } (void) closedir(dirp); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2); (void) response(); } #define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \ ((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \ (sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \ (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8)) void sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src) { static BUF buffer; struct stat stb; enum { YES, NO, DISPLAYED } wrerr; BUF *bp; off_t i; size_t j, count; int amt, exists, first, ofd; mode_t mode, omode, mask; off_t size, statbytes; unsigned long long ull; int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0; char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048]; char **patterns = NULL; size_t n, npatterns = 0; struct timeval tv[2]; #define atime tv[0] #define mtime tv[1] #define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; } if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0)) SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size"); setimes = targisdir = 0; mask = umask(0); if (!pflag) (void) umask(mask); if (argc != 1) { run_err("ambiguous target"); exit(1); } targ = *argv; if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(targ); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) targisdir = 1; if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) { /* * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match * the requested destination file glob. */ if (brace_expand(src, &patterns, &npatterns) != 0) fatal("%s: could not expand pattern", __func__); } for (first = 1;; first = 0) { cp = buf; if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) goto done; if (*cp++ == '\n') SCREWUP("unexpected "); do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) SCREWUP("lost connection"); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); *cp = 0; if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf); if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') { if (iamremote == 0) { (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf), NULL, "%s", buf + 1); (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, visbuf, strlen(visbuf)); } if (buf[0] == '\02') exit(1); ++errs; continue; } if (buf[0] == 'E') { (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); goto done; } if (ch == '\n') *--cp = 0; cp = buf; if (*cp == 'T') { setimes++; cp++; if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited"); if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull)) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ mtime.tv_sec = ull; mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 || mtime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited"); if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("atime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited"); if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull)) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ atime.tv_sec = ull; atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 || atime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited"); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); continue; } if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') { /* * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar". * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't * followed. */ if (first) { run_err("%s", cp); exit(1); } SCREWUP("expected control record"); } mode = 0; for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) { if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7') SCREWUP("bad mode"); mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0'); } if (!pflag) mode &= ~mask; if (*cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("size not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("size not delimited"); if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull)) SCREWUP("size out of range"); size = (off_t)ull; if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL || strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) { run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); exit(1); } if (npatterns > 0) { for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) { if (fnmatch(patterns[n], cp, 0) == 0) break; } if (n >= npatterns) SCREWUP("filename does not match request"); } if (targisdir) { static char *namebuf; static size_t cursize; size_t need; need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250; if (need > cursize) { free(namebuf); namebuf = xmalloc(need); cursize = need; } (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ, strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp); np = namebuf; } else np = targ; curfile = cp; exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0; if (buf[0] == 'D') { int mod_flag = pflag; if (!iamrecursive) SCREWUP("received directory without -r"); if (exists) { if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) { errno = ENOTDIR; goto bad; } if (pflag) (void) chmod(np, mode); } else { /* Handle copying from a read-only directory */ mod_flag = 1; if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) == -1) goto bad; } vect[0] = xstrdup(np); sink(1, vect, src); if (setimes) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(vect[0], tv) == -1) run_err("%s: set times: %s", vect[0], strerror(errno)); } if (mod_flag) (void) chmod(vect[0], mode); free(vect[0]); continue; } omode = mode; mode |= S_IWUSR; if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) { bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); continue; } (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { (void) close(ofd); continue; } cp = bp->buf; wrerr = NO; statbytes = 0; if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remin); for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + amt > size) amt = size - i; count += amt; do { j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt, scpio, &statbytes); if (j == 0) { run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ? strerror(errno) : "dropped connection"); exit(1); } amt -= j; cp += j; } while (amt > 0); if (count == bp->cnt) { /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */ if (wrerr == NO) { if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } } count = 0; cp = bp->buf; } } unset_nonblock(remin); if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO && atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) && ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) { run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } if (pflag) { if (exists || omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ run_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } else { if (!exists && omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ run_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } if (close(ofd) == -1) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } (void) response(); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); if (setimes && wrerr == NO) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(np, tv) == -1) { run_err("%s: set times: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } switch (wrerr) { case YES: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno)); break; case NO: (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); break; case DISPLAYED: break; } } done: for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) free(patterns[n]); free(patterns); return; screwup: for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) free(patterns[n]); free(patterns); run_err("protocol error: %s", why); exit(1); } int response(void) { char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048], visbuf[2048]; if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp)) lostconn(0); cp = rbuf; switch (resp) { case 0: /* ok */ return (0); default: *cp++ = resp; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */ case 2: /* fatal error, "" */ do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) lostconn(0); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); if (!iamremote) { cp[-1] = '\0'; (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf), NULL, "%s\n", rbuf); (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, visbuf, strlen(visbuf)); } ++errs; if (resp == 1) return (-1); exit(1); } /* NOTREACHED */ } void usage(void) { (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: scp [-346BCpqrTv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]\n" " [-S program] source ... target\n"); exit(1); } void run_err(const char *fmt,...) { static FILE *fp; va_list ap; ++errs; if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) { (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01); (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: "); va_start(ap, fmt); (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); (void) fprintf(fp, "\n"); (void) fflush(fp); } if (!iamremote) { va_start(ap, fmt); vfmprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } } void verifydir(char *cp) { struct stat stb; if (!stat(cp, &stb)) { if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) return; errno = ENOTDIR; } run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno)); killchild(0); } int okname(char *cp0) { int c; char *cp; cp = cp0; do { c = (int)*cp; if (c & 0200) goto bad; if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) { switch (c) { case '\'': case '"': case '`': case ' ': case '#': goto bad; default: break; } } } while (*++cp); return (1); bad: fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0); return (0); } BUF * allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize) { size_t size; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE struct stat stb; if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) { run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno)); return (0); } size = ROUNDUP(stb.st_blksize, blksize); if (size == 0) size = blksize; #else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ size = blksize; #endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ if (bp->cnt >= size) return (bp); bp->buf = xrecallocarray(bp->buf, bp->cnt, size, 1); bp->cnt = size; return (bp); } void lostconn(int signo) { if (!iamremote) (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16); if (signo) _exit(1); else exit(1); } openssh-8.2p1/servconf.c010064400017500001750000002527461362136622600134720ustar00djmdjm /* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.360 2020/01/31 22:42:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB # include #else # include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "channels.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *, int); static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *, int); void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth); /* Use of privilege separation or not */ extern int use_privsep; extern struct sshbuf *cfg; /* Initializes the server options to their default values. */ void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options)); /* Portable-specific options */ options->use_pam = -1; /* Standard Options */ options->num_ports = 0; options->ports_from_cmdline = 0; options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; options->num_queued_listens = 0; options->listen_addrs = NULL; options->num_listen_addrs = 0; options->address_family = -1; options->routing_domain = NULL; options->num_host_key_files = 0; options->num_host_cert_files = 0; options->host_key_agent = NULL; options->pid_file = NULL; options->login_grace_time = -1; options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET; options->ignore_rhosts = -1; options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1; options->print_motd = -1; options->print_lastlog = -1; options->x11_forwarding = -1; options->x11_display_offset = -1; options->x11_use_localhost = -1; options->permit_tty = -1; options->permit_user_rc = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->strict_modes = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1; options->hostbased_key_types = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_auth_options = -1; options->pubkey_key_types = NULL; options->kerberos_authentication = -1; options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; options->permit_user_env = -1; options->permit_user_env_whitelist = NULL; options->compression = -1; options->rekey_limit = -1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1; options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1; options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1; options->num_allow_users = 0; options->num_deny_users = 0; options->num_allow_groups = 0; options->num_deny_groups = 0; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->num_subsystems = 0; options->max_startups_begin = -1; options->max_startups_rate = -1; options->max_startups = -1; options->max_authtries = -1; options->max_sessions = -1; options->banner = NULL; options->use_dns = -1; options->client_alive_interval = -1; options->client_alive_count_max = -1; options->num_authkeys_files = 0; options->num_accept_env = 0; options->num_setenv = 0; options->permit_tun = -1; options->permitted_opens = NULL; options->permitted_listens = NULL; options->adm_forced_command = NULL; options->chroot_directory = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL; options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; options->sk_provider = NULL; options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; options->authorized_principals_command = NULL; options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->version_addendum = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; options->disable_forwarding = -1; options->expose_userauth_info = -1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ static int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } static void assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o) { char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig; char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig; int r; all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0); all_mac = mac_alg_list(','); all_kex = kex_alg_list(','); all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */ def_cipher = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); def_mac = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac); def_kex = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex); def_key = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); def_sig = match_filter_whitelist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ do { \ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \ } while (0) ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher); ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac); ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex); ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig); #undef ASSEMBLE free(all_cipher); free(all_mac); free(all_kex); free(all_key); free(all_sig); free(def_cipher); free(def_mac); free(def_kex); free(def_key); free(def_sig); } static void array_append2(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive, char ***array, int **iarray, u_int *lp, const char *s, int i) { if (*lp >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s line %d: Too many %s entries", file, line, directive); if (iarray != NULL) { *iarray = xrecallocarray(*iarray, *lp, *lp + 1, sizeof(**iarray)); (*iarray)[*lp] = i; } *array = xrecallocarray(*array, *lp, *lp + 1, sizeof(**array)); (*array)[*lp] = xstrdup(s); (*lp)++; } static void array_append(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive, char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s) { array_append2(file, line, directive, array, NULL, lp, s, 0); } void servconf_add_hostkey(const char *file, const int line, ServerOptions *options, const char *path, int userprovided) { char *apath = derelativise_path(path); array_append2(file, line, "HostKey", &options->host_key_files, &options->host_key_file_userprovided, &options->num_host_key_files, apath, userprovided); free(apath); } void servconf_add_hostcert(const char *file, const int line, ServerOptions *options, const char *path) { char *apath = derelativise_path(path); array_append(file, line, "HostCertificate", &options->host_cert_files, &options->num_host_cert_files, apath); free(apath); } void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { u_int i; /* Portable-specific options */ if (options->use_pam == -1) options->use_pam = 0; /* Standard Options */ if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0); #endif servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 0); #ifdef WITH_XMSS servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options, _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 0); #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ } /* No certificates by default */ if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) add_listen_addr(options, NULL, NULL, 0); if (options->pid_file == NULL) options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE); if (options->login_grace_time == -1) options->login_grace_time = 120; if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD; if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1) options->ignore_rhosts = 1; if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1) options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0; if (options->print_motd == -1) options->print_motd = 1; if (options->print_lastlog == -1) options->print_lastlog = 1; if (options->x11_forwarding == -1) options->x11_forwarding = 0; if (options->x11_display_offset == -1) options->x11_display_offset = 10; if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1) options->x11_use_localhost = 1; if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH); if (options->permit_tty == -1) options->permit_tty = 1; if (options->permit_user_rc == -1) options->permit_user_rc = 1; if (options->strict_modes == -1) options->strict_modes = 1; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1) options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_auth_options == -1) options->pubkey_auth_options = 0; if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1) options->kerberos_authentication = 0; if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1) options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1; if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1) options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1) options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) options->permit_empty_passwd = 0; if (options->permit_user_env == -1) { options->permit_user_env = 0; options->permit_user_env_whitelist = NULL; } if (options->compression == -1) #ifdef WITH_ZLIB options->compression = COMP_DELAYED; #else options->compression = COMP_NONE; #endif if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1) options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1) options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1) options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1; if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->max_startups == -1) options->max_startups = 100; if (options->max_startups_rate == -1) options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */ if (options->max_startups_begin == -1) options->max_startups_begin = 10; if (options->max_authtries == -1) options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX; if (options->max_sessions == -1) options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX; if (options->use_dns == -1) options->use_dns = 0; if (options->client_alive_interval == -1) options->client_alive_interval = 0; if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1) options->client_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { array_append("[default]", 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles", &options->authorized_keys_files, &options->num_authkeys_files, _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS); array_append("[default]", 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles", &options->authorized_keys_files, &options->num_authkeys_files, _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2); } if (options->permit_tun == -1) options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; if (options->disable_forwarding == -1) options->disable_forwarding = 0; if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1) options->expose_userauth_info = 0; if (options->sk_provider == NULL) options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal"); assemble_algorithms(options); /* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */ if (use_privsep == -1) use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON; #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->routing_domain); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_agent); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]); #undef CLEAR_ON_NONE /* Similar handling for AuthenticationMethods=any */ if (options->num_auth_methods == 1 && strcmp(options->auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) { free(options->auth_methods[0]); options->auth_methods[0] = NULL; options->num_auth_methods = 0; } #ifndef HAVE_MMAP if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) { error("This platform does not support both privilege " "separation and compression"); error("Compression disabled"); options->compression = 0; } #endif } /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { sBadOption, /* == unknown option */ /* Portable-specific options */ sUsePAM, /* Standard Options */ sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive, sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile, sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, sHostKeyAlgorithms, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, sHostCertificate, sInclude, sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink, sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding, sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider, sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported } ServerOpCodes; #define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of config */ #define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */ #define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH) #define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH 0x04 /* Match never matches; internal only */ /* Textual representation of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int flags; } keywords[] = { /* Portable-specific options */ #ifdef USE_PAM { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* Standard Options */ { "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "serverkeybits", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keyregenerationinterval", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostkeyalgorithms", sHostKeyAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyauthoptions", sPubkeyAuthOptions, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ #ifdef KRB5 { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef USE_AFS { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif #else { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "skeyauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG { "printlastlog", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */ { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "protocol", sIgnore, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "setenv", sSetEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } }; static struct { int val; char *text; } tunmode_desc[] = { { SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" }, { -1, NULL } }; /* Returns an opcode name from its number */ static const char * lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption. */ static ServerOpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, u_int *flags) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) { *flags = keywords[i].flags; return keywords[i].opcode; } error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return sBadOption; } char * derelativise_path(const char *path) { char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX]; if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0) return xstrdup("none"); expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid()); if (path_absolute(expanded)) return expanded; if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL) fatal("%s: getcwd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded); free(expanded); return ret; } static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, const char *rdomain, int port) { u_int i; if (port > 0) add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, port); else { for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) { add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, options->ports[i]); } } } static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, const char *rdomain, int port) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr; u_int i; /* Find listen_addrs entry for this rdomain */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_listen_addrs; i++) { if (rdomain == NULL && options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL) break; if (rdomain == NULL || options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(rdomain, options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain) == 0) break; } if (i >= options->num_listen_addrs) { /* No entry for this rdomain; allocate one */ if (i >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s: too many listen addresses", __func__); options->listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(options->listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs + 1, sizeof(*options->listen_addrs)); i = options->num_listen_addrs++; if (rdomain != NULL) options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain = xstrdup(rdomain); } /* options->listen_addrs[i] points to the addresses for this rdomain */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options->address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)", addr ? addr : "", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next) ; ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs[i].addrs; options->listen_addrs[i].addrs = aitop; } /* Returns nonzero if the routing domain name is valid */ static int valid_rdomain(const char *name) { #if defined(HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN) return sys_valid_rdomain(name); #elif defined(__OpenBSD__) const char *errstr; long long num; struct rt_tableinfo info; int mib[6]; size_t miblen = sizeof(mib); if (name == NULL) return 1; num = strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return 0; /* Check whether the table actually exists */ memset(mib, 0, sizeof(mib)); mib[0] = CTL_NET; mib[1] = PF_ROUTE; mib[4] = NET_RT_TABLE; mib[5] = (int)num; if (sysctl(mib, 6, &info, &miblen, NULL, 0) == -1) return 0; return 1; #else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ error("Routing domains are not supported on this platform"); return 0; #endif } /* * Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports * and AddressFamily options. */ static void queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, const char *rdomain, int port) { struct queued_listenaddr *qla; options->queued_listen_addrs = xrecallocarray( options->queued_listen_addrs, options->num_queued_listens, options->num_queued_listens + 1, sizeof(*options->queued_listen_addrs)); qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens++]; qla->addr = xstrdup(addr); qla->port = port; qla->rdomain = rdomain == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(rdomain); } /* * Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries. */ static void process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options) { u_int i; struct queued_listenaddr *qla; if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) { qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[i]; add_listen_addr(options, qla->addr, qla->rdomain, qla->port); free(qla->addr); free(qla->rdomain); } free(options->queued_listen_addrs); options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; options->num_queued_listens = 0; } /* * Inform channels layer of permitopen options for a single forwarding * direction (local/remote). */ static void process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOpCodes opcode, char **opens, u_int num_opens) { u_int i; int port; char *host, *arg, *oarg, ch; int where = opcode == sPermitOpen ? FORWARD_LOCAL : FORWARD_REMOTE; const char *what = lookup_opcode_name(opcode); channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where); if (num_opens == 0) return; /* permit any */ /* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */ if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0) return; if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) { channel_disable_admin(ssh, where); return; } /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */ for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) { oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]); ch = '\0'; host = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); if (host == NULL || ch == '/') fatal("%s: missing host in %s", __func__, what); host = cleanhostname(host); if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) fatal("%s: bad port number in %s", __func__, what); /* Send it to channels layer */ channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where, host, port); free(oarg); } } /* * Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration. */ void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options) { process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitOpen, options->permitted_opens, options->num_permitted_opens); process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitListen, options->permitted_listens, options->num_permitted_listens); } struct connection_info * get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns) { static struct connection_info ci; if (ssh == NULL || !populate) return &ci; ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns); ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh); ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh); ci.rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh); return &ci; } /* * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice. * * The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the * directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are * checked for syntax only. * * The second time is after a connection has been established but before * authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives * are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any * options set are copied into the main server config. * * Potential additions/improvements: * - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg. Ciphers. * * - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg: * Match Address 192.168.0.* * Tag trusted * Match Group wheel * Tag trusted * Match Tag trusted * AllowTcpForwarding yes * GatewayPorts clientspecified * [...] * * - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive * Match Group shell * PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip */ static int match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user) { int result = 0; struct passwd *pw; if (user == NULL) goto out; if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does " "not exist", line, user); } else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group " "at line %d", user, line); } else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) { debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); } else { debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); result = 1; } out: ga_free(); return result; } static void match_test_missing_fatal(const char *criteria, const char *attrib) { fatal("'Match %s' in configuration but '%s' not in connection " "test specification.", criteria, attrib); } /* * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need * to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does * not match. */ static int match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci) { int result = 1, attributes = 0, port; char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition; if (ci == NULL) debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp); else debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s " "laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)", ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)", ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)", ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport); while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { attributes++; if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes != 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) { error("'all' cannot be combined with other " "Match attributes"); return -1; } *condition = cp; return 1; } if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); return -1; } if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->user == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("User", "user"); if (match_usergroup_pattern_list(ci->user, arg) != 1) result = 0; else debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at " "line %d", ci->user, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->user == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user"); switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) { case -1: return -1; case 0: result = 0; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->host == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("Host", "host"); if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1) result = 0; else debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->address == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("Address", "addr"); switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->laddress == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("LocalAddress", "laddr"); switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d", ci->laddress, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) { if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) { error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line", arg); return -1; } if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->lport == 0) match_test_missing_fatal("LocalPort", "lport"); /* TODO support port lists */ if (port == ci->lport) debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalPort %d' at line %d", ci->laddress, port, line); else result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->rdomain == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain"); if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1) result = 0; else debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at " "line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line); } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); return -1; } } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); return -1; } if (ci != NULL) debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; return result; } #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = { { "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, { "prohibit-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, { "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY }, { "yes", PERMIT_YES }, { "no", PERMIT_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = { #ifdef WITH_ZLIB { "yes", COMP_DELAYED }, { "delayed", COMP_DELAYED }, #endif { "no", COMP_NONE }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = { { "clientspecified", 2 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = { { "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "all", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "no", FORWARD_DENY }, { "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE }, { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL }, { NULL, -1 } }; static int process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo, int inc_flags, int depth, struct include_list *includes) { char ch, *cp, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p; int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, flags = 0; size_t len; long long val64; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; const char *errstr; struct include_item *item; glob_t gbuf; /* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */ if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) return 0; for (len--; len > 0; len--) { if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; } cp = line; if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace */ if (*arg == '\0') arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#') return 0; intptr = NULL; charptr = NULL; opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags); if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude) debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp); if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) { if (connectinfo == NULL) { fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed " "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg); } else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */ while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); return 0; } } switch (opcode) { /* Portable-specific options */ case sUsePAM: intptr = &options->use_pam; goto parse_flag; /* Standard Options */ case sBadOption: return -1; case sPort: /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ if (options->ports_from_cmdline) return 0; if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.", filename, linenum); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.", filename, linenum); options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg); if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.", filename, linenum); break; case sLoginGraceTime: intptr = &options->login_grace_time; parse_time: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sListenAddress: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing address", filename, linenum); /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */ if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) { port = 0; p = arg; } else { arg2 = NULL; ch = '\0'; p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); if (p == NULL || ch == '/') fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage", filename, linenum); p = cleanhostname(p); if (arg == NULL) port = 0; else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum); } /* Optional routing table */ arg2 = NULL; if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL) { if (strcmp(arg, "rdomain") != 0 || (arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: bad ListenAddress syntax", filename, linenum); if (!valid_rdomain(arg2)) fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain", filename, linenum); } queue_listen_addr(options, p, arg2, port); break; case sAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; parse_multistate: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sHostKeyFile: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { servconf_add_hostkey(filename, linenum, options, arg, 1); } break; case sHostKeyAgent: charptr = &options->host_key_agent; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ? xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg); break; case sHostCertificate: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) servconf_add_hostcert(filename, linenum, options, arg); break; case sPidFile: charptr = &options->pid_file; parse_filename: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = derelativise_path(arg); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sPermitRootLogin: intptr = &options->permit_root_login; multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin; goto parse_multistate; case sIgnoreRhosts: intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts; parse_flag: multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; goto parse_multistate; case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts: intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly: intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types; parse_keytypes: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sHostKeyAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; goto parse_keytypes; case sCASignatureAlgorithms: charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms; goto parse_keytypes; case sPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types; goto parse_keytypes; case sPubkeyAuthOptions: intptr = &options->pubkey_auth_options; value = 0; while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) continue; if (strcasecmp(arg, "touch-required") == 0) value |= PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED; else { fatal("%s line %d: unsupported " "PubkeyAuthOptions option %s", filename, linenum, arg); } } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sKerberosAuthentication: intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd: intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosTicketCleanup: intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosGetAFSToken: intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token; goto parse_flag; case sGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sGssCleanupCreds: intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; case sGssStrictAcceptor: intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; goto parse_flag; case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sChallengeResponseAuthentication: intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPrintMotd: intptr = &options->print_motd; goto parse_flag; case sPrintLastLog: intptr = &options->print_lastlog; goto parse_flag; case sX11Forwarding: intptr = &options->x11_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sX11DisplayOffset: intptr = &options->x11_display_offset; parse_int: arg = strdelim(&cp); if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: integer value %s.", filename, linenum, errstr); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sX11UseLocalhost: intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost; goto parse_flag; case sXAuthLocation: charptr = &options->xauth_location; goto parse_filename; case sPermitTTY: intptr = &options->permit_tty; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserRC: intptr = &options->permit_user_rc; goto parse_flag; case sStrictModes: intptr = &options->strict_modes; goto parse_flag; case sTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case sEmptyPasswd: intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserEnvironment: intptr = &options->permit_user_env; charptr = &options->permit_user_env_whitelist; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = 0; p = NULL; if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0) value = 1; else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0) value = 0; else { /* Pattern-list specified */ value = 1; p = xstrdup(arg); } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { *intptr = value; *charptr = p; p = NULL; } free(p); break; case sCompression: intptr = &options->compression; multistate_ptr = multistate_compression; goto parse_multistate; case sRekeyLimit: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", filename, linenum); } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = val64; if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) { (void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case sGatewayPorts: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports; goto parse_multistate; case sUseDNS: intptr = &options->use_dns; goto parse_flag; case sLogFacility: log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; arg = strdelim(&cp); value = log_facility_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; break; case sLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = strdelim(&cp); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == -1) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case sAllowTcpForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowAgentForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sDisableForwarding: intptr = &options->disable_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sAllowUsers: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid AllowUsers pattern: " "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg); if (!*activep) continue; array_append(filename, linenum, "AllowUsers", &options->allow_users, &options->num_allow_users, arg); } break; case sDenyUsers: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid DenyUsers pattern: " "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg); if (!*activep) continue; array_append(filename, linenum, "DenyUsers", &options->deny_users, &options->num_deny_users, arg); } break; case sAllowGroups: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (!*activep) continue; array_append(filename, linenum, "AllowGroups", &options->allow_groups, &options->num_allow_groups, arg); } break; case sDenyGroups: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (!*activep) continue; array_append(filename, linenum, "DenyGroups", &options->deny_groups, &options->num_deny_groups, arg); } break; case sCiphers: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case sMacs: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case sKexAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case sSubsystem: if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) { fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.", filename, linenum); } arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) { arg = strdelim(&cp); break; } for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0) fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.", filename, linenum, arg); options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.", filename, linenum); options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); /* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */ p = xstrdup(arg); len = strlen(p) + 1; while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { len += 1 + strlen(arg); p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len); strlcat(p, " ", len); strlcat(p, arg, len); } options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p; options->num_subsystems++; break; case sMaxStartups: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d", &options->max_startups_begin, &options->max_startups_rate, &options->max_startups)) == 3) { if (options->max_startups_begin > options->max_startups || options->max_startups_rate > 100 || options->max_startups_rate < 1) fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); } else if (n != 1) fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); else options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin; break; case sMaxAuthTries: intptr = &options->max_authtries; goto parse_int; case sMaxSessions: intptr = &options->max_sessions; goto parse_int; case sBanner: charptr = &options->banner; goto parse_filename; /* * These options can contain %X options expanded at * connect time, so that you can specify paths like: * * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u */ case sAuthorizedKeysFile: if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { arg = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); array_append(filename, linenum, "AuthorizedKeysFile", &options->authorized_keys_files, &options->num_authkeys_files, arg); free(arg); } } return 0; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sClientAliveInterval: intptr = &options->client_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case sClientAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case sAcceptEnv: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; array_append(filename, linenum, "AcceptEnv", &options->accept_env, &options->num_accept_env, arg); } break; case sSetEnv: uvalue = options->num_setenv; while ((arg = strdelimw(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep || uvalue != 0) continue; array_append(filename, linenum, "SetEnv", &options->setenv, &options->num_setenv, arg); } break; case sPermitTunnel: intptr = &options->permit_tun; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/" "ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) { value = tunmode_desc[i].val; break; } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/" "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sInclude: if (cmdline) { fatal("Include directive not supported as a " "command-line option"); } value = 0; while ((arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg2 != '\0') { value++; found = 0; if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') { xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg); } else arg = xstrdup(arg2); /* * Don't let included files clobber the containing * file's Match state. */ oactive = *activep; /* consult cache of include files */ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) { if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0) continue; if (item->filename != NULL) { parse_server_config_depth(options, item->filename, item->contents, includes, connectinfo, (oactive ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH), activep, depth + 1); } found = 1; *activep = oactive; } if (found != 0) { free(arg); continue; } /* requested glob was not in cache */ debug2("%s line %d: new include %s", filename, linenum, arg); if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) { if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) { fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" " "glob failed", filename, linenum, arg); } /* * If no entry matched then record a * placeholder to skip later glob calls. */ debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s", filename, linenum, arg); item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item)); item->selector = strdup(arg); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry); } if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: too many glob results", __func__); for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) { debug2("%s line %d: including %s", filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]); item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item)); item->selector = strdup(arg); item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]); if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); } load_server_config(item->filename, item->contents); parse_server_config_depth(options, item->filename, item->contents, includes, connectinfo, (oactive ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH), activep, depth + 1); *activep = oactive; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry); } globfree(&gbuf); free(arg); } if (value == 0) { fatal("%s line %d: Include missing filename argument", filename, linenum); } break; case sMatch: if (cmdline) fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo); if (value < 0) fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); *activep = (inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value; break; case sPermitListen: case sPermitOpen: if (opcode == sPermitListen) { uintptr = &options->num_permitted_listens; chararrayptr = &options->permitted_listens; } else { uintptr = &options->num_permitted_opens; chararrayptr = &options->permitted_opens; } arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing %s specification", filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); uvalue = *uintptr; /* modified later */ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { *uintptr = 1; *chararrayptr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**chararrayptr)); (*chararrayptr)[0] = xstrdup(arg); } break; } for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) { if (opcode == sPermitListen && strchr(arg, ':') == NULL) { /* * Allow bare port number for PermitListen * to indicate a wildcard listen host. */ xasprintf(&arg2, "*:%s", arg); } else { arg2 = xstrdup(arg); ch = '\0'; p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); if (p == NULL || ch == '/') { fatal("%s line %d: missing host in %s", filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); } p = cleanhostname(p); } if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) { fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in %s", filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); } if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { array_append(filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode), chararrayptr, uintptr, arg2); } free(arg2); } break; case sForceCommand: if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL) options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len); return 0; case sChrootDirectory: charptr = &options->chroot_directory; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sTrustedUserCAKeys: charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys; goto parse_filename; case sRevokedKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file; goto parse_filename; case sSecurityKeyProvider: charptr = &options->sk_provider; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = strcasecmp(arg, "internal") == 0 ? xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sIPQoS: arg = strdelim(&cp); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case sVersionAddendum: if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) { if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument", filename, linenum); else options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len); } return 0; case sAuthorizedKeysCommand: if (cp == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) { if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand " "must be an absolute path", filename, linenum); options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len); } return 0; case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser: charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing AuthorizedKeysCommandUser " "argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand: if (cp == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) { if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: " "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be " "an absolute path", filename, linenum); options->authorized_principals_command = xstrdup(cp + len); } return 0; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing " "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sAuthenticationMethods: if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) { value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */ value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) { if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) { fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" " "must appear alone in " "AuthenticationMethods", filename, linenum); } value = 1; } else if (value) { fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear " "alone in AuthenticationMethods", filename, linenum); } else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) { fatal("%s line %d: invalid " "authentication method list.", filename, linenum); } value2 = 1; if (!*activep) continue; array_append(filename, linenum, "AuthenticationMethods", &options->auth_methods, &options->num_auth_methods, arg); } if (value2 == 0) { fatal("%s line %d: no AuthenticationMethods " "specified", filename, linenum); } } return 0; case sStreamLocalBindMask: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask " "argument.", filename, linenum); /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &p, 8); if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777) fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case sStreamLocalBindUnlink: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; goto parse_flag; case sFingerprintHash: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) options->fingerprint_hash = value; break; case sExposeAuthInfo: intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info; goto parse_flag; case sRDomain: charptr = &options->routing_domain; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") != 0 && strcmp(arg, "%D") != 0 && !valid_rdomain(arg)) fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sDeprecated: case sIgnore: case sUnsupported: do_log2(opcode == sIgnore ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, "%s line %d: %s option %s", filename, linenum, opcode == sUnsupported ? "Unsupported" : "Deprecated", arg); while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); break; default: fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)", filename, linenum, arg, opcode); } if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", filename, linenum, arg); return 0; } int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes) { return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename, linenum, activep, connectinfo, 0, 0, includes); } /* Reads the server configuration file. */ void load_server_config(const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf) { char *line = NULL, *cp; size_t linesize = 0; FILE *f; int r, lineno = 0; debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename); if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) { perror(filename); exit(1); } sshbuf_reset(conf); while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { lineno++; /* * Trim out comments and strip whitespace * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce * line numbers later for error messages */ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL) memcpy(cp, "\n", 2); cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r"); if ((r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, strlen(cp))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } free(line); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(conf, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fclose(f); debug2("%s: done config len = %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(conf)); } void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { ServerOptions mo; initialize_server_options(&mo); parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes, connectinfo); copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0); } int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec) { char *p; while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') { if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) { ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) { ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) { ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) { ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6); } else if (strncmp(p, "rdomain=", 8) == 0) { ci->rdomain = xstrdup(p + 8); } else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) { ci->lport = a2port(p + 6); if (ci->lport == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode" " specification %s\n", p+6, p); return -1; } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n", p); return -1; } } return 0; } /* * Copy any supported values that are set. * * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we * do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow(). */ void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) { #define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != -1) \ dst->n = src->n; \ } while (0) M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options); M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(disable_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(expose_userauth_info); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun); M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports); M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc); M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions); M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries); M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_count_max); M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); M_CP_INTOPT(log_level); /* * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use * M_CP_INTOPT - it does a signed comparison that causes compiler * warnings. */ if (src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask != (mode_t)-1) { dst->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask; } /* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */ #define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \ free(dst->n); \ dst->n = src->n; \ } \ } while(0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(s, num_s) do {\ u_int i; \ if (src->num_s != 0) { \ for (i = 0; i < dst->num_s; i++) \ free(dst->s[i]); \ free(dst->s); \ dst->s = xcalloc(src->num_s, sizeof(*dst->s)); \ for (i = 0; i < src->num_s; i++) \ dst->s[i] = xstrdup(src->s[i]); \ dst->num_s = src->num_s; \ } \ } while(0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); /* Arguments that accept '+...' need to be expanded */ assemble_algorithms(dst); /* * The only things that should be below this point are string options * which are only used after authentication. */ if (preauth) return; /* These options may be "none" to clear a global setting */ M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command); if (option_clear_or_none(dst->adm_forced_command)) { free(dst->adm_forced_command); dst->adm_forced_command = NULL; } M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory); if (option_clear_or_none(dst->chroot_directory)) { free(dst->chroot_directory); dst->chroot_directory = NULL; } } #undef M_CP_INTOPT #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT #define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16 void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth) { int linenum, bad_options = 0; char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf; if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH) fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes"); debug2("%s: config %s len %zu", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf)); if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); linenum = 1; while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) { if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp, filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, flags, depth, includes) != 0) bad_options++; } free(obuf); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); process_queued_listen_addrs(options); } void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1; parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes, connectinfo, 0, &active, 0); } static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case sAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case sPermitRootLogin: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin); case sGatewayPorts: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports); case sCompression: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression); case sAllowTcpForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static void dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val == NULL ? "none" : val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; if (count <= 0 && code != sAuthenticationMethods) return; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); if (code == sAuthenticationMethods && count == 0) printf(" any"); printf("\n"); } static char * format_listen_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) { int r; struct addrinfo *ai; char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV]; char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL; /* * ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes * addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to * print these in reverse order. */ for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if ((r = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); continue; } laddr2 = laddr1; if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) { xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s%s%s\n%s", addr, port, la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain, laddr2); } else { xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s%s%s\n%s", addr, port, la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain, laddr2); } free(laddr2); } return laddr1; } void dump_config(ServerOptions *o) { char *s; u_int i; /* these are usually at the top of the config */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++) printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family); for (i = 0; i < o->num_listen_addrs; i++) { s = format_listen_addrs(&o->listen_addrs[i]); printf("%s", s); free(s); } /* integer arguments */ #ifdef USE_PAM dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam); #endif dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset); dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries); dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max); dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); /* formatted integer arguments */ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); #ifdef KRB5 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup); # ifdef USE_AFS dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); # endif #endif #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd); #ifndef DISABLE_LASTLOG dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc); dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes); dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info); /* string arguments */ dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers); dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs); dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner); dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file); dump_cfg_string(sSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, o->authorized_principals_file); dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0' ? "none" : o->version_addendum); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent); dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(sCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms); dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types); dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain); /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); /* string array arguments */ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files, o->authorized_keys_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files, o->host_key_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files, o->host_cert_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env); dump_cfg_strarray(sSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods, o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods); /* other arguments */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++) printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i], o->subsystem_args[i]); printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin, o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups); s = NULL; for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) { if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) { s = tunmode_desc[i].text; break; } } dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s); printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); printf("permitopen"); if (o->num_permitted_opens == 0) printf(" any"); else { for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_opens; i++) printf(" %s", o->permitted_opens[i]); } printf("\n"); printf("permitlisten"); if (o->num_permitted_listens == 0) printf(" any"); else { for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_listens; i++) printf(" %s", o->permitted_listens[i]); } printf("\n"); if (o->permit_user_env_whitelist == NULL) { dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env); } else { printf("permituserenvironment %s\n", o->permit_user_env_whitelist); } printf("pubkeyauthoptions"); if (o->pubkey_auth_options == 0) printf(" none"); if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) printf(" touch-required"); printf("\n"); } openssh-8.2p1/servconf.h010064400017500001750000000254331362136622600134660ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.143 2020/01/31 22:42:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef SERVCONF_H #define SERVCONF_H #include #define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */ #define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */ /* permit_root_login */ #define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1 #define PERMIT_NO 0 #define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1 #define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2 #define PERMIT_YES 3 /* use_privsep */ #define PRIVSEP_OFF 0 #define PRIVSEP_ON 1 #define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX 2 /* PermitOpen */ #define PERMITOPEN_ANY 0 #define PERMITOPEN_NONE -2 #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */ /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp" /* PubkeyAuthOptions flags */ #define PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED 1 struct ssh; struct fwd_perm_list; /* * Used to store addresses from ListenAddr directives. These may be * incomplete, as they may specify addresses that need to be merged * with any ports requested by ListenPort. */ struct queued_listenaddr { char *addr; int port; /* <=0 if unspecified */ char *rdomain; }; /* Resolved listen addresses, grouped by optional routing domain */ struct listenaddr { char *rdomain; struct addrinfo *addrs; }; typedef struct { u_int num_ports; u_int ports_from_cmdline; int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */ struct queued_listenaddr *queued_listen_addrs; u_int num_queued_listens; struct listenaddr *listen_addrs; u_int num_listen_addrs; int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */ char *routing_domain; /* Bind session to routing domain */ char **host_key_files; /* Files containing host keys. */ int *host_key_file_userprovided; /* Key was specified by user. */ u_int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */ char **host_cert_files; /* Files containing host certs. */ u_int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */ char *host_key_agent; /* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */ char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */ int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time * (sec). */ int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */ int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */ int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts * for RhostsRsaAuth */ int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */ int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */ int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */ int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start * searching at */ int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */ char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */ int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */ int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */ int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */ int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */ int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */ char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */ int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */ int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */ char *hostbased_key_types; /* Key types allowed for hostbased */ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types */ char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */ int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ char *pubkey_key_types; /* Key types allowed for public key */ int pubkey_auth_options; /* -1 or mask of PUBKEYAUTH_* flags */ int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos * authentication. */ int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos * and any other password * authentication mechanism, * such as SecurID or * /etc/passwd */ int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket * file on logout. */ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if * authenticated with Kerberos. */ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ int challenge_response_authentication; int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty * passwords. */ int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */ char *permit_user_env_whitelist; /* pattern-list whitelist */ int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */ int allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */ int allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */ int allow_agent_forwarding; int disable_forwarding; u_int num_allow_users; char **allow_users; u_int num_deny_users; char **deny_users; u_int num_allow_groups; char **allow_groups; u_int num_deny_groups; char **deny_groups; u_int num_subsystems; char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; char *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; u_int num_accept_env; char **accept_env; u_int num_setenv; char **setenv; int max_startups_begin; int max_startups_rate; int max_startups; int max_authtries; int max_sessions; char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */ int use_dns; int client_alive_interval; /* * poke the client this often to * see if it's still there */ int client_alive_count_max; /* * If the client is unresponsive * for this many intervals above, * disconnect the session */ u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */ char **authorized_keys_files; char *adm_forced_command; int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */ int permit_tun; char **permitted_opens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */ u_int num_permitted_opens; char **permitted_listens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */ u_int num_permitted_listens; char *chroot_directory; char *revoked_keys_file; char *trusted_user_ca_keys; char *authorized_keys_command; char *authorized_keys_command_user; char *authorized_principals_file; char *authorized_principals_command; char *authorized_principals_command_user; int64_t rekey_limit; int rekey_interval; char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */ u_int num_auth_methods; char **auth_methods; int fingerprint_hash; int expose_userauth_info; u_int64_t timing_secret; char *sk_provider; } ServerOptions; /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */ struct connection_info { const char *user; const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */ const char *address; /* remote address */ const char *laddress; /* local address */ int lport; /* local port */ const char *rdomain; /* routing domain if available */ int test; /* test mode, allow some attributes to be * unspecified */ }; /* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */ struct include_item { char *selector; char *filename; struct sshbuf *contents; TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry; }; TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item); /* * These are string config options that must be copied between the * Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the * privsep slave to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all * the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order. * * NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or * COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both. */ #define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \ M_CP_STROPT(banner); \ M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \ M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \ M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \ M_CP_STROPT(ca_sign_algorithms); \ M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \ M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_whitelist); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_listens, num_permitted_listens); \ } while (0) struct connection_info *get_connection_info(struct ssh *, int, int); void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *); void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *); int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int, int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes); void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options); void load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *); void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *); void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *); int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *); int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *); void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int); void dump_config(ServerOptions *); char *derelativise_path(const char *); void servconf_add_hostkey(const char *, const int, ServerOptions *, const char *path, int); void servconf_add_hostcert(const char *, const int, ServerOptions *, const char *path); #endif /* SERVCONF_H */ openssh-8.2p1/serverloop.c010064400017500001750000000726551362136622600140440ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.222 2020/01/30 07:21:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Server main loop for handling the interactive session. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "session.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "serverloop.h" #include "ssherr.h" extern ServerOptions options; /* XXX */ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; extern int use_privsep; static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */ /* * This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server * will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */ /* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; /* prototypes */ static void server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *); /* requested tunnel forwarding interface(s), shared with session.c */ char *tun_fwd_ifnames = NULL; /* returns 1 if bind to specified port by specified user is permitted */ static int bind_permitted(int port, uid_t uid) { if (use_privsep) return 1; /* allow system to decide */ if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && uid != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid * the race between select() and child_terminated */ static int notify_pipe[2]; static void notify_setup(void) { if (pipe(notify_pipe) == -1) { error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno)); } else if ((fcntl(notify_pipe[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) || (fcntl(notify_pipe[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)) { error("fcntl(notify_pipe, F_SETFD) failed %s", strerror(errno)); close(notify_pipe[0]); close(notify_pipe[1]); } else { set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]); set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]); return; } notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */ notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */ } static void notify_parent(void) { if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); } static void notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) { if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); } static void notify_done(fd_set *readset) { char c; if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) debug2("%s: reading", __func__); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; child_terminated = 1; notify_parent(); errno = save_errno; } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigterm_handler(int sig) { received_sigterm = sig; } static void client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh) { char remote_id[512]; int r, channel_id; /* timeout, check to see how many we have had */ if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 && ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) > options.client_alive_count_max) { sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply", * we should get back a failure */ if ((channel_id = channel_find_open(ssh)) == -1) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* boolean: want reply */ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { channel_request_start(ssh, channel_id, "keepalive@openssh.com", 1); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* * Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the * select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors * have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite). */ static void wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh, int connection_in, int connection_out, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms) { struct timeval tv, *tvp; int ret; time_t minwait_secs = 0; int client_alive_scheduled = 0; /* time we last heard from the client OR sent a keepalive */ static time_t last_client_time; /* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */ channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, &minwait_secs); /* XXX need proper deadline system for rekey/client alive */ if (minwait_secs != 0) max_time_ms = MINIMUM(max_time_ms, (u_int)minwait_secs * 1000); /* * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly, * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag. * * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet. */ if (options.client_alive_interval) { uint64_t keepalive_ms = (uint64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000; if (max_time_ms == 0 || max_time_ms > keepalive_ms) { max_time_ms = keepalive_ms; client_alive_scheduled = 1; } } #if 0 /* wrong: bad condition XXX */ if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) #endif FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); notify_prepare(*readsetp); /* * If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that * descriptor. */ if (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); /* * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read * from it, then read as much as is available and exit. */ if (child_terminated && ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh)) if (max_time_ms == 0 || client_alive_scheduled) max_time_ms = 100; if (max_time_ms == 0) tvp = NULL; else { tv.tv_sec = max_time_ms / 1000; tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_ms % 1000); tvp = &tv; } /* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */ ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); if (ret == -1) { memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); if (errno != EINTR) error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } else if (client_alive_scheduled) { time_t now = monotime(); /* * If the select timed out, or returned for some other reason * but we haven't heard from the client in time, send keepalive. */ if (ret == 0 || (last_client_time != 0 && last_client_time + options.client_alive_interval <= now)) { client_alive_check(ssh); last_client_time = now; } else if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, *readsetp)) { last_client_time = now; } } notify_done(*readsetp); } /* * Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored * in buffers and processed later. */ static int process_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, int connection_in) { int r, len; char buf[16384]; /* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == 0) { verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); return -1; } else if (len == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) { verbose("Read error from remote host " "%.100s port %d: %.100s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } else { /* Buffer any received data. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_packet_process_incoming: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } return 0; } /* * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin. */ static void process_output(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *writeset, int connection_out) { int r; /* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) { if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll", __func__); } } } static void process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL); } static void collect_children(struct ssh *ssh) { pid_t pid; sigset_t oset, nset; int status; /* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */ sigemptyset(&nset); sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD); sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset); if (child_terminated) { debug("Received SIGCHLD."); while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR)) if (pid > 0) session_close_by_pid(ssh, pid, status); child_terminated = 0; } sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); } void server_loop2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; int max_fd; u_int nalloc = 0, connection_in, connection_out; u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0; debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2."); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); child_terminated = 0; connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh); if (!use_privsep) { ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); ssh_signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler); ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); } notify_setup(); max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out); max_fd = MAXIMUM(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]); server_init_dispatch(ssh); for (;;) { process_buffered_input_packets(ssh); if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh) && ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh)) channel_output_poll(ssh); if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { rekey_timeout_ms = ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh) * 1000; } else { rekey_timeout_ms = 0; } wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, connection_in, connection_out, &readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm); /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */ cleanup_exit(255); } collect_children(ssh); if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset); if (process_input(ssh, readset, connection_in) < 0) break; process_output(ssh, writeset, connection_out); } collect_children(ssh); free(readset); free(writeset); /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */ channel_free_all(ssh); /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */ session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL); } static int server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq); /* * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client. * even if this was generated by something other than * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives. */ ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0); return 0; } static Channel * server_request_direct_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { Channel *c = NULL; char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL; u_int target_port = 0, originator_port = 0; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &target_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (target_port > 0xFFFF) { error("%s: invalid target port", __func__); *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; goto out; } if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) { error("%s: invalid originator port", __func__); *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; goto out; } debug("%s: originator %s port %u, target %s port %u", __func__, originator, originator_port, target, target_port); /* XXX fine grained permissions */ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) { c = channel_connect_to_port(ssh, target, target_port, "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg); } else { logit("refused local port forward: " "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port); if (reason != NULL) *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; } out: free(originator); free(target); return c; } static Channel * server_request_direct_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL; u_int originator_port = 0; struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; int r; if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__); if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) { error("%s: invalid originator port", __func__); goto out; } debug("%s: originator %s port %d, target %s", __func__, originator, originator_port, target); /* XXX fine grained permissions */ if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) { c = channel_connect_to_path(ssh, target, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal"); } else { logit("refused streamlocal port forward: " "originator %s port %d, target %s", originator, originator_port, target); } out: free(originator); free(target); return c; } static Channel * server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; u_int mode, tun; int r, sock; char *tmp, *ifname = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mode)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse mode", __func__); switch (mode) { case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT: case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET: break; default: ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode."); return NULL; } if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device " "forwarding"); return NULL; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tun)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse device", __func__); if (tun > INT_MAX) { debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__); goto done; } if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) { if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun) goto done; tun = auth_opts->force_tun_device; } sock = tun_open(tun, mode, &ifname); if (sock < 0) goto done; debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname); c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif /* * Update the list of names exposed to the session * XXX remove these if the tunnels are closed (won't matter * much if they are already in the environment though) */ tmp = tun_fwd_ifnames; xasprintf(&tun_fwd_ifnames, "%s%s%s", tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : tun_fwd_ifnames, tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : ",", ifname); free(tmp); free(ifname); done: if (c == NULL) ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Failed to open the tunnel device."); return c; } static Channel * server_request_session(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int r; debug("input_session_request"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (no_more_sessions) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Possible attack: attempt to open a " "session after additional sessions disabled"); } /* * A server session has no fd to read or write until a * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered. */ c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL, -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "server-session", 1); if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) { debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self); channel_free(ssh, c); return NULL; } channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0); return c; } static int server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype = NULL; const char *errmsg = NULL; int r, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED; u_int rchan = 0, rmaxpack = 0, rwindow = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); debug("%s: ctype %s rchan %u win %u max %u", __func__, ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) { c = server_request_session(ssh); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { c = server_request_direct_tcpip(ssh, &reason, &errmsg); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(ssh); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) { c = server_request_tun(ssh); } if (c != NULL) { debug("%s: confirm %s", __func__, ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; c->have_remote_id = 1; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send open confirm", __func__); } } } else { debug("%s: failure %s", __func__, ctype); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, reason)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send open failure", __func__); } } free(ctype); return 0; } static int server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp) { struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL; int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0; const u_char *blob; u_char *sig = 0; size_t blen, slen; if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain( sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)); while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* * Better check that this is actually one of our hostkeys * before attempting to sign anything with it. */ if ((ndx = ssh->kex->host_key_index(key, 1, ssh)) == -1) { error("%s: unknown host %s key", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); goto out; } /* * XXX refactor: make kex->sign just use an index rather * than passing in public and private keys */ if ((key_prv = get_hostkey_by_index(ndx)) == NULL && (key_pub = get_hostkey_public_by_index(ndx, ssh)) == NULL) { error("%s: can't retrieve hostkey %d", __func__, ndx); goto out; } sshbuf_reset(sigbuf); free(sig); sig = NULL; /* * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated * during KEX to the default (SHA1). */ use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA && sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 || (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } } /* Success */ *respp = resp; resp = NULL; /* don't free it */ success = 1; out: free(sig); sshbuf_free(resp); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshkey_free(key); return success; } static int server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { char *rtype = NULL; u_char want_reply = 0; int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0; u_int port = 0; struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__); if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); debug("%s: rtype %s want_reply %d", __func__, rtype, want_reply); /* -R style forwarding */ if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse tcpip-forward", __func__); debug("%s: tcpip-forward listen %s port %u", __func__, fwd.listen_host, port); if (port <= INT_MAX) fwd.listen_port = (int)port; /* check permissions */ if (port > INT_MAX || (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 || !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding || (!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) || (fwd.listen_port != 0 && !bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) { success = 0; ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled port forwarding."); } else { /* Start listening on the port */ success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, &allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts); } if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if (allocated_listen_port != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u32: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-tcpip-forward", __func__); debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__, fwd.listen_host, port); if (port <= INT_MAX) { fwd.listen_port = (int)port; success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd); } } else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__); debug("%s: streamlocal-forward listen path %s", __func__, fwd.listen_path); /* check permissions */ if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 || !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding || (pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) { success = 0; ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled " "streamlocal forwarding."); } else { /* Start listening on the socket */ success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts); } } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__); debug("%s: cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", __func__, fwd.listen_path); success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) { no_more_sessions = 1; success = 1; } else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) { success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(ssh, &resp); } /* XXX sshpkt_get_end() */ if (want_reply) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 || (success && resp != NULL && (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, resp)) != 0) || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__); } free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(rtype); sshbuf_free(resp); return 0; } static int server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int r, success = 0; char *rtype = NULL; u_char want_reply = 0; u_int id = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %u request %s reply %d", id, rtype, want_reply); if (id >= INT_MAX || (c = channel_lookup(ssh, (int)id)) == NULL) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "%s: unknown channel %d", __func__, id); } if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c); } else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL || c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0) success = session_input_channel_req(ssh, c, rtype); if (want_reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", __func__, c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__); } free(rtype); return 0; } static void server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh) { debug("server_init_dispatch"); ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request); /* client_alive */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive); /* rekeying */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); } openssh-8.2p1/serverloop.h010064400017500001750000000017501362136622600140350ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.8 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to stdin * (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the child * program). */ #ifndef SERVERLOOP_H #define SERVERLOOP_H struct ssh; void server_loop2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); #endif openssh-8.2p1/session.c010064400017500001750000002065201362136622600133150ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.318 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "match.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "serverloop.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "session.h" #include "kex.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "atomicio.h" #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) #include #endif #ifdef WITH_SELINUX #include #endif #define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \ (!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \ (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t')) /* func */ Session *session_new(void); void session_set_fds(struct ssh *, Session *, int, int, int, int, int); void session_pty_cleanup(Session *); void session_proctitle(Session *); int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *, Session *); int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); int do_exec(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); void do_login(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); void do_child(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); void do_motd(void); int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *); static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *); /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern char *__progname; extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */ /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; /* data */ static int sessions_first_unused = -1; static int sessions_nalloc = 0; static Session *sessions = NULL; #define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0 #define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP login_cap_t *lc; #endif static int is_child = 0; static int in_chroot = 0; /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */ static char *auth_info_file = NULL; /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; /* removes the agent forwarding socket */ static void auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw) { if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { temporarily_use_uid(pw); unlink(auth_sock_name); rmdir(auth_sock_dir); auth_sock_name = NULL; restore_uid(); } } static int auth_input_request_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw) { Channel *nc; int sock = -1; if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { error("authentication forwarding requested twice."); return 0; } /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */ auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX"); /* Create private directory for socket */ if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Agent forwarding disabled: " "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); free(auth_sock_dir); auth_sock_dir = NULL; goto authsock_err; } xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld", auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid()); /* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */ sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); /* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */ if (sock < 0) goto authsock_err; /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth socket", SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "auth socket", 1); nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name); return 1; authsock_err: free(auth_sock_name); if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) { temporarily_use_uid(pw); rmdir(auth_sock_dir); restore_uid(); free(auth_sock_dir); } if (sock != -1) close(sock); auth_sock_name = NULL; auth_sock_dir = NULL; return 0; } static void display_loginmsg(void) { int r; if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) == 0) return; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(loginmsg, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); printf("%s", (char *)sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg)); sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); } static void prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info) { int fd = -1, success = 0; if (!options.expose_userauth_info || info == NULL) return; temporarily_use_uid(pw); auth_info_file = xstrdup("/tmp/sshauth.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"); if ((fd = mkstemp(auth_info_file)) == -1) { error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(info), sshbuf_len(info)) != sshbuf_len(info)) { error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (close(fd) != 0) { error("%s: close: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } success = 1; out: if (!success) { if (fd != -1) close(fd); free(auth_info_file); auth_info_file = NULL; } restore_uid(); } static void set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshauthopt *opts) { char *tmp, *cp, *host; int port; size_t i; if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) { channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL); for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitopen; i++) { tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitopen[i]); /* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */ if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL) fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__); host = cleanhostname(host); if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0) fatal("%s: internal error: permitopen port", __func__); channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host, port); free(tmp); } } if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0) { channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE); for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitlisten; i++) { tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitlisten[i]); /* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */ if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL) fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__); host = cleanhostname(host); if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0) fatal("%s: internal error: permitlisten port", __func__); channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE, host, port); free(tmp); } } } void do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name); auth_log_authopts("active", auth_opts, 0); /* setup the channel layer */ /* XXX - streamlocal? */ set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(ssh, auth_opts); if (!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding) { channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL); channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE); } else { if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0) channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL); else channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL); if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0) channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE); else channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE); } auth_debug_send(ssh); prepare_auth_info_file(authctxt->pw, authctxt->session_info); do_authenticated2(ssh, authctxt); do_cleanup(ssh, authctxt); } /* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */ static int xauth_valid_string(const char *s) { size_t i; for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) && s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' && s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_') return 0; } return 1; } #define USE_PIPES 1 /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after * setting up file descriptors and such. */ int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { pid_t pid; #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2]; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */ if (pipe(pin) == -1) { error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(pout) == -1) { error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); return -1; } if (pipe(perr) == -1) { error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); return -1; } #else int inout[2], err[2]; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) { error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) == -1) { error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(inout[0]); close(inout[1]); return -1; } #endif session_proctitle(s); /* Fork the child. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifdef USE_PIPES close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); close(perr[0]); close(perr[1]); #else close(inout[0]); close(inout[1]); close(err[0]); close(err[1]); #endif return -1; case 0: is_child = 1; /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. */ if (setsid() == -1) error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifdef USE_PIPES /* * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket * pair, and make the child side the standard input. */ close(pin[1]); if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); /* Redirect stdout. */ close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1) perror("dup2 stdout"); close(pout[1]); /* Redirect stderr. */ close(perr[0]); if (dup2(perr[1], 2) == -1) perror("dup2 stderr"); close(perr[1]); #else /* * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist) * seem to depend on it. */ close(inout[1]); close(err[1]); if (dup2(inout[0], 0) == -1) /* stdin */ perror("dup2 stdin"); if (dup2(inout[0], 1) == -1) /* stdout (same as stdin) */ perror("dup2 stdout"); close(inout[0]); if (dup2(err[0], 2) == -1) /* stderr */ perror("dup2 stderr"); close(err[0]); #endif /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ do_child(ssh, s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; } #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, s->display != NULL, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); /* * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); #ifdef USE_PIPES /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); close(perr[1]); session_set_fds(ssh, s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], s->is_subsystem, 0); #else /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */ close(inout[0]); close(err[0]); /* * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same. */ session_set_fds(ssh, s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1], s->is_subsystem, 0); #endif return 0; } /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp, * lastlog, and other such operations. */ int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; pid_t pid; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_pty: no session"); ptyfd = s->ptyfd; ttyfd = s->ttyfd; /* * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional. * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions. */ if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) { error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); return -1; } /* we keep a reference to the pty master */ if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) { error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); close(fdout); return -1; } /* Fork the child. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(fdout); close(ptymaster); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); return -1; case 0: is_child = 1; close(fdout); close(ptymaster); /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ptyfd); /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */ pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty); /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */ if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) == -1) error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) == -1) error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) == -1) error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA do_login(ssh, s, command); #endif /* * Do common processing for the child, such as execing * the command. */ do_child(ssh, s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; } #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); /* Enter interactive session. */ s->ptymaster = ptymaster; ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1); return 0; } /* * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is * to be forced, execute that instead. */ int do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { int ret; const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL; char session_type[1024]; if (options.adm_forced_command) { original_command = command; command = options.adm_forced_command; forced = "(config)"; } else if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) { original_command = command; command = auth_opts->force_command; forced = "(key-option)"; } s->forced = 0; if (forced != NULL) { s->forced = 1; if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) { s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ? SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR; } else if (s->is_subsystem) s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command); } else if (s->is_subsystem) { snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys); } else if (command == NULL) { snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell"); } else { /* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command"); } if (s->ttyfd != -1) { tty = s->tty; if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) tty += 5; } verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d", session_type, tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", tty == NULL ? "" : tty, s->pw->pw_name, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), s->self); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS if (command != NULL) PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ shell =_PATH_BSHELL; PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); } #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command); else ret = do_exec_no_pty(ssh, s, command); original_command = NULL; /* * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); return ret; } /* administrative, login(1)-like work */ void do_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; struct passwd * pw = s->pw; pid_t pid = getpid(); /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ if (!use_privsep) record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); #ifdef USE_PAM /* * If password change is needed, do it now. * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check. */ if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { display_loginmsg(); do_pam_chauthtok(); s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0; /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */ } #endif if (check_quietlogin(s, command)) return; display_loginmsg(); do_motd(); } /* * Display the message of the day. */ void do_motd(void) { FILE *f; char buf[256]; if (options.print_motd) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd", "/etc/motd"), "r"); #else f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r"); #endif if (f) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stdout); fclose(f); } } } /* * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given. */ int check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command) { char buf[256]; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; struct stat st; /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */ if (command != NULL) return 1; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0) return 1; #else if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) return 1; #endif return 0; } /* * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing. * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#') * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed. * If whitelist is not NULL, then it is interpreted as a pattern list and * only variable names that match it will be accepted. */ static void read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize, const char *filename, const char *whitelist) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL, *cp, *value; size_t linesize = 0; u_int lineno = 0; f = fopen(filename, "r"); if (!f) return; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { if (++lineno > 1000) fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename); for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') continue; cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; value = strchr(cp, '='); if (value == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno, filename); continue; } /* * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to * the value string. */ *value = '\0'; value++; if (whitelist != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, whitelist, 0) != 1) continue; child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value); } free(line); fclose(f); } #ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN /* * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present. */ static char * child_get_env(char **env, const char *name) { int i; size_t len; len = strlen(name); for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++) if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=') return(env[i] + len + 1); return NULL; } /* * Read /etc/default/login. * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK. */ static void read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid) { char **tmpenv = NULL, *var; u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0; u_long mask; /* * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment, * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're * interested in. */ read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login", options.permit_user_env_whitelist); if (tmpenv == NULL) return; if (uid == 0) var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH"); else var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH"); if (var != NULL) child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var); if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL) if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1) umask((mode_t)mask); for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++) free(tmpenv[i]); free(tmpenv); } #endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ #if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) static void copy_environment_blacklist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize, const char *blacklist) { char *var_name, *var_val; int i; if (source == NULL) return; for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) { var_name = xstrdup(source[i]); if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) { free(var_name); continue; } *var_val++ = '\0'; if (blacklist == NULL || match_pattern_list(var_name, blacklist, 0) != 1) { debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); } free(var_name); } } #endif /* defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN static void copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize) { copy_environment_blacklist(source, env, envsize, NULL); } #endif static char ** do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) { char buf[256]; size_t n; u_int i, envsize; char *ocp, *cp, *value, **env, *laddr; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN) char *path = NULL; #endif /* Initialize the environment. */ envsize = 100; env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *)); env[0] = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * The Windows environment contains some setting which are * important for a running system. They must not be dropped. */ { char **p; p = fetch_windows_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_windows_environment(p); } #endif #ifdef GSSAPI /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter * the childs environment as they see fit */ ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize); #endif /* Set basic environment. */ for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); #ifdef _AIX child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name); #endif child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); else child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH")); #else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ # ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains * important components pointing to the system directories, * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better * remains intact here. */ # ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid); path = child_get_env(env, "PATH"); # endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH); } # endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ if (!options.use_pam) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf); } /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell); if (getenv("TZ")) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); if (s->term) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term); if (s->display) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display); /* * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or * SIA), so copy it to the child. */ { char *cp; if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp); } #ifdef _AIX { char *cp; if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment", options.permit_user_env_whitelist); } #endif #ifdef KRB5 if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", s->authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif if (auth_sock_name != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, auth_sock_name); /* Set custom environment options from pubkey authentication. */ if (options.permit_user_env) { for (n = 0 ; n < auth_opts->nenv; n++) { ocp = xstrdup(auth_opts->env[n]); cp = strchr(ocp, '='); if (*cp == '=') { *cp = '\0'; /* Apply PermitUserEnvironment whitelist */ if (options.permit_user_env_whitelist == NULL || match_pattern_list(ocp, options.permit_user_env_whitelist, 0) == 1) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, ocp, cp + 1); } free(ocp); } } /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */ if (options.permit_user_env) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment", pw->pw_dir); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf, options.permit_user_env_whitelist); } #ifdef USE_PAM /* * Pull in any environment variables that may have * been set by PAM. */ if (options.use_pam) { char **p; /* * Don't allow PAM-internal env vars to leak * back into the session environment. */ #define PAM_ENV_BLACKLIST "SSH_AUTH_INFO*,SSH_CONNECTION*" p = fetch_pam_child_environment(); copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize, PAM_ENV_BLACKLIST); free_pam_environment(p); p = fetch_pam_environment(); copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize, PAM_ENV_BLACKLIST); free_pam_environment(p); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ /* Environment specified by admin */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]); if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) { /* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */ fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]); } *value++ = '\0'; child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value); } /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_local_port(ssh)); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf); laddr = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh)); free(laddr); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf); if (tun_fwd_ifnames != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TUNNEL", tun_fwd_ifnames); if (auth_info_file != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file); if (s->ttyfd != -1) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty); if (original_command) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", original_command); if (debug_flag) { /* dump the environment */ fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n"); for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]); } return env; } /* * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found * first in this order). */ static void do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) { FILE *f = NULL; char cmd[1024]; int do_xauth; struct stat st; do_xauth = s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL; /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */ if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL && auth_opts->permit_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc && stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) { snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); if (debug_flag) fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { if (do_xauth) fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) { if (debug_flag) fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w"); if (f) { if (do_xauth) fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) { /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */ if (debug_flag) { fprintf(stderr, "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n", options.xauth_location, s->auth_display); fprintf(stderr, "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n", options.xauth_location, s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); } snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -", options.xauth_location); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display); fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", cmd); } } } static void do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f = NULL; char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN; struct stat sb; #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0) return; nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl); #else if (pw->pw_uid == 0) return; nl = def_nl; #endif if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) { if (nl != def_nl) free(nl); return; } /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */ logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl); if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stderr); fclose(f); } exit(254); } /* * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions. */ static void safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid) { const char *cp; char component[PATH_MAX]; struct stat st; if (!path_absolute(path)) fatal("chroot path does not begin at root"); if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component)) fatal("chroot path too long"); /* * Descend the path, checking that each component is a * root-owned directory with strict permissions. */ for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) { if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL) strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component)); else { cp++; memcpy(component, path, cp - path); component[cp - path] = '\0'; } debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); if (stat(component, &st) != 0) fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, component, strerror(errno)); if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot " "directory %s\"%s\"", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); } if (chdir(path) == -1) fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": " "%s", path, strerror(errno)); if (chroot(path) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (chdir("/") == -1) fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path); } /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */ void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { char uidstr[32], *chroot_path, *tmp; platform_setusercontext(pw); if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context"); exit(1); } #else if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("setgid"); exit(1); } /* Initialize the group list. */ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("initgroups"); exit(1); } endgrent(); #endif platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw); if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory, pw->pw_uid); snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); free(tmp); free(chroot_path); /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */ free(options.chroot_directory); options.chroot_directory = NULL; in_chroot = 1; } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context (setuser)"); exit(1); } /* * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID. */ (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK); #else # ifdef USE_LIBIAF /* * In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail; * typically because of the lack of necessary authentication * services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so, * ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the * internal sftp chroot case. We'll lose auditing and ACLs but * permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest. */ if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name); # endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ permanently_set_uid(pw); #endif } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); } if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid); } static void do_pwchange(Session *s) { fflush(NULL); fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n"); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { fprintf(stderr, "You must change your password now and login again!\n"); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX setexeccon(NULL); #endif #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #else execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL); #endif perror("passwd"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Password change required but no TTY available.\n"); } exit(1); } static void child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh) { extern int auth_sock; if (auth_sock != -1) { close(auth_sock); auth_sock = -1; } if (ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh) == ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh)) close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); else { close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); close(ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh)); } /* * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain * open in the parent. */ /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */ channel_close_all(ssh); /* * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later. */ endpwent(); /* * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file * descriptors open. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); } /* * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group * ids, and executing the command or shell. */ #define ARGV_MAX 10 void do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { extern char **environ; char **env, *argv[ARGV_MAX], remote_id[512]; const char *shell, *shell0; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; int r = 0; sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ destroy_sensitive_data(); ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { do_setusercontext(pw); child_close_fds(ssh); do_pwchange(s); exit(1); } /* * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. */ #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty); if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) do_motd(); #else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */ if (!options.use_pam) do_nologin(pw); do_setusercontext(pw); /* * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have * generated messages, so if this in an interactive * login then display them too. */ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) display_loginmsg(); #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_session_open()) { debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting"); display_loginmsg(); exit(254); } #endif /* * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is * legal, and means /bin/sh. */ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; /* * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file, * even if shell is overridden from login.conf */ env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); #endif /* * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be * closed before building the environment, as we call * ssh_remote_ipaddr there. */ child_close_fds(ssh); /* * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment. */ environ = env; #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) /* * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable. */ if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() && (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) { char cell[64]; debug("Getting AFS token"); k_setpag(); if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL); krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir); } #endif /* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */ if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) == -1) { /* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0); #endif if (r || !in_chroot) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home " "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno)); } if (r) exit(1); } closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell); /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) { error("Connection from %s: refusing non-sftp session", remote_id); printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n"); fflush(NULL); exit(1); } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) { extern int optind, optreset; int i; char *p, *args; setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME); args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server"); for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " "))) if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1) argv[i++] = p; argv[i] = NULL; optind = optreset = 1; __progname = argv[0]; #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); #endif exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); } fflush(NULL); /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL) shell0++; else shell0 = shell; /* * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that * this is a login shell. */ if (!command) { char argv0[256]; /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */ argv0[0] = '-'; if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1) >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) { errno = EINVAL; perror(shell); exit(1); } /* Execute the shell. */ argv[0] = argv0; argv[1] = NULL; execve(shell, argv, env); /* Executing the shell failed. */ perror(shell); exit(1); } /* * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c * option to execute the command. */ argv[0] = (char *) shell0; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = (char *) command; argv[3] = NULL; execve(shell, argv, env); perror(shell); exit(1); } void session_unused(int id) { debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id); if (id >= options.max_sessions || id >= sessions_nalloc) { fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)", __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); } memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions)); sessions[id].self = id; sessions[id].used = 0; sessions[id].chanid = -1; sessions[id].ptyfd = -1; sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; sessions_first_unused = id; } Session * session_new(void) { Session *s, *tmp; if (sessions_first_unused == -1) { if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions) return NULL; debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)", __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions); tmp = xrecallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc, sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions)); if (tmp == NULL) { error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions", __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1); return NULL; } sessions = tmp; session_unused(sessions_nalloc++); } if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc || sessions_first_unused < 0) { fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d", __func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); } s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused]; if (s->used) { fatal("%s: session %d already used", __func__, sessions_first_unused); } sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused; s->used = 1; s->next_unused = -1; debug("session_new: session %d", s->self); return s; } static void session_dump(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p " "channel %d pid %ld", s->used, s->next_unused, s->self, s, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); } } int session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) { Session *s = session_new(); debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid); if (s == NULL) { error("no more sessions"); return 0; } s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid) fatal("no user for session %d", s->self); debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid); s->chanid = chanid; return 1; } Session * session_by_tty(char *tty) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) { debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty); return s; } } debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_channel(int id) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->chanid == id) { debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d", i, id); return s; } } debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_x11_channel(int id) { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used) continue; for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) { if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) { debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d " "channel %d", s->self, id); return s; } } } debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_pid(pid_t pid) { int i; debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid); for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->pid == pid) return s; } error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid); session_dump(); return NULL; } static int session_window_change_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); return 1; } static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int r; if (!auth_opts->permit_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) { debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection."); return 0; } if (s->ttyfd != -1) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: you already have a pty."); return 0; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->term, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) { free(s->term); s->term = NULL; } /* Allocate a pty and open it. */ debug("Allocating pty."); if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)))) { free(s->term); s->term = NULL; s->ptyfd = -1; s->ttyfd = -1; error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self); return 0; } debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty); ssh_tty_parse_modes(ssh, s->ttyfd); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (!use_privsep) pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty); /* Set window size from the packet. */ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); session_proctitle(s); return 1; } static int session_subsystem_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { struct stat st; int r, success = 0; char *prog, *cmd; u_int i; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->subsys, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) { if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) { prog = options.subsystem_command[i]; cmd = options.subsystem_args[i]; if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) { s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP; debug("subsystem: %s", prog); } else { if (stat(prog, &st) == -1) debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", prog, strerror(errno)); s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd); } success = do_exec(ssh, s, cmd) == 0; break; } } if (!success) logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, " "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); return success; } static int session_x11_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int r, success; u_char single_connection = 0; if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) { error("session_x11_req: session %d: " "x11 forwarding already active", s->self); return 0; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &single_connection)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_proto, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_data, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->screen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); s->single_connection = single_connection; if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) && xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data)) success = session_setup_x11fwd(ssh, s); else { success = 0; error("Invalid X11 forwarding data"); } if (!success) { free(s->auth_proto); free(s->auth_data); s->auth_proto = NULL; s->auth_data = NULL; } return success; } static int session_shell_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); return do_exec(ssh, s, NULL) == 0; } static int session_exec_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { u_int success; int r; char *command = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &command, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); success = do_exec(ssh, s, command) == 0; free(command); return success; } static int session_break_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignore */ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) == -1) return 0; return 1; } static int session_env_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { char *name, *val; u_int i; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); /* Don't set too many environment variables */ if (s->num_env > 128) { debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name); goto fail; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) { debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val); s->env = xrecallocarray(s->env, s->num_env, s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env)); s->env[s->num_env].name = name; s->env[s->num_env].val = val; s->num_env++; return (1); } } debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name); fail: free(name); free(val); return (0); } /* * Conversion of signals from ssh channel request names. * Subset of signals from RFC 4254 section 6.10C, with SIGINFO as * local extension. */ static int name2sig(char *name) { #define SSH_SIG(x) if (strcmp(name, #x) == 0) return SIG ## x SSH_SIG(HUP); SSH_SIG(INT); SSH_SIG(KILL); SSH_SIG(QUIT); SSH_SIG(TERM); SSH_SIG(USR1); SSH_SIG(USR2); #undef SSH_SIG #ifdef SIGINFO if (strcmp(name, "INFO@openssh.com") == 0) return SIGINFO; #endif return -1; } static int session_signal_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { char *signame = NULL; int r, sig, success = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &signame, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((sig = name2sig(signame)) == -1) { error("%s: unsupported signal \"%s\"", __func__, signame); goto out; } if (s->pid <= 0) { error("%s: no pid for session %d", __func__, s->self); goto out; } if (s->forced || s->is_subsystem) { error("%s: refusing to send signal %s to %s session", __func__, signame, s->forced ? "forced-command" : "subsystem"); goto out; } if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) { error("%s: session signalling requires privilege separation", __func__); goto out; } debug("%s: signal %s, killpg(%ld, %d)", __func__, signame, (long)s->pid, sig); temporarily_use_uid(s->pw); r = killpg(s->pid, sig); restore_uid(); if (r != 0) { error("%s: killpg(%ld, %d): %s", __func__, (long)s->pid, sig, strerror(errno)); goto out; } /* success */ success = 1; out: free(signame); return success; } static int session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { static int called = 0; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) { debug("%s: agent forwarding disabled", __func__); return 0; } if (called) { return 0; } else { called = 1; return auth_input_request_forwarding(ssh, s->pw); } } int session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *rtype) { int success = 0; Session *s; if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) { logit("%s: no session %d req %.100s", __func__, c->self, rtype); return 0; } debug("%s: session %d req %s", __func__, s->self, rtype); /* * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command * or a subsystem is executed */ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) { success = session_shell_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) { success = session_exec_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) { success = session_pty_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) { success = session_x11_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) { success = session_auth_agent_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { success = session_subsystem_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) { success = session_env_req(ssh, s); } } if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) { success = session_window_change_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) { success = session_break_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "signal") == 0) { success = session_signal_req(ssh, s); } return success; } void session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty) { /* * now that have a child and a pipe to the child, * we can activate our channel and register the fd's */ if (s->chanid == -1) fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self); channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid, fdout, fdin, fderr, ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT); } /* * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally * (e.g., due to a dropped connection). */ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) { if (s == NULL) { error("%s: no session", __func__); return; } if (s->ttyfd == -1) return; debug("%s: session %d release %s", __func__, s->self, s->tty); /* Record that the user has logged out. */ if (s->pid != 0) record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name); /* Release the pseudo-tty. */ if (getuid() == 0) pty_release(s->tty); /* * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty * while we're still cleaning up. */ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1) error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); /* unlink pty from session */ s->ttyfd = -1; } void session_pty_cleanup(Session *s) { PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s)); } static char * sig2name(int sig) { #define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x SSH_SIG(ABRT); SSH_SIG(ALRM); SSH_SIG(FPE); SSH_SIG(HUP); SSH_SIG(ILL); SSH_SIG(INT); SSH_SIG(KILL); SSH_SIG(PIPE); SSH_SIG(QUIT); SSH_SIG(SEGV); SSH_SIG(TERM); SSH_SIG(USR1); SSH_SIG(USR2); #undef SSH_SIG return "SIG@openssh.com"; } static void session_close_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) { debug("%s: x11 channel %d missing", __func__, id); } else { /* Detach X11 listener */ debug("%s: detach x11 channel %d", __func__, id); channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } } static void session_close_single_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) { Session *s; u_int i; debug3("%s: channel %d", __func__, id); channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no x11 channel %d", __func__, id); for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { debug("%s: session %d: closing channel %d", __func__, s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]); /* * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we * close all of its siblings. */ if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id) session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]); } free(s->x11_chanids); s->x11_chanids = NULL; free(s->display); s->display = NULL; free(s->auth_proto); s->auth_proto = NULL; free(s->auth_data); s->auth_data = NULL; free(s->auth_display); s->auth_display = NULL; } static void session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status) { Channel *c; int r; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, s->chanid)) == NULL) fatal("%s: session %d: no channel %d", __func__, s->self, s->chanid); debug("%s: session %d channel %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); if (WIFEXITED(status)) { channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-status", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, WEXITSTATUS(status))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0); #ifndef WCOREDUMP # define WCOREDUMP(x) (0) #endif if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__); } else { /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "wait returned status %04x.", status); } /* disconnect channel */ debug("%s: release channel %d", __func__, s->chanid); /* * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds. */ channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1); /* * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be * interested in data we write. * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could * be some more data waiting in the pipe. */ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } void session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { u_int i; verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d", s->pw->pw_name, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), s->self); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); free(s->term); free(s->display); free(s->x11_chanids); free(s->auth_display); free(s->auth_data); free(s->auth_proto); free(s->subsys); if (s->env != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) { free(s->env[i].name); free(s->env[i].val); } free(s->env); } session_proctitle(s); session_unused(s->self); } void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t pid, int status) { Session *s = session_by_pid(pid); if (s == NULL) { debug("%s: no session for pid %ld", __func__, (long)pid); return; } if (s->chanid != -1) session_exit_message(ssh, s, status); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); s->pid = 0; } /* * this is called when a channel dies before * the session 'child' itself dies */ void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) { Session *s = session_by_channel(id); u_int i; if (s == NULL) { debug("%s: no session for id %d", __func__, id); return; } debug("%s: channel %d child %ld", __func__, id, (long)s->pid); if (s->pid != 0) { debug("%s: channel %d: has child, ttyfd %d", __func__, id, s->ttyfd); /* * delay detach of session, but release pty, since * the fd's to the child are already closed */ if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); return; } /* detach by removing callback */ channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, s->chanid); /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */ if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) { for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]); s->x11_chanids[i] = -1; } } s->chanid = -1; session_close(ssh, s); } void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *)) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used) { if (closefunc != NULL) closefunc(s); else session_close(ssh, s); } } } static char * session_tty_list(void) { static char buf[1024]; int i; char *cp; buf[0] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) { if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) { cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/'); cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1; } else cp = s->tty + 5; if (buf[0] != '\0') strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf); strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf); } } if (buf[0] == '\0') strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf); return buf; } void session_proctitle(Session *s) { if (s->pw == NULL) error("no user for session %d", s->self); else setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list()); } int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { struct stat st; char display[512], auth_display[512]; char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; u_int i; if (!auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options."); return 0; } if (!options.x11_forwarding) { debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file."); return 0; } if (options.xauth_location == NULL || (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "No xauth program; cannot forward X11."); return 0; } if (s->display != NULL) { debug("X11 display already set."); return 0; } if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset, options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection, &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) { debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); return 0; } for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { channel_register_cleanup(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i], session_close_single_x11, 0); } /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the * authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays. */ if (options.x11_use_localhost) { snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u", s->display_number, s->screen); snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u", s->display_number, s->screen); s->display = xstrdup(display); s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display); } else { #ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY struct hostent *he; struct in_addr my_addr; he = gethostbyname(hostname); if (he == NULL) { error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); return 0; } memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)); snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr), s->display_number, s->screen); #else snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname, s->display_number, s->screen); #endif s->display = xstrdup(display); s->auth_display = xstrdup(display); } return 1; } static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { server_loop2(ssh, authctxt); } void do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { static int called = 0; debug("do_cleanup"); /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */ if (is_child) return; /* avoid double cleanup */ if (called) return; called = 1; if (authctxt == NULL) return; #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { sshpam_cleanup(); sshpam_thread_cleanup(); } #endif if (!authctxt->authenticated) return; #ifdef KRB5 if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup && authctxt->krb5_ctx) krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(); #endif /* remove agent socket */ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw); /* remove userauth info */ if (auth_info_file != NULL) { temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); unlink(auth_info_file); restore_uid(); free(auth_info_file); auth_info_file = NULL; } /* * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled, * or if running in monitor. */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2); } /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */ const char * session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns) { const char *remote = ""; if (utmp_size > 0) remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns); if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size) remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); return remote; } openssh-8.2p1/session.h010064400017500001750000000051401362136622600133150ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.36 2018/10/02 12:40:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef SESSION_H #define SESSION_H #define TTYSZ 64 typedef struct Session Session; struct Session { int used; int self; int next_unused; struct passwd *pw; Authctxt *authctxt; pid_t pid; int forced; /* tty */ char *term; int ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; u_int row, col, xpixel, ypixel; char tty[TTYSZ]; /* X11 */ u_int display_number; char *display; u_int screen; char *auth_display; char *auth_proto; char *auth_data; int single_connection; int chanid; int *x11_chanids; int is_subsystem; char *subsys; u_int num_env; struct { char *name; char *val; } *env; }; void do_authenticated(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); void do_cleanup(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); int session_open(Authctxt *, int); void session_unused(int); int session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *); void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int); void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *); void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *)); void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); Session *session_new(void); Session *session_by_tty(char *); void session_close(struct ssh *, Session *); void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); const char *session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *, u_int, int); #endif openssh-8.2p1/sftp-client.c010064400017500001750000001453751362136622600140740ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.135 2019/10/04 04:31:59 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* XXX: memleaks */ /* XXX: signed vs unsigned */ /* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */ /* XXX: copy between two remote sites */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "progressmeter.h" #include "misc.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted; extern int showprogress; /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */ #define MIN_READ_SIZE 512 /* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */ #define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64 /* Directory separator characters */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN # define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/\\" #else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ # define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/" #endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ struct sftp_conn { int fd_in; int fd_out; u_int transfer_buflen; u_int num_requests; u_int version; u_int msg_id; #define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001 #define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002 #define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004 #define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008 #define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010 #define SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT 0x00000020 u_int exts; u_int64_t limit_kbps; struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out; }; static u_char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5))); /* ARGSUSED */ static int sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount) { struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit; refresh_progress_meter(0); if (bwlimit != NULL) bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount); return 0; } static void send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) { u_char mlen[4]; struct iovec iov[2]; if (sshbuf_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) fatal("Outbound message too long %zu", sshbuf_len(m)); /* Send length first */ put_u32(mlen, sshbuf_len(m)); iov[0].iov_base = mlen; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen); iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m); iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m); if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, sftpio, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_out : NULL) != sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen)) fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); } static void get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial) { u_int msg_len; u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, sftpio, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != 4) { if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &msg_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { do_log2(initial ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, "Received message too long %u", msg_len); fatal("Ensure the remote shell produces no output " "for non-interactive sessions."); } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, sftpio, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != msg_len) { if (errno == EPIPE) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } } static void get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) { get_msg_extended(conn, m, 0); } static void send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s, u_int len) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const void *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); sshbuf_free(msg); } static u_int get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id, status; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); return status; } static u_char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, const char *errfmt, ...) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id, status; u_char type; u_char *handle; char errmsg[256]; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, errfmt); if (errfmt != NULL) vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args); va_end(args); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (errfmt != NULL) error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE) fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &handle, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); return handle; } static Attrib * get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; u_char type; int r; static Attrib a; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (quiet) debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type); } if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); return NULL; } sshbuf_free(msg); return &a; } static int get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id; u_int64_t flag; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (quiet) debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type); } memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_frsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bfree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bavail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_files)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_ffree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_favail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_fsid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_namemax)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0; st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0; sshbuf_free(msg); return 0; } struct sftp_conn * do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests, u_int64_t limit_kbps) { u_char type; struct sshbuf *msg; struct sftp_conn *ret; int r; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->msg_id = 1; ret->fd_in = fd_in; ret->fd_out = fd_out; ret->transfer_buflen = transfer_buflen; ret->num_requests = num_requests; ret->exts = 0; ret->limit_kbps = 0; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(ret, msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg_extended(ret, msg, 1); /* Expecting a VERSION reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) { error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)", type); sshbuf_free(msg); free(ret); return(NULL); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version); /* Check for extensions */ while (sshbuf_len(msg) > 0) { char *name; u_char *value; size_t vlen; int known = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &value, &vlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fsync@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "lsetstat@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT; known = 1; } if (known) { debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s", name, value); } else { debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name); } free(name); free(value); } sshbuf_free(msg); /* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */ if (ret->version == 0) ret->transfer_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->transfer_buflen, 20480); ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps; if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) { bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps, ret->transfer_buflen); bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps, ret->transfer_buflen); } return ret; } u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn) { return conn->version; } int do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { u_int id, status; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int count, id, i, expected_id, ents = 0; size_t handle_len; u_char type, *handle; int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; int r; if (dir) *dir = NULL; id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote readdir(\"%s\")", path); if (handle == NULL) { sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } if (dir) { ents = 0; *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[0] = NULL; } for (; !interrupted;) { id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++; debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int rstatus; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rstatus)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", rstatus); if (rstatus == SSH2_FX_EOF) break; error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(rstatus)); goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (count > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) fatal("%s: nonsensical number of entries", __func__); if (count == 0) break; debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(filename); free(longname); goto out; } if (print_flag) mprintf("%s\n", longname); /* * Directory entries should never contain '/' * These can be used to attack recursive ops * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd') */ if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) { error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" " "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path); } else if (dir) { *dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir)); (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename); (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname); memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, &a, sizeof(a)); (*dir)[++ents] = NULL; } free(filename); free(longname); } } status = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); free(handle); if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) { /* Don't return results on error */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = NULL; } else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) { /* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); **dir = NULL; } return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); } void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) { free(s[i]->filename); free(s[i]->longname); free(s[i]); } free(s); } int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { u_int status, id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag) error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } Attrib * do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } Attrib * do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; if (conn->version == 0) { if (quiet) debug("Server version does not support lstat operation"); else logit("Server version does not support lstat operation"); return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet)); } id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #ifdef notyet Attrib * do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet) { u_int id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle, handle_len); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #endif int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle, handle_len, a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } char * do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; u_char type; int r; expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path, strlen(path)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return NULL; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s size %lu", path, filename, (unsigned long)a.size); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return(filename); } int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath, int force_legacy) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r, use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send rename request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if (use_ext) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", use_ext ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" : "SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) { error("Server does not support hardlink@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send link request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message hardlink@openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't link file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if (conn->version < 3) { error("This server does not support the symlink operation"); return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send symlink request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; /* Silently return if the extension is not supported */ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0) return -1; /* Send fsync request */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fsync@openssh.com I:%u", id); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't sync file: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } #ifdef notyet char * do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; u_char type; int r; expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return filename; } #endif int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #ifdef notyet int do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #endif int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT) == 0) { error("Server does not support lsetstat@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static void send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset, u_int len, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } int do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { Attrib junk; struct sshbuf *msg; u_char *handle; int local_fd = -1, write_error; int read_error, write_errno, lmodified = 0, reordered = 0, r; u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater; u_int mode, id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK; off_t progress_counter; size_t handle_len; struct stat st; struct request { u_int id; size_t len; u_int64_t offset; TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq; }; TAILQ_HEAD(reqhead, request) requests; struct request *req; u_char type; TAILQ_INIT(&requests); if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) return -1; /* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) mode = a->perm & 0777; else mode = 0666; if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) { error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path); return(-1); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) size = a->size; else size = 0; buflen = conn->transfer_buflen; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */ /* Send open request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_READ)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &junk)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path); if (handle == NULL) { sshbuf_free(msg); return(-1); } local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR); if (local_fd == -1) { error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } offset = highwater = 0; if (resume_flag) { if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) { error("Unable to stat local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (st.st_size < 0) { error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path); goto fail; } if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "local file is larger than remote", local_path); fail: do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); sshbuf_free(msg); free(handle); if (local_fd != -1) close(local_fd); return -1; } offset = highwater = st.st_size; } /* Read from remote and write to local */ write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0; max_req = 1; progress_counter = offset; if (showprogress && size != 0) start_progress_meter(remote_path, size, &progress_counter); while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) { u_char *data; size_t len; /* * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully */ if (interrupted) { if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */ break; max_req = 0; } /* Send some more requests */ while (num_req < max_req) { debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)", (unsigned long long)offset, (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1, num_req, max_req); req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req)); req->id = conn->msg_id++; req->len = buflen; req->offset = offset; offset += buflen; num_req++; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&requests, req, tq); send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); } sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req); /* Find the request in our queue */ for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests); req != NULL && req->id != id; req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq)) ; if (req == NULL) fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_STATUS: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF) read_error = 1; max_req = 0; TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; break; case SSH2_FXP_DATA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu", (unsigned long long)req->offset, (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1); if (len > req->len) fatal("Received more data than asked for " "%zu > %zu", len, req->len); lmodified = 1; if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 || atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) && !write_error) { write_errno = errno; write_error = 1; max_req = 0; } else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater) highwater = req->offset + len; else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater) reordered = 1; progress_counter += len; free(data); if (len == req->len) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; } else { /* Resend the request for the missing data */ debug3("Short data block, re-requesting " "%llu -> %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)req->offset + len, (unsigned long long)req->offset + req->len - 1, num_req); req->id = conn->msg_id++; req->len -= len; req->offset += len; send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); /* Reduce the request size */ if (len < buflen) buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len); } if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */ if (size > 0 && offset > size) { /* Only one request at a time * after the expected EOF */ debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)offset, num_req); max_req = 1; } else if (max_req <= conn->num_requests) { ++max_req; } } break; default: fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_DATA, type); } } if (showprogress && size) stop_progress_meter(); /* Sanity check */ if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL) fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue"); /* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */ if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) { if (reordered && resume_flag) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "server reordered requests", local_path); } debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater); if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1) error("ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } if (read_error) { error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = -1; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else if (write_error) { error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(write_errno)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else { if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0 || interrupted) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else status = SSH2_FX_OK; /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1) #else if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1) #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (preserve_flag && (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1) error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } if (resume_flag && !lmodified) logit("File \"%s\" was not modified", local_path); else if (fsync_flag) { debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path); if (fsync(local_fd) == -1) error("Couldn't sync file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } } close(local_fd); sshbuf_free(msg); free(handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { int i, ret = 0; SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries; char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL; mode_t mode = 0777; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (dirattrib == NULL && (dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) { error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", src); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag) mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", src); if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777; else { debug("Server did not send permissions for " "directory \"%s\"", dst); } if (mkdir(dst, mode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) { error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) { error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", src); return -1; } for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) { free(new_dst); free(new_src); filename = dir_entries[i]->filename; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ) { if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) { error("Download of file %s to %s failed", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_src); } free(new_dst); free(new_src); if (preserve_flag) { if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1) error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno)); } else debug("Server did not send times for directory " "\"%s\"", dst); } free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries); return ret; } int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { char *src_canon; int ret; if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src); return -1; } ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0, dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag); free(src_canon); return ret; } int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { int r, local_fd; u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK; u_int id; u_char type; off_t offset, progress_counter; u_char *handle, *data; struct sshbuf *msg; struct stat sb; Attrib a, *c = NULL; u_int32_t startid; u_int32_t ackid; struct outstanding_ack { u_int id; u_int len; off_t offset; TAILQ_ENTRY(outstanding_ack) tq; }; TAILQ_HEAD(ackhead, outstanding_ack) acks; struct outstanding_ack *ack = NULL; size_t handle_len; TAILQ_INIT(&acks); if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) { error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); return(-1); } if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) { error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); close(local_fd); return(-1); } if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { error("%s is not a regular file", local_path); close(local_fd); return(-1); } stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 0777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; if (resume) { /* Get remote file size if it exists */ if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) { close(local_fd); return -1; } if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) { error("destination file bigger or same size as " "source file"); close(local_fd); return -1; } if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) { close(local_fd); return -1; } } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send open request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT| (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC))) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path); sshbuf_reset(msg); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path); if (handle == NULL) { close(local_fd); sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } startid = ackid = id + 1; data = xmalloc(conn->transfer_buflen); /* Read from local and write to remote */ offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0); if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(local_path, sb.st_size, &progress_counter); for (;;) { int len; /* * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF, * thus losing the last block of the file. * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the * server to drain. */ if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK) len = 0; else do len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen); while ((len == -1) && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)); if (len == -1) fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (len != 0) { ack = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ack)); ack->id = ++id; ack->offset = offset; ack->len = len; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&acks, ack, tq); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, ack->id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u", id, (unsigned long long)offset, len); } else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL) break; if (ack == NULL) fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id); if (id == startid || len == 0 || id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) { u_int rid; sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, " "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); /* Find the request in our queue */ for (ack = TAILQ_FIRST(&acks); ack != NULL && ack->id != rid; ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq)) ; if (ack == NULL) fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", rid); TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq); debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %lld", ack->id, ack->len, (long long)ack->offset); ++ackid; progress_counter += ack->len; free(ack); } offset += len; if (offset < 0) fatal("%s: offset < 0", __func__); } sshbuf_free(msg); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); free(data); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } if (close(local_fd) == -1) { error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ if (preserve_flag) do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a); if (fsync_flag) (void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len); if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; free(handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { int ret = 0; DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL; struct stat sb; Attrib a, *dirattrib; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) { error("Couldn't stat directory \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag) mprintf("Entering %s\n", src); attrib_clear(&a); stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 01777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; /* * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST, * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether * the path already existed and is a directory. */ if (do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0) != 0) { if ((dirattrib = do_stat(conn, dst, 0)) == NULL) return -1; if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", dst); return -1; } } if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) { error("Failed to open dir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; free(new_dst); free(new_src); filename = dp->d_name; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) { logit("%s: lstat failed: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); ret = -1; } else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst, preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) { error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", filename); } free(new_dst); free(new_src); do_setstat(conn, dst, &a); (void) closedir(dirp); return ret; } int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { char *dst_canon; int ret; if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst); return -1; } ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag); free(dst_canon); return ret; } char * path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2) { char *ret; size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; ret = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(ret, p1, len); if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/') strlcat(ret, "/", len); strlcat(ret, p2, len); return(ret); } openssh-8.2p1/sftp-client.h010064400017500001750000000106521362136622600140660ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.28 2019/01/16 23:23:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */ #ifndef _SFTP_CLIENT_H #define _SFTP_CLIENT_H #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB # include #else # include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" #endif typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT; struct SFTP_DIRENT { char *filename; char *longname; Attrib a; }; /* * Used for statvfs responses on the wire from the server, because the * server's native format may be larger than the client's. */ struct sftp_statvfs { u_int64_t f_bsize; u_int64_t f_frsize; u_int64_t f_blocks; u_int64_t f_bfree; u_int64_t f_bavail; u_int64_t f_files; u_int64_t f_ffree; u_int64_t f_favail; u_int64_t f_fsid; u_int64_t f_flag; u_int64_t f_namemax; }; /* * Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or * a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success. */ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t); u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *); /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */ int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int); /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */ int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **); /* Delete file 'path' */ int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); /* Create directory 'path' */ int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int); /* Remove directory 'path' */ int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */ Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */ Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); /* Set file attributes of 'path' */ int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *); /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */ int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *); /* Set file attributes of 'path', not following symlinks */ int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a); /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */ char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */ int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int); /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int force_legacy); /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); /* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */ int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *, u_int); /* * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times * if 'pflag' is set */ int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); /* * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve * times if 'pflag' is set */ int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int, int); /* * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times * if 'pflag' is set */ int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int); /* * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve * times if 'pflag' is set */ int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int, int); /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */ char *path_append(const char *, const char *); #endif openssh-8.2p1/sftp-common.c010064400017500001750000000155241362136622600140760ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.31 2018/09/13 15:23:32 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" /* Clear contents of attributes structure */ void attrib_clear(Attrib *a) { a->flags = 0; a->size = 0; a->uid = 0; a->gid = 0; a->perm = 0; a->atime = 0; a->mtime = 0; } /* Convert from struct stat to filexfer attribs */ void stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *st, Attrib *a) { attrib_clear(a); a->flags = 0; a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a->size = st->st_size; a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a->uid = st->st_uid; a->gid = st->st_gid; a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a->perm = st->st_mode; a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; a->atime = st->st_atime; a->mtime = st->st_mtime; } /* Convert from filexfer attribs to struct stat */ void attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *a, struct stat *st) { memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) st->st_size = a->size; if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { st->st_uid = a->uid; st->st_gid = a->gid; } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) st->st_mode = a->perm; if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { st->st_atime = a->atime; st->st_mtime = a->mtime; } } /* Decode attributes in buffer */ int decode_attrib(struct sshbuf *b, Attrib *a) { int r; attrib_clear(a); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->flags)) != 0) return r; if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &a->size)) != 0) return r; } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->uid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->gid)) != 0) return r; } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->perm)) != 0) return r; } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->atime)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->mtime)) != 0) return r; } /* vendor-specific extensions */ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) { char *type; u_char *data; size_t dlen; u_int i, count; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0) return r; debug3("Got file attribute \"%.100s\" len %zu", type, dlen); free(type); free(data); } } return 0; } /* Encode attributes to buffer */ int encode_attrib(struct sshbuf *b, const Attrib *a) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->flags)) != 0) return r; if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(b, a->size)) != 0) return r; } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->uid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->gid)) != 0) return r; } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->perm)) != 0) return r; } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->atime)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->mtime)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* Convert from SSH2_FX_ status to text error message */ const char * fx2txt(int status) { switch (status) { case SSH2_FX_OK: return("No error"); case SSH2_FX_EOF: return("End of file"); case SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE: return("No such file or directory"); case SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED: return("Permission denied"); case SSH2_FX_FAILURE: return("Failure"); case SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE: return("Bad message"); case SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION: return("No connection"); case SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST: return("Connection lost"); case SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED: return("Operation unsupported"); default: return("Unknown status"); } /* NOTREACHED */ } /* * drwxr-xr-x 5 markus markus 1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh */ char * ls_file(const char *name, const struct stat *st, int remote, int si_units) { int ulen, glen, sz = 0; struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime); const char *user, *group; char buf[1024], lc[8], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1]; char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; time_t now; strmode(st->st_mode, mode); if (remote) { snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid); user = ubuf; snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid); group = gbuf; strlcpy(lc, "?", sizeof(lc)); } else { user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0); group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0); snprintf(lc, sizeof(lc), "%u", (u_int)st->st_nlink); } if (ltime != NULL) { now = time(NULL); if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime && now >= st->st_mtime) sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime); else sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %Y", ltime); } if (sz == 0) tbuf[0] = '\0'; ulen = MAXIMUM(strlen(user), 8); glen = MAXIMUM(strlen(group), 8); if (si_units) { fmt_scaled((long long)st->st_size, sbuf); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3s %-*s %-*s %8s %s %s", mode, lc, ulen, user, glen, group, sbuf, tbuf, name); } else { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3s %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", mode, lc, ulen, user, glen, group, (unsigned long long)st->st_size, tbuf, name); } return xstrdup(buf); } openssh-8.2p1/sftp-common.h010064400017500001750000000040301362136622600140710ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.12 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* Maximum packet that we are willing to send/accept */ #define SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH (256 * 1024) struct sshbuf; typedef struct Attrib Attrib; /* File attributes */ struct Attrib { u_int32_t flags; u_int64_t size; u_int32_t uid; u_int32_t gid; u_int32_t perm; u_int32_t atime; u_int32_t mtime; }; void attrib_clear(Attrib *); void stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *, Attrib *); void attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *, struct stat *); int decode_attrib(struct sshbuf *, Attrib *); int encode_attrib(struct sshbuf *, const Attrib *); char *ls_file(const char *, const struct stat *, int, int); const char *fx2txt(int); openssh-8.2p1/sftp-glob.c010064400017500001750000000066161362136622600135330ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.29 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); struct SFTP_OPENDIR { SFTP_DIRENT **dir; int offset; }; static struct { struct sftp_conn *conn; } cur; static void * fudge_opendir(const char *path) { struct SFTP_OPENDIR *r; r = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*r)); if (do_readdir(cur.conn, (char *)path, &r->dir)) { free(r); return(NULL); } r->offset = 0; return((void *)r); } static struct dirent * fudge_readdir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od) { /* Solaris needs sizeof(dirent) + path length (see below) */ static char buf[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN]; struct dirent *ret = (struct dirent *)buf; #ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__ static int inum = 1; #endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */ if (od->dir[od->offset] == NULL) return(NULL); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); /* * Solaris defines dirent->d_name as a one byte array and expects * you to hack around it. */ #ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, MAXPATHLEN); #else strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, sizeof(ret->d_name)); #endif #ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__ /* * Idiot glibc uses extensions to struct dirent for readdir with * ALTDIRFUNCs. Not that this is documented anywhere but the * source... Fake an inode number to appease it. */ ret->d_ino = inum++; if (!inum) inum = 1; #endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */ return(ret); } static void fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od) { free_sftp_dirents(od->dir); free(od); } static int fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st) { Attrib *a; if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1))) return(-1); attrib_to_stat(a, st); return(0); } static int fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st) { Attrib *a; if (!(a = do_stat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1))) return(-1); attrib_to_stat(a, st); return(0); } int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob) { pglob->gl_opendir = fudge_opendir; pglob->gl_readdir = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))fudge_readdir; pglob->gl_closedir = (void (*)(void *))fudge_closedir; pglob->gl_lstat = fudge_lstat; pglob->gl_stat = fudge_stat; memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur)); cur.conn = conn; return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob)); } openssh-8.2p1/sftp-realpath.c010064400017500001750000000137431362136622600144070ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.1 2019/07/05 04:55:40 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote * products derived from this software without specific prior written * permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX # define SYMLOOP_MAX 32 #endif /* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */ char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved); /* * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]); * * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink * components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure, * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved). */ char * sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved) { struct stat sb; char *p, *q, *s; size_t left_len, resolved_len; unsigned symlinks; int serrno, slen, mem_allocated; char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX]; if (path[0] == '\0') { errno = ENOENT; return (NULL); } serrno = errno; if (resolved == NULL) { resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX); if (resolved == NULL) return (NULL); mem_allocated = 1; } else mem_allocated = 0; symlinks = 0; if (path[0] == '/') { resolved[0] = '/'; resolved[1] = '\0'; if (path[1] == '\0') return (resolved); resolved_len = 1; left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left)); } else { if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) { if (mem_allocated) free(resolved); else strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX); return (NULL); } resolved_len = strlen(resolved); left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left)); } if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } /* * Iterate over path components in `left'. */ while (left_len != 0) { /* * Extract the next path component and adjust `left' * and its length. */ p = strchr(left, '/'); s = p ? p : left + left_len; if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } memcpy(next_token, left, s - left); next_token[s - left] = '\0'; left_len -= s - left; if (p != NULL) memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1); if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') { if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } resolved[resolved_len++] = '/'; resolved[resolved_len] = '\0'; } if (next_token[0] == '\0') continue; else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0) continue; else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) { /* * Strip the last path component except when we have * single "/" */ if (resolved_len > 1) { resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1; *q = '\0'; resolved_len = q - resolved; } continue; } /* * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if * there are no more path components left. */ resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX); if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) { if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) { errno = serrno; return (resolved); } goto err; } if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) { if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) { errno = ELOOP; goto err; } slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1); if (slen < 0) goto err; symlink[slen] = '\0'; if (symlink[0] == '/') { resolved[1] = 0; resolved_len = 1; } else if (resolved_len > 1) { /* Strip the last path component. */ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1; *q = '\0'; resolved_len = q - resolved; } /* * If there are any path components left, then * append them to symlink. The result is placed * in `left'. */ if (p != NULL) { if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') { if (slen + 1 >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } symlink[slen] = '/'; symlink[slen + 1] = 0; } left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink)); if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } } left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left)); } } /* * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname * is a single "/". */ if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/') resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; return (resolved); err: if (mem_allocated) free(resolved); return (NULL); } openssh-8.2p1/sftp-server-main.c010064400017500001750000000027041362136622600150320ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.6 2019/06/06 05:13:13 otto Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2008 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "misc.h" #include "xmalloc.h" void cleanup_exit(int i) { sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct passwd *user_pw; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); seed_rng(); if ((user_pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu\n", (u_long)getuid()); return 1; } return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw)); } openssh-8.2p1/sftp-server.8010064400017500001750000000117651362136622600140440ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.28 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $ .Dt SFTP-SERVER 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sftp-server .Nd OpenSSH SFTP server subsystem .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sftp-server .Bk -words .Op Fl ehR .Op Fl d Ar start_directory .Op Fl f Ar log_facility .Op Fl l Ar log_level .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests .Op Fl u Ar umask .Ek .Nm .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to stdout and expects client requests from stdin. .Nm is not intended to be called directly, but from .Xr sshd 8 using the .Cm Subsystem option. .Pp Command-line flags to .Nm should be specified in the .Cm Subsystem declaration. See .Xr sshd_config 5 for more information. .Pp Valid options are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl d Ar start_directory specifies an alternate starting directory for users. The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %d is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. The default is to use the user's home directory. This option is useful in conjunction with the .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm ChrootDirectory option. .It Fl e Causes .Nm to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging. .It Fl f Ar log_facility Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Nm . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. .It Fl h Displays .Nm usage information. .It Fl l Ar log_level Specifies which messages will be logged by .Nm . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that .Nm performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. The default is ERROR. .It Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by the server. .Nm will reply to any blacklisted request with a failure. The .Fl Q flag can be used to determine the supported request types. If both a blacklist and a whitelist are specified, then the blacklist is applied before the whitelist. .It Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted by the server. All request types that are not on the whitelist will be logged and replied to with a failure message. .Pp Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted. .It Fl Q Ar protocol_feature Query protocol features supported by .Nm . At present the only feature that may be queried is .Dq requests , which may be used for black or whitelisting (flags .Fl P and .Fl p respectively). .It Fl R Places this instance of .Nm into a read-only mode. Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied. .It Fl u Ar umask Sets an explicit .Xr umask 2 to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the user's default mask. .El .Pp On some systems, .Nm must be able to access .Pa /dev/log for logging to work, and use of .Nm in a chroot configuration therefore requires that .Xr syslogd 8 establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr sshd_config 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A S. Lehtinen .%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol" .%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt .%D October 2001 .%O work in progress material .Re .Sh HISTORY .Nm first appeared in .Ox 2.8 . .Sh AUTHORS .An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org openssh-8.2p1/sftp-server.c010064400017500001750000001302441362136622600141110ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.117 2019/07/05 04:55:40 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */ /* Our verbosity */ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; /* Our client */ static struct passwd *pw = NULL; static char *client_addr = NULL; /* input and output queue */ struct sshbuf *iqueue; struct sshbuf *oqueue; /* Version of client */ static u_int version; /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */ static int init_done; /* Disable writes */ static int readonly; /* Requests that are allowed/denied */ static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist; /* portable attributes, etc. */ typedef struct Stat Stat; struct Stat { char *name; char *long_name; Attrib attrib; }; /* Packet handlers */ static void process_open(u_int32_t id); static void process_close(u_int32_t id); static void process_read(u_int32_t id); static void process_write(u_int32_t id); static void process_stat(u_int32_t id); static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id); static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_remove(u_int32_t id); static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id); static void process_rename(u_int32_t id); static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_lsetstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended(u_int32_t id); struct sftp_handler { const char *name; /* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */ const char *ext_name; /* extended request name */ u_int type; /* packet type, for non extended packets */ void (*handler)(u_int32_t); int does_write; /* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */ }; static const struct sftp_handler handlers[] = { /* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */ { "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 }, { "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 }, { "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 }, { "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 }, { "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 }, { "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 }, { "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 }, { "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 }, { "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 }, { "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 }, { "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 }, { "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 }, { "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 }, { "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 }, { "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 }, { "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 }, { "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 }, { "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 }, { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } }; /* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */ static const struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = { { "posix-rename", "posix-rename@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_posix_rename, 1 }, { "statvfs", "statvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 }, { "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 }, { "hardlink", "hardlink@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 }, { "fsync", "fsync@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 }, { "lsetstat", "lsetstat@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_lsetstat, 1 }, { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } }; static int request_permitted(const struct sftp_handler *h) { char *result; if (readonly && h->does_write) { verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name); return 0; } if (request_blacklist != NULL && ((result = match_list(h->name, request_blacklist, NULL))) != NULL) { free(result); verbose("Refusing blacklisted %s request", h->name); return 0; } if (request_whitelist != NULL && ((result = match_list(h->name, request_whitelist, NULL))) != NULL) { free(result); debug2("Permitting whitelisted %s request", h->name); return 1; } if (request_whitelist != NULL) { verbose("Refusing non-whitelisted %s request", h->name); return 0; } return 1; } static int errno_to_portable(int unixerrno) { int ret = 0; switch (unixerrno) { case 0: ret = SSH2_FX_OK; break; case ENOENT: case ENOTDIR: case EBADF: case ELOOP: ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; break; case EPERM: case EACCES: case EFAULT: ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; break; case ENAMETOOLONG: case EINVAL: ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE; break; case ENOSYS: ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; break; default: ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; break; } return ret; } static int flags_from_portable(int pflags) { int flags = 0; if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) && (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) { flags = O_RDWR; } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) { flags = O_RDONLY; } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) { flags = O_WRONLY; } if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) flags |= O_APPEND; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) flags |= O_CREAT; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) flags |= O_TRUNC; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) flags |= O_EXCL; return flags; } static const char * string_from_portable(int pflags) { static char ret[128]; *ret = '\0'; #define PAPPEND(str) { \ if (*ret != '\0') \ strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \ strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \ } if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) PAPPEND("READ") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) PAPPEND("WRITE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) PAPPEND("APPEND") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) PAPPEND("CREATE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) PAPPEND("TRUNCATE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) PAPPEND("EXCL") return ret; } /* handle handles */ typedef struct Handle Handle; struct Handle { int use; DIR *dirp; int fd; int flags; char *name; u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write; int next_unused; }; enum { HANDLE_UNUSED, HANDLE_DIR, HANDLE_FILE }; static Handle *handles = NULL; static u_int num_handles = 0; static int first_unused_handle = -1; static void handle_unused(int i) { handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED; handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle; first_unused_handle = i; } static int handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp) { int i; if (first_unused_handle == -1) { if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles) return -1; num_handles++; handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle)); handle_unused(num_handles - 1); } i = first_unused_handle; first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused; handles[i].use = use; handles[i].dirp = dirp; handles[i].fd = fd; handles[i].flags = flags; handles[i].name = xstrdup(name); handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0; return i; } static int handle_is_ok(int i, int type) { return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type; } static int handle_to_string(int handle, u_char **stringp, int *hlenp) { if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL) return -1; *stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t)); put_u32(*stringp, handle); *hlenp = sizeof(int32_t); return 0; } static int handle_from_string(const u_char *handle, u_int hlen) { int val; if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t)) return -1; val = get_u32(handle); if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) || handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR)) return val; return -1; } static char * handle_to_name(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)|| handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].name; return NULL; } static DIR * handle_to_dir(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) return handles[handle].dirp; return NULL; } static int handle_to_fd(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].fd; return -1; } static int handle_to_flags(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].flags; return 0; } static void handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes; } static void handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes; } static u_int64_t handle_bytes_read(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return (handles[handle].bytes_read); return 0; } static u_int64_t handle_bytes_write(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return (handles[handle].bytes_write); return 0; } static int handle_close(int handle) { int ret = -1; if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { ret = close(handles[handle].fd); free(handles[handle].name); handle_unused(handle); } else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) { ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp); free(handles[handle].name); handle_unused(handle); } else { errno = ENOENT; } return ret; } static void handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu", emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", handle_to_name(handle), (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle), (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle)); } else { logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"", emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", handle_to_name(handle)); } } static void handle_log_exit(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++) if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED) handle_log_close(i, "forced"); } static int get_handle(struct sshbuf *queue, int *hp) { u_char *handle; int r; size_t hlen; *hp = -1; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(queue, &handle, &hlen)) != 0) return r; if (hlen < 256) *hp = handle_from_string(handle, hlen); free(handle); return 0; } /* send replies */ static void send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_reset(m); } static const char * status_to_message(u_int32_t status) { const char *status_messages[] = { "Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */ "End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */ "No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */ "Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */ "Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */ "Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */ "No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */ "Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */ "Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */ "Unknown error" /* Others */ }; return (status_messages[MINIMUM(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]); } static void send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status); if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE || (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF)) logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (version >= 3) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, status_to_message(status))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, dlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_data(u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen) { debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen); send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen); } static void send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle) { u_char *string; int hlen; handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen); debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle); send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen); free(string); } static void send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats) { struct sshbuf *msg; int i, r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].long_name)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &stats[i].attrib)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int64_t flag; int r; flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0; flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_frsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bfree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bavail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_files)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_ffree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_favail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_namemax)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } /* parse incoming */ static void process_init(void) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &version)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); verbose("received client version %u", version); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0 || /* POSIX rename extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */ /* statvfs extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */ /* fstatvfs extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */ /* hardlink extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */ /* fsync extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0) /* version */ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void process_open(u_int32_t id) { u_int32_t pflags; Attrib a; char *name; int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */ (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags); flags = flags_from_portable(pflags); mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666; logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o", name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode); if (readonly && ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY || (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) { verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode"); status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; } else { fd = open(name, flags, mode); if (fd == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL); if (handle < 0) { close(fd); } else { send_handle(id, handle); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_close(u_int32_t id) { int r, handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle); handle_log_close(handle, NULL); ret = handle_close(handle); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); } static void process_read(u_int32_t id) { u_char buf[64*1024]; u_int32_t len; int r, handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; u_int64_t off; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); if (len > sizeof buf) { len = sizeof buf; debug2("read change len %d", len); } fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd >= 0) { if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) { error("process_read: seek failed"); status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { ret = read(fd, buf, len); if (ret == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else if (ret == 0) { status = SSH2_FX_EOF; } else { send_data(id, buf, ret); status = SSH2_FX_OK; handle_update_read(handle, ret); } } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); } static void process_write(u_int32_t id) { u_int64_t off; size_t len; int r, handle, fd, ret, status; u_char *data; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %zu", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd < 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else { if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) && lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error("process_write: seek failed"); } else { /* XXX ATOMICIO ? */ ret = write(fd, data, len); if (ret == -1) { error("process_write: write failed"); status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else if ((size_t)ret == len) { status = SSH2_FX_OK; handle_update_write(handle, ret); } else { debug2("nothing at all written"); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } } } send_status(id, status); free(data); } static void process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat) { Attrib a; struct stat st; char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : ""); verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name); r = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st); if (r == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); send_attrib(id, &a); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_stat(u_int32_t id) { process_do_stat(id, 0); } static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id) { process_do_stat(id, 1); } static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; struct stat st; int fd, r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd >= 0) { r = fstat(fd, &st); if (r == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); send_attrib(id, &a); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); } static struct timeval * attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a) { static struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[0].tv_usec = 0; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[1].tv_usec = 0; return tv; } static struct timespec * attrib_to_ts(const Attrib *a) { static struct timespec ts[2]; ts[0].tv_sec = a->atime; ts[0].tv_nsec = 0; ts[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; ts[1].tv_nsec = 0; return ts; } static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name); if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, (unsigned long long)a.size); r = truncate(name, a.size); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a.mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a)); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; int handle, fd, r; int status = SSH2_FX_OK; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd < 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else { char *name = handle_to_name(handle); if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, (unsigned long long)a.size); r = ftruncate(fd, a.size); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD r = fchmod(fd, a.perm & 07777); #else r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a.mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); #ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES r = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(&a)); #else r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a)); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); #ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN r = fchown(fd, a.uid, a.gid); #else r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } } send_status(id, status); } static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id) { DIR *dirp = NULL; char *path; int r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: opendir", id); logit("opendir \"%s\"", path); dirp = opendir(path); if (dirp == NULL) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp); if (handle < 0) { closedir(dirp); } else { send_handle(id, handle); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(path); } static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *path; int r, handle; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); dirp = handle_to_dir(handle); path = handle_to_name(handle); if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); } else { struct stat st; char pathname[PATH_MAX]; Stat *stats; int nstats = 10, count = 0, i; stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat)); while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (count >= nstats) { nstats *= 2; stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat)); } /* XXX OVERFLOW ? */ snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path, strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name); if (lstat(pathname, &st) == -1) continue; stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib)); stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name); stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0, 0); count++; /* send up to 100 entries in one message */ /* XXX check packet size instead */ if (count == 100) break; } if (count > 0) { send_names(id, count, stats); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { free(stats[i].name); free(stats[i].long_name); } } else { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF); } free(stats); } } static void process_remove(u_int32_t id) { char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: remove", id); logit("remove name \"%s\"", name); r = unlink(name); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; char *name; int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm & 07777 : 0777; debug3("request %u: mkdir", id); logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode); r = mkdir(name, mode); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id) { char *name; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: rmdir", id); logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name); r = rmdir(name); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id) { char resolvedname[PATH_MAX]; char *path; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (path[0] == '\0') { free(path); path = xstrdup("."); } debug3("request %u: realpath", id); verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path); if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) { send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); } else { Stat s; attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname; send_names(id, 1, &s); } free(path); } static void process_rename(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; struct stat sb; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: rename", id); logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { /* Race-free rename of regular files */ if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) { if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS #ifdef EXDEV || errno == EXDEV #endif #ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO || errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO #endif ) { struct stat st; /* * fs doesn't support links, so fall back to * stat+rename. This is racy. */ if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) { if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } else { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } } else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); /* clean spare link */ unlink(newpath); } else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) { if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id) { int r, len; char buf[PATH_MAX]; char *path; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: readlink", id); verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path); if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else { Stat s; buf[len] = '\0'; attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = buf; send_names(id, 1, &s); } free(path); } static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: symlink", id); logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); /* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */ r = symlink(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id); logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); r = rename(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id) { char *path; struct statvfs st; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: statvfs", id); logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path); if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else send_statvfs(id, &st); free(path); } static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id) { int r, handle, fd; struct statvfs st; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); return; } if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else send_statvfs(id, &st); } static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: hardlink", id); logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); r = link(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id) { int handle, fd, r, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle); verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle)); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { r = fsync(fd); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; } send_status(id, status); } static void process_extended_lsetstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: lsetstat name \"%s\"", id, name); if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { /* nonsensical for links */ status = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE; goto out; } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); r = fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, name, a.perm & 07777, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a.mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); r = utimensat(AT_FDCWD, name, attrib_to_ts(&a), AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); r = fchownat(AT_FDCWD, name, a.uid, a.gid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } out: send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_extended(u_int32_t id) { char *request; int i, r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) { if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i])) send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); else extended_handlers[i].handler(id); break; } } if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request); send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */ } free(request); } /* stolen from ssh-agent */ static void process(void) { u_int msg_len; u_int buf_len; u_int consumed; u_char type; const u_char *cp; int i, r; u_int32_t id; buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue); if (buf_len < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue); msg_len = get_u32(cp); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { error("bad message from %s local user %s", client_addr, pw->pw_name); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11); } if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) return; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); buf_len -= 4; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_INIT: process_init(); init_done = 1; break; case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED: if (!init_done) fatal("Received extended request before init"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); process_extended(id); break; default: if (!init_done) fatal("Received %u request before init", type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == handlers[i].type) { if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); } else { handlers[i].handler(id); } break; } } if (handlers[i].handler == NULL) error("Unknown message %u", type); } /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) { error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue); if (msg_len < consumed) { error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } if (msg_len > consumed && (r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */ void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i) { if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) { handle_log_exit(); logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]", pw->pw_name, client_addr); } _exit(i); } static void sftp_server_usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] " "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] " "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n" " %s -Q protocol_feature\n", __progname, __progname); exit(1); } int sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) { fd_set *rset, *wset; int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0; ssize_t len, olen, set_size; SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; char *cp, *homedir = NULL, uidstr[32], buf[4*4096]; long mask; extern char *optarg; extern char *__progname; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); pw = pwcopy(user_pw); while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'Q': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n"); exit(1); } for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name); for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name); exit(0); break; case 'R': readonly = 1; break; case 'c': /* * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a * shell using "sftp-server -c command" */ skipargs = 1; break; case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'l': log_level = log_level_number(optarg); if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'f': log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg); if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'd': cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid); snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir, "u", user_pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); free(cp); break; case 'p': if (request_whitelist != NULL) fatal("Permitted requests already set"); request_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'P': if (request_blacklist != NULL) fatal("Refused requests already set"); request_blacklist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'u': errno = 0; mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8); if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' || cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0)) fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg); (void)umask((mode_t)mask); break; case 'h': default: sftp_server_usage(); } } log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); /* * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps} * available to the user so that sftp access doesn't automatically * imply arbitrary code execution access that will break * restricted configurations. */ platform_disable_tracing(1); /* strict */ /* Drop any fine-grained privileges we don't need */ platform_pledge_sftp_server(); if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) { client_addr = xstrdup(cp); if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) { error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"", getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } *cp = '\0'; } else client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]", pw->pw_name, client_addr); in = STDIN_FILENO; out = STDOUT_FILENO; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(in, O_BINARY); setmode(out, O_BINARY); #endif max = 0; if (in > max) max = in; if (out > max) max = out; if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); rset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); wset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); if (homedir != NULL) { if (chdir(homedir) != 0) { error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir, strerror(errno)); } } set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); for (;;) { memset(rset, 0, set_size); memset(wset, 0, set_size); /* * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle * the worst-case length packet it can generate, * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. */ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 && (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0) FD_SET(in, rset); else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue); if (olen > 0) FD_SET(out, wset); if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; error("select: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2); } /* copy stdin to iqueue */ if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) { len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); if (len == 0) { debug("read eof"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0); } else if (len == -1) { error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } /* send oqueue to stdout */ if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) { len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen); if (len == -1) { error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } /* * Process requests from client if we can fit the results * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input * and let the output queue drain. */ r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH); if (r == 0) process(); else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } openssh-8.2p1/sftp.1010064400017500001750000000370241362136622600125250ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.128 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $ .Dt SFTP 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sftp .Nd OpenSSH secure file transfer .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sftp .Op Fl 46aCfpqrv .Op Fl B Ar buffer_size .Op Fl b Ar batchfile .Op Fl c Ar cipher .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl J Ar destination .Op Fl l Ar limit .Op Fl o Ar ssh_option .Op Fl P Ar port .Op Fl R Ar num_requests .Op Fl S Ar program .Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server .Ar destination .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a file transfer program, similar to .Xr ftp 1 , which performs all operations over an encrypted .Xr ssh 1 transport. It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and compression. .Pp The .Ar destination may be specified either as .Sm off .Oo user @ Oc host Op : path .Sm on or as a URI in the form .Sm off .No sftp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path . .Sm on .Pp If the .Ar destination includes a .Ar path and it is not a directory, .Nm will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after successful interactive authentication. .Pp If no .Ar path is specified, or if the .Ar path is a directory, .Nm will log in to the specified .Ar host and enter interactive command mode, changing to the remote directory if one was specified. An optional trailing slash can be used to force the .Ar path to be interpreted as a directory. .Pp Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host names from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl a Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting existing partial or complete copies of files. If the partial contents differ from those being transferred, then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. .It Fl B Ar buffer_size Specify the size of the buffer that .Nm uses when transferring files. Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes. .It Fl b Ar batchfile Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input .Ar batchfile instead of .Em stdin . Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see .Xr sshd 8 and .Xr ssh-keygen 1 for details). .Pp A .Ar batchfile of .Sq \- may be used to indicate standard input. .Nm will abort if any of the following commands fail: .Ic get , put , reget , reput , rename , ln , .Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls , .Ic lchdir , chmod , chown , .Ic chgrp , lpwd , df , symlink , and .Ic lmkdir . .Pp Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by prefixing the command with a .Sq \- character (for example, .Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) . Echo of the command may be suppressed by prefixing the command with a .Sq @ character. These two prefixes may be combined in any order, for example .Ic -@ls /bsd . .It Fl C Enables compression (via ssh's .Fl C flag). .It Fl c Ar cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via .Xr ssh 1 ) . This option may be useful in debugging the client and server. .It Fl F Ar ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for .Xr ssh 1 . This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl f Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer. When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl J Ar destination Connect to the target host by first making an .Nm connection to the jump host described by .Ar destination and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This is a shortcut to specify a .Cm ProxyJump configuration directive. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl l Ar limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. .It Fl o Ar ssh_option Can be used to pass options to .Nm ssh in the format used in .Xr ssh_config 5 . This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate .Nm sftp command-line flag. For example, to specify an alternate port use: .Ic sftp -oPort=24 . For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It BindInterface .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs .It CASignatureAlgorithms .It CertificateFile .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP .It Ciphers .It Compression .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostbasedKeyTypes .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It Hostname .It IdentitiesOnly .It IdentityAgent .It IdentityFile .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It LogLevel .It MACs .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyJump .It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It SetEnv .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It UpdateHostKeys .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .El .It Fl P Ar port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. .It Fl p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original files transferred. .It Fl q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl R Ar num_requests Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time. Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests. .It Fl r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading. Note that .Nm does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. .It Fl S Ar program Name of the .Ar program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand .Xr ssh 1 options. .It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on the remote host. A path is useful when the remote .Xr sshd 8 does not have an sftp subsystem configured. .It Fl v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh. .El .Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS Once in interactive mode, .Nm understands a set of commands similar to those of .Xr ftp 1 . Commands are case insensitive. Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes. Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by .Xr glob 3 must be escaped with backslashes .Pq Sq \e . .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ic bye Quit .Nm sftp . .It Ic cd Op Ar path Change remote directory to .Ar path . If .Ar path is not specified, then change directory to the one the session started in. .It Xo Ic chgrp .Op Fl h .Ar grp .Ar path .Xc Change group of file .Ar path to .Ar grp . If the .Fl h flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed. .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 7 characters and may match multiple files. .Ar grp must be a numeric GID. .It Xo Ic chmod .Op Fl h .Ar mode .Ar path .Xc Change permissions of file .Ar path to .Ar mode . If the .Fl h flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed. .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 7 characters and may match multiple files. .It Xo Ic chown .Op Fl h .Ar own .Ar path .Xc Change owner of file .Ar path to .Ar own . If the .Fl h flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed. .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 7 characters and may match multiple files. .Ar own must be a numeric UID. .It Xo Ic df .Op Fl hi .Op Ar path .Xc Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory (or .Ar path if specified). If the .Fl h flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable" suffixes. The .Fl i flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information. This command is only supported on servers that implement the .Dq statvfs@openssh.com extension. .It Ic exit Quit .Nm sftp . .It Xo Ic get .Op Fl afpR .Ar remote-path .Op Ar local-path .Xc Retrieve the .Ar remote-path and store it on the local machine. If the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the remote machine. .Ar remote-path may contain .Xr glob 7 characters and may match multiple files. If it does and .Ar local-path is specified, then .Ar local-path must specify a directory. .Pp If the .Fl a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy. If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. .Pp If the .Fl f flag is specified, then .Xr fsync 2 will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk. .Pp If the .Fl p .\" undocumented redundant alias .\" or .\" .Fl P flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are copied too. .Pp If the .Fl R .\" undocumented redundant alias .\" or .\" .Fl r flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. Note that .Nm does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. .It Ic help Display help text. .It Ic lcd Op Ar path Change local directory to .Ar path . If .Ar path is not specified, then change directory to the local user's home directory. .It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path Display local directory listing of either .Ar path or current directory if .Ar path is not specified. .Ar ls-options may contain any flags supported by the local system's .Xr ls 1 command. .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 7 characters and may match multiple files. .It Ic lmkdir Ar path Create local directory specified by .Ar path . .It Xo Ic ln .Op Fl s .Ar oldpath .Ar newpath .Xc Create a link from .Ar oldpath to .Ar newpath . If the .Fl s flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a hard link. .It Ic lpwd Print local working directory. .It Xo Ic ls .Op Fl 1afhlnrSt .Op Ar path .Xc Display a remote directory listing of either .Ar path or the current directory if .Ar path is not specified. .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 7 characters and may match multiple files. .Pp The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of .Ic ls accordingly: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 1 Produce single columnar output. .It Fl a List files beginning with a dot .Pq Sq \&. . .It Fl f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is lexicographical. .It Fl h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024, M=1048576, etc.). .It Fl l Display additional details including permissions and ownership information. .It Fl n Produce a long listing with user and group information presented numerically. .It Fl r Reverse the sort order of the listing. .It Fl S Sort the listing by file size. .It Fl t Sort the listing by last modification time. .El .It Ic lumask Ar umask Set local umask to .Ar umask . .It Ic mkdir Ar path Create remote directory specified by .Ar path . .It Ic progress Toggle display of progress meter. .It Xo Ic put .Op Fl afpR .Ar local-path .Op Ar remote-path .Xc Upload .Ar local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the local machine. .Ar local-path may contain .Xr glob 7 characters and may match multiple files. If it does and .Ar remote-path is specified, then .Ar remote-path must specify a directory. .Pp If the .Fl a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the remote file matches the local copy. If the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. .Pp If the .Fl f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call .Xr fsync 2 after the file has been transferred. Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. .Pp If the .Fl p .\" undocumented redundant alias .\" or .\" .Fl P flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are copied too. .Pp If the .Fl R .\" undocumented redundant alias .\" or .\" .Fl r flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. Note that .Nm does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. .It Ic pwd Display remote working directory. .It Ic quit Quit .Nm sftp . .It Xo Ic reget .Op Fl fpR .Ar remote-path .Op Ar local-path .Xc Resume download of .Ar remote-path . Equivalent to .Ic get with the .Fl a flag set. .It Xo Ic reput .Op Fl fpR .Ar local-path .Op Ar remote-path .Xc Resume upload of .Ar local-path . Equivalent to .Ic put with the .Fl a flag set. .It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath Rename remote file from .Ar oldpath to .Ar newpath . .It Ic rm Ar path Delete remote file specified by .Ar path . .It Ic rmdir Ar path Remove remote directory specified by .Ar path . .It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath Create a symbolic link from .Ar oldpath to .Ar newpath . .It Ic version Display the .Nm protocol version. .It Ic \&! Ns Ar command Execute .Ar command in local shell. .It Ic \&! Escape to local shell. .It Ic \&? Synonym for help. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ftp 1 , .Xr ls 1 , .Xr scp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr glob 7 , .Xr sftp-server 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A S. Lehtinen .%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol" .%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt .%D January 2001 .%O work in progress material .Re openssh-8.2p1/sftp.c010064400017500001750000001712021362136622600126040ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.197 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H # include #endif #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT #include #else typedef void EditLine; #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */ #define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */ /* File to read commands from */ FILE* infile; /* Are we in batchfile mode? */ int batchmode = 0; /* PID of ssh transport process */ static volatile pid_t sshpid = -1; /* Suppress diagnositic messages */ int quiet = 0; /* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */ int global_rflag = 0; /* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */ int global_aflag = 0; /* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */ int global_pflag = 0; /* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */ int global_fflag = 0; /* SIGINT received during command processing */ volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0; /* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/ int sort_flag; glob_t *sort_glob; /* Context used for commandline completion */ struct complete_ctx { struct sftp_conn *conn; char **remote_pathp; }; int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */ extern char *__progname; /* Separators for interactive commands */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* ls flags */ #define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */ #define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */ #define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */ #define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */ #define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */ #define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */ #define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */ #define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */ #define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */ #define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS) #define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT) /* Commands for interactive mode */ enum sftp_command { I_CHDIR = 1, I_CHGRP, I_CHMOD, I_CHOWN, I_DF, I_GET, I_HELP, I_LCHDIR, I_LINK, I_LLS, I_LMKDIR, I_LPWD, I_LS, I_LUMASK, I_MKDIR, I_PUT, I_PWD, I_QUIT, I_REGET, I_RENAME, I_REPUT, I_RM, I_RMDIR, I_SHELL, I_SYMLINK, I_VERSION, I_PROGRESS, }; struct CMD { const char *c; const int n; const int t; }; /* Type of completion */ #define NOARGS 0 #define REMOTE 1 #define LOCAL 2 static const struct CMD cmds[] = { { "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE }, { "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE }, { "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE }, { "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE }, { "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE }, { "df", I_DF, REMOTE }, { "dir", I_LS, REMOTE }, { "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "get", I_GET, REMOTE }, { "help", I_HELP, NOARGS }, { "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL }, { "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL }, { "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL }, { "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL }, { "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE }, { "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL }, { "ls", I_LS, REMOTE }, { "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS }, { "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE }, { "mget", I_GET, REMOTE }, { "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL }, { "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS }, { "put", I_PUT, LOCAL }, { "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE }, { "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE }, { "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE }, { "reput", I_REPUT, LOCAL }, { "rm", I_RM, REMOTE }, { "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE }, { "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE }, { "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS }, { "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS }, { "?", I_HELP, NOARGS }, { NULL, -1, -1 } }; /* ARGSUSED */ static void killchild(int signo) { pid_t pid; pid = sshpid; if (pid > 1) { kill(pid, SIGTERM); waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); } _exit(1); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void suspchild(int signo) { if (sshpid > 1) { kill(sshpid, signo); while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR) continue; } kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void cmd_interrupt(int signo) { const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n"; int olderrno = errno; (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); interrupted = 1; errno = olderrno; } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; const char msg[] = "\rConnection closed. \n"; /* Report if ssh transport process dies. */ while ((pid = waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WNOHANG)) == -1 && errno == EINTR) continue; if (pid == sshpid) { (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); sshpid = -1; } errno = save_errno; } static void help(void) { printf("Available commands:\n" "bye Quit sftp\n" "cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n" "chgrp [-h] grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n" "chmod [-h] mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n" "chown [-h] own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n" "df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n" " filesystem containing 'path'\n" "exit Quit sftp\n" "get [-afpR] remote [local] Download file\n" "help Display this help text\n" "lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n" "lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n" "lmkdir path Create local directory\n" "ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n" "lpwd Print local working directory\n" "ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n" "lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n" "mkdir path Create remote directory\n" "progress Toggle display of progress meter\n" "put [-afpR] local [remote] Upload file\n" "pwd Display remote working directory\n" "quit Quit sftp\n" "reget [-fpR] remote [local] Resume download file\n" "rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n" "reput [-fpR] local [remote] Resume upload file\n" "rm path Delete remote file\n" "rmdir path Remove remote directory\n" "symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n" "version Show SFTP version\n" "!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n" "! Escape to local shell\n" "? Synonym for help\n"); } static void local_do_shell(const char *args) { int status; char *shell; pid_t pid; if (!*args) args = NULL; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { /* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */ if (args) { debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); } else { debug3("Executing %s", shell); execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL); } fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); if (!WIFEXITED(status)) error("Shell exited abnormally"); else if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } static void local_do_ls(const char *args) { if (!args || !*args) local_do_shell(_PATH_LS); else { int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1; char *buf = xmalloc(len); /* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */ snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args); local_do_shell(buf); free(buf); } } /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */ static char * path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip) { size_t len; if (strip == NULL) return (xstrdup(path)); len = strlen(strip); if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) { if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/') len++; return (xstrdup(path + len)); } return (xstrdup(path)); } static char * make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd) { char *abs_str; /* Derelativise */ if (p && !path_absolute(p)) { abs_str = path_append(pwd, p); free(p); return(abs_str); } else return(p); } static int parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'a': *aflag = 1; break; case 'f': *fflag = 1; break; case 'p': case 'P': *pflag = 1; break; case 'r': case 'R': *rflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *sflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 's': *sflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *lflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'l': *lflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *lflag = LS_NAME_SORT; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case '1': *lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW; break; case 'S': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT; break; case 'a': *lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL; break; case 'f': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; break; case 'h': *lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS; break; case 'l': *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; *lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW; break; case 'n': *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; *lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW; break; case 'r': *lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT; break; case 't': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT; break; default: error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *hflag = *iflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'h': *hflag = 1; break; case 'i': *iflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_ch_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *hflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "h")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'h': *hflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) { switch (ch) { default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int is_dir(const char *path) { struct stat sb; /* XXX: report errors? */ if (stat(path, &sb) == -1) return(0); return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)); } static int remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { Attrib *a; /* XXX: report errors? */ if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL) return(0); if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) return(0); return(S_ISDIR(a->perm)); } /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */ static int pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname) { size_t l = strlen(pathname); return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/'; } static int process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) { char *abs_src = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; glob_t g; char *filename, *tmp=NULL; int i, r, err = 0; abs_src = xstrdup(src); abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src); if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) { if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src); } else { error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src); } err = -1; goto out; } /* * If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or * unspecified. */ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !is_dir(dst)) { error("Multiple source paths, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); free(tmp); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) { if (is_dir(dst)) { abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = xstrdup(dst); } } else if (dst) { abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = xstrdup(filename); } free(tmp); resume |= global_aflag; if (!quiet && resume) mprintf("Resuming %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); else if (!quiet && !resume) mprintf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag || global_pflag, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } free(abs_dst); abs_dst = NULL; } out: free(abs_src); globfree(&g); return(err); } static int process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) { char *tmp_dst = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL; glob_t g; int err = 0; int i, dst_is_dir = 1; struct stat sb; if (dst) { tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst); tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd); } memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); debug3("Looking up %s", src); if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) { error("File \"%s\" not found.", src); err = -1; goto out; } /* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */ if (tmp_dst != NULL) dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst); /* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) { error("Multiple paths match, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) { err = -1; error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno)); continue; } tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); free(tmp); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) { /* If directory specified, append filename */ if (dst_is_dir) abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); else abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst); } else if (tmp_dst) { abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd); } free(tmp); resume |= global_aflag; if (!quiet && resume) mprintf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); else if (!quiet && !resume) mprintf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag || global_pflag, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } } out: free(abs_dst); free(tmp_dst); globfree(&g); return(err); } static int sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) { SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa; SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb; int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; #define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename)); else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime)); else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size)); fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); } /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */ static int do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag) { int n; u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1; SFTP_DIRENT **d; if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0) return (n); if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { u_int m = 0, width = 80; struct winsize ws; char *tmp; /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) { if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(d[n]->filename)); } /* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */ tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path); m += strlen(tmp); free(tmp); if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width); } if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) ; /* count entries */ sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp); } for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) { char *tmp, *fname; if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) continue; tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename); fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path); free(tmp); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if (lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) { char *lname; struct stat sb; memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb); lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1, (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS)); mprintf("%s\n", lname); free(lname); } else mprintf("%s\n", d[n]->longname); } else { mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname); if (c >= columns) { printf("\n"); c = 1; } else c++; } free(fname); } if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) printf("\n"); free_sftp_dirents(d); return (0); } static int sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) { u_int a = *(const u_int *)aa; u_int b = *(const u_int *)bb; const char *ap = sort_glob->gl_pathv[a]; const char *bp = sort_glob->gl_pathv[b]; const struct stat *as = sort_glob->gl_statv[a]; const struct stat *bs = sort_glob->gl_statv[b]; int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; #define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp)); else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) { #if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM) return (rmul * timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <)); #elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME) return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime)); #else return rmul * 1; #endif } else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_size, bs->st_size)); fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); } /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ static int do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag) { char *fname, *lname; glob_t g; int err, r; struct winsize ws; u_int i, j, nentries, *indices = NULL, c = 1; u_int colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path, GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT, NULL, &g)) != 0 || (g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) { if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path); } else { error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path); } return -1; } if (interrupted) goto out; /* * If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory, * then just list its contents. */ if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL && S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) { err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag); globfree(&g); return err; } if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i])); columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; } /* * Sorting: rather than mess with the contents of glob_t, prepare * an array of indices into it and sort that. For the usual * unsorted case, the indices are just the identity 1=1, 2=2, etc. */ for (nentries = 0; g.gl_pathv[nentries] != NULL; nentries++) ; /* count entries */ indices = calloc(nentries, sizeof(*indices)); for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++) indices[i] = i; if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { sort_glob = &g; sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); qsort(indices, nentries, sizeof(*indices), sglob_comp); sort_glob = NULL; } for (j = 0; j < nentries && !interrupted; j++) { i = indices[j]; fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) { error("no stat information for %s", fname); continue; } lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1, (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS)); mprintf("%s\n", lname); free(lname); } else { mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname); if (c >= columns) { printf("\n"); c = 1; } else c++; } free(fname); } if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) printf("\n"); out: if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); free(indices); return 0; } static int do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag) { struct sftp_statvfs st; char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16]; if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1) return -1; if (st.f_files == 0) strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity)); else { snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%", (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / st.f_files)); } if (st.f_blocks == 0) strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity)); else { snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%", (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / st.f_blocks)); } if (iflag) { printf(" Inodes Used Avail " "(root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %s\n", (unsigned long long)st.f_files, (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree), (unsigned long long)st.f_favail, (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity); } else if (hflag) { strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used)); strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail)); strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root)); strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total)); fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used); fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail); fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root); fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total); printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %s\n", s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity); } else { printf(" Size Used Avail " "(root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %s\n", (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024), s_dcapacity); } return 0; } /* * Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping * applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that * does not glob it. */ static void undo_glob_escape(char *s) { size_t i, j; for (i = j = 0;;) { if (s[i] == '\0') { s[j] = '\0'; return; } if (s[i] != '\\') { s[j++] = s[i++]; continue; } /* s[i] == '\\' */ ++i; switch (s[i]) { case '?': case '[': case '*': case '\\': s[j++] = s[i++]; break; case '\0': s[j++] = '\\'; s[j] = '\0'; return; default: s[j++] = '\\'; s[j++] = s[i++]; break; } } } /* * Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting, * comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3) * wildcards. * The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for * use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion. * * Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments. * * If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last * argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\""). * * If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the * last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise. * This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set. */ #define MAXARGS 128 #define MAXARGLEN 8192 static char ** makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote, u_int *terminated) { int argc, quot; size_t i, j; static char argvs[MAXARGLEN]; static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1]; enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q; *argcp = argc = 0; if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) { args_too_longs: error("string too long"); return NULL; } if (terminated != NULL) *terminated = 1; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; state = MA_START; i = j = 0; for (;;) { if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){ error("Too many arguments."); return NULL; } if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) { if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { /* Terminate current argument */ argvs[j++] = '\0'; argc++; state = MA_START; } else if (state != MA_START) argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') { q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE; if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = q; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = arg[i]; } else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) state = q; else if (state == q) state = MA_UNQUOTED; else argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i] == '\\') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"'; /* Unescape quote we are in */ /* XXX support \n and friends? */ if (arg[i + 1] == quot) { i++; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') { /* * Special case for sftp: append * double-escaped glob sequence - * glob will undo one level of * escaping. NB. string can grow here. */ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5) goto args_too_longs; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else { argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } } else { if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; } if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') { /* * Special case for sftp: append * escaped glob sequence - * glob will undo one level of * escaping. */ argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else { /* Unescape everything */ /* XXX support \n and friends? */ i++; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } } } else if (arg[i] == '#') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) argvs[j++] = arg[i]; else goto string_done; } else if (arg[i] == '\0') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { if (sloppy) { state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (terminated != NULL) *terminated = 0; goto string_done; } error("Unterminated quoted argument"); return NULL; } string_done: if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { argvs[j++] = '\0'; argc++; } break; } else { if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; } if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) && (arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) { /* * Special case for sftp: escape quoted * glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow * here. */ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3) goto args_too_longs; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } i++; } *argcp = argc; return argv; } static int parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *disable_echo, int *aflag, int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag, int *rflag, int *sflag, unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2) { const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp; char *cp2, **argv; int base = 0; long l; int path1_mandatory = 0, i, cmdnum, optidx, argc; /* Skip leading whitespace */ cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); /* * Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) and '@' (suppress * command echo) */ *ignore_errors = 0; *disable_echo = 0; for (;*cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (*cp == '-') { *ignore_errors = 1; } else if (*cp == '@') { *disable_echo = 1; } else { /* all other characters terminate prefix processing */ break; } } cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); /* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */ if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#') return (0); if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) return -1; /* Figure out which command we have */ for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) { if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0) break; } cmdnum = cmds[i].n; cmd = cmds[i].c; /* Special case */ if (*cp == '!') { cp++; cmdnum = I_SHELL; } else if (cmdnum == -1) { error("Invalid command."); return -1; } /* Get arguments and parse flags */ *aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0; *rflag = *sflag = 0; *path1 = *path2 = NULL; optidx = 1; switch (cmdnum) { case I_GET: case I_REGET: case I_REPUT: case I_PUT: if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc, aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Get first pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) { error("You must specify at least one path after a " "%s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); /* Get second pathname (optional) */ if (argc - optidx > 1) { *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); /* Destination is not globbed */ undo_glob_escape(*path2); } break; case I_LINK: if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_RENAME: if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_SYMLINK: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; parse_two_paths: if (argc - optidx < 2) { error("You must specify two paths after a %s " "command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); /* Paths are not globbed */ undo_glob_escape(*path1); undo_glob_escape(*path2); break; case I_RM: case I_MKDIR: case I_RMDIR: case I_LMKDIR: path1_mandatory = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_CHDIR: case I_LCHDIR: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) { if (!path1_mandatory) break; /* return a NULL path1 */ error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); /* Only "rm" globs */ if (cmdnum != I_RM) undo_glob_escape(*path1); break; case I_DF: if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag, iflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ if (argc - optidx < 1) *path1 = NULL; else { *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); undo_glob_escape(*path1); } break; case I_LS: if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) return(-1); /* Path is optional */ if (argc - optidx > 0) *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); break; case I_LLS: /* Skip ls command and following whitespace */ cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); case I_SHELL: /* Uses the rest of the line */ break; case I_LUMASK: case I_CHMOD: base = 8; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_CHOWN: case I_CHGRP: if ((optidx = parse_ch_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) goto need_num_arg; errno = 0; l = strtol(argv[optidx], &cp2, base); if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' || ((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) || l < 0) { need_num_arg: error("You must supply a numeric argument " "to the %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *n_arg = l; if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK) break; /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 2) { error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); break; case I_QUIT: case I_PWD: case I_LPWD: case I_HELP: case I_VERSION: case I_PROGRESS: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; break; default: fatal("Command not implemented"); } *cpp = cp; return(cmdnum); } static int parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd, const char *startdir, int err_abort, int echo_command) { const char *ocmd = cmd; char *path1, *path2, *tmp; int ignore_errors = 0, disable_echo = 1; int aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, iflag = 0; int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0; int cmdnum, i; unsigned long n_arg = 0; Attrib a, *aa; char path_buf[PATH_MAX]; int err = 0; glob_t g; path1 = path2 = NULL; cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &disable_echo, &aflag, &fflag, &hflag, &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2); if (ignore_errors != 0) err_abort = 0; if (echo_command && !disable_echo) mprintf("sftp> %s\n", ocmd); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); /* Perform command */ switch (cmdnum) { case 0: /* Blank line */ break; case -1: /* Unrecognized command */ err = -1; break; case I_REGET: aflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_GET: err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, rflag, aflag, fflag); break; case I_REPUT: aflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_PUT: err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, rflag, aflag, fflag); break; case I_RENAME: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag); break; case I_SYMLINK: sflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_LINK: if (!sflag) path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2); break; case I_RM: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_MKDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); attrib_clear(&a); a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = 0777; err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1); break; case I_RMDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_rmdir(conn, path1); break; case I_CHDIR: if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0') path1 = xstrdup(startdir); path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) { err = 1; break; } if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) { free(tmp); err = 1; break; } if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) { error("Can't change directory: Can't check target"); free(tmp); err = 1; break; } if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) { error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not " "a directory", tmp); free(tmp); err = 1; break; } free(*pwd); *pwd = tmp; break; case I_LS: if (!path1) { do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag); break; } /* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */ tmp = NULL; if (!path_absolute(path1)) tmp = *pwd; path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag); break; case I_DF: /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ if (path1 == NULL) path1 = xstrdup(*pwd); path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag); break; case I_LCHDIR: if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0') path1 = xstrdup("~"); tmp = tilde_expand_filename(path1, getuid()); free(path1); path1 = tmp; if (chdir(path1) == -1) { error("Couldn't change local directory to " "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); err = 1; } break; case I_LMKDIR: if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) { error("Couldn't create local directory " "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); err = 1; } break; case I_LLS: local_do_ls(cmd); break; case I_SHELL: local_do_shell(cmd); break; case I_LUMASK: umask(n_arg); printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg); break; case I_CHMOD: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); attrib_clear(&a); a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = n_arg; remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing mode on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], &a); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_CHOWN: case I_CHGRP: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!(aa = (hflag ? do_lstat : do_stat)(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) { if (err_abort) { err = -1; break; } else continue; } if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) { error("Can't get current ownership of " "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]); if (err_abort) { err = -1; break; } else continue; } aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing owner on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); aa->uid = n_arg; } else { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing group on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); aa->gid = n_arg; } err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], aa); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_PWD: mprintf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd); break; case I_LPWD: if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) { error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno)); err = -1; break; } mprintf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf); break; case I_QUIT: /* Processed below */ break; case I_HELP: help(); break; case I_VERSION: printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn)); break; case I_PROGRESS: showprogress = !showprogress; if (showprogress) printf("Progress meter enabled\n"); else printf("Progress meter disabled\n"); break; default: fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum); } if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); free(path1); free(path2); /* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */ if (err_abort && err != 0) return (-1); else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT) return (1); return (0); } #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT static char * prompt(EditLine *el) { return ("sftp> "); } /* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */ static void complete_display(char **list, u_int len) { u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen; struct winsize ws; char *tmp; /* Count entries for sort and find longest */ for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(list[y])); if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; m = m > len ? m - len : 0; columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width); printf("\n"); m = 1; for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) { llen = strlen(list[y]); tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : ""; mprintf("%-*s", colspace, tmp); if (m >= columns) { printf("\n"); m = 1; } else m++; } printf("\n"); } /* * Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word", * attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next * characters common to all entries in "list". */ static char * complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count) { if (word == NULL) return NULL; if (count > 0) { u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]); /* Find length of common stem */ for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) { u_int x; for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++) if (list[0][x] != list[y][x]) break; matchlen = x; } if (matchlen > strlen(word)) { char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]); tmp[matchlen] = '\0'; return tmp; } } return xstrdup(word); } /* Autocomplete a sftp command */ static int complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) { u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen; char *tmp, **list, argterm[3]; const LineInfo *lf; list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *)); /* No command specified: display all available commands */ if (cmd == NULL) { for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); list[count] = NULL; complete_display(list, 0); for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++) free(list[y]); free(list); return count; } /* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */ cmdlen = strlen(cmd); for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) { if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen)) list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); } list[count] = NULL; if (count == 0) { free(list); return 0; } /* Complete ambiguous command */ tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count); if (count > 1) complete_display(list, 0); for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) free(list[y]); free(list); if (tmp != NULL) { tmplen = strlen(tmp); cmdlen = strlen(cmd); /* If cmd may be extended then do so */ if (tmplen > cmdlen) if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); lf = el_line(el); /* Terminate argument cleanly */ if (count == 1) { y = 0; if (!terminated) argterm[y++] = quote; if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ') argterm[y++] = ' '; argterm[y] = '\0'; if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); } free(tmp); } return count; } /* * Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any) * represent local or remote files. */ static int complete_is_remote(char *cmd) { int i; if (cmd == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) { if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c))) return cmds[i].t; } return -1; } /* Autocomplete a filename "file" */ static int complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) { glob_t g; char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8]; u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs; int clen; const LineInfo *lf; /* Glob from "file" location */ if (file == NULL) tmp = xstrdup("*"); else xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file); /* Check if the path is absolute. */ isabs = path_absolute(tmp); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); if (remote != LOCAL) { tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path); remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); } else glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); /* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */ for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) { /* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */ if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') { if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') hadglob = 1; break; } if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') tmplen++; if (tmp[tmplen] == '/') pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */ } free(tmp); tmp = NULL; if (g.gl_matchc == 0) goto out; if (g.gl_matchc > 1) complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen); /* Don't try to extend globs */ if (file == NULL || hadglob) goto out; tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc); tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path); free(tmp2); if (tmp == NULL) goto out; tmplen = strlen(tmp); filelen = strlen(file); /* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */ cesc = isesc = 0; for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) { if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){ isesc = 1; cesc++; } else isesc = 0; } if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) { tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc; len = strlen(tmp2); /* quote argument on way out */ for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) { if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 || (size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2) fatal("invalid multibyte character"); ins[0] = '\\'; memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen); ins[clen + 1] = '\0'; switch (tmp2[i]) { case '\'': case '"': case '\\': case '\t': case '[': case ' ': case '#': case '*': if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) { if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr " "failed."); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); break; } } } lf = el_line(el); if (g.gl_matchc == 1) { i = 0; if (!terminated && quote != '\0') ins[i++] = quote; if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' && (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')) ins[i++] = ' '; ins[i] = '\0'; if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); } free(tmp); out: globfree(&g); return g.gl_matchc; } /* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */ static unsigned char complete(EditLine *el, int ch) { char **argv, *line, quote; int argc, carg; u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR; const LineInfo *lf; struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx; lf = el_line(el); if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0) fatal("%s: el_get failed", __func__); /* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */ cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer; line = xmalloc(cursor + 1); memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor); line[cursor] = '\0'; argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, "e, &terminated); free(line); /* Get all the arguments on the line */ len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer; line = xmalloc(len + 1); memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len); line[len] = '\0'; argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL); /* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */ if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' && line[cursor] != '\n') { free(line); return ret; } if (carg == 0) { /* Show all available commands */ complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1); ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') { /* Handle the command parsing */ if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg, quote, terminated) != 0) ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } else if (carg >= 1) { /* Handle file parsing */ int remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0]); char *filematch = NULL; if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ') filematch = argv[carg - 1]; if (remote != 0 && complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn, *complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch, remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0) ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } free(line); return ret; } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ static int interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2) { char *remote_path; char *dir = NULL, *startdir = NULL; char cmd[2048]; int err, interactive; EditLine *el = NULL; #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT History *hl = NULL; HistEvent hev; extern char *__progname; struct complete_ctx complete_ctx; if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise editline"); if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history"); history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100); el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl); el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt); el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs"); el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL); el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1); el_source(el, NULL); /* Tab Completion */ el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete", "Context sensitive argument completion", complete); complete_ctx.conn = conn; complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path; el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL); /* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[C", "em-next-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); /* make ^w match ksh behaviour */ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL); } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ remote_path = do_realpath(conn, "."); if (remote_path == NULL) fatal("Need cwd"); startdir = xstrdup(remote_path); if (file1 != NULL) { dir = xstrdup(file1); dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path); if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing to: %s\n", dir); snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir); if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0) != 0) { free(dir); free(startdir); free(remote_path); free(conn); return (-1); } } else { /* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s", global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir, file2 == NULL ? "" : " ", file2 == NULL ? "" : file2); err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0); free(dir); free(startdir); free(remote_path); free(conn); return (err); } free(dir); } setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO); err = 0; for (;;) { ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); if (el == NULL) { if (interactive) printf("sftp> "); if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) { if (interactive) printf("\n"); break; } } else { #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT const char *line; int count = 0; if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL || count <= 0) { printf("\n"); break; } history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line); if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n"); continue; } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ } cmd[strcspn(cmd, "\n")] = '\0'; /* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */ interrupted = 0; ssh_signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt); err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, startdir, batchmode, !interactive && el == NULL); if (err != 0) break; } ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); free(remote_path); free(startdir); free(conn); #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT if (el != NULL) el_end(el); #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ /* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */ return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1); } static void connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out) { int c_in, c_out; #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2]; if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1)) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); *in = pin[0]; *out = pout[1]; c_in = pout[0]; c_out = pin[1]; #else /* USE_PIPES */ int inout[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); *in = *out = inout[0]; c_in = c_out = inout[1]; #endif /* USE_PIPES */ if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1) fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); else if (sshpid == 0) { if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(*in); close(*out); close(c_in); close(c_out); /* * The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must * ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands, * otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and * kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the * underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal. */ ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); execvp(path, args); fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); close(c_in); close(c_out); } static void usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-46aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n" " [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]\n" " [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server]\n" " destination\n", __progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int in, out, ch, err, tmp, port = -1; char *host = NULL, *user, *cp, *file2 = NULL; int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2; char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL; char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL; const char *errstr; LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; arglist args; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; struct sftp_conn *conn; size_t copy_buffer_len = DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN; size_t num_requests = DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS; long long limit_kbps = 0; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); msetlocale(); seed_rng(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no"); addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes"); ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; infile = stdin; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:J:P:R:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { /* Passed through to ssh(1) */ case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); break; /* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */ case 'F': case 'J': case 'c': case 'i': case 'o': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'q': ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; quiet = 1; showprogress = 0; addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); break; case 'P': port = a2port(optarg); if (port <= 0) fatal("Bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg); break; case 'v': if (debug_level < 3) { addargs(&args, "-v"); ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level; } debug_level++; break; case '1': sshver = 1; if (sftp_server == NULL) sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER; break; case '2': sshver = 2; break; case 'a': global_aflag = 1; break; case 'B': copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0') fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'b': if (batchmode) fatal("Batch file already specified."); /* Allow "-" as stdin */ if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 && (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg); showprogress = 0; quiet = batchmode = 1; addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes"); break; case 'f': global_fflag = 1; break; case 'p': global_pflag = 1; break; case 'D': sftp_direct = optarg; break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ break; case 'r': global_rflag = 1; break; case 'R': num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0') fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 's': sftp_server = optarg; break; case 'S': ssh_program = optarg; replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); break; case 'h': default: usage(); } } if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); if (sftp_direct == NULL) { if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2)) usage(); argv += optind; switch (parse_uri("sftp", *argv, &user, &host, &tmp, &file1)) { case -1: usage(); break; case 0: if (tmp != -1) port = tmp; break; default: /* Try with user, host and path. */ if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host, &file1) == 0) break; /* Try with user and host. */ if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL) == 0) break; /* Treat as a plain hostname. */ host = xstrdup(*argv); host = cleanhostname(host); break; } file2 = *(argv + 1); if (!*host) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n"); usage(); } if (port != -1) addargs(&args, "-oPort %d", port); if (user != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", user); } addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver); /* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */ if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL) addargs(&args, "-s"); addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ? sftp_server : "sftp")); connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out); } else { args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "sftp-server"); connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out); } freeargs(&args); conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps); if (conn == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server"); if (!quiet) { if (sftp_direct == NULL) fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host); else fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct); } err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2); #if !defined(USE_PIPES) shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR); shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR); #endif close(in); close(out); if (batchmode) fclose(infile); while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1 && sshpid > 1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1); } openssh-8.2p1/sftp.h010064400017500001750000000065221362136622600126130ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sftp.h,v 1.9 2008/06/13 00:12:02 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-01.txt */ /* version */ #define SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION 3 /* client to server */ #define SSH2_FXP_INIT 1 #define SSH2_FXP_OPEN 3 #define SSH2_FXP_CLOSE 4 #define SSH2_FXP_READ 5 #define SSH2_FXP_WRITE 6 #define SSH2_FXP_LSTAT 7 #define SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 7 #define SSH2_FXP_FSTAT 8 #define SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT 9 #define SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT 10 #define SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR 11 #define SSH2_FXP_READDIR 12 #define SSH2_FXP_REMOVE 13 #define SSH2_FXP_MKDIR 14 #define SSH2_FXP_RMDIR 15 #define SSH2_FXP_REALPATH 16 #define SSH2_FXP_STAT 17 #define SSH2_FXP_RENAME 18 #define SSH2_FXP_READLINK 19 #define SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK 20 /* server to client */ #define SSH2_FXP_VERSION 2 #define SSH2_FXP_STATUS 101 #define SSH2_FXP_HANDLE 102 #define SSH2_FXP_DATA 103 #define SSH2_FXP_NAME 104 #define SSH2_FXP_ATTRS 105 #define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED 200 #define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY 201 /* attributes */ #define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE 0x00000001 #define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID 0x00000002 #define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS 0x00000004 #define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME 0x00000008 #define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED 0x80000000 /* portable open modes */ #define SSH2_FXF_READ 0x00000001 #define SSH2_FXF_WRITE 0x00000002 #define SSH2_FXF_APPEND 0x00000004 #define SSH2_FXF_CREAT 0x00000008 #define SSH2_FXF_TRUNC 0x00000010 #define SSH2_FXF_EXCL 0x00000020 /* statvfs@openssh.com f_flag flags */ #define SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x00000001 #define SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x00000002 /* status messages */ #define SSH2_FX_OK 0 #define SSH2_FX_EOF 1 #define SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE 2 #define SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED 3 #define SSH2_FX_FAILURE 4 #define SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE 5 #define SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION 6 #define SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST 7 #define SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED 8 #define SSH2_FX_MAX 8 struct passwd; int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *); void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn)); openssh-8.2p1/sk-api.h010064400017500001750000000053061362136622600130220ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sk-api.h,v 1.8 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _SK_API_H #define _SK_API_H 1 #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif /* Flags */ #define SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD 0x01 #define SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD 0x04 #define SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY 0x20 /* Algs */ #define SSH_SK_ECDSA 0x00 #define SSH_SK_ED25519 0x01 /* Error codes */ #define SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL -1 #define SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED -2 #define SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED -3 #define SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -4 struct sk_enroll_response { uint8_t *public_key; size_t public_key_len; uint8_t *key_handle; size_t key_handle_len; uint8_t *signature; size_t signature_len; uint8_t *attestation_cert; size_t attestation_cert_len; }; struct sk_sign_response { uint8_t flags; uint32_t counter; uint8_t *sig_r; size_t sig_r_len; uint8_t *sig_s; size_t sig_s_len; }; struct sk_resident_key { uint32_t alg; size_t slot; char *application; struct sk_enroll_response key; }; struct sk_option { char *name; char *value; uint8_t required; }; #define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00040000 /* current API version */ #define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK 0xffff0000 /* Return the version of the middleware API */ uint32_t sk_api_version(void); /* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */ int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response); /* Sign a challenge */ int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_sign_response **sign_response); /* Enumerate all resident keys */ int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks); #endif /* _SK_API_H */ openssh-8.2p1/sk-usbhid.c010064400017500001750000000655631362136622600135350ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #include #include #ifndef SK_STANDALONE # include "log.h" # include "xmalloc.h" /* * If building as part of OpenSSH, then rename exported functions. * This must be done before including sk-api.h. */ # define sk_api_version ssh_sk_api_version # define sk_enroll ssh_sk_enroll # define sk_sign ssh_sk_sign # define sk_load_resident_keys ssh_sk_load_resident_keys #endif /* !SK_STANDALONE */ #include "sk-api.h" /* #define SK_DEBUG 1 */ #define MAX_FIDO_DEVICES 256 /* Compatibility with OpenSSH 1.0.x */ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) #define ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, pr, ps) \ do { \ (*pr) = sig->r; \ (*ps) = sig->s; \ } while (0) #endif /* Return the version of the middleware API */ uint32_t sk_api_version(void); /* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */ int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response); /* Sign a challenge */ int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_sign_response **sign_response); /* Load resident keys */ int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks); static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))); static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...) { #if !defined(SK_STANDALONE) char *msg; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); debug("%s: %s", func, msg); free(msg); #elif defined(SK_DEBUG) va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", func); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); fputc('\n', stderr); va_end(ap); #else (void)func; /* XXX */ (void)fmt; /* XXX */ #endif } uint32_t sk_api_version(void) { return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR; } /* Select the first identified FIDO device attached to the system */ static char * pick_first_device(void) { char *ret = NULL; fido_dev_info_t *devlist = NULL; size_t olen = 0; int r; const fido_dev_info_t *di; if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(1)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed"); goto out; } if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist, 1, &olen)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest failed: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if (olen != 1) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest bad len %zu", olen); goto out; } di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, 0); if ((ret = strdup(fido_dev_info_path(di))) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_path failed"); goto out; } out: fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, 1); return ret; } /* Check if the specified key handle exists on a given device. */ static int try_device(fido_dev_t *dev, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len) { fido_assert_t *assert = NULL; int r = FIDO_ERR_INTERNAL; if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed"); goto out; } if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash(assert, message, message_len)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_assert_allow_cred(assert, key_handle, key_handle_len)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_allow_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert, FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_up: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } r = fido_dev_get_assert(dev, assert, NULL); skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r)); if (r == FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED) { /* U2F tokens may return this */ r = FIDO_OK; } out: fido_assert_free(&assert); return r != FIDO_OK ? -1 : 0; } /* Iterate over configured devices looking for a specific key handle */ static fido_dev_t * find_device(const char *path, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len) { fido_dev_info_t *devlist = NULL; fido_dev_t *dev = NULL; size_t devlist_len = 0, i; int r; if (path != NULL) { if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed"); return NULL; } if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, path)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open failed"); fido_dev_free(&dev); return NULL; } return dev; } if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(MAX_FIDO_DEVICES)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed"); goto out; } if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES, &devlist_len)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } skdebug(__func__, "found %zu device(s)", devlist_len); for (i = 0; i < devlist_len; i++) { const fido_dev_info_t *di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, i); if (di == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_ptr %zu failed", i); continue; } if ((path = fido_dev_info_path(di)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_path %zu failed", i); continue; } skdebug(__func__, "trying device %zu: %s", i, path); if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed"); continue; } if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, path)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open failed"); fido_dev_free(&dev); continue; } if (try_device(dev, message, message_len, application, key_handle, key_handle_len) == 0) { skdebug(__func__, "found key"); break; } fido_dev_close(dev); fido_dev_free(&dev); } out: if (devlist != NULL) fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES); return dev; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* * The key returned via fido_cred_pubkey_ptr() is in affine coordinates, * but the API expects a SEC1 octet string. */ static int pack_public_key_ecdsa(const fido_cred_t *cred, struct sk_enroll_response *response) { const uint8_t *ptr; BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL; EC_POINT *q = NULL; EC_GROUP *g = NULL; int ret = -1; response->public_key = NULL; response->public_key_len = 0; if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL || (y = BN_new()) == NULL || (g = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) == NULL || (q = EC_POINT_new(g)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "libcrypto setup failed"); goto out; } if ((ptr = fido_cred_pubkey_ptr(cred)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_pubkey_ptr failed"); goto out; } if (fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred) != 64) { skdebug(__func__, "bad fido_cred_pubkey_len %zu", fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred)); goto out; } if (BN_bin2bn(ptr, 32, x) == NULL || BN_bin2bn(ptr + 32, 32, y) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "BN_bin2bn failed"); goto out; } if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(g, q, x, y, NULL) != 1) { skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp failed"); goto out; } response->public_key_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); if (response->public_key_len == 0 || response->public_key_len > 2048) { skdebug(__func__, "bad pubkey length %zu", response->public_key_len); goto out; } if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed"); goto out; } if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, response->public_key, response->public_key_len, NULL) == 0) { skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_point2oct failed"); goto out; } /* success */ ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0 && response->public_key != NULL) { memset(response->public_key, 0, response->public_key_len); free(response->public_key); response->public_key = NULL; } EC_POINT_free(q); EC_GROUP_free(g); BN_clear_free(x); BN_clear_free(y); return ret; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ static int pack_public_key_ed25519(const fido_cred_t *cred, struct sk_enroll_response *response) { const uint8_t *ptr; size_t len; int ret = -1; response->public_key = NULL; response->public_key_len = 0; if ((len = fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred)) != 32) { skdebug(__func__, "bad fido_cred_pubkey_len len %zu", len); goto out; } if ((ptr = fido_cred_pubkey_ptr(cred)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_pubkey_ptr failed"); goto out; } response->public_key_len = len; if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed"); goto out; } memcpy(response->public_key, ptr, len); ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0) free(response->public_key); return ret; } static int pack_public_key(uint32_t alg, const fido_cred_t *cred, struct sk_enroll_response *response) { switch(alg) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case SSH_SK_ECDSA: return pack_public_key_ecdsa(cred, response); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case SSH_SK_ED25519: return pack_public_key_ed25519(cred, response); default: return -1; } } static int fidoerr_to_skerr(int fidoerr) { switch (fidoerr) { case FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION: case FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM: return SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED; case FIDO_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED: case FIDO_ERR_PIN_INVALID: return SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED; default: return -1; } } static int check_enroll_options(struct sk_option **options, char **devicep, uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_len) { size_t i; if (options == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "device") == 0) { if ((*devicep = strdup(options[i]->value)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "strdup device failed"); return -1; } skdebug(__func__, "requested device %s", *devicep); } else if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "user") == 0) { if (strlcpy(user_id, options[i]->value, user_id_len) >= user_id_len) { skdebug(__func__, "user too long"); return -1; } skdebug(__func__, "requested user %s", (char *)user_id); } else { skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s", options[i]->name); if (options[i]->required) { skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option"); return -1; } } } return 0; } int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response) { fido_cred_t *cred = NULL; fido_dev_t *dev = NULL; const uint8_t *ptr; uint8_t user_id[32]; struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL; size_t len; int cose_alg; int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL; int r; char *device = NULL; #ifdef SK_DEBUG fido_init(FIDO_DEBUG); #endif if (enroll_response == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "enroll_response == NULL"); goto out; } memset(user_id, 0, sizeof(user_id)); if (check_enroll_options(options, &device, user_id, sizeof(user_id)) != 0) goto out; /* error already logged */ *enroll_response = NULL; switch(alg) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case SSH_SK_ECDSA: cose_alg = COSE_ES256; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case SSH_SK_ED25519: cose_alg = COSE_EDDSA; break; default: skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg); goto out; } if (device == NULL && (device = pick_first_device()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND; skdebug(__func__, "pick_first_device failed"); goto out; } skdebug(__func__, "using device %s", device); if ((cred = fido_cred_new()) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_new failed"); goto out; } if ((r = fido_cred_set_type(cred, cose_alg)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_type: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash(cred, challenge, challenge_len)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_cred_set_rk(cred, (flags & SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY) != 0 ? FIDO_OPT_TRUE : FIDO_OPT_OMIT)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_rk: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_cred_set_user(cred, user_id, sizeof(user_id), "openssh", "openssh", NULL)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_user: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_cred_set_rp(cred, application, NULL)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed"); goto out; } if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, device)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_dev_make_cred(dev, cred, pin)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_make_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r)); ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r); goto out; } if (fido_cred_x5c_ptr(cred) != NULL) { if ((r = fido_cred_verify(cred)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_verify: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } } else { skdebug(__func__, "self-attested credential"); if ((r = fido_cred_verify_self(cred)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_verify_self: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } } if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed"); goto out; } if (pack_public_key(alg, cred, response) != 0) { skdebug(__func__, "pack_public_key failed"); goto out; } if ((ptr = fido_cred_id_ptr(cred)) != NULL) { len = fido_cred_id_len(cred); if ((response->key_handle = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc key handle failed"); goto out; } memcpy(response->key_handle, ptr, len); response->key_handle_len = len; } if ((ptr = fido_cred_sig_ptr(cred)) != NULL) { len = fido_cred_sig_len(cred); if ((response->signature = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed"); goto out; } memcpy(response->signature, ptr, len); response->signature_len = len; } if ((ptr = fido_cred_x5c_ptr(cred)) != NULL) { len = fido_cred_x5c_len(cred); debug3("%s: attestation cert len=%zu", __func__, len); if ((response->attestation_cert = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc attestation cert failed"); goto out; } memcpy(response->attestation_cert, ptr, len); response->attestation_cert_len = len; } *enroll_response = response; response = NULL; ret = 0; out: free(device); if (response != NULL) { free(response->public_key); free(response->key_handle); free(response->signature); free(response->attestation_cert); free(response); } if (dev != NULL) { fido_dev_close(dev); fido_dev_free(&dev); } if (cred != NULL) { fido_cred_free(&cred); } return ret; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static int pack_sig_ecdsa(fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response) { ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; const unsigned char *cp; size_t sig_len; int ret = -1; cp = fido_assert_sig_ptr(assert, 0); sig_len = fido_assert_sig_len(assert, 0); if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &cp, sig_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed"); goto out; } ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s); response->sig_r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r); response->sig_s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s); if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL || (response->sig_s = calloc(1, response->sig_s_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed"); goto out; } BN_bn2bin(sig_r, response->sig_r); BN_bn2bin(sig_s, response->sig_s); ret = 0; out: ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); if (ret != 0) { free(response->sig_r); free(response->sig_s); response->sig_r = NULL; response->sig_s = NULL; } return ret; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ static int pack_sig_ed25519(fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response) { const unsigned char *ptr; size_t len; int ret = -1; ptr = fido_assert_sig_ptr(assert, 0); len = fido_assert_sig_len(assert, 0); if (len != 64) { skdebug(__func__, "bad length %zu", len); goto out; } response->sig_r_len = len; if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed"); goto out; } memcpy(response->sig_r, ptr, len); ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0) { free(response->sig_r); response->sig_r = NULL; } return ret; } static int pack_sig(uint32_t alg, fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response) { switch(alg) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case SSH_SK_ECDSA: return pack_sig_ecdsa(assert, response); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case SSH_SK_ED25519: return pack_sig_ed25519(assert, response); default: return -1; } } /* Checks sk_options for sk_sign() and sk_load_resident_keys() */ static int check_sign_load_resident_options(struct sk_option **options, char **devicep) { size_t i; if (options == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "device") == 0) { if ((*devicep = strdup(options[i]->value)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "strdup device failed"); return -1; } skdebug(__func__, "requested device %s", *devicep); } else { skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s", options[i]->name); if (options[i]->required) { skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option"); return -1; } } } return 0; } int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_sign_response **sign_response) { fido_assert_t *assert = NULL; char *device = NULL; fido_dev_t *dev = NULL; struct sk_sign_response *response = NULL; int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL; int r; #ifdef SK_DEBUG fido_init(FIDO_DEBUG); #endif if (sign_response == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "sign_response == NULL"); goto out; } *sign_response = NULL; if (check_sign_load_resident_options(options, &device) != 0) goto out; /* error already logged */ if ((dev = find_device(device, message, message_len, application, key_handle, key_handle_len)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "couldn't find device for key handle"); goto out; } if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed"); goto out; } if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash(assert, message, message_len)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_assert_allow_cred(assert, key_handle, key_handle_len)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_allow_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert, (flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) ? FIDO_OPT_TRUE : FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_up: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((r = fido_dev_get_assert(dev, assert, NULL)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed"); goto out; } response->flags = fido_assert_flags(assert, 0); response->counter = fido_assert_sigcount(assert, 0); if (pack_sig(alg, assert, response) != 0) { skdebug(__func__, "pack_sig failed"); goto out; } *sign_response = response; response = NULL; ret = 0; out: free(device); if (response != NULL) { free(response->sig_r); free(response->sig_s); free(response); } if (dev != NULL) { fido_dev_close(dev); fido_dev_free(&dev); } if (assert != NULL) { fido_assert_free(&assert); } return ret; } static int read_rks(const char *devpath, const char *pin, struct sk_resident_key ***rksp, size_t *nrksp) { int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, r = -1; fido_dev_t *dev = NULL; fido_credman_metadata_t *metadata = NULL; fido_credman_rp_t *rp = NULL; fido_credman_rk_t *rk = NULL; size_t i, j, nrp, nrk; const fido_cred_t *cred; struct sk_resident_key *srk = NULL, **tmp; if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed"); return ret; } if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, devpath)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open %s failed: %s", devpath, fido_strerr(r)); fido_dev_free(&dev); return ret; } if ((metadata = fido_credman_metadata_new()) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "alloc failed"); goto out; } if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_metadata(dev, metadata, pin)) != 0) { if (r == FIDO_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND) { skdebug(__func__, "device %s does not support " "resident keys", devpath); ret = 0; goto out; } skdebug(__func__, "get metadata for %s failed: %s", devpath, fido_strerr(r)); ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r); goto out; } skdebug(__func__, "existing %llu, remaining %llu", (unsigned long long)fido_credman_rk_existing(metadata), (unsigned long long)fido_credman_rk_remaining(metadata)); if ((rp = fido_credman_rp_new()) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "alloc rp failed"); goto out; } if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rp(dev, rp, pin)) != 0) { skdebug(__func__, "get RPs for %s failed: %s", devpath, fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } nrp = fido_credman_rp_count(rp); skdebug(__func__, "Device %s has resident keys for %zu RPs", devpath, nrp); /* Iterate over RP IDs that have resident keys */ for (i = 0; i < nrp; i++) { skdebug(__func__, "rp %zu: name=\"%s\" id=\"%s\" hashlen=%zu", i, fido_credman_rp_name(rp, i), fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), fido_credman_rp_id_hash_len(rp, i)); /* Skip non-SSH RP IDs */ if (strncasecmp(fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), "ssh:", 4) != 0) continue; fido_credman_rk_free(&rk); if ((rk = fido_credman_rk_new()) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "alloc rk failed"); goto out; } if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rk(dev, fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), rk, pin)) != 0) { skdebug(__func__, "get RKs for %s slot %zu failed: %s", devpath, i, fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } nrk = fido_credman_rk_count(rk); skdebug(__func__, "RP \"%s\" has %zu resident keys", fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), nrk); /* Iterate over resident keys for this RP ID */ for (j = 0; j < nrk; j++) { if ((cred = fido_credman_rk(rk, j)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "no RK in slot %zu", j); continue; } skdebug(__func__, "Device %s RP \"%s\" slot %zu: " "type %d", devpath, fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), j, fido_cred_type(cred)); /* build response entry */ if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL || (srk->key.key_handle = calloc(1, fido_cred_id_len(cred))) == NULL || (srk->application = strdup(fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i))) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "alloc sk_resident_key"); goto out; } srk->key.key_handle_len = fido_cred_id_len(cred); memcpy(srk->key.key_handle, fido_cred_id_ptr(cred), srk->key.key_handle_len); switch (fido_cred_type(cred)) { case COSE_ES256: srk->alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA; break; case COSE_EDDSA: srk->alg = SSH_SK_ED25519; break; default: skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", fido_cred_type(cred)); goto out; /* XXX free rk and continue */ } if ((r = pack_public_key(srk->alg, cred, &srk->key)) != 0) { skdebug(__func__, "pack public key failed"); goto out; } /* append */ if ((tmp = recallocarray(*rksp, *nrksp, (*nrksp) + 1, sizeof(**rksp))) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "alloc rksp"); goto out; } *rksp = tmp; (*rksp)[(*nrksp)++] = srk; srk = NULL; } } /* Success */ ret = 0; out: if (srk != NULL) { free(srk->application); freezero(srk->key.public_key, srk->key.public_key_len); freezero(srk->key.key_handle, srk->key.key_handle_len); freezero(srk, sizeof(*srk)); } fido_credman_rp_free(&rp); fido_credman_rk_free(&rk); fido_dev_close(dev); fido_dev_free(&dev); fido_credman_metadata_free(&metadata); return ret; } int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, struct sk_resident_key ***rksp, size_t *nrksp) { int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, r = -1; fido_dev_info_t *devlist = NULL; size_t i, ndev = 0, nrks = 0; const fido_dev_info_t *di; struct sk_resident_key **rks = NULL; char *device = NULL; *rksp = NULL; *nrksp = 0; if (check_sign_load_resident_options(options, &device) != 0) goto out; /* error already logged */ if (device != NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "trying %s", device); if ((r = read_rks(device, pin, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) { skdebug(__func__, "read_rks failed for %s", device); ret = r; goto out; } } else { /* Try all devices */ if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(MAX_FIDO_DEVICES)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed"); goto out; } if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES, &ndev)) != FIDO_OK) { skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest failed: %s", fido_strerr(r)); goto out; } for (i = 0; i < ndev; i++) { if ((di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, i)) == NULL) { skdebug(__func__, "no dev info at %zu", i); continue; } skdebug(__func__, "trying %s", fido_dev_info_path(di)); if ((r = read_rks(fido_dev_info_path(di), pin, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) { skdebug(__func__, "read_rks failed for %s", fido_dev_info_path(di)); /* remember last error */ ret = r; continue; } } } /* success, unless we have no keys but a specific error */ if (nrks > 0 || ret == SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL) ret = 0; *rksp = rks; *nrksp = nrks; rks = NULL; nrks = 0; out: free(device); for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) { free(rks[i]->application); freezero(rks[i]->key.public_key, rks[i]->key.public_key_len); freezero(rks[i]->key.key_handle, rks[i]->key.key_handle_len); freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i])); } free(rks); fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES); return ret; } #endif /* ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL */ openssh-8.2p1/smult_curve25519_ref.c010064400017500001750000000153241362136622600154440ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: smult_curve25519_ref.c,v 1.2 2013/11/02 22:02:14 markus Exp $ */ /* version 20081011 Matthew Dempsky Public domain. Derived from public domain code by D. J. Bernstein. */ int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *); static void add(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32],const unsigned int b[32]) { unsigned int j; unsigned int u; u = 0; for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += a[j] + b[j]; out[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } u += a[31] + b[31]; out[31] = u; } static void sub(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32],const unsigned int b[32]) { unsigned int j; unsigned int u; u = 218; for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += a[j] + 65280 - b[j]; out[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } u += a[31] - b[31]; out[31] = u; } static void squeeze(unsigned int a[32]) { unsigned int j; unsigned int u; u = 0; for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += a[j]; a[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } u += a[31]; a[31] = u & 127; u = 19 * (u >> 7); for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += a[j]; a[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } u += a[31]; a[31] = u; } static const unsigned int minusp[32] = { 19, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 128 } ; static void freeze(unsigned int a[32]) { unsigned int aorig[32]; unsigned int j; unsigned int negative; for (j = 0;j < 32;++j) aorig[j] = a[j]; add(a,a,minusp); negative = -((a[31] >> 7) & 1); for (j = 0;j < 32;++j) a[j] ^= negative & (aorig[j] ^ a[j]); } static void mult(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32],const unsigned int b[32]) { unsigned int i; unsigned int j; unsigned int u; for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) { u = 0; for (j = 0;j <= i;++j) u += a[j] * b[i - j]; for (j = i + 1;j < 32;++j) u += 38 * a[j] * b[i + 32 - j]; out[i] = u; } squeeze(out); } static void mult121665(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32]) { unsigned int j; unsigned int u; u = 0; for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += 121665 * a[j]; out[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } u += 121665 * a[31]; out[31] = u & 127; u = 19 * (u >> 7); for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += out[j]; out[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } u += out[j]; out[j] = u; } static void square(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32]) { unsigned int i; unsigned int j; unsigned int u; for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) { u = 0; for (j = 0;j < i - j;++j) u += a[j] * a[i - j]; for (j = i + 1;j < i + 32 - j;++j) u += 38 * a[j] * a[i + 32 - j]; u *= 2; if ((i & 1) == 0) { u += a[i / 2] * a[i / 2]; u += 38 * a[i / 2 + 16] * a[i / 2 + 16]; } out[i] = u; } squeeze(out); } static void select(unsigned int p[64],unsigned int q[64],const unsigned int r[64],const unsigned int s[64],unsigned int b) { unsigned int j; unsigned int t; unsigned int bminus1; bminus1 = b - 1; for (j = 0;j < 64;++j) { t = bminus1 & (r[j] ^ s[j]); p[j] = s[j] ^ t; q[j] = r[j] ^ t; } } static void mainloop(unsigned int work[64],const unsigned char e[32]) { unsigned int xzm1[64]; unsigned int xzm[64]; unsigned int xzmb[64]; unsigned int xzm1b[64]; unsigned int xznb[64]; unsigned int xzn1b[64]; unsigned int a0[64]; unsigned int a1[64]; unsigned int b0[64]; unsigned int b1[64]; unsigned int c1[64]; unsigned int r[32]; unsigned int s[32]; unsigned int t[32]; unsigned int u[32]; unsigned int j; unsigned int b; int pos; for (j = 0;j < 32;++j) xzm1[j] = work[j]; xzm1[32] = 1; for (j = 33;j < 64;++j) xzm1[j] = 0; xzm[0] = 1; for (j = 1;j < 64;++j) xzm[j] = 0; for (pos = 254;pos >= 0;--pos) { b = e[pos / 8] >> (pos & 7); b &= 1; select(xzmb,xzm1b,xzm,xzm1,b); add(a0,xzmb,xzmb + 32); sub(a0 + 32,xzmb,xzmb + 32); add(a1,xzm1b,xzm1b + 32); sub(a1 + 32,xzm1b,xzm1b + 32); square(b0,a0); square(b0 + 32,a0 + 32); mult(b1,a1,a0 + 32); mult(b1 + 32,a1 + 32,a0); add(c1,b1,b1 + 32); sub(c1 + 32,b1,b1 + 32); square(r,c1 + 32); sub(s,b0,b0 + 32); mult121665(t,s); add(u,t,b0); mult(xznb,b0,b0 + 32); mult(xznb + 32,s,u); square(xzn1b,c1); mult(xzn1b + 32,r,work); select(xzm,xzm1,xznb,xzn1b,b); } for (j = 0;j < 64;++j) work[j] = xzm[j]; } static void recip(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int z[32]) { unsigned int z2[32]; unsigned int z9[32]; unsigned int z11[32]; unsigned int z2_5_0[32]; unsigned int z2_10_0[32]; unsigned int z2_20_0[32]; unsigned int z2_50_0[32]; unsigned int z2_100_0[32]; unsigned int t0[32]; unsigned int t1[32]; int i; /* 2 */ square(z2,z); /* 4 */ square(t1,z2); /* 8 */ square(t0,t1); /* 9 */ mult(z9,t0,z); /* 11 */ mult(z11,z9,z2); /* 22 */ square(t0,z11); /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ mult(z2_5_0,t0,z9); /* 2^6 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_5_0); /* 2^7 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0); /* 2^8 - 2^3 */ square(t0,t1); /* 2^9 - 2^4 */ square(t1,t0); /* 2^10 - 2^5 */ square(t0,t1); /* 2^10 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_10_0,t0,z2_5_0); /* 2^11 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_10_0); /* 2^12 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0); /* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); } /* 2^20 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_20_0,t1,z2_10_0); /* 2^21 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_20_0); /* 2^22 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0); /* 2^40 - 2^20 */ for (i = 2;i < 20;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); } /* 2^40 - 2^0 */ mult(t0,t1,z2_20_0); /* 2^41 - 2^1 */ square(t1,t0); /* 2^42 - 2^2 */ square(t0,t1); /* 2^50 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { square(t1,t0); square(t0,t1); } /* 2^50 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_50_0,t0,z2_10_0); /* 2^51 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_50_0); /* 2^52 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0); /* 2^100 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); } /* 2^100 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_100_0,t1,z2_50_0); /* 2^101 - 2^1 */ square(t1,z2_100_0); /* 2^102 - 2^2 */ square(t0,t1); /* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for (i = 2;i < 100;i += 2) { square(t1,t0); square(t0,t1); } /* 2^200 - 2^0 */ mult(t1,t0,z2_100_0); /* 2^201 - 2^1 */ square(t0,t1); /* 2^202 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0); /* 2^250 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); } /* 2^250 - 2^0 */ mult(t0,t1,z2_50_0); /* 2^251 - 2^1 */ square(t1,t0); /* 2^252 - 2^2 */ square(t0,t1); /* 2^253 - 2^3 */ square(t1,t0); /* 2^254 - 2^4 */ square(t0,t1); /* 2^255 - 2^5 */ square(t1,t0); /* 2^255 - 21 */ mult(out,t1,z11); } int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(unsigned char *q, const unsigned char *n, const unsigned char *p) { unsigned int work[96]; unsigned char e[32]; unsigned int i; for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) e[i] = n[i]; e[0] &= 248; e[31] &= 127; e[31] |= 64; for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) work[i] = p[i]; mainloop(work,e); recip(work + 32,work + 32); mult(work + 64,work,work + 32); freeze(work + 64); for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) q[i] = work[64 + i]; return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/sntrup4591761.c010064400017500001750000000614271362136622600137530ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sntrup4591761.c,v 1.3 2019/01/30 19:51:15 markus Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain, Authors: * - Daniel J. Bernstein * - Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup * - Tanja Lange * - Christine van Vredendaal */ #include "includes.h" #include #include "crypto_api.h" /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/int32_sort.h */ #ifndef int32_sort_h #define int32_sort_h static void int32_sort(crypto_int32 *,int); #endif /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/int32_sort.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ static void minmax(crypto_int32 *x,crypto_int32 *y) { crypto_uint32 xi = *x; crypto_uint32 yi = *y; crypto_uint32 xy = xi ^ yi; crypto_uint32 c = yi - xi; c ^= xy & (c ^ yi); c >>= 31; c = -c; c &= xy; *x = xi ^ c; *y = yi ^ c; } static void int32_sort(crypto_int32 *x,int n) { int top,p,q,i; if (n < 2) return; top = 1; while (top < n - top) top += top; for (p = top;p > 0;p >>= 1) { for (i = 0;i < n - p;++i) if (!(i & p)) minmax(x + i,x + i + p); for (q = top;q > p;q >>= 1) for (i = 0;i < n - q;++i) if (!(i & p)) minmax(x + i + p,x + i + q); } } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/small.h */ #ifndef small_h #define small_h typedef crypto_int8 small; static void small_encode(unsigned char *,const small *); static void small_decode(small *,const unsigned char *); static void small_random(small *); static void small_random_weightw(small *); #endif /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/mod3.h */ #ifndef mod3_h #define mod3_h /* -1 if x is nonzero, 0 otherwise */ static inline int mod3_nonzero_mask(small x) { return -x*x; } /* input between -100000 and 100000 */ /* output between -1 and 1 */ static inline small mod3_freeze(crypto_int32 a) { a -= 3 * ((10923 * a) >> 15); a -= 3 * ((89478485 * a + 134217728) >> 28); return a; } static inline small mod3_minusproduct(small a,small b,small c) { crypto_int32 A = a; crypto_int32 B = b; crypto_int32 C = c; return mod3_freeze(A - B * C); } static inline small mod3_plusproduct(small a,small b,small c) { crypto_int32 A = a; crypto_int32 B = b; crypto_int32 C = c; return mod3_freeze(A + B * C); } static inline small mod3_product(small a,small b) { return a * b; } static inline small mod3_sum(small a,small b) { crypto_int32 A = a; crypto_int32 B = b; return mod3_freeze(A + B); } static inline small mod3_reciprocal(small a1) { return a1; } static inline small mod3_quotient(small num,small den) { return mod3_product(num,mod3_reciprocal(den)); } #endif /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/modq.h */ #ifndef modq_h #define modq_h typedef crypto_int16 modq; /* -1 if x is nonzero, 0 otherwise */ static inline int modq_nonzero_mask(modq x) { crypto_int32 r = (crypto_uint16) x; r = -r; r >>= 30; return r; } /* input between -9000000 and 9000000 */ /* output between -2295 and 2295 */ static inline modq modq_freeze(crypto_int32 a) { a -= 4591 * ((228 * a) >> 20); a -= 4591 * ((58470 * a + 134217728) >> 28); return a; } static inline modq modq_minusproduct(modq a,modq b,modq c) { crypto_int32 A = a; crypto_int32 B = b; crypto_int32 C = c; return modq_freeze(A - B * C); } static inline modq modq_plusproduct(modq a,modq b,modq c) { crypto_int32 A = a; crypto_int32 B = b; crypto_int32 C = c; return modq_freeze(A + B * C); } static inline modq modq_product(modq a,modq b) { crypto_int32 A = a; crypto_int32 B = b; return modq_freeze(A * B); } static inline modq modq_square(modq a) { crypto_int32 A = a; return modq_freeze(A * A); } static inline modq modq_sum(modq a,modq b) { crypto_int32 A = a; crypto_int32 B = b; return modq_freeze(A + B); } static inline modq modq_reciprocal(modq a1) { modq a2 = modq_square(a1); modq a3 = modq_product(a2,a1); modq a4 = modq_square(a2); modq a8 = modq_square(a4); modq a16 = modq_square(a8); modq a32 = modq_square(a16); modq a35 = modq_product(a32,a3); modq a70 = modq_square(a35); modq a140 = modq_square(a70); modq a143 = modq_product(a140,a3); modq a286 = modq_square(a143); modq a572 = modq_square(a286); modq a1144 = modq_square(a572); modq a1147 = modq_product(a1144,a3); modq a2294 = modq_square(a1147); modq a4588 = modq_square(a2294); modq a4589 = modq_product(a4588,a1); return a4589; } static inline modq modq_quotient(modq num,modq den) { return modq_product(num,modq_reciprocal(den)); } #endif /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/params.h */ #ifndef params_h #define params_h #define q 4591 /* XXX: also built into modq in various ways */ #define qshift 2295 #define p 761 #define w 286 #define rq_encode_len 1218 #define small_encode_len 191 #endif /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/r3.h */ #ifndef r3_h #define r3_h static void r3_mult(small *,const small *,const small *); extern int r3_recip(small *,const small *); #endif /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq.h */ #ifndef rq_h #define rq_h static void rq_encode(unsigned char *,const modq *); static void rq_decode(modq *,const unsigned char *); static void rq_encoderounded(unsigned char *,const modq *); static void rq_decoderounded(modq *,const unsigned char *); static void rq_round3(modq *,const modq *); static void rq_mult(modq *,const modq *,const small *); int rq_recip3(modq *,const small *); #endif /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/swap.h */ #ifndef swap_h #define swap_h static void swap(void *,void *,int,int); #endif /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/dec.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ #ifdef KAT #endif int crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_dec( unsigned char *k, const unsigned char *cstr, const unsigned char *sk ) { small f[p]; modq h[p]; small grecip[p]; modq c[p]; modq t[p]; small t3[p]; small r[p]; modq hr[p]; unsigned char rstr[small_encode_len]; unsigned char hash[64]; int i; int result = 0; int weight; small_decode(f,sk); small_decode(grecip,sk + small_encode_len); rq_decode(h,sk + 2 * small_encode_len); rq_decoderounded(c,cstr + 32); rq_mult(t,c,f); for (i = 0;i < p;++i) t3[i] = mod3_freeze(modq_freeze(3*t[i])); r3_mult(r,t3,grecip); #ifdef KAT { int j; printf("decrypt r:"); for (j = 0;j < p;++j) if (r[j] == 1) printf(" +%d",j); else if (r[j] == -1) printf(" -%d",j); printf("\n"); } #endif weight = 0; for (i = 0;i < p;++i) weight += (1 & r[i]); weight -= w; result |= modq_nonzero_mask(weight); /* XXX: puts limit on p */ rq_mult(hr,h,r); rq_round3(hr,hr); for (i = 0;i < p;++i) result |= modq_nonzero_mask(hr[i] - c[i]); small_encode(rstr,r); crypto_hash_sha512(hash,rstr,sizeof rstr); result |= crypto_verify_32(hash,cstr); for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) k[i] = (hash[32 + i] & ~result); return result; } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/enc.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ #ifdef KAT #endif int crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_enc( unsigned char *cstr, unsigned char *k, const unsigned char *pk ) { small r[p]; modq h[p]; modq c[p]; unsigned char rstr[small_encode_len]; unsigned char hash[64]; small_random_weightw(r); #ifdef KAT { int i; printf("encrypt r:"); for (i = 0;i < p;++i) if (r[i] == 1) printf(" +%d",i); else if (r[i] == -1) printf(" -%d",i); printf("\n"); } #endif small_encode(rstr,r); crypto_hash_sha512(hash,rstr,sizeof rstr); rq_decode(h,pk); rq_mult(c,h,r); rq_round3(c,c); memcpy(k,hash + 32,32); memcpy(cstr,hash,32); rq_encoderounded(cstr + 32,c); return 0; } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/keypair.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ #if crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_PUBLICKEYBYTES != rq_encode_len #error "crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_PUBLICKEYBYTES must match rq_encode_len" #endif #if crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_SECRETKEYBYTES != rq_encode_len + 2 * small_encode_len #error "crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_SECRETKEYBYTES must match rq_encode_len + 2 * small_encode_len" #endif int crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_keypair(unsigned char *pk,unsigned char *sk) { small g[p]; small grecip[p]; small f[p]; modq f3recip[p]; modq h[p]; do small_random(g); while (r3_recip(grecip,g) != 0); small_random_weightw(f); rq_recip3(f3recip,f); rq_mult(h,f3recip,g); rq_encode(pk,h); small_encode(sk,f); small_encode(sk + small_encode_len,grecip); memcpy(sk + 2 * small_encode_len,pk,rq_encode_len); return 0; } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/r3_mult.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ static void r3_mult(small *h,const small *f,const small *g) { small fg[p + p - 1]; small result; int i, j; for (i = 0;i < p;++i) { result = 0; for (j = 0;j <= i;++j) result = mod3_plusproduct(result,f[j],g[i - j]); fg[i] = result; } for (i = p;i < p + p - 1;++i) { result = 0; for (j = i - p + 1;j < p;++j) result = mod3_plusproduct(result,f[j],g[i - j]); fg[i] = result; } for (i = p + p - 2;i >= p;--i) { fg[i - p] = mod3_sum(fg[i - p],fg[i]); fg[i - p + 1] = mod3_sum(fg[i - p + 1],fg[i]); } for (i = 0;i < p;++i) h[i] = fg[i]; } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/r3_recip.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ /* caller must ensure that x-y does not overflow */ static int smaller_mask_r3_recip(int x,int y) { return (x - y) >> 31; } static void vectormod3_product(small *z,int len,const small *x,const small c) { int i; for (i = 0;i < len;++i) z[i] = mod3_product(x[i],c); } static void vectormod3_minusproduct(small *z,int len,const small *x,const small *y,const small c) { int i; for (i = 0;i < len;++i) z[i] = mod3_minusproduct(x[i],y[i],c); } static void vectormod3_shift(small *z,int len) { int i; for (i = len - 1;i > 0;--i) z[i] = z[i - 1]; z[0] = 0; } /* r = s^(-1) mod m, returning 0, if s is invertible mod m or returning -1 if s is not invertible mod m r,s are polys of degree

= loops) break; c = mod3_quotient(g[p],f[p]); vectormod3_minusproduct(g,p + 1,g,f,c); vectormod3_shift(g,p + 1); #ifdef SIMPLER vectormod3_minusproduct(v,loops + 1,v,u,c); vectormod3_shift(v,loops + 1); #else if (loop < p) { vectormod3_minusproduct(v,loop + 1,v,u,c); vectormod3_shift(v,loop + 2); } else { vectormod3_minusproduct(v + loop - p,p + 1,v + loop - p,u + loop - p,c); vectormod3_shift(v + loop - p,p + 2); } #endif e -= 1; ++loop; swapmask = smaller_mask_r3_recip(e,d) & mod3_nonzero_mask(g[p]); swap(&e,&d,sizeof e,swapmask); swap(f,g,(p + 1) * sizeof(small),swapmask); #ifdef SIMPLER swap(u,v,(loops + 1) * sizeof(small),swapmask); #else if (loop < p) { swap(u,v,(loop + 1) * sizeof(small),swapmask); } else { swap(u + loop - p,v + loop - p,(p + 1) * sizeof(small),swapmask); } #endif } c = mod3_reciprocal(f[p]); vectormod3_product(r,p,u + p,c); return smaller_mask_r3_recip(0,d); } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/randomsmall.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ static void small_random(small *g) { int i; for (i = 0;i < p;++i) { crypto_uint32 r = small_random32(); g[i] = (small) (((1073741823 & r) * 3) >> 30) - 1; } } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/randomweightw.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ static void small_random_weightw(small *f) { crypto_int32 r[p]; int i; for (i = 0;i < p;++i) r[i] = small_random32(); for (i = 0;i < w;++i) r[i] &= -2; for (i = w;i < p;++i) r[i] = (r[i] & -3) | 1; int32_sort(r,p); for (i = 0;i < p;++i) f[i] = ((small) (r[i] & 3)) - 1; } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ static void rq_encode(unsigned char *c,const modq *f) { crypto_int32 f0, f1, f2, f3, f4; int i; for (i = 0;i < p/5;++i) { f0 = *f++ + qshift; f1 = *f++ + qshift; f2 = *f++ + qshift; f3 = *f++ + qshift; f4 = *f++ + qshift; /* now want f0 + 6144*f1 + ... as a 64-bit integer */ f1 *= 3; f2 *= 9; f3 *= 27; f4 *= 81; /* now want f0 + f1<<11 + f2<<22 + f3<<33 + f4<<44 */ f0 += f1 << 11; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; f0 += f2 << 6; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; f0 += f3 << 1; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; f0 += f4 << 4; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; *c++ = f0; } /* XXX: using p mod 5 = 1 */ f0 = *f++ + qshift; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; *c++ = f0; } static void rq_decode(modq *f,const unsigned char *c) { crypto_uint32 c0, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7; crypto_uint32 f0, f1, f2, f3, f4; int i; for (i = 0;i < p/5;++i) { c0 = *c++; c1 = *c++; c2 = *c++; c3 = *c++; c4 = *c++; c5 = *c++; c6 = *c++; c7 = *c++; /* f0 + f1*6144 + f2*6144^2 + f3*6144^3 + f4*6144^4 */ /* = c0 + c1*256 + ... + c6*256^6 + c7*256^7 */ /* with each f between 0 and 4590 */ c6 += c7 << 8; /* c6 <= 23241 = floor(4591*6144^4/2^48) */ /* f4 = (16/81)c6 + (1/1296)(c5+[0,1]) - [0,0.75] */ /* claim: 2^19 f4 < x < 2^19(f4+1) */ /* where x = 103564 c6 + 405(c5+1) */ /* proof: x - 2^19 f4 = (76/81)c6 + (37/81)c5 + 405 - (32768/81)[0,1] + 2^19[0,0.75] */ /* at least 405 - 32768/81 > 0 */ /* at most (76/81)23241 + (37/81)255 + 405 + 2^19 0.75 < 2^19 */ f4 = (103564*c6 + 405*(c5+1)) >> 19; c5 += c6 << 8; c5 -= (f4 * 81) << 4; c4 += c5 << 8; /* f0 + f1*6144 + f2*6144^2 + f3*6144^3 */ /* = c0 + c1*256 + c2*256^2 + c3*256^3 + c4*256^4 */ /* c4 <= 247914 = floor(4591*6144^3/2^32) */ /* f3 = (1/54)(c4+[0,1]) - [0,0.75] */ /* claim: 2^19 f3 < x < 2^19(f3+1) */ /* where x = 9709(c4+2) */ /* proof: x - 2^19 f3 = 19418 - (1/27)c4 - (262144/27)[0,1] + 2^19[0,0.75] */ /* at least 19418 - 247914/27 - 262144/27 > 0 */ /* at most 19418 + 2^19 0.75 < 2^19 */ f3 = (9709*(c4+2)) >> 19; c4 -= (f3 * 27) << 1; c3 += c4 << 8; /* f0 + f1*6144 + f2*6144^2 */ /* = c0 + c1*256 + c2*256^2 + c3*256^3 */ /* c3 <= 10329 = floor(4591*6144^2/2^24) */ /* f2 = (4/9)c3 + (1/576)c2 + (1/147456)c1 + (1/37748736)c0 - [0,0.75] */ /* claim: 2^19 f2 < x < 2^19(f2+1) */ /* where x = 233017 c3 + 910(c2+2) */ /* proof: x - 2^19 f2 = 1820 + (1/9)c3 - (2/9)c2 - (32/9)c1 - (1/72)c0 + 2^19[0,0.75] */ /* at least 1820 - (2/9)255 - (32/9)255 - (1/72)255 > 0 */ /* at most 1820 + (1/9)10329 + 2^19 0.75 < 2^19 */ f2 = (233017*c3 + 910*(c2+2)) >> 19; c2 += c3 << 8; c2 -= (f2 * 9) << 6; c1 += c2 << 8; /* f0 + f1*6144 */ /* = c0 + c1*256 */ /* c1 <= 110184 = floor(4591*6144/2^8) */ /* f1 = (1/24)c1 + (1/6144)c0 - (1/6144)f0 */ /* claim: 2^19 f1 < x < 2^19(f1+1) */ /* where x = 21845(c1+2) + 85 c0 */ /* proof: x - 2^19 f1 = 43690 - (1/3)c1 - (1/3)c0 + 2^19 [0,0.75] */ /* at least 43690 - (1/3)110184 - (1/3)255 > 0 */ /* at most 43690 + 2^19 0.75 < 2^19 */ f1 = (21845*(c1+2) + 85*c0) >> 19; c1 -= (f1 * 3) << 3; c0 += c1 << 8; f0 = c0; *f++ = modq_freeze(f0 + q - qshift); *f++ = modq_freeze(f1 + q - qshift); *f++ = modq_freeze(f2 + q - qshift); *f++ = modq_freeze(f3 + q - qshift); *f++ = modq_freeze(f4 + q - qshift); } c0 = *c++; c1 = *c++; c0 += c1 << 8; *f++ = modq_freeze(c0 + q - qshift); } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq_mult.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ static void rq_mult(modq *h,const modq *f,const small *g) { modq fg[p + p - 1]; modq result; int i, j; for (i = 0;i < p;++i) { result = 0; for (j = 0;j <= i;++j) result = modq_plusproduct(result,f[j],g[i - j]); fg[i] = result; } for (i = p;i < p + p - 1;++i) { result = 0; for (j = i - p + 1;j < p;++j) result = modq_plusproduct(result,f[j],g[i - j]); fg[i] = result; } for (i = p + p - 2;i >= p;--i) { fg[i - p] = modq_sum(fg[i - p],fg[i]); fg[i - p + 1] = modq_sum(fg[i - p + 1],fg[i]); } for (i = 0;i < p;++i) h[i] = fg[i]; } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq_recip3.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ /* caller must ensure that x-y does not overflow */ static int smaller_mask_rq_recip3(int x,int y) { return (x - y) >> 31; } static void vectormodq_product(modq *z,int len,const modq *x,const modq c) { int i; for (i = 0;i < len;++i) z[i] = modq_product(x[i],c); } static void vectormodq_minusproduct(modq *z,int len,const modq *x,const modq *y,const modq c) { int i; for (i = 0;i < len;++i) z[i] = modq_minusproduct(x[i],y[i],c); } static void vectormodq_shift(modq *z,int len) { int i; for (i = len - 1;i > 0;--i) z[i] = z[i - 1]; z[0] = 0; } /* r = (3s)^(-1) mod m, returning 0, if s is invertible mod m or returning -1 if s is not invertible mod m r,s are polys of degree

= loops) break; c = modq_quotient(g[p],f[p]); vectormodq_minusproduct(g,p + 1,g,f,c); vectormodq_shift(g,p + 1); #ifdef SIMPLER vectormodq_minusproduct(v,loops + 1,v,u,c); vectormodq_shift(v,loops + 1); #else if (loop < p) { vectormodq_minusproduct(v,loop + 1,v,u,c); vectormodq_shift(v,loop + 2); } else { vectormodq_minusproduct(v + loop - p,p + 1,v + loop - p,u + loop - p,c); vectormodq_shift(v + loop - p,p + 2); } #endif e -= 1; ++loop; swapmask = smaller_mask_rq_recip3(e,d) & modq_nonzero_mask(g[p]); swap(&e,&d,sizeof e,swapmask); swap(f,g,(p + 1) * sizeof(modq),swapmask); #ifdef SIMPLER swap(u,v,(loops + 1) * sizeof(modq),swapmask); #else if (loop < p) { swap(u,v,(loop + 1) * sizeof(modq),swapmask); } else { swap(u + loop - p,v + loop - p,(p + 1) * sizeof(modq),swapmask); } #endif } c = modq_reciprocal(f[p]); vectormodq_product(r,p,u + p,c); return smaller_mask_rq_recip3(0,d); } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq_round3.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ static void rq_round3(modq *h,const modq *f) { int i; for (i = 0;i < p;++i) h[i] = ((21846 * (f[i] + 2295) + 32768) >> 16) * 3 - 2295; } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq_rounded.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ static void rq_encoderounded(unsigned char *c,const modq *f) { crypto_int32 f0, f1, f2; int i; for (i = 0;i < p/3;++i) { f0 = *f++ + qshift; f1 = *f++ + qshift; f2 = *f++ + qshift; f0 = (21846 * f0) >> 16; f1 = (21846 * f1) >> 16; f2 = (21846 * f2) >> 16; /* now want f0 + f1*1536 + f2*1536^2 as a 32-bit integer */ f2 *= 3; f1 += f2 << 9; f1 *= 3; f0 += f1 << 9; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; *c++ = f0; } /* XXX: using p mod 3 = 2 */ f0 = *f++ + qshift; f1 = *f++ + qshift; f0 = (21846 * f0) >> 16; f1 = (21846 * f1) >> 16; f1 *= 3; f0 += f1 << 9; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; *c++ = f0; f0 >>= 8; *c++ = f0; } static void rq_decoderounded(modq *f,const unsigned char *c) { crypto_uint32 c0, c1, c2, c3; crypto_uint32 f0, f1, f2; int i; for (i = 0;i < p/3;++i) { c0 = *c++; c1 = *c++; c2 = *c++; c3 = *c++; /* f0 + f1*1536 + f2*1536^2 */ /* = c0 + c1*256 + c2*256^2 + c3*256^3 */ /* with each f between 0 and 1530 */ /* f2 = (64/9)c3 + (1/36)c2 + (1/9216)c1 + (1/2359296)c0 - [0,0.99675] */ /* claim: 2^21 f2 < x < 2^21(f2+1) */ /* where x = 14913081*c3 + 58254*c2 + 228*(c1+2) */ /* proof: x - 2^21 f2 = 456 - (8/9)c0 + (4/9)c1 - (2/9)c2 + (1/9)c3 + 2^21 [0,0.99675] */ /* at least 456 - (8/9)255 - (2/9)255 > 0 */ /* at most 456 + (4/9)255 + (1/9)255 + 2^21 0.99675 < 2^21 */ f2 = (14913081*c3 + 58254*c2 + 228*(c1+2)) >> 21; c2 += c3 << 8; c2 -= (f2 * 9) << 2; /* f0 + f1*1536 */ /* = c0 + c1*256 + c2*256^2 */ /* c2 <= 35 = floor((1530+1530*1536)/256^2) */ /* f1 = (128/3)c2 + (1/6)c1 + (1/1536)c0 - (1/1536)f0 */ /* claim: 2^21 f1 < x < 2^21(f1+1) */ /* where x = 89478485*c2 + 349525*c1 + 1365*(c0+1) */ /* proof: x - 2^21 f1 = 1365 - (1/3)c2 - (1/3)c1 - (1/3)c0 + (4096/3)f0 */ /* at least 1365 - (1/3)35 - (1/3)255 - (1/3)255 > 0 */ /* at most 1365 + (4096/3)1530 < 2^21 */ f1 = (89478485*c2 + 349525*c1 + 1365*(c0+1)) >> 21; c1 += c2 << 8; c1 -= (f1 * 3) << 1; c0 += c1 << 8; f0 = c0; *f++ = modq_freeze(f0 * 3 + q - qshift); *f++ = modq_freeze(f1 * 3 + q - qshift); *f++ = modq_freeze(f2 * 3 + q - qshift); } c0 = *c++; c1 = *c++; c2 = *c++; f1 = (89478485*c2 + 349525*c1 + 1365*(c0+1)) >> 21; c1 += c2 << 8; c1 -= (f1 * 3) << 1; c0 += c1 << 8; f0 = c0; *f++ = modq_freeze(f0 * 3 + q - qshift); *f++ = modq_freeze(f1 * 3 + q - qshift); } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/small.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ /* XXX: these functions rely on p mod 4 = 1 */ /* all coefficients in -1, 0, 1 */ static void small_encode(unsigned char *c,const small *f) { small c0; int i; for (i = 0;i < p/4;++i) { c0 = *f++ + 1; c0 += (*f++ + 1) << 2; c0 += (*f++ + 1) << 4; c0 += (*f++ + 1) << 6; *c++ = c0; } c0 = *f++ + 1; *c++ = c0; } static void small_decode(small *f,const unsigned char *c) { unsigned char c0; int i; for (i = 0;i < p/4;++i) { c0 = *c++; *f++ = ((small) (c0 & 3)) - 1; c0 >>= 2; *f++ = ((small) (c0 & 3)) - 1; c0 >>= 2; *f++ = ((small) (c0 & 3)) - 1; c0 >>= 2; *f++ = ((small) (c0 & 3)) - 1; } c0 = *c++; *f++ = ((small) (c0 & 3)) - 1; } /* from libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/swap.c */ /* See https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/software.html for detailed documentation. */ static void swap(void *x,void *y,int bytes,int mask) { int i; char xi, yi, c, t; c = mask; for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) { xi = i[(char *) x]; yi = i[(char *) y]; t = c & (xi ^ yi); xi ^= t; yi ^= t; i[(char *) x] = xi; i[(char *) y] = yi; } } openssh-8.2p1/sntrup4591761.sh010064400017500001750000000041611362136622600141330ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # $OpenBSD: sntrup4591761.sh,v 1.3 2019/01/30 19:51:15 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. # AUTHOR="libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/implementors" FILES=" libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/int32_sort.h libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/int32_sort.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/small.h libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/mod3.h libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/modq.h libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/params.h libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/r3.h libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq.h libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/swap.h libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/dec.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/enc.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/keypair.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/r3_mult.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/r3_recip.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/randomsmall.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/randomweightw.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq_mult.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq_recip3.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq_round3.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/rq_rounded.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/small.c libpqcrypto-20180314/crypto_kem/sntrup4591761/ref/swap.c " ### set -e cd $1 echo -n '/* $' echo 'OpenBSD: $ */' echo echo '/*' echo ' * Public Domain, Authors:' sed -e '/Alphabetical order:/d' -e 's/^/ * - /' < $AUTHOR echo ' */' echo echo '#include ' echo '#include "crypto_api.h"' echo for i in $FILES; do echo "/* from $i */" b=$(basename $i .c) grep \ -v '#include' $i | \ grep -v "extern crypto_int32 small_random32" | sed -e "s/crypto_kem_/crypto_kem_sntrup4591761_/g" \ -e "s/smaller_mask/smaller_mask_${b}/g" \ -e "s/^extern void /static void /" \ -e "s/^void /static void /" echo done openssh-8.2p1/ssh-add.1010064400017500001750000000164471362136622600131020ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.79 2020/02/07 03:57:31 djm Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $ .Dt SSH-ADD 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-add .Nd adds private key identities to the OpenSSH authentication agent .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-add .Op Fl cDdKkLlqvXx .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl S Ar provider .Op Fl t Ar life .Op Ar .Nm ssh-add .Fl s Ar pkcs11 .Nm ssh-add .Fl e Ar pkcs11 .Nm ssh-add .Fl T .Ar pubkey ... .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm adds private key identities to the authentication agent, .Xr ssh-agent 1 . When run without arguments, it adds the files .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 , and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk . After loading a private key, .Nm will try to load corresponding certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to the name of the private key file. Alternative file names can be given on the command line. .Pp If any file requires a passphrase, .Nm asks for the passphrase from the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. .Nm retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given. .Pp The authentication agent must be running and the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable must contain the name of its socket for .Nm to work. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed by .Xr ssh-askpass 1 . Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from .Xr ssh-askpass 1 , rather than text entered into the requester. .It Fl D Deletes all identities from the agent. .It Fl d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent. If .Nm has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and their corresponding certificates will be removed. Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent. If no public key is found at a given path, .Nm will append .Pa .pub and retry. .It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Fl e Ar pkcs11 Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library .Ar pkcs11 . .It Fl K Load resident keys from a FIDO authenticator. .It Fl k When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private keys only and skip certificates. .It Fl L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented by the agent. .It Fl l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent. .It Fl q Be quiet after a successful operation. .It Fl S Ar provider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when adding FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the internal USB HID support. .It Fl s Ar pkcs11 Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library .Ar pkcs11 . .It Fl T Ar pubkey ... Tests whether the private keys that correspond to the specified .Ar pubkey files are usable by performing sign and verify operations on each. .It Fl t Ar life Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging problems. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .It Fl X Unlock the agent. .It Fl x Lock the agent with a password. .El .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS" If .Nm needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If .Nm does not have a terminal associated with it but .Ev DISPLAY and .Ev SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by .Ev SSH_ASKPASS (by default .Dq ssh-askpass ) and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling .Nm from a .Pa .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from .Pa /dev/null to make this work.) .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the agent. .It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user. .El .Pp Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that .Nm ignores identity files if they are accessible by others. .Sh EXIT STATUS Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if .Nm is unable to contact the authentication agent. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-askpass 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. openssh-8.2p1/ssh-add.c010064400017500001750000000500641362136622600131550ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.152 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation, * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # include # include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; /* Default files to add */ static char *default_files[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK, #endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, NULL }; static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */ static int lifetime = 0; /* User has to confirm key use */ static int confirm = 0; /* Maximum number of signatures (XMSS) */ static u_int maxsign = 0; static u_int minleft = 0; /* we keep a cache of one passphrase */ static char *pass = NULL; static void clear_pass(void) { if (pass) { explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass)); free(pass); pass = NULL; } } static int delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag) { struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL; char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL; int r, ret = -1; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) { printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, public)) == 0) { if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); } ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); if (key_only) goto out; /* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */ free(comment); comment = NULL; xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT) error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s", certpath, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public)) fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", certpath, filename); if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, cert)) == 0) { if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", certpath, comment); } ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", certpath, ssh_err(r)); out: sshkey_free(cert); sshkey_free(public); free(certpath); free(comment); return ret; } /* Send a request to remove all identities. */ static int delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag) { int ret = -1; /* * Since the agent might be forwarded, old or non-OpenSSH, when asked * to remove all keys, attempt to remove both protocol v.1 and v.2 * keys. */ if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0) ret = 0; /* ignore error-code for ssh1 */ ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1); if (ret != 0) fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n"); else if (!qflag) fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n"); return ret; } static int add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag, const char *skprovider) { struct sshkey *private, *cert; char *comment = NULL; char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL; int r, fd, ret = -1; size_t i; u_int32_t left; struct sshbuf *keyblob; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) { fd = STDIN_FILENO; filename = "(stdin)"; } else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { perror(filename); return -1; } /* * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong. */ if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) { if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { close(fd); return -1; } } if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &keyblob)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(keyblob); close(fd); return -1; } close(fd); /* At first, try empty passphrase */ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto fail_load; } /* try last */ if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto fail_load; } } if (private == NULL) { /* clear passphrase since it did not work */ clear_pass(); snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %s%s: ", filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); for (;;) { pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) goto fail_load; if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private, &comment)) == 0) break; else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); fail_load: clear_pass(); sshbuf_free(keyblob); return -1; } clear_pass(); snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Bad passphrase, try again for %s%s: ", filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); } } if (comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') comment = xstrdup(filename); sshbuf_free(keyblob); /* For XMSS */ if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(private, filename)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not add filename to private key: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); goto out; } if (maxsign && minleft && (r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) { for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { if (!sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], private)) continue; left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]); if (left < minleft) { fprintf(stderr, "Only %d signatures left.\n", left); break; } fprintf(stderr, "Skipping update: "); if (left == minleft) { fprintf(stderr, "required signatures left (%d).\n", left); } else { fprintf(stderr, "more signatures left (%d) than" " required (%d).\n", left, minleft); } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); goto out; } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); } if (!sshkey_is_sk(private)) skprovider = NULL; /* Don't send constraint for other keys */ else if (skprovider == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Cannot load authenticator-hosted key %s " "without provider\n", filename); goto out; } if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment, lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) == 0) { ret = 0; if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); if (lifetime != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); } if (confirm != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm " "each use of the key\n"); } } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); } /* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */ if (key_only) goto out; /* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */ xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT) error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s", certpath, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) { error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", certpath, filename); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } /* Graft with private bits */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } sshkey_free(cert); if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment, lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) != 0) { error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed: %s", certpath, private->cert->key_id, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* success */ if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath, private->cert->key_id); if (lifetime != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); } if (confirm != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use " "of the key\n"); } } out: free(certpath); free(comment); sshkey_free(private); return ret; } static int update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag) { char *pin = NULL; int r, ret = -1; if (add) { if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) return -1; } if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin, lifetime, confirm)) == 0) { ret = 0; if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n", add ? "added" : "removed", id); } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n", add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r)); ret = -1; } free(pin); return ret; } static int test_key(int agent_fd, const char *filename) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_char *sig = NULL; size_t slen = 0; int r, ret = -1; char data[1024]; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &key, NULL)) != 0) { error("Couldn't read public key %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } arc4random_buf(data, sizeof(data)); if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(agent_fd, key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0)) != 0) { error("Agent signature failed for %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) { error("Signature verification failed for %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } /* success */ ret = 0; done: free(sig); sshkey_free(key); return ret; } static int list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp) { char *fp; int r; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; u_int32_t left; size_t i; if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); else printf("The agent has no identities.\n"); return -1; } for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { if (do_fp) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, idlist->comments[i], sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i])); free(fp); } else { if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], stdout)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); continue; } fprintf(stdout, " %s", idlist->comments[i]); left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]); if (left > 0) fprintf(stdout, " [signatures left %d]", left); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); return 0; } static int lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock) { char prompt[100], *p1, *p2; int r, passok = 1, ret = -1; strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt)); p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (lock) { strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt); p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n"); passok = 0; } explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2)); free(p2); } if (passok) { if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un"); ret = 0; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n", lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r)); } } explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1)); free(p1); return (ret); } static int load_resident_keys(int agent_fd, const char *skprovider, int qflag) { struct sshkey **keys; size_t nkeys, i; int r, ok = 0; char *fp; pass = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, NULL, pass, &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) { error("Unable to load resident keys: %s", ssh_err(r)); return r; } for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, keys[i], "", lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) != 0) { error("Unable to add key %s %s", sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp); free(fp); ok = r; continue; } if (ok == 0) ok = 1; if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Resident identity added: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp); if (lifetime != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); } if (confirm != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm " "each use of the key\n"); } } free(fp); sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(keys); if (nkeys == 0) return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; return ok == 1 ? 0 : ok; } static int do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag, const char *skprovider) { if (deleting) { if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1) return -1; } else { if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag, skprovider) == -1) return -1; } return 0; } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-S provider] [-t life]\n" #ifdef WITH_XMSS " [-M maxsign] [-m minleft]\n" #endif " [file ...]\n" " ssh-add -s pkcs11\n" " ssh-add -e pkcs11\n" " ssh-add -T pubkey ...\n" ); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int agent_fd; char *pkcs11provider = NULL, *skprovider = NULL; int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0, do_download = 0; int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0, qflag = 0, Tflag = 0; SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1); setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); /* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */ switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT: fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your " "authentication agent.\n"); exit(2); default: fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); exit(2); } skprovider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER"); while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vkKlLcdDTxXE:e:M:m:qs:S:t:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'v': if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; break; case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'k': key_only = 1; break; case 'K': do_download = 1; break; case 'l': case 'L': if (lflag != 0) fatal("-%c flag already specified", lflag); lflag = ch; break; case 'x': case 'X': if (xflag != 0) fatal("-%c flag already specified", xflag); xflag = ch; break; case 'c': confirm = 1; break; case 'm': minleft = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL); if (minleft == 0) { usage(); ret = 1; goto done; } break; case 'M': maxsign = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL); if (maxsign == 0) { usage(); ret = 1; goto done; } break; case 'd': deleting = 1; break; case 'D': Dflag = 1; break; case 's': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'S': skprovider = optarg; break; case 'e': deleting = 1; pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); ret = 1; goto done; } break; case 'q': qflag = 1; break; case 'T': Tflag = 1; break; default: usage(); ret = 1; goto done; } } log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1); if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1) fatal("Invalid combination of actions"); else if (xflag) { if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } else if (lflag) { if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } else if (Dflag) { if (delete_all(agent_fd, qflag) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } #ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL if (skprovider == NULL) skprovider = "internal"; #endif argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (Tflag) { if (argc <= 0) fatal("no keys to test"); for (r = i = 0; i < argc; i++) r |= test_key(agent_fd, argv[i]); ret = r == 0 ? 0 : 1; goto done; } if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider, qflag) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } if (do_download) { if (skprovider == NULL) fatal("Cannot download keys without provider"); if (load_resident_keys(agent_fd, skprovider, qflag) != 0) ret = 1; goto done; } if (argc == 0) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int count = 0; if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n", (u_int)getuid()); ret = 1; goto done; } for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) { snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, default_files[i]); if (stat(buf, &st) == -1) continue; if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf, qflag, skprovider) == -1) ret = 1; else count++; } if (count == 0) ret = 1; } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, argv[i], qflag, skprovider) == -1) ret = 1; } } done: clear_pass(); ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd); return ret; } openssh-8.2p1/ssh-agent.1010064400017500001750000000156751362136622600134520ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.70 2019/12/21 20:22:34 naddy Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2019 $ .Dt SSH-AGENT 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-agent .Nd OpenSSH authentication agent .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-agent .Op Fl c | s .Op Fl \&Dd .Op Fl a Ar bind_address .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl P Ar provider_whitelist .Op Fl t Ar life .Op Ar command Op Ar arg ... .Nm ssh-agent .Op Fl c | s .Fl k .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication. Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines using .Xr ssh 1 . .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl a Ar bind_address Bind the agent to the .Ux Ns -domain socket .Ar bind_address . The default is .Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt . .It Fl c Generate C-shell commands on .Dv stdout . This is the default if .Ev SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell. .It Fl D Foreground mode. When this option is specified .Nm will not fork. .It Fl d Debug mode. When this option is specified .Nm will not fork and will write debug information to standard error. .It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Fl k Kill the current agent (given by the .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable). .It Fl P Ar provider_whitelist Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 and FIDO authenticator shared libraries that may be used with the .Fl S or .Fl s options to .Xr ssh-add 1 . Libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused. See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for a description of pattern-list syntax. The default whitelist is .Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* . .It Fl s Generate Bourne shell commands on .Dv stdout . This is the default if .Ev SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell. .It Fl t Ar life Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in .Xr sshd_config 5 . A lifetime specified for an identity with .Xr ssh-add 1 overrides this value. Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever. .It Ar command Op Ar arg ... If a command (and optional arguments) is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent. The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line terminates. .El .Pp There are two main ways to get an agent set up. The first is at the start of an X session, where all other windows or programs are started as children of the .Nm program. The agent starts a command under which its environment variables are exported, for example .Cm ssh-agent xterm & . When the command terminates, so does the agent. .Pp The second method is used for a login session. When .Nm is started, it prints the shell commands required to set its environment variables, which in turn can be evaluated in the calling shell, for example .Cm eval `ssh-agent -s` . .Pp In both cases, .Xr ssh 1 looks at these environment variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent. .Pp The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using .Xr ssh-add 1 or by .Xr ssh 1 when .Cm AddKeysToAgent is set in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Multiple identities may be stored in .Nm concurrently and .Xr ssh 1 will automatically use them if present. .Xr ssh-add 1 is also used to remove keys from .Nm and to query the keys that are held in one. .Pp Connections to .Nm may be forwarded from further remote hosts using the .Fl A option to .Xr ssh 1 (but see the caveats documented therein), avoiding the need for authentication data to be stored on other machines. Authentication passphrases and private keys never go over the network: the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote connections and the result is returned to the requester, allowing the user access to their identities anywhere in the network in a secure fashion. .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Bl -tag -width "SSH_AGENT_PID" .It Ev SSH_AGENT_PID When .Nm starts, it stores the name of the agent's process ID (PID) in this variable. .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK When .Nm starts, it creates a .Ux Ns -domain socket and stores its pathname in this variable. It is accessible only to the current user, but is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user. .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent. .Ux Ns -domain sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by .An Tatu Ylonen . .An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt and .An Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. .An Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. openssh-8.2p1/ssh-agent.c010064400017500001750000001076731362136622600135340ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.255 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The authentication agent program. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "sk-api.h" #ifndef DEFAULT_PROVIDER_WHITELIST # define DEFAULT_PROVIDER_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*" #endif /* Maximum accepted message length */ #define AGENT_MAX_LEN (256*1024) /* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */ #define AGENT_RBUF_LEN (4096) typedef enum { AUTH_UNUSED, AUTH_SOCKET, AUTH_CONNECTION } sock_type; typedef struct { int fd; sock_type type; struct sshbuf *input; struct sshbuf *output; struct sshbuf *request; } SocketEntry; u_int sockets_alloc = 0; SocketEntry *sockets = NULL; typedef struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; struct sshkey *key; char *comment; char *provider; time_t death; u_int confirm; char *sk_provider; } Identity; struct idtable { int nentries; TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist; }; /* private key table */ struct idtable *idtab; int max_fd = 0; /* pid of shell == parent of agent */ pid_t parent_pid = -1; time_t parent_alive_interval = 0; /* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */ pid_t cleanup_pid = 0; /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */ char socket_name[PATH_MAX]; char socket_dir[PATH_MAX]; /* PKCS#11/Security key path whitelist */ static char *provider_whitelist; /* locking */ #define LOCK_SIZE 32 #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16 #define LOCK_ROUNDS 1 int locked = 0; u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE]; u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE]; extern char *__progname; /* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */ static long lifetime = 0; static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; static void close_socket(SocketEntry *e) { close(e->fd); e->fd = -1; e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; sshbuf_free(e->input); sshbuf_free(e->output); sshbuf_free(e->request); } static void idtab_init(void) { idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab)); TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist); idtab->nentries = 0; } static void free_identity(Identity *id) { sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->provider); free(id->comment); free(id->sk_provider); free(id); } /* return matching private key for given public key */ static Identity * lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key) { Identity *id; TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) { if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) return (id); } return (NULL); } /* Check confirmation of keysign request */ static int confirm_key(Identity *id) { char *p; int ret = -1; p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (p != NULL && ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", id->comment, p)) ret = 0; free(p); return (ret); } static void send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */ static void process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e) { Identity *id; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, idtab->nentries)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) { if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, msg, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) { error("%s: put key/comment: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); continue; } } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); } static char * agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags) { if (key->type == KEY_RSA) { if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256) return "rsa-sha2-256"; else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512) return "rsa-sha2-512"; } else if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) { if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256) return "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"; else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512) return "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"; } return NULL; } /* ssh2 only */ static void process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) { const u_char *data; u_char *signature = NULL; size_t dlen, slen = 0; u_int compat = 0, flags; int r, ok = -1; char *fp = NULL; struct sshbuf *msg; struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct identity *id; struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't parse request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto send; } if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) { verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); goto send; } if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id) != 0) { verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__); goto send; } if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key) && (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__); notifier = notify_start(0, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", sshkey_type(id->key), fp); } if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags), id->sk_provider, compat)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto send; } /* Success */ ok = 0; send: notify_complete(notifier); sshkey_free(key); free(fp); if (ok == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); free(signature); } /* shared */ static void process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e) { int r, success = 0; struct sshkey *key = NULL; Identity *id; if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: get key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) { debug("%s: key not found", __func__); goto done; } /* We have this key, free it. */ if (idtab->nentries < 1) fatal("%s: internal error: nentries %d", __func__, idtab->nentries); TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); idtab->nentries--; sshkey_free(key); success = 1; done: send_status(e, success); } static void process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e) { Identity *id; /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); } /* Mark that there are no identities. */ idtab->nentries = 0; /* Send success. */ send_status(e, 1); } /* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */ static time_t reaper(void) { time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime(); Identity *id, *nxt; for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); if (id->death == 0) continue; if (now >= id->death) { debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment); TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); idtab->nentries--; } else deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death : MINIMUM(deadline, id->death); } if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now) return 0; else return (deadline - now); } static void process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e) { Identity *id; int success = 0, confirm = 0; u_int seconds, maxsign; char *fp, *comment = NULL, *ext_name = NULL, *sk_provider = NULL; char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; time_t death = 0; struct sshkey *k = NULL; u_char ctype; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 || k == NULL || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: decode private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &ctype)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } switch (ctype) { case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) { error("%s: bad lifetime constraint: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } death = monotime() + seconds; break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: confirm = 1; break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &maxsign)) != 0) { error("%s: bad maxsign constraint: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } if ((r = sshkey_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign)) != 0) { error("%s: cannot enable maxsign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &ext_name, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: cannot parse extension: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } debug("%s: constraint ext %s", __func__, ext_name); if (strcmp(ext_name, "sk-provider@openssh.com") == 0) { if (sk_provider != NULL) { error("%s already set", ext_name); goto err; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &sk_provider, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: cannot parse %s: %s", __func__, ext_name, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } } else { error("%s: unsupported constraint \"%s\"", __func__, ext_name); goto err; } free(ext_name); break; default: error("%s: Unknown constraint %d", __func__, ctype); err: free(sk_provider); free(ext_name); sshbuf_reset(e->request); free(comment); sshkey_free(k); goto send; } } if (sk_provider != NULL) { if (!sshkey_is_sk(k)) { error("Cannot add provider: %s is not an " "authenticator-hosted key", sshkey_type(k)); free(sk_provider); goto send; } if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) { debug("%s: internal provider", __func__); } else { if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": " "realpath: %s", sk_provider, strerror(errno)); free(sk_provider); goto send; } free(sk_provider); sk_provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider); if (match_pattern_list(sk_provider, provider_whitelist, 0) != 1) { error("Refusing add key: " "provider %s not whitelisted", sk_provider); free(sk_provider); goto send; } } } if ((r = sshkey_shield_private(k)) != 0) { error("%s: shield private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } success = 1; if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next); /* Increment the number of identities. */ idtab->nentries++; } else { /* key state might have been updated */ sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->comment); free(id->sk_provider); } id->key = k; id->comment = comment; id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; id->sk_provider = sk_provider; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); debug("%s: add %s %s \"%.100s\" (life: %u) (confirm: %u) " "(provider: %s)", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k), fp, comment, seconds, confirm, sk_provider == NULL ? "none" : sk_provider); free(fp); send: send_status(e, success); } /* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */ static void process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock) { int r, success = 0, delay; char *passwd; u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE]; static u_int fail_count = 0; size_t pwlen; /* * This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock, * but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to * do is abort. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (pwlen == 0) { debug("empty password not supported"); } else if (locked && !lock) { if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) { debug("agent unlocked"); locked = 0; fail_count = 0; explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash)); success = 1; } else { /* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */ if (fail_count < 100) fail_count++; delay = 100000 * fail_count; debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds", (double)delay/1000000); usleep(delay); } explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash)); } else if (!locked && lock) { debug("agent locked"); locked = 1; arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt)); if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); success = 1; } explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen); free(passwd); send_status(e, success); } static void no_identities(SocketEntry *e) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); } #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 static void process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; char **comments = NULL; int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; u_int seconds; time_t death = 0; u_char type; struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k; Identity *id; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto send; } while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto send; } switch (type) { case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto send; } death = monotime() + seconds; break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: confirm = 1; break; default: error("%s: Unknown constraint type %d", __func__, type); goto send; } } if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", provider, strerror(errno)); goto send; } if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, provider_whitelist, 0) != 1) { verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": " "provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider); goto send; } debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider); if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { k = keys[i]; if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */ id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider); if (*comments[i] != '\0') { id->comment = comments[i]; comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */ } else { id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); } id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next); idtab->nentries++; success = 1; } sshkey_free(keys[i]); free(comments[i]); } send: free(pin); free(provider); free(keys); free(comments); send_status(e, success); } static void process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; int r, success = 0; Identity *id, *nxt; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto send; } free(pin); if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", provider, strerror(errno)); goto send; } debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); /* Skip file--based keys */ if (id->provider == NULL) continue; if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); idtab->nentries--; } } if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0) success = 1; else error("%s: pkcs11_del_provider failed", __func__); send: free(provider); send_status(e, success); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ /* dispatch incoming messages */ static int process_message(u_int socknum) { u_int msg_len; u_char type; const u_char *cp; int r; SocketEntry *e; if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) { fatal("%s: socket number %u >= allocated %u", __func__, socknum, sockets_alloc); } e = &sockets[socknum]; if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5) return 0; /* Incomplete message header. */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input); msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp); if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) { debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u", __func__, socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN); return -1; } if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4) return 0; /* Incomplete message body. */ /* move the current input to e->request */ sshbuf_reset(e->request); if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE || r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) { debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", __func__, socknum, e->fd, type); /* check whether agent is locked */ if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) { sshbuf_reset(e->request); switch (type) { case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: /* send empty lists */ no_identities(e); break; default: /* send a fail message for all other request types */ send_status(e, 0); } return 0; } switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK: case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK: process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */ break; /* ssh2 */ case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: process_sign_request2(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: process_request_identities(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY: case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED: process_add_identity(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY: process_remove_identity(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e); break; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED: process_add_smartcard_key(e); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: process_remove_smartcard_key(e); break; #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ default: /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ error("Unknown message %d", type); sshbuf_reset(e->request); send_status(e, 0); break; } return 0; } static void new_socket(sock_type type, int fd) { u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc; set_nonblock(fd); if (fd > max_fd) max_fd = fd; for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) { sockets[i].fd = fd; if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sockets[i].type = type; return; } old_alloc = sockets_alloc; new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10; sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0])); for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++) sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; sockets_alloc = new_alloc; sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd; if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sockets[old_alloc].type = type; } static int handle_socket_read(u_int socknum) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; socklen_t slen; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; int fd; slen = sizeof(sunaddr); fd = accept(sockets[socknum].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen); if (fd == -1) { error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) == -1) { error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return -1; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid()); close(fd); return -1; } new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd); return 0; } static int handle_conn_read(u_int socknum) { char buf[AGENT_RBUF_LEN]; ssize_t len; int r; if ((len = read(sockets[socknum].fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) <= 0) { if (len == -1) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) return 0; error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s", __func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno)); } return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); process_message(socknum); return 0; } static int handle_conn_write(u_int socknum) { ssize_t len; int r; if (sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output) == 0) return 0; /* shouldn't happen */ if ((len = write(sockets[socknum].fd, sshbuf_ptr(sockets[socknum].output), sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output))) <= 0) { if (len == -1) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) return 0; error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s", __func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno)); } return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[socknum].output, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return 0; } static void after_poll(struct pollfd *pfd, size_t npfd, u_int maxfds) { size_t i; u_int socknum, activefds = npfd; for (i = 0; i < npfd; i++) { if (pfd[i].revents == 0) continue; /* Find sockets entry */ for (socknum = 0; socknum < sockets_alloc; socknum++) { if (sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_SOCKET && sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_CONNECTION) continue; if (pfd[i].fd == sockets[socknum].fd) break; } if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) { error("%s: no socket for fd %d", __func__, pfd[i].fd); continue; } /* Process events */ switch (sockets[socknum].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) == 0) break; if (npfd > maxfds) { debug3("out of fds (active %u >= limit %u); " "skipping accept", activefds, maxfds); break; } if (handle_socket_read(socknum) == 0) activefds++; break; case AUTH_CONNECTION: if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0 && handle_conn_read(socknum) != 0) { goto close_sock; } if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0 && handle_conn_write(socknum) != 0) { close_sock: if (activefds == 0) fatal("activefds == 0 at close_sock"); close_socket(&sockets[socknum]); activefds--; break; } break; default: break; } } } static int prepare_poll(struct pollfd **pfdp, size_t *npfdp, int *timeoutp, u_int maxfds) { struct pollfd *pfd = *pfdp; size_t i, j, npfd = 0; time_t deadline; int r; /* Count active sockets */ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: case AUTH_CONNECTION: npfd++; break; case AUTH_UNUSED: break; default: fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type); break; } } if (npfd != *npfdp && (pfd = recallocarray(pfd, *npfdp, npfd, sizeof(*pfd))) == NULL) fatal("%s: recallocarray failed", __func__); *pfdp = pfd; *npfdp = npfd; for (i = j = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: if (npfd > maxfds) { debug3("out of fds (active %zu >= limit %u); " "skipping arming listener", npfd, maxfds); break; } pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd; pfd[j].revents = 0; pfd[j].events = POLLIN; j++; break; case AUTH_CONNECTION: pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd; pfd[j].revents = 0; /* * Only prepare to read if we can handle a full-size * input read buffer and enqueue a max size reply.. */ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].input, AGENT_RBUF_LEN)) == 0 && (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].output, AGENT_MAX_LEN)) == 0) pfd[j].events = POLLIN; else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) { fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0) pfd[j].events |= POLLOUT; j++; break; default: break; } } deadline = reaper(); if (parent_alive_interval != 0) deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval : MINIMUM(deadline, parent_alive_interval); if (deadline == 0) { *timeoutp = -1; /* INFTIM */ } else { if (deadline > INT_MAX / 1000) *timeoutp = INT_MAX / 1000; else *timeoutp = deadline * 1000; } return (1); } static void cleanup_socket(void) { if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid) return; debug("%s: cleanup", __func__); if (socket_name[0]) unlink(socket_name); if (socket_dir[0]) rmdir(socket_dir); } void cleanup_exit(int i) { cleanup_socket(); _exit(i); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void cleanup_handler(int sig) { cleanup_socket(); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); #endif _exit(2); } static void check_parent_exists(void) { /* * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1, * so testing for that should be safe. */ if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) { /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */ cleanup_socket(); _exit(2); } } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n" " [-P provider_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n" " ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n"); exit(1); } int main(int ac, char **av) { int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0; int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno; char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT struct rlimit rlim; #endif extern int optind; extern char *optarg; pid_t pid; char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid]; size_t len; mode_t prev_mask; int timeout = -1; /* INFTIM */ struct pollfd *pfd = NULL; size_t npfd = 0; u_int maxfds; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* drop */ setegid(getgid()); setgid(getgid()); platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */ #ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) == -1) fatal("%s: getrlimit: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); #endif __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); seed_rng(); while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'c': if (s_flag) usage(); c_flag++; break; case 'k': k_flag++; break; case 'P': if (provider_whitelist != NULL) fatal("-P option already specified"); provider_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 's': if (c_flag) usage(); s_flag++; break; case 'd': if (d_flag || D_flag) usage(); d_flag++; break; case 'D': if (d_flag || D_flag) usage(); D_flag++; break; case 'a': agentsocket = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); usage(); } break; default: usage(); } } ac -= optind; av += optind; if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag)) usage(); if (provider_whitelist == NULL) provider_whitelist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_PROVIDER_WHITELIST); if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) { shell = getenv("SHELL"); if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 && strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0) c_flag = 1; } if (k_flag) { const char *errstr = NULL; pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); if (pidstr == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n", SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); exit(1); } pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fprintf(stderr, "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n", SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr); exit(1); } if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) { perror("kill"); exit(1); } format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid); exit(0); } /* * Minimum file descriptors: * stdio (3) + listener (1) + syslog (1 maybe) + connection (1) + * a few spare for libc / stack protectors / sanitisers, etc. */ #define SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS (3+1+1+1+4) if (rlim.rlim_cur < SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS) fatal("%s: file descriptor rlimit %lld too low (minimum %u)", __progname, (long long)rlim.rlim_cur, SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS); maxfds = rlim.rlim_cur - SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS; parent_pid = getpid(); if (agentsocket == NULL) { /* Create private directory for agent socket */ mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir)); if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) { perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir"); exit(1); } snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir, (long)parent_pid); } else { /* Try to use specified agent socket */ socket_dir[0] = '\0'; strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name); } /* * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from * the parent. */ prev_mask = umask(0177); sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); if (sock < 0) { /* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */ *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */ cleanup_exit(1); } umask(prev_mask); /* * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent. */ if (D_flag || d_flag) { log_init(__progname, d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1); format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid); fflush(stdout); goto skip; } pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { perror("fork"); cleanup_exit(1); } if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */ close(sock); snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid); if (ac == 0) { format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid); exit(0); } if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 || setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) { perror("setenv"); exit(1); } execvp(av[0], av); perror(av[0]); exit(1); } /* child */ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); if (setsid() == -1) { error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } (void)chdir("/"); if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { /* XXX might close listen socket */ (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); if (fd > 2) close(fd); } #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == -1) { error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } #endif skip: cleanup_pid = getpid(); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(0); #endif new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock); if (ac > 0) parent_alive_interval = 10; idtab_init(); ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); ssh_signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler); if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); platform_pledge_agent(); while (1) { prepare_poll(&pfd, &npfd, &timeout, maxfds); result = poll(pfd, npfd, timeout); saved_errno = errno; if (parent_alive_interval != 0) check_parent_exists(); (void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */ if (result == -1) { if (saved_errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("poll: %s", strerror(saved_errno)); } else if (result > 0) after_poll(pfd, npfd, maxfds); } /* NOTREACHED */ } openssh-8.2p1/ssh-dss.c010064400017500001750000000130661362136622600132170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.37 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #define INTBLOB_LEN 20 #define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN) int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s); rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r); slen = BN_num_bytes(sig_s); if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); BN_bn2bin(sig_r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); BN_bn2bin(sig_s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-dss")) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); DSA_SIG_free(sig); sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL; size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *ktype = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA || signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* fetch signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* parse signature */ if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL || (sig_r = BN_new()) == NULL || (sig_s = BN_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig_r) == NULL) || (BN_bin2bn(sigblob + INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig_s) == NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (!DSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ /* sha1 the data */ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) { case 1: ret = 0; break; case 0: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; default: ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); DSA_SIG_free(sig); BN_clear_free(sig_r); BN_clear_free(sig_s); sshbuf_free(b); free(ktype); if (sigblob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); free(sigblob); } return ret; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c010064400017500001750000000146141362136622600141200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c,v 1.5 2019/11/26 03:04:27 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2019 Google Inc. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #endif #include #include /* needed for DEBUG_SK only */ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" /* ARGSUSED */ int ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) { #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; u_char sig_flags; u_char msghash[32], apphash[32], sighash[32]; u_int sig_counter; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL, *original_signed = NULL; char *ktype = NULL; struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_SK char *tmp = NULL; #endif if (detailsp != NULL) *detailsp = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA_SK || signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (key->ecdsa_nid != NID_X9_62_prime256v1) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* fetch signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0 || sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 || sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } /* parse signature */ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: data: (len %zu)\n", __func__, datalen); /* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_r))); free(tmp); fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_s))); free(tmp); fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n", __func__, sig_flags, sig_counter); #endif sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } /* Reconstruct data that was supposedly signed */ if ((original_signed = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, datalen, msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0) goto out; /* Application value is hashed before signature */ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application, strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr); fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr); #endif if ((ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed, apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u8(original_signed, sig_flags)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(original_signed, sig_counter)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed, msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0) goto out; /* Signature is over H(original_signed) */ if ((ret = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, original_signed, sighash, sizeof(sighash))) != 0) goto out; if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } details->sk_counter = sig_counter; details->sk_flags = sig_flags; #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump(original_signed, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed hash:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(sighash, sizeof(sighash), stderr); #endif /* Verify it */ switch (ECDSA_do_verify(sighash, sizeof(sighash), sig, key->ecdsa)) { case 1: ret = 0; break; case 0: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; default: ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } /* success */ if (detailsp != NULL) { *detailsp = details; details = NULL; } out: explicit_bzero(&sig_flags, sizeof(sig_flags)); explicit_bzero(&sig_counter, sizeof(sig_counter)); explicit_bzero(msghash, sizeof(msghash)); explicit_bzero(sighash, sizeof(msghash)); explicit_bzero(apphash, sizeof(apphash)); sshkey_sig_details_free(details); sshbuf_free(original_signed); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshbuf_free(b); ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); BN_clear_free(sig_r); BN_clear_free(sig_s); free(ktype); return ret; #else return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; #endif } openssh-8.2p1/ssh-ecdsa.c010064400017500001750000000127371362136622600135110ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.16 2019/01/21 09:54:11 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" /* ARGSUSED */ int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; int hash_alg; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t len, dlen; struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig_r)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig_s)) != 0) goto out; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); sshbuf_free(b); sshbuf_free(bb); ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); return ret; } /* ARGSUSED */ int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; int hash_alg; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t dlen; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL; char *ktype = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA || signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* fetch signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } /* parse signature */ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) { case 1: ret = 0; break; case 0: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; default: ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshbuf_free(b); ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); BN_clear_free(sig_r); BN_clear_free(sig_s); free(ktype); return ret; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh-ed25519-sk.c010064400017500001750000000112351362136622600140330ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519-sk.c,v 1.4 2019/11/26 03:04:27 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */ #include "includes.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include #include #include "crypto_api.h" #include #include #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "digest.h" int ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL; char *ktype = NULL; const u_char *sigblob; const u_char *sm; u_char *m = NULL; u_char apphash[32]; u_char msghash[32]; u_char sig_flags; u_int sig_counter; size_t len; unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; int ret; struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL; if (detailsp != NULL) *detailsp = NULL; if (key == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519_SK || key->ed25519_pk == NULL || signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0 || sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 || sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: data:\n", __func__); /* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sigblob:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(sigblob, len, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n", __func__, sig_flags, sig_counter); #endif if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application, strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash)) != 0 || ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, datalen, msghash, sizeof(msghash)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr); fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr); #endif if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } details->sk_counter = sig_counter; details->sk_flags = sig_flags; if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_put(encoded, sigblob, len) != 0 || sshbuf_put(encoded, apphash, sizeof(apphash)) != 0 || sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, sig_flags) != 0 || sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sig_counter) != 0 || sshbuf_put(encoded, msghash, sizeof(msghash)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump(encoded, stderr); #endif sm = sshbuf_ptr(encoded); smlen = sshbuf_len(encoded); mlen = smlen; if ((m = malloc(smlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen, key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) { debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d", __func__, ret); } if (ret != 0 || mlen != smlen - len) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } /* XXX compare 'm' and 'sm + len' ? */ /* success */ r = 0; if (detailsp != NULL) { *detailsp = details; details = NULL; } out: if (m != NULL) { explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */ free(m); } sshkey_sig_details_free(details); sshbuf_free(b); sshbuf_free(encoded); free(ktype); return r; } openssh-8.2p1/ssh-ed25519.c010064400017500001750000000103311362136622600134140ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.7 2016/04/21 06:08:02 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include "crypto_api.h" #include #include #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh.h" int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { u_char *sig = NULL; size_t slen = 0, len; unsigned long long smlen; int r, ret; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (key == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 || key->ed25519_sk == NULL || datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES; if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, data, datalen, key->ed25519_sk)) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */ goto out; } /* encode signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-ed25519")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); if (sig != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sig, slen); free(sig); } return r; } int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *ktype = NULL; const u_char *sigblob; u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL; size_t len; unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0; int r, ret; if (key == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 || key->ed25519_pk == NULL || datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES || signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0) goto out; if (strcmp("ssh-ed25519", ktype) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (datalen >= SIZE_MAX - len) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } smlen = len + datalen; mlen = smlen; if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = malloc(mlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(sm, sigblob, len); memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen); if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen, key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) { debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d", __func__, ret); } if (ret != 0 || mlen != datalen) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } /* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */ /* success */ r = 0; out: if (sm != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sm, smlen); free(sm); } if (m != NULL) { explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */ free(m); } sshbuf_free(b); free(ktype); return r; } openssh-8.2p1/ssh-gss.h010064400017500001750000000113001362136622600132140ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.14 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _SSH_GSS_H #define _SSH_GSS_H #ifdef GSSAPI #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H #include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) #include #endif #ifdef KRB5 # ifndef HEIMDAL # ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H # include # elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H) # include # endif /* Old MIT Kerberos doesn't seem to define GSS_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */ # if !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE # define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name # endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */ # endif /* !HEIMDAL */ #endif /* KRB5 */ /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */ #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66 #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 typedef struct { char *filename; char *envvar; char *envval; void *data; } ssh_gssapi_ccache; typedef struct { gss_buffer_desc displayname; gss_buffer_desc exportedname; gss_cred_id_t creds; struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; ssh_gssapi_ccache store; } ssh_gssapi_client; typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { char *enc_name; char *name; gss_OID_desc oid; int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *); int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); } ssh_gssapi_mech; typedef struct { OM_uint32 major; /* both */ OM_uint32 minor; /* both */ gss_ctx_id_t context; /* both */ gss_name_t name; /* both */ gss_OID oid; /* client */ gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ gss_name_t client; /* server */ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ } Gssctxt; extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *, gss_OID); void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *); ssh_gssapi_mech *ssh_gssapi_get_ctype(Gssctxt *); void ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *); struct sshbuf; int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int, gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *, ssh_gssapi_client *); void ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *); char *ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *, OM_uint32 *, OM_uint32 *); void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **); void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *, const char *, const char *); int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); /* In the server */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); #endif /* GSSAPI */ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh-keygen.1010064400017500001750000001077651362136622600136400ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.201 2020/02/07 03:57:31 djm Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $ .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-keygen .Nd OpenSSH authentication key utility .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-keygen .Op Fl q .Op Fl b Ar bits .Op Fl C Ar comment .Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile .Op Fl m Ar format .Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase .Op Fl O Ar option .Op Fl w Ar provider .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl p .Op Fl f Ar keyfile .Op Fl m Ar format .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase .Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl i .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Op Fl m Ar key_format .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl e .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Op Fl m Ar key_format .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl y .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl c .Op Fl C Ar comment .Op Fl f Ar keyfile .Op Fl P Ar passphrase .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl l .Op Fl v .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl B .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl D Ar pkcs11 .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl F Ar hostname .Op Fl lv .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl H .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl K .Op Fl w Ar provider .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl R Ar hostname .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl r Ar hostname .Op Fl g .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl M Cm generate .Op Fl O Ar option .Ar output_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl M Cm screen .Op Fl f Ar input_file .Op Fl O Ar option .Ar output_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl I Ar certificate_identity .Fl s Ar ca_key .Op Fl hU .Op Fl D Ar pkcs11_provider .Op Fl n Ar principals .Op Fl O Ar option .Op Fl V Ar validity_interval .Op Fl z Ar serial_number .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl L .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl A .Op Fl f Ar prefix_path .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl k .Fl f Ar krl_file .Op Fl u .Op Fl s Ar ca_public .Op Fl z Ar version_number .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Q .Fl f Ar krl_file .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Y Cm find-principals .Fl s Ar signature_file .Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Y Cm check-novalidate .Fl n Ar namespace .Fl s Ar signature_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Y Cm sign .Fl f Ar key_file .Fl n Ar namespace .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Y Cm verify .Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file .Fl I Ar signer_identity .Fl n Ar namespace .Fl s Ar signature_file .Op Fl r Ar revocation_file .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm generates, manages and converts authentication keys for .Xr ssh 1 . .Nm can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2. .Pp The type of key to be generated is specified with the .Fl t option. If invoked without any arguments, .Nm will generate an RSA key. .Pp .Nm is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group exchange (DH-GEX). See the .Sx MODULI GENERATION section for details. .Pp Finally, .Nm can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. .Pp Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication key in .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in .Pa /etc/rc . .Pp Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same name but .Dq .pub appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using the .Fl p option. .Pp There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public key copied to other machines. .Pp .Nm will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format. This format is preferred as it offers better protection for keys at rest as well as allowing storage of key comments within the private key file itself. The key comment may be useful to help identify the key. The comment is initialized to .Dq user@host when the key is created, but can be changed using the .Fl c option. .Pp It is still possible for .Nm to write the previously-used PEM format private keys using the .Fl m flag. This may be used when generating new keys, and existing new-format keys may be converted using this option in conjunction with the .Fl p (change passphrase) flag. .Pp After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should be placed to be activated. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl A For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment. If .Fl f has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the default path for the resulting host key files. This is used by .Pa /etc/rc to generate new host keys. .It Fl a Ar rounds When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function) rounds used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). .It Fl B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file. .It Fl b Ar bits Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits. Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys, the .Fl b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will fail. ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length and the .Fl b flag will be ignored. .It Fl C Ar comment Provides a new comment. .It Fl c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files. The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment. .It Fl D Ar pkcs11 Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library .Ar pkcs11 . When used in combination with .Fl s , this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details). .It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Fl e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by the .Fl m option. The default export format is .Dq RFC4716 . This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including several commercial SSH implementations. .It Fl F Ar hostname | [hostname]:port Search for the specified .Ar hostname (with optional port number) in a .Pa known_hosts file, listing any occurrences found. This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be used in conjunction with the .Fl H option to print found keys in a hashed format. .It Fl f Ar filename Specifies the filename of the key file. .It Fl g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the .Fl r command. .It Fl H Hash a .Pa known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix. These hashes may be used normally by .Nm ssh and .Nm sshd , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names. .It Fl h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user certificate. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl I Ar certificate_identity Specify the key identity when signing a public key. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file in the format specified by the .Fl m option and print an OpenSSH compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows importing keys from other software, including several commercial SSH implementations. The default import format is .Dq RFC4716 . .It Fl K Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator. Public and private key files will be written to the current directory for each downloaded key. .It Fl k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, .Nm will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the .Fl f flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line. Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or using the format described in the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section. .It Fl L Prints the contents of one or more certificates. .It Fl l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. For RSA and DSA keys .Nm tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. If combined with .Fl v , a visual ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint. .It Fl M Cm generate Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) parameters for eventual use by the .Sq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key exchange methods. The numbers generated by this operation must be further screened before use. See the .Sx MODULI GENERATION section for more information. .It Fl M Cm screen Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange. This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they are safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group generators. The results of this operation may be added to the .Pa /etc/moduli file. See the .Sx MODULI GENERATION section for more information. .It Fl m Ar key_format Specify a key format for key generation, the .Fl i (import), .Fl e (export) conversion options, and the .Fl p change passphrase operation. The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH private key and PEM private key formats. The supported key formats are: .Dq RFC4716 (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), .Dq PKCS8 (PKCS8 public or private key) or .Dq PEM (PEM public key). By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is .Dq RFC4716 . Setting a format of .Dq PEM when generating or updating a supported private key type will cause the key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format. .It Fl N Ar new_passphrase Provides the new passphrase. .It Fl n Ar principals Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl O Ar option Specify a key/value option. These are specific to the operation that .Nm has been requested to perform. .Pp When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the .Sx CERTIFICATES section may be specified here. .Pp When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the options listed in the .Sx MODULI GENERATION section may be specified. .Pp When generating a key that will be hosted on a FIDO authenticator, this flag may be used to specify key-specific options. Those supported at present are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm application Override the default FIDO application/origin string of .Dq ssh: . This may be useful when generating host or domain-specific resident keys. The specified application string must begin with .Dq ssh: . .It Cm challenge Ns = Ns Ar path Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be passed to the FIDO token during key generation. The challenge string may be used as part of an out-of-band protocol for key enrollment (a random challenge is used by default). .It Cm device Explicitly specify a .Xr fido 4 device to use, rather than letting the token middleware select one. .It Cm no-touch-required Indicate that the generated private key should not require touch events (user presence) when making signatures. Note that .Xr sshd 8 will refuse such signatures by default, unless overridden via an authorized_keys option. .It Cm resident Indicate that the key should be stored on the FIDO authenticator itself. Resident keys may be supported on FIDO2 tokens and typically require that a PIN be set on the token prior to generation. Resident keys may be loaded off the token using .Xr ssh-add 1 . .It Cm user A username to be associated with a resident key, overriding the empty default username. Specifying a username may be useful when generating multiple resident keys for the same application name. .It Cm write-attestation Ns = Ns Ar path May be used at key generation time to record the attestation certificate returned from FIDO tokens during key generation. By default this information is discarded. .El .Pp The .Fl O option may be specified multiple times. .It Fl P Ar passphrase Provides the (old) passphrase. .It Fl p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the new passphrase. .It Fl Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL. .It Fl q Silence .Nm ssh-keygen . .It Fl R Ar hostname | [hostname]:port Removes all keys belonging to the specified .Ar hostname (with optional port number) from a .Pa known_hosts file. This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the .Fl H option above). .It Fl r Ar hostname Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named .Ar hostname for the specified public key file. .It Fl s Ar ca_key Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .Pp When generating a KRL, .Fl s specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial number. See the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. .It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ecdsa-sk , .Dq ed25519 , .Dq ed25519-sk , or .Dq rsa . .Pp This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when signing certificates using an RSA CA key. The available RSA signature variants are .Dq ssh-rsa (SHA1 signatures, not recommended), .Dq rsa-sha2-256 , and .Dq rsa-sha2-512 (the default). .It Fl U When used in combination with .Fl s , this option indicates that a CA key resides in a .Xr ssh-agent 1 . See the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for more information. .It Fl u Update a KRL. When specified with .Fl k , keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL being created. .It Fl V Ar validity_interval Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval. .Pp The start time may be specified as the string .Dq always to indicate the certificate has no specified start time, a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format, a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by an interval in the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Pp The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time, a relative time starting with a plus character or the string .Dq forever to indicate that the certificate has no expirty date. .Pp For example: .Dq +52w1d (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now), .Dq -4w:+4w (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now), .Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000 (valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), .Dq -1d:20110101 (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011). .Dq -1m:forever (valid from one minute ago and never expiring). .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli generation. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .It Fl w Ar provider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the internal USB HID support. .It Fl Y Cm find-principals Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a signature, provided using the .Fl s flag in an authorized signers file provided using the .Fl f flag. The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the .Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS section below. If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned on standard output. .It Fl Y Cm check-novalidate Checks that a signature generated using .Nm .Fl Y Cm sign has a valid structure. This does not validate if a signature comes from an authorized signer. When testing a signature, .Nm accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using .Fl n . A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the .Fl s flag. Successful testing of the signature is signalled by .Nm returning a zero exit status. .It Fl Y Cm sign Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key. When signing, .Nm accepts zero or more files to sign on the command-line - if no files are specified then .Nm will sign data presented on standard input. Signatures are written to the path of the input file with .Dq .sig appended, or to standard output if the message to be signed was read from standard input. .Pp The key used for signing is specified using the .Fl f option and may refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private half available via .Xr ssh-agent 1 . An additional signature namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across different domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be provided via the .Fl n flag. Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and may include: .Dq file for file signing, .Dq email for email signing. For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces. .It Fl Y Cm verify Request to verify a signature generated using .Nm .Fl Y Cm sign as described above. When verifying a signature, .Nm accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using .Fl n . A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the .Fl s flag, along with the identity of the signer using .Fl I and a list of allowed signers via the .Fl f flag. The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the .Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS section below. A file containing revoked keys can be passed using the .Fl r flag. The revocation file may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. Successful verification by an authorized signer is signalled by .Nm returning a zero exit status. .It Fl y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout. .It Fl z Ar serial_number Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. If the .Ar serial_number is prefixed with a .Sq + character, then the serial number will be incremented for each certificate signed on a single command-line. The default serial number is zero. .Pp When generating a KRL, the .Fl z flag is used to specify a KRL version number. .El .Sh MODULI GENERATION .Nm may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive process). .Pp Generation of primes is performed using the .Fl M Cm generate option. The desired length of the primes may be specified by the .Fl O Cm bits option. For example: .Pp .Dl # ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates .Pp By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired length range. This may be overridden using the .Fl O Cm start option, which specifies a different start point (in hex). .Pp Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for suitability. This may be performed using the .Fl M Cm screen option. In this mode .Nm will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the .Fl f option). For example: .Pp .Dl # ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048 .Pp By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests. This may be overridden using the .Fl O Cm prime-tests option. The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the .Fl O Cm generator option. Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5. .Pp Screened DH groups may be installed in .Pa /etc/moduli . It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of a connection share common moduli. .Pp A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via the .Fl O flag: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ic lines Ns = Ns Ar number Exit after screening the specified number of lines while performing DH candidate screening. .It Ic start-line Ns = Ns Ar line-number Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH candidate screening. .It Ic checkpoint Ns = Ns Ar filename Write the last line processed to the specified file while performing DH candidate screening. This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been processed if the job is restarted. .It Ic memory Ns = Ns Ar mbytes Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Ic start Ns = Ns Ar hex-value Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Ic generator Ns = Ns Ar value Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .El .Sh CERTIFICATES .Nm supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys. Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to the X.509 certificates used in .Xr ssl 8 . .Pp .Nm supports two types of certificates: user and host. User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub .Pp The resultant certificate will be placed in .Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub . A host certificate requires the .Fl h option: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub .Pp The host certificate will be output to .Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub . .Pp It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by providing the token library using .Fl D and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument to .Fl s : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub .Pp Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a .Xr ssh-agent 1 . This is indicated by the .Fl U flag and, again, the CA key must be identified by its public half. .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub .Pp In all cases, .Ar key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate is used for authentication. .Pp Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub .Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub" .Pp Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific command. .Pp The options that are valid for user certificates are: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Ic clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may be added individually. .Pp .It Ic critical : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents .It Ic extension : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension. The specified .Ar name should include a domain suffix, e.g.\& .Dq name@example.com . If .Ar contents is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no contents (usually indicating a flag). Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them, whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused. .Pp .It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command Forces the execution of .Ar command instead of any shell or command specified by the user when the certificate is used for authentication. .Pp .It Ic no-agent-forwarding Disable .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding (permitted by default). .Pp .It Ic no-port-forwarding Disable port forwarding (permitted by default). .Pp .It Ic no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default). .Pp .It Ic no-user-rc Disable execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc by .Xr sshd 8 (permitted by default). .Pp .It Ic no-x11-forwarding Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default). .Pp .It Ic permit-agent-forwarding Allows .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding. .Pp .It Ic permit-port-forwarding Allows port forwarding. .Pp .It Ic permit-pty Allows PTY allocation. .Pp .It Ic permit-user-rc Allows execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc by .Xr sshd 8 . .Pp .It Ic permit-X11-forwarding Allows X11 forwarding. .Pp .It Ic no-touch-required Do not require signatures made using this key require demonstration of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the authenticator). This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms .Cm ecdsa-sk and .Cm ed25519-sk . .Pp .It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid. The .Ar address_list is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format. .El .Pp At present, no standard options are valid for host keys. .Pp Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The .Fl V option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from .Ux Epoch to the distant future. .Pp For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA public key must be trusted by .Xr sshd 8 or .Xr ssh 1 . Please refer to those manual pages for details. .Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS .Nm is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being revoked by serial number. .Pp KRLs may be generated using the .Fl k flag. This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or not available). .Pp Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some directive-specific information. .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been specified on the .Nm command line using the .Fl s option. .It Cm id : Ar key_id Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA key must have been specified on the .Nm command line using the .Fl s option. .It Cm key : Ar public_key Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key. .It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL. .It Cm sha256 : Ar public_key Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the KRL. KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9. .It Cm hash : Ar fingerprint Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a .Xr sshd 8 authentication log message or the .Nm .Fl l flag. Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9. .El .Pp KRLs may be updated using the .Fl u flag in addition to .Fl k . When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the KRL, adding to those already there. .Pp It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key (or keys). The .Fl Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the command line. If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered) then .Nm will exit with a non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked. .Sh ALLOWED SIGNERS When verifying signatures, .Nm uses a simple list of identities and keys to determine whether a signature comes from an authorized source. This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in .Xr sshd 8 . Each line of the file contains the following space-separated fields: principals, options, keytype, base64-encoded key. Empty lines and lines starting with a .Ql # are ignored as comments. .Pp The principals field is a pattern-list (See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 ) consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns that are accepted for signing. When verifying, the identity presented via the .Fl I option must match a principals pattern in order for the corresponding key to be considered acceptable for verification. .Pp The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm cert-authority Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority (CA) and that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for verification. .It Cm namespaces="namespace-list" Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this key. If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded in the signature object and presented on the verification command-line must match the specified list before the key will be considered acceptable. .El .Pp When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file and the principals embedded in the certificate itself. .Pp An example allowed signers file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1... # A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain. *@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4... # A key that is accepted only for file signing. user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41... .Ed .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically accessed by .Nm but it is offered as the default file for the private key. .Xr ssh 1 will read this file when a login attempt is made. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for authentication. The contents of this file should be added to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. .Pp .It Pa /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr moduli 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%R RFC 4716 .%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format" .%D 2006 .Re .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. openssh-8.2p1/ssh-keygen.c010064400017500001750000003102271362136622600137070ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.398 2020/02/07 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Identity and host key generation and maintenance. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "dns.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "krl.h" #include "digest.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "sshsig.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" #include "sk-api.h" /* XXX for SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; remove */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" #else # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519" #endif /* * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys. These value can be * overridden on the command line. * * These values, with the exception of DSA, provide security equivalent to at * least 128 bits of security according to NIST Special Publication 800-57: * Recommendation for Key Management Part 1 rev 4 section 5.6.1. * For DSA it (and FIPS-186-4 section 4.2) specifies that the only size for * which a 160bit hash is acceptable is 1kbit, and since ssh-dss specifies only * SHA1 we limit the DSA key size 1k bits. */ #define DEFAULT_BITS 3072 #define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 #define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256 static int quiet = 0; /* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */ static int print_fingerprint = 0; static int print_bubblebabble = 0; /* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */ static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */ static char identity_file[PATH_MAX]; static int have_identity = 0; /* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */ static char *identity_passphrase = NULL; /* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */ static char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL; /* Key type when certifying */ static u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; /* "key ID" of signed key */ static char *cert_key_id = NULL; /* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */ static char *cert_principals = NULL; /* Validity period for certificates */ static u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0; static u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL; /* Certificate options */ #define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1) #define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1) #define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2) #define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3) #define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4) #define CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE (1<<5) #define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \ CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC) static u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT; static char *certflags_command = NULL; static char *certflags_src_addr = NULL; /* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */ struct cert_userext { char *key; char *val; int crit; }; static struct cert_userext *cert_userext; static size_t ncert_userext; /* Conversion to/from various formats */ enum { FMT_RFC4716, FMT_PKCS8, FMT_PEM } convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; static char *key_type_name = NULL; /* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */ static char *pkcs11provider = NULL; /* FIDO/U2F provider to use */ static char *sk_provider = NULL; /* Format for writing private keys */ static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH; /* Cipher for new-format private keys */ static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL; /* Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys. */ static int rounds = 0; /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; static char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* moduli.c */ int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, unsigned long); #endif static void type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) { if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name); if (*bitsp == 0) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL u_int nid; switch(type) { case KEY_DSA: *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA: if (name != NULL && (nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0) *bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); if (*bitsp == 0) *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA; break; case KEY_RSA: *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS; break; } #endif } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL switch (type) { case KEY_DSA: if (*bitsp != 1024) fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits"); break; case KEY_RSA: if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits", SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); else if (*bitsp > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) fatal("Invalid RSA key length: maximum is %d bits", OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS); break; case KEY_ECDSA: if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are " #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 "256, 384 or 521 bits"); #else "256 or 384 bits"); #endif } #endif } /* * Checks whether a file exists and, if so, asks the user whether they wish * to overwrite it. * Returns nonzero if the file does not already exist or if the user agrees to * overwrite, or zero otherwise. */ static int confirm_overwrite(const char *filename) { char yesno[3]; struct stat st; if (stat(filename, &st) != 0) return 1; printf("%s already exists.\n", filename); printf("Overwrite (y/n)? "); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) return 0; if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') return 0; return 1; } static void ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) { char buf[1024]; char *name = NULL; if (key_type_name == NULL) name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; else { switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA; break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK; break; #endif case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; break; case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK; break; case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS; break; default: fatal("bad key type"); } } snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) exit(1); buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0) strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file)); have_identity = 1; } static struct sshkey * load_identity(const char *filename, char **commentp) { char *pass; struct sshkey *prv; int r; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, commentp)) == 0) return prv; if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); if (identity_passphrase) pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, commentp); explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass)); free(pass); if (r != 0) fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); return prv; } #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static void do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k) { struct sshbuf *b; char comment[61], *b64; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshkey_putb(k, b)) != 0) fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 1)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dtob64_string failed", __func__); /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment), "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH", sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k), pw->pw_name, hostname); sshkey_free(k); sshbuf_free(b); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n%s", comment, b64); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END); free(b64); exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed"); break; case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *k; struct stat st; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0) k = load_identity(identity_file, NULL); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_to_pkcs8(k); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_to_pem(k); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format); } exit(0); } /* * This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length * instead of 16. */ static void buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value) { u_int bytes, bignum_bits; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8; if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes) fatal("%s: input buffer too small: need %d have %zu", __func__, bytes, sshbuf_len(b)); if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static struct sshkey * do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *type, *cipher; u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345"; int r, rlen, ktype; u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4; size_t slen; u_long e; BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL; BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) { error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC); return NULL; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4); if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) { error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher); free(cipher); free(type); return NULL; } free(cipher); if (strstr(type, "dsa")) { ktype = KEY_DSA; } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) { ktype = KEY_RSA; } else { free(type); return NULL; } if ((key = sshkey_new(ktype)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); free(type); switch (key->type) { case KEY_DSA: if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_p); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_g); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_pub_key); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_priv_key); if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) fatal("%s: DSA_set0_pqg failed", __func__); dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key)) fatal("%s: DSA_set0_key failed", __func__); dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */ break; case KEY_RSA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 || (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) || (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0)) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); e = e1; debug("e %lx", e); if (e < 30) { e <<= 8; e += e2; debug("e %lx", e); e <<= 8; e += e3; debug("e %lx", e); } if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); if (!BN_set_word(rsa_e, e)) { BN_clear_free(rsa_e); sshkey_free(key); return NULL; } if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_d); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_n); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_iqmp); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_p); if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d)) fatal("%s: RSA_set0_key failed", __func__); rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) fatal("%s: RSA_set0_factors failed", __func__); rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */ if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0) fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); break; } rlen = sshbuf_len(b); if (rlen != 0) error("%s: remaining bytes in key blob %d", __func__, rlen); /* try the key */ if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 || sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0, NULL) != 0) { sshkey_free(key); free(sig); return NULL; } free(sig); return key; } static int get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len) { int c; size_t pos = 0; line[0] = '\0'; while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) { if (pos >= len - 1) fatal("input line too long."); switch (c) { case '\r': c = fgetc(fp); if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno)); return pos; case '\n': return pos; } line[pos++] = c; line[pos] = '\0'; } /* We reached EOF */ return -1; } static void do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private) { int r, blen, escaped = 0; u_int len; char line[1024]; struct sshbuf *buf; char encoded[8096]; FILE *fp; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); encoded[0] = '\0'; while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) { if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\') escaped++; if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 || strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) { if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL) *private = 1; if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) { break; } /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */ continue; } if (escaped) { escaped--; /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */ continue; } strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded)); } len = strlen(encoded); if (((len % 4) == 3) && (encoded[len-1] == '=') && (encoded[len-2] == '=') && (encoded[len-3] == '=')) encoded[len-3] = '\0'; if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, encoded)) != 0) fatal("%s: base64 decoding failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (*private) *k = do_convert_private_ssh2(buf); else if ((r = sshkey_fromb(buf, k)) != 0) fatal("decode blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(buf); fclose(fp); } static void do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private) { EVP_PKEY *pubkey; FILE *fp; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { fatal("%s: %s is not a recognised public key format", __func__, identity_file); } fclose(fp); switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey); break; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case EVP_PKEY_EC: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA; (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey); (*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa); break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__, EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)); } EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); return; } static void do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private) { FILE *fp; RSA *rsa; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = rsa; fclose(fp); return; } fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__); } static void do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *k = NULL; int r, private = 0, ok = 0; struct stat st; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format); } if (!private) { if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0) ok = 1; if (ok) fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } else { switch (k->type) { case KEY_DSA: ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #endif case KEY_RSA: ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); } } if (!ok) fatal("key write failed"); sshkey_free(k); exit(0); } #endif static void do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *prv; struct stat st; int r; char *comment = NULL; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); prv = load_identity(identity_file, &comment); if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0) error("sshkey_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(prv); if (comment != NULL && *comment != '\0') fprintf(stdout, " %s", comment); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); free(comment); exit(0); } static void do_download(struct passwd *pw) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL; int i, nkeys; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; char *fp, *ra, **comments = NULL; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; pkcs11_init(1); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys, &comments); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (print_fingerprint) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]), fp, sshkey_type(keys[i])); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } else { (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */ fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n", *(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]); } free(comments[i]); sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(comments); free(keys); pkcs11_terminate(); exit(0); #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } static struct sshkey * try_read_key(char **cpp) { struct sshkey *ret; int r; if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0) return ret; /* Not a key */ sshkey_free(ret); return NULL; } static void fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment) { char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp, comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public)); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } static void fingerprint_private(const char *path) { struct stat st; char *comment = NULL; struct sshkey *public = NULL; int r; if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, &comment)) != 0) { debug("load public \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL, &public, &comment)) != 0) { debug("load private \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r)); fatal("%s is not a key file.", path); } } fingerprint_one_key(public, comment); sshkey_free(public); free(comment); } static void do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f; struct sshkey *public = NULL; char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; int i, invalid = 1; const char *path; u_long lnum = 0; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); path = identity_file; if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) { f = stdin; path = "(stdin)"; } else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno)); while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { lnum++; cp = line; cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; /* Trim leading space and comments */ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') continue; /* * Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys * or known_hosts. */ /* * Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if * "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're * not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin). */ if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) { free(line); fclose(f); fingerprint_private(path); exit(0); } /* * If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to * accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options. * Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff. */ if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10); if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) { int quoted = 0; comment = cp; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } if (!*cp) continue; *cp++ = '\0'; } } /* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */ if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum); continue; } /* Find trailing comment, if any */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#') comment = cp; fingerprint_one_key(public, comment); sshkey_free(public); invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */ } fclose(f); free(line); if (invalid) fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path); exit(0); } static void do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) { struct { char *key_type; char *key_type_display; char *path; } key_types[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef WITH_XMSS { "xmss", "XMSS",_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE }, #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; u_int32_t bits = 0; int first = 0; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private, *public; char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file; int i, type, fd, r; FILE *f; for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) { public = private = NULL; prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL; xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s", identity_file, key_types[i].path); /* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */ if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) { if (st.st_size != 0) goto next; } else if (errno != ENOENT) { error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } /* * Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with * key generation. */ xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX", identity_file, key_types[i].path); xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX", identity_file, key_types[i].path); xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub", identity_file, key_types[i].path); if (first == 0) { first = 1; printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); } printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); fflush(stdout); type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) { error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s", prv_tmp, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to generate/reserve a name */ bits = 0; type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits); if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { error("sshkey_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto failnext; } if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "", comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", prv_tmp, ssh_err(r)); goto failnext; } if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) { error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s", pub_tmp, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } (void)fchmod(fd, 0644); f = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (f == NULL) { error("fdopen %s failed: %s", pub_tmp, strerror(errno)); close(fd); goto failnext; } if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) { error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fclose(f); goto failnext; } fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); if (ferror(f) != 0) { error("write key failed: %s", strerror(errno)); fclose(f); goto failnext; } if (fclose(f) != 0) { error("key close failed: %s", strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } /* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */ if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) { error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", pub_file, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) { error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); failnext: first = 0; goto next; } next: sshkey_free(private); sshkey_free(public); free(prv_tmp); free(pub_tmp); free(prv_file); free(pub_file); } if (first != 0) printf("\n"); } struct known_hosts_ctx { const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */ FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */ int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */ int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */ int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */ int hash_hosts; /* Hash hostnames as we go */ int find_host; /* Search for specific hostname */ int delete_host; /* Delete host from known_hosts */ }; static int known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts; int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts); int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM; switch (l->status) { case HKF_STATUS_OK: case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED: /* * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard * characters or a CA/revocation marker. */ if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) { fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); if (has_wild && !ctx->find_host) { logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name " "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path, l->linenum, l->hosts); } return 0; } /* * Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list, * hash and store separately. */ ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts); while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') { lowercase(cp); if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("hash_host failed"); fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey); ctx->has_unhashed = 1; } free(ohosts); return 0; case HKF_STATUS_INVALID: /* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */ ctx->invalid = 1; logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } /* NOTREACHED */ return -1; } static int known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { if (ctx->delete_host) { if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } else { /* * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke * marker, delete it by *not* writing the * line to ctx->out. */ ctx->found_key = 1; if (!quiet) printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n", ctx->host, l->linenum); } return 0; } else if (ctx->find_host) { ctx->found_key = 1; if (!quiet) { printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n", ctx->host, l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" : (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : "")); } if (ctx->hash_hosts) known_hosts_hash(l, ctx); else if (print_fingerprint) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); mprintf("%s %s %s%s%s\n", ctx->host, sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment[0] ? " " : "", l->comment); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } else fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } } else if (ctx->delete_host) { /* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { ctx->invalid = 1; logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); } fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } return 0; } static void do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name, int find_host, int delete_host, int hash_hosts) { char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX]; int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0; struct known_hosts_ctx ctx; u_int foreach_options; if (!have_identity) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid); if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Specified known hosts path too long"); free(cp); have_identity = 1; } memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.out = stdout; ctx.host = name; ctx.hash_hosts = hash_hosts; ctx.find_host = find_host; ctx.delete_host = delete_host; /* * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout */ if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) { if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) || strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old)) fatal("known_hosts path too long"); umask(077); if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno)); if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { oerrno = errno; unlink(tmp); fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno)); } inplace = 1; } /* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */ foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0; foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0; if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, (find_host || !hash_hosts) ? known_hosts_find_delete : known_hosts_hash, &ctx, name, NULL, foreach_options)) != 0) { if (inplace) unlink(tmp); fatal("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (inplace) fclose(ctx.out); if (ctx.invalid) { error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file); if (inplace) { error("Not replacing existing known_hosts " "file because of errors"); unlink(tmp); } exit(1); } else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) { logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file); if (inplace) unlink(tmp); } else if (inplace) { /* Backup existing file */ if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno)); if (link(identity_file, old) == -1) fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old, strerror(errno)); /* Move new one into place */ if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) { error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file, strerror(errno)); unlink(tmp); unlink(old); exit(1); } printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file); printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old); if (ctx.has_unhashed) { logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old); logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy " "of hostnames"); } } exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key); } /* * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure * for the current user. */ static void do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) { char *comment; char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */ r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment); if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { if (identity_passphrase) old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else old_passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase, &private, &comment); explicit_bzero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase)); free(old_passphrase); if (r != 0) goto badkey; } else if (r != 0) { badkey: fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); } if (comment) mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment); /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_new_passphrase) { passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); passphrase2 = NULL; } else { passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Verify that they are the same. */ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase1); free(passphrase2); printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n"); exit(1); } /* Destroy the other copy. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase2); } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */ free(comment); printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n"); exit(0); } /* * Print the SSHFP RR. */ static int do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname, int print_generic) { struct sshkey *public; char *comment = NULL; struct stat st; int r; if (fname == NULL) fatal("%s: no filename", __func__); if (stat(fname, &st) == -1) { if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) fatal("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.", fname, ssh_err(r)); export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic); sshkey_free(public); free(comment); return 1; } /* * Change the comment of a private key file. */ static void do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment) { char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase; struct sshkey *private; struct sshkey *public; struct stat st; FILE *f; int r, fd; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment)) == 0) passphrase = xstrdup(""); else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); else { if (identity_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Try to load using the passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &private, &comment)) != 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); } } if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS && private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) { error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in " "the new format (-o)."); explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } if (comment) printf("Old comment: %s\n", comment); else printf("No existing comment\n"); if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment)); } else { printf("New comment: "); fflush(stdout); if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0'; } if (comment != NULL && strcmp(comment, new_comment) == 0) { printf("No change to comment\n"); free(passphrase); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(0); } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(private); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); if (fd == -1) fatal("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file); f = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (f == NULL) fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) fatal("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(public); fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment); fclose(f); free(comment); if (strlen(new_comment) > 0) printf("Comment '%s' applied\n", new_comment); else printf("Comment removed\n"); exit(0); } static void add_flag_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name) { int r; debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static void add_string_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name, const char *value) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, value)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(b); } #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 static void prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which) { size_t i; sshbuf_reset(c); if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && certflags_command != NULL) add_string_option(c, "force-command", certflags_command); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc"); if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "no-touch-required"); if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && certflags_src_addr != NULL) add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr); for (i = 0; i < ncert_userext; i++) { if ((cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) || (!cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL))) continue; if (cert_userext[i].val == NULL) add_flag_option(c, cert_userext[i].key); else { add_string_option(c, cert_userext[i].key, cert_userext[i].val); } } } static struct sshkey * load_pkcs11_key(char *path) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL; int r, i, nkeys; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0) fatal("Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r)); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys, NULL); debug3("%s: %d keys", __func__, nkeys); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) { private = keys[i]; continue; } sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(keys); sshkey_free(public); return private; #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } /* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */ static int agent_signer(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, const char *provider, u_int compat, void *ctx) { int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx; return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat); } static void do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent, unsigned long long cert_serial, int cert_serial_autoinc, int argc, char **argv) { int r, i, fd, found, agent_fd = -1; u_int n; struct sshkey *ca, *public; char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment; char *ca_fp = NULL, **plist = NULL; FILE *f; struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids; size_t j; struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(1); #endif tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { /* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */ if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL) fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path); } else if (prefer_agent) { /* * Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making * sure the public key specified is actually present in the * agent. */ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) fatal("Cannot use public key for CA signature: %s", ssh_err(r)); if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0) fatal("Retrieve agent key list: %s", ssh_err(r)); found = 0; for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) { if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp); ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids); ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; } else { /* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */ ca = load_identity(tmp, NULL); } free(tmp); if (key_type_name != NULL) { if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) { fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s", sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name); } } else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) { /* Default to a good signature algorithm */ key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512"; } ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ca, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { /* Split list of principals */ n = 0; if (cert_principals != NULL) { otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals); plist = NULL; for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) { plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0') fatal("Empty principal name"); } free(otmp); } if (n > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) fatal("Too many certificate principals specified"); tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0) fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\": %s", __func__, tmp, ssh_err(r)); if (sshkey_is_cert(public)) fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified", __func__, tmp, sshkey_type(public)); /* Prepare certificate to sign */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0) fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r)); public->cert->type = cert_key_type; public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial; public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id); public->cert->nprincipals = n; public->cert->principals = plist; public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from; public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to; prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL); prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions, OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca, &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_from_private (ca key): %s", ssh_err(r)); if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) { if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca, key_type_name, sk_provider, agent_signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) fatal("Couldn't certify key %s via agent: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r)); } else { if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) && (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { notifier = notify_start(0, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", sshkey_type(ca), ca_fp); } r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name, sk_provider); notify_complete(notifier); if (r != 0) fatal("Couldn't certify key %s: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r)); } if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0) *cp = '\0'; xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp); free(tmp); if ((fd = open(out, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) fatal("Could not open \"%s\" for writing: %s", out, strerror(errno)); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) fatal("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) fatal("Could not write certified key to %s: %s", out, ssh_err(r)); fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); if (!quiet) { sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s " "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public), out, public->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial, cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "", cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "", valid); } sshkey_free(public); free(out); if (cert_serial_autoinc) cert_serial++; } free(ca_fp); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); #endif exit(0); } static u_int64_t parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now) { int64_t mul, secs; mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1; if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s); if (mul == -1 && secs > now) fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul); } static void parse_cert_times(char *timespec) { char *from, *to; time_t now = time(NULL); int64_t secs; /* +timespec relative to now */ if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) { if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec); cert_valid_to = now + secs; /* * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts * with poorly-synchronised clocks. */ cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60; return; } /* * from:to, where * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "always" * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "forever" */ from = xstrdup(timespec); to = strchr(from, ':'); if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0') fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec); *to++ = '\0'; if (*from == '-' || *from == '+') cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now); else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0) cert_valid_from = 0; else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0) fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from); if (*to == '-' || *to == '+') cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now); else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0) cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0; else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0) fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to); if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from) fatal("Empty certificate validity interval"); free(from); } static void add_cert_option(char *opt) { char *val, *cp; int iscrit = 0; if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0) certflags_flags = 0; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "touch-required") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-touch-required") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE; else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) { val = opt + 14; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty force-command option"); if (certflags_command != NULL) fatal("force-command already specified"); certflags_command = xstrdup(val); } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) { val = opt + 15; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty source-address option"); if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) fatal("source-address already specified"); if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0) fatal("Invalid source-address list"); certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val); } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 || (iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) { val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1); if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL) *cp++ = '\0'; cert_userext = xreallocarray(cert_userext, ncert_userext + 1, sizeof(*cert_userext)); cert_userext[ncert_userext].key = val; cert_userext[ncert_userext].val = cp == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(cp); cert_userext[ncert_userext].crit = iscrit; ncert_userext++; } else fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt); } static void show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical) { char *name, *arg; struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL; int r; if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__); while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) { sshbuf_free(option); option = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); printf(" %s", name); if (!in_critical && (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0 || strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0)) { printf("\n"); } else if (in_critical && (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 || strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); printf(" %s\n", arg); free(arg); } else { printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %zu)\n", sshbuf_len(option)); sshbuf_reset(option); } free(name); if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0) fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end"); } sshbuf_free(option); sshbuf_free(options); } static void print_cert(struct sshkey *key) { char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp; u_int i; key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key), sshkey_cert_type(key)); printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp); printf(" Signing CA: %s %s (using %s)\n", sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, key->cert->signature_type); printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial); printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid); printf(" Principals: "); if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++) printf("\n %s", key->cert->principals[i]); printf("\n"); } printf(" Critical Options: "); if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); show_options(key->cert->critical, 1); } printf(" Extensions: "); if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0); } } static void do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct stat st; int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0; FILE *f; char *cp, *line = NULL; const char *path; size_t linesize = 0; u_long lnum = 0; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); path = identity_file; if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { f = stdin; path = "(stdin)"; is_stdin = 1; } else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { lnum++; sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; /* Trim leading space and comments */ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') continue; if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) { error("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path, lnum, ssh_err(r)); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum); continue; } ok = 1; if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1) printf("%s:\n", path); else printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum); print_cert(key); } free(line); sshkey_free(key); fclose(f); exit(ok ? 0 : 1); } static void load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp) { struct sshbuf *krlbuf; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) fatal("Unable to load KRL: %s", ssh_err(r)); /* XXX check sigs */ if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 || *krlp == NULL) fatal("Invalid KRL file: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(krlbuf); } static void hash_to_blob(const char *cp, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, const char *file, u_long lnum) { char *tmp; size_t tlen; struct sshbuf *b; int r; if (strncmp(cp, "SHA256:", 7) != 0) fatal("%s:%lu: unsupported hash algorithm", file, lnum); cp += 7; /* * OpenSSH base64 hashes omit trailing '=' * characters; put them back for decode. */ tlen = strlen(cp); tmp = xmalloc(tlen + 4 + 1); strlcpy(tmp, cp, tlen + 1); while ((tlen % 4) != 0) { tmp[tlen++] = '='; tmp[tlen] = '\0'; } if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(b, tmp)) != 0) fatal("%s:%lu: decode hash failed: %s", file, lnum, ssh_err(r)); free(tmp); *lenp = sshbuf_len(b); *blobp = xmalloc(*lenp); memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), *lenp); sshbuf_free(b); } static void update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca, const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_long lnum = 0; char *path, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL; u_char *blob = NULL; size_t blen = 0, linesize = 0; unsigned long long serial, serial2; int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, was_sha256, was_hash, r; FILE *krl_spec; path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid); if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { krl_spec = stdin; free(path); path = xstrdup("(standard input)"); } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (!quiet) printf("Revoking from %s\n", path); while (getline(&line, &linesize, krl_spec) != -1) { lnum++; was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = was_sha256 = was_hash = 0; cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */ for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') { cp[i] = '\0'; break; } if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') { /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */ if (r == -1) r = i; } else r = -1; } if (r != -1) cp[r] = '\0'; if (*cp == '\0') continue; if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) { if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { fatal("revoking certificates by serial number " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 7; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); errno = 0; serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-')) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); serial2 = serial; if (*ep == '-') { cp = ep + 1; errno = 0; serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0') fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); if (serial2 <= serial) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range " "%llu:%llu", path, lnum, (unsigned long long)serial, (unsigned long long)serial2); } if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca, serial, serial2) != 0) { fatal("%s: revoke serial failed", __func__); } } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) { if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { fatal("revoking certificates by key ID " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 3; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0) fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__); } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "hash:", 5) == 0) { cp += 5; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); hash_to_blob(cp, &blob, &blen, file, lnum); r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); } else { if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) { cp += 4; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_explicit_key = 1; } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) { cp += 5; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_sha1 = 1; } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha256:", 7) == 0) { cp += 7; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_sha256 = 1; /* * Just try to process the line as a key. * Parsing will fail if it isn't. */ } if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path, lnum, ssh_err(r)); if (was_explicit_key) r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); else if (was_sha1) { if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &blen) != 0) { fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed", file, lnum); } r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, blob, blen); } else if (was_sha256) { if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &blob, &blen) != 0) { fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed", file, lnum); } r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); } else r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key); if (r != 0) fatal("%s: revoke key failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); freezero(blob, blen); blob = NULL; blen = 0; sshkey_free(key); } } if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0) fclose(krl_spec); free(line); free(path); } static void do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, const char *ca_key_path, unsigned long long krl_version, const char *krl_comment, int argc, char **argv) { struct ssh_krl *krl; struct stat sb; struct sshkey *ca = NULL; int i, r, wild_ca = 0; char *tmp; struct sshbuf *kbuf; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL generation requires an output file"); if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) { if (errno != ENOENT) fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if (updating) fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0) wild_ca = 1; else { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r)); free(tmp); } } if (updating) load_krl(identity_file, &krl); else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) fatal("couldn't create KRL"); if (krl_version != 0) ssh_krl_set_version(krl, krl_version); if (krl_comment != NULL) ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, krl_comment); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl); if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0) fatal("Couldn't generate KRL"); if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(identity_file, kbuf)) != 0) fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(kbuf); ssh_krl_free(krl); sshkey_free(ca); } static void do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) { int i, r, ret = 0; char *comment; struct ssh_krl *krl; struct sshkey *k; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL checking requires an input file"); load_krl(identity_file, &krl); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0) fatal("Cannot load public key %s: %s", argv[i], ssh_err(r)); r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k); printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i], *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "", r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED"); if (r != 0) ret = 1; sshkey_free(k); free(comment); } ssh_krl_free(krl); exit(ret); } static struct sshkey * load_sign_key(const char *keypath, const struct sshkey *pubkey) { size_t i, slen, plen = strlen(keypath); char *privpath = xstrdup(keypath); const char *suffixes[] = { "-cert.pub", ".pub", NULL }; struct sshkey *ret = NULL, *privkey = NULL; int r; /* * If passed a public key filename, then try to locate the correponding * private key. This lets us specify certificates on the command-line * and have ssh-keygen find the appropriate private key. */ for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) { slen = strlen(suffixes[i]); if (plen <= slen || strcmp(privpath + plen - slen, suffixes[i]) != 0) continue; privpath[plen - slen] = '\0'; debug("%s: %s looks like a public key, using private key " "path %s instead", __func__, keypath, privpath); } if ((privkey = load_identity(privpath, NULL)) == NULL) { error("Couldn't load identity %s", keypath); goto done; } if (!sshkey_equal_public(pubkey, privkey)) { error("Public key %s doesn't match private %s", keypath, privpath); goto done; } if (sshkey_is_cert(pubkey) && !sshkey_is_cert(privkey)) { /* * Graft the certificate onto the private key to make * it capable of signing. */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(privkey)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(pubkey, privkey)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } } /* success */ ret = privkey; privkey = NULL; done: sshkey_free(privkey); free(privpath); return ret; } static int sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd, const char *sig_namespace, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) { struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, wfd = -1, oerrno; char *wfile = NULL, *asig = NULL, *fp = NULL; if (!quiet) { if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) fprintf(stderr, "Signing data on standard input\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Signing file %s\n", filename); } if (signer == NULL && sshkey_is_sk(signkey) && (signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(signkey, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); fprintf(stderr, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s\n", sshkey_type(signkey), fp); free(fp); } if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, NULL, sk_provider, fd, sig_namespace, &sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) { error("Signing %s failed: %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshsig_armor(sigbuf, &abuf)) != 0) { error("%s: sshsig_armor: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((asig = sshbuf_dup_string(abuf)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) { fputs(asig, stdout); fflush(stdout); } else { xasprintf(&wfile, "%s.sig", filename); if (confirm_overwrite(wfile)) { if ((wfd = open(wfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0666)) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error("Cannot open %s: %s", wfile, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if (atomicio(vwrite, wfd, asig, strlen(asig)) != strlen(asig)) { oerrno = errno; error("Cannot write to %s: %s", wfile, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if (!quiet) { fprintf(stderr, "Write signature to %s\n", wfile); } } } /* success */ r = 0; out: free(wfile); free(asig); sshbuf_free(abuf); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); if (wfd != -1) close(wfd); return r; } static int sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv) { int i, fd = -1, r, ret = -1; int agent_fd = -1; struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL, *signkey = NULL; sshsig_signer *signer = NULL; /* Check file arguments. */ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") != 0) continue; if (i > 0 || argc > 1) fatal("Cannot sign mix of paths and standard input"); } if ((r = sshkey_load_public(keypath, &pubkey, NULL)) != 0) { error("Couldn't load public key %s: %s", keypath, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) debug("Couldn't get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); else { if ((r = ssh_agent_has_key(agent_fd, pubkey)) == 0) signer = agent_signer; else debug("Couldn't find key in agent: %s", ssh_err(r)); } if (signer == NULL) { /* Not using agent - try to load private key */ if ((privkey = load_sign_key(keypath, pubkey)) == NULL) goto done; signkey = privkey; } else { /* Will use key in agent */ signkey = pubkey; } if (argc == 0) { if ((r = sign_one(signkey, "(stdin)", STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) goto done; } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0) fd = STDIN_FILENO; else if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) == -1) { error("Cannot open %s for signing: %s", argv[i], strerror(errno)); goto done; } if ((r = sign_one(signkey, argv[i], fd, sig_namespace, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) goto done; if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) close(fd); fd = -1; } } ret = 0; done: if (fd != -1 && fd != STDIN_FILENO) close(fd); sshkey_free(pubkey); sshkey_free(privkey); return ret; } static int sig_verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace, const char *principal, const char *allowed_keys, const char *revoked_keys) { int r, ret = -1; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL; char *fp = NULL; struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; memset(&sig_details, 0, sizeof(sig_details)); if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) { error("Couldn't read signature file: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) { error("%s: sshsig_armor: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_verify_fd(sigbuf, STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace, &sign_key, &sig_details)) != 0) goto done; /* sshsig_verify() prints error */ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); debug("Valid (unverified) signature from key %s", fp); if (sig_details != NULL) { debug2("%s: signature details: counter = %u, flags = 0x%02x", __func__, sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags); } free(fp); fp = NULL; if (revoked_keys != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_check_revoked(sign_key, revoked_keys)) != 0) { debug3("sshkey_check_revoked failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } } if (allowed_keys != NULL && (r = sshsig_check_allowed_keys(allowed_keys, sign_key, principal, sig_namespace)) != 0) { debug3("sshsig_check_allowed_keys failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } /* success */ ret = 0; done: if (!quiet) { if (ret == 0) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); } if (principal == NULL) { printf("Good \"%s\" signature with %s key %s\n", sig_namespace, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); } else { printf("Good \"%s\" signature for %s with %s key %s\n", sig_namespace, principal, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); } } else { printf("Could not verify signature.\n"); } } sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshbuf_free(abuf); sshkey_free(sign_key); sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details); free(fp); return ret; } static int sig_find_principals(const char *signature, const char *allowed_keys) { int r, ret = -1; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL; char *principals = NULL, *cp, *tmp; if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) { error("Couldn't read signature file: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) { error("%s: sshsig_armor: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_get_pubkey(sigbuf, &sign_key)) != 0) { error("%s: sshsig_get_pubkey: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_find_principals(allowed_keys, sign_key, &principals)) != 0) { error("%s: sshsig_get_principal: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } ret = 0; done: if (ret == 0 ) { /* Emit matching principals one per line */ tmp = principals; while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') puts(cp); } else { fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n"); } sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshbuf_free(abuf); sshkey_free(sign_key); free(principals); return ret; } static void do_moduli_gen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* Moduli generation/screening */ u_int32_t memory = 0; BIGNUM *start = NULL; int moduli_bits = 0; FILE *out; size_t i; const char *errstr; /* Parse options */ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strncmp(opts[i], "memory=", 7) == 0) { memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(opts[i]+7, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, opts[i]+7); } } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start=", 6) == 0) { /* XXX - also compare length against bits */ if (BN_hex2bn(&start, opts[i]+6) == 0) fatal("Invalid start point."); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "bits=", 5) == 0) { moduli_bits = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+5, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", opts[i]+12, errstr); } } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli " "generation", opts[i]); } } if ((out = fopen(out_file, "w")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); } setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); if (moduli_bits == 0) moduli_bits = DEFAULT_BITS; if (gen_candidates(out, memory, moduli_bits, start) != 0) fatal("modulus candidate generation failed"); #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ fatal("Moduli generation is not supported"); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } static void do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* Moduli generation/screening */ char *checkpoint = NULL; u_int32_t generator_wanted = 0; unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0; int prime_tests = 0; FILE *out, *in = stdin; size_t i; const char *errstr; /* Parse options */ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strncmp(opts[i], "lines=", 6) == 0) { lines_to_process = strtoul(opts[i]+6, NULL, 10); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) { start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) { checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) { generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum( opts[i]+10, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) { fatal("Generator invalid: %s (%s)", opts[i]+10, errstr); } } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "prime-tests=", 12) == 0) { prime_tests = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+12, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", opts[i]+12, errstr); } } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli " "screening", opts[i]); } } if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) { if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate " "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); } } if ((out = fopen(out_file, "a")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); } setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); if (prime_test(in, out, prime_tests == 0 ? 100 : prime_tests, generator_wanted, checkpoint, start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0) fatal("modulus screening failed"); #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ fatal("Moduli screening is not supported"); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } static char * private_key_passphrase(void) { char *passphrase1, *passphrase2; /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_passphrase) passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else { passphrase_again: passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { /* * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and * retry. */ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n"); goto passphrase_again; } /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); } return passphrase1; } static const char * skip_ssh_url_preamble(const char *s) { if (strncmp(s, "ssh://", 6) == 0) return s + 6; else if (strncmp(s, "ssh:", 4) == 0) return s + 4; return s; } static int do_download_sk(const char *skprovider, const char *device) { struct sshkey **keys; size_t nkeys, i; int r, ok = -1; char *fp, *pin, *pass = NULL, *path, *pubpath; const char *ext; if (skprovider == NULL) fatal("Cannot download keys without provider"); pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, device, pin, &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) { freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); error("Unable to load resident keys: %s", ssh_err(r)); return -1; } if (nkeys == 0) logit("No keys to download"); freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (keys[i]->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK && keys[i]->type != KEY_ED25519_SK) { error("Unsupported key type %s (%d)", sshkey_type(keys[i]), keys[i]->type); continue; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); debug("%s: key %zu: %s %s %s (flags 0x%02x)", __func__, i, sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp, keys[i]->sk_application, keys[i]->sk_flags); ext = skip_ssh_url_preamble(keys[i]->sk_application); xasprintf(&path, "id_%s_rk%s%s", keys[i]->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK ? "ecdsa_sk" : "ed25519_sk", *ext == '\0' ? "" : "_", ext); /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ if (!confirm_overwrite(path)) { free(path); break; } /* Save the key with the application string as the comment */ if (pass == NULL) pass = private_key_passphrase(); if ((r = sshkey_save_private(keys[i], path, pass, keys[i]->sk_application, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", path, ssh_err(r)); free(path); break; } if (!quiet) { printf("Saved %s key%s%s to %s\n", sshkey_type(keys[i]), *ext != '\0' ? " " : "", *ext != '\0' ? keys[i]->sk_application : "", path); } /* Save public key too */ xasprintf(&pubpath, "%s.pub", path); free(path); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(keys[i], pubpath, keys[i]->sk_application)) != 0) { free(pubpath); error("Saving public key \"%s\" failed: %s", pubpath, ssh_err(r)); break; } free(pubpath); } if (i >= nkeys) ok = 0; /* success */ if (pass != NULL) freezero(pass, strlen(pass)); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(keys[i]); free(keys); return ok ? 0 : -1; } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] [-m format]\n" " [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]\n" " [-N new_passphrase] [-O option] [-w provider]\n" " ssh-keygen -p [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]\n" " [-P old_passphrase]\n" " ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n" " ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n" " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -c [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]\n" " ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n"); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n"); #endif fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -K [-w provider]\n" " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]\n" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL " ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file\n" " ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file\n" #endif " ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]\n" " [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]\n" " [-z serial_number] file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -A [-f prefix_path]\n" " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n" " file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file\n" " ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file\n" " ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity\n" " -n namespace -s signature_file [-r revocation_file]\n"); exit(1); } /* * Main program for key management. */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase; char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra; struct sshkey *private, *public; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int r, opt, type; int change_passphrase = 0, change_comment = 0, show_cert = 0; int find_host = 0, delete_host = 0, hash_hosts = 0; int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; int prefer_agent = 0, convert_to = 0, convert_from = 0; int print_public = 0, print_generic = 0, cert_serial_autoinc = 0; int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0, download_sk = 0; unsigned long long cert_serial = 0; char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL, **opts = NULL; char *sk_application = NULL, *sk_device = NULL, *sk_user = NULL; char *sk_attestaion_path = NULL; struct sshbuf *challenge = NULL, *attest = NULL; size_t i, nopts = 0; u_int32_t bits = 0; uint8_t sk_flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; const char *errstr; int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; char *sign_op = NULL; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); msetlocale(); /* we need this for the home * directory. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); if (!pw) fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); sk_provider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER"); /* Remaining characters: dGjJSTWx */ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHKLQUXceghiklopquvy" "C:D:E:F:I:M:N:O:P:R:V:Y:Z:" "a:b:f:g:m:n:r:s:t:w:z:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'A': gen_all_hostkeys = 1; break; case 'b': bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT32_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'F': find_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; case 'I': cert_key_id = optarg; break; case 'R': delete_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'L': show_cert = 1; break; case 'l': print_fingerprint = 1; break; case 'B': print_bubblebabble = 1; break; case 'm': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PKCS8; private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PEM; private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM; break; } fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg); case 'n': cert_principals = optarg; break; case 'o': /* no-op; new format is already the default */ break; case 'p': change_passphrase = 1; break; case 'c': change_comment = 1; break; case 'f': if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Identity filename too long"); have_identity = 1; break; case 'g': print_generic = 1; break; case 'K': download_sk = 1; break; case 'P': identity_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'N': identity_new_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'Q': check_krl = 1; break; case 'O': opts = xrecallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 1, sizeof(*opts)); opts[nopts++] = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'Z': openssh_format_cipher = optarg; break; case 'C': identity_comment = optarg; break; case 'q': quiet = 1; break; case 'e': /* export key */ convert_to = 1; break; case 'h': cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST; certflags_flags = 0; break; case 'k': gen_krl = 1; break; case 'i': case 'X': /* import key */ convert_from = 1; break; case 'y': print_public = 1; break; case 's': ca_key_path = optarg; break; case 't': key_type_name = optarg; break; case 'D': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'U': prefer_agent = 1; break; case 'u': update_krl = 1; break; case 'v': if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else { if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 && log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; } break; case 'r': rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'a': rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'V': parse_cert_times(optarg); break; case 'Y': sign_op = optarg; break; case 'w': sk_provider = optarg; break; case 'z': errno = 0; if (*optarg == '+') { cert_serial_autoinc = 1; optarg++; } cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'M': if (strcmp(optarg, "generate") == 0) do_gen_candidates = 1; else if (strcmp(optarg, "screen") == 0) do_screen_candidates = 1; else fatal("Unsupported moduli option %s", optarg); break; case '?': default: usage(); } } #ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL if (sk_provider == NULL) sk_provider = "internal"; #endif /* reinit */ log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); argv += optind; argc -= optind; if (sign_op != NULL) { if (strncmp(sign_op, "find-principals", 15) == 0) { if (ca_key_path == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for find-principals:" "missing signature file"); exit(1); } if (!have_identity) { error("Too few arguments for find-principals:" "missing allowed keys file"); exit(1); } return sig_find_principals(ca_key_path, identity_file); } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "sign", 4) == 0) { if (cert_principals == NULL || *cert_principals == '\0') { error("Too few arguments for sign: " "missing namespace"); exit(1); } if (!have_identity) { error("Too few arguments for sign: " "missing key"); exit(1); } return sig_sign(identity_file, cert_principals, argc, argv); } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "check-novalidate", 16) == 0) { if (ca_key_path == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: " "missing signature file"); exit(1); } return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals, NULL, NULL, NULL); } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "verify", 6) == 0) { if (cert_principals == NULL || *cert_principals == '\0') { error("Too few arguments for verify: " "missing namespace"); exit(1); } if (ca_key_path == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for verify: " "missing signature file"); exit(1); } if (!have_identity) { error("Too few arguments for sign: " "missing allowed keys file"); exit(1); } if (cert_key_id == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for verify: " "missing principal ID"); exit(1); } return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals, cert_key_id, identity_file, rr_hostname); } error("Unsupported operation for -Y: \"%s\"", sign_op); usage(); /* NOTREACHED */ } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) { error("Too few arguments."); usage(); } } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl && !do_gen_candidates && !do_screen_candidates) { error("Too many arguments."); usage(); } if (change_passphrase && change_comment) { error("Can only have one of -p and -c."); usage(); } if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) { error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R."); usage(); } if (gen_krl) { do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, ca_key_path, cert_serial, identity_comment, argc, argv); return (0); } if (check_krl) { do_check_krl(pw, argc, argv); return (0); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (cert_key_id == NULL) fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying"); for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) add_cert_option(opts[i]); do_ca_sign(pw, ca_key_path, prefer_agent, cert_serial, cert_serial_autoinc, argc, argv); } if (show_cert) do_show_cert(pw); if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) { do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname, find_host, delete_host, hash_hosts); } if (pkcs11provider != NULL) do_download(pw); if (download_sk) { for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) { sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7); } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for " "FIDO authenticator download", opts[i]); } } return do_download_sk(sk_provider, sk_device); } if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) do_fingerprint(pw); if (change_passphrase) do_change_passphrase(pw); if (change_comment) do_change_comment(pw, identity_comment); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (convert_to) do_convert_to(pw); if (convert_from) do_convert_from(pw); #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (convert_to || convert_from) fatal("key conversion disabled at compile time"); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (print_public) do_print_public(pw); if (rr_hostname != NULL) { unsigned int n = 0; if (have_identity) { n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file, rr_hostname, print_generic); if (n == 0) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); exit(0); } else { n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, print_generic); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, print_generic); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, print_generic); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, print_generic); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, print_generic); if (n == 0) fatal("no keys found."); exit(0); } } if (do_gen_candidates || do_screen_candidates) { if (argc <= 0) fatal("No output file specified"); else if (argc > 1) fatal("Too many output files specified"); } if (do_gen_candidates) { do_moduli_gen(argv[0], opts, nopts); return 0; } if (do_screen_candidates) { do_moduli_screen(argv[0], opts, nopts); return 0; } if (gen_all_hostkeys) { do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw); return (0); } if (key_type_name == NULL) key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name); type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); if (!quiet) printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name); switch (type) { case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK: for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "no-touch-required") == 0) { sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "resident") == 0) { sk_flags |= SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY; } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) { sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7); } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "user=", 5) == 0) { sk_user = xstrdup(opts[i] + 5); } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "challenge=", 10) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(opts[i] + 10, &challenge)) != 0) { fatal("Unable to load FIDO enrollment " "challenge \"%s\": %s", opts[i] + 10, ssh_err(r)); } } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "write-attestation=", 18) == 0) { sk_attestaion_path = opts[i] + 18; } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "application=", 12) == 0) { sk_application = xstrdup(opts[i] + 12); if (strncmp(sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0) { fatal("FIDO application string must " "begin with \"ssh:\""); } } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for " "FIDO authenticator enrollment", opts[i]); } } if (!quiet) { printf("You may need to touch your authenticator " "to authorize key generation.\n"); } passphrase = NULL; if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); for (i = 0 ; ; i++) { fflush(stdout); r = sshsk_enroll(type, sk_provider, sk_device, sk_application == NULL ? "ssh:" : sk_application, sk_user, sk_flags, passphrase, challenge, &private, attest); if (r == 0) break; if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal("Key enrollment failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); else if (i > 0) error("PIN incorrect"); if (passphrase != NULL) { freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); passphrase = NULL; } if (i >= 3) fatal("Too many incorrect PINs"); passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for " "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); } if (passphrase != NULL) { freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); passphrase = NULL; } break; default: if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_generate failed"); break; } if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */ snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL) { if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) == -1) { if (errno != ENOENT) { error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); } else if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) == -1) { error("Could not create directory '%s': %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); } else if (!quiet) printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir); } } /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ if (!confirm_overwrite(identity_file)) exit(1); /* Determine the passphrase for the private key */ passphrase = private_key_passphrase(); if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment)); } else { /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); } /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); exit(1); } freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); if (!quiet) { printf("Your identification has been saved in %s\n", identity_file); } strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, comment)) != 0) { fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); } if (!quiet) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); printf("Your public key has been saved in %s\n", identity_file); printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } if (sk_attestaion_path != NULL) { if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0) { fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation " "certificate"); } if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(sk_attestaion_path, attest)) != 0) { fatal("Unable to write attestation certificate " "\"%s\": %s", sk_attestaion_path, ssh_err(r)); } if (!quiet) { printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been " "saved in %s\n", sk_attestaion_path); } } sshbuf_free(attest); sshkey_free(public); exit(0); } openssh-8.2p1/ssh-keyscan.1010064400017500001750000000075241362136622600140030ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.45 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . .\" .\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is .\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the .\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. .\" .Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $ .Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-keyscan .Nd gather SSH public keys from servers .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-keyscan .Op Fl 46cDHv .Op Fl f Ar file .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl T Ar timeout .Op Fl t Ar type .Op Ar host | addrlist namelist .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying .Pa ssh_known_hosts files, the format of which is documented in .Xr sshd 8 . .Nm provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl scripts. .Pp .Nm uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of 1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those hosts are down or do not run .Xr sshd 8 . For scanning, one does not need login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning process involve any encryption. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Force .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Force .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl c Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys. .It Fl D Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records. The default is to print keys in a format usable as a .Xr ssh 1 .Pa known_hosts file. .It Fl f Ar file Read hosts or .Dq addrlist namelist pairs from .Ar file , one per line. If .Sq - is supplied instead of a filename, .Nm will read from the standard input. Input is expected in the format: .Bd -literal 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 .Ed .It Fl H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may be used normally by .Xr ssh 1 and .Xr sshd 8 , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. .It Fl p Ar port Connect to .Ar port on the remote host. .It Fl T Ar timeout Set the timeout for connection attempts. If .Ar timeout seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the last time anything was read from that host, the connection is closed and the host in question considered unavailable. The default is 5 seconds. .It Fl t Ar type Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. The possible values are .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 , or .Dq rsa . Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas. The default is to fetch .Dq rsa , .Dq ecdsa , and .Dq ed25519 keys. .It Fl v Verbose mode: print debugging messages about progress. .El .Pp If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using .Nm without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to .Em man in the middle attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk, .Nm can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created. .Sh FILES .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts .Sh EXAMPLES Print the RSA host key for machine .Ar hostname : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname .Pp Find all hosts from the file .Pa ssh_hosts which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file .Pa ssh_known_hosts : .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \e sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts - .Ed .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%D 2006 .%R RFC 4255 .%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints .Re .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit .An David Mazieres Aq Mt dm@lcs.mit.edu wrote the initial version, and .An Wayne Davison Aq Mt wayned@users.sourceforge.net added support for protocol version 2. openssh-8.2p1/ssh-keyscan.c010064400017500001750000000451521362136622600140640ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.131 2019/12/15 19:47:10 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . * * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "compat.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh_api.h" #include "dns.h" /* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */ int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; #define KT_DSA (1) #define KT_RSA (1<<1) #define KT_ECDSA (1<<2) #define KT_ED25519 (1<<3) #define KT_XMSS (1<<4) #define KT_ECDSA_SK (1<<5) #define KT_ED25519_SK (1<<6) #define KT_MIN KT_DSA #define KT_MAX KT_ED25519_SK int get_cert = 0; int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519|KT_ECDSA_SK|KT_ED25519_SK; int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */ int print_sshfp = 0; /* Print SSHFP records instead of known_hosts */ int found_one = 0; /* Successfully found a key */ #define MAXMAXFD 256 /* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */ int timeout = 5; int maxfd; #define MAXCON (maxfd - 10) extern char *__progname; fd_set *read_wait; size_t read_wait_nfdset; int ncon; /* * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n]. */ typedef struct Connection { u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */ #define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */ #define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */ #define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */ #define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */ int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */ int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */ int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */ int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */ int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_* */ sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */ char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */ char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */ char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */ char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */ char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */ struct ssh *c_ssh; /* SSH-connection */ struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */ TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */ } con; TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */ con *fdcon; static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key); static int fdlim_get(int hard) { #if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1) return (-1); if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY) return SSH_SYSFDMAX; else return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur; #else return SSH_SYSFDMAX; #endif } static int fdlim_set(int lim) { #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; #endif if (lim <= 0) return (-1); #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1) return (-1); rlfd.rlim_cur = lim; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1) return (-1); #elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE) setdtablesize(lim); #endif return (0); } /* * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent * separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the * one in the GNU libc. */ static char * xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim) { char *s, *e; if (!**str) return (NULL); s = *str; e = s + strcspn(s, delim); if (*e != '\0') *e++ = '\0'; *str = e; return (s); } /* * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop. */ static char * strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim) { char *tok; do { tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim); } while (tok && *tok == '\0'); return (tok); } static int key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { con *c; if ((c = ssh_get_app_data(ssh)) != NULL) keyprint(c, hostkey); /* always abort key exchange */ return -1; } static int ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor) { switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99) return 1; break; case 2: return 1; default: break; } return 0; } static void keygrab_ssh2(con *c) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; int r; switch (c->c_keytype) { case KT_DSA: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-dss"; break; case KT_RSA: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "rsa-sha2-512," "rsa-sha2-256," "ssh-rsa"; break; case KT_ED25519: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-ed25519"; break; case KT_XMSS: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-xmss@openssh.com"; break; case KT_ECDSA: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"; break; case KT_ECDSA_SK: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"; break; case KT_ED25519_SK: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"; break; default: fatal("unknown key type %d", c->c_keytype); break; } if ((r = kex_setup(c->c_ssh, myproposal)) != 0) { free(c->c_ssh); fprintf(stderr, "kex_setup: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); exit(1); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client; # endif #endif c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper); /* * do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until * the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done. */ ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done); } static void keyprint_one(const char *host, struct sshkey *key) { char *hostport; const char *known_host, *hashed; found_one = 1; if (print_sshfp) { export_dns_rr(host, key, stdout, 0); return; } hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port); lowercase(hostport); if (hash_hosts && (hashed = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("host_hash failed"); known_host = hash_hosts ? hashed : hostport; if (!get_cert) fprintf(stdout, "%s ", known_host); sshkey_write(key, stdout); fputs("\n", stdout); free(hostport); } static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key) { char *hosts = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name; char *host, *ohosts; if (key == NULL) return; if (get_cert || (!hash_hosts && ssh_port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)) { keyprint_one(hosts, key); return; } ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(hosts); while ((host = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL) keyprint_one(host, key); free(ohosts); } static int tcpconnect(char *host) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, s = -1; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (s == -1) { error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(s) == -1) fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s); if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno)); else break; close(s); s = -1; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); return s; } static int conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype) { char *namebase, *name, *namelist; int s; namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname); do { name = xstrsep(&namelist, ","); if (!name) { free(namebase); return (-1); } } while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0); if (s >= maxfd) fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s); if (fdcon[s].c_status) fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s); debug3("%s: oname %s kt %d", __func__, oname, keytype); fdcon[s].c_fd = s; fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON; fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase; fdcon[s].c_name = name; fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist; fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname); fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen; fdcon[s].c_len = 4; fdcon[s].c_off = 0; fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype; monotime_tv(&fdcon[s].c_tv); fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); FD_SET(s, read_wait); ncon++; return (s); } static void confree(int s) { if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED) fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s); free(fdcon[s].c_namebase); free(fdcon[s].c_output_name); if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS) free(fdcon[s].c_data); fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED; fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0; if (fdcon[s].c_ssh) { ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh); free(fdcon[s].c_ssh); fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL; } else close(s); TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); FD_CLR(s, read_wait); ncon--; } static void contouch(int s) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); monotime_tv(&fdcon[s].c_tv); fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); } static int conrecycle(int s) { con *c = &fdcon[s]; int ret; ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype); confree(s); return (ret); } static void congreet(int s) { int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0; char buf[256], *cp; char remote_version[sizeof buf]; size_t bufsiz; con *c = &fdcon[s]; /* send client banner */ n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n", PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2); if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) { error("snprintf: buffer too small"); confree(s); return; } if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) { error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); confree(s); return; } for (;;) { memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); bufsiz = sizeof(buf); cp = buf; while (bufsiz-- && (n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') { if (*cp == '\r') *cp = '\n'; cp++; } if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; } if (n == 0) { switch (errno) { case EPIPE: error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name); break; case ECONNREFUSED: break; default: error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); break; } conrecycle(s); return; } if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } *cp = '\0'; if ((c->c_ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, s, s)) == NULL) fatal("ssh_packet_set_connection failed"); ssh_packet_set_timeout(c->c_ssh, timeout, 1); ssh_set_app_data(c->c_ssh, c); /* back link */ if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3) c->c_ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); else c->c_ssh->compat = 0; if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) { debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } fprintf(stderr, "%c %s:%d %s\n", print_sshfp ? ';' : '#', c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf)); keygrab_ssh2(c); confree(s); } static void conread(int s) { con *c = &fdcon[s]; size_t n; if (c->c_status == CS_CON) { congreet(s); return; } n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off); if (n == 0) { error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); confree(s); return; } c->c_off += n; if (c->c_off == c->c_len) switch (c->c_status) { case CS_SIZE: c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen); c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7); c->c_off = 0; c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len); c->c_status = CS_KEYS; break; default: fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status); break; } contouch(s); } static void conloop(void) { struct timeval seltime, now; fd_set *r, *e; con *c; int i; monotime_tv(&now); c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec || (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) { seltime = c->c_tv; seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec; seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec; if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) { seltime.tv_usec += 1000000; seltime.tv_sec--; } } else timerclear(&seltime); r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask)); memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask)); while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) ; for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) { if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) { error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name); confree(i); } else if (FD_ISSET(i, r)) conread(i); } free(r); free(e); c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec || (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) { int s = c->c_fd; c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link); conrecycle(s); } } static void do_host(char *host) { char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n"); int j; if (name == NULL) return; for (j = KT_MIN; j <= KT_MAX; j *= 2) { if (get_keytypes & j) { while (ncon >= MAXCON) conloop(); conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j); } } } void fatal(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); va_end(args); exit(255); } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n" "\t\t [host | addrlist namelist]\n", __progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; int opt, fopt_count = 0, j; char *tname, *cp, *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; FILE *fp; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); TAILQ_INIT(&tq); /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); if (argc <= 1) usage(); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "cDHv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; case 'c': get_cert = 1; break; case 'D': print_sshfp = 1; break; case 'p': ssh_port = a2port(optarg); if (ssh_port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(1); } break; case 'T': timeout = convtime(optarg); if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg); usage(); } break; case 'v': if (!debug_flag) { debug_flag = 1; log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; else fatal("Too high debugging level."); break; case 'f': if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0) optarg = NULL; argv[fopt_count++] = optarg; break; case 't': get_keytypes = 0; tname = strtok(optarg, ","); while (tname) { int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); switch (type) { case KEY_DSA: get_keytypes |= KT_DSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA: get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA; break; case KEY_RSA: get_keytypes |= KT_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519; break; case KEY_XMSS: get_keytypes |= KT_XMSS; break; case KEY_ED25519_SK: get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519_SK; break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK: get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA_SK; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: default: fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname); } tname = strtok(NULL, ","); } break; case '4': IPv4or6 = AF_INET; break; case '6': IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; break; case '?': default: usage(); } } if (optind == argc && !fopt_count) usage(); log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); maxfd = fdlim_get(1); if (maxfd < 0) fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname); if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD) maxfd = MAXMAXFD; if (MAXCON <= 0) fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname); if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0)) fdlim_set(maxfd); fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con)); read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS); read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) { if (argv[j] == NULL) fp = stdin; else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno)); while (getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) { /* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL) cp = line + strlen(line) - 1; while (cp >= line) { if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') *cp-- = '\0'; else break; } /* Skip empty lines */ if (*line == '\0') continue; do_host(line); } if (ferror(fp)) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno)); fclose(fp); } free(line); while (optind < argc) do_host(argv[optind++]); while (ncon > 0) conloop(); return found_one ? 0 : 1; } openssh-8.2p1/ssh-keysign.8010064400017500001750000000057071362136622600140270ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.16 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $ .Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-keysign .Nd OpenSSH helper for host-based authentication .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is used by .Xr ssh 1 to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature required during host-based authentication. .Pp .Nm is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the global client configuration file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config by setting .Cm EnableSSHKeysign to .Dq yes . .Pp .Nm is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from .Xr ssh 1 . See .Xr ssh 1 and .Xr sshd 8 for more information about host-based authentication. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Controls whether .Nm is enabled. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to generate the digital signature. They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Since they are readable only by root, .Nm must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate information corresponding with the private keys above. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh HISTORY .Nm first appeared in .Ox 3.2 . .Sh AUTHORS .An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org openssh-8.2p1/ssh-keysign.c010064400017500001750000000200521362136622600140700ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.63 2019/11/18 16:10:05 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "msg.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "ssherr.h" extern char *__progname; static int valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, u_char *data, size_t datalen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_char type, *pkblob; char *p; size_t blen, len; char *pkalg, *luser; int r, pktype, fail; if (ret != NULL) *ret = NULL; fail = 0; if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); /* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, NULL, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (len != 20 && len != 32) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; /* server user */ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* service */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* method */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* pubkey */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) fail++; else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: bad key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fail++; } else if (key->type != pktype) fail++; free(pkalg); free(pkblob); /* client host name, handle trailing dot */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug2("%s: check expect chost %s got %s", __func__, host, p); if (strlen(host) != len - 1) fail++; else if (p[len - 1] != '.') fail++; else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* local user */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &luser, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, luser) != 0) fail++; free(luser); /* end of message */ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) fail++; sshbuf_free(b); debug3("%s: fail %d", __func__, fail); if (fail) sshkey_free(key); else if (ret != NULL) *ret = key; return (fail ? -1 : 0); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct sshbuf *b; Options options; #define NUM_KEYTYPES 5 struct sshkey *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL; struct passwd *pw; int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd; u_char *signature, *data, rver; char *host, *fp; size_t slen, dlen; if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0) fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); /* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2) exit(1); /* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */ if (fd > 2) close(fd); i = 0; /* XXX This really needs to read sshd_config for the paths */ key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) fatal("getpwuid failed"); pw = pwcopy(pw); permanently_set_uid(pw); seed_rng(); #ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); #endif /* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */ initialize_options(&options); (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", "", &options, 0, NULL); fill_default_options(&options); if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1) fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s", _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE); for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { if (key_fd[i] != -1) found = 1; } if (found == 0) fatal("could not open any host key"); found = 0; for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { keys[i] = NULL; if (key_fd[i] == -1) continue; r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, &key, NULL); close(key_fd[i]); if (r != 0) debug("parse key %d: %s", i, ssh_err(r)); else if (key != NULL) { keys[i] = key; found = 1; } } if (!found) fatal("no hostkey found"); if (pledge("stdio dns", NULL) != 0) fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname); if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, b) < 0) fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rver)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (rver != version) fatal("bad version: received %d, expected %d", rver, version); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&fd)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (fd < 0 || fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO) fatal("bad fd = %d", fd); if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL) fatal("cannot get local name for fd"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0) fatal("not a valid request"); free(host); found = 0; for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { if (keys[i] != NULL && sshkey_equal_public(key, keys[i])) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __progname); fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp ? fp : ""); } if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_sign failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); free(data); /* send reply */ sshbuf_reset(b); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, b) == -1) fatal("ssh_msg_send failed"); return (0); } openssh-8.2p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c010064400017500001750000000236211362136622600150020ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.16 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "ssherr.h" /* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ static int fd = -1; static pid_t pid = -1; static void send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) { u_char buf[4]; size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m); int r; POKE_U32(buf, mlen); if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 || atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), sshbuf_len(m)) != sshbuf_len(m)) error("write to helper failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(m, mlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static int recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m) { u_int l, len; u_char c, buf[1024]; int r; if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) { error("read from helper failed: %u", len); return (0); /* XXX */ } len = PEEK_U32(buf); if (len > 256 * 1024) fatal("response too long: %u", len); /* read len bytes into m */ sshbuf_reset(m); while (len > 0) { l = len; if (l > sizeof(buf)) l = sizeof(buf); if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, l) != l) { error("response from helper failed."); return (0); /* XXX */ } if ((r = sshbuf_put(m, buf, l)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); len -= l; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &c)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return c; } int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { return (0); } void pkcs11_terminate(void) { if (fd >= 0) close(fd); } static int rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct sshbuf *msg = NULL; u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; size_t blen, slen = 0; int r, ret = -1; if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) goto fail; key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); goto fail; } key->type = KEY_RSA; RSA_up_ref(rsa); key->rsa = rsa; if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto fail; } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, from, flen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (slen <= (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) { memcpy(to, signature, slen); ret = slen; } free(signature); } fail: free(blob); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(msg); return (ret); } #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW static ECDSA_SIG * ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct sshbuf *msg = NULL; ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL; const u_char *cp; u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; size_t blen, slen = 0; int r, nid; nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec); if (nid < 0) { error("%s: couldn't get curve nid", __func__); goto fail; } key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); goto fail; } key->ecdsa = ec; key->ecdsa_nid = nid; key->type = KEY_ECDSA; EC_KEY_up_ref(ec); if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto fail; } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, dgst, dgst_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); cp = signature; ret = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &cp, slen); free(signature); } fail: free(blob); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(msg); return (ret); } #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa; #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW static EC_KEY_METHOD *helper_ecdsa; #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ /* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ static void wrap_key(struct sshkey *k) { if (k->type == KEY_RSA) RSA_set_method(k->rsa, helper_rsa); #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW else if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA) EC_KEY_set_method(k->ecdsa, helper_ecdsa); #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ else fatal("%s: unknown key type", __func__); } static int pkcs11_start_helper_methods(void) { if (helper_rsa != NULL) return (0); #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL; if (helper_ecdsa != NULL) return (0); helper_ecdsa = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL()); if (helper_ecdsa == NULL) return (-1); EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(helper_ecdsa, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL); EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(helper_ecdsa, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign); #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ if ((helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL) fatal("%s: RSA_meth_dup failed", __func__); if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper") || !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, rsa_encrypt)) fatal("%s: failed to prepare method", __func__); return (0); } static int pkcs11_start_helper(void) { int pair[2]; char *helper, *verbosity = NULL; if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1) verbosity = "-vvv"; if (pkcs11_start_helper_methods() == -1) { error("pkcs11_start_helper_methods failed"); return (-1); } if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) { error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { error("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); return (-1); } else if (pid == 0) { if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(pair[0]); close(pair[1]); helper = getenv("SSH_PKCS11_HELPER"); if (helper == NULL || strlen(helper) == 0) helper = _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER; debug("%s: starting %s %s", __func__, helper, verbosity == NULL ? "" : verbosity); execlp(helper, helper, verbosity, (char *)NULL); fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", helper, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(pair[1]); fd = pair[0]; return (0); } int pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp) { struct sshkey *k; int r, type; u_char *blob; char *label; size_t blen; u_int nkeys, i; struct sshbuf *msg; if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0) return (-1); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); type = recv_msg(msg); if (type == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); *keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); if (labelsp) *labelsp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { /* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &label, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &k)) != 0) fatal("%s: bad key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); wrap_key(k); (*keysp)[i] = k; if (labelsp) (*labelsp)[i] = label; else free(label); free(blob); } } else if (type == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0) nkeys = -1; } else { nkeys = -1; } sshbuf_free(msg); return (nkeys); } int pkcs11_del_provider(char *name) { int r, ret = -1; struct sshbuf *msg; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) ret = 0; sshbuf_free(msg); return (ret); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8010064400017500001750000000032771362136622600147350ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.8,v 1.6 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any .\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above .\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. .\" .\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES .\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF .\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR .\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES .\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN .\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF .\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. .\" .Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $ .Dt SSH-PKCS11-HELPER 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-pkcs11-helper .Nd OpenSSH helper for PKCS#11 support .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm .Op Fl v .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is used by .Xr ssh-agent 1 to access keys provided by a PKCS#11 token. .Pp .Nm is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from .Xr ssh-agent 1 . .Pp A single option is supported: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging problems. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .Pp Note that .Xr ssh-agent 1 will automatically pass the .Fl v flag to .Nm when it has itself been placed in debug mode. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 .Sh HISTORY .Nm first appeared in .Ox 4.7 . .Sh AUTHORS .An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org openssh-8.2p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c010064400017500001750000000263051362136622600150050ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.22 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ struct pkcs11_keyinfo { struct sshkey *key; char *providername, *label; TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next; }; TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_keyinfo) pkcs11_keylist; #define MAX_MSG_LENGTH 10240 /*XXX*/ /* input and output queue */ struct sshbuf *iqueue; struct sshbuf *oqueue; static void add_key(struct sshkey *k, char *name, char *label) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; ki = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ki)); ki->providername = xstrdup(name); ki->key = k; ki->label = xstrdup(label); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); } static void del_keys_by_name(char *name) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki, *nxt; for (ki = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_keylist); ki; ki = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(ki, next); if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); free(ki->providername); free(ki->label); sshkey_free(ki->key); free(ki); } } } /* lookup matching 'private' key */ static struct sshkey * lookup_key(struct sshkey *k) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; TAILQ_FOREACH(ki, &pkcs11_keylist, next) { debug("check %p %s %s", ki, ki->providername, ki->label); if (sshkey_equal(k, ki->key)) return (ki->key); } return (NULL); } static void send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static void process_add(void) { char *name, *pin; struct sshkey **keys = NULL; int r, i, nkeys; u_char *blob; size_t blen; struct sshbuf *msg; char **labels = NULL; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &pin, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys, &labels)) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, nkeys)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(keys[i], &blob, &blen)) != 0) { debug("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); continue; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, labels[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(blob); add_key(keys[i], name, labels[i]); free(labels[i]); } } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, -nkeys)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } free(labels); free(keys); /* keys themselves are transferred to pkcs11_keylist */ free(pin); free(name); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void process_del(void) { char *name, *pin; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &pin, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); del_keys_by_name(name); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, pkcs11_del_provider(name) == 0 ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(pin); free(name); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void process_sign(void) { u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; size_t blen, dlen, slen = 0; int r, ok = -1; struct sshkey *key, *found; struct sshbuf *msg; /* XXX support SHA2 signature flags */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &dlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) error("%s: sshkey_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); else { if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int ret; if (key->type == KEY_RSA) { slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); signature = xmalloc(slen); ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature, found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (ret != -1) { slen = ret; ok = 0; } #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC } else if (key->type == KEY_ECDSA) { u_int xslen = ECDSA_size(key->ecdsa); signature = xmalloc(xslen); /* "The parameter type is ignored." */ ret = ECDSA_sign(-1, data, dlen, signature, &xslen, found->ecdsa); if (ret != 0) ok = 0; else error("%s: ECDSA_sign" " returns %d", __func__, ret); slen = xslen; #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ } else error("%s: don't know how to sign with key " "type %d", __func__, (int)key->type); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } sshkey_free(key); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (ok == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } free(data); free(blob); free(signature); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void process(void) { u_int msg_len; u_int buf_len; u_int consumed; u_char type; const u_char *cp; int r; buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue); if (buf_len < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue); msg_len = get_u32(cp); if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { error("bad message len %d", msg_len); cleanup_exit(11); } if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) return; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); buf_len -= 4; switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: debug("process_add"); process_add(); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: debug("process_del"); process_del(); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: debug("process_sign"); process_sign(); break; default: error("Unknown message %d", type); break; } /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) { error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); cleanup_exit(255); } consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue); if (msg_len < consumed) { error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed); cleanup_exit(255); } if (msg_len > consumed) { if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } void cleanup_exit(int i) { /* XXX */ _exit(i); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int r, ch, in, out, max, log_stderr = 0; ssize_t len; SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; char buf[4*4096]; extern char *__progname; struct pollfd pfd[2]; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_keylist); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'v': log_stderr = 1; if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; break; default: fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname); exit(1); } } log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); pkcs11_init(0); in = STDIN_FILENO; out = STDOUT_FILENO; max = 0; if (in > max) max = in; if (out > max) max = out; if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); while (1) { memset(pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd)); pfd[0].fd = in; pfd[1].fd = out; /* * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle * the worst-case length packet it can generate, * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. */ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 && (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0) pfd[0].events = POLLIN; else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (sshbuf_len(oqueue) > 0) pfd[1].events = POLLOUT; if ((r = poll(pfd, 2, -1 /* INFTIM */)) <= 0) { if (r == 0 || errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("poll: %s", strerror(errno)); } /* copy stdin to iqueue */ if ((pfd[0].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0) { len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); if (len == 0) { debug("read eof"); cleanup_exit(0); } else if (len < 0) { error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } /* send oqueue to stdout */ if ((pfd[1].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0) { len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), sshbuf_len(oqueue)); if (len < 0) { error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } /* * Process requests from client if we can fit the results * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input * and let the output queue drain. */ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0) process(); else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { _exit(i); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { fprintf(stderr, "PKCS#11 code is not enabled\n"); return 1; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { extern char *__progname; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); fatal("PKCS#11 support disabled at compile time"); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh-pkcs11.c010064400017500001750000001347261362136622600135370ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.47 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include #include #include #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT #include "pkcs11.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct pkcs11_slotinfo { CK_TOKEN_INFO token; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; int logged_in; }; struct pkcs11_provider { char *name; void *handle; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list; CK_INFO info; CK_ULONG nslots; CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo; int valid; int refcount; TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next; }; TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers; struct pkcs11_key { struct pkcs11_provider *provider; CK_ULONG slotidx; char *keyid; int keyid_len; }; int pkcs11_interactive = 0; #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW static void ossl_error(const char *msg) { unsigned long e; error("%s: %s", __func__, msg); while ((e = ERR_get_error()) != 0) error("%s: libcrypto error: %.100s", __func__, ERR_error_string(e, NULL)); } #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { pkcs11_interactive = interactive; TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers); return (0); } /* * finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable. * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider, * so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref(). * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. */ static void pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) { CK_RV rv; CK_ULONG i; debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid); if (!p->valid) return; for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { if (p->slotinfo[i].session && (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession( p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); } if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); p->valid = 0; p->function_list = NULL; dlclose(p->handle); } /* * remove a reference to the provider. * called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered. */ static void pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p) { debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount); if (--p->refcount <= 0) { if (p->valid) error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p); free(p->name); free(p->slotlist); free(p->slotinfo); free(p); } } /* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */ void pkcs11_terminate(void) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); } } /* lookup provider by name */ static struct pkcs11_provider * pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) { debug("check %p %s", p, p->name); if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name)) return (p); } return (NULL); } /* unregister provider by name */ int pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); return (0); } return (-1); } static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method; static int rsa_idx = 0; #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method; static int ec_key_idx = 0; #endif /* release a wrapped object */ static void pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { struct pkcs11_key *k11 = ptr; debug("%s: parent %p ptr %p idx %d", __func__, parent, ptr, idx); if (k11 == NULL) return; if (k11->provider) pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); free(k11->keyid); free(k11); } /* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */ static int pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) { CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_ULONG nfound = 0; CK_RV rv; int ret = -1; f = p->function_list; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv); return (-1); } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK || nfound != 1) { debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu", nfound, nattr, rv); } else ret = 0; if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); return (ret); } static int pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si, CK_USER_TYPE type) { char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024]; CK_RV rv; if (provider == NULL || si == NULL || !provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); return (-1); } if (!pkcs11_interactive) { error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ? " on reader keypad" : ""); return (-1); } if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad."); else { snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label); if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) { debug("%s: no pin specified", __func__); return (-1); /* bail out */ } } rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin, (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } si->logged_in = 1; return (0); } static int pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type) { if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); return (-1); } return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider, &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type); } static int pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, int *val) { struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_BBOOL flag = 0; CK_ATTRIBUTE attr; CK_RV rv; *val = 0; if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); return (-1); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; attr.type = type; attr.pValue = &flag; attr.ulValueLen = sizeof(flag); rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(si->session, obj, &attr, 1); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } *val = flag != 0; debug("%s: provider %p slot %lu object %lu: attrib %lu = %d", __func__, k11->provider, k11->slotidx, obj, type, *val); return (0); } static int pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type) { struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class; CK_BBOOL true_val; CK_MECHANISM mech; CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[3]; int always_auth = 0; int did_login = 0; if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); return (-1); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) { error("login failed"); return (-1); } did_login = 1; } memset(&key_filter, 0, sizeof(key_filter)); private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; key_filter[0].type = CKA_CLASS; key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class; key_filter[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(private_key_class); key_filter[1].type = CKA_ID; key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid; key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len; true_val = CK_TRUE; key_filter[2].type = CKA_SIGN; key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val; key_filter[2].ulValueLen = sizeof(true_val); /* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */ if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 && pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) { error("cannot find private key"); return (-1); } memset(&mech, 0, sizeof(mech)); mech.mechanism = mech_type; mech.pParameter = NULL_PTR; mech.ulParameterLen = 0; if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(k11, obj, CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE, &always_auth); /* ignore errors here */ if (always_auth && !did_login) { debug("%s: always-auth key", __func__); if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) < 0) { error("login failed for always-auth key"); return (-1); } } return (0); } /* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ static int pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_ULONG tlen = 0; CK_RV rv; int rval = -1; if ((k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx)) == NULL) { error("RSA_get_ex_data failed for rsa %p", rsa); return (-1); } if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_RSA_PKCS) == -1) { error("pkcs11_get_key failed"); return (-1); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; tlen = RSA_size(rsa); /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen); if (rv == CKR_OK) rval = tlen; else error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); return (rval); } static int pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return (-1); } static int pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void) { if (rsa_method != NULL) return (0); rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method()); if (rsa_method == NULL) return (-1); rsa_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-rsa", NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free); if (rsa_idx == -1) return (-1); if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(rsa_method, "pkcs11") || !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) || !RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt)) { error("%s: setup pkcs11 method failed", __func__); return (-1); } return (0); } /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */ static int pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; if (pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper() == -1) return (-1); k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); k11->provider = provider; provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */ k11->slotidx = slotidx; /* identify key object on smartcard */ k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen; if (k11->keyid_len > 0) { k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); } RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method); RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11); return (0); } #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW /* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ static ECDSA_SIG * ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_ULONG siglen = 0, bnlen; CK_RV rv; ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL; u_char *sig; BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; if ((k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx)) == NULL) { ossl_error("EC_KEY_get_key_method_data failed for ec"); return (NULL); } if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_ECDSA) == -1) { error("pkcs11_get_key failed"); return (NULL); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; siglen = ECDSA_size(ec); sig = xmalloc(siglen); /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)dgst, dgst_len, sig, &siglen); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); goto done; } if (siglen < 64 || siglen > 132 || siglen % 2) { ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed"); goto done; } bnlen = siglen/2; if ((ret = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { error("ECDSA_SIG_new failed"); goto done; } if ((r = BN_bin2bn(sig, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL || (s = BN_bin2bn(sig+bnlen, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL) { ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed"); ECDSA_SIG_free(ret); ret = NULL; goto done; } if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(ret, r, s)) { error("%s: ECDSA_SIG_set0 failed", __func__); ECDSA_SIG_free(ret); ret = NULL; goto done; } r = s = NULL; /* now owned by ret */ /* success */ done: BN_free(r); BN_free(s); free(sig); return (ret); } static int pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void) { int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL; if (ec_key_method != NULL) return (0); ec_key_idx = EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-ecdsa", NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free); if (ec_key_idx == -1) return (-1); ec_key_method = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL()); if (ec_key_method == NULL) return (-1); EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(ec_key_method, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL); EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(ec_key_method, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign); return (0); } static int pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; if (pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper() == -1) return (-1); k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); k11->provider = provider; provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by ECDSA key */ k11->slotidx = slotidx; /* identify key object on smartcard */ k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen; k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method); EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11); return (0); } #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ /* remove trailing spaces */ static void rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len) { size_t i; if (!len) return; for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--) if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ') buf[i] = '\0'; else break; } /* * open a pkcs11 session and login if required. * if pin == NULL we delay login until key use */ static int pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin, CK_ULONG user) { struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_RV rv; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; int login_required, ret; f = p->function_list; si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; /* fail early before opening session */ if (login_required && !pkcs11_interactive && (pin == NULL || strlen(pin) == 0)) { error("pin required"); return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED); } if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) { rv = f->C_Login(session, user, (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin)); if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); ret = (rv == CKR_PIN_LOCKED) ? -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED : -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_LOGIN_FAIL; if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); return (ret); } si->logged_in = 1; } si->session = session; return (0); } static int pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key) { int i; for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++) if (sshkey_equal(key, (*keysp)[i])) return (1); return (0); } #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW static struct sshkey * pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) { CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_RV rv; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet = NULL; EC_KEY *ec = NULL; EC_GROUP *group = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; const unsigned char *attrp = NULL; int i; int nid; memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT; key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; f = p->function_list; /* figure out size of the attributes */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); return (NULL); } /* * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but * ensure that none of the others are zero length. * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. */ if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { error("invalid attribute length"); return (NULL); } /* allocate buffers for attributes */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen); /* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } ec = EC_KEY_new(); if (ec == NULL) { error("EC_KEY_new failed"); goto fail; } attrp = key_attr[2].pValue; group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen); if (group == NULL) { ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed"); goto fail; } if (EC_KEY_set_group(ec, group) == 0) { ossl_error("EC_KEY_set_group failed"); goto fail; } if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) { error("CKA_EC_POINT too small"); goto fail; } attrp = key_attr[1].pValue; octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen); if (octet == NULL) { ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed"); goto fail; } attrp = octet->data; if (o2i_ECPublicKey(&ec, &attrp, octet->length) == NULL) { ossl_error("o2i_ECPublicKey failed"); goto fail; } nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec); if (nid < 0) { error("couldn't get curve nid"); goto fail; } if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec)) goto fail; key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { error("sshkey_new failed"); goto fail; } key->ecdsa = ec; key->ecdsa_nid = nid; key->type = KEY_ECDSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */ fail: for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) free(key_attr[i].pValue); if (ec) EC_KEY_free(ec); if (group) EC_GROUP_free(group); if (octet) ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(octet); return (key); } #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ static struct sshkey * pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) { CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_RV rv; RSA *rsa = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; struct sshkey *key = NULL; int i; memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS; key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; f = p->function_list; /* figure out size of the attributes */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); return (NULL); } /* * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but * ensure that none of the others are zero length. * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. */ if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { error("invalid attribute length"); return (NULL); } /* allocate buffers for attributes */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen); /* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } rsa = RSA_new(); if (rsa == NULL) { error("RSA_new failed"); goto fail; } rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL); rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL); if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) { error("BN_bin2bn failed"); goto fail; } if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) fatal("%s: set key", __func__); rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */ if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa)) goto fail; key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { error("sshkey_new failed"); goto fail; } key->rsa = rsa; key->type = KEY_RSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */ fail: for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) free(key_attr[i].pValue); RSA_free(rsa); return (key); } static int pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp) { CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attr[3]; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_RV rv; X509 *x509 = NULL; X509_NAME *x509_name = NULL; EVP_PKEY *evp; RSA *rsa = NULL; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC EC_KEY *ec = NULL; #endif struct sshkey *key = NULL; int i; #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW int nid; #endif const u_char *cp; char *subject = NULL; *keyp = NULL; *labelp = NULL; memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr)); cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT; cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; f = p->function_list; /* figure out size of the attributes */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); return -1; } /* * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but * ensure that none of the others are zero length. * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. */ if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { error("invalid attribute length"); return -1; } /* allocate buffers for attributes */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen); /* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); goto out; } /* Decode DER-encoded cert subject */ cp = cert_attr[2].pValue; if ((x509_name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[1].ulValueLen)) == NULL || (subject = X509_NAME_oneline(x509_name, NULL, 0)) == NULL) subject = xstrdup("invalid subject"); X509_NAME_free(x509_name); cp = cert_attr[2].pValue; if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) { error("d2i_x509 failed"); goto out; } if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL) { error("X509_get_pubkey failed"); goto out; } if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) { error("invalid x509; no rsa key"); goto out; } if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp))) == NULL) { error("RSAPublicKey_dup failed"); goto out; } if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa)) goto out; key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { error("sshkey_new failed"); goto out; } key->rsa = rsa; key->type = KEY_RSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */ #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW } else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp) == NULL) { error("invalid x509; no ec key"); goto out; } if ((ec = EC_KEY_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp))) == NULL) { error("EC_KEY_dup failed"); goto out; } nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec); if (nid < 0) { error("couldn't get curve nid"); goto out; } if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec)) goto out; key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { error("sshkey_new failed"); goto out; } key->ecdsa = ec; key->ecdsa_nid = nid; key->type = KEY_ECDSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */ #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ } else { error("unknown certificate key type"); goto out; } out: for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) free(cert_attr[i].pValue); X509_free(x509); RSA_free(rsa); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC EC_KEY_free(ec); #endif if (key == NULL) { free(subject); return -1; } /* success */ *keyp = key; *labelp = subject; return 0; } #if 0 static int have_rsa_key(const RSA *rsa) { const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); return rsa_n != NULL && rsa_e != NULL; } #endif /* * lookup certificates for token in slot identified by slotidx, * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys. * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys. */ static int pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class; CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[1]; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG n = 0; int ret = -1; char *label; memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj)); key_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE; key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS; key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class; key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class); session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; f = p->function_list; rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } while (1) { CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE ck_cert_type; rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } if (n == 0) break; memset(&ck_cert_type, 0, sizeof(ck_cert_type)); memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); key_attr[0].type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_cert_type; key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_cert_type); rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 1); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } key = NULL; label = NULL; switch (ck_cert_type) { case CKC_X_509: if (pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj, &key, &label) != 0) { error("failed to fetch key"); continue; } break; default: error("skipping unsupported certificate type %lu", ck_cert_type); continue; } if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) { sshkey_free(key); } else { /* expand key array and add key */ *keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; if (labelsp != NULL) { *labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *)); (*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label); } *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; debug("have %d keys", *nkeys); } } ret = 0; fail: rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); ret = -1; } return (ret); } /* * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx, * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys. * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys. */ static int pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class; CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[2]; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG n = 0; int ret = -1; memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj)); key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS; key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class; key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class); session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; f = p->function_list; rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } while (1) { CK_KEY_TYPE ck_key_type; CK_UTF8CHAR label[256]; rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } if (n == 0) break; memset(&ck_key_type, 0, sizeof(ck_key_type)); memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); key_attr[0].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE; key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_key_type; key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_key_type); key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL; key_attr[1].pValue = &label; key_attr[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(label) - 1; rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 2); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } label[key_attr[1].ulValueLen] = '\0'; switch (ck_key_type) { case CKK_RSA: key = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj); break; #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW case CKK_ECDSA: key = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj); break; #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ default: /* XXX print key type? */ key = NULL; error("skipping unsupported key type"); } if (key == NULL) { error("failed to fetch key"); continue; } if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) { sshkey_free(key); } else { /* expand key array and add key */ *keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; if (labelsp != NULL) { *labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *)); (*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label); } *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; debug("have %d keys", *nkeys); } } ret = 0; fail: rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); ret = -1; } return (ret); } #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN #define FILL_ATTR(attr, idx, typ, val, len) \ { (attr[idx]).type=(typ); (attr[idx]).pValue=(val); (attr[idx]).ulValueLen=len; idx++; } static struct sshkey * pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err) { struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; char *plabel = label ? label : ""; int npub = 0, npriv = 0; CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, privKey; CK_ATTRIBUTE tpub[16], tpriv[16]; CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0 }; CK_BYTE pubExponent[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 /* RSA_F4 in bytes */ }; pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class; cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class; *err = 0; FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &bits, sizeof(bits)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubExponent, sizeof(pubExponent)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); f = p->function_list; si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; session = si->session; if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv, &pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) { error("%s: key generation failed: error 0x%lx", __func__, rv); *err = rv; return NULL; } return pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey); } static int pkcs11_decode_hex(const char *hex, unsigned char **dest, size_t *rlen) { size_t i, len; char ptr[3]; if (dest) *dest = NULL; if (rlen) *rlen = 0; if ((len = strlen(hex)) % 2) return -1; len /= 2; *dest = xmalloc(len); ptr[2] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { ptr[0] = hex[2 * i]; ptr[1] = hex[(2 * i) + 1]; if (!isxdigit(ptr[0]) || !isxdigit(ptr[1])) return -1; (*dest)[i] = (unsigned char)strtoul(ptr, NULL, 16); } if (rlen) *rlen = len; return 0; } static struct ec_curve_info { const char *name; const char *oid; const char *oid_encoded; size_t size; } ec_curve_infos[] = { {"prime256v1", "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7", "06082A8648CE3D030107", 256}, {"secp384r1", "1.3.132.0.34", "06052B81040022", 384}, {"secp521r1", "1.3.132.0.35", "06052B81040023", 521}, {NULL, NULL, NULL, 0}, }; static struct sshkey * pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err) { struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; char *plabel = label ? label : ""; int i; size_t ecparams_size; unsigned char *ecparams = NULL; int npub = 0, npriv = 0; CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, privKey; CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0 }; CK_ATTRIBUTE tpub[16], tpriv[16]; *err = 0; for (i = 0; ec_curve_infos[i].name; i++) { if (ec_curve_infos[i].size == bits) break; } if (!ec_curve_infos[i].name) { error("%s: invalid key size %lu", __func__, bits); return NULL; } if (pkcs11_decode_hex(ec_curve_infos[i].oid_encoded, &ecparams, &ecparams_size) == -1) { error("%s: invalid oid", __func__); return NULL; } FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecparams, ecparams_size); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); f = p->function_list; si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; session = si->session; if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv, &pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) { error("%s: key generation failed: error 0x%lx", __func__, rv); *err = rv; return NULL; } return pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey); } #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */ /* * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if * keyp is provided, fetch keys. */ static int pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user) { int nkeys, need_finalize = 0; int ret = -1; struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; void *handle = NULL; CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **); CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; CK_ULONG i; if (providerp == NULL) goto fail; *providerp = NULL; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (labelsp != NULL) *labelsp = NULL; if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) { debug("%s: provider already registered: %s", __func__, provider_id); goto fail; } /* open shared pkcs11-library */ if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); goto fail; } if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); goto fail; } p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); p->handle = handle; /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu", provider_id, rv); goto fail; } p->function_list = f; if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu", provider_id, rv); goto fail; } need_finalize = 1; if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu", provider_id, rv); goto fail; } rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID)); rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription)); debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d", provider_id, p->info.manufacturerID, p->info.cryptokiVersion.major, p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, p->info.libraryDescription, p->info.libraryVersion.major, p->info.libraryVersion.minor); if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } if (p->nslots == 0) { debug("%s: provider %s returned no slots", __func__, provider_id); ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS; goto fail; } p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu", provider_id, rv); goto fail; } p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); p->valid = 1; nkeys = 0; for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { token = &p->slotinfo[i].token; if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu " "failed: %lu", provider_id, (unsigned long)i, rv); continue; } if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) { debug2("%s: ignoring uninitialised token in " "provider %s slot %lu", __func__, provider_id, (unsigned long)i); continue; } rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label)); rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID)); rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model)); rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber)); debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> " "model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx", provider_id, (unsigned long)i, token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model, token->serialNumber, token->flags); /* * open session, login with pin and retrieve public * keys (if keyp is provided) */ if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 || keyp == NULL) continue; pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in && pkcs11_interactive) { /* * Some tokens require login before they will * expose keys. */ if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i], CKU_USER) < 0) { error("login failed"); continue; } pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); } } /* now owned by caller */ *providerp = p; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ return (nkeys); fail: if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu", provider_id, rv); if (p) { free(p->name); free(p->slotlist); free(p->slotinfo); free(p); } if (handle) dlclose(handle); return (ret); } /* * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token, * fails if provider already exists */ int pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp) { struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; int nkeys; nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp, &p, CKU_USER); /* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */ if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); } if (nkeys == 0) debug("%s: provider %s returned no keys", __func__, provider_id); return (nkeys); } #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN struct sshkey * pkcs11_gakp(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned int slotidx, char *label, unsigned int type, unsigned int bits, unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err) { struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; struct sshkey *k = NULL; int ret = -1, reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0; CK_RV rv; *err = 0; if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) debug("%s: provider \"%s\" available", __func__, provider_id); else if ((ret = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL, &p, CKU_SO)) < 0) { debug("%s: could not register provider %s", __func__, provider_id); goto out; } else reset_provider = 1; f = p->function_list; si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; session = si->session; if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin), CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) { debug("%s: could not supply SO pin: %lu", __func__, rv); reset_pin = 0; } else reset_pin = 1; switch (type) { case KEY_RSA: if ((k = pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label, bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) { debug("%s: failed to generate RSA key", __func__); goto out; } break; case KEY_ECDSA: if ((k = pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label, bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) { debug("%s: failed to generate ECDSA key", __func__); goto out; } break; default: *err = SSH_PKCS11_ERR_GENERIC; debug("%s: unknown type %d", __func__, type); goto out; } out: if (reset_pin) f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE); if (reset_provider) pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id); return (k); } struct sshkey * pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned long slotidx, unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err) { struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; struct sshkey *k = NULL; int reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0; CK_ULONG nattrs; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[16]; CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; CK_RV rv; *err = 0; if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { debug("%s: using provider \"%s\"", __func__, provider_id); } else if (pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL, &p, CKU_SO) < 0) { debug("%s: could not register provider %s", __func__, provider_id); goto out; } else reset_provider = 1; f = p->function_list; si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; session = si->session; if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin), CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) { debug("%s: could not supply SO pin: %lu", __func__, rv); reset_pin = 0; } else reset_pin = 1; /* private key */ nattrs = 0; key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)); FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 && obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) { debug("%s: could not destroy private key 0x%hhx", __func__, keyid); *err = rv; goto out; } } /* public key */ nattrs = 0; key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)); FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 && obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { /* get key type */ nattrs = 0; FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(key_type)); rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, nattrs); if (rv != CKR_OK) { debug("%s: could not get key type of public key 0x%hhx", __func__, keyid); *err = rv; key_type = -1; } if (key_type == CKK_RSA) k = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj); else if (key_type == CKK_ECDSA) k = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj); if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) { debug("%s: could not destroy public key 0x%hhx", __func__, keyid); *err = rv; goto out; } } out: if (reset_pin) f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE); if (reset_provider) pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id); return (k); } #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */ #else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__); return (-1); } int pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp) { error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__); return (-1); } void pkcs11_terminate(void) { error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh-pkcs11.h010064400017500001750000000030641362136622600135320ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.6 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Errors for pkcs11_add_provider() */ #define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_GENERIC 1 #define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_LOGIN_FAIL 2 #define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS 3 #define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED 4 #define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED 5 int pkcs11_init(int); void pkcs11_terminate(void); int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***); int pkcs11_del_provider(char *); #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN struct sshkey * pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned char, u_int32_t *); struct sshkey * pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *, char *, unsigned long, unsigned char, u_int32_t *); #endif #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) #undef ENABLE_PKCS11 #endif openssh-8.2p1/ssh-rsa.c010064400017500001750000000276211362136622600132150ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.67 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "digest.h" #include "log.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *); static const char * rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg) { switch (hash_alg) { case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: return "ssh-rsa"; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: return "rsa-sha2-256"; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: return "rsa-sha2-512"; } return NULL; } /* * Returns the hash algorithm ID for a given algorithm identifier as used * inside the signature blob, */ static int rsa_hash_id_from_ident(const char *ident) { if (strcmp(ident, "ssh-rsa") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; return -1; } /* * Return the hash algorithm ID for the specified key name. This includes * all the cases of rsa_hash_id_from_ident() but also the certificate key * types. */ static int rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg) { int r; if ((r = rsa_hash_id_from_ident(alg)) != -1) return r; if (strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; return -1; } static int rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type) { switch (type) { case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: return NID_sha1; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: return NID_sha256; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: return NID_sha512; default: return -1; } } int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp) { const BIGNUM *rsa_p, *rsa_q, *rsa_d; BIGNUM *aux = NULL, *d_consttime = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_dmq1 = NULL, *rsa_dmp1 = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int r; if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_d); RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q); if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((d_consttime = BN_dup(rsa_d)) == NULL || (rsa_iqmp = BN_dup(iqmp)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } BN_set_flags(aux, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_set_flags(d_consttime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa_q, BN_value_one()) == 0) || (BN_mod(rsa_dmq1, d_consttime, aux, ctx) == 0) || (BN_sub(aux, rsa_p, BN_value_one()) == 0) || (BN_mod(rsa_dmp1, d_consttime, aux, ctx) == 0)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (!RSA_set0_crt_params(key->rsa, rsa_dmp1, rsa_dmq1, rsa_iqmp)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_dmp1 = rsa_dmq1 = rsa_iqmp = NULL; /* transferred */ /* success */ r = 0; out: BN_clear_free(aux); BN_clear_free(d_consttime); BN_clear_free(rsa_dmp1); BN_clear_free(rsa_dmq1); BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return r; } /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident) { const BIGNUM *rsa_n; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL; size_t slen = 0; u_int dlen, len; int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (alg_ident == NULL || strlen(alg_ident) == 0) hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; else hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident); if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* hash the data */ nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg); if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (len < slen) { size_t diff = slen - len; memmove(sig + diff, sig, len); explicit_bzero(sig, diff); } else if (len > slen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* encode signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, rsa_hash_alg_ident(hash_alg))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, slen)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); freezero(sig, slen); sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg) { const BIGNUM *rsa_n; char *sigtype = NULL; int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || sig == NULL || siglen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_ident(sigtype)) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } /* * Allow ssh-rsa-cert-v01 certs to generate SHA2 signatures for * legacy reasons, but otherwise the signature type should match. */ if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") != 0) { if ((want_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg)) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (hash_alg != want_alg) { ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } } if (sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */ modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa); if (len > modlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; goto out; } else if (len < modlen) { diff = modlen - len; osigblob = sigblob; if ((sigblob = realloc(sigblob, modlen)) == NULL) { sigblob = osigblob; /* put it back for clear/free */ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len); explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff); len = modlen; } if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa); out: freezero(sigblob, len); free(sigtype); sshbuf_free(b); explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); return ret; } /* * See: * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn */ /* * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ static const u_char id_sha1[] = { 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */ 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */ 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */ 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */ }; /* * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) * id-sha256(1) } */ static const u_char id_sha256[] = { 0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */ 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ 0x04, 0x20 /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */ }; /* * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) * id-sha256(3) } */ static const u_char id_sha512[] = { 0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */ 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ 0x04, 0x40 /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */ }; static int rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp) { switch (hash_alg) { case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: *oidp = id_sha1; *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1); break; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: *oidp = id_sha256; *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256); break; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: *oidp = id_sha512; *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512); break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } return 0; } static int openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen, u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) { size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch; const u_char *oid = NULL; u_char *decrypted = NULL; if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0) return ret; ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); if (hashlen != hlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto done; } rsasize = RSA_size(rsa); if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM || siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto done; } if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto done; } if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto done; } oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0; hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0; if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) { ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto done; } ret = 0; done: freezero(decrypted, rsasize); return ret; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh-sandbox.h010064400017500001750000000021301362136622600140570ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sandbox.h,v 1.1 2011/06/23 09:34:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ struct monitor; struct ssh_sandbox; struct ssh_sandbox *ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *); void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *); void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *); void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *, pid_t); openssh-8.2p1/ssh-sk-client.c010064400017500001750000000262611362136622600143200ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-client.c,v 1.7 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "msg.h" #include "digest.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" #include "misc.h" /* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */ static int start_helper(int *fdp, pid_t *pidp, void (**osigchldp)(int)) { void (*osigchld)(int); int oerrno, pair[2], r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; pid_t pid; char *helper, *verbosity = NULL; *fdp = -1; *pidp = 0; *osigchldp = SIG_DFL; helper = getenv("SSH_SK_HELPER"); if (helper == NULL || strlen(helper) == 0) helper = _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER; if (access(helper, X_OK) != 0) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: helper \"%s\" unusable: %s", __func__, helper, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } #ifdef DEBUG_SK verbosity = "-vvv"; #endif /* Start helper */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) { error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); close(pair[0]); close(pair[1]); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (pid == 0) { if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); _exit(1); } close(pair[0]); close(pair[1]); closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); debug("%s: starting %s %s", __func__, helper, verbosity == NULL ? "" : verbosity); execlp(helper, helper, verbosity, (char *)NULL); error("%s: execlp: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(pair[1]); /* success */ debug3("%s: started pid=%ld", __func__, (long)pid); *fdp = pair[0]; *pidp = pid; *osigchldp = osigchld; return 0; } static int reap_helper(pid_t pid) { int status, oerrno; debug3("%s: pid=%ld", __func__, (long)pid); errno = 0; while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) { errno = 0; continue; } oerrno = errno; error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error("%s: helper exited abnormally", __func__); return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { error("%s: helper exited with non-zero exit status", __func__); return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; } return 0; } static int client_converse(struct sshbuf *msg, struct sshbuf **respp, u_int type) { int oerrno, fd, r2, ll, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_int rtype, rerr; pid_t pid; u_char version; void (*osigchld)(int); struct sshbuf *req = NULL, *resp = NULL; *respp = NULL; if ((r = start_helper(&fd, &pid, &osigchld)) != 0) return r; if ((req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* Request preamble: type, log_on_stderr, log_level */ ll = log_level_get(); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(req, log_is_on_stderr() != 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, ll < 0 ? 0 : ll)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(req, msg)) != 0) { error("%s: build: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = ssh_msg_send(fd, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION, req)) != 0) { error("%s: send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = ssh_msg_recv(fd, resp)) != 0) { error("%s: receive: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(resp, &version)) != 0) { error("%s: parse version: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (version != SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION) { error("%s: unsupported version: got %u, expected %u", __func__, version, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(resp, &rtype)) != 0) { error("%s: parse message type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (rtype == SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(resp, &rerr)) != 0) { error("%s: parse error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } debug("%s: helper returned error -%u", __func__, rerr); /* OpenSSH error values are negative; encoded as -err on wire */ if (rerr == 0 || rerr >= INT_MAX) r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; else r = -(int)rerr; goto out; } else if (rtype != type) { error("%s: helper returned incorrect message type %u, " "expecting %u", __func__, rtype, type); r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: oerrno = errno; close(fd); if ((r2 = reap_helper(pid)) != 0) { if (r == 0) { r = r2; oerrno = errno; } } if (r == 0) { *respp = resp; resp = NULL; } sshbuf_free(req); sshbuf_free(resp); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); errno = oerrno; return r; } int sshsk_sign(const char *provider, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *pin) { int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; char *fp = NULL; struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL; *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; #ifndef ENABLE_SK return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; #endif if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, kbuf)) != 0) { error("%s: serialize private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(req, kbuf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(req, data, datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, compat)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0) { error("%s: compose: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(resp, sigp, lenp)) != 0) { error("%s: parse signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) { error("%s: trailing data in response", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: oerrno = errno; if (r != 0) { freezero(*sigp, *lenp); *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; } sshbuf_free(kbuf); sshbuf_free(req); sshbuf_free(resp); errno = oerrno; return r; } int sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device, const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf, struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest) { int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; *keyp = NULL; if (attest != NULL) sshbuf_reset(attest); #ifndef ENABLE_SK return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; #endif if (type < 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((abuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, (u_int)type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider_path)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, device)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, application)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, userid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(req, flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(req, challenge_buf)) != 0) { error("%s: compose: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, abuf)) != 0) { error("%s: parse signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) { error("%s: trailing data in response", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse private key: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (attest != NULL && (r = sshbuf_putb(attest, abuf)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; *keyp = key; key = NULL; out: oerrno = errno; sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(kbuf); sshbuf_free(abuf); sshbuf_free(req); sshbuf_free(resp); errno = oerrno; return r; } int sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device, const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp) { int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **keys = NULL, **tmp; size_t i, nkeys = 0; *keysp = NULL; *nkeysp = 0; if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider_path)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, device)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0) { error("%s: compose: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT)) != 0) goto out; while (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) { /* key, comment */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(resp, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: parse signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse private key: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((tmp = recallocarray(keys, nkeys, nkeys + 1, sizeof(*keys))) == NULL) { error("%s: recallocarray keys failed", __func__); goto out; } debug("%s: keys[%zu]: %s %s", __func__, nkeys, sshkey_type(key), key->sk_application); keys = tmp; keys[nkeys++] = key; key = NULL; } /* success */ r = 0; *keysp = keys; *nkeysp = nkeys; keys = NULL; nkeys = 0; out: oerrno = errno; for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(keys[i]); free(keys); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(kbuf); sshbuf_free(req); sshbuf_free(resp); errno = oerrno; return r; } openssh-8.2p1/ssh-sk-helper.8010064400017500001750000000033021362136622600142350ustar00djmdjm.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-helper.8,v 1.3 2019/12/21 20:22:34 naddy Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any .\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above .\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. .\" .\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES .\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF .\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR .\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES .\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN .\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF .\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. .\" .Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2019 $ .Dt SSH-SK-HELPER 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-sk-helper .Nd OpenSSH helper for FIDO authenticator support .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm .Op Fl v .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is used by .Xr ssh-agent 1 to access keys provided by a FIDO authenticator. .Pp .Nm is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from .Xr ssh-agent 1 . .Pp A single option is supported: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging problems. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .Pp Note that .Xr ssh-agent 1 will automatically pass the .Fl v flag to .Nm when it has itself been placed in debug mode. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 .Sh HISTORY .Nm first appeared in .Ox 6.7 . .Sh AUTHORS .An Damien Miller Aq Mt djm@openbsd.org openssh-8.2p1/ssh-sk-helper.c010064400017500001750000000237361362136622600143250ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-helper.c,v 1.9 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * This is a tiny program used to isolate the address space used for * security key middleware signing operations from ssh-agent. It is similar * to ssh-pkcs11-helper.c but considerably simpler as the operations for * security keys are stateless. * * Please crank SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION in sshkey.h for any incompatible * protocol changes. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "msg.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" #ifdef ENABLE_SK extern char *__progname; static struct sshbuf *reply_error(int r, char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))); static struct sshbuf * reply_error(int r, char *fmt, ...) { char *msg; va_list ap; struct sshbuf *resp; va_start(ap, fmt); xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); debug("%s: %s", __progname, msg); free(msg); if (r >= 0) fatal("%s: invalid error code %d", __func__, r); if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname); if (sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR) != 0 || sshbuf_put_u32(resp, (u_int)-r) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error", __progname); return resp; } /* If the specified string is zero length, then free it and replace with NULL */ static void null_empty(char **s) { if (s == NULL || *s == NULL || **s != '\0') return; free(*s); *s = NULL; } static struct sshbuf * process_sign(struct sshbuf *req) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *resp, *kbuf; struct sshkey *key; uint32_t compat; const u_char *message; u_char *sig; size_t msglen, siglen; char *provider, *pin; if ((r = sshbuf_froms(req, &kbuf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(req, &message, &msglen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &compat)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0) fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname); if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0) fatal("Unable to parse private key: %s", ssh_err(r)); if (!sshkey_is_sk(key)) fatal("Unsupported key type %s", sshkey_ssh_name(key)); debug("%s: ready to sign with key %s, provider %s: " "msg len %zu, compat 0x%lx", __progname, sshkey_type(key), provider, msglen, (u_long)compat); null_empty(&pin); if ((r = sshsk_sign(provider, key, &sig, &siglen, message, msglen, compat, pin)) != 0) { resp = reply_error(r, "Signing failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, siglen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); out: sshbuf_free(kbuf); free(provider); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); return resp; } static struct sshbuf * process_enroll(struct sshbuf *req) { int r; u_int type; char *provider, *application, *pin, *device, *userid; uint8_t flags; struct sshbuf *challenge, *attest, *kbuf, *resp; struct sshkey *key; if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &device, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &application, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &userid, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(req, &challenge)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0) fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname); if (type > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: bad type %u", __progname, type); if (sshbuf_len(challenge) == 0) { sshbuf_free(challenge); challenge = NULL; } null_empty(&device); null_empty(&userid); null_empty(&pin); if ((r = sshsk_enroll((int)type, provider, device, application, userid, flags, pin, challenge, &key, attest)) != 0) { resp = reply_error(r, "Enrollment failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname); if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, kbuf)) != 0) fatal("%s: serialize private key: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, attest)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); out: sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(kbuf); sshbuf_free(attest); sshbuf_free(challenge); free(provider); free(application); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); return resp; } static struct sshbuf * process_load_resident(struct sshbuf *req) { int r; char *provider, *pin, *device; struct sshbuf *kbuf, *resp; struct sshkey **keys = NULL; size_t nkeys = 0, i; if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &device, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0) fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname); null_empty(&device); null_empty(&pin); if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(provider, device, pin, &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) { resp = reply_error(r, " sshsk_load_resident failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { debug("%s: key %zu %s %s", __func__, i, sshkey_type(keys[i]), keys[i]->sk_application); sshbuf_reset(kbuf); if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(keys[i], kbuf)) != 0) fatal("%s: serialize private key: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(resp, "")) != 0) /* comment */ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); } out: for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(keys[i]); free(keys); sshbuf_free(kbuf); free(provider); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); return resp; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *req, *resp; int in, out, ch, r, vflag = 0; u_int rtype, ll = 0; uint8_t version, log_stderr = 0; sanitise_stdfd(); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'v': vflag = 1; if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; break; default: fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname); exit(1); } } log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, vflag); /* * Rearrange our file descriptors a little; we don't trust the * providers not to fiddle with stdin/out. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) fatal("%s: dup: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); close(STDIN_FILENO); close(STDOUT_FILENO); sanitise_stdfd(); /* resets to /dev/null */ if ((req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname); if (ssh_msg_recv(in, req) < 0) fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed"); close(in); debug("%s: received message len %zu", __progname, sshbuf_len(req)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &version)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (version != SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION) { fatal("unsupported version: received %d, expected %d", version, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &rtype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &log_stderr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &ll)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (!vflag && log_level_name((LogLevel)ll) != NULL) log_init(__progname, (LogLevel)ll, log_facility, log_stderr); switch (rtype) { case SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN: resp = process_sign(req); break; case SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL: resp = process_enroll(req); break; case SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT: resp = process_load_resident(req); break; default: fatal("%s: unsupported request type %u", __progname, rtype); } sshbuf_free(req); debug("%s: reply len %zu", __progname, sshbuf_len(resp)); if (ssh_msg_send(out, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION, resp) == -1) fatal("ssh_msg_send failed"); sshbuf_free(resp); close(out); return (0); } #else /* ENABLE_SK */ #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { fprintf(stderr, "ssh-sk-helper: disabled at compile time\n"); return -1; } #endif /* ENABLE_SK */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh-sk.c010064400017500001750000000525261362136622600130470ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.c,v 1.27 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef ENABLE_SK #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" #include "sk-api.h" #include "crypto_api.h" struct sshsk_provider { char *path; void *dlhandle; /* Return the version of the middleware API */ uint32_t (*sk_api_version)(void); /* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */ int (*sk_enroll)(int alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response); /* Sign a challenge */ int (*sk_sign)(int alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts, struct sk_sign_response **sign_response); /* Enumerate resident keys */ int (*sk_load_resident_keys)(const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts, struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks); }; /* Built-in version */ int ssh_sk_enroll(int alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response); int ssh_sk_sign(int alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts, struct sk_sign_response **sign_response); int ssh_sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts, struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks); static void sshsk_free(struct sshsk_provider *p) { if (p == NULL) return; free(p->path); if (p->dlhandle != NULL) dlclose(p->dlhandle); free(p); } static struct sshsk_provider * sshsk_open(const char *path) { struct sshsk_provider *ret = NULL; uint32_t version; if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) { error("%s: calloc failed", __func__); return NULL; } if ((ret->path = strdup(path)) == NULL) { error("%s: strdup failed", __func__); goto fail; } /* Skip the rest if we're using the linked in middleware */ if (strcasecmp(ret->path, "internal") == 0) { #ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL ret->sk_enroll = ssh_sk_enroll; ret->sk_sign = ssh_sk_sign; ret->sk_load_resident_keys = ssh_sk_load_resident_keys; #else error("internal security key support not enabled"); #endif return ret; } if ((ret->dlhandle = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { error("Provider \"%s\" dlopen failed: %s", path, dlerror()); goto fail; } if ((ret->sk_api_version = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_api_version")) == NULL) { error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_api_version) failed: %s", path, dlerror()); goto fail; } version = ret->sk_api_version(); debug("%s: provider %s implements version 0x%08lx", __func__, ret->path, (u_long)version); if ((version & SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK) != SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR) { error("Provider \"%s\" implements unsupported " "version 0x%08lx (supported: 0x%08lx)", path, (u_long)version, (u_long)SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR); goto fail; } if ((ret->sk_enroll = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_enroll")) == NULL) { error("Provider %s dlsym(sk_enroll) failed: %s", path, dlerror()); goto fail; } if ((ret->sk_sign = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_sign")) == NULL) { error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_sign) failed: %s", path, dlerror()); goto fail; } if ((ret->sk_load_resident_keys = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_load_resident_keys")) == NULL) { error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_load_resident_keys) " "failed: %s", path, dlerror()); goto fail; } /* success */ return ret; fail: sshsk_free(ret); return NULL; } static void sshsk_free_enroll_response(struct sk_enroll_response *r) { if (r == NULL) return; freezero(r->key_handle, r->key_handle_len); freezero(r->public_key, r->public_key_len); freezero(r->signature, r->signature_len); freezero(r->attestation_cert, r->attestation_cert_len); freezero(r, sizeof(*r)); } static void sshsk_free_sign_response(struct sk_sign_response *r) { if (r == NULL) return; freezero(r->sig_r, r->sig_r_len); freezero(r->sig_s, r->sig_s_len); freezero(r, sizeof(*r)); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* Assemble key from response */ static int sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; EC_POINT *q = NULL; int r; *keyp = NULL; if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA_SK)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } key->ecdsa_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL || (q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: allocation failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, resp->public_key, resp->public_key_len)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) != 0) { error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q) != 0) { error("Authenticator returned invalid ECDSA key"); r = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) { /* XXX assume it is a allocation error */ error("%s: allocation failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* success */ *keyp = key; key = NULL; /* transferred */ r = 0; out: EC_POINT_free(q); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ static int sshsk_ed25519_assemble(struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; int r; *keyp = NULL; if (resp->public_key_len != ED25519_PK_SZ) { error("%s: invalid size: %zu", __func__, resp->public_key_len); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519_SK)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((key->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) { error("%s: malloc failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(key->ed25519_pk, resp->public_key, ED25519_PK_SZ); /* success */ *keyp = key; key = NULL; /* transferred */ r = 0; out: sshkey_free(key); return r; } static int sshsk_key_from_response(int alg, const char *application, uint8_t flags, struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *keyp = NULL; /* Check response validity */ if (resp->public_key == NULL || resp->key_handle == NULL) { error("%s: sk_enroll response invalid", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } switch (alg) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case SSH_SK_ECDSA: if ((r = sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(resp, &key)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case SSH_SK_ED25519: if ((r = sshsk_ed25519_assemble(resp, &key)) != 0) goto out; break; default: error("%s: unsupported algorithm %d", __func__, alg); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } key->sk_flags = flags; if ((key->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (key->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: allocation failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((key->sk_application = strdup(application)) == NULL) { error("%s: strdup application failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(key->sk_key_handle, resp->key_handle, resp->key_handle_len)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; *keyp = key; key = NULL; out: sshkey_free(key); return r; } static int skerr_to_ssherr(int skerr) { switch (skerr) { case SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED: return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; case SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED: return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; case SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND: return SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND; case SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL: default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } } static void sshsk_free_options(struct sk_option **opts) { size_t i; if (opts == NULL) return; for (i = 0; opts[i] != NULL; i++) { free(opts[i]->name); free(opts[i]->value); free(opts[i]); } free(opts); } static int sshsk_add_option(struct sk_option ***optsp, size_t *noptsp, const char *name, const char *value, uint8_t required) { struct sk_option **opts = *optsp; size_t nopts = *noptsp; if ((opts = recallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 2, /* extra for NULL */ sizeof(*opts))) == NULL) { error("%s: array alloc failed", __func__); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } *optsp = opts; *noptsp = nopts + 1; if ((opts[nopts] = calloc(1, sizeof(**opts))) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc failed", __func__); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } if ((opts[nopts]->name = strdup(name)) == NULL || (opts[nopts]->value = strdup(value)) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc failed", __func__); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } opts[nopts]->required = required; return 0; } static int make_options(const char *device, const char *user_id, struct sk_option ***optsp) { struct sk_option **opts = NULL; size_t nopts = 0; int r, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (device != NULL && (r = sshsk_add_option(&opts, &nopts, "device", device, 0)) != 0) { ret = r; goto out; } if (user_id != NULL && (r = sshsk_add_option(&opts, &nopts, "user", user_id, 0)) != 0) { ret = r; goto out; } /* success */ *optsp = opts; opts = NULL; nopts = 0; ret = 0; out: sshsk_free_options(opts); return ret; } int sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device, const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf, struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest) { struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_char randchall[32]; const u_char *challenge; size_t challenge_len; struct sk_enroll_response *resp = NULL; struct sk_option **opts = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; int alg; debug("%s: provider \"%s\", device \"%s\", application \"%s\", " "userid \"%s\", flags 0x%02x, challenge len %zu%s", __func__, provider_path, device, application, userid, flags, challenge_buf == NULL ? 0 : sshbuf_len(challenge_buf), (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? " with-pin" : ""); *keyp = NULL; if (attest) sshbuf_reset(attest); if ((r = make_options(device, userid, &opts)) != 0) goto out; switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_ECDSA_SK: alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_SK: alg = SSH_SK_ED25519; break; default: error("%s: unsupported key type", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (provider_path == NULL) { error("%s: missing provider", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (application == NULL || *application == '\0') { error("%s: missing application", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (challenge_buf == NULL) { debug("%s: using random challenge", __func__); arc4random_buf(randchall, sizeof(randchall)); challenge = randchall; challenge_len = sizeof(randchall); } else if (sshbuf_len(challenge_buf) == 0) { error("Missing enrollment challenge"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } else { challenge = sshbuf_ptr(challenge_buf); challenge_len = sshbuf_len(challenge_buf); debug3("%s: using explicit challenge len=%zd", __func__, challenge_len); } if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */ goto out; } /* XXX validate flags? */ /* enroll key */ if ((r = skp->sk_enroll(alg, challenge, challenge_len, application, flags, pin, opts, &resp)) != 0) { debug("%s: provider \"%s\" returned failure %d", __func__, provider_path, r); r = skerr_to_ssherr(r); goto out; } if ((r = sshsk_key_from_response(alg, application, flags, resp, &key)) != 0) goto out; /* Optionally fill in the attestation information */ if (attest != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(attest, "ssh-sk-attest-v00")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest, resp->attestation_cert, resp->attestation_cert_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest, resp->signature, resp->signature_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(attest, 0)) != 0 || /* resvd flags */ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest, NULL, 0)) != 0 /* resvd */) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } } /* success */ *keyp = key; key = NULL; /* transferred */ r = 0; out: sshsk_free_options(opts); sshsk_free(skp); sshkey_free(key); sshsk_free_enroll_response(resp); explicit_bzero(randchall, sizeof(randchall)); return r; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static int sshsk_ecdsa_sig(struct sk_sign_response *resp, struct sshbuf *sig) { struct sshbuf *inner_sig = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Check response validity */ if (resp->sig_r == NULL || resp->sig_s == NULL) { error("%s: sk_sign response invalid", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((inner_sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* Prepare and append inner signature object */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(inner_sig, resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(inner_sig, resp->sig_s, resp->sig_s_len)) != 0) { debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sig, inner_sig)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(sig, resp->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(sig, resp->counter)) != 0) { debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_s, resp->sig_s_len, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "%s: inner:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump(inner_sig, stderr); #endif r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(inner_sig); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ static int sshsk_ed25519_sig(struct sk_sign_response *resp, struct sshbuf *sig) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Check response validity */ if (resp->sig_r == NULL) { error("%s: sk_sign response invalid", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sig, resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(sig, resp->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(sig, resp->counter)) != 0) { debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len, stderr); #endif r = 0; out: return 0; } int sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *pin) { struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; int type, alg; struct sk_sign_response *resp = NULL; struct sshbuf *inner_sig = NULL, *sig = NULL; uint8_t message[32]; struct sk_option **opts = NULL; debug("%s: provider \"%s\", key %s, flags 0x%02x%s", __func__, provider_path, sshkey_type(key), key->sk_flags, (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? " with-pin" : ""); if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; type = sshkey_type_plain(key->type); switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_ECDSA_SK: alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_SK: alg = SSH_SK_ED25519; break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if (provider_path == NULL || key->sk_key_handle == NULL || key->sk_application == NULL || *key->sk_application == '\0') { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */ goto out; } /* hash data to be signed before it goes to the security key */ if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, datalen, message, sizeof(message))) != 0) { error("%s: hash application failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = skp->sk_sign(alg, message, sizeof(message), key->sk_application, sshbuf_ptr(key->sk_key_handle), sshbuf_len(key->sk_key_handle), key->sk_flags, pin, opts, &resp)) != 0) { debug("%s: sk_sign failed with code %d", __func__, r); r = skerr_to_ssherr(r); goto out; } /* Assemble signature */ if ((sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sig, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0) { debug("%s: buffer error (outer): %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_ECDSA_SK: if ((r = sshsk_ecdsa_sig(resp, sig)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_SK: if ((r = sshsk_ed25519_sig(resp, sig)) != 0) goto out; break; } #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n", __func__, resp->flags, resp->counter); fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(message, sizeof(message), stderr); fprintf(stderr, "%s: sigbuf:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump(sig, stderr); #endif if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(sshbuf_len(sig))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(sig), sshbuf_len(sig)); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = sshbuf_len(sig); /* success */ r = 0; out: sshsk_free_options(opts); explicit_bzero(message, sizeof(message)); sshsk_free(skp); sshsk_free_sign_response(resp); sshbuf_free(sig); sshbuf_free(inner_sig); return r; } static void sshsk_free_sk_resident_keys(struct sk_resident_key **rks, size_t nrks) { size_t i; if (nrks == 0 || rks == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) { free(rks[i]->application); freezero(rks[i]->key.key_handle, rks[i]->key.key_handle_len); freezero(rks[i]->key.public_key, rks[i]->key.public_key_len); freezero(rks[i]->key.signature, rks[i]->key.signature_len); freezero(rks[i]->key.attestation_cert, rks[i]->key.attestation_cert_len); freezero(rks[i], sizeof(**rks)); } free(rks); } int sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device, const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp) { struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sk_resident_key **rks = NULL; size_t i, nrks = 0, nkeys = 0; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **keys = NULL, **tmp; uint8_t flags; struct sk_option **opts = NULL; debug("%s: provider \"%s\"%s", __func__, provider_path, (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? ", have-pin": ""); if (keysp == NULL || nkeysp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *keysp = NULL; *nkeysp = 0; if ((r = make_options(device, NULL, &opts)) != 0) goto out; if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */ goto out; } if ((r = skp->sk_load_resident_keys(pin, opts, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) { error("Provider \"%s\" returned failure %d", provider_path, r); r = skerr_to_ssherr(r); goto out; } for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) { debug3("%s: rk %zu: slot = %zu, alg = %d, application = \"%s\"", __func__, i, rks[i]->slot, rks[i]->alg, rks[i]->application); /* XXX need better filter here */ if (strncmp(rks[i]->application, "ssh:", 4) != 0) continue; switch (rks[i]->alg) { case SSH_SK_ECDSA: case SSH_SK_ED25519: break; default: continue; } /* XXX where to get flags? */ flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD|SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY; if ((r = sshsk_key_from_response(rks[i]->alg, rks[i]->application, flags, &rks[i]->key, &key)) != 0) goto out; if ((tmp = recallocarray(keys, nkeys, nkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) { error("%s: recallocarray failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } keys = tmp; keys[nkeys++] = key; key = NULL; /* XXX synthesise comment */ } /* success */ *keysp = keys; *nkeysp = nkeys; keys = NULL; nkeys = 0; r = 0; out: sshsk_free_options(opts); sshsk_free(skp); sshsk_free_sk_resident_keys(rks, nrks); sshkey_free(key); if (nkeys != 0) { for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(keys[i]); free(keys); } return r; } #endif /* ENABLE_SK */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh-sk.h010064400017500001750000000046211362136622600130450ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.h,v 1.10 2020/01/10 23:43:26 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _SSH_SK_H #define _SSH_SK_H 1 struct sshbuf; struct sshkey; struct sk_option; /* Version of protocol expected from ssh-sk-helper */ #define SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION 5 /* ssh-sk-helper messages */ #define SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR 0 /* Only valid H->C */ #define SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN 1 #define SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL 2 #define SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT 3 /* * Enroll (generate) a new security-key hosted private key of given type * via the specified provider middleware. * If challenge_buf is NULL then a random 256 bit challenge will be used. * * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure. * * If successful and the attest_data buffer is not NULL then attestation * information is placed there. */ int sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device, const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf, struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest); /* * Calculate an ECDSA_SK or ED25519_SK signature using the specified key * and provider middleware. * * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure. */ int sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *pin); /* * Enumerates and loads all SSH-compatible resident keys from a security * key. * * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure. */ int sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device, const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp); #endif /* _SSH_SK_H */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh-xmss.c010064400017500001750000000117761362136622600134260ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh-xmss.c,v 1.1 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $*/ /* * Copyright (c) 2017 Stefan-Lukas Gazdag. * Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_XMSS #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshkey-xmss.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "xmss_fast.h" int ssh_xmss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { u_char *sig = NULL; size_t slen = 0, len = 0, required_siglen; unsigned long long smlen; int r, ret; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (key == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_XMSS || key->xmss_sk == NULL || sshkey_xmss_params(key) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(key, &required_siglen)) != 0) return r; if (datalen >= INT_MAX - required_siglen) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; smlen = slen = datalen + required_siglen; if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(key, error)) != 0) goto out; if ((ret = xmss_sign(key->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(key), sig, &smlen, data, datalen, sshkey_xmss_params(key))) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */ goto out; } /* encode signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-xmss@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; /* success */ r = 0; out: if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_update_state(key, error)) != 0) { /* discard signature since we cannot update the state */ if (r == 0 && sigp != NULL && *sigp != NULL) { explicit_bzero(*sigp, len); free(*sigp); } if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; r = ret; } sshbuf_free(b); if (sig != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sig, slen); free(sig); } return r; } int ssh_xmss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *ktype = NULL; const u_char *sigblob; u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL; size_t len, required_siglen; unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0; int r, ret; if (key == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_XMSS || key->xmss_pk == NULL || sshkey_xmss_params(key) == NULL || signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(key, &required_siglen)) != 0) return r; if (datalen >= INT_MAX - required_siglen) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0) goto out; if (strcmp("ssh-xmss@openssh.com", ktype) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } if (len != required_siglen) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (datalen >= SIZE_MAX - len) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } smlen = len + datalen; mlen = smlen; if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = malloc(mlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(sm, sigblob, len); memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen); if ((ret = xmss_sign_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen, key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_params(key))) != 0) { debug2("%s: crypto_sign_xmss_open failed: %d", __func__, ret); } if (ret != 0 || mlen != datalen) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } /* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */ /* success */ r = 0; out: if (sm != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sm, smlen); free(sm); } if (m != NULL) { explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */ free(m); } sshbuf_free(b); free(ktype); return r; } #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/ssh.1010064400017500001750000001313201362136622600123400ustar00djmdjm.\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.410 2020/02/07 03:54:44 dtucker Exp $ .Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh .Nd OpenSSH remote login client .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh .Op Fl 46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy .Op Fl B Ar bind_interface .Op Fl b Ar bind_address .Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec .Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl e Ar escape_char .Op Fl F Ar configfile .Op Fl I Ar pkcs11 .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl J Ar destination .Op Fl L Ar address .Op Fl l Ar login_name .Op Fl m Ar mac_spec .Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl Q Ar query_option .Op Fl R Ar address .Op Fl S Ar ctl_path .Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port .Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun .Ar destination .Op Ar command .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and .Ux Ns -domain sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel. .Pp .Nm connects and logs into the specified .Ar destination , which may be specified as either .Sm off .Oo user @ Oc hostname .Sm on or a URI of the form .Sm off .No ssh:// Oo user @ Oc hostname Op : port . .Sm on The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods (see below). .Pp If a .Ar command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. .Pp The options are as follows: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .Pp .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .Pp .It Fl A Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent such as .Xr ssh-agent 1 . This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's .Ux Ns -domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. A safer alternative may be to use a jump host (see .Fl J ) . .Pp .It Fl a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. .Pp .It Fl B Ar bind_interface Bind to the address of .Ar bind_interface before attempting to connect to the destination host. This is only useful on systems with more than one address. .Pp .It Fl b Ar bind_address Use .Ar bind_address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. .Pp .It Fl C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and .Ux Ns -domain connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by .Xr gzip 1 . Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the .Cm Compression option. .Pp .It Fl c Ar cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. .Ar cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order of preference. See the .Cm Ciphers keyword in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Pp .It Fl D Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port .Sm on .Xc Specifies a local .Dq dynamic application-level port forwarding. This works by allocating a socket to listen to .Ar port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified .Ar bind_address . Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Nm will act as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. .Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of standard error. .Pp .It Fl e Ar escape_char Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape character followed by a dot .Pq Ql \&. closes the connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the character to .Dq none disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent. .Pp .It Fl F Ar configfile Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config will be ignored. The default for the per-user configuration file is .Pa ~/.ssh/config . .Pp .It Fl f Requests .Nm to go to background just before command execution. This is useful if .Nm is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This implies .Fl n . The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like .Ic ssh -f host xterm . .Pp If the .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to .Dq yes , then a client started with .Fl f will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. .Pp .It Fl G Causes .Nm to print its configuration after evaluating .Cm Host and .Cm Match blocks and exit. .Pp .It Fl g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified on the master process. .Pp .It Fl I Ar pkcs11 Specify the PKCS#11 shared library .Nm should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication. .Pp .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have multiple .Fl i options (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the .Cm CertificateFile directive, .Nm will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to identity filenames. .Pp .It Fl J Ar destination Connect to the target host by first making a .Nm connection to the jump host described by .Ar destination and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This is a shortcut to specify a .Cm ProxyJump configuration directive. Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line generally apply to the destination host and not any specified jump hosts. Use .Pa ~/.ssh/config to specify configuration for jump hosts. .Pp .It Fl K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. .Pp .It Fl k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. .Pp .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : remote_socket .Sm on .Xc .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Ar local_socket : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Ar local_socket : remote_socket .Sm on .Xc Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP .Ar port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified .Ar bind_address , or to a Unix socket. Whenever a connection is made to the local port or socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to either .Ar host port .Ar hostport , or the Unix socket .Ar remote_socket , from the remote machine. .Pp Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. .Pp By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp .It Fl l Ar login_name Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. .Pp .It Fl M Places the .Nm client into .Dq master mode for connection sharing. Multiple .Fl M options places .Nm into .Dq master mode but with confirmation required using .Xr ssh-askpass 1 before each operation that changes the multiplexing state (e.g. opening a new session). Refer to the description of .Cm ControlMaster in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .Pp .It Fl m Ar mac_spec A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms, specified in order of preference. See the .Cm MACs keyword for more information. .Pp .It Fl N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just forwarding ports. .Pp .It Fl n Redirects stdin from .Pa /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from stdin). This must be used when .Nm is run in the background. A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. For example, .Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The .Nm program will be put in the background. (This does not work if .Nm needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the .Fl f option.) .Pp .It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When the .Fl O option is specified, the .Ar ctl_cmd argument is interpreted and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: .Dq check (check that the master process is running), .Dq forward (request forwardings without command execution), .Dq cancel (cancel forwardings), .Dq exit (request the master to exit), and .Dq stop (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests). .Pp .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddKeysToAgent .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs .It CASignatureAlgorithms .It CertificateFile .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP .It Ciphers .It ClearAllForwardings .It Compression .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It DynamicForward .It EscapeChar .It ExitOnForwardFailure .It FingerprintHash .It ForwardAgent .It ForwardX11 .It ForwardX11Timeout .It ForwardX11Trusted .It GatewayPorts .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostbasedKeyTypes .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It Hostname .It IdentitiesOnly .It IdentityAgent .It IdentityFile .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It LocalCommand .It LocalForward .It LogLevel .It MACs .It Match .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PermitLocalCommand .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyJump .It ProxyUseFdpass .It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It RemoteCommand .It RemoteForward .It RequestTTY .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It SetEnv .It StreamLocalBindMask .It StreamLocalBindUnlink .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It Tunnel .It TunnelDevice .It UpdateHostKeys .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .It VisualHostKey .It XAuthLocation .El .Pp .It Fl p Ar port Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. .Pp .It Fl Q Ar query_option Queries .Nm for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2. The available features are: .Ar cipher (supported symmetric ciphers), .Ar cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption), .Ar help (supported query terms for use with the .Fl Q flag), .Ar mac (supported message integrity codes), .Ar kex (key exchange algorithms), .Ar key (key types), .Ar key-cert (certificate key types), .Ar key-plain (non-certificate key types), .Ar key-sig (all key types and signature algorithms), .Ar protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions), and .Ar sig (supported signature algorithms). Alternatively, any keyword from .Xr ssh_config 5 or .Xr sshd_config 5 that takes an algorithm list may be used as an alias for the corresponding query_option. .Pp .It Fl q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. .Pp .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : local_socket .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Ar remote_socket : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Ar remote_socket : local_socket .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port .Sm on .Xc Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local side. .Pp This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP .Ar port or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made from the local machine to either an explicit destination specified by .Ar host port .Ar hostport , or .Ar local_socket , or, if no explicit destination was specified, .Nm will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward connections to the destinations requested by the remote SOCKS client. .Pp Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. .Pp By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by specifying a .Ar bind_address . An empty .Ar bind_address , or the address .Ql * , indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .Pp If the .Ar port argument is .Ql 0 , the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. When used together with .Ic -O forward the allocated port will be printed to the standard output. .Pp .It Fl S Ar ctl_path Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing, or the string .Dq none to disable connection sharing. Refer to the description of .Cm ControlPath and .Cm ControlMaster in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .Pp .It Fl s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (e.g.\& .Xr sftp 1 ) . The subsystem is specified as the remote command. .Pp .It Fl T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. .Pp .It Fl t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple .Fl t options force tty allocation, even if .Nm has no local tty. .Pp .It Fl V Display the version number and exit. .Pp .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .Pp .It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to .Ar host on .Ar port over the secure channel. Implies .Fl N , .Fl T , .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure and .Cm ClearAllForwardings , though these can be overridden in the configuration file or using .Fl o command line options. .Pp .It Fl w Xo .Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun .Xc Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified .Xr tun 4 devices between the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Dq any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Dq any . See also the .Cm Tunnel and .Cm TunnelDevice directives in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp If the .Cm Tunnel directive is unset, it will be set to the default tunnel mode, which is .Dq point-to-point . If a different .Cm Tunnel forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before .Fl w . .Pp .It Fl X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. .Pp For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the .Nm .Fl Y option and the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted directive in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Pp .It Fl x Disables X11 forwarding. .Pp .It Fl Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. .Pp .It Fl y Send log information using the .Xr syslog 3 system module. By default this information is sent to stderr. .El .Pp .Nm may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2. .Pp The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, and password authentication. Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though .Cm PreferredAuthentications can be used to change the default order. .Pp Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs in from is listed in .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv or .Pa /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files .Pa ~/.rhosts or .Pa ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login. Additionally, the server .Em must be able to verify the client's host key (see the description of .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.] .Pp Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. .Nm implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. The HISTORY section of .Xr ssl 8 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. .Pp The file .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the .Nm program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. .Pp The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a different method. These may be viewed by increasing the .Cm LogLevel to .Cm DEBUG or higher (e.g. by using the .Fl v flag). .Pp The user creates his/her key pair by running .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . This stores the private key in .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (Ed25519), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public key in .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's home directory. The user should then copy the public key to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine. The .Pa authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional .Pa ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this, the user can log in without giving the password. .Pp A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority can be used in place of many public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of .Xr ssh-keygen 1 for more information. .Pp The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication may be with an authentication agent. See .Xr ssh-agent 1 and (optionally) the .Cm AddKeysToAgent directive in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Pp Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an arbitrary .Qq challenge text, and prompts for a response. Examples of challenge-response authentication include .Bx Authentication (see .Xr login.conf 5 ) and PAM (some .Pf non- Ox systems). .Pp Finally, if other authentication methods fail, .Nm prompts the user for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. .Pp .Nm automatically maintains and checks a database containing identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored in .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, the file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a host's identification ever changes, .Nm warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed. .Pp When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. .Pp If an interactive session is requested .Nm by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one. The flags .Fl T and .Fl t can be used to override this behaviour. .Pp If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape characters noted below. .Pp If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to .Dq none will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used. .Pp The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. .Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, .Nm supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character. .Pp A single tilde character can be sent as .Ic ~~ or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below. The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the .Cm EscapeChar configuration directive or on the command line by the .Fl e option. .Pp The supported escapes (assuming the default .Ql ~ ) are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm ~. Disconnect. .It Cm ~^Z Background .Nm . .It Cm ~# List forwarded connections. .It Cm ~& Background .Nm at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate. .It Cm ~? Display a list of escape characters. .It Cm ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful if the peer supports it). .It Cm ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the .Fl L , .Fl R and .Fl D options (see above). It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with .Sm off .Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for local, .Sm off .Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for remote and .Sm off .Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for dynamic port-forwardings. .Ic !\& Ns Ar command allows the user to execute a local command if the .Ic PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Basic help is available, using the .Fl h option. .It Cm ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful if the peer supports it). .It Cm ~V Decrease the verbosity .Pq Ic LogLevel when errors are being written to stderr. .It Cm ~v Increase the verbosity .Pq Ic LogLevel when errors are being written to stderr. .El .Sh TCP FORWARDING Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail server; another is going through firewalls. .Pp In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC client, even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly support encrypted communication. This works as follows: the user connects to the remote host using .Nm , specifying the ports to be used to forward the connection. After that it is possible to start the program locally, and .Nm will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote server. .Pp The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client to an IRC server at .Dq server.example.com , joining channel .Dq #users , nickname .Dq pinky , using the standard IRC port, 6667: .Bd -literal -offset 4n $ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 $ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1 .Ed .Pp The .Fl f option backgrounds .Nm and the remote command .Dq sleep 10 is specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the program which is going to use the tunnel. If no connections are made within the time specified, .Nm will exit. .Sh X11 FORWARDING If the .Cm ForwardX11 variable is set to .Dq yes (or see the description of the .Fl X , .Fl x , and .Fl Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the local machine. The user should not manually set .Ev DISPLAY . Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration files. .Pp The .Ev DISPLAY value set by .Nm will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because .Nm creates a .Dq proxy X server on the server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted channel. .Pp .Nm will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). .Pp If the .Cm ForwardAgent variable is set to .Dq yes (or see the description of the .Fl A and .Fl a options above) and the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side. .Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .Pp If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .Fl E option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match. .Pp Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, using .Em random art . By setting the .Cm VisualHostKey option to .Dq yes , a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. .Pp To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all known hosts, the following command line can be used: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts .Pp If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented. .Pp In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, .Dq host.example.com . The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for host.example.com: .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. .Ed .Pp The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries: .Pp .Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com .Pp Finally the client connects: .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com [...] Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? .Ed .Pp See the .Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS option in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS .Nm contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using the .Xr tun 4 network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined securely. The .Xr sshd_config 5 configuration option .Cm PermitTunnel controls whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic). .Pp The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it. .Pp On the client: .Bd -literal -offset indent # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 .Ed .Pp On the server: .Bd -literal -offset indent # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 .Ed .Pp Client access may be more finely tuned via the .Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file (see below) and the .Cm PermitRootLogin server option. The following entry would permit connections on .Xr tun 4 device 1 from user .Dq jane and on tun device 2 from user .Dq john , if .Cm PermitRootLogin is set to .Dq forced-commands-only : .Bd -literal -offset 2n tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john .Ed .Pp Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as .Xr ipsecctl 8 and .Xr isakmpd 8 . .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Nm will normally set the following environment variables: .Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" .It Ev DISPLAY The .Ev DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the X11 server. It is automatically set by .Nm to point to a value of the form .Dq hostname:n , where .Dq hostname indicates the host where the shell runs, and .Sq n is an integer \*(Ge 1. .Nm uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user should normally not set .Ev DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manually copy any required authorization cookies). .It Ev HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory. .It Ev LOGNAME Synonym for .Ev USER ; set for compatibility with systems that use this variable. .It Ev MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox. .It Ev PATH Set to the default .Ev PATH , as specified when compiling .Nm . .It Ev SSH_ASKPASS If .Nm needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If .Nm does not have a terminal associated with it but .Ev DISPLAY and .Ev SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by .Ev SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling .Nm from a .Pa .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from .Pa /dev/null to make this work.) .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the agent. .It Ev SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The variable contains four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number, server IP address, and server port number. .It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if a forced command is executed. It can be used to extract the original arguments. .It Ev SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated with the current shell or command. If the current session has no tty, this variable is not set. .It Ev SSH_TUNNEL Optionally set by .Xr sshd 8 to contain the interface names assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested by the client. .It Ev SSH_USER_AUTH Optionally set by .Xr sshd 8 , this variable may contain a pathname to a file that lists the authentication methods successfully used when the session was established, including any public keys that were used. .It Ev TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connections). .It Ev USER Set to the name of the user logging in. .El .Pp Additionally, .Nm reads .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , and adds lines of the format .Dq VARNAME=value to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Xr sshd 8 reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described in the .Xr sshd 8 manual page. This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see .Sx ENVIRONMENT , above. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/execute). .Nm will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using AES-128. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. See .Xr sshd 8 for further details of the format of this file. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Commands in this file are executed by .Nm when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the .Xr sshd 8 manual page for more information. .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are used for host-based authentication. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. See .Xr sshd 8 for further details of the format of this file. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Commands in this file are executed by .Nm when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the .Xr sshd 8 manual page for more information. .El .Sh EXIT STATUS .Nm exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr tun 4 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr ssh-keysign 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh STANDARDS .Rs .%A S. Lehtinen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4250 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4251 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4252 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4253 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4254 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Schlyter .%A W. Griffin .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4255 .%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints .Re .Pp .Rs .%A F. Cusack .%A M. Forssen .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4256 .%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Galbraith .%A P. Remaker .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4335 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension .Re .Pp .Rs .%A M. Bellare .%A T. Kohno .%A C. Namprempre .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4344 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes .Re .Pp .Rs .%A B. Harris .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4345 .%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A M. Friedl .%A N. Provos .%A W. Simpson .%D March 2006 .%R RFC 4419 .%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Galbraith .%A R. Thayer .%D November 2006 .%R RFC 4716 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format .Re .Pp .Rs .%A D. Stebila .%A J. Green .%D December 2009 .%R RFC 5656 .%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer .Re .Pp .Rs .%A A. Perrig .%A D. Song .%D 1999 .%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) .%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security .Re .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. openssh-8.2p1/ssh.c010064400017500001750000002010311362136622600124170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.519 2020/02/07 03:54:44 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine. * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos * in Canada (German citizen). * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "channels.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "utf8.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif extern char *__progname; /* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE static char **saved_av; #endif /* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */ int tty_flag = 0; /* don't exec a shell */ int no_shell_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set * on the command line. */ int stdin_null_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and * a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist. */ int need_controlpersist_detach = 0; /* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */ int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, otty_flag, orequest_tty; /* * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the * background. */ int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; /* * General data structure for command line options and options configurable * in configuration files. See readconf.h. */ Options options; /* optional user configfile */ char *config = NULL; /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ char *host; /* * A config can specify a path to forward, overriding SSH_AUTH_SOCK. If this is * not NULL, forward the socket at this path instead. */ char *forward_agent_sock_path = NULL; /* Various strings used to to percent_expand() arguments */ static char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; static char uidstr[32], *host_arg, *conn_hash_hex; /* socket address the host resolves to */ struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* Private host keys. */ Sensitive sensitive_data; /* command to be executed */ struct sshbuf *command; /* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */ int subsystem_flag = 0; /* # of replies received for global requests */ static int remote_forward_confirms_received = 0; /* mux.c */ extern int muxserver_sock; extern u_int muxclient_command; /* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */ static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]\n" " [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]\n" " [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]\n" " [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]\n" " [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n" " [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n" " [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command]\n" ); exit(255); } static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *, struct passwd *); static void load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *); static void main_sigchld_handler(int); /* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */ static void tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths) { u_int i; char *cp; for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], getuid()); free(paths[i]); paths[i] = cp; } } /* * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen) { char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr; LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if (cname != NULL) hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA)) loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) { if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) { error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", __func__, name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *cname = '\0'; } } return res; } /* Returns non-zero if name can only be an address and not a hostname */ static int is_addr_fast(const char *name) { return (strchr(name, '%') != NULL || strchr(name, ':') != NULL || strspn(name, "0123456789.") == strlen(name)); } /* Returns non-zero if name represents a valid, single address */ static int is_addr(const char *name) { char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; if (is_addr_fast(name)) return 1; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", default_ssh_port()); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV; if (getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res) != 0) return 0; if (res == NULL || res->ai_next != NULL) { freeaddrinfo(res); return 0; } freeaddrinfo(res); return 1; } /* * Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address. * Returns a canonical address string. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen) { char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { debug2("%s: could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s", __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (res == NULL) { debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses", __func__, name); return NULL; } if (res->ai_next != NULL) { debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses", __func__, name); goto fail; } if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) { debug("%s: Could not format address for name %.100s: %s", __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); goto fail; } if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) { error("%s: host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", __func__, name, addr, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *caddr = '\0'; fail: freeaddrinfo(res); return NULL; } return res; } /* * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname * and perform the replacement if it is. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static int check_follow_cname(int direct, char **namep, const char *cname) { int i; struct allowed_cname *rule; if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 || strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0) return 0; if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return 0; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy or jump host unless the user specifically requests so. */ if (!direct && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return 0; debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname); for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) { rule = options.permitted_cnames + i; if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 || match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1) continue; verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname " "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname); free(*namep); *namep = xstrdup(cname); return 1; } return 0; } /* * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL * if no name was found after canonicalization. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port) { int i, direct, ndots; char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST]; struct addrinfo *addrs; /* * Attempt to canonicalise addresses, regardless of * whether hostname canonicalisation was requested */ if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port, newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) { debug2("%s: hostname %.100s is address", __func__, *hostp); if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) { debug2("%s: canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__, *hostp, newname); free(*hostp); *hostp = xstrdup(newname); } return addrs; } /* * If this looks like an address but didn't parse as one, it might * be an address with an invalid interface scope. Skip further * attempts at canonicalisation. */ if (is_addr_fast(*hostp)) { debug("%s: hostname %.100s is an unrecognised address", __func__, *hostp); return NULL; } if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return NULL; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so. */ direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.jump_host == NULL; if (!direct && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return NULL; /* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */ if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') { debug3("%s: name is fully qualified", __func__); fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp); if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) goto found; free(fullhost); goto notfound; } /* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */ ndots = 0; for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (*cp == '.') ndots++; } if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) { debug3("%s: not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)", __func__, *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots); return NULL; } /* Attempt each supplied suffix */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) { *newname = '\0'; xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp, options.canonical_domains[i]); debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__, *hostp, fullhost); if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) { free(fullhost); continue; } found: /* Remove trailing '.' */ fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0'; /* Follow CNAME if requested */ if (!check_follow_cname(direct, &fullhost, newname)) { debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost); } free(*hostp); *hostp = fullhost; return addrs; } notfound: if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local) fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp); debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp); return NULL; } /* * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and * fatal()ing for others. */ static void check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message) { switch (r) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: fatal("load %s \"%s\": %s", message, path, ssh_err(r)); case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: /* Ignore missing files */ if (errno == ENOENT) break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: error("load %s \"%s\": %s", message, path, ssh_err(r)); break; } } /* * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line. */ static void process_config_files(const char *host_name, struct passwd *pw, int final_pass, int *want_final_pass) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; int r; if (config != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 && !read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_name, &options, SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass)) fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: " "%.100s", config, strerror(errno)); } else { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name, &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass); /* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */ (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, host, host_name, &options, final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0, want_final_pass); } } /* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */ static void set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port) { struct addrinfo *addr; for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) { switch (addr->ai_family) { case AF_INET: ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)-> sin_port = htons(port); break; case AF_INET6: ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)-> sin6_port = htons(port); break; } } } /* * Main program for the ssh client. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { struct ssh *ssh = NULL; int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms; int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0; char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[PATH_MAX], *logfile; char cname[NI_MAXHOST]; struct stat st; struct passwd *pw; extern int optind, optreset; extern char *optarg; struct Forward fwd; struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t n, len; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ /* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */ saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av)); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_av[i] = NULL; compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_av; #endif seed_rng(); /* * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); /* Get user data. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); if (!pw) { logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); exit(255); } /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */ pw = pwcopy(pw); /* * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we * don't set the modes explicitly. */ umask(022); msetlocale(); /* * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been * set. */ initialize_options(&options); /* * Prepare main ssh transport/connection structures */ if ((ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state()) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't allocate session state"); channel_init_channels(ssh); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ host = NULL; use_syslog = 0; logfile = NULL; argv0 = av[0]; again: while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx" "AB:CD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '1': fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); break; case '2': /* Ignored */ break; case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'n': stdin_null_flag = 1; break; case 'f': fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; stdin_null_flag = 1; break; case 'x': options.forward_x11 = 0; break; case 'X': options.forward_x11 = 1; break; case 'y': use_syslog = 1; break; case 'E': logfile = optarg; break; case 'G': config_test = 1; break; case 'Y': options.forward_x11 = 1; options.forward_x11_trusted = 1; break; case 'g': options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1; break; case 'O': if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing " "command with -W"); else if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Multiplexing command already specified"); if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD; else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE; else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP; else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD; else if (strcmp(optarg, "proxy") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY; else fatal("Invalid multiplex command."); break; case 'P': /* deprecated */ break; case 'Q': cp = NULL; if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "Ciphers") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1); else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "MACs") == 0) cp = mac_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0) cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-sig") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "HostKeyAlgorithms") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedKeyTypes") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "sig") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) cp = xstrdup("2"); else if (strcmp(optarg, "compression") == 0) { cp = xstrdup(compression_alg_list(0)); len = strlen(cp); for (n = 0; n < len; n++) if (cp[n] == ',') cp[n] = '\n'; } else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) { cp = xstrdup( "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n" "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n" "protocol-version\nsig"); } if (cp == NULL) fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); printf("%s\n", cp); free(cp); exit(0); break; case 'a': options.forward_agent = 0; break; case 'A': options.forward_agent = 1; break; case 'k': options.gss_deleg_creds = 0; break; case 'K': options.gss_authentication = 1; options.gss_deleg_creds = 1; break; case 'i': p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid()); if (stat(p, &st) == -1) fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " "not accessible: %s.\n", p, strerror(errno)); else add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1); free(p); break; case 'I': #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 free(options.pkcs11_provider); options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg); #else fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n"); #endif break; case 'J': if (options.jump_host != NULL) { fatal("Only a single -J option is permitted " "(use commas to separate multiple " "jump hops)"); } if (options.proxy_command != NULL) fatal("Cannot specify -J with ProxyCommand"); if (parse_jump(optarg, &options, 1) == -1) fatal("Invalid -J argument"); options.proxy_command = xstrdup("none"); break; case 't': if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES) options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE; else options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES; break; case 'v': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else { if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { debug_flag++; options.log_level++; } } break; case 'V': fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION) #else "without OpenSSL" #endif ); if (opt == 'V') exit(0); break; case 'w': if (options.tun_open == -1) options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT; options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote); if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'W': if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("stdio forward already specified"); if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O"); if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { options.stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host; options.stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port; free(fwd.connect_host); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; no_shell_flag = 1; break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'e': if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 && (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) optarg[1] < 128) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31; else if (strlen(optarg) == 1) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0]; else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0) options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'c': if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' || *optarg == '^' ? optarg + 1 : optarg)) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } free(options.ciphers); options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'm': if (mac_valid(optarg)) { free(options.macs); options.macs = xstrdup(optarg); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'M': if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES) options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK; else options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES; break; case 'p': if (options.port == -1) { options.port = a2port(optarg); if (options.port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } } break; case 'l': if (options.user == NULL) options.user = optarg; break; case 'L': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0)) add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'R': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1) || parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 1)) { add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad remote forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'D': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'C': #ifdef WITH_ZLIB options.compression = 1; #else error("Compression not supported, disabling."); #endif break; case 'N': no_shell_flag = 1; options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'T': options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_config_line(&options, pw, host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line, "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0) exit(255); free(line); break; case 's': subsystem_flag = 1; break; case 'S': free(options.control_path); options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'b': options.bind_address = optarg; break; case 'B': options.bind_interface = optarg; break; case 'F': config = optarg; break; default: usage(); } } if (optind > 1 && strcmp(av[optind - 1], "--") == 0) opt_terminated = 1; ac -= optind; av += optind; if (ac > 0 && !host) { int tport; char *tuser; switch (parse_ssh_uri(*av, &tuser, &host, &tport)) { case -1: usage(); break; case 0: if (options.user == NULL) { options.user = tuser; tuser = NULL; } free(tuser); if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1) options.port = tport; break; default: p = xstrdup(*av); cp = strrchr(p, '@'); if (cp != NULL) { if (cp == p) usage(); if (options.user == NULL) { options.user = p; p = NULL; } *cp++ = '\0'; host = xstrdup(cp); free(p); } else host = p; break; } if (ac > 1 && !opt_terminated) { optind = optreset = 1; goto again; } ac--, av++; } /* Check that we got a host name. */ if (!host) usage(); host_arg = xstrdup(host); /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ if ((command = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); /* * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command. */ if (!ac) { /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */ if (subsystem_flag) { fprintf(stderr, "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n"); usage(); } } else { /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(command, "%s%s", i ? " " : "", av[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } /* * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E. */ if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL) fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E"); if (logfile != NULL) log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); log_init(argv0, options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER : options.log_facility, !use_syslog); if (debug_flag) logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION) #else "without OpenSSL" #endif ); /* Parse the configuration files */ process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 0, &want_final_pass); if (want_final_pass) debug("configuration requests final Match pass"); /* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */ fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options); /* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */ if (options.hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */ cp = percent_expand(options.hostname, "h", host, (char *)NULL); free(host); host = cp; free(options.hostname); options.hostname = xstrdup(host); } /* Don't lowercase addresses, they will be explicitly canonicalised */ if ((was_addr = is_addr(host)) == 0) lowercase(host); /* * Try to canonicalize if requested by configuration or the * hostname is an address. */ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO || was_addr) addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port); /* * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed * as a result of CNAME following. * * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules. * * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via * CanonicalizeHostname=always */ direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.jump_host == NULL; if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 && (direct || options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) { if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, direct, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) { /* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */ if (direct) cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */ } else check_follow_cname(direct, &host, cname); } /* * If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration * files as new stanzas may match. */ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0 && !want_final_pass) { debug("hostname canonicalisation enabled, " "will re-parse configuration"); want_final_pass = 1; } if (want_final_pass) { debug("re-parsing configuration"); free(options.hostname); options.hostname = xstrdup(host); process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 1, NULL); /* * Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation * enabled and the port number may have changed since, so * reset it in address list */ if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0) set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port); } /* Fill configuration defaults. */ fill_default_options(&options); /* * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now. */ if (options.jump_host != NULL) { char port_s[8]; const char *sshbin = argv0; /* * Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to * "ssh" if it appears unavailable. */ if (strchr(argv0, '/') != NULL && access(argv0, X_OK) != 0) sshbin = "ssh"; /* Consistency check */ if (options.proxy_command != NULL) fatal("inconsistent options: ProxyCommand+ProxyJump"); /* Never use FD passing for ProxyJump */ options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0; snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port); xasprintf(&options.proxy_command, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s", sshbin, /* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */ options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ", options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user, /* Optional "-p port" argument if jump_port set */ options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : " -p ", options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : port_s, /* Optional additional jump hosts ",..." */ options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : " -J ", options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : options.jump_extra, /* Optional "-F" argumment if -F specified */ config == NULL ? "" : " -F ", config == NULL ? "" : config, /* Optional "-v" arguments if -v set */ debug_flag ? " -" : "", debug_flag, "vvv", /* Mandatory hostname */ options.jump_host); debug("Setting implicit ProxyCommand from ProxyJump: %s", options.proxy_command); } if (options.port == 0) options.port = default_ssh_port(); channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); /* Tidy and check options */ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) lowercase(options.host_key_alias); if (options.proxy_command != NULL && strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 && options.proxy_use_fdpass) fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible"); if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { if (options.control_persist && options.control_path != NULL) { debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with " "ControlPersist; disabling"); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } else if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 || options.remote_command != NULL || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO) { debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with " "remote command execution; disabling"); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) { /* no point logging anything; user won't see it */ options.update_hostkeys = 0; } } if (options.connection_attempts <= 0) fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts"); if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 && options.remote_command != NULL) fatal("Cannot execute command-line and remote command."); /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag && sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL && !no_shell_flag) fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command " "to execute."); /* reinit */ log_init(argv0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, !use_syslog); if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) tty_flag = 1; /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */ if (sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL) tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO; /* Force no tty */ if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO || (muxclient_command && muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY)) tty_flag = 0; /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */ if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) && options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) { if (tty_flag) logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because " "stdin is not a terminal."); tty_flag = 0; } if (options.user == NULL) options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); /* Set up strings used to percent_expand() arguments */ if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", options.port); snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, options.user, strlen(options.user)) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0) fatal("%s: mux digest failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); conn_hash_hex = tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)); /* * Expand tokens in arguments. NB. LocalCommand is expanded later, * after port-forwarding is set up, so it may pick up any local * tunnel interface name allocated. */ if (options.remote_command != NULL) { debug3("expanding RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command); cp = options.remote_command; options.remote_command = percent_expand(cp, "C", conn_hash_hex, "L", shorthost, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "i", uidstr, "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "p", portstr, "r", options.user, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); debug3("expanded RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command); free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_put(command, options.remote_command, strlen(options.remote_command))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (options.control_path != NULL) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, getuid()); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, "C", conn_hash_hex, "L", shorthost, "h", host, "i", uidstr, "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "p", portstr, "r", options.user, "u", pw->pw_name, "i", uidstr, (char *)NULL); free(cp); } if (config_test) { dump_client_config(&options, host); exit(0); } /* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */ if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' && strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) { if ((cp = getenv(options.sk_provider + 1)) == NULL) { debug("Authenticator provider %s did not resolve; " "disabling", options.sk_provider); free(options.sk_provider); options.sk_provider = NULL; } else { debug2("resolved SecurityKeyProvider %s => %s", options.sk_provider, cp); free(options.sk_provider); options.sk_provider = xstrdup(cp); } } if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL) fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command"); if (options.control_path != NULL) { int sock; if ((sock = muxclient(options.control_path)) >= 0) { ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock); ssh_packet_set_mux(ssh); goto skip_connect; } } /* * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now. */ if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) { debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port); if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */ } timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0) exit(255); if (addrs != NULL) freeaddrinfo(addrs); ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.server_alive_interval, options.server_alive_count_max); if (timeout_ms > 0) debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms); /* * If we successfully made the connection and we have hostbased auth * enabled, load the public keys so we can later use the ssh-keysign * helper to sign challenges. */ sensitive_data.nkeys = 0; sensitive_data.keys = NULL; if (options.hostbased_authentication) { sensitive_data.nkeys = 10; sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey)); /* XXX check errors? */ #define L_PUBKEY(p,o) do { \ if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \ fatal("%s pubkey out of array bounds", __func__); \ check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \ p, "pubkey"); \ } while (0) #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \ if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \ fatal("%s cert out of array bounds", __func__); \ check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \ } while (0) if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) { L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 1); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 2); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 3); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 4); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 5); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 6); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 7); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 8); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 9); } } /* Create ~/.ssh * directory if it doesn't already exist. */ if (config == NULL) { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) == -1) { #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(buf); #endif if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0) error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL); #endif } } /* load options.identity_files */ load_public_identity_files(pw); /* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */ if (options.identity_agent && strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) { if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) { unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); } else { p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent, getuid()); cp = percent_expand(p, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "i", uidstr, "l", thishost, "r", options.user, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); free(p); /* * If identity_agent represents an environment variable * then recheck that it is valid (since processing with * percent_expand() may have changed it) and substitute * its value. */ if (cp[0] == '$') { if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) { fatal("Invalid IdentityAgent " "environment variable name %s", cp); } if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) == NULL) unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); else setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, p, 1); } else { /* identity_agent specifies a path directly */ setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, cp, 1); } free(cp); } } if (options.forward_agent && (options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL)) { p = tilde_expand_filename(options.forward_agent_sock_path, getuid()); cp = percent_expand(p, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "i", uidstr, "l", thishost, "r", options.user, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); free(p); if (cp[0] == '$') { if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) { fatal("Invalid ForwardAgent environment variable name %s", cp); } if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) != NULL) forward_agent_sock_path = p; else options.forward_agent = 0; free(cp); } else { forward_agent_sock_path = cp; } } /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */ tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles); ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */ ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, options.port, pw, timeout_ms); if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); } else { verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host); } /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */ if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) { for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) { if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) { /* Destroys contents safely */ debug3("clear hostkey %d", i); sshkey_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]); sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; } } free(sensitive_data.keys); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { free(options.identity_files[i]); options.identity_files[i] = NULL; if (options.identity_keys[i]) { sshkey_free(options.identity_keys[i]); options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; } } for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { free(options.certificate_files[i]); options.certificate_files[i] = NULL; } skip_connect: exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, pw); ssh_packet_close(ssh); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */ ssh_kill_proxy_command(); return exit_status; } static void control_persist_detach(void) { pid_t pid; int devnull, keep_stderr; debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__); /* * master (current process) into the background, and make the * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); case 0: /* Child: master process continues mainloop */ break; default: /* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */ debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid); stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag; options.request_tty = orequest_tty; tty_flag = otty_flag; close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; muxclient(options.control_path); /* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */ fatal("Failed to connect to new control master"); } if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } else { keep_stderr = log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag; if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 || (!keep_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)) error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } daemon(1, 1); setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path); } /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */ static void fork_postauth(void) { if (need_controlpersist_detach) control_persist_detach(); debug("forking to background"); fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; if (daemon(1, 1) == -1) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); } /* Callback for remote forward global requests */ static void ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt; u_int port; int r; /* XXX verbose() on failure? */ debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d", type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path : rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "", (rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "", rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) { if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (port > 65535) { error("Invalid allocated port %u for remote " "forward to %s:%d", port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); /* Ensure failure processing runs below */ type = SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE; channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); } else { rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port; logit("Allocated port %u for remote " "forward to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } } else { channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); } } if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) { if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } else { if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } } if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) { debug("All remote forwarding requests processed"); if (fork_after_authentication_flag) fork_postauth(); } } static void client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) { debug("stdio forwarding: done"); cleanup_exit(0); } static void ssh_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { if (!success) fatal("stdio forwarding failed"); } static void ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int in, out; if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL) return; debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, options.stdio_forward_host, options.stdio_forward_port); if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed"); if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host, options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__); channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0); channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL); } static void ssh_init_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, char **ifname) { int success = 0; int i; /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote " "address %.200s:%d", (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? options.local_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : options.local_forwards[i].listen_host, options.local_forwards[i].listen_port, (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? options.local_forwards[i].connect_path : options.local_forwards[i].connect_host, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port); success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts); } if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request local forwarding."); if (i > 0 && success == 0) error("Could not request local forwarding."); /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to " "local address %.200s:%d", (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host, options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port, (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path : options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host, options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port); options.remote_forwards[i].handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &options.remote_forwards[i]); if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request remote forwarding."); else logit("Warning: Could not request remote " "forwarding."); } else { client_register_global_confirm( ssh_confirm_remote_forward, &options.remote_forwards[i]); } } /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { if ((*ifname = client_request_tun_fwd(ssh, options.tun_open, options.tun_local, options.tun_remote)) == NULL) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); else error("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); } } } static void check_agent_present(void) { int r; if (options.forward_agent) { /* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) { options.forward_agent = 0; if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); } } } static void ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { extern char **environ; const char *display; int r, interactive = tty_flag; char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; if (!success) return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto, data, 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ interactive = 1; } check_agent_present(); if (options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, interactive, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"), NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ); } /* open new channel for a session */ static int ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int window, packetmax, in, out, err; if (stdin_null_flag) { in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY); } else { in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); } out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); err = dup(STDERR_FILENO); if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1) fatal("dup() in/out/err failed"); /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(in)) set_nonblock(in); if (!isatty(out)) set_nonblock(out); if (!isatty(err)) set_nonblock(err); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (tty_flag) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self); channel_send_open(ssh, c->self); if (!no_shell_flag) channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_session2_setup, NULL); return c->self; } static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw) { int r, devnull, id = -1; char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL; /* XXX should be pre-session */ if (!options.control_persist) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); ssh_init_forwarding(ssh, &tun_fwd_ifname); if (options.local_command != NULL) { debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); cp = options.local_command; options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, "C", conn_hash_hex, "L", shorthost, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "i", uidstr, "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "p", portstr, "r", options.user, "u", pw->pw_name, "T", tun_fwd_ifname == NULL ? "NONE" : tun_fwd_ifname, (char *)NULL); debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); free(cp); } /* Start listening for multiplex clients */ if (!ssh_packet_get_mux(ssh)) muxserver_listen(ssh); /* * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground * client attach as a control slave. * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until * after the connection is fully established (in particular, * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure). */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) { ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag; ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag; orequest_tty = options.request_tty; otty_flag = tty_flag; stdin_null_flag = 1; no_shell_flag = 1; tty_flag = 0; if (!fork_after_authentication_flag) need_controlpersist_detach = 1; fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; } /* * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier. */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); if (!no_shell_flag) id = ssh_session2_open(ssh); else { ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); } /* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO && (datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) { debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Execute a local command */ if (options.local_command != NULL && options.permit_local_command) ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); /* * stdout is now owned by the session channel; clobber it here * so future channel closes are propagated to the local fd. * NB. this can only happen after LocalCommand has completed, * as it may want to write to stdout. */ if (!need_controlpersist_detach) { if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1) error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2() stdout failed", __func__); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } /* * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " "confirmation received"); } else fork_postauth(); } return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); } /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */ static void load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *pw) { char *filename, *cp; struct sshkey *public; int i; u_int n_ids, n_certs; char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL; char **comments = NULL; int nkeys; #endif /* PKCS11 */ n_ids = n_certs = 0; memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files)); memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys)); memset(identity_file_userprovided, 0, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided)); memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files)); memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates)); memset(certificate_file_userprovided, 0, sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, &keys, &comments)) > 0) { for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { sshkey_free(keys[i]); free(comments[i]); continue; } identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */ n_ids++; } free(keys); free(comments); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES || strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) { free(options.identity_files[i]); options.identity_files[i] = NULL; continue; } cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid()); filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, "l", thishost, "h", host, "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); free(cp); check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL), filename, "pubkey"); debug("identity file %s type %d", filename, public ? public->type : -1); free(options.identity_files[i]); identity_files[n_ids] = filename; identity_keys[n_ids] = public; identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) continue; /* * If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try * to add the default certificate variant too. */ if (options.num_certificate_files != 0) continue; xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename); check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL), filename, "pubkey"); debug("identity file %s type %d", cp, public ? public->type : -1); if (public == NULL) { free(cp); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) { debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate", __func__, cp, sshkey_type(public)); sshkey_free(public); free(cp); continue; } /* NB. leave filename pointing to private key */ identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename); identity_keys[n_ids] = public; identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; n_ids++; } if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) fatal("%s: too many certificates", __func__); for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i], getuid()); filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "i", uidstr, "l", thishost, "r", options.user, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); free(cp); check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL), filename, "certificate"); debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename, public ? public->type : -1); free(options.certificate_files[i]); options.certificate_files[i] = NULL; if (public == NULL) { free(filename); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) { debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate", __func__, filename, sshkey_type(public)); sshkey_free(public); free(filename); continue; } certificate_files[n_certs] = filename; certificates[n_certs] = public; certificate_file_userprovided[n_certs] = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i]; ++n_certs; } options.num_identity_files = n_ids; memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files)); memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys)); memcpy(options.identity_file_userprovided, identity_file_userprovided, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided)); options.num_certificate_files = n_certs; memcpy(options.certificate_files, certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files)); memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates)); memcpy(options.certificate_file_userprovided, certificate_file_userprovided, sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); } static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR)) ; errno = save_errno; } openssh-8.2p1/ssh.h010064400017500001750000000053121362136622600124300ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.89 2018/12/27 03:25:25 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */ #define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER SSH_CIPHER_3DES /* Default port number. */ #define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22 /* * Maximum number of certificate files that can be specified * in configuration files or on the command line. */ #define SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES 100 /* * Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified * in configuration files or on the command line. */ #define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100 /* * Major protocol version. Different version indicates major incompatibility * that prevents communication. * * Minor protocol version. Different version indicates minor incompatibility * that does not prevent interoperation. */ #define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 1 #define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 5 /* We support only SSH2 */ #define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 2 #define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 0 /* * Name for the service. The port named by this service overrides the * default port if present. */ #define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh" /* * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the * authentication agent. */ #define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME "SSH_AGENT_PID" /* * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the * authentication socket. */ #define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" /* * Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass */ #define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS" /* * Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this * many bits. This is to make double encryption with rsaref work. */ #define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED 128 /* * Length of the session key in bytes. (Specified as 256 bits in the * protocol.) */ #define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH 32 /* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */ #define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE -2 /* * unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes; * sshd will change its privileges to this user and its * primary group. */ #ifndef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER #define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd" #endif /* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */ #define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG 128 /* Limits for banner exchange */ #define SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN 8192 #define SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES 1024 openssh-8.2p1/ssh2.h010064400017500001750000000132461362136622600125170ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.18 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt * * Transport layer protocol: * * 1-19 Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug, * etc) * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for * different authentication methods) * * User authentication protocol: * * 50-59 User authentication generic * 60-79 User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused * for different authentication methods) * * Connection protocol: * * 80-89 Connection protocol generic * 90-127 Channel related messages * * Reserved for client protocols: * * 128-191 Reserved * * Local extensions: * * 192-255 Local extensions */ /* special marker for no message */ #define SSH_MSG_NONE 0 /* ranges */ #define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN 1 #define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX 49 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN 50 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX 79 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN 60 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX #define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN 80 #define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX 127 #define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MIN 128 #define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MAX 191 #define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN 192 #define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MAX 255 #define SSH2_MSG_MIN 1 #define SSH2_MSG_MAX 255 /* transport layer: generic */ #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 #define SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO 7 /* transport layer: alg negotiation */ #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* transport layer: kex specific messages, can be reused */ #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* dh-group-exchange */ #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD 30 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 34 /* ecdh */ #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT 30 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY 31 /* user authentication: generic */ #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* user authentication: method specific, can be reused */ #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* connection protocol: generic */ #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* channel related messages */ #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* disconnect reason code */ #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_RESERVED 4 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* misc */ #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* Certificate types for OpenSSH certificate keys extension */ #define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER 1 #define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2 openssh-8.2p1/ssh_api.c010064400017500001750000000353031362136622600132570ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.19 2019/10/31 21:23:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "ssh_api.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "version.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include int _ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *); int _ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *); int _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *); int _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *); int _ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *_ssh_host_public_key(int, int, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *_ssh_host_private_key(int, int, struct ssh *); int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *); /* * stubs for the server side implementation of kex. * disable privsep so our stubs will never be called. */ int use_privsep = 0; int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, const char *, const char *, u_int); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); #endif /* Define these two variables here so that they are part of the library */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; u_int session_id2_len = 0; int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, u_int compat) { return (-1); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL DH * mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) { return (NULL); } #endif /* API */ int ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; struct ssh *ssh; char **proposal; static int called; int r; if (!called) { seed_rng(); called = 1; } if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (is_server) ssh_packet_set_server(ssh); /* Initialize key exchange */ proposal = kex_params ? kex_params->proposal : myproposal; if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0) { ssh_free(ssh); return r; } ssh->kex->server = is_server; if (is_server) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; # endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; ssh->kex->load_host_public_key=&_ssh_host_public_key; ssh->kex->load_host_private_key=&_ssh_host_private_key; ssh->kex->sign=&_ssh_host_key_sign; } else { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client; # endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->verify_host_key =&_ssh_verify_host_key; } *sshp = ssh; return 0; } void ssh_free(struct ssh *ssh) { struct key_entry *k; ssh_packet_close(ssh); /* * we've only created the public keys variants in case we * are a acting as a server. */ while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->public_keys)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->public_keys, k, next); if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->server) sshkey_free(k->key); free(k); } while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->private_keys)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->private_keys, k, next); free(k); } if (ssh->kex) kex_free(ssh->kex); free(ssh); } void ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *ssh, void *app_data) { ssh->app_data = app_data; } void * ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->app_data; } /* Returns < 0 on error, 0 otherwise */ int ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key) { struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL; struct key_entry *k = NULL, *k_prv = NULL; int r; if (ssh->kex->server) { if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0) return r; if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL || (k_prv = malloc(sizeof(*k_prv))) == NULL) { free(k); sshkey_free(pubkey); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } k_prv->key = key; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->private_keys, k_prv, next); /* add the public key, too */ k->key = pubkey; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next); r = 0; } else { if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; k->key = key; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next); r = 0; } return r; } int ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh, int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *)) { if (cb == NULL || ssh->kex == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ssh->kex->verify_host_key = cb; return 0; } int ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len) { return sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), data, len); } int ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep) { int r; u_int32_t seqnr; u_char type; /* * Try to read a packet. Return SSH_MSG_NONE if no packet or not * enough data. */ *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0 || sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0) return _ssh_exchange_banner(ssh); /* * If we enough data and a dispatch function then * call the function and get the next packet. * Otherwise return the packet type to the caller so it * can decide how to go on. * * We will only call the dispatch function for: * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for * different authentication methods) */ for (;;) { if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, &type, &seqnr)) != 0) return r; if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && type >= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX && ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) { if ((r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh)) != 0) return r; } else { *typep = type; return 0; } } } const u_char * ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp) { return sshpkt_ptr(ssh, lenp); } int ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data, size_t len) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, data, len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; return 0; } const u_char * ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len) { struct sshbuf *output = ssh_packet_get_output(ssh); *len = sshbuf_len(output); return sshbuf_ptr(output); } int ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len) { return sshbuf_consume(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len); } int ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len) { return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len)); } int ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len) { return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), len)); } /* Read other side's version identification. */ int _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *banner) { struct sshbuf *input = ssh_packet_get_input(ssh); const char *mismatch = "Protocol mismatch.\r\n"; const u_char *s = sshbuf_ptr(input); u_char c; char *cp = NULL, *remote_version = NULL; int r = 0, remote_major, remote_minor, expect_nl; size_t n, j; for (j = n = 0;;) { sshbuf_reset(banner); expect_nl = 0; for (;;) { if (j >= sshbuf_len(input)) return 0; /* insufficient data in input buf */ c = s[j++]; if (c == '\r') { expect_nl = 1; continue; } if (c == '\n') break; if (expect_nl) goto bad; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(banner, c)) != 0) return r; if (sshbuf_len(banner) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN) goto bad; } if (sshbuf_len(banner) >= 4 && memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(banner), "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; debug("%s: %.*s", __func__, (int)sshbuf_len(banner), sshbuf_ptr(banner)); /* Accept lines before banner only on client */ if (ssh->kex->server || ++n > SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) { bad: if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), mismatch, strlen(mismatch))) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION; } } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, j)) != 0) return r; /* XXX remote version must be the same size as banner for sscanf */ if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(banner)) == NULL || (remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(banner))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(cp, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99) { remote_major = 2; remote_minor = 0; } if (remote_major != 2) r = SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH; debug("Remote version string %.100s", cp); out: free(cp); free(remote_version); return r; } /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ int _ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *banner) { char *cp; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), banner)) != 0) return r; /* Remove trailing \r\n */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(banner, 2)) != 0) return r; if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(banner)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; debug("Local version string %.100s", cp); free(cp); return 0; } int _ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; /* * if _ssh_read_banner() cannot parse a full version string * it will return NULL and we end up calling it again. */ r = 0; if (kex->server) { if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0) r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->server_version); if (r == 0 && sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 && sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0) r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->client_version); } else { if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0) r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->server_version); if (r == 0 && sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 && sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0) r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->client_version); } if (r != 0) return r; /* start initial kex as soon as we have exchanged the banners */ if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 && sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) != 0) { if ((r = _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(ssh)) != 0 || (r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } struct sshkey * _ssh_host_public_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { struct key_entry *k; debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type); TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) { debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key)); if (k->key->type == type && (type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid)) return (k->key); } return (NULL); } struct sshkey * _ssh_host_private_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { struct key_entry *k; debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type); TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->private_keys, next) { debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key)); if (k->key->type == type && (type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid)) return (k->key); } return (NULL); } int _ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { struct key_entry *k; debug3("%s: need %s", __func__, sshkey_type(hostkey)); TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) { debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key)); if (sshkey_equal_public(hostkey, k->key)) return (0); /* ok */ } return (-1); /* failed */ } /* offer hostkey algorithms in kexinit depending on registered keys */ int _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *ssh) { struct key_entry *k; char *orig, *avail, *oavail = NULL, *alg, *replace = NULL; char **proposal; size_t maxlen; int ktype, r; /* XXX we de-serialize ssh->kex->my, modify it, and change it */ if ((r = kex_buf2prop(ssh->kex->my, NULL, &proposal)) != 0) return r; orig = proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; if ((oavail = avail = strdup(orig)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; if ((replace = calloc(1, maxlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } *replace = '\0'; while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') { if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) continue; TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) { if (k->key->type == ktype || (sshkey_is_cert(k->key) && k->key->type == sshkey_type_plain(ktype))) { if (*replace != '\0') strlcat(replace, ",", maxlen); strlcat(replace, alg, maxlen); break; } } } if (*replace != '\0') { debug2("%s: orig/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, orig); debug2("%s: replace/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, replace); free(orig); proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = replace; replace = NULL; /* owned by proposal */ r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal); } out: free(oavail); free(replace); kex_prop_free(proposal); return r; } int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg) { return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen, alg, NULL, ssh->compat); } openssh-8.2p1/ssh_api.h010064400017500001750000000105221362136622600132600ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.h,v 1.2 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef API_H #define API_H #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" struct kex_params { char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]; }; /* public SSH API functions */ /* * ssh_init() create a ssh connection object with given (optional) * key exchange parameters. */ int ssh_init(struct ssh **, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params); /* * release ssh connection state. */ void ssh_free(struct ssh *); /* * attach application specific data to the connection state */ void ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *, void *); void *ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *); /* * ssh_add_hostkey() registers a private/public hostkey for an ssh * connection. * ssh_add_hostkey() needs to be called before a key exchange is * initiated with ssh_packet_next(). * private hostkeys are required if we need to act as a server. * public hostkeys are used to verify the servers hostkey. */ int ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key); /* * ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback() registers a callback function * which should be called instead of the default verification. The * function given must return 0 if the hostkey is ok, -1 if the * verification has failed. */ int ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh, int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *)); /* * ssh_packet_next() advances to the next input packet and returns * the packet type in typep. * ssh_packet_next() works by processing an input byte-stream, * decrypting the received data and hiding the key-exchange from * the caller. * ssh_packet_next() sets typep if there is no new packet available. * in this case the caller must fill the input byte-stream by passing * the data received over network to ssh_input_append(). * additionally, the caller needs to send the resulting output * byte-stream back over the network. otherwise the key exchange * would not proceed. the output byte-stream is accessed through * ssh_output_ptr(). */ int ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep); /* * ssh_packet_payload() returns a pointer to the raw payload data of * the current input packet and the length of this payload. * the payload is accessible until ssh_packet_next() is called again. */ const u_char *ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp); /* * ssh_packet_put() creates an encrypted packet with the given type * and payload. * the encrypted packet is appended to the output byte-stream. */ int ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data, size_t len); /* * ssh_input_space() checks if 'len' bytes can be appended to the * input byte-stream. */ int ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len); /* * ssh_input_append() appends data to the input byte-stream. */ int ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len); /* * ssh_output_space() checks if 'len' bytes can be appended to the * output byte-stream. XXX */ int ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len); /* * ssh_output_ptr() retrieves both a pointer and the length of the * current output byte-stream. the bytes need to be sent over the * network. the number of bytes that have been successfully sent can * be removed from the output byte-stream with ssh_output_consume(). */ const u_char *ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len); /* * ssh_output_consume() removes the given number of bytes from * the output byte-stream. */ int ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len); #endif openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config010064400017500001750000000027141362136622600135320ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.34 2019/02/04 02:39:42 dtucker Exp $ # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See # ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for # users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files # or on the command line. # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options. For a comprehensive # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the # ssh_config(5) man page. # Host * # ForwardAgent no # ForwardX11 no # PasswordAuthentication yes # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no # BatchMode no # CheckHostIP yes # AddressFamily any # ConnectTimeout 0 # StrictHostKeyChecking ask # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 # Port 22 # Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc # MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com # EscapeChar ~ # Tunnel no # TunnelDevice any:any # PermitLocalCommand no # VisualHostKey no # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com # RekeyLimit 1G 1h openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5010064400017500001750000001534621362136622600137040ustar00djmdjm.\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.322 2020/02/07 03:54:44 dtucker Exp $ .Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh_config .Nd OpenSSH client configuration file .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr ssh 1 obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: .Pp .Bl -enum -offset indent -compact .It command-line options .It user's configuration file .Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config .It system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config .El .Pp For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections separated by .Cm Host specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option for exceptions). .Pp Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end. .Pp The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one .Ql = ; the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying configuration options using the .Nm ssh , .Nm scp , and .Nm sftp .Fl o option. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single .Ql * as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is usually the .Ar hostname argument given on the command line (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname keyword for exceptions). .Pp A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . If a negated entry is matched, then the .Cm Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard matches. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .It Cm Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the .Cm Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria or the single token .Cm all which always matches. The available criteria keywords are: .Cm canonical , .Cm final , .Cm exec , .Cm host , .Cm originalhost , .Cm user , and .Cm localuser . The .Cm all criteria must appear alone or immediately after .Cm canonical or .Cm final . Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but .Cm all , .Cm canonical , and .Cm final require an argument. Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . .Pp The .Cm canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option). This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host names only. .Pp The .Cm final keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed (regardless of whether .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled), and matches only during this final pass. If .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, then .Cm canonical and .Cm final match during the same pass. .Pp The .Cm exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted. Arguments to .Cm exec accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the .Sx PATTERNS section. The criteria for the .Cm host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the .Cm Hostname or .Cm CanonicalizeHostname options. The .Cm originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line. The .Cm user keyword matches against the target username on the remote host. The .Cm localuser keyword matches against the name of the local user running .Xr ssh 1 (this keyword may be useful in system-wide .Nm files). .It Cm AddKeysToAgent Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running .Xr ssh-agent 1 . If this option is set to .Cm yes and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to the agent with the default lifetime, as if by .Xr ssh-add 1 . If this option is set to .Cm ask , .Xr ssh 1 will require confirmation using the .Ev SSH_ASKPASS program before adding a key (see .Xr ssh-add 1 for details). If this option is set to .Cm confirm , each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the .Fl c option was specified to .Xr ssh-add 1 . If this option is set to .Cm no , no keys are added to the agent. The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm confirm , .Cm ask , or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid arguments are .Cm any (the default), .Cm inet (use IPv4 only), or .Cm inet6 (use IPv6 only). .It Cm BatchMode If set to .Cm yes , user interaction such as password prompts and host key confirmation requests will be disabled. This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present to interact with .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm BindAddress Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. .It Cm BindInterface Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine as the source address of the connection. .It Cm CanonicalDomains When .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified destination host. .It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails. The default, .Cm yes , will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search rules. A value of .Cm no will cause .Xr ssh 1 to fail instantly if .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains specified by .Cm CanonicalDomains . .It Cm CanonicalizeHostname Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. The default, .Cm no , is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to .Cm yes then, for connections that do not use a .Cm ProxyCommand or .Cm ProxyJump , .Xr ssh 1 will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line using the .Cm CanonicalDomains suffixes and .Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is set to .Cm always , then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too. .Pp If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching .Cm Host and .Cm Match stanzas. .It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before canonicalization is disabled. The default, 1, allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). .It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more arguments of .Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list , where .Ar source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization, and .Ar target_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to. .Pp For example, .Qq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com will allow hostnames matching .Qq *.a.example.com to be canonicalized to names in the .Qq *.b.example.com or .Qq *.c.example.com domains. .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp .Xr ssh 1 will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those specified. .It Cm CertificateFile Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read. A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order to use this certificate either from an .Cm IdentityFile directive or .Fl i flag to .Xr ssh 1 , via .Xr ssh-agent 1 , or via a .Cm PKCS11Provider or .Cm SecurityKeyProvider . .Pp Arguments to .Cm CertificateFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence. Multiple .Cm CertificateFile directives will add to the list of certificates used for authentication. .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm no . .It Cm CheckHostIP If set to .Cm yes (the default), .Xr ssh 1 will additionally check the host IP address in the .Pa known_hosts file. This allows it to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add addresses of destination hosts to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the process, regardless of the setting of .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking . If the option is set to .Cm no , the check will not be executed. .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Bd -literal -offset indent 3des-cbc aes128-cbc aes192-cbc aes256-cbc aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q cipher . .It Cm ClearAllForwardings Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings specified in the configuration files or on the command line be cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the .Xr ssh 1 command line to clear port forwardings set in configuration files, and is automatically set by .Xr scp 1 and .Xr sftp 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm Compression Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1. .It Cm ConnectTimeout Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and to performing the initial SSH protocol handshake and key exchange. .It Cm ControlMaster Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. When set to .Cm yes , .Xr ssh 1 will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the .Cm ControlPath argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same .Cm ControlPath with .Cm ControlMaster set to .Cm no (the default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. .Pp Setting this to .Cm ask will cause .Xr ssh 1 to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using .Xr ssh-askpass 1 . If the .Cm ControlPath cannot be opened, .Xr ssh 1 will continue without connecting to a master instance. .Pp X11 and .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents. .Pp Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already exist. These options are: .Cm auto and .Cm autoask . The latter requires confirmation like the .Cm ask option. .It Cm ControlPath Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described in the .Cm ControlMaster section above or the string .Cm none to disable connection sharing. Arguments to .Cm ControlPath may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. It is recommended that any .Cm ControlPath used for opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not writable by other users. This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified. .It Cm ControlPersist When used in conjunction with .Cm ControlMaster , specifies that the master connection should remain open in the background (waiting for future client connections) after the initial client connection has been closed. If set to .Cm no (the default), then the master connection will not be placed into the background, and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to .Cm yes or 0, then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the .Qq ssh -O exit ) . If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in .Xr sshd_config 5 , then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the specified time. .It Cm DynamicForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port . .Sm on IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Cm localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Xr ssh 1 will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. .It Cm EnableSSHKeysign Setting this option to .Cm yes in the global client configuration file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program .Xr ssh-keysign 8 during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. See .Xr ssh-keysign 8 for more information. .It Cm EscapeChar Sets the escape character (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character, .Ql ^ followed by a letter, or .Cm none to disable the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary data). .It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g.\& if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port). Note that .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not, for example, cause .Xr ssh 1 to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Cm md5 and .Cm sha256 (the default). .It Cm ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument may be .Cm yes , .Cm no (the default), an explicit path to an agent socket or the name of an environment variable (beginning with .Sq $ ) in which to find the path. .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .It Cm ForwardX11 Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected over the secure channel and .Ev DISPLAY set. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled. .It Cm ForwardX11Timeout Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format described in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . X11 connections received by .Xr ssh 1 after this time will be refused. Setting .Cm ForwardX11Timeout to zero will disable the timeout and permit X11 forwarding for the life of the connection. The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has elapsed. .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted If this option is set to .Cm yes , remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm no (the default), remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the .Xr xauth 1 token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this time. .Pp See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local forwarded ports. By default, .Xr ssh 1 binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm HashKnownHosts Indicates that .Xr ssh 1 should hash host names and addresses when they are added to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts . These hashed names may be used normally by .Xr ssh 1 and .Xr sshd 8 , but they do not visually reveal identifying information if the file's contents are disclosed. The default is .Cm no . Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be manually hashed using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key authentication. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm HostbasedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 may be used to list supported key types. .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the host key algorithms that the client wants to use in order of preference. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified to prefer their algorithms. .Pp The list of available key types may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms . .It Cm HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key database files and when validating host certificates. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. .It Cm Hostname Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. Arguments to .Cm Hostname accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in .Cm Hostname specifications). The default is the name given on the command line. .It Cm IdentitiesOnly Specifies that .Xr ssh 1 should only use the configured authentication identity and certificate files (either the default files, or those explicitly configured in the .Nm files or passed on the .Xr ssh 1 command-line), even if .Xr ssh-agent 1 or a .Cm PKCS11Provider or .Cm SecurityKeyProvider offers more identities. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. .It Cm IdentityAgent Specifies the .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the authentication agent. .Pp This option overrides the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable and can be used to select a specific agent. Setting the socket name to .Cm none disables the use of an authentication agent. If the string .Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. Otherwise if the specified value begins with a .Sq $ character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the location of the socket. .Pp Arguments to .Cm IdentityAgent may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .It Cm IdentityFile Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless .Cm IdentitiesOnly is set. If no certificates have been explicitly specified by .Cm CertificateFile , .Xr ssh 1 will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to the path of a specified .Cm IdentityFile . .Pp Arguments to .Cm IdentityFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these identities will be tried in sequence. Multiple .Cm IdentityFile directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other configuration directives). .Pp .Cm IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with .Cm IdentitiesOnly to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication. .Cm IdentityFile may also be used in conjunction with .Cm CertificateFile in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with the identity. .It Cm IgnoreUnknown Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to suppress errors if .Nm contains options that are unrecognised by .Xr ssh 1 . It is recommended that .Cm IgnoreUnknown be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied to unknown options that appear before it. .It Cm Include Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain .Xr glob 7 wildcards and, for user configurations, shell-like .Sq ~ references to user home directories. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in .Pa ~/.ssh if included in a user configuration file or .Pa /etc/ssh if included from the system configuration file. .Cm Include directive may appear inside a .Cm Match or .Cm Host block to perform conditional inclusion. .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. Accepted values are .Cm af11 , .Cm af12 , .Cm af13 , .Cm af21 , .Cm af22 , .Cm af23 , .Cm af31 , .Cm af32 , .Cm af33 , .Cm af41 , .Cm af42 , .Cm af43 , .Cm cs0 , .Cm cs1 , .Cm cs2 , .Cm cs3 , .Cm cs4 , .Cm cs5 , .Cm cs6 , .Cm cs7 , .Cm ef , .Cm le , .Cm lowdelay , .Cm throughput , .Cm reliability , a numeric value, or .Cm none to use the operating system default. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Cm af21 (Low-Latency Data) for interactive sessions and .Cm cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm no . .It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated. The default is to use the server specified list. The methods available vary depending on what the server supports. For an OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: .Cm bsdauth and .Cm pam . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the default set. The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 .Ed .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q kex . .It Cm LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. Arguments to .Cm LocalCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the session of the .Xr ssh 1 that spawned it. It should not be used for interactive commands. .Pp This directive is ignored unless .Cm PermitLocalCommand has been enabled. .It Cm LocalForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. The first argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on and the second argument must be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport . IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Cm localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr ssh 1 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output. .It Cm MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Qq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q mac . .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses). The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3. .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm no . .It Cm PermitLocalCommand Allow local command execution via the .Ic LocalCommand option or using the .Ic !\& Ns Ar command escape sequence in .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm PKCS11Provider Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or .Cm none to indicate that no provider should be used (the default). The argument to this keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library .Xr ssh 1 should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication. .It Cm Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The default is 22. .It Cm PreferredAuthentications Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\& .Cm keyboard-interactive ) over another method (e.g.\& .Cm password ) . The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password .Ed .It Cm ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed using the user's shell .Ql exec directive to avoid a lingering shell process. .Pp Arguments to .Cm ProxyCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. The command can be basically anything, and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an .Xr sshd 8 server running on some machine, or execute .Ic sshd -i somewhere. Host key management will be done using the .Cm Hostname of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting the command to .Cm none disables this option entirely. Note that .Cm CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command. .Pp This directive is useful in conjunction with .Xr nc 1 and its proxy support. For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p .Ed .It Cm ProxyJump Specifies one or more jump proxies as either .Xo .Sm off .Op Ar user No @ .Ar host .Op : Ns Ar port .Sm on or an ssh URI .Xc . Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be visited sequentially. Setting this option will cause .Xr ssh 1 to connect to the target host by first making a .Xr ssh 1 connection to the specified .Cm ProxyJump host and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there. .Pp Note that this option will compete with the .Cm ProxyCommand option - whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the other from taking effect. .Pp Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either supplied via the command-line or the configuration file) is not generally applied to jump hosts. .Pa ~/.ssh/config should be used if specific configuration is required for jump hosts. .It Cm ProxyUseFdpass Specifies that .Cm ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor back to .Xr ssh 1 instead of continuing to execute and pass data. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default instead of replacing it. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The list of available key types may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes . .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm no . .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Cm default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. .It Cm RemoteCommand Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. Arguments to .Cm RemoteCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .It Cm RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over the secure channel. The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine. The first argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on If forwarding to a specific destination then the second argument must be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport , otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote forwarding will be established as a SOCKS proxy. .Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. .Pp If the .Ar port argument is 0, the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. .Pp If the .Ar bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses. If the .Ar bind_address is .Ql * or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .It Cm RequestTTY Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The argument may be one of: .Cm no (never request a TTY), .Cm yes (always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), .Cm force (always request a TTY) or .Cm auto (request a TTY when opening a login session). This option mirrors the .Fl t and .Fl T flags for .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm RevokedHostKeys Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm SecurityKeyProvider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. .Pp If the specified value begins with a .Sq $ character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the path to the library. .It Cm SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local .Xr environ 7 should be sent to the server. The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note that the .Ev TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. Refer to .Cm AcceptEnv in .Xr sshd_config 5 for how to configure the server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm SendEnv directives. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .Pp It is possible to clear previously set .Cm SendEnv variable names by prefixing patterns with .Pa - . The default is not to send any environment variables. .It Cm ServerAliveCountMax Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be sent without .Xr ssh 1 receiving any messages back from the server. If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive (below). The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive. .Pp The default value is 3. If, for example, .Cm ServerAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15 and .Cm ServerAliveCountMax is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds. .It Cm ServerAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the server, .Xr ssh 1 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. .It Cm SetEnv Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to be sent to the server. Similarly to .Cm SendEnv , the server must be prepared to accept the environment variable. .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask .Pq umask used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. .It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, .Nm ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking If this flag is set to .Cm yes , .Xr ssh 1 will never automatically add host keys to the .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, though it can be annoying when the .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. .Pp If this flag is set to .Dq accept-new then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files, but will not permit connections to hosts with changed host keys. If this flag is set to .Dq no or .Dq off , ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files and allow connections to hosts with changed hostkeys to proceed, subject to some restrictions. If this flag is set to .Cm ask (the default), new host keys will be added to the user known host files only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. .It Cm SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Xr ssh 1 . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is USER. .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. .Pp The default is .Cm yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Cm no . See also .Cm ServerAliveInterval for protocol-level keepalives. .It Cm Tunnel Request .Xr tun 4 device forwarding between the client and the server. The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm point-to-point (layer 3), .Cm ethernet (layer 2), or .Cm no (the default). Specifying .Cm yes requests the default tunnel mode, which is .Cm point-to-point . .It Cm TunnelDevice Specifies the .Xr tun 4 devices to open on the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun . .Sm on The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Cm any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Cm any . The default is .Cm any:any . .It Cm UpdateHostKeys Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has completed and add them to .Cm UserKnownHostsFile . The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm no or .Cm ask . This option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement public keys before old ones are removed. Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user. .Pp .Cm UpdateHostKeys is enabled by default if the user has not overridden the default .Cm UserKnownHostsFile setting, otherwise .Cm UpdateHostKeys will be set to .Cm ask . .Pp If .Cm UpdateHostKeys is set to .Cm ask , then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file. Confirmation is currently incompatible with .Cm ControlPersist , and will be disabled if it is enabled. .Pp Presently, only .Xr sshd 8 from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the .Qq hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys. .It Cm User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. This saves the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the command line. .It Cm UserKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 . .It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource records. If this option is set to .Cm yes , the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to .Cm ask . If this option is set to .Cm ask , information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm new host keys according to the .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option. The default is .Cm no . .Pp See also .Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS in .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm VisualHostKey If this flag is set to .Cm yes , an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this flag is set to .Cm no (the default), no fingerprint strings are printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys. .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program. The default is .Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth . .El .Sh PATTERNS A .Em pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, .Sq * (a wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or .Sq ?\& (a wildcard that matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the .Qq .co.uk set of domains, the following pattern could be used: .Pp .Dl Host *.co.uk .Pp The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range: .Pp .Dl Host 192.168.0.? .Pp A .Em pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization except from the .Qq dialup pool, the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&" .Pp Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself. For example, attempting to match .Qq host3 against the following pattern-list will fail: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2\&" .Pp The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match, such as a wildcard: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2,*\&" .Sh TOKENS Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at runtime: .Pp .Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact .It %% A literal .Sq % . .It \&%C Hash of %l%h%p%r. .It %d Local user's home directory. .It %h The remote hostname. .It %i The local user ID. .It %L The local hostname. .It %l The local hostname, including the domain name. .It %n The original remote hostname, as given on the command line. .It %p The remote port. .It %r The remote username. .It \&%T The local .Xr tun 4 or .Xr tap 4 network interface assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested, or .Qq NONE otherwise. .It %u The local username. .El .Pp .Cm Match exec accepts the tokens %%, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. .Pp .Cm CertificateFile accepts the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u. .Pp .Cm ControlPath accepts the tokens %%, %C, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. .Pp .Cm Hostname accepts the tokens %% and %h. .Pp .Cm IdentityAgent and .Cm IdentityFile accept the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u. .Pp .Cm LocalCommand accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, %T, and %u. .Pp .Cm ProxyCommand accepts the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r. .Pp .Cm RemoteCommand accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for those values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file. This file must be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by .An Tatu Ylonen . .An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , .An Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt and .An Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. .An Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. openssh-8.2p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c010064400017500001750000000303041362136622600155040ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.10 2019/12/13 19:09:37 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" int sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len) { const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); int r; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len)) < 0) return r; if (v != NULL && len != 0) memcpy(v, p, len); return 0; } int sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp) { const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); int r; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 8)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = PEEK_U64(p); return 0; } int sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp) { const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); int r; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 4)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = PEEK_U32(p); return 0; } int sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp) { const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); int r; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 2)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = PEEK_U16(p); return 0; } int sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp) { const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); int r; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 1)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = (u_int8_t)*p; return 0; } static int check_offset(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wr, size_t offset, size_t len) { if (sshbuf_ptr(buf) == NULL) /* calls sshbuf_check_sanity() */ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (offset >= SIZE_MAX - len) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (offset + len > sshbuf_len(buf)) { return wr ? SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE : SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; } return 0; } static int check_roffset(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, size_t len, const u_char **p) { int r; *p = NULL; if ((r = check_offset(buf, 0, offset, len)) != 0) return r; *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf) + offset; return 0; } int sshbuf_peek_u64(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t *valp) { const u_char *p = NULL; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = 0; if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 8, &p)) != 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = PEEK_U64(p); return 0; } int sshbuf_peek_u32(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t *valp) { const u_char *p = NULL; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = 0; if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 4, &p)) != 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = PEEK_U32(p); return 0; } int sshbuf_peek_u16(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t *valp) { const u_char *p = NULL; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = 0; if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 2, &p)) != 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = PEEK_U16(p); return 0; } int sshbuf_peek_u8(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char *valp) { const u_char *p = NULL; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = 0; if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 1, &p)) != 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = *p; return 0; } int sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { const u_char *val; size_t len; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &val, &len)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) { if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } if (len != 0) memcpy(*valp, val, len); (*valp)[len] = '\0'; } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; return 0; } int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { size_t len; const u_char *p; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = p; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; if (sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4) != 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); SSHBUF_ABORT(); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { u_int32_t len; const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); if (valp != NULL) *valp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 4) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE")); return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; } len = PEEK_U32(p); if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE")); return SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE; } if (sshbuf_len(buf) - 4 < len) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE")); return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; } if (valp != NULL) *valp = p + 4; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; return 0; } int sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp) { size_t len; const u_char *p, *z; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0) return r; /* Allow a \0 only at the end of the string */ if (len > 0 && (z = memchr(p , '\0', len)) != NULL && z < p + len - 1) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT")); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) return -1; if (valp != NULL) { if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } if (len != 0) memcpy(*valp, p, len); (*valp)[len] = '\0'; } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = (size_t)len; return 0; } int sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v) { u_int32_t len; u_char *p; int r; /* * Use sshbuf_peek_string_direct() to figure out if there is * a complete string in 'buf' and copy the string directly * into 'v'. */ if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_reserve(v, len, &p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(buf, p, len)) != 0) return r; return 0; } int sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) { u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len, &p)) < 0) return r; if (len != 0) memcpy(p, v, len); return 0; } int sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v) { return sshbuf_put(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v)); } int sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = sshbuf_putfv(buf, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return r; } int sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap) { va_list ap2; int r, len; u_char *p; VA_COPY(ap2, ap); if ((len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ap2)) < 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (len == 0) { r = 0; goto out; /* Nothing to do */ } va_end(ap2); VA_COPY(ap2, ap); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, (size_t)len + 1, &p)) < 0) goto out; if ((r = vsnprintf((char *)p, len + 1, fmt, ap2)) != len) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; /* Shouldn't happen */ } /* Consume terminating \0 */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, 1)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: va_end(ap2); return r; } int sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val) { u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 8, &p)) < 0) return r; POKE_U64(p, val); return 0; } int sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val) { u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 4, &p)) < 0) return r; POKE_U32(p, val); return 0; } int sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val) { u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 2, &p)) < 0) return r; POKE_U16(p, val); return 0; } int sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val) { u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 1, &p)) < 0) return r; p[0] = val; return 0; } static int check_woffset(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, size_t len, u_char **p) { int r; *p = NULL; if ((r = check_offset(buf, 1, offset, len)) != 0) return r; if (sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY; *p = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf) + offset; return 0; } int sshbuf_poke_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t val) { u_char *p = NULL; int r; if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 8, &p)) != 0) return r; POKE_U64(p, val); return 0; } int sshbuf_poke_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t val) { u_char *p = NULL; int r; if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 4, &p)) != 0) return r; POKE_U32(p, val); return 0; } int sshbuf_poke_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t val) { u_char *p = NULL; int r; if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 2, &p)) != 0) return r; POKE_U16(p, val); return 0; } int sshbuf_poke_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char val) { u_char *p = NULL; int r; if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 1, &p)) != 0) return r; *p = val; return 0; } int sshbuf_poke(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, void *v, size_t len) { u_char *p = NULL; int r; if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, len, &p)) != 0) return r; memcpy(p, v, len); return 0; } int sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) { u_char *d; int r; if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE")); return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4, &d)) < 0) return r; POKE_U32(d, len); if (len != 0) memcpy(d + 4, v, len); return 0; } int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v) { return sshbuf_put_string(buf, v, v == NULL ? 0 : strlen(v)); } int sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v) { if (v == NULL) return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0); return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v)); } int sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp) { const u_char *p; size_t len; struct sshbuf *ret; int r; if (buf == NULL || bufp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *bufp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0) return r; if ((ret = sshbuf_from(p, len)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4)) != 0 || /* Shouldn't happen */ (r = sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf)) != 0) { sshbuf_free(ret); return r; } *bufp = ret; return 0; } int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) { u_char *d; const u_char *s = (const u_char *)v; int r, prepend; if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 5) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE")); return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; } /* Skip leading zero bytes */ for (; len > 0 && *s == 0; len--, s++) ; /* * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to * avoid interpretation as a negative number. */ prepend = len > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4 + prepend, &d)) < 0) return r; POKE_U32(d, len + prepend); if (prepend) d[4] = 0; if (len != 0) memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len); return 0; } int sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { const u_char *d; size_t len, olen; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &olen)) < 0) return r; len = olen; /* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */ if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0)) return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE; /* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */ if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 || (len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0)) return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE; /* Trim leading zeros */ while (len > 0 && *d == 0x00) { d++; len--; } if (valp != NULL) *valp = d; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; if (sshbuf_consume(buf, olen + 4) != 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); SSHBUF_ABORT(); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c010064400017500001750000000107001362136622600157410ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.8 2019/11/15 06:00:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM **valp) { BIGNUM *v; const u_char *d; size_t len; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(buf, &d, &len)) != 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) { if ((v = BN_new()) == NULL || BN_bin2bn(d, len, v) == NULL) { BN_clear_free(v); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } *valp = v; } return 0; } #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC static int get_ec(const u_char *d, size_t len, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { /* Refuse overlong bignums */ if (len == 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) return SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE; /* Only handle uncompressed points */ if (*d != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if (v != NULL && EC_POINT_oct2point(g, v, d, len, NULL) != 1) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX assumption */ return 0; } int sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { const u_char *d; size_t len; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) return r; if ((r = get_ec(d, len, v, g)) != 0) return r; /* Skip string */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); SSHBUF_ABORT(); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } int sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v) { EC_POINT *pt = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(v)); int r; const u_char *d; size_t len; if (pt == NULL) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) { EC_POINT_free(pt); return r; } if ((r = get_ec(d, len, pt, EC_KEY_get0_group(v))) != 0) { EC_POINT_free(pt); return r; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(v, pt) != 1) { EC_POINT_free(pt); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* XXX assumption */ } EC_POINT_free(pt); /* Skip string */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); SSHBUF_ABORT(); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ int sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v) { u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1]; int len = BN_num_bytes(v), prepend = 0, r; if (len < 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *d = '\0'; if (BN_bn2bin(v, d + 1) != len) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */ /* If MSB is set, prepend a \0 */ if (len > 0 && (d[1] & 0x80) != 0) prepend = 1; if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d + 1 - prepend, len + prepend)) < 0) { explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d)); return r; } explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d)); return 0; } #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT]; size_t len; int ret; if ((len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL)) > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) { return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, d, len, NULL) != len) { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */ } ret = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d, len); explicit_bzero(d, len); return ret; } int sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v) { return sshbuf_put_ec(buf, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(v), EC_KEY_get0_group(v)); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ openssh-8.2p1/sshbuf-io.c010064400017500001750000000053711362136622600135320ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-io.c,v 1.2 2020/01/25 23:28:06 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "atomicio.h" /* Load a file from a fd into a buffer */ int sshbuf_load_fd(int fd, struct sshbuf **blobp) { u_char buf[4096]; size_t len; struct stat st; int r; struct sshbuf *blob; *blobp = NULL; if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && st.st_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; for (;;) { if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) { if (errno == EPIPE) break; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0) goto out; if (sshbuf_len(blob) > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) { r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED; goto out; } /* success */ *blobp = blob; blob = NULL; /* transferred */ r = 0; out: explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); sshbuf_free(blob); return r; } int sshbuf_load_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf **bufp) { int r, fd, oerrno; *bufp = NULL; if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, bufp)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: oerrno = errno; close(fd); if (r != 0) errno = oerrno; return r; } int sshbuf_write_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf *buf) { int fd, oerrno; if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)) != sshbuf_len(buf) || close(fd) != 0) { oerrno = errno; close(fd); unlink(path); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/sshbuf-misc.c010064400017500001750000000125361362136622600140570ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.13 2020/01/25 23:28:06 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssherr.h" #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL #include "sshbuf.h" void sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f) { size_t i, j; const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s; for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) { fprintf(f, "%.4zu: ", i); for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { if (j < len) fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]); else fprintf(f, " "); } fprintf(f, " "); for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { if (j < len) { if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j])) fprintf(f, "%c", p[j]); else fprintf(f, "."); } } fprintf(f, "\n"); } } void sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f) { fprintf(f, "buffer %p len = %zu\n", buf, sshbuf_len(buf)); sshbuf_dump_data(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), f); } char * sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf) { size_t i, j, len = sshbuf_len(buf); const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); char *ret; const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef"; if (len == 0) return strdup(""); if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(len * 2 + 1)) == NULL) return NULL; for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) { ret[j++] = hex[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf]; ret[j++] = hex[p[i] & 0xf]; } ret[j] = '\0'; return ret; } int sshbuf_dtob64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap) { size_t i, slen = 0; char *s = NULL; int r; if (d == NULL || b64 == NULL || sshbuf_len(d) >= SIZE_MAX / 2) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (sshbuf_len(d) == 0) return 0; slen = ((sshbuf_len(d) + 2) / 3) * 4 + 1; if ((s = malloc(slen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (b64_ntop(sshbuf_ptr(d), sshbuf_len(d), s, slen) == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto fail; } if (wrap) { for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, s[i])) != 0) goto fail; if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, '\n')) != 0) goto fail; } if ((i - 1) % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, '\n')) != 0) goto fail; } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put(b64, s, strlen(s))) != 0) goto fail; } /* Success */ r = 0; fail: freezero(s, slen); return r; } char * sshbuf_dtob64_string(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wrap) { struct sshbuf *tmp; char *ret; if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return NULL; if (sshbuf_dtob64(buf, tmp, wrap) != 0) { sshbuf_free(tmp); return NULL; } ret = sshbuf_dup_string(tmp); sshbuf_free(tmp); return ret; } int sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64) { size_t plen = strlen(b64); int nlen, r; u_char *p; if (plen == 0) return 0; if ((p = malloc(plen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((nlen = b64_pton(b64, p, plen)) < 0) { explicit_bzero(p, plen); free(p); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, nlen)) < 0) { explicit_bzero(p, plen); free(p); return r; } explicit_bzero(p, plen); free(p); return 0; } char * sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf) { const u_char *p = NULL, *s = sshbuf_ptr(buf); size_t l = sshbuf_len(buf); char *r; if (s == NULL || l > SIZE_MAX) return NULL; /* accept a nul only as the last character in the buffer */ if (l > 0 && (p = memchr(s, '\0', l)) != NULL) { if (p != s + l - 1) return NULL; l--; /* the nul is put back below */ } if ((r = malloc(l + 1)) == NULL) return NULL; if (l > 0) memcpy(r, s, l); r[l] = '\0'; return r; } int sshbuf_cmp(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t offset, const void *s, size_t len) { if (sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (offset > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (offset + len > sshbuf_len(b)) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(b) + offset, s, len) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; return 0; } int sshbuf_find(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t start_offset, const void *s, size_t len, size_t *offsetp) { void *p; if (offsetp != NULL) *offsetp = 0; if (sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (start_offset > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (start_offset > sshbuf_len(b) || start_offset + len > sshbuf_len(b)) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; if ((p = memmem(sshbuf_ptr(b) + start_offset, sshbuf_len(b) - start_offset, s, len)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if (offsetp != NULL) *offsetp = (const u_char *)p - sshbuf_ptr(b); return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/sshbuf.c010064400017500001750000000217331362136622600131250ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.14 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" static inline int sshbuf_check_sanity(const struct sshbuf *buf) { SSHBUF_TELL("sanity"); if (__predict_false(buf == NULL || (!buf->readonly && buf->d != buf->cd) || buf->refcount < 1 || buf->refcount > SSHBUF_REFS_MAX || buf->cd == NULL || buf->max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || buf->alloc > buf->max_size || buf->size > buf->alloc || buf->off > buf->size)) { /* Do not try to recover from corrupted buffer internals */ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); ssh_signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL); raise(SIGSEGV); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } static void sshbuf_maybe_pack(struct sshbuf *buf, int force) { SSHBUF_DBG(("force %d", force)); SSHBUF_TELL("pre-pack"); if (buf->off == 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) return; if (force || (buf->off >= SSHBUF_PACK_MIN && buf->off >= buf->size / 2)) { memmove(buf->d, buf->d + buf->off, buf->size - buf->off); buf->size -= buf->off; buf->off = 0; SSHBUF_TELL("packed"); } } struct sshbuf * sshbuf_new(void) { struct sshbuf *ret; if ((ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL) return NULL; ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; ret->readonly = 0; ret->refcount = 1; ret->parent = NULL; if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } struct sshbuf * sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len) { struct sshbuf *ret; if (blob == NULL || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || (ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL) return NULL; ret->alloc = ret->size = ret->max_size = len; ret->readonly = 1; ret->refcount = 1; ret->parent = NULL; ret->cd = blob; ret->d = NULL; return ret; } int sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(child)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_check_sanity(parent)) != 0) return r; child->parent = parent; child->parent->refcount++; return 0; } struct sshbuf * sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf) { struct sshbuf *ret; if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) return NULL; if ((ret = sshbuf_from(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf))) == NULL) return NULL; if (sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf) != 0) { sshbuf_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf) { if (buf == NULL) return; /* * The following will leak on insane buffers, but this is the safest * course of action - an invalid pointer or already-freed pointer may * have been passed to us and continuing to scribble over memory would * be bad. */ if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) return; /* * If we are a parent with still-extant children, then don't free just * yet. The last child's call to sshbuf_free should decrement our * refcount to 0 and trigger the actual free. */ buf->refcount--; if (buf->refcount > 0) return; /* * If we are a child, the free our parent to decrement its reference * count and possibly free it. */ sshbuf_free(buf->parent); buf->parent = NULL; if (!buf->readonly) { explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc); free(buf->d); } explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(*buf)); free(buf); } void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf) { u_char *d; if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) { /* Nonsensical. Just make buffer appear empty */ buf->off = buf->size; return; } (void) sshbuf_check_sanity(buf); buf->off = buf->size = 0; if (buf->alloc != SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) { if ((d = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT, 1)) != NULL) { buf->cd = buf->d = d; buf->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; } } explicit_bzero(buf->d, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT); } size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf) { return buf->max_size; } size_t sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf) { return buf->alloc; } const struct sshbuf * sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf) { return buf->parent; } u_int sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf) { return buf->refcount; } int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size) { size_t rlen; u_char *dp; int r; SSHBUF_DBG(("set max buf = %p len = %zu", buf, max_size)); if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) return r; if (max_size == buf->max_size) return 0; if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY; if (max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; /* pack and realloc if necessary */ sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, max_size < buf->size); if (max_size < buf->alloc && max_size > buf->size) { if (buf->size < SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) rlen = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; else rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->size, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); if (rlen > max_size) rlen = max_size; SSHBUF_DBG(("new alloc = %zu", rlen)); if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; buf->cd = buf->d = dp; buf->alloc = rlen; } SSHBUF_TELL("new-max"); if (max_size < buf->alloc) return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; buf->max_size = max_size; return 0; } size_t sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf) { if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) return 0; return buf->size - buf->off; } size_t sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf) { if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) return 0; return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off); } const u_char * sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf) { if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) return NULL; return buf->cd + buf->off; } u_char * sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf) { if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) return NULL; return buf->d + buf->off; } int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) return r; if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY; SSHBUF_TELL("check"); /* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */ if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off) return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; return 0; } int sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) { size_t rlen, need; u_char *dp; int r; SSHBUF_DBG(("allocate buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len)); if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0) return r; /* * If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size * then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off. */ sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size); SSHBUF_TELL("allocate"); if (len + buf->size <= buf->alloc) return 0; /* already have it. */ /* * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size. */ need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc; rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen)); if (rlen > buf->max_size) rlen = buf->alloc + need; SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen)); if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) { SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail")); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } buf->alloc = rlen; buf->cd = buf->d = dp; if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) { /* shouldn't fail */ return r; } SSHBUF_TELL("done"); return 0; } int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp) { u_char *dp; int r; if (dpp != NULL) *dpp = NULL; SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len)); if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(buf, len)) != 0) return r; dp = buf->d + buf->size; buf->size += len; if (dpp != NULL) *dpp = dp; return 0; } int sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) { int r; SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len)); if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) return r; if (len == 0) return 0; if (len > sshbuf_len(buf)) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; buf->off += len; /* deal with empty buffer */ if (buf->off == buf->size) buf->off = buf->size = 0; SSHBUF_TELL("done"); return 0; } int sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) { int r; SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len)); if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) return r; if (len == 0) return 0; if (len > sshbuf_len(buf)) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; buf->size -= len; SSHBUF_TELL("done"); return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/sshbuf.h010064400017500001750000000340761362136622600131360ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.19 2020/01/25 23:02:14 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _SSHBUF_H #define _SSHBUF_H #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size */ #define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX 0x100000 /* Max child buffers */ #define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM (16384 / 8) /* Max bignum *bytes* */ #define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT ((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */ /* * NB. do not depend on the internals of this. It will be made opaque * one day. */ struct sshbuf { u_char *d; /* Data */ const u_char *cd; /* Const data */ size_t off; /* First available byte is buf->d + buf->off */ size_t size; /* Last byte is buf->d + buf->size - 1 */ size_t max_size; /* Maximum size of buffer */ size_t alloc; /* Total bytes allocated to buf->d */ int readonly; /* Refers to external, const data */ int dont_free; /* Kludge to support sshbuf_init */ u_int refcount; /* Tracks self and number of child buffers */ struct sshbuf *parent; /* If child, pointer to parent */ }; /* * Create a new sshbuf buffer. * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. */ struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void); /* * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data. * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. */ struct sshbuf *sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len); /* * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of an existing * buffer. The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the * resultant buffer. * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. */ struct sshbuf *sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of a string in * an existing buffer (the string is consumed in the process). * The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the resultant * buffer. * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. */ int sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp); /* * Clear and free buf */ void sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Reset buf, clearing its contents. NB. max_size is preserved. */ void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Return the maximum size of buf */ size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Set the maximum size of buf * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size); /* * Returns the length of data in buf */ size_t sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Returns number of bytes left in buffer before hitting max_size. */ size_t sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Returns a read-only pointer to the start of the data in buf */ const u_char *sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Returns a mutable pointer to the start of the data in buf, or * NULL if the buffer is read-only. */ u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf * Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes * with unsigned overflows correctly. * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); /* * Preallocates len additional bytes in buf. * Useful for cases where the caller knows how many bytes will ultimately be * required to avoid realloc in the buffer code. * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); /* * Reserve len bytes in buf. * Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the * optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp); /* * Consume len bytes from the start of buf * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); /* * Consume len bytes from the end of buf * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); /* Extract or deposit some bytes */ int sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len); int sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); int sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v); /* Append using a printf(3) format */ int sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); int sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap); /* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */ int sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp); int sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp); int sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp); int sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp); int sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val); int sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val); int sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val); int sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val); /* Functions to peek at the contents of a buffer without modifying it. */ int sshbuf_peek_u64(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t *valp); int sshbuf_peek_u32(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t *valp); int sshbuf_peek_u16(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t *valp); int sshbuf_peek_u8(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char *valp); /* * Functions to poke values into an exisiting buffer (e.g. a length header * to a packet). The destination bytes must already exist in the buffer. */ int sshbuf_poke_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t val); int sshbuf_poke_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t val); int sshbuf_poke_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t val); int sshbuf_poke_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char val); int sshbuf_poke(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, void *v, size_t len); /* * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded strings (u32 len || data) * The "cstring" variants admit no \0 characters in the string contents. * Caller must free *valp. */ int sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v); int sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v); int sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v); /* * "Direct" variant of sshbuf_get_string, returns pointer into the sshbuf to * avoid an malloc+memcpy. The pointer is guaranteed to be valid until the * next sshbuf-modifying function call. Caller does not free. */ int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); /* Skip past a string */ #define sshbuf_skip_string(buf) sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) /* Another variant: "peeks" into the buffer without modifying it */ int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); /* * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded bignums and elliptic * curve points. */ int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); int sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM **valp); int sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v); # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); int sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v); int sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); int sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v); # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* Dump the contents of the buffer in a human-readable format */ void sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f); /* Dump specified memory in a human-readable format */ void sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f); /* Return the hexadecimal representation of the contents of the buffer */ char *sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf); /* Encode the contents of the buffer as base64 */ char *sshbuf_dtob64_string(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wrap); int sshbuf_dtob64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap); /* Decode base64 data and append it to the buffer */ int sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64); /* * Tests whether the buffer contains the specified byte sequence at the * specified offset. Returns 0 on successful match, or a ssherr.h code * otherwise. SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT indicates sufficient bytes were * present but the buffer contents did not match those supplied. Zero- * length comparisons are not allowed. * * If sufficient data is present to make a comparison, then it is * performed with timing independent of the value of the data. If * insufficient data is present then the comparison is not attempted at * all. */ int sshbuf_cmp(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t offset, const void *s, size_t len); /* * Searches the buffer for the specified string. Returns 0 on success * and updates *offsetp with the offset of the first match, relative to * the start of the buffer. Otherwise sshbuf_find will return a ssherr.h * error code. SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT indicates sufficient bytes were * present in the buffer for a match to be possible but none was found. * Searches for zero-length data are not allowed. */ int sshbuf_find(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t start_offset, const void *s, size_t len, size_t *offsetp); /* * Duplicate the contents of a buffer to a string (caller to free). * Returns NULL on buffer error, or if the buffer contains a premature * nul character. */ char *sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Fill a buffer from a file descriptor or filename. Both allocate the * buffer for the caller. */ int sshbuf_load_fd(int, struct sshbuf **) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); int sshbuf_load_file(const char *, struct sshbuf **) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); /* * Write a buffer to a path, creating/truncating as needed (mode 0644, * subject to umask). The buffer contents are not modified. */ int sshbuf_write_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf *buf) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); /* Macros for decoding/encoding integers */ #define PEEK_U64(p) \ (((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 48) | \ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 40) | \ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]) << 32) | \ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[4]) << 24) | \ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[5]) << 16) | \ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[6]) << 8) | \ (u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[7])) #define PEEK_U32(p) \ (((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 24) | \ ((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 16) | \ ((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 8) | \ (u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3])) #define PEEK_U16(p) \ (((u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 8) | \ (u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1])) #define POKE_U64(p, v) \ do { \ const u_int64_t __v = (v); \ ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 56) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 48) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 40) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[3] = (__v >> 32) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[4] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[5] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[6] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[7] = __v & 0xff; \ } while (0) #define POKE_U32(p, v) \ do { \ const u_int32_t __v = (v); \ ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[3] = __v & 0xff; \ } while (0) #define POKE_U16(p, v) \ do { \ const u_int16_t __v = (v); \ ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \ ((u_char *)(p))[1] = __v & 0xff; \ } while (0) /* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */ #ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL /* * Return the allocation size of buf */ size_t sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Increment the reference count of buf. */ int sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent); /* * Return the parent buffer of buf, or NULL if it has no parent. */ const struct sshbuf *sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Return the reference count of buf */ u_int sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf); # define SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT 256 /* Initial allocation */ # define SSHBUF_SIZE_INC 256 /* Preferred increment length */ # define SSHBUF_PACK_MIN 8192 /* Minimim packable offset */ /* # define SSHBUF_ABORT abort */ /* # define SSHBUF_DEBUG */ # ifndef SSHBUF_ABORT # define SSHBUF_ABORT() # endif # ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG # define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \ printf("%s:%d %s: %s size %zu alloc %zu off %zu max %zu\n", \ __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, what, \ buf->size, buf->alloc, buf->off, buf->max_size); \ fflush(stdout); \ } while (0) # define SSHBUF_DBG(x) do { \ printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \ printf x; \ printf("\n"); \ fflush(stdout); \ } while (0) # else # define SSHBUF_TELL(what) # define SSHBUF_DBG(x) # endif #endif /* SSHBUF_INTERNAL */ #endif /* _SSHBUF_H */ openssh-8.2p1/sshconnect.c010064400017500001750000001213361362136622600140020ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.328 2020/01/25 07:17:18 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the * login (authentication) dialog. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "dns.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "version.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "kex.h" struct sshkey *previous_host_key = NULL; static int matching_host_key_dns = 0; static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0; /* import */ extern int debug_flag; extern Options options; extern char *__progname; static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *); static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *); /* Expand a proxy command */ static char * expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, const char *host, const char *host_arg, int port) { char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV]; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command); ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "n", host_arg, "p", strport, "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); free(tmp); return ret; } static void stderr_null(void) { int devnull; if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1) { error("Can't open %s for stderr redirection: %s", _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno)); return; } if (devnull == STDERR_FILENO) return; if (dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) error("Cannot redirect stderr to %s", _PATH_DEVNULL); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a * a connected fd back to us. */ static int ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int sp[2], sock; pid_t pid; char *shell; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) == -1) fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with " "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, host, host_arg, port); debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; close(sp[1]); /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ if (sp[0] != 0) { if (dup2(sp[0], 0) == -1) perror("dup2 stdin"); } if (sp[0] != 1) { if (dup2(sp[0], 1) == -1) perror("dup2 stdout"); } if (sp[0] >= 2) close(sp[0]); /* * Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so * error messages may be printed on the user's terminal. */ if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL && options.control_persist) stderr_null(); argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* * Execute the proxy command. * Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. */ execv(argv[0], argv); perror(argv[0]); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid == -1) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sp[0]); free(command_string); if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1) fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection"); close(sp[1]); while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL) return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ return 0; } /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. */ static int ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int pin[2], pout[2]; pid_t pid; char *shell; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ if (pipe(pin) == -1 || pipe(pout) == -1) fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, host, host_arg, port); debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ close(pin[1]); if (pin[0] != 0) { if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); } close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1) perror("dup2 stdout"); /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ close(pout[1]); /* * Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so * error messages may be printed on the user's terminal. */ if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL && options.control_persist) stderr_null(); argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. */ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); execv(argv[0], argv); perror(argv[0]); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid == -1) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */ /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); /* Free the command name. */ free(command_string); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, pout[0], pin[1]) == NULL) return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ return 0; } void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void) { /* * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child */ if (proxy_command_pid > 1) kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP); } #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H /* * Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an * address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface. * Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure. */ static int check_ifaddrs(const char *ifname, int af, const struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs, struct sockaddr_storage *resultp, socklen_t *rlenp) { struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; struct sockaddr_in *sa; struct in6_addr *v6addr; const struct ifaddrs *ifa; int allow_local; /* * Prefer addresses that are not loopback or linklocal, but use them * if nothing else matches. */ for (allow_local = 0; allow_local < 2; allow_local++) { for (ifa = ifaddrs; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) { if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL || ifa->ifa_name == NULL || (ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0 || ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != af || strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, options.bind_interface) != 0) continue; switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) { case AF_INET: sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr; if (!allow_local && sa->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK)) continue; if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) { error("%s: v4 addr doesn't fit", __func__); return -1; } *rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); memcpy(resultp, sa, *rlenp); return 0; case AF_INET6: sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ifa->ifa_addr; v6addr = &sa6->sin6_addr; if (!allow_local && (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(v6addr) || IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(v6addr))) continue; if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) { error("%s: v6 addr doesn't fit", __func__); return -1; } *rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); memcpy(resultp, sa6, *rlenp); return 0; } } } return -1; } #endif /* * Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection. */ static int ssh_create_socket(struct addrinfo *ai) { int sock, r; struct sockaddr_storage bindaddr; socklen_t bindaddrlen = 0; struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs = NULL; #endif char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */ if (options.bind_address == NULL && options.bind_interface == NULL) return sock; if (options.bind_address != NULL) { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family; hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype; hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; if ((r = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); goto fail; } if (res == NULL) { error("getaddrinfo: no addrs"); goto fail; } memcpy(&bindaddr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); bindaddrlen = res->ai_addrlen; } else if (options.bind_interface != NULL) { #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H if ((r = getifaddrs(&ifaddrs)) != 0) { error("getifaddrs: %s: %s", options.bind_interface, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } bindaddrlen = sizeof(bindaddr); if (check_ifaddrs(options.bind_interface, ai->ai_family, ifaddrs, &bindaddr, &bindaddrlen) != 0) { logit("getifaddrs: %s: no suitable addresses", options.bind_interface); goto fail; } #else error("BindInterface not supported on this platform."); #endif } if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) { error("%s: getnameinfo failed: %s", __func__, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); goto fail; } if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen) != 0) { error("bind %s: %s", ntop, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } debug("%s: bound to %s", __func__, ntop); /* success */ goto out; fail: close(sock); sock = -1; out: if (res != NULL) freeaddrinfo(res); #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H if (ifaddrs != NULL) freeifaddrs(ifaddrs); #endif return sock; } /* * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr. * If port is 0, the default port will be used. * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact * the daemon. */ static int ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive) { int on = 1, saved_timeout_ms = *timeout_ms; int oerrno, sock = -1, attempt; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo *ai; debug2("%s", __func__); memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop)); memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport)); for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) { if (attempt > 0) { /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ sleep(1); debug("Trying again..."); } /* * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in * sequence until the connection succeeds. */ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) { errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; continue; } if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); errno = oerrno; continue; } debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.", host, ntop, strport); /* Create a socket for connecting. */ sock = ssh_create_socket(ai); if (sock < 0) { /* Any error is already output */ errno = 0; continue; } *timeout_ms = saved_timeout_ms; if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, timeout_ms) >= 0) { /* Successful connection. */ memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen); break; } else { oerrno = errno; debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); sock = -1; errno = oerrno; } } if (sock != -1) break; /* Successful connection. */ } /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ if (sock == -1) { error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s", host, strport, errno == 0 ? "failure" : strerror(errno)); return -1; } debug("Connection established."); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (want_keepalive && setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection. */ if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL) return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ return 0; } int ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg, struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive) { int in, out; if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { return ssh_connect_direct(ssh, host, addrs, hostaddr, port, family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive); } else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) { if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) { if (in >= 0) close(in); error("%s: dup() in/out failed", __func__); return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ } if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, in, out)) == NULL) return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ return 0; } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) { return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port, options.proxy_command); } return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port, options.proxy_command); } /* defaults to 'no' */ static int confirm(const char *prompt, const char *fingerprint) { const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': "; const char *again_fp = "Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: "; char *p, *cp; int ret = -1; if (options.batch_mode) return 0; for (msg = prompt;;msg = fingerprint ? again_fp : again) { cp = p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO); if (p == NULL) return 0; p += strspn(p, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */ p[strcspn(p, " \t\n")] = '\0'; /* remove trailing whitespace */ if (p[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(p, "no") == 0) ret = 0; else if (strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0 || (fingerprint != NULL && strcasecmp(p, fingerprint) == 0)) ret = 1; free(cp); if (ret != -1) return ret; } } static int check_host_cert(const char *host, const struct sshkey *key) { const char *reason; int r; if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) { error("%s", reason); return 0; } if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) != 0) { error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported " "critical options(s)", host); return 0; } if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) { logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__, (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ? "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r)); return 0; } return 1; } static int sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr) { switch (hostaddr->sa_family) { case AF_INET: return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)-> sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; case AF_INET6: return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK( &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr)); default: return 0; } } /* * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended. */ void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr) { char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; socklen_t addrlen; switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) { case -1: addrlen = 0; break; case AF_INET: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr); break; } /* * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections * using a proxy command */ if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) { if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) fatal("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); *hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port); } else { *hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup(""); } } /* * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or * differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple * sshd's on different ports on the same machine. */ if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) { if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) { *hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias); debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname); } else { *hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port); } } } /* * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true. */ #define RDRW 0 #define RDONLY 1 #define ROQUIET 2 static int check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly, char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles, char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles) { HostStatus host_status; HostStatus ip_status; struct sshkey *raw_key = NULL; char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL; char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra; char msg[1024]; const char *type; const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found; int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed; int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr); int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0; int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */ struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys; u_int i; /* * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however, * this is probably not a real problem. */ if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local && options.host_key_alias == NULL) { debug("Forcing accepting of host key for " "loopback/localhost."); return 0; } /* * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup. * In some cases, these will have a port number appended. */ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip); /* * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with */ if (options.check_host_ip && (local || strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL)) options.check_host_ip = 0; host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]); ip_hostkeys = NULL; if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) { ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]); } retry: /* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */ want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key); type = sshkey_type(host_key); /* * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known * hosts or in the systemwide list. */ host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key, &host_found); /* * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip * address to begin with. */ if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) { ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key, &ip_found); if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || (ip_found != NULL && !sshkey_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key)))) host_ip_differ = 1; } else ip_status = host_status; switch (host_status) { case HOST_OK: /* The host is known and the key matches. */ debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.", host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key"); debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key", host_found->file, host_found->line); if (want_cert && !check_host_cert(options.host_key_alias == NULL ? hostname : options.host_key_alias, host_key)) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { if (readonly || want_cert) logit("%s host key for IP address " "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.", type, ip); else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts)) logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP " "address '%.128s' to the list of known " "hosts (%.500s).", type, ip, user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host " "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " "of known hosts.", type, ip); } else if (options.visual_host_key) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra); free(ra); free(fp); } hostkey_trusted = 1; break; case HOST_NEW: if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 && port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) { debug("checking without port identifier"); if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key, ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles, system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) { debug("found matching key w/out port"); break; } } if (readonly || want_cert) goto fail; /* The host is new. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES) { /* * User has requested strict host key checking. We * will not add the host key automatically. The only * alternative left is to abort. */ error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you " "have requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) { char msg1[1024], msg2[1024]; if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key)) snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "\nbut keys of different type are already" " known for this host."); else snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); /* The default */ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); msg2[0] = '\0'; if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { if (matching_host_key_dns) snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), "Matching host key fingerprint" " found in DNS.\n"); else snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), "No matching host key fingerprint" " found in DNS.\n"); } snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " "established%s\n" "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " "(yes/no/[fingerprint])? ", host, ip, msg1, type, fp, options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", msg2); free(ra); confirmed = confirm(msg, fp); free(fp); if (!confirmed) goto fail; hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */ } /* * If in "new" or "off" strict mode, add the key automatically * to the local known_hosts file. */ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); hostp = hostline; if (options.hash_known_hosts) { /* Add hash of host and IP separately */ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) && add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); } else { /* Add unhashed "host,ip" */ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], hostline, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); } } else { r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); hostp = host; } if (!r) logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known " "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the " "list of known hosts.", hostp, type); break; case HOST_REVOKED: error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host); error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to"); error("impersonate this host."); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking != SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } goto continue_unsafe; case HOST_CHANGED: if (want_cert) { /* * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match * all hosts that one might visit. */ debug("Host certificate authority does not " "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER, host_found->file, host_found->line); goto fail; } if (readonly == ROQUIET) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { char *key_msg; if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) key_msg = "is unknown"; else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) key_msg = "is unchanged"; else key_msg = "has a different value"; error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host); error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip); error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg); error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); error("and its host key have changed at the same time."); if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu", ip_found->file, ip_found->line); } /* The host key has changed. */ warn_changed_key(host_key); error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", user_hostfiles[0]); error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", sshkey_type(host_found->key), host_found->file, host_found->line); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking != SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } continue_unsafe: /* * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or * forwarding. */ if (options.password_authentication) { error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.password_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) { error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled" " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.challenge_response_authentication) { error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled" " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.forward_agent) { error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.forward_agent = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.forward_x11) { error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.forward_x11 = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 || options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.num_local_forwards = options.num_remote_forwards = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding) fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key " "check failure"); /* * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. * This could be done by converting the host key to an * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to * accept the authentication. */ break; case HOST_FOUND: fatal("internal error"); break; } if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED && ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) { snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' " "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'" "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu", type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line); if (host_status == HOST_OK) { len = strlen(msg); snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len, "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu", host_found->file, host_found->line); } if (options.strict_host_key_checking == SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) { strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want " "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg)); if (!confirm(msg, NULL)) goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking != SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { logit("%s", msg); error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); goto fail; } else { logit("%s", msg); } } if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) { debug("%s: hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: " "disabling UpdateHostkeys", __func__); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); return 0; fail: if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) { /* * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and * search normally. */ debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key"); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &raw_key)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshkey_from_private: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0) fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r)); host_key = raw_key; goto retry; } sshkey_free(raw_key); free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); return -1; } /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */ int verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key) { u_int i; int r = -1, flags = 0; char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL; struct sshkey *plain = NULL; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); r = -1; goto out; } if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) { if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); r = -1; goto out; } sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu " "ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp, (unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial, host_key->cert->key_id, sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp, valid); for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) { debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s", host_key->cert->principals[i]); } } else { debug("Server host key: %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp); } if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) { debug2("%s: server host key %s %s matches cached key", __func__, sshkey_type(host_key), fp); r = 0; goto out; } /* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */ if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) { r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys); switch (r) { case 0: break; /* not revoked */ case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s", sshkey_type(host_key), fp, options.revoked_host_keys); r = -1; goto out; default: error("Error checking host key %s %s in " "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(host_key), fp, options.revoked_host_keys, ssh_err(r)); r = -1; goto out; } } if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { /* * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade * them and try the plain key. */ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0) goto out; if (sshkey_is_cert(plain)) sshkey_drop_cert(plain); if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) { if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) { r = 0; goto out; } if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { matching_host_key_dns = 1; } else { warn_changed_key(plain); error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS " "with the new host key to get rid " "of this message."); } } } } r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles, options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); out: sshkey_free(plain); free(fp); free(cafp); if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) { sshkey_free(previous_host_key); r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key); } return r; } /* * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection * to the server must already have been established before this is called. * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. * This function does not require super-user privileges. */ void ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms) { char *host; char *server_user, *local_user; local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ host = xstrdup(orighost); lowercase(host); /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ if (kex_exchange_identification(ssh, timeout_ms, NULL) != 0) cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */ /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh); /* key exchange */ /* authenticate user */ debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user); ssh_kex2(ssh, host, hostaddr, port); ssh_userauth2(ssh, local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); free(local_user); free(host); } /* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */ static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key) { int type[] = { KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, KEY_XMSS, -1 }; int i, ret = 0; char *fp, *ra; const struct hostkey_entry *found; for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) { if (type[i] == key->type) continue; if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found)) continue; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" "in %s:%lu\n" "%s key fingerprint %s.", sshkey_type(found->key), found->host, found->file, found->line, sshkey_type(found->key), fp); if (options.visual_host_key) logit("%s", ra); free(ra); free(fp); ret = 1; } return ret; } static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *host_key) { char *fp; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (fp == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed."); error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", sshkey_type(host_key), fp); error("Please contact your system administrator."); free(fp); } /* * Execute a local command */ int ssh_local_cmd(const char *args) { char *shell; pid_t pid; int status; void (*osighand)(int); if (!options.permit_local_command || args == NULL || !*args) return (1); if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; osighand = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s", shell, args, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osighand); if (!WIFEXITED(status)) return (1); return (WEXITSTATUS(status)); } void maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *authfile, struct sshkey *private, const char *comment, const char *passphrase) { int auth_sock = -1, r; const char *skprovider = NULL; if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0) return; if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key"); return; } if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 && !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) { debug3("user denied adding this key"); close(auth_sock); return; } if (sshkey_is_sk(private)) skprovider = options.sk_provider; if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private, comment == NULL ? authfile : comment, 0, (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0, skprovider)) == 0) debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile); else debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r); close(auth_sock); } openssh-8.2p1/sshconnect.h010064400017500001750000000043221362136622600140020ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.40 2020/01/25 07:17:18 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive; struct Sensitive { struct sshkey **keys; int nkeys; }; struct addrinfo; struct ssh; int ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int, int *, int); void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void); void ssh_login(struct ssh *, Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, struct passwd *, int); int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *); void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, char **, char **); void ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short); void ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *); int ssh_local_cmd(const char *); void maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *, struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *); openssh-8.2p1/sshconnect2.c010064400017500001750000001745101362136622600140660ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.320 2020/02/06 22:48:23 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "dh.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "msg.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" #include "sk-api.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif /* import */ extern char *client_version_string; extern char *server_version_string; extern Options options; /* * SSH2 key exchange */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; u_int session_id2_len = 0; char *xxx_host; struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; static int verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1) fatal("Host key verification failed."); return 0; } static char * order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) { char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret; size_t maxlen; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; int ktype; u_int i; /* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL); hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; first = xmalloc(maxlen); last = xmalloc(maxlen); *first = *last = '\0'; #define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \ do { \ if (*to != '\0') \ strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \ strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \ } while (0) while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') { if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg); if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL)) ALG_APPEND(first, alg); else ALG_APPEND(last, alg); } #undef ALG_APPEND xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first, (*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last); if (*first != '\0') debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first); free(first); free(last); free(hostname); free(oavail); free_hostkeys(hostkeys); return ret; } void ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; char *s, *all_key; int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0; xxx_host = host; xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; /* * If the user has not specified HostkeyAlgorithms, or has only * appended or removed algorithms from that list then prefer algorithms * that are in the list that are supported by known_hosts keys. */ if (options.hostkeyalgorithms == NULL || options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '-' || options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '+') use_known_hosts_order = 1; /* Expand or fill in HostkeyAlgorithms */ all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms, kex_default_pk_alg(), all_key) != 0) fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__); free(all_key); if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL) fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__); myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers); myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = (char *)compression_alg_list(options.compression); myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; if (use_known_hosts_order) { /* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port)); } else { /* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms); } if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, options.rekey_interval); /* start key exchange */ if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client; # endif #endif ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done); /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms); if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r)); session_id2 = ssh->kex->session_id; session_id2_len = ssh->kex->session_id_len; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #endif } /* * Authenticate user */ typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt; typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod; typedef struct identity Identity; typedef struct idlist Idlist; struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; int agent_fd; /* >=0 if agent supports key */ struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */ char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */ int tried; int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */ int userprovided; }; TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity); struct cauthctxt { const char *server_user; const char *local_user; const char *host; const char *service; struct cauthmethod *method; sig_atomic_t success; char *authlist; #ifdef GSSAPI /* gssapi */ gss_OID_set gss_supported_mechs; u_int mech_tried; #endif /* pubkey */ struct idlist keys; int agent_fd; /* hostbased */ Sensitive *sensitive; char *oktypes, *ktypes; const char *active_ktype; /* kbd-interactive */ int info_req_seen; int attempt_kbdint; /* password */ int attempt_passwd; /* generic */ void *methoddata; }; struct cauthmethod { char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */ int (*userauth)(struct ssh *ssh); void (*cleanup)(struct ssh *ssh); int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */ int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */ }; static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int userauth_none(struct ssh *); static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *); static int userauth_passwd(struct ssh *); static int userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *); static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *); #ifdef GSSAPI static int userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *); static void userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); #endif void userauth(struct ssh *, char *); static void pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *); static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *); static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *); static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *); static struct sshkey *load_identity_file(Identity *); static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist); static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name); static char *authmethods_get(void); Authmethod authmethods[] = { #ifdef GSSAPI {"gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, userauth_gssapi_cleanup, &options.gss_authentication, NULL}, #endif {"hostbased", userauth_hostbased, NULL, &options.hostbased_authentication, NULL}, {"publickey", userauth_pubkey, NULL, &options.pubkey_authentication, NULL}, {"keyboard-interactive", userauth_kbdint, NULL, &options.kbd_interactive_authentication, &options.batch_mode}, {"password", userauth_passwd, NULL, &options.password_authentication, &options.batch_mode}, {"none", userauth_none, NULL, NULL, NULL}, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL} }; void ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive) { Authctxt authctxt; int r; if (options.challenge_response_authentication) options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL) options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get(); /* setup authentication context */ memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt)); authctxt.server_user = server_user; authctxt.local_user = local_user; authctxt.host = host; authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */ authctxt.success = 0; authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none"); authctxt.authlist = NULL; authctxt.methoddata = NULL; authctxt.sensitive = sensitive; authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL; authctxt.info_req_seen = 0; authctxt.attempt_kbdint = 0; authctxt.attempt_passwd = 0; #if GSSAPI authctxt.gss_supported_mechs = NULL; authctxt.mech_tried = 0; #endif authctxt.agent_fd = -1; pubkey_prepare(&authctxt); if (authctxt.method == NULL) { fatal("%s: internal error: cannot send userauth none request", __func__); } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh->authctxt = &authctxt; ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept); ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */ pubkey_cleanup(ssh); ssh->authctxt = NULL; ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL); if (!authctxt.success) fatal("Authentication failed."); debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int r; if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { char *reply; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &reply, NULL)) != 0) goto out; debug2("service_accept: %s", reply); free(reply); } else { debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service"); } if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received"); /* initial userauth request */ userauth_none(ssh); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner); r = 0; out: return r; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) { return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh); } void userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; if (authlist == NULL) { authlist = authctxt->authlist; } else { free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = authlist; } for (;;) { Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist); if (method == NULL) fatal("%s@%s: Permission denied (%s).", authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host, authlist); authctxt->method = method; /* reset the per method handler */ ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL); /* and try new method */ if (method->userauth(ssh) != 0) { debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name); break; } else { debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method"); method->enabled = NULL; } } } /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { fatal("%s: bad message during authentication: type %d", __func__, type); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { char *msg = NULL; size_t len; int r; debug3("%s", __func__); if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) fmprintf(stderr, "%s", msg); r = 0; out: free(msg); return r; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__); free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = NULL; if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ return 0; } #if 0 static int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__); fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.", authctxt->method->name); return 0; } #endif /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *authlist = NULL; u_char partial; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context"); if (sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &authlist, NULL) != 0 || sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &partial) != 0 || sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0) goto out; if (partial != 0) { verbose("Authenticated with partial success."); /* reset state */ pubkey_reset(authctxt); } debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist); userauth(ssh, authlist); authlist = NULL; out: free(authlist); return 0; } /* * Format an identity for logging including filename, key type, fingerprint * and location (agent, etc.). Caller must free. */ static char * format_identity(Identity *id) { char *fp = NULL, *ret = NULL; const char *note = ""; if (id->key != NULL) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); } if (id->key) { if ((id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) note = " token"; else if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) note = " authenticator"; } xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s%s%s%s", id->filename, id->key ? sshkey_type(id->key) : "", id->key ? " " : "", fp ? fp : "", id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "", note, id->agent_fd != -1 ? " agent" : ""); free(fp); return ret; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; struct sshkey *key = NULL; Identity *id = NULL; int pktype, found = 0, sent = 0; size_t blen; char *pkalg = NULL, *fp = NULL, *ident = NULL; u_char *pkblob = NULL; int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto done; if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) { debug("%s: server sent unknown pkalg %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s: %s", pkalg, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch " "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } /* * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been * moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by * duplicate keys */ TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) { if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found || id == NULL) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); error("%s: server replied with unknown key: %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "" : fp); goto done; } ident = format_identity(id); debug("Server accepts key: %s", ident); sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id); r = 0; done: sshkey_free(key); free(ident); free(fp); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); /* try another method if we did not send a packet */ if (r == 0 && sent == 0) userauth(ssh, NULL); return r; } #ifdef GSSAPI static int userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL; OM_uint32 min; int r, ok = 0; gss_OID mech = NULL; /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at * once. */ if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL) gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs); /* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count && !ok) { mech = &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs-> elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, mech, authctxt->host)) { ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ } else { authctxt->mech_tried++; } } if (!ok || mech == NULL) return 0; authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (mech->length) + 2)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, mech->length)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, mech->elements, mech->length)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); authctxt->mech_tried++; /* Move along to next candidate */ return 1; } static void userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = (Gssctxt *)authctxt->methoddata; ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; free(authctxt->gss_supported_mechs); authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL; } static OM_uint32 process_gssapi_token(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; OM_uint32 status, ms, flags; int r; status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags); if (send_tok.length > 0) { u_char type = GSS_ERROR(status) ? SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK : SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); } if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */ if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { struct sshbuf *b; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic"); if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__); gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic); if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } sshbuf_free(b); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); } } return status; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; size_t oidlen; u_char *oidv = NULL; int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; /* Setup our OID */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &oidv, &oidlen)) != 0) goto done; if (oidlen <= 2 || oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE || oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) { debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received"); userauth(ssh, NULL); goto ok; } if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2)) fatal("Server returned different OID than expected"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto done; if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) { /* Start again with next method on list */ debug("Trying to start again"); userauth(ssh, NULL); goto ok; } ok: r = 0; done: free(oidv); return r; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; u_char *p = NULL; size_t len; OM_uint32 status; int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; recv_tok.value = p; recv_tok.length = len; status = process_gssapi_token(ssh, &recv_tok); /* Start again with the next method in the list */ if (GSS_ERROR(status)) { userauth(ssh, NULL); /* ok */ } r = 0; out: free(p); return r; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 ms; u_char *p = NULL; size_t len; int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { free(p); return r; } /* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */ recv_tok.value = p; recv_tok.length = len; (void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL); free(p); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); /* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */ return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { char *msg = NULL; char *lang = NULL; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* maj */ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* min */ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) goto out; r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh); debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg); out: free(msg); free(lang); return r; } #endif /* GSSAPI */ static int userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; int r; /* initial userauth request */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return 1; } static int userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; char *password, *prompt = NULL; const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; int r; if (authctxt->attempt_passwd++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; if (authctxt->attempt_passwd != 1) error("Permission denied, please try again."); xasprintf(&prompt, "%s@%s's password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(prompt); if (password != NULL) freezero(password, strlen(password)); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); return 1; } /* * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */ /* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *info = NULL, *lang = NULL, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL; char prompt[256]; const char *host; int r; debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: " "no authentication context"); host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &info, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (strlen(info) > 0) logit("%s", info); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* additional info */ goto out; snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0) goto out; freezero(password, strlen(password)); password = NULL; while (password == NULL) { snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); if (password == NULL) { /* bail out */ r = 0; goto out; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) { freezero(password, strlen(password)); logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit."); password = NULL; } freezero(retype, strlen(retype)); } if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); r = 0; out: if (password) freezero(password, strlen(password)); free(info); free(lang); return r; } /* * Select an algorithm for publickey signatures. * Returns algorithm (caller must free) or NULL if no mutual algorithm found. * * Call with ssh==NULL to ignore server-sig-algs extension list and * only attempt with the key's base signature type. */ static char * key_sig_algorithm(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key) { char *allowed, *oallowed, *cp, *tmp, *alg = NULL; /* * The signature algorithm will only differ from the key algorithm * for RSA keys/certs and when the server advertises support for * newer (SHA2) algorithms. */ if (ssh == NULL || ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL || (key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) || (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE))) { /* Filter base key signature alg against our configuration */ return match_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_key_types, NULL); } /* * For RSA keys/certs, since these might have a different sig type: * find the first entry in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes of the right type * that also appears in the supported signature algorithms list from * the server. */ oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types); while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) { if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type) continue; tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), ssh->kex->server_sig_algs, NULL); if (tmp != NULL) alg = xstrdup(cp); free(tmp); if (alg != NULL) break; } free(oallowed); return alg; } static int identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *alg) { struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL, *prv = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; char *fp = NULL; *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; /* The agent supports this key. */ if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1) { return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat); } /* * We have already loaded the private key or the private key is * stored in external hardware. */ if (id->key != NULL && (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))) { sign_key = id->key; } else { /* Load the private key from the file. */ if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) { error("%s: private key %s contents do not match public", __func__, id->filename); r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; goto out; } sign_key = prv; if (sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) && (sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { /* XXX match batch mode should just skip these keys? */ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint", __func__); notifier = notify_start(options.batch_mode, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); free(fp); } } if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, options.sk_provider, compat)) != 0) { debug("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms, * so check what we get back. */ if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0) { debug("%s: sshkey_check_sigtype: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: notify_complete(notifier); sshkey_free(prv); return r; } static int id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id) { const char *suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL }; size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename); size_t i, slen; if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0) return 1; for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) { slen = strlen(suffixes[i]); if (len > slen && plen == len - slen && strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 && memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0) return 1; } return 0; } static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; Identity *private_id, *sign_id = NULL; u_char *signature = NULL; size_t slen = 0, skip = 0; int r, fallback_sigtype, sent = 0; char *alg = NULL, *fp = NULL; const char *loc = ""; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); /* * If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key * and use it to complete the signature. * If no such private key exists, fall back to trying the certificate * key itself in case it has a private half already loaded. * This will try to set sign_id to the private key that will perform * the signature. */ if (sshkey_is_cert(id->key)) { TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) && id->key->type != private_id->key->type) { sign_id = private_id; break; } } /* * Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow * filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that * didn't load public keys. This supports the case * of keeping just a private key file and public * certificate on disk. */ if (sign_id == NULL && !id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 && (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) { TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { if (private_id->key == NULL && id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) { sign_id = private_id; break; } } } if (sign_id != NULL) { debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for " "certificate", __func__, id->filename, id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : ""); } else { debug("%s: no separate private key for certificate " "\"%s\"", __func__, id->filename); } } /* * If the above didn't select another identity to do the signing * then default to the one we started with. */ if (sign_id == NULL) sign_id = id; /* assemble and sign data */ for (fallback_sigtype = 0; fallback_sigtype <= 1; fallback_sigtype++) { free(alg); slen = 0; signature = NULL; if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(fallback_sigtype ? NULL : ssh, id->key)) == NULL) { error("%s: no mutual signature supported", __func__); goto out; } debug3("%s: signing using %s %s", __func__, alg, fp); sshbuf_free(b); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } skip = sshbuf_len(b); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, alg)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(id->key, b)) != 0) { fatal("%s: assemble signed data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* generate signature */ r = identity_sign(sign_id, &signature, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), datafellows, alg); if (r == 0) break; else if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) goto out; /* soft failure */ else if (r == SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED && !fallback_sigtype) { if (sign_id->agent_fd != -1) loc = "agent "; else if ((sign_id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) loc = "token "; logit("%skey %s %s returned incorrect signature type", loc, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); continue; } error("%s: signing failed for %s \"%s\"%s: %s", __func__, sshkey_type(sign_id->key), sign_id->filename, id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "", ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (slen == 0 || signature == NULL) /* shouldn't happen */ fatal("%s: no signature", __func__); /* append signature */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0) fatal("%s: append signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif /* skip session id and packet type */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, skip + 1)) != 0) fatal("%s: consume: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, b)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: enqueue request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* success */ sent = 1; out: free(fp); free(alg); sshbuf_free(b); freezero(signature, slen); return sent; } static int send_pubkey_test(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; u_char *blob = NULL; char *alg = NULL; size_t bloblen; u_int have_sig = 0; int sent = 0, r; if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(ssh, id->key)) == NULL) { debug("%s: no mutual signature algorithm", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0) { /* we cannot handle this key */ debug3("%s: cannot handle key", __func__); goto out; } /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, have_sig)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, alg)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, blob, bloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sent = 1; out: free(alg); free(blob); return sent; } static struct sshkey * load_identity_file(Identity *id) { struct sshkey *private = NULL; char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment; int r, quit = 0, i; struct stat st; if (stat(id->filename, &st) == -1) { (id->userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s", id->filename, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", id->filename); for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { if (i == 0) passphrase = ""; else { passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (*passphrase == '\0') { debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); free(passphrase); break; } } switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, id->filename, passphrase, &private, &comment))) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE: if (options.batch_mode) { quit = 1; break; } if (i != 0) debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); break; case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: if (errno == ENOENT) { debug2("Load key \"%s\": %s", id->filename, ssh_err(r)); quit = 1; break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: error("Load key \"%s\": %s", id->filename, ssh_err(r)); quit = 1; break; } if (private != NULL && sshkey_is_sk(private) && options.sk_provider == NULL) { debug("key \"%s\" is an authenticator-hosted key, " "but no provider specified", id->filename); sshkey_free(private); private = NULL; quit = 1; } if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 && !(id->key && id->isprivate)) maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment, passphrase); if (i > 0) freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(comment); if (private != NULL || quit) break; } return private; } static int key_type_allowed_by_config(struct sshkey *key) { if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) return 1; /* RSA keys/certs might be allowed by alternate signature types */ switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) return 1; if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) return 1; break; case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com", options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) return 1; if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com", options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) return 1; break; } return 0; } /* * try keys in the following order: * 1. certificates listed in the config file * 2. other input certificates * 3. agent keys that are found in the config file * 4. other agent keys * 5. keys that are only listed in the config file */ static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp; struct idlist agent, files, *preferred; struct sshkey *key; int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found; size_t j; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; char *ident; TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */ TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */ preferred = &authctxt->keys; TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */ /* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { key = options.identity_keys[i]; if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { debug("%s: ignoring certificate %s: not a user " "certificate", __func__, options.identity_files[i]); continue; } if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) { debug("%s: ignoring authenticator-hosted key %s as no " "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified", __func__, options.identity_files[i]); continue; } options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); id->agent_fd = -1; id->key = key; id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]); id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next); } /* list of certificates specified by user */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { key = options.certificates[i]; if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || key->cert == NULL || key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { debug("%s: ignoring certificate %s: not a user " "certificate", __func__, options.identity_files[i]); continue; } if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) { debug("%s: ignoring authenticator-hosted key " "certificate %s as no " "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified", __func__, options.identity_files[i]); continue; } id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); id->agent_fd = -1; id->key = key; id->filename = xstrdup(options.certificate_files[i]); id->userprovided = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i]; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } /* list of keys supported by the agent */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); close(agent_fd); } else { for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) { found = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) { /* * agent keys from the config file are * preferred */ if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); id->agent_fd = agent_fd; found = 1; break; } } if (!found && !options.identities_only) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); /* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */ id->key = idlist->keys[j]; id->filename = idlist->comments[j]; idlist->keys[j] = NULL; idlist->comments[j] = NULL; id->agent_fd = agent_fd; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next); } } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); /* append remaining agent keys */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd; } /* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) { if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) continue; found = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) { if (id2->key == NULL || (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) continue; if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); found = 1; break; } } /* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */ if (!found && options.identities_only) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); freezero(id, sizeof(*id)); } } /* append remaining keys from the config file */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } /* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes */ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) { if (id->key != NULL && !key_type_allowed_by_config(id->key)) { debug("Skipping %s key %s - " "not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename); TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next); sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->filename); memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id)); continue; } } /* List the keys we plan on using */ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) { ident = format_identity(id); debug("Will attempt key: %s", ident); free(ident); } debug2("%s: done", __func__); } static void pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; Identity *id; if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) { ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd); authctxt->agent_fd = -1; } for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->filename); free(id); } } static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id; TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &authctxt->keys, next) id->tried = 0; } static int try_identity(Identity *id) { if (!id->key) return (0); if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server", sshkey_type(id->key), id->filename); return (0); } return 1; } static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; Identity *id; int sent = 0; char *ident; while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) { if (id->tried++) return (0); /* move key to the end of the queue */ TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next); /* * send a test message if we have the public key. for * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the * private key instead */ if (id->key != NULL) { if (try_identity(id)) { ident = format_identity(id); debug("Offering public key: %s", ident); free(ident); sent = send_pubkey_test(ssh, id); } } else { debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename); id->key = load_identity_file(id); if (id->key != NULL) { if (try_identity(id)) { id->isprivate = 1; sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id); } sshkey_free(id->key); id->key = NULL; id->isprivate = 0; } } if (sent) return (sent); } return (0); } /* * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method. */ static int userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; int r; if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */ if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) { debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL); return 0; } debug2("userauth_kbdint"); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* lang */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, options.kbd_interactive_devices ? options.kbd_interactive_devices : "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req); return 1; } /* * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE */ static int input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *lang = NULL, *prompt = NULL; char *response = NULL; u_char echo = 0; u_int num_prompts, i; int r; debug2("input_userauth_info_req"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context"); authctxt->info_req_seen = 1; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &inst, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (strlen(name) > 0) logit("%s", name); if (strlen(inst) > 0) logit("%s", inst); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &num_prompts)) != 0) goto out; /* * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested. * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response. */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, num_prompts)) != 0) goto out; debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts); for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &prompt, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &echo)) != 0) goto out; response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, response)) != 0) goto out; freezero(response, strlen(response)); free(prompt); response = prompt = NULL; } /* done with parsing incoming message. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0) goto out; r = sshpkt_send(ssh); out: if (response) freezero(response, strlen(response)); free(prompt); free(name); free(inst); free(lang); return r; } static int ssh_keysign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct stat st; pid_t pid; int r, to[2], from[2], status; int sock = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); u_char rversion = 0, version = 2; void (*osigchld)(int); *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) == -1) { error("%s: not installed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (fflush(stdout) != 0) { error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(to) == -1) { error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(from) == -1) { error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (pid == 0) { close(from[0]); if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(to[1]); if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(from[1]); close(to[0]); if (dup2(sock, STDERR_FILENO + 1) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1; fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0); /* keep the socket on exec */ closefrom(sock + 1); debug3("%s: [child] pid=%ld, exec %s", __func__, (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN); execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *)NULL); fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, strerror(errno)); } close(from[1]); close(to[0]); sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* send # of sock, data to be signed */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1) fatal("%s: couldn't send request", __func__); sshbuf_reset(b); r = ssh_msg_recv(from[0], b); close(from[0]); close(to[1]); if (r < 0) { error("%s: no reply", __func__); goto fail; } errno = 0; while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) { error("%s: waitpid %ld: %s", __func__, (long)pid, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error("%s: exited abnormally", __func__); goto fail; } if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { error("%s: exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); goto fail; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rversion)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto fail; } if (rversion != version) { error("%s: bad version", __func__); goto fail; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fail: ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); sshbuf_free(b); return -1; } ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); sshbuf_free(b); return 0; } static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; struct sshkey *private = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL; char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL; size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0; int i, r, success = 0; if (authctxt->ktypes == NULL) { authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_key_types); authctxt->ktypes = authctxt->oktypes; } /* * Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedKeyTypes, * trying each hostkey that matches the type in turn. */ for (;;) { if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL) authctxt->active_ktype = strsep(&authctxt->ktypes, ","); if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL || *authctxt->active_ktype == '\0') break; debug3("%s: trying key type %s", __func__, authctxt->active_ktype); /* check for a useful key */ private = NULL; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) { if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL || authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC) continue; if (match_pattern_list( sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]), authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1) continue; /* we take and free the key */ private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]; authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] = NULL; break; } /* Found one */ if (private != NULL) break; /* No more keys of this type; advance */ authctxt->active_ktype = NULL; } if (private == NULL) { free(authctxt->oktypes); authctxt->oktypes = authctxt->ktypes = NULL; authctxt->active_ktype = NULL; debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication."); goto out; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); goto out; } debug("%s: trying hostkey %s %s", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); /* figure out a name for the client host */ lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); if (lname == NULL) { error("%s: cannot get local ipaddr/name", __func__); goto out; } /* XXX sshbuf_put_stringf? */ xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname); debug2("%s: chost %s", __func__, chost); /* construct data */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(private, &keyblob, &keylen)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif if ((r = ssh_keysign(ssh, private, &sig, &siglen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b))) != 0) { error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sig, siglen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } success = 1; out: if (sig != NULL) freezero(sig, siglen); free(keyblob); free(lname); free(fp); free(chost); sshkey_free(private); sshbuf_free(b); return success; } /* find auth method */ /* * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false. */ static int authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method) { if (method == NULL) return 0; /* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */ if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0) return 0; /* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */ if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0) return 0; return 1; } static Authmethod * authmethod_lookup(const char *name) { Authmethod *method = NULL; if (name != NULL) for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0) return method; debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL"); return NULL; } /* XXX internal state */ static Authmethod *current = NULL; static char *supported = NULL; static char *preferred = NULL; /* * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the * next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list, * use a built-in default list. */ static Authmethod * authmethod_get(char *authlist) { char *name = NULL; u_int next; /* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */ if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0) authlist = options.preferred_authentications; if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) { debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist); free(supported); supported = xstrdup(authlist); preferred = options.preferred_authentications; debug3("preferred %s", preferred); current = NULL; } else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) return current; for (;;) { if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) { debug("No more authentication methods to try."); current = NULL; return NULL; } preferred += next; debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name); debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred); if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) { debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name); debug("Next authentication method: %s", name); free(name); return current; } free(name); } } static char * authmethods_get(void) { Authmethod *method = NULL; struct sshbuf *b; char *list; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) { if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", method->name)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); sshbuf_free(b); return list; } openssh-8.2p1/sshd.8010064400017500001750000000756261362136622600125330ustar00djmdjm.\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.312 2020/01/25 06:03:10 djm Exp $ .Dd $Mdocdate: January 25 2020 $ .Dt SSHD 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd .Nd OpenSSH daemon .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sshd .Bk -words .Op Fl 46DdeiqTt .Op Fl C Ar connection_spec .Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl f Ar config_file .Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time .Op Fl h Ar host_key_file .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl u Ar len .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for .Xr ssh 1 . Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. .Pp .Nm listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at boot from .Pa /etc/rc . It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, and data exchange. .Pp .Nm can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file (by default .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ; command-line options override values specified in the configuration file. .Nm rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, .Dv SIGHUP , by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\& .Pa /usr/sbin/sshd . .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl C Ar connection_spec Specify the connection parameters to use for the .Fl T extended test mode. If provided, any .Cm Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple .Fl C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are .Dq addr, .Dq user , .Dq host , .Dq laddr , .Dq lport , and .Dq rdomain and correspond to source address, user, resolved source host name, local address, local port number and routing domain respectively. .It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify .Nm during key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the .Fl h option or the .Cm HostKey configuration directive. .It Fl D When this option is specified, .Nm will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of .Nm sshd . .It Fl d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard error, and does not put itself in the background. The server also will not fork and will only process one connection. This option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple .Fl d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of the system log. .It Fl e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. .It Fl f Ar config_file Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config . .Nm refuses to start if there is no configuration file. .It Fl g Ar login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. .It Fl h Ar host_key_file Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must be given if .Nm is not run as root (as the normal host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key . It is possible to have multiple host key files for the different host key algorithms. .It Fl i Specifies that .Nm is being run from .Xr inetd 8 . .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options, and their values, see .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Fl p Ar port Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports specified in the configuration file with the .Cm Port option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the .Cm ListenAddress option override command-line ports. .It Fl q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. .It Fl T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit. Optionally, .Cm Match rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more .Fl C options. .It Fl t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating .Nm reliably as configuration options may change. .It Fl u Ar len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the .Li utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host name is longer than .Ar len , the dotted decimal value will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying .Fl u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into the .Pa utmp file. .Fl u0 may also be used to prevent .Nm from making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include .Cm HostbasedAuthentication and using a .Cm from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in .Cm AllowUsers or .Cm DenyUsers . .El .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only. Each host has a host-specific key, used to identify the host. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public host key. The client compares the host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC). .Pp Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password authentication. .Pp Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, listed in .Cm DenyUsers or its group is listed in .Cm DenyGroups \&. The definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( .Ql \&*LK\&* on Solaris and UnixWare, .Ql \&* on HP-UX, containing .Ql Nologin on Tru64, a leading .Ql \&*LOCKED\&* on FreeBSD and a leading .Ql \&! on most Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to something other than these values (eg .Ql NP or .Ql \&*NP\&* ). .Pp If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the secure channel. .Pp After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. .Pp When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the client, and both sides exit. .Sh LOGIN PROCESS When a user successfully logs in, .Nm does the following: .Bl -enum -offset indent .It If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, prints last login time and .Pa /etc/motd (unless prevented in the configuration file or by .Pa ~/.hushlogin ; see the .Sx FILES section). .It If the login is on a tty, records login time. .It Checks .Pa /etc/nologin ; if it exists, prints contents and quits (unless root). .It Changes to run with normal user privileges. .It Sets up basic environment. .It Reads the file .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment. See the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Changes to user's home directory. .It If .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists and the .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm PermitUserRC option is set, runs it; else if .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it; otherwise runs xauth. The .Dq rc files are given the X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See .Sx SSHRC , below. .It Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the system password database. .El .Sh SSHRC If the file .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists, .Xr sh 1 runs it after reading the environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard input (and .Ev DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call .Xr xauth 1 because .Nm will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies. .Pp The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. .Pp This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to: .Bd -literal -offset 3n if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie fi | xauth -q - fi .Ed .Pp If this file does not exist, .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. .Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public key authentication; if this option is not specified, the default is .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 . Each line of the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a .Ql # are ignored as comments). Public keys consist of the following space-separated fields: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is optional. The supported key types are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com .It ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 .It ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 .It ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 .It sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com .It ssh-ed25519 .It ssh-dss .It ssh-rsa .El .Pp The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key). .Pp Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the .Pa id_dsa.pub , .Pa id_ecdsa.pub , .Pa id_ecdsa_sk.pub , .Pa id_ed25519.pub , .Pa id_ed25519_sk.pub , or the .Pa id_rsa.pub file and edit it. .Pp .Nm enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits. .Pp The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm agent-forwarding Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm cert-authority Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. .Pp Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. .It Cm command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify .Cm no-pty . A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. .Pp This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the .Cm restrict key option. .Pp The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by a .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm ForceCommand directive. .Pp If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the two commands are identical. .It Cm environment="NAME=value" Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. .It Cm expiry-time="timespec" Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted. The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time in the system time-zone. .It Cm from="pattern-list" Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .Pp In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or addresses, a .Cm from stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. .Pp The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). .It Cm no-agent-forwarding Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. .It Cm no-port-forwarding Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. This might be used, e.g. in connection with the .Cm command option. .It Cm no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). .It Cm no-user-rc Disables execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc . .It Cm no-X11-forwarding Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. .It Cm permitlisten="[host:]port" Limit remote port forwarding with the .Xr ssh 1 .Fl R option such that it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple .Cm permitlisten options may be applied separated by commas. Hostnames may include wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in .Xr ssh_config 5 . A port specification of .Cm * matches any port. Note that the setting of .Cm GatewayPorts may further restrict listen addresses. Note that .Xr ssh 1 will send a hostname of .Dq localhost if a listen host was not specified when the forwarding was requested, and that this name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses .Dq 127.0.0.1 and .Dq ::1 . .It Cm permitopen="host:port" Limit local port forwarding with the .Xr ssh 1 .Fl L option such that it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple .Cm permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or addresses. A port specification of .Cm * matches any port. .It Cm port-forwarding Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm principals="principals" On a .Cm cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate signers using the .Cm cert-authority option. .It Cm pty Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm no-touch-required Do not require demonstration of user presence for signatures made using this key. This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms .Cm ecdsa-sk and .Cm ed25519-sk . .It Cm restrict Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding, as well as disabling PTY allocation and execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc . If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files they will be included in this set. .It Cm tunnel="n" Force a .Xr tun 4 device on the server. Without this option, the next available device will be used if the client requests a tunnel. .It Cm user-rc Enables execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm X11-forwarding Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .El .Pp An example authorized_keys file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa AAAAC3...51R== example.net permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa AAAAB5...21S== permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitopen="localhost:22000" ssh-rsa AAAAB5...21S== tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== jane@example.net restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv== user@example.net restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5== user@example.net no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInN...Ko== user@example.net .Ed .Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT The .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, its key is added to the per-user file. .Pp Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional), hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The fields are separated by spaces. .Pp The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of .Dq @cert-authority , to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, or .Dq @revoked , to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker should be used on a key line. .Pp Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns .Pf ( Ql * and .Ql \&? act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. When .Nm sshd is authenticating a client, such as when using .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , this will be the canonical client host name. When .Xr ssh 1 is authenticating a server, this will be the host name given by the user, the value of the .Xr ssh 1 .Cm HostkeyAlias if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the .Xr ssh 1 .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option was used. .Pp A pattern may also be preceded by .Ql \&! to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within .Ql \&[ and .Ql \&] brackets then followed by .Ql \&: and a non-standard port number. .Pp Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed hostnames start with a .Ql | character. Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard operators may be applied. .Pp The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they can be obtained, for example, from .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub . The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. .Pp Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are ignored as comments. .Pp When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the .Dq @cert-authority marker described above. .Pp The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, for example when it is known that the associated private key has been stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the .Dq @revoked marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from .Xr ssh 1 when they are encountered. .Pp It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file. .Pp Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script, .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 or by taking, for example, .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. .Xr ssh-keygen 1 also offers some basic automated editing for .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host names to their hashed representations. .Pp An example ssh_known_hosts file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A hashed hostname |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A revoked key @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... .Ed .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.hushlogin This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and .Pa /etc/motd , if .Cm PrintLastLog and .Cm PrintMotd , respectively, are enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by .Cm Banner . .Pp .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 for more information). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Nm reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described above. The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp If this file, the .Pa ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, .Nm will not allow it to be used unless the .Cm StrictModes option has been set to .Dq no . .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with .Ql # ) , and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not be, world-readable. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 ) . It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange" key exchange method. The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will be used. .Pp .It Pa /etc/motd See .Xr motd 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/nologin If this file exists, .Nm refuses to let anyone except root log in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Note that .Nm does not start if these files are group/world-accessible. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their contents should match the respective private parts. These files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. These files are created using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Nm sshd . The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Similar to .Pa ~/.ssh/rc , it can be used to specify machine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /var/empty .Xr chroot 2 directory used by .Nm during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-writable. .Pp .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid Contains the process ID of the .Nm listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr chroot 2 , .Xr login.conf 5 , .Xr moduli 5 , .Xr sshd_config 5 , .Xr inetd 8 , .Xr sftp-server 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. openssh-8.2p1/sshd.c010064400017500001750000002017341362136622600125750ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.549 2020/01/31 23:13:04 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and * authentication agent connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation: * Privilege Separation: * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE #include #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "msg.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sk-api.h" /* Re-exec fds */ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2) #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3) #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4) extern char *__progname; /* Server configuration options. */ ServerOptions options; /* Name of the server configuration file. */ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; /* * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing * the first connection. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* * Indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. * If test_flag > 1 ("-T" flag), then sshd will also dump the effective * configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the * "-C" flag. */ static int test_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ static int inetd_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ static int no_daemon_flag = 0; /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ static int log_stderr = 0; /* Saved arguments to main(). */ static char **saved_argv; static int saved_argc; /* re-exec */ static int rexeced_flag = 0; static int rexec_flag = 1; static int rexec_argc = 0; static char **rexec_argv; /* * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP * signal handler. */ #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 static int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; static int num_listen_socks = 0; /* Daemon's agent connection */ int auth_sock = -1; static int have_agent = 0; /* * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. */ struct { struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */ struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ int have_ssh2_key; } sensitive_data; /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ u_char session_id[16]; /* same for ssh2 */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; u_int session_id2_len = 0; /* record remote hostname or ip */ u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1; /* * startup_pipes/flags are used for tracking children of the listening sshd * process early in their lifespans. This tracking is needed for three things: * * 1) Implementing the MaxStartups limit of concurrent unauthenticated * connections. * 2) Avoiding a race condition for SIGHUP processing, where child processes * may have listen_socks open that could collide with main listener process * after it restarts. * 3) Ensuring that rexec'd sshd processes have received their initial state * from the parent listen process before handling SIGHUP. * * Child processes signal that they have completed closure of the listen_socks * and (if applicable) received their rexec state by sending a char over their * sock. Child processes signal that authentication has completed by closing * the sock (or by exiting). */ static int *startup_pipes = NULL; static int *startup_flags = NULL; /* Indicates child closed listener */ static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */ /* variables used for privilege separation */ int use_privsep = -1; struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL; int privsep_is_preauth = 1; static int privsep_chroot = 1; /* global connection state and authentication contexts */ Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL; struct ssh *the_active_state; /* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL; /* sshd_config buffer */ struct sshbuf *cfg; /* Included files from the configuration file */ struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes); /* message to be displayed after login */ struct sshbuf *loginmsg; /* Unprivileged user */ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void); void demote_sensitive_data(void); static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *); static char *listener_proctitle; /* * Close all listening sockets */ static void close_listen_socks(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) close(listen_socks[i]); num_listen_socks = -1; } static void close_startup_pipes(void) { int i; if (startup_pipes) for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) close(startup_pipes[i]); } /* * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate * the server key). */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sighup_handler(int sig) { received_sighup = 1; } /* * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. * Restarts the server. */ static void sighup_restart(void) { logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); if (options.pid_file != NULL) unlink(options.pid_file); platform_pre_restart(); close_listen_socks(); close_startup_pipes(); alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */ execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(1); } /* * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigterm_handler(int sig) { received_sigterm = sig; } /* * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then * reap any zombies left by exited children. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; debug("main_sigchld_handler: %s", strsignal(sig)); while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR)) ; errno = save_errno; } /* * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void grace_alarm_handler(int sig) { if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0) kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM); /* * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized * keys command helpers. */ if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) { ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN); kill(0, SIGTERM); } /* XXX pre-format ipaddr/port so we don't need to access active_state */ /* Log error and exit. */ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state), ssh_remote_port(the_active_state)); } /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; } if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; } } } /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ void demote_sensitive_data(void) { struct sshkey *tmp; u_int i; int r; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { if ((r = sshkey_from_private( sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0) fatal("could not demote host %s key: %s", sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]), ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; } /* Certs do not need demotion */ } } static void reseed_prngs(void) { u_int32_t rnd[256]; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_poll(); #endif arc4random_stir(); /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */ arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */ if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); } static void privsep_preauth_child(void) { gid_t gidset[1]; /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ privsep_challenge_enable(); #ifdef GSSAPI /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); #endif reseed_prngs(); /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); /* Demote the child */ if (privsep_chroot) { /* Change our root directory */ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, strerror(errno)); if (chdir("/") == -1) fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); /* Drop our privileges */ debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid, (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid); gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid; if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw); } } static int privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh) { int status, r; pid_t pid; struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ pmonitor = monitor_init(); /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex; if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); } else if (pid != 0) { debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid); pmonitor->m_pid = pid; if (have_agent) { r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock); if (r != 0) { error("Could not get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); have_agent = 0; } } if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid); monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor); /* Wait for the child's exit status */ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; pmonitor->m_pid = -1; fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } privsep_is_preauth = 0; pmonitor->m_pid = -1; if (WIFEXITED(status)) { if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d", __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box); return 1; } else { /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); privsep_preauth_child(); setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_child(box); return 0; } } static void privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING if (1) { #else if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) { #endif /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */ use_privsep = 0; goto skip; } /* New socket pair */ monitor_reinit(pmonitor); pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ exit(0); } /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); reseed_prngs(); /* Drop privileges */ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); skip: /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); /* * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since * this information is not part of the key state. */ ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh); } static void append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s) { int r; if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) { debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", __func__, s); return; } if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static char * list_hostkey_types(void) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *key; char *ret; u_int i; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL) key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */ append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512"); append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256"); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_XMSS: append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); break; } /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */ key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT: /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */ append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"); append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); break; } } if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); sshbuf_free(b); debug("%s: %s", __func__, ret); return ret; } static struct sshkey * get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; struct sshkey *key; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; break; default: key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL && !need_private) key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; break; } if (key == NULL || key->type != type) continue; switch (type) { case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid) continue; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: return need_private ? sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key; } } return NULL; } struct sshkey * get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh); } struct sshkey * get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh); } struct sshkey * get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) { if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); } struct sshkey * get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh) { if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]); } int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]))) return (i); } else { if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))) return (i); if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]))) return (i); } } return (-1); } /* Inform the client of all hostkeys */ static void notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *buf; struct sshkey *key; u_int i, nkeys; int r; char *fp; /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS) return; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh); if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC || sshkey_is_cert(key)) continue; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3("%s: key %d: %s %s", __func__, i, sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp); free(fp); if (nkeys == 0) { /* * Start building the request when we find the * first usable key. */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__); } /* Append the key to the request */ sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s", __func__, i, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__); nkeys++; } debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys); if (nkeys == 0) fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__); sshbuf_free(buf); } /* * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups */ static int drop_connection(int startups) { int p, r; if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) return 0; if (startups >= options.max_startups) return 1; if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) return 1; p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin; p += options.max_startups_rate; r = arc4random_uniform(100); debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r); return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION) #else "without OpenSSL" #endif ); fprintf(stderr, "usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n" " [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n" " [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n" ); exit(1); } static void send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf) { struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL; struct include_item *item = NULL; int r; debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd, sshbuf_len(conf)); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* pack includes into a string */ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* * Protocol from reexec master to child: * string configuration * string included_files[] { * string selector * string filename * string contents * } * string rng_seed (if required) */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY) rexec_send_rng_seed(m); #endif if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1) fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__); sshbuf_free(m); sshbuf_free(inc); debug3("%s: done", __func__); } static void recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf) { struct sshbuf *m, *inc; u_char *cp, ver; size_t len; int r; struct include_item *item; debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1) fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ver != 0) fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY) rexec_recv_rng_seed(m); #endif if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len))) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) { item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item)); if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry); } free(cp); sshbuf_free(m); debug3("%s: done", __func__); } /* Accept a connection from inetd */ static void server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out) { int fd; if (rexeced_flag) { close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO); } else { *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); } /* * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if * ttyfd happens to be one of those. */ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); if (!log_stderr) dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO)) close(fd); } debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out); } /* * Listen for TCP connections */ static void listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) { int ret, listen_sock; struct addrinfo *ai; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) fatal("Too many listen sockets. " "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(ret)); continue; } /* Create socket for listening. */ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (listen_sock == -1) { /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) { close(listen_sock); continue; } if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) { verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno)); close(listen_sock); continue; } /* Socket options */ set_reuseaddr(listen_sock); if (la->rdomain != NULL && set_rdomain(listen_sock, la->rdomain) == -1) { close(listen_sock); continue; } /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(listen_sock); debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); close(listen_sock); continue; } listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; num_listen_socks++; /* Start listening on the port. */ if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); logit("Server listening on %s port %s%s%s.", ntop, strport, la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain); } } static void server_listen(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_listen_addrs; i++) { listen_on_addrs(&options.listen_addrs[i]); freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs[i].addrs); free(options.listen_addrs[i].rdomain); memset(&options.listen_addrs[i], 0, sizeof(options.listen_addrs[i])); } free(options.listen_addrs); options.listen_addrs = NULL; options.num_listen_addrs = 0; if (!num_listen_socks) fatal("Cannot bind any address."); } /* * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns * from this function are in a forked subprocess. */ static void server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) { fd_set *fdset; int i, j, ret, maxfd; int ostartups = -1, startups = 0, listening = 0, lameduck = 0; int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }; char c = 0; struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; pid_t pid; u_char rnd[256]; /* setup fd set for accept */ fdset = NULL; maxfd = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) maxfd = listen_socks[i]; /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); startup_flags = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) startup_pipes[i] = -1; /* * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or * the daemon is killed with a signal. */ for (;;) { if (ostartups != startups) { setproctitle("%s [listener] %d of %d-%d startups", listener_proctitle, startups, options.max_startups_begin, options.max_startups); ostartups = startups; } if (received_sighup) { if (!lameduck) { debug("Received SIGHUP; waiting for children"); close_listen_socks(); lameduck = 1; } if (listening <= 0) sighup_restart(); } free(fdset); fdset = xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (ret == -1 && errno != EINTR) error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", (int) received_sigterm); close_listen_socks(); if (options.pid_file != NULL) unlink(options.pid_file); exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); } if (ret == -1) continue; for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) { if (startup_pipes[i] == -1 || !FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) continue; switch (read(startup_pipes[i], &c, sizeof(c))) { case -1: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) continue; if (errno != EPIPE) { error("%s: startup pipe %d (fd=%d): " "read %s", __func__, i, startup_pipes[i], strerror(errno)); } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 0: /* child exited or completed auth */ close(startup_pipes[i]); startup_pipes[i] = -1; startups--; if (startup_flags[i]) listening--; break; case 1: /* child has finished preliminaries */ if (startup_flags[i]) { listening--; startup_flags[i] = 0; } break; } } for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) continue; fromlen = sizeof(from); *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); if (*newsock == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) usleep(100 * 1000); continue; } if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) { close(*newsock); continue; } if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { char *laddr = get_local_ipaddr(*newsock); char *raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(*newsock); char msg[] = "Exceeded MaxStartups\r\n"; verbose("drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d " "on [%s]:%d past MaxStartups", startups, raddr, get_peer_port(*newsock), laddr, get_local_port(*newsock)); free(laddr); free(raddr); /* best-effort notification to client */ (void)write(*newsock, msg, strlen(msg)); close(*newsock); continue; } if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { close(*newsock); continue; } if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) { error("reexec socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); close(*newsock); close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); continue; } for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) maxfd = startup_p[0]; startups++; startup_flags[j] = 1; break; } /* * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless * we are in debugging mode. */ if (debug_flag) { /* * In debugging mode. Close the listening * socket, and start processing the * connection without forking. */ debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); close_listen_socks(); *sock_in = *newsock; *sock_out = *newsock; close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); startup_pipe = -1; pid = getpid(); if (rexec_flag) { send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg); close(config_s[0]); } return; } /* * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have * the child process the connection. The * parent continues listening. */ platform_pre_fork(); listening++; if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* * Child. Close the listening and * max_startup sockets. Start using * the accepted socket. Reinitialize * logging (since our pid has changed). * We return from this function to handle * the connection. */ platform_post_fork_child(); startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; close_startup_pipes(); close_listen_socks(); *sock_in = *newsock; *sock_out = *newsock; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); if (rexec_flag) close(config_s[0]); else { /* * Signal parent that the preliminaries * for this child are complete. For the * re-exec case, this happens after the * child has received the rexec state * from the server. */ (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1); } return; } /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ platform_post_fork_parent(pid); if (pid == -1) error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid); close(startup_p[1]); if (rexec_flag) { send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg); close(config_s[0]); close(config_s[1]); } close(*newsock); /* * Ensure that our random state differs * from that of the child */ arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); } } } /* * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and * return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable" * under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we * exit here if we detect any IP options. */ static void check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh) { #ifdef IP_OPTIONS int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); struct sockaddr_storage from; u_char opts[200]; socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from); char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1]; memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) return; if (from.ss_family != AF_INET) return; /* XXX IPv6 options? */ if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts, &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { text[0] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, " %2.2x", opts[i]); fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text); } return; #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ } /* Set the routing domain for this process */ static void set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name) { #if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN) if (name == NULL) return; /* default */ if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) { /* "expands" to routing domain of connection */ if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL) return; } /* NB. We don't pass 'ssh' to sys_set_process_rdomain() */ return sys_set_process_rdomain(name); #elif defined(__OpenBSD__) int rtable, ortable = getrtable(); const char *errstr; if (name == NULL) return; /* default */ if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) { /* "expands" to routing domain of connection */ if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL) return; } rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */ fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr); if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0) fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s", rtable, strerror(errno)); debug("%s: set routing domain %d (was %d)", __func__, rtable, ortable); #else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ fatal("Unable to set routing domain: not supported in this platform"); #endif } static void accumulate_host_timing_secret(struct sshbuf *server_cfg, struct sshkey *key) { static struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx; u_char *hash; size_t len; struct sshbuf *buf; int r; if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512)) == NULL) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start", __func__); if (key == NULL) { /* finalize */ /* add server config in case we are using agent for host keys */ if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(server_cfg), sshbuf_len(server_cfg)) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__); len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512); hash = xmalloc(len); if (ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, len) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final", __func__); options.timing_secret = PEEK_U64(hash); freezero(hash, len); ssh_digest_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; return; } if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s could not allocate buffer", __func__); if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, buf)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_private_serialize: %s", ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__); sshbuf_reset(buf); sshbuf_free(buf); } static char * prepare_proctitle(int ac, char **av) { char *ret = NULL; int i; for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) xextendf(&ret, " ", "%s", av[i]); return ret; } /* * Main program for the daemon. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { struct ssh *ssh = NULL; extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int r, opt, on = 1, already_daemon, remote_port; int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; const char *remote_ip, *rdomain; char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL; int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; u_int i, j; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; mode_t new_umask; struct sshkey *key; struct sshkey *pubkey; int keytype; Authctxt *authctxt; struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); #endif __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ saved_argc = ac; rexec_argc = ac; saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv)); for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++) saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_argv[i] = NULL; #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_argv; #endif if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1) debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); seed_rng(); /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ initialize_server_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrt")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'f': config_file_name = optarg; break; case 'c': servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0, &options, optarg); break; case 'd': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) options.log_level++; break; case 'D': no_daemon_flag = 1; break; case 'E': logfile = optarg; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'i': inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'r': rexec_flag = 0; break; case 'R': rexeced_flag = 1; inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'Q': /* ignored */ break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'b': /* protocol 1, ignored */ break; case 'p': options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); exit(1); } options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'g': if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'k': /* protocol 1, ignored */ break; case 'h': servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0, &options, optarg, 1); break; case 't': test_flag = 1; break; case 'T': test_flag = 2; break; case 'C': connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0); if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info, optarg) == -1) exit(1); break; case 'u': utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL); if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_server_config_line(&options, line, "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0) exit(1); free(line); break; case '?': default: usage(); break; } } if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) rexec_flag = 0; if (!test_flag && rexec_flag && !path_absolute(av[0])) fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); if (rexeced_flag) closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); else closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ if (logfile != NULL) log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); /* * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host * key (unless started from inetd) */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag); /* * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from * root's environment */ if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL) (void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME"); sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; /* * If we're not doing an extended test do not silently ignore connection * test params. */ if (test_flag < 2 && connection_info != NULL) fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without " "test mode (-T)"); /* Fetch our configuration */ if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (rexeced_flag) { recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg); if (!debug_flag) { startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); /* * Signal parent that this child is at a point where * they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending. */ (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1); } } else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0) load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg); parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, cfg, &includes, NULL); /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ fill_default_server_options(&options); /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */ if (options.challenge_response_authentication) options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; /* Check that options are sensible */ if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL && (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL && strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0)) fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without " "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser"); if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL && (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL && strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0)) fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without " "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser"); /* * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods. * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login. */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) { if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) == 0) break; } if (i >= options.num_auth_methods) fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by " "enabled authentication methods"); } /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ if (optind < ac) { fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); exit(1); } debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION) #else "without OpenSSL" #endif ); /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */ privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0); if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) { if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication) fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); } else { privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw); freezero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd)); privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*"); } endpwent(); /* load host keys */ sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); if (options.host_key_agent) { if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, options.host_key_agent, 1); if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0) have_agent = 1; else error("Could not connect to agent \"%s\": %s", options.host_key_agent, ssh_err(r)); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { int ll = options.host_key_file_userprovided[i] ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL) continue; if ((r = sshkey_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\": %s", options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r)); if (sshkey_is_sk(key) && key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) { debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring", options.host_key_files[i]); key->sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; } if (r == 0 && key != NULL && (r = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0) { do_log2(ll, "Unable to shield host key \"%s\": %s", options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; } if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], &pubkey, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\": %s", options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r)); if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0) fatal("Could not demote key: \"%s\": %s", options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r)); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey; if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) { debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s", options.host_key_files[i]); keytype = pubkey->type; } else if (key != NULL) { keytype = key->type; accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, key); } else { do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key: %s", options.host_key_files[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL; continue; } switch (keytype) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_XMSS: if (have_agent || key != NULL) sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; break; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s", key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp); free(fp); } accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL); if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); exit(1); } /* * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical * indices to the public keys that they relate to. */ sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) { if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL) continue; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], &key, NULL)) != 0) { error("Could not load host certificate \"%s\": %s", options.host_cert_files[i], ssh_err(r)); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); sshkey_free(key); continue; } /* Find matching private key */ for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) { sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; break; } } if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) { error("No matching private key for certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); sshkey_free(key); continue; } sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; debug("host certificate: #%u type %d %s", j, key->type, sshkey_type(key)); } if (privsep_chroot) { struct stat st; if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) || (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0)) fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) && (st.st_uid != getuid () || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)) #else if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0) #endif fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or " "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); } if (test_flag > 1) { /* * If no connection info was provided by -C then use * use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match. */ if (connection_info == NULL) connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0); connection_info->test = 1; parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info); dump_config(&options); } /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ if (test_flag) exit(0); /* * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every * module which might be used). */ if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); if (rexec_flag) { if (rexec_argc < 0) fatal("rexec_argc %d < 0", rexec_argc); rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < (u_int)rexec_argc; i++) { debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]); rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i]; } rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R"; rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL; } listener_proctitle = prepare_proctitle(ac, av); /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; (void) umask(new_umask); /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag)) log_stderr = 1; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* * If not in debugging mode, not started from inetd and not already * daemonized (eg re-exec via SIGHUP), disconnect from the controlling * terminal, and fork. The original process exits. */ already_daemon = daemonized(); if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag || already_daemon)) { if (daemon(0, 0) == -1) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); disconnect_controlling_tty(); } /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be unmounted if desired. */ if (chdir("/") == -1) error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); /* ignore SIGPIPE */ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */ if (inetd_flag) { server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out); } else { platform_pre_listen(); server_listen(); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); /* * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler * is setup and the listen sockets are bound */ if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) { FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w"); if (f == NULL) { error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s", options.pid_file, strerror(errno)); } else { fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid()); fclose(f); } } /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, &newsock, config_s); } /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]"); /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't * want the child to be able to affect the parent. */ #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY) /* * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set * controlling tty" errors. */ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() == -1) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif if (rexec_flag) { int fd; debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); if (startup_pipe == -1) close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) { dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD; } dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); close(config_s[1]); execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv); /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */ error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno)); recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL); log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Clean up fds */ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); if (fd > STDERR_FILENO) close(fd); } debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); } /* Executed child processes don't need these. */ fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */ alarm(0); ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); /* * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do * not have a key. */ if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL) fatal("Unable to create connection"); the_active_state = ssh; ssh_packet_set_server(ssh); check_ip_options(ssh); /* Prepare the channels layer */ channel_init_channels(ssh); channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); process_permitopen(ssh, &options); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) && setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) { debug("ssh_remote_port failed"); cleanup_exit(255); } if (options.routing_domain != NULL) set_process_rdomain(ssh, options.routing_domain); /* * The rest of the code depends on the fact that * ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if * the socket goes away. */ remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port); #endif rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh); /* Log the connection. */ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in); verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d%s%s%s", remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh), rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain \"", rdomain == NULL ? "" : rdomain, rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\""); free(laddr); /* * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you * are about to discover the bug. */ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); if (!debug_flag) alarm(options.login_grace_time); if (kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1, options.version_addendum) != 0) cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */ ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh); /* allocate authentication context */ authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt)); ssh->authctxt = authctxt; authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg; /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */ the_authctxt = authctxt; /* Set default key authentication options */ if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL) fatal("allocation failed"); /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */ if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); auth_debug_reset(); if (use_privsep) { if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1) goto authenticated; } else if (have_agent) { if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); have_agent = 0; } } /* perform the key exchange */ /* authenticate user and start session */ do_ssh2_kex(ssh); do_authentication2(ssh); /* * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers * the current keystate and exits */ if (use_privsep) { mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); exit(0); } authenticated: /* * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for * authentication. */ alarm(0); ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); authctxt->authenticated = 1; if (startup_pipe != -1) { close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = -1; } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_event(ssh, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI if (options.gss_authentication) { temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); restore_uid(); } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { do_pam_setcred(1); do_pam_session(ssh); } #endif /* * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare * file descriptor passing. */ if (use_privsep) { privsep_postauth(ssh, authctxt); /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ } ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.client_alive_interval, options.client_alive_count_max); /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */ notify_hostkeys(ssh); /* Start session. */ do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) finish_pam(); #endif /* USE_PAM */ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE)); #endif ssh_packet_close(ssh); if (use_privsep) mm_terminate(); exit(0); } int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg) { int r; if (use_privsep) { if (privkey) { if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, ssh->compat) < 0) fatal("%s: privkey sign failed", __func__); } else { if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, ssh->compat) < 0) fatal("%s: pubkey sign failed", __func__); } } else { if (privkey) { if (sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, ssh->compat) < 0) fatal("%s: privkey sign failed", __func__); } else { if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg, ssh->compat)) != 0) { fatal("%s: agent sign failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } } return 0; } /* SSH2 key exchange */ static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER }; struct kex *kex; int r; myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( options.kex_algorithms); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal( options.ciphers); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal( options.ciphers); myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; } if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, options.rekey_interval); myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( list_hostkey_types()); /* start key exchange */ if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); kex = ssh->kex; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; # endif #endif kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); session_id2 = kex->session_id; session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); packet_put_cstring("markus"); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); #endif debug("KEX done"); } /* server specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) { do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt); if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid); if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 && errno != ESRCH) error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__, pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); } } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif _exit(i); } openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config010064400017500001750000000060621362136622600136760ustar00djmdjm# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.103 2018/04/09 20:41:22 tj Exp $ # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See # sshd_config(5) for more information. # This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin # The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with # OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the # default value. #Port 22 #AddressFamily any #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 #ListenAddress :: #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key # Ciphers and keying #RekeyLimit default none # Logging #SyslogFacility AUTH #LogLevel INFO # Authentication: #LoginGraceTime 2m #PermitRootLogin prohibit-password #StrictModes yes #MaxAuthTries 6 #MaxSessions 10 #PubkeyAuthentication yes # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2 # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none #AuthorizedKeysCommand none #AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts #HostbasedAuthentication no # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for # HostbasedAuthentication #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files #IgnoreRhosts yes # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! #PasswordAuthentication yes #PermitEmptyPasswords no # Change to no to disable s/key passwords #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes # Kerberos options #KerberosAuthentication no #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes #KerberosTicketCleanup yes #KerberosGetAFSToken no # GSSAPI options #GSSAPIAuthentication no #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and # PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration, # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password". # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. #UsePAM no #AllowAgentForwarding yes #AllowTcpForwarding yes #GatewayPorts no #X11Forwarding no #X11DisplayOffset 10 #X11UseLocalhost yes #PermitTTY yes #PrintMotd yes #PrintLastLog yes #TCPKeepAlive yes #PermitUserEnvironment no #Compression delayed #ClientAliveInterval 0 #ClientAliveCountMax 3 #UseDNS no #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid #MaxStartups 10:30:100 #PermitTunnel no #ChrootDirectory none #VersionAddendum none # no default banner path #Banner none # override default of no subsystems Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis #Match User anoncvs # X11Forwarding no # AllowTcpForwarding no # PermitTTY no # ForceCommand cvs server openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5010064400017500001750000001506151362136622600140450ustar00djmdjm.\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.307 2020/02/07 03:54:44 dtucker Exp $ .Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd_config .Nd OpenSSH daemon configuration file .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr sshd 8 reads configuration data from .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file specified with .Fl f on the command line). The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. For each keyword, the first obtained value will be used. Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm AcceptEnv Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into the session's .Xr environ 7 . See .Cm SendEnv and .Cm SetEnv in .Xr ssh_config 5 for how to configure the client. The .Ev TERM environment variable is always accepted whenever the client requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters .Ql * and .Ql \&? . Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm AcceptEnv directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept any environment variables. .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family should be used by .Xr sshd 8 . Valid arguments are .Cm any (the default), .Cm inet (use IPv4 only), or .Cm inet6 (use IPv6 only). .It Cm AllowAgentForwarding Specifies whether .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is permitted. The default is .Cm yes . Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm all to allow StreamLocal forwarding, .Cm no to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding, .Cm local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Cm remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowTcpForwarding Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm all to allow TCP forwarding, .Cm no to prevent all TCP forwarding, .Cm local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Cm remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format. The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm AuthenticationMethods Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be followed by one or more lists of comma-separated authentication method names, or by the single string .Cm any to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication method. If the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least one of these lists. .Pp For example, .Qq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by either password or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this example it would not be possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive authentication before public key. .Pp For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon followed by the device identifier .Cm bsdauth or .Cm pam . depending on the server configuration. For example, .Qq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the .Cm bsdauth device. .Pp If the publickey method is listed more than once, .Xr sshd 8 verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for subsequent authentications. For example, .Qq publickey,publickey requires successful authentication using two different public keys. .Pp Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. .Pp The available authentication methods are: .Qq gssapi-with-mic , .Qq hostbased , .Qq keyboard-interactive , .Qq none (used for access to password-less accounts when .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords is enabled), .Qq password and .Qq publickey . .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used. .Pp The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see .Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS in .Xr sshd 8 ) . If a key supplied by .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile files. By default, no .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not, then .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of .Xr sshd 8 . Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. Alternately this option may be set to .Cm none to skip checking for user keys in files. The default is .Qq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 . .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed certificate principals as per .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile . The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used. .Pp The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By default, no .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized principals commands. If .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified but .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a key listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in .Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in .Xr sshd 8 ) . Empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are ignored. .Pp Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. The default is .Cm none , i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. .Pp Note that .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys , though the .Cm principals= key option offers a similar facility (see .Xr sshd 8 for details). .It Cm Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before authentication is allowed. If the argument is .Cm none then no banner is displayed. By default, no banner is displayed. .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for public key or host-based authentication. .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via PAM or through authentication styles supported in .Xr login.conf 5 ) The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm ChrootDirectory Specifies the pathname of a directory to .Xr chroot 2 to after authentication. At session startup .Xr sshd 8 checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot, .Xr sshd 8 changes the working directory to the user's home directory. Arguments to .Cm ChrootDirectory accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp The .Cm ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and directories to support the user's session. For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically .Xr sh 1 , and basic .Pa /dev nodes such as .Xr null 4 , .Xr zero 4 , .Xr stdin 4 , .Xr stdout 4 , .Xr stderr 4 , and .Xr tty 4 devices. For file transfer sessions using SFTP no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process sftp-server is used, though sessions which use logging may require .Pa /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see .Xr sftp-server 8 for details). .Pp For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which .Xr sshd 8 cannot detect. .Pp The default is .Cm none , indicating not to .Xr chroot 2 . .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It 3des-cbc .It aes128-cbc .It aes192-cbc .It aes256-cbc .It aes128-ctr .It aes192-ctr .It aes256-ctr .It aes128-gcm@openssh.com .It aes256-gcm@openssh.com .It chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q cipher . .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent without .Xr sshd 8 receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive . The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive. .Pp The default value is 3. If .Cm ClientAliveInterval is set to 15, and .Cm ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. Setting a zero .Cm ClientAliveCountMax disables connection termination. .It Cm ClientAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, .Xr sshd 8 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. .It Cm Compression Specifies whether compression is enabled after the user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm delayed (a legacy synonym for .Cm yes ) or .Cm no . The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm DenyGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm DenyUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format. The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm DisableForwarding Disables all forwarding features, including X11, .Xr ssh-agent 1 , TCP and StreamLocal. This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may simplify restricted configurations. .It Cm ExposeAuthInfo Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user. The location of the file is exposed to the user session through the .Ev SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Cm md5 and .Cm sha256 . The default is .Cm sha256 . .It Cm ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by .Cm ForceCommand , ignoring any command supplied by the client and .Pa ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. It is most useful inside a .Cm Match block. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command of .Cm internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process SFTP server that requires no support files when used with .Cm ChrootDirectory . The default is .Cm none . .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports forwarded for the client. By default, .Xr sshd 8 binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to connect. The argument may be .Cm no to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only, .Cm yes to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or .Cm clientspecified to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to .Cm yes then the client must authenticate against the host service on the current hostname. If set to .Cm no then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The list of available key types may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes . .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful public key client host authentication is allowed (host-based authentication). The default is .Cm no . .It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse name lookup when matching the name in the .Pa ~/.shosts , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv files during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . A setting of .Cm yes means that .Xr sshd 8 uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm HostCertificate Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified by .Cm HostKey . The default behaviour of .Xr sshd 8 is not to load any certificates. .It Cm HostKey Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The defaults are .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key . .Pp Note that .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible and that the .Cm HostKeyAlgorithms option restricts which of the keys are actually used by .Xr sshd 8 . .Pp It is possible to have multiple host key files. It is also possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case operations on the private key will be delegated to an .Xr ssh-agent 1 . .It Cm HostKeyAgent Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an agent that has access to the private host keys. If the string .Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the host key algorithms that the server offers. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The list of available key types may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms . .It Cm IgnoreRhosts Specifies that .Pa .rhosts and .Pa .shosts files will not be used in .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . .Pp .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv and .Pa /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should ignore the user's .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication and use only the system-wide known hosts file .Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm Include Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain .Xr glob 7 wildcards. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in .Pa /etc/ssh . An .Cm Include directive may appear inside a .Cm Match block to perform conditional inclusion. .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. Accepted values are .Cm af11 , .Cm af12 , .Cm af13 , .Cm af21 , .Cm af22 , .Cm af23 , .Cm af31 , .Cm af32 , .Cm af33 , .Cm af41 , .Cm af42 , .Cm af43 , .Cm cs0 , .Cm cs1 , .Cm cs2 , .Cm cs3 , .Cm cs4 , .Cm cs5 , .Cm cs6 , .Cm cs7 , .Cm ef , .Cm le , .Cm lowdelay , .Cm throughput , .Cm reliability , a numeric value, or .Cm none to use the operating system default. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Cm af21 (Low-Latency Data) for interactive sessions and .Cm cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . The default is to use whatever value .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to (by default .Cm yes ) . .It Cm KerberosAuthentication Specifies whether the password provided by the user for .Cm PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism such as .Pa /etc/passwd . The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache file on logout. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the default set. The supported algorithms are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It curve25519-sha256 .It curve25519-sha256@libssh.org .It diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 .It diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 .It diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 .It diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp256 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp384 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp521 .It sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 .Ed .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms . .It Cm ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses .Xr sshd 8 should listen on. The following forms may be used: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar hostname | address .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar hostname : port .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar IPv4_address : port .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Oo Ar hostname | address Oc : Ar port .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .El .Pp The optional .Cm rdomain qualifier requests .Xr sshd 8 listen in an explicit routing domain. If .Ar port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all .Cm Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local addresses on the current default routing domain. Multiple .Cm ListenAddress options are permitted. For more information on routing domains, see .Xr rdomain 4 . .It Cm LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. The default is 120 seconds. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. .It Cm MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Qq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The supported MACs are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It hmac-md5 .It hmac-md5-96 .It hmac-sha1 .It hmac-sha1-96 .It hmac-sha2-256 .It hmac-sha2-512 .It umac-64@openssh.com .It umac-128@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com .It umac-64-etm@openssh.com .It umac-128-etm@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q mac . .It Cm Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the .Cm Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those set in the global section of the config file, until either another .Cm Match line or the end of the file. If a keyword appears in multiple .Cm Match blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is applied. .Pp The arguments to .Cm Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token .Cm All which matches all criteria. The available criteria are .Cm User , .Cm Group , .Cm Host , .Cm LocalAddress , .Cm LocalPort , .Cm RDomain , and .Cm Address (with .Cm RDomain representing the .Xr rdomain 4 on which the connection was received). .Pp The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the .Sx PATTERNS section of .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp The patterns in an .Cm Address criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, such as 192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32. Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example, 192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively. .Pp Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a .Cm Match keyword. Available keywords are .Cm AcceptEnv , .Cm AllowAgentForwarding , .Cm AllowGroups , .Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding , .Cm AllowTcpForwarding , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm AuthenticationMethods , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser , .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile , .Cm Banner , .Cm ChrootDirectory , .Cm ClientAliveCountMax , .Cm ClientAliveInterval , .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm ForceCommand , .Cm GatewayPorts , .Cm GSSAPIAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes , .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly , .Cm Include , .Cm IPQoS , .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , .Cm KerberosAuthentication , .Cm LogLevel , .Cm MaxAuthTries , .Cm MaxSessions , .Cm PasswordAuthentication , .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords , .Cm PermitListen , .Cm PermitOpen , .Cm PermitRootLogin , .Cm PermitTTY , .Cm PermitTunnel , .Cm PermitUserRC , .Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes , .Cm PubkeyAuthentication , .Cm RekeyLimit , .Cm RevokedKeys , .Cm RDomain , .Cm SetEnv , .Cm StreamLocalBindMask , .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink , .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , .Cm X11DisplayOffset , .Cm X11Forwarding and .Cm X11UseLocalhost . .It Cm MaxAuthTries Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6. .It Cm MaxSessions Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp) sessions permitted per network connection. Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection multiplexing. Setting .Cm MaxSessions to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting forwarding. The default is 10. .It Cm MaxStartups Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the .Cm LoginGraceTime expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100. .Pp Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the three colon separated values start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60"). .Xr sshd 8 will refuse connection attempts with a probability of rate/100 (30%) if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches full (60). .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm PermitListen Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port forwarding may listen. The listen specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitListen .Sm off .Ar port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitListen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Cm any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any listen requests. An argument of .Cm none can be used to prohibit all listen requests. The host name may contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in .Xr ssh_config 5 . The wildcard .Sq * can also be used in place of a port number to allow all ports. By default all port forwarding listen requests are permitted. Note that the .Cm GatewayPorts option may further restrict which addresses may be listened on. Note also that .Xr ssh 1 will request a listen host of .Dq localhost if no listen host was specifically requested, and this name is treated differently to explicit localhost addresses of .Dq 127.0.0.1 and .Dq ::1 . .It Cm PermitOpen Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar IPv4_addr : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Cm any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of .Cm none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The wildcard .Sq * can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively. Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied names. By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. .It Cm PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm prohibit-password , .Cm forced-commands-only , or .Cm no . The default is .Cm prohibit-password . .Pp If this option is set to .Cm prohibit-password (or its deprecated alias, .Cm without-password ) , password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm forced-commands-only , root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the .Ar command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm no , root is not allowed to log in. .It Cm PermitTTY Specifies whether .Xr pty 4 allocation is permitted. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PermitTunnel Specifies whether .Xr tun 4 device forwarding is allowed. The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm point-to-point (layer 3), .Cm ethernet (layer 2), or .Cm no . Specifying .Cm yes permits both .Cm point-to-point and .Cm ethernet . The default is .Cm no . .Pp Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected .Xr tun 4 device must allow access to the user. .It Cm PermitUserEnvironment Specifies whether .Pa ~/.ssh/environment and .Cm environment= options in .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by .Xr sshd 8 . Valid options are .Cm yes , .Cm no or a pattern-list specifying which environment variable names to accept (for example .Qq LANG,LC_* ) . The default is .Cm no . Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as .Ev LD_PRELOAD . .It Cm PermitUserRC Specifies whether any .Pa ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH daemon, or .Cm none to not write one. The default is .Pa /var/run/sshd.pid . .It Cm Port Specifies the port number that .Xr sshd 8 listens on. The default is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also .Cm ListenAddress . .It Cm PrintLastLog Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PrintMotd Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print .Pa /etc/motd when a user logs in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the shell, .Pa /etc/profile , or equivalent.) The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The list of available key types may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes . .It Cm PubkeyAuthOptions Sets one or more public key authentication options. Two option keywords are currently supported: .Cm none (the default; indicating no additional options are enabled) and .Cm touch-required . .Pp The .Cm touch-required option causes public key authentication using a FIDO authenticator algorithm (i.e.\& .Cm ecdsa-sk or .Cm ed25519-sk ) to always require the signature to attest that a physically present user explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching the authenticator). By default, .Xr sshd 8 requires user presence unless overridden with an authorized_keys option. The .Cm touch-required flag disables this override. This option has no effect for other, non-authenticator public key types. .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section. The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Cm default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. .It Cm RevokedKeys Specifies revoked public keys file, or .Cm none to not use one. Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm RDomain Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after authentication has completed. The user session, as well and any forwarded or listening IP sockets, will be bound to this .Xr rdomain 4 . If the routing domain is set to .Cm \&%D , then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied. .It Cm SecurityKeyProvider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. .It Cm SetEnv Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started by .Xr sshd 8 as .Dq NAME=VALUE . The environment value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace characters). Environment variables set by .Cm SetEnv override the default environment and any variables specified by the user via .Cm AcceptEnv or .Cm PermitUserEnvironment . .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask .Pq umask used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. .It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, .Nm sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . The default is .Cm no . .It Cm StrictModes Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should check file modes and ownership of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is .Cm yes . Note that this does not apply to .Cm ChrootDirectory , whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. .It Cm Subsystem Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments) to execute upon subsystem request. .Pp The command .Cm sftp-server implements the SFTP file transfer subsystem. .Pp Alternately the name .Cm internal-sftp implements an in-process SFTP server. This may simplify configurations using .Cm ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients. .Pp By default no subsystems are defined. .It Cm SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving .Qq ghost users and consuming server resources. .Pp The default is .Cm yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice if the network goes down or the client host crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Cm no . .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or .Cm none to not use one. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are allowed. If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted for authentication using .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys . For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm UseDNS Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should look up the remote host name, and to check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the very same IP address. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm no (the default) then only addresses and not host names may be used in .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys .Cm from and .Nm .Cm Match .Cm Host directives. .It Cm UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to .Cm yes this will enable PAM authentication using .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication and .Cm PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types. .Pp Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable either .Cm PasswordAuthentication or .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication. .Pp If .Cm UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run .Xr sshd 8 as a non-root user. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default is .Cm none . .It Cm X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's X11 forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. .It Cm X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . The default is .Cm no . .Pp When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the server and to client displays if the .Xr sshd 8 proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see .Cm X11UseLocalhost ) , though this is not the default. Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see the warnings for .Cm ForwardX11 in .Xr ssh_config 5 ) . A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a .Cm no setting. .Pp Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm X11UseLocalhost Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the hostname part of the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable to .Cm localhost . This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function with this configuration. .Cm X11UseLocalhost may be set to .Cm no to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard address. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program, or .Cm none to not use one. The default is .Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth . .El .Sh TIME FORMATS .Xr sshd 8 command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: .Sm off .Ar time Op Ar qualifier , .Sm on where .Ar time is a positive integer value and .Ar qualifier is one of the following: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It Aq Cm none seconds .It Cm s | Cm S seconds .It Cm m | Cm M minutes .It Cm h | Cm H hours .It Cm d | Cm D days .It Cm w | Cm W weeks .El .Pp Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time value. .Pp Time format examples: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) .It 10m 10 minutes .It 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) .El .Sh TOKENS Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at runtime: .Pp .Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact .It %% A literal .Sq % . .It \&%D The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received. .It %F The fingerprint of the CA key. .It %f The fingerprint of the key or certificate. .It %h The home directory of the user. .It %i The key ID in the certificate. .It %K The base64-encoded CA key. .It %k The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication. .It %s The serial number of the certificate. .It \&%T The type of the CA key. .It %t The key or certificate type. .It \&%U The numeric user ID of the target user. .It %u The username. .El .Pp .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm ChrootDirectory accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm RoutingDomain accepts the token %D. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Xr sshd 8 . This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not necessary) that it be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sftp-server 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by .An Tatu Ylonen . .An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos , .An Theo de Raadt and .An Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. .An Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. .An Niels Provos and .An Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. openssh-8.2p1/ssherr.c010064400017500001750000000122611362136622600131350ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.10 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include #include "ssherr.h" const char * ssh_err(int n) { switch (n) { case SSH_ERR_SUCCESS: return "success"; case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: return "unexpected internal error"; case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: return "memory allocation failed"; case SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE: return "incomplete message"; case SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT: return "invalid format"; case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE: return "bignum is negative"; case SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE: return "string is too large"; case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE: return "bignum is too large"; case SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE: return "elliptic curve point is too large"; case SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE: return "insufficient buffer space"; case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: return "invalid argument"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH: return "key bits do not match"; case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID: return "invalid elliptic curve"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH: return "key type does not match"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN: return "unknown or unsupported key type"; case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH: return "elliptic curve does not match"; case SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT: return "plain key provided where certificate required"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB: return "key lacks certificate data"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE: return "unknown/unsupported certificate type"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY: return "invalid certificate signing key"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE: return "invalid elliptic curve value"; case SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID: return "incorrect signature"; case SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR: return "error in libcrypto"; /* XXX fetch and return */ case SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA: return "unexpected bytes remain after decoding"; case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: return strerror(errno); case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID: return "invalid certificate"; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION: return "communication with agent failed"; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE: return "agent refused operation"; case SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE: return "DH GEX group out of range"; case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: return "disconnected"; case SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID: return "message authentication code incorrect"; case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH: return "no matching cipher found"; case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH: return "no matching MAC found"; case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH: return "no matching compression method found"; case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH: return "no matching key exchange method found"; case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH: return "no matching host key type found"; case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH: return "protocol version mismatch"; case SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return "could not read protocol version"; case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED: return "could not load host key"; case SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY: return "rekeying not supported by peer"; case SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT: return "passphrase is too short (minimum five characters)"; case SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED: return "file changed while reading"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER: return "key encrypted using unsupported cipher"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE: return "incorrect passphrase supplied to decrypt private key"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS: return "bad permissions"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH: return "certificate does not match key"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: return "key not found"; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT: return "agent not present"; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES: return "agent contains no identities"; case SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY: return "internal error: buffer is read-only"; case SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC: return "KRL file has invalid magic number"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: return "Key is revoked"; case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: return "Connection closed"; case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: return "Connection timed out"; case SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT: return "Connection corrupted"; case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR: return "Protocol error"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH: return "Invalid key length"; case SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE: return "number is too large"; case SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED: return "signature algorithm not supported"; case SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED: return "requested feature not supported"; case SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND: return "device not found"; default: return "unknown error"; } } openssh-8.2p1/ssherr.h010064400017500001750000000065621362136622600131510ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.8 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _SSHERR_H #define _SSHERR_H /* XXX are these too granular? not granular enough? I can't decide - djm */ /* Error codes */ #define SSH_ERR_SUCCESS 0 #define SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR -1 #define SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL -2 #define SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE -3 #define SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT -4 #define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE -5 #define SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE -6 #define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE -7 #define SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE -8 #define SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE -9 #define SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -10 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH -11 #define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID -12 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH -13 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN -14 /* XXX UNSUPPORTED? */ #define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH -15 #define SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT -16 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB -17 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE -18 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY -19 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE -20 #define SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID -21 #define SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR -22 #define SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA -23 #define SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR -24 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID -25 #define SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION -26 #define SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE -27 #define SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE -28 #define SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED -29 #define SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID -30 #define SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH -31 #define SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH -32 #define SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH -33 #define SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH -34 #define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH -35 #define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED -36 #define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH -37 #define SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION -38 #define SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY -39 #define SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT -40 #define SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED -41 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -42 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE -43 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS -44 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH -45 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND -46 #define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT -47 #define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES -48 #define SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY -49 #define SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC -50 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED -51 #define SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED -52 #define SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT -53 #define SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT -54 #define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR -55 #define SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH -56 #define SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE -57 #define SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED -58 #define SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -59 #define SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -60 /* Translate a numeric error code to a human-readable error string */ const char *ssh_err(int n); #endif /* _SSHERR_H */ openssh-8.2p1/sshkey-xmss.c010064400017500001750000000736021362136622600141330ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.8 2019/11/13 07:53:10 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_XMSS #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H # include #endif #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshkey-xmss.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmss_fast.h" /* opaque internal XMSS state */ #define XMSS_MAGIC "xmss-state-v1" #define XMSS_CIPHERNAME "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" struct ssh_xmss_state { xmss_params params; u_int32_t n, w, h, k; bds_state bds; u_char *stack; u_int32_t stackoffset; u_char *stacklevels; u_char *auth; u_char *keep; u_char *th_nodes; u_char *retain; treehash_inst *treehash; u_int32_t idx; /* state read from file */ u_int32_t maxidx; /* restricted # of signatures */ int have_state; /* .state file exists */ int lockfd; /* locked in sshkey_xmss_get_state() */ u_char allow_update; /* allow sshkey_xmss_update_state() */ char *enc_ciphername;/* encrypt state with cipher */ u_char *enc_keyiv; /* encrypt state with key */ u_int32_t enc_keyiv_len; /* length of enc_keyiv */ }; int sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(struct sshkey *, const char *); void sshkey_xmss_free_bds(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int *, sshkey_printfn *); int sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **); int sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **); int sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); #define PRINT(s...) do { if (pr) pr(s); } while (0) int sshkey_xmss_init(struct sshkey *key, const char *name) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state; if (key->xmss_state != NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; state = calloc(sizeof(struct ssh_xmss_state), 1); if (state == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME) == 0) { state->n = 32; state->w = 16; state->h = 10; } else if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME) == 0) { state->n = 32; state->w = 16; state->h = 16; } else if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME) == 0) { state->n = 32; state->w = 16; state->h = 20; } else { free(state); return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } if ((key->xmss_name = strdup(name)) == NULL) { free(state); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } state->k = 2; /* XXX hardcoded */ state->lockfd = -1; if (xmss_set_params(&state->params, state->n, state->h, state->w, state->k) != 0) { free(state); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } key->xmss_state = state; return 0; } void sshkey_xmss_free_state(struct sshkey *key) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; sshkey_xmss_free_bds(key); if (state) { if (state->enc_keyiv) { explicit_bzero(state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len); free(state->enc_keyiv); } free(state->enc_ciphername); free(state); } key->xmss_state = NULL; } #define SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC "k=2" #define num_stack(x) ((x->h+1)*(x->n)) #define num_stacklevels(x) (x->h+1) #define num_auth(x) ((x->h)*(x->n)) #define num_keep(x) ((x->h >> 1)*(x->n)) #define num_th_nodes(x) ((x->h - x->k)*(x->n)) #define num_retain(x) (((1ULL << x->k) - x->k - 1) * (x->n)) #define num_treehash(x) ((x->h) - (x->k)) int sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(struct sshkey *key) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; u_int32_t i; state->stackoffset = 0; if ((state->stack = calloc(num_stack(state), 1)) == NULL || (state->stacklevels = calloc(num_stacklevels(state), 1))== NULL || (state->auth = calloc(num_auth(state), 1)) == NULL || (state->keep = calloc(num_keep(state), 1)) == NULL || (state->th_nodes = calloc(num_th_nodes(state), 1)) == NULL || (state->retain = calloc(num_retain(state), 1)) == NULL || (state->treehash = calloc(num_treehash(state), sizeof(treehash_inst))) == NULL) { sshkey_xmss_free_bds(key); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } for (i = 0; i < state->h - state->k; i++) state->treehash[i].node = &state->th_nodes[state->n*i]; xmss_set_bds_state(&state->bds, state->stack, state->stackoffset, state->stacklevels, state->auth, state->keep, state->treehash, state->retain, 0); return 0; } void sshkey_xmss_free_bds(struct sshkey *key) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; if (state == NULL) return; free(state->stack); free(state->stacklevels); free(state->auth); free(state->keep); free(state->th_nodes); free(state->retain); free(state->treehash); state->stack = NULL; state->stacklevels = NULL; state->auth = NULL; state->keep = NULL; state->th_nodes = NULL; state->retain = NULL; state->treehash = NULL; } void * sshkey_xmss_params(const struct sshkey *key) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; if (state == NULL) return NULL; return &state->params; } void * sshkey_xmss_bds_state(const struct sshkey *key) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; if (state == NULL) return NULL; return &state->bds; } int sshkey_xmss_siglen(const struct sshkey *key, size_t *lenp) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; if (lenp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (state == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; *lenp = 4 + state->n + state->params.wots_par.keysize + state->h * state->n; return 0; } size_t sshkey_xmss_pklen(const struct sshkey *key) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; if (state == NULL) return 0; return state->n * 2; } size_t sshkey_xmss_sklen(const struct sshkey *key) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; if (state == NULL) return 0; return state->n * 4 + 4; } int sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(struct sshkey *k, const char *ciphername) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; const struct sshcipher *cipher; size_t keylen = 0, ivlen = 0; if (state == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((state->enc_ciphername = strdup(ciphername)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); state->enc_keyiv_len = keylen + ivlen; if ((state->enc_keyiv = calloc(state->enc_keyiv_len, 1)) == NULL) { free(state->enc_ciphername); state->enc_ciphername = NULL; return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } arc4random_buf(state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len); return 0; } int sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; int r; if (state == NULL || state->enc_keyiv == NULL || state->enc_ciphername == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, state->enc_ciphername)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len)) != 0) return r; return 0; } int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; size_t len; int r; if (state == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &state->enc_ciphername, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->enc_keyiv, &len)) != 0) return r; state->enc_keyiv_len = len; return 0; } int sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; u_char have_info = 1; u_int32_t idx; int r; if (state == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (opts != SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO) return 0; idx = k->xmss_sk ? PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk) : state->idx; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_info)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, idx)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->maxidx)) != 0) return r; return 0; } int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; u_char have_info; int r; if (state == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* optional */ if (sshbuf_len(b) == 0) return 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_info)) != 0) return r; if (have_info != 1) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->idx)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->maxidx)) != 0) return r; return 0; } int sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(struct sshkey *k, u_int bits) { int r; const char *name; if (bits == 10) { name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME; } else if (bits == 16) { name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME; } else if (bits == 20) { name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME; } else { name = XMSS_DEFAULT_NAME; } if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, name)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(k)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(k, XMSS_CIPHERNAME)) != 0) return r; if ((k->xmss_pk = malloc(sshkey_xmss_pklen(k))) == NULL || (k->xmss_sk = malloc(sshkey_xmss_sklen(k))) == NULL) { return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } xmss_keypair(k->xmss_pk, k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(k), sshkey_xmss_params(k)); return 0; } int sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, int *have_file, sshkey_printfn *pr) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *enc = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, r, fd = -1; u_int32_t len; unsigned char buf[4], *data = NULL; *have_file = 0; if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) { *have_file = 1; if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { PRINT("%s: corrupt state file: %s", __func__, filename); goto done; } len = PEEK_U32(buf); if ((data = calloc(len, 1)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if (atomicio(read, fd, data, len) != len) { PRINT("%s: cannot read blob: %s", __func__, filename); goto done; } if ((enc = sshbuf_from(data, len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } sshkey_xmss_free_bds(k); if ((r = sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(k, enc, &b)) != 0) { ret = r; goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0) { ret = r; goto done; } ret = 0; } done: if (fd != -1) close(fd); free(data); sshbuf_free(enc); sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } int sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; u_int32_t idx = 0; char *filename = NULL; char *statefile = NULL, *ostatefile = NULL, *lockfile = NULL; int lockfd = -1, have_state = 0, have_ostate, tries = 0; int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, r; if (state == NULL) goto done; /* * If maxidx is set, then we are allowed a limited number * of signatures, but don't need to access the disk. * Otherwise we need to deal with the on-disk state. */ if (state->maxidx) { /* xmss_sk always contains the current state */ idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); if (idx < state->maxidx) { state->allow_update = 1; return 0; } return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if ((filename = k->xmss_filename) == NULL) goto done; if (asprintf(&lockfile, "%s.lock", filename) == -1 || asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) == -1 || asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if ((lockfd = open(lockfile, O_CREAT|O_RDONLY, 0600)) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; PRINT("%s: cannot open/create: %s", __func__, lockfile); goto done; } while (flock(lockfd, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB) == -1) { if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK) { ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; PRINT("%s: cannot lock: %s", __func__, lockfile); goto done; } if (++tries > 10) { ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; PRINT("%s: giving up on: %s", __func__, lockfile); goto done; } usleep(1000*100*tries); } /* XXX no longer const */ if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file((struct sshkey *)k, statefile, &have_state, pr)) != 0) { if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file((struct sshkey *)k, ostatefile, &have_ostate, pr)) == 0) { state->allow_update = 1; r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, 1); state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); state->allow_update = 0; } } if (!have_state && !have_ostate) { /* check that bds state is initialized */ if (state->bds.auth == NULL) goto done; PRINT("%s: start from scratch idx 0: %u", __func__, state->idx); } else if (r != 0) { ret = r; goto done; } if (state->idx + 1 < state->idx) { PRINT("%s: state wrap: %u", __func__, state->idx); goto done; } state->have_state = have_state; state->lockfd = lockfd; state->allow_update = 1; lockfd = -1; ret = 0; done: if (lockfd != -1) close(lockfd); free(lockfile); free(statefile); free(ostatefile); return ret; } int sshkey_xmss_forward_state(const struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t reserve) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; u_char *sig = NULL; size_t required_siglen; unsigned long long smlen; u_char data; int ret, r; if (state == NULL || !state->allow_update) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (reserve == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (state->idx + reserve <= state->idx) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(k, &required_siglen)) != 0) return r; if ((sig = malloc(required_siglen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; while (reserve-- > 0) { state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); smlen = required_siglen; if ((ret = xmss_sign(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(k), sig, &smlen, &data, 0, sshkey_xmss_params(k))) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; break; } } free(sig); return r; } int sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *enc = NULL; u_int32_t idx = 0; unsigned char buf[4]; char *filename = NULL; char *statefile = NULL, *ostatefile = NULL, *nstatefile = NULL; int fd = -1; int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (state == NULL || !state->allow_update) return ret; if (state->maxidx) { /* no update since the number of signatures is limited */ ret = 0; goto done; } idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); if (idx == state->idx) { /* no signature happened, no need to update */ ret = 0; goto done; } else if (idx != state->idx + 1) { PRINT("%s: more than one signature happened: idx %u state %u", __func__, idx, state->idx); goto done; } state->idx = idx; if ((filename = k->xmss_filename) == NULL) goto done; if (asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) == -1 || asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) == -1 || asprintf(&nstatefile, "%s.nstate", filename) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } unlink(nstatefile); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b)) != 0) { PRINT("%s: SERLIALIZE FAILED: %d", __func__, ret); goto done; } if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(k, b, &enc)) != 0) { PRINT("%s: ENCRYPT FAILED: %d", __func__, ret); goto done; } if ((fd = open(nstatefile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0600)) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; PRINT("%s: open new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile); goto done; } POKE_U32(buf, sshbuf_len(enc)); if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; PRINT("%s: write new state file hdr: %s", __func__, nstatefile); close(fd); goto done; } if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(enc), sshbuf_len(enc)) != sshbuf_len(enc)) { ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; PRINT("%s: write new state file data: %s", __func__, nstatefile); close(fd); goto done; } if (fsync(fd) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; PRINT("%s: sync new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile); close(fd); goto done; } if (close(fd) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; PRINT("%s: close new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile); goto done; } if (state->have_state) { unlink(ostatefile); if (link(statefile, ostatefile)) { ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; PRINT("%s: backup state %s to %s", __func__, statefile, ostatefile); goto done; } } if (rename(nstatefile, statefile) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; PRINT("%s: rename %s to %s", __func__, nstatefile, statefile); goto done; } ret = 0; done: if (state->lockfd != -1) { close(state->lockfd); state->lockfd = -1; } if (nstatefile) unlink(nstatefile); free(statefile); free(ostatefile); free(nstatefile); sshbuf_free(b); sshbuf_free(enc); return ret; } int sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; treehash_inst *th; u_int32_t i, node; int r; if (state == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (state->stack == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; state->stackoffset = state->bds.stackoffset; /* copy back */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->idx)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->stack, num_stack(state))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->stackoffset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->stacklevels, num_stacklevels(state))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->auth, num_auth(state))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->keep, num_keep(state))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->th_nodes, num_th_nodes(state))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->retain, num_retain(state))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, num_treehash(state))) != 0) return r; for (i = 0; i < num_treehash(state); i++) { th = &state->treehash[i]; node = th->node - state->th_nodes; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->h)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->next_idx)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->stackusage)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, th->completed)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, node)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } int sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; int r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; u_char have_stack, have_filename, have_enc; if (state == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, opts)) != 0) return r; switch (opts) { case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE: r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b); break; case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL: if ((r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0) return r; r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b); break; case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD: /* all of stack/filename/enc are optional */ have_stack = state->stack != NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_stack)) != 0) return r; if (have_stack) { state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); /* update */ if ((r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b)) != 0) return r; } have_filename = k->xmss_filename != NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_filename)) != 0) return r; if (have_filename && (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, k->xmss_filename)) != 0) return r; have_enc = state->enc_keyiv != NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_enc)) != 0) return r; if (have_enc && (r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->maxidx)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, state->allow_update)) != 0) return r; break; case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT: r = 0; break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; break; } return r; } int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; treehash_inst *th; u_int32_t i, lh, node; size_t ls, lsl, la, lk, ln, lr; char *magic; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (state == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (k->xmss_sk == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((state->treehash = calloc(num_treehash(state), sizeof(treehash_inst))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &magic, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->idx)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->stack, &ls)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->stackoffset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->stacklevels, &lsl)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->auth, &la)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->keep, &lk)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->th_nodes, &ln)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->retain, &lr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &lh)) != 0) goto out; if (strcmp(magic, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } /* XXX check stackoffset */ if (ls != num_stack(state) || lsl != num_stacklevels(state) || la != num_auth(state) || lk != num_keep(state) || ln != num_th_nodes(state) || lr != num_retain(state) || lh != num_treehash(state)) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < num_treehash(state); i++) { th = &state->treehash[i]; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->h)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->next_idx)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->stackusage)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &th->completed)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &node)) != 0) goto out; if (node < num_th_nodes(state)) th->node = &state->th_nodes[node]; } POKE_U32(k->xmss_sk, state->idx); xmss_set_bds_state(&state->bds, state->stack, state->stackoffset, state->stacklevels, state->auth, state->keep, state->treehash, state->retain, 0); /* success */ r = 0; out: free(magic); return r; } int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts; u_char have_state, have_stack, have_filename, have_enc; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_state)) != 0) return r; opts = have_state; switch (opts) { case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT: r = 0; break; case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_stack)) != 0) return r; if (have_stack && (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_filename)) != 0) return r; if (have_filename && (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &k->xmss_filename, NULL)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_enc)) != 0) return r; if (have_enc && (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->maxidx)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &state->allow_update)) != 0) return r; break; case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE: if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0) return r; break; case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL: if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0) return r; break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; break; } return r; } int sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b, struct sshbuf **retp) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; struct sshbuf *encrypted = NULL, *encoded = NULL, *padded = NULL; struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL; const struct sshcipher *cipher; u_char *cp, *key, *iv = NULL; size_t i, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen, encrypted_len, aadlen; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (retp != NULL) *retp = NULL; if (state == NULL || state->enc_keyiv == NULL || state->enc_ciphername == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); if (state->enc_keyiv_len != keylen + ivlen) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } key = state->enc_keyiv; if ((encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (padded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (iv = malloc(ivlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* replace first 4 bytes of IV with index to ensure uniqueness */ memcpy(iv, key + keylen, ivlen); POKE_U32(iv, state->idx); if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, XMSS_MAGIC, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, state->idx)) != 0) goto out; /* padded state will be encrypted */ if ((r = sshbuf_putb(padded, b)) != 0) goto out; i = 0; while (sshbuf_len(padded) % blocksize) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(padded, ++i & 0xff)) != 0) goto out; } encrypted_len = sshbuf_len(padded); /* header including the length of state is used as AAD */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, encrypted_len)) != 0) goto out; aadlen = sshbuf_len(encoded); /* concat header and state */ if ((r = sshbuf_putb(encoded, padded)) != 0) goto out; /* reserve space for encryption of encoded data plus auth tag */ /* encrypt at offset addlen */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted, encrypted_len + aadlen + authlen, &cp)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 1)) != 0 || (r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(encoded), encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: if (retp != NULL) { *retp = encrypted; encrypted = NULL; } sshbuf_free(padded); sshbuf_free(encoded); sshbuf_free(encrypted); cipher_free(ciphercontext); free(iv); return r; } int sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *encoded, struct sshbuf **retp) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *decrypted = NULL; struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL; const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL; u_char *key, *iv = NULL, *dp; size_t keylen, ivlen, authlen, aadlen; u_int blocksize, encrypted_len, index; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (retp != NULL) *retp = NULL; if (state == NULL || state->enc_keyiv == NULL || state->enc_ciphername == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); if (state->enc_keyiv_len != keylen + ivlen) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } key = state->enc_keyiv; if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(encoded)) == NULL || (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (iv = malloc(ivlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* check magic */ if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC) || memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(encoded), XMSS_MAGIC, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* parse public portion */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(encoded, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(encoded, &index)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(encoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0) goto out; /* check size of encrypted key blob */ if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */ if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < authlen || sshbuf_len(encoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } aadlen = sshbuf_len(copy) - sshbuf_len(encoded); /* replace first 4 bytes of IV with index to ensure uniqueness */ memcpy(iv, key + keylen, ivlen); POKE_U32(iv, index); /* decrypt private state of key */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, aadlen + encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 0)) != 0 || (r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(copy), encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* there should be no trailing data */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(encoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0) goto out; if (sshbuf_len(encoded) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* remove AAD */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decrypted, aadlen)) != 0) goto out; /* XXX encrypted includes unchecked padding */ /* success */ r = 0; if (retp != NULL) { *retp = decrypted; decrypted = NULL; } out: cipher_free(ciphercontext); sshbuf_free(copy); sshbuf_free(decrypted); free(iv); return r; } u_int32_t sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; u_int32_t idx; if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS && state && state->maxidx) { idx = k->xmss_sk ? PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk) : state->idx; if (idx < state->maxidx) return state->maxidx - idx; } return 0; } int sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign) { struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (maxsign == 0) return 0; if (state->idx + maxsign < state->idx) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; state->maxidx = state->idx + maxsign; return 0; } #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/sshkey-xmss.h010064400017500001750000000056211362136622600141340ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.h,v 1.1 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef SSHKEY_XMSS_H #define SSHKEY_XMSS_H #define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H10" #define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H16" #define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H20" #define XMSS_DEFAULT_NAME XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME size_t sshkey_xmss_pklen(const struct sshkey *); size_t sshkey_xmss_sklen(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_xmss_init(struct sshkey *, const char *); void sshkey_xmss_free_state(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(struct sshkey *, u_int); int sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, enum sshkey_serialize_rep); int sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, enum sshkey_serialize_rep); int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_xmss_siglen(const struct sshkey *, size_t *); void *sshkey_xmss_params(const struct sshkey *); void *sshkey_xmss_bds_state(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *, sshkey_printfn *); int sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *, u_int32_t); int sshkey_xmss_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t); int sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *, sshkey_printfn *); u_int32_t sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *); #endif /* SSHKEY_XMSS_H */ openssh-8.2p1/sshkey.c010064400017500001750000003566131362136622600131510ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.99 2020/01/21 05:56:56 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #endif #include "crypto_api.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */ #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" #ifdef WITH_XMSS #include "sshkey-xmss.h" #include "xmss_fast.h" #endif #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" /* openssh private key file format */ #define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" #define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" #define MARK_BEGIN_LEN (sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1) #define MARK_END_LEN (sizeof(MARK_END) - 1) #define KDFNAME "bcrypt" #define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1" #define SALT_LEN 16 #define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-ctr" #define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16 /* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */ #define LEGACY_BEGIN "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n" /* * Constants relating to "shielding" support; protection of keys expected * to remain in memory for long durations */ #define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN (16 * 1024) #define SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER "aes256-ctr" /* XXX want AES-EME* */ #define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep); static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert); /* Supported key types */ struct keytype { const char *name; const char *shortname; const char *sigalg; int type; int nid; int cert; int sigonly; }; static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { { "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", NULL, KEY_ED25519, 0, 0, 0 }, { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", NULL, KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, { "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com", "ED25519-SK", NULL, KEY_ED25519_SK, 0, 0, 0 }, { "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-SK-CERT", NULL, KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, #ifdef WITH_XMSS { "ssh-xmss@openssh.com", "XMSS", NULL, KEY_XMSS, 0, 0, 0 }, { "ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "XMSS-CERT", NULL, KEY_XMSS_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { "ssh-rsa", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 }, { "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 }, { "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 }, { "ssh-dss", "DSA", NULL, KEY_DSA, 0, 0, 0 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 }, { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0, 0 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0, 0 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ { "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com", "ECDSA-SK", NULL, KEY_ECDSA_SK, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ { "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", NULL, KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, { "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", "rsa-sha2-256", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 1 }, { "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", "rsa-sha2-512", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 1 }, { "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", NULL, KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL, KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 }, { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL, KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1, 0 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL, KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1, 0 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ { "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-SK-CERT", NULL, KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 } }; const char * sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == k->type) return kt->shortname; } return "unknown"; } static const char * sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid)) return kt->name; } return "ssh-unknown"; } int sshkey_type_is_cert(int type) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == type) return kt->cert; } return 0; } const char * sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k) { return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid); } const char * sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k) { return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type), k->ecdsa_nid); } int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { /* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */ if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) || (!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0)) return kt->type; } return KEY_UNSPEC; } static int key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(int type) { switch (type) { case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: return 1; } return 0; } int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (!key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(kt->type)) continue; if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) return kt->nid; } return -1; } char * sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep) { char *tmp, *ret = NULL; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->name == NULL) continue; if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly) continue; if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert)) continue; if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(kt->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard) { char *s, *cp, *p; const struct keytype *kt; int type; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { type = sshkey_type_from_name(p); if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { if (allow_wildcard) { /* * Try matching key types against the string. * If any has a positive or negative match then * the component is accepted. */ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (match_pattern_list(kt->name, p, 0) != 0) break; } if (kt->type != -1) continue; } free(s); return 0; } } free(s); return 1; } u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *dsa_p; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (k->rsa == NULL) return 0; RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); return BN_num_bits(rsa_n); case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if (k->dsa == NULL) return 0; DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, NULL, NULL); return BN_num_bits(dsa_p); case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: return 256; /* XXX */ } return 0; } static int sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_XMSS: return 1; default: return 0; } } int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) { if (k == NULL) return 0; return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type); } int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *k) { if (k == NULL) return 0; switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK: return 1; default: return 0; } } /* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */ int sshkey_type_plain(int type) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT: return KEY_RSA; case KEY_DSA_CERT: return KEY_DSA; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: return KEY_ECDSA; case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: return KEY_ECDSA_SK; case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return KEY_ED25519; case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: return KEY_ED25519_SK; case KEY_XMSS_CERT: return KEY_XMSS; default: return type; } } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */ int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name) { if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0) return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0) return NID_secp384r1; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0) return NID_secp521r1; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ else return -1; } u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: return 256; case NID_secp384r1: return 384; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 case NID_secp521r1: return 521; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ default: return 0; } } int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits) { switch (bits) { case 256: return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; case 384: return NID_secp384r1; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 case 521: return NID_secp521r1; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ default: return -1; } } const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: return "nistp256"; case NID_secp384r1: return "nistp384"; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 case NID_secp521r1: return "nistp521"; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ default: return NULL; } } int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid) { int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); if (kbits <= 0) return -1; /* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */ if (kbits <= 256) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; else if (kbits <= 384) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384; else return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ static void cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert) { u_int i; if (cert == NULL) return; sshbuf_free(cert->certblob); sshbuf_free(cert->critical); sshbuf_free(cert->extensions); free(cert->key_id); for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) free(cert->principals[i]); free(cert->principals); sshkey_free(cert->signature_key); free(cert->signature_type); freezero(cert, sizeof(*cert)); } static struct sshkey_cert * cert_new(void) { struct sshkey_cert *cert; if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL) return NULL; if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { cert_free(cert); return NULL; } cert->key_id = NULL; cert->principals = NULL; cert->signature_key = NULL; cert->signature_type = NULL; return cert; } struct sshkey * sshkey_new(int type) { struct sshkey *k; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RSA *rsa; DSA *dsa; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL) return NULL; k->type = type; k->ecdsa = NULL; k->ecdsa_nid = -1; k->dsa = NULL; k->rsa = NULL; k->cert = NULL; k->ed25519_sk = NULL; k->ed25519_pk = NULL; k->xmss_sk = NULL; k->xmss_pk = NULL; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { free(k); return NULL; } k->rsa = rsa; break; case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) { free(k); return NULL; } k->dsa = dsa; break; case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: /* no need to prealloc */ break; case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: free(k); return NULL; } if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) { if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) { sshkey_free(k); return NULL; } } return k; } void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k) { if (k == NULL) return; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: RSA_free(k->rsa); k->rsa = NULL; break; case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: DSA_free(k->dsa); k->dsa = NULL; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: free(k->sk_application); sshbuf_free(k->sk_key_handle); sshbuf_free(k->sk_reserved); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa); k->ecdsa = NULL; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: free(k->sk_application); sshbuf_free(k->sk_key_handle); sshbuf_free(k->sk_reserved); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: freezero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); k->ed25519_pk = NULL; freezero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ); k->ed25519_sk = NULL; break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: freezero(k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k)); k->xmss_pk = NULL; freezero(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)); k->xmss_sk = NULL; sshkey_xmss_free_state(k); free(k->xmss_name); k->xmss_name = NULL; free(k->xmss_filename); k->xmss_filename = NULL; break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: break; } if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) cert_free(k->cert); freezero(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len); freezero(k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len); freezero(k, sizeof(*k)); } static int cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b) { if (a == NULL && b == NULL) return 1; if (a == NULL || b == NULL) return 0; if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob)) return 0; if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob), sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between * certificates and plain keys too. */ int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) { #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) const BIGNUM *rsa_e_a, *rsa_n_a; const BIGNUM *rsa_e_b, *rsa_n_b; const BIGNUM *dsa_p_a, *dsa_q_a, *dsa_g_a, *dsa_pub_key_a; const BIGNUM *dsa_p_b, *dsa_q_b, *dsa_g_b, *dsa_pub_key_b; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (a == NULL || b == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type)) return 0; switch (a->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: if (a->rsa == NULL || b->rsa == NULL) return 0; RSA_get0_key(a->rsa, &rsa_n_a, &rsa_e_a, NULL); RSA_get0_key(b->rsa, &rsa_n_b, &rsa_e_b, NULL); return BN_cmp(rsa_e_a, rsa_e_b) == 0 && BN_cmp(rsa_n_a, rsa_n_b) == 0; case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: if (a->dsa == NULL || b->dsa == NULL) return 0; DSA_get0_pqg(a->dsa, &dsa_p_a, &dsa_q_a, &dsa_g_a); DSA_get0_pqg(b->dsa, &dsa_p_b, &dsa_q_b, &dsa_g_b); DSA_get0_key(a->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_a, NULL); DSA_get0_key(b->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_b, NULL); return BN_cmp(dsa_p_a, dsa_p_b) == 0 && BN_cmp(dsa_q_a, dsa_q_b) == 0 && BN_cmp(dsa_g_a, dsa_g_b) == 0 && BN_cmp(dsa_pub_key_a, dsa_pub_key_b) == 0; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: if (a->sk_application == NULL || b->sk_application == NULL) return 0; if (strcmp(a->sk_application, b->sk_application) != 0) return 0; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL) return 0; if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), NULL) != 0 || EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), NULL) != 0) return 0; return 1; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: if (a->sk_application == NULL || b->sk_application == NULL) return 0; if (strcmp(a->sk_application, b->sk_application) != 0) return 0; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL && memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: return a->xmss_pk != NULL && b->xmss_pk != NULL && sshkey_xmss_pklen(a) == sshkey_xmss_pklen(b) && memcmp(a->xmss_pk, b->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(a)) == 0; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ default: return 0; } /* NOTREACHED */ } int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) { if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type) return 0; if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) { if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert)) return 0; } return sshkey_equal_public(a, b); } static int to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; const char *typename; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (key == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if (key->cert == NULL) return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB; } type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type; typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid); switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_RSA_CERT: #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS_CERT: #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ /* Use the existing blob */ /* XXX modified flag? */ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0) return ret; break; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: if (key->dsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g); DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0) return ret; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: if (key->ecdsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0) return ret; if (type == KEY_ECDSA_SK) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0) return ret; } break; # endif case KEY_RSA: if (key->rsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0) return ret; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_SK: if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0) return ret; if (type == KEY_ED25519_SK) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0) return ret; } break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: if (key->xmss_name == NULL || key->xmss_pk == NULL || sshkey_xmss_pklen(key) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 || (ret = sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(key, b, opts)) != 0) return ret; break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } return 0; } int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); } int sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { struct sshbuf *tmp; int r; if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; r = to_blob_buf(key, tmp, 0, opts); if (r == 0) r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, tmp); sshbuf_free(tmp); return r; } int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { return sshkey_puts_opts(key, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); } int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); } static int to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t len; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (blobp != NULL) *blobp = NULL; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain, opts)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; if (blobp != NULL) { if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } ret = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp) { return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); } int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp) { return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); } int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp) { u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL; size_t blob_len = 0; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (retp != NULL) *retp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT)) != 0) goto out; if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst_alg, blob, blob_len, ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ if (retp != NULL) { *retp = ret; ret = NULL; } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg); r = 0; out: free(ret); if (blob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(blob, blob_len); free(blob); } return r; } static char * fingerprint_b64(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) { char *ret; size_t plen = strlen(alg) + 1; size_t rlen = ((dgst_raw_len + 2) / 3) * 4 + plen + 1; if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (ret = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL) return NULL; strlcpy(ret, alg, rlen); strlcat(ret, ":", rlen); if (dgst_raw_len == 0) return ret; if (b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, ret + plen, rlen - plen) == -1) { freezero(ret, rlen); return NULL; } /* Trim padding characters from end */ ret[strcspn(ret, "=")] = '\0'; return ret; } static char * fingerprint_hex(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) { char *retval, hex[5]; size_t i, rlen = dgst_raw_len * 3 + strlen(alg) + 2; if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (retval = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL) return NULL; strlcpy(retval, alg, rlen); strlcat(retval, ":", rlen); for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%s%02x", i > 0 ? ":" : "", dgst_raw[i]); strlcat(retval, hex, rlen); } return retval; } static char * fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) { char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' }; char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm', 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' }; u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1; char *retval; rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1; if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL) return NULL; retval[j++] = 'x'; for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4; if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) { idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) + seed) % 6; idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15; idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) + (seed / 6)) % 6; retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; if ((i + 1) < rounds) { idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15; idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15; retval[j++] = consonants[idx3]; retval[j++] = '-'; retval[j++] = consonants[idx4]; seed = ((seed * 5) + ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) + ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36; } } else { idx0 = seed % 6; idx1 = 16; idx2 = seed / 6; retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; } } retval[j++] = 'x'; retval[j++] = '\0'; return retval; } /* * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability. * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some * scientific publications like this original paper: * * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security", * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf * * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too. * * If you see the picture is different, the key is different. * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing. * * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane, * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes. * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn. * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be * walked in either direction. */ /* * Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 . * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore. */ #define FLDBASE 8 #define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1) #define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1) static char * fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len, const struct sshkey *k) { /* * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm * intersects with itself. Matter of taste. */ char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE"; char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X]; u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y]; size_t i, tlen, hlen; u_int b; int x, y, r; size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1; if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL) return NULL; /* initialize field */ memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char)); x = FLDSIZE_X / 2; y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2; /* process raw key */ for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { int input; /* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */ input = dgst_raw[i]; for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) { /* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */ x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1; y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1; /* assure we are still in bounds */ x = MAXIMUM(x, 0); y = MAXIMUM(y, 0); x = MINIMUM(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1); y = MINIMUM(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1); /* augment the field */ if (field[x][y] < len - 2) field[x][y]++; input = input >> 2; } } /* mark starting point and end point*/ field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1; field[x][y] = len; /* assemble title */ r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]", sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k)); /* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */ if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title)) r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k)); tlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(title); /* assemble hash ID. */ r = snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", alg); hlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(hash); /* output upper border */ p = retval; *p++ = '+'; for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++) *p++ = '-'; memcpy(p, title, tlen); p += tlen; for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) *p++ = '-'; *p++ = '+'; *p++ = '\n'; /* output content */ for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) { *p++ = '|'; for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++) *p++ = augmentation_string[MINIMUM(field[x][y], len)]; *p++ = '|'; *p++ = '\n'; } /* output lower border */ *p++ = '+'; for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - hlen) / 2; i++) *p++ = '-'; memcpy(p, hash, hlen); p += hlen; for (i += hlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) *p++ = '-'; *p++ = '+'; return retval; } char * sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg, enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep) { char *retval = NULL; u_char *dgst_raw; size_t dgst_raw_len; if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_alg, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0) return NULL; switch (dgst_rep) { case SSH_FP_DEFAULT: if (dgst_alg == SSH_DIGEST_MD5) { retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); } else { retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); } break; case SSH_FP_HEX: retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); break; case SSH_FP_BASE64: retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); break; case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE: retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); break; case SSH_FP_RANDOMART: retval = fingerprint_randomart(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k); break; default: explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); free(dgst_raw); return NULL; } explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); free(dgst_raw); return retval; } static int peek_type_nid(const char *s, size_t l, int *nid) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->name == NULL || strlen(kt->name) != l) continue; if (memcmp(s, kt->name, l) == 0) { *nid = -1; if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(kt->type)) *nid = kt->nid; return kt->type; } } return KEY_UNSPEC; } /* XXX this can now be made const char * */ int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp) { struct sshkey *k; char *cp, *blobcopy; size_t space; int r, type, curve_nid = -1; struct sshbuf *blob; if (ret == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; switch (ret->type) { case KEY_UNSPEC: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ break; /* ok */ default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } /* Decode type */ cp = *cpp; space = strcspn(cp, " \t"); if (space == strlen(cp)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if ((type = peek_type_nid(cp, space, &curve_nid)) == KEY_UNSPEC) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* skip whitespace */ for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (*cp == '\0') return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && ret->type != type) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* find end of keyblob and decode */ space = strcspn(cp, " \t"); if ((blobcopy = strndup(cp, space)) == NULL) { sshbuf_free(blob); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, blobcopy)) != 0) { free(blobcopy); sshbuf_free(blob); return r; } free(blobcopy); if ((r = sshkey_fromb(blob, &k)) != 0) { sshbuf_free(blob); return r; } sshbuf_free(blob); /* skip whitespace and leave cp at start of comment */ for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; /* ensure type of blob matches type at start of line */ if (k->type != type) { sshkey_free(k); return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; } if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(type) && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) { sshkey_free(k); return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; } /* Fill in ret from parsed key */ ret->type = type; if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) { if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) { sshkey_free(k); return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; } if (ret->cert != NULL) cert_free(ret->cert); ret->cert = k->cert; k->cert = NULL; } switch (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type)) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: RSA_free(ret->rsa); ret->rsa = k->rsa; k->rsa = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8); #endif break; case KEY_DSA: DSA_free(ret->dsa); ret->dsa = k->dsa; k->dsa = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8); #endif break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa); ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa; ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; k->ecdsa = NULL; k->ecdsa_nid = -1; #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa); #endif break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK: EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa); ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa; ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; ret->sk_application = k->sk_application; k->ecdsa = NULL; k->ecdsa_nid = -1; k->sk_application = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa); fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", ret->sk_application); #endif break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: freezero(ret->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk; k->ed25519_pk = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */ #endif break; case KEY_ED25519_SK: freezero(ret->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk; ret->sk_application = k->sk_application; k->ed25519_pk = NULL; k->sk_application = NULL; break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: free(ret->xmss_pk); ret->xmss_pk = k->xmss_pk; k->xmss_pk = NULL; free(ret->xmss_state); ret->xmss_state = k->xmss_state; k->xmss_state = NULL; free(ret->xmss_name); ret->xmss_name = k->xmss_name; k->xmss_name = NULL; free(ret->xmss_filename); ret->xmss_filename = k->xmss_filename; k->xmss_filename = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */ #endif break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ default: sshkey_free(k); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } sshkey_free(k); /* success */ *cpp = cp; return 0; } int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *uu = NULL; if (b64p != NULL) *b64p = NULL; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0) goto out; if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 0)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* Success */ if (b64p != NULL) { *b64p = uu; uu = NULL; } r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); free(uu); return r; } int sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; char *uu = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: free(uu); return r; } int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0) goto out; if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) { if (feof(f)) errno = EPIPE; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } /* Success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } const char * sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k) { switch (k->cert->type) { case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER: return "user"; case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST: return "host"; default: return "unknown"; } } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static int rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap) { RSA *private = NULL; BIGNUM *f4 = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (rsap == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; *rsap = NULL; if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) || !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } *rsap = private; private = NULL; ret = 0; out: RSA_free(private); BN_free(f4); return ret; } static int dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, DSA **dsap) { DSA *private; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (dsap == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (bits != 1024) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } *dsap = NULL; if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } *dsap = private; private = NULL; ret = 0; out: DSA_free(private); return ret; } # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k) { EC_GROUP *eg; int nids[] = { NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 NID_secp521r1, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ -1 }; int nid; u_int i; const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k); /* * The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two * ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID * or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the * "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure * it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that * are supported. */ if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0) return nid; for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) { if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL) return -1; if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, NULL) == 0) break; EC_GROUP_free(eg); } if (nids[i] != -1) { /* Use the group with the NID attached */ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) { EC_GROUP_free(eg); return -1; } } return nids[i]; } static int ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap) { EC_KEY *private; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; *ecdsap = NULL; if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); *ecdsap = private; private = NULL; ret = 0; out: EC_KEY_free(private); return ret; } # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *k; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (keyp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *keyp = NULL; if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; switch (type) { case KEY_ED25519: if ((k->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL || (k->ed25519_sk = malloc(ED25519_SK_SZ)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; } crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk); ret = 0; break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: ret = sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(k, bits); break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: ret = dsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->dsa); break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: ret = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid, &k->ecdsa); break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: ret = rsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->rsa); break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ default: ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if (ret == 0) { k->type = type; *keyp = k; } else sshkey_free(k); return ret; } int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key) { u_int i; const struct sshkey_cert *from; struct sshkey_cert *to; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (to_key == NULL || (from = from_key->cert) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((to = cert_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions)) != 0) goto out; to->serial = from->serial; to->type = from->type; if (from->key_id == NULL) to->key_id = NULL; else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } to->valid_after = from->valid_after; to->valid_before = from->valid_before; if (from->signature_key == NULL) to->signature_key = NULL; else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key, &to->signature_key)) != 0) goto out; if (from->signature_type != NULL && (to->signature_type = strdup(from->signature_type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (from->nprincipals > 0) { if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals, sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) { to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]); if (to->principals[i] == NULL) { to->nprincipals = i; r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } } } to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals; /* success */ cert_free(to_key->cert); to_key->cert = to; to = NULL; r = 0; out: cert_free(to); return r; } int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp) { struct sshkey *n = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; BIGNUM *rsa_n_dup = NULL, *rsa_e_dup = NULL; const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key; BIGNUM *dsa_p_dup = NULL, *dsa_q_dup = NULL, *dsa_g_dup = NULL; BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ *pkp = NULL; if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g); DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL); if ((dsa_p_dup = BN_dup(dsa_p)) == NULL || (dsa_q_dup = BN_dup(dsa_q)) == NULL || (dsa_g_dup = BN_dup(dsa_g)) == NULL || (dsa_pub_key_dup = BN_dup(dsa_pub_key)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!DSA_set0_pqg(n->dsa, dsa_p_dup, dsa_q_dup, dsa_g_dup)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_p_dup = dsa_q_dup = dsa_g_dup = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!DSA_set0_key(n->dsa, dsa_pub_key_dup, NULL)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL; /* transferred */ break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); if (n->ecdsa == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (k->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK && k->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT) break; /* Append security-key application string */ if ((n->sk_application = strdup(k->sk_application)) == NULL) goto out; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); if ((rsa_n_dup = BN_dup(rsa_n)) == NULL || (rsa_e_dup = BN_dup(rsa_e)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!RSA_set0_key(n->rsa, rsa_n_dup, rsa_e_dup, NULL)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_n_dup = rsa_e_dup = NULL; /* transferred */ break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) { if ((n->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); } if (k->type != KEY_ED25519_SK && k->type != KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT) break; /* Append security-key application string */ if ((n->sk_application = strdup(k->sk_application)) == NULL) goto out; break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(n, k->xmss_name)) != 0) goto out; if (k->xmss_pk != NULL) { u_int32_t left; size_t pklen = sshkey_xmss_pklen(k); if (pklen == 0 || sshkey_xmss_pklen(n) != pklen) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((n->xmss_pk = malloc(pklen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(n->xmss_pk, k->xmss_pk, pklen); /* simulate number of signatures left on pubkey */ left = sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k); if (left) sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(n, left); } break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ default: r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; goto out; } if (sshkey_is_cert(k) && (r = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ *pkp = n; n = NULL; r = 0; out: sshkey_free(n); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL BN_clear_free(rsa_n_dup); BN_clear_free(rsa_e_dup); BN_clear_free(dsa_p_dup); BN_clear_free(dsa_q_dup); BN_clear_free(dsa_g_dup); BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key_dup); #endif return r; } int sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *k) { return k != NULL && k->shielded_private != NULL; } int sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *k) { struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL; u_char *prekey = NULL, *enc = NULL, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL; const struct sshcipher *cipher; size_t i, enclen = 0; struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; #ifdef DEBUG_PK fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k)); #endif if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) > ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* Prepare a random pre-key, and from it an ephemeral key */ if ((prekey = malloc(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } arc4random_buf(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN); if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH, prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN, keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_PK fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH), stderr); #endif if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher), keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 1)) != 0) goto out; /* Serialise and encrypt the private key using the ephemeral key */ if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshkey_is_shielded(k) && (r = sshkey_unshield_private(k)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, prvbuf, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD)) != 0) goto out; /* pad to cipher blocksize */ i = 0; while (sshbuf_len(prvbuf) % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(prvbuf, ++i & 0xff)) != 0) goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr); #endif /* encrypt */ enclen = sshbuf_len(prvbuf); if ((enc = malloc(enclen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, enc, sshbuf_ptr(prvbuf), sshbuf_len(prvbuf), 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_PK fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(enc, enclen, stderr); #endif /* Make a scrubbed, public-only copy of our private key argument */ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(k, &kswap)) != 0) goto out; /* Swap the private key out (it will be destroyed below) */ tmp = *kswap; *kswap = *k; *k = tmp; /* Insert the shielded key into our argument */ k->shielded_private = enc; k->shielded_len = enclen; k->shield_prekey = prekey; k->shield_prekey_len = SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN; enc = prekey = NULL; /* transferred */ enclen = 0; /* preserve key fields that are required for correct operation */ k->sk_flags = kswap->sk_flags; /* success */ r = 0; out: /* XXX behaviour on error - invalidate original private key? */ cipher_free(cctx); explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv)); explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp)); freezero(enc, enclen); freezero(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN); sshkey_free(kswap); sshbuf_free(prvbuf); return r; } int sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *k) { struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL; u_char pad, *cp, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL; const struct sshcipher *cipher; size_t i; struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; #ifdef DEBUG_PK fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k)); #endif if (!sshkey_is_shielded(k)) return 0; /* nothing to do */ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) > ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* check size of shielded key blob */ if (k->shielded_len < cipher_blocksize(cipher) || (k->shielded_len % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Calculate the ephemeral key from the prekey */ if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH, k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len, keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher), keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_PK fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH), stderr); #endif /* Decrypt and parse the shielded private key using the ephemeral key */ if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(prvbuf, k->shielded_len, &cp)) != 0) goto out; /* decrypt */ #ifdef DEBUG_PK fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, stderr); #endif if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, cp, k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_PK fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr); #endif /* Parse private key */ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(prvbuf, &kswap)) != 0) goto out; /* Check deterministic padding */ i = 0; while (sshbuf_len(prvbuf)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(prvbuf, &pad)) != 0) goto out; if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Swap the parsed key back into place */ tmp = *kswap; *kswap = *k; *k = tmp; /* success */ r = 0; out: cipher_free(cctx); explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv)); explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp)); sshkey_free(kswap); sshbuf_free(prvbuf); return r; } static int cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf) { struct sshbuf *principals = NULL, *crit = NULL; struct sshbuf *exts = NULL, *ca = NULL; u_char *sig = NULL; size_t signed_len = 0, slen = 0, kidlen = 0; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->certblob, certbuf)) != 0) return ret; /* Parse body of certificate up to signature */ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &principals)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &crit)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &exts)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &ca)) != 0) { /* XXX debug print error for ret */ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */ signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b); if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE; goto out; } /* Parse principals section */ while (sshbuf_len(principals) > 0) { char *principal = NULL; char **oprincipals = NULL; if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(principals, &principal, NULL)) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } oprincipals = key->cert->principals; key->cert->principals = recallocarray(key->cert->principals, key->cert->nprincipals, key->cert->nprincipals + 1, sizeof(*key->cert->principals)); if (key->cert->principals == NULL) { free(principal); key->cert->principals = oprincipals; ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal; } /* * Stash a copies of the critical options and extensions sections * for later use. */ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->critical, crit)) != 0 || (exts != NULL && (ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->extensions, exts)) != 0)) goto out; /* * Validate critical options and extensions sections format. */ while (sshbuf_len(crit) != 0) { if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { sshbuf_reset(key->cert->critical); ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } while (exts != NULL && sshbuf_len(exts) != 0) { if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { sshbuf_reset(key->cert->extensions); ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Parse CA key and check signature */ if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(ca, &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; goto out; } if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; goto out; } if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen, &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0) goto out; /* Success */ ret = 0; out: sshbuf_free(ca); sshbuf_free(crit); sshbuf_free(exts); sshbuf_free(principals); free(sig); return ret; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static int check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa) { const BIGNUM *rsa_n; RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; return 0; } #endif static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert) { int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL, *xmss_name = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; size_t len; u_char *pk = NULL; struct sshbuf *copy; #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL; BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL, *dsa_pub_key = NULL; # if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) EC_POINT *q = NULL; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(b)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; goto out; } switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_RSA: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_e) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_n) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */ if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8); #endif break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_DSA: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_p) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_q) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_g) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_pub_key) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_pub_key = NULL; /* transferred */ #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8); #endif break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype); if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; goto out; } EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa); if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID; goto out; } if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa)) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) { /* XXX assume it is a allocation error */ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q); #endif if (type == KEY_ECDSA_SK || type == KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT) { /* Parse additional security-key application string */ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->sk_application, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", key->sk_application); #endif } break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_SK: if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0) goto out; if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (type == KEY_ED25519_SK || type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT) { /* Parse additional security-key application string */ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->sk_application, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", key->sk_application); #endif } key->ed25519_pk = pk; pk = NULL; break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_XMSS: if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_init(key, xmss_name)) != 0) goto out; if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0) goto out; if (len == 0 || len != sshkey_xmss_pklen(key)) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } key->xmss_pk = pk; pk = NULL; if (type != KEY_XMSS_CERT && (ret = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(key, b)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ case KEY_UNSPEC: default: ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; goto out; } /* Parse certificate potion */ if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && (ret = cert_parse(b, key, copy)) != 0) goto out; if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } ret = 0; if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = key; key = NULL; } out: sshbuf_free(copy); sshkey_free(key); free(xmss_name); free(ktype); free(curve); free(pk); #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) BN_clear_free(rsa_n); BN_clear_free(rsa_e); BN_clear_free(dsa_p); BN_clear_free(dsa_q); BN_clear_free(dsa_g); BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key); # if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) EC_POINT_free(q); # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ return ret; } int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp) { return sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); } int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &b)) != 0) return r; r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } int sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep) { int r; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *sigtype = NULL; if (sigtypep != NULL) *sigtypep = NULL; if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ if (sigtypep != NULL) { *sigtypep = sigtype; sigtype = NULL; } r = 0; out: free(sigtype); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* * * Checks whether a certificate's signature type is allowed. * Returns 0 (success) if the certificate signature type appears in the * "allowed" pattern-list, or the key is not a certificate to begin with. * Otherwise returns a ssherr.h code. */ int sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *key, const char *allowed) { if (key == NULL || allowed == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(key->type)) return 0; if (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (match_pattern_list(key->cert->signature_type, allowed, 0) != 1) return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; return 0; } /* * Returns the expected signature algorithm for a given public key algorithm. */ const char * sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *name) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (strcmp(kt->name, name) != 0) continue; if (kt->sigalg != NULL) return kt->sigalg; if (!kt->cert) return kt->name; return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid( sshkey_type_plain(kt->type), kt->nid); } return NULL; } /* * Verifies that the signature algorithm appearing inside the signature blob * matches that which was requested. */ int sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const char *requested_alg) { const char *expected_alg; char *sigtype = NULL; int r; if (requested_alg == NULL) return 0; if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0) return r; r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0; free(sigtype); return r ? 0 : SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; } int sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, u_int compat) { int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key); int r2, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0) return r; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: r = ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: r = ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: r = ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg); break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: r = ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); break; case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat, /* XXX PIN */ NULL); break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: r = ssh_xmss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ default: r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; break; } if (was_shielded && (r2 = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0) return r2; return r; } /* * ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature and < 0 on error. * If "alg" specified, then the signature must use that algorithm. */ int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) { if (detailsp != NULL) *detailsp = NULL; if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: return ssh_dss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: return ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat, detailsp); # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: return ssh_rsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, alg); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: return ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat, detailsp); #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: return ssh_xmss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } } /* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */ int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k) { int newtype; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: newtype = KEY_RSA_CERT; break; case KEY_DSA: newtype = KEY_DSA_CERT; break; case KEY_ECDSA: newtype = KEY_ECDSA_CERT; break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK: newtype = KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_SK: newtype = KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT; break; case KEY_ED25519: newtype = KEY_ED25519_CERT; break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: newtype = KEY_XMSS_CERT; break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; k->type = newtype; return 0; } /* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */ int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k) { if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; cert_free(k->cert); k->cert = NULL; k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type); return 0; } /* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */ int sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, sshkey_certify_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) { struct sshbuf *principals = NULL; u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32]; size_t i, ca_len, sig_len; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *cert = NULL; char *sigtype = NULL; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL || k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; /* * If no alg specified as argument but a signature_type was set, * then prefer that. If both were specified, then they must match. */ if (alg == NULL) alg = k->cert->signature_type; else if (k->cert->signature_type != NULL && strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* * If no signing algorithm or signature_type was specified and we're * using a RSA key, then default to a good signature algorithm. */ if (alg == NULL && ca->type == KEY_RSA) alg = "rsa-sha2-512"; if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0) return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */ sshbuf_reset(cert); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0) goto out; /* -v01 certs put nonce first */ arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0) goto out; /* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */ switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT: DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g); DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_p)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_q)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_g)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_pub_key)) != 0) goto out; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_ec(cert, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->sk_application)) != 0) goto out; } break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA_CERT: RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, rsa_e)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, rsa_n)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0) goto out; if (k->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->sk_application)) != 0) goto out; } break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS_CERT: if (k->xmss_name == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->xmss_name)) || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k))) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ default: ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0) goto out; if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, k->cert->principals[i])) != 0) goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */ (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0) goto out; /* Sign the whole mess */ if ((ret = signer(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert), sshbuf_len(cert), alg, sk_provider, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) goto out; /* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */ if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0) goto out; if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; goto out; } if (k->cert->signature_type == NULL) { k->cert->signature_type = sigtype; sigtype = NULL; } /* Append signature and we are done */ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0) goto out; ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0) sshbuf_reset(cert); free(sig_blob); free(ca_blob); free(sigtype); sshbuf_free(principals); return ret; } static int default_key_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, u_int compat, void *ctx) { if (ctx != NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; return sshkey_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, sk_provider, compat); } int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg, const char *sk_provider) { return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, sk_provider, default_key_sign, NULL); } int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k, int want_host, int require_principal, const char *name, const char **reason) { u_int i, principal_matches; time_t now = time(NULL); if (reason != NULL) *reason = NULL; if (want_host) { if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } else { if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } if (now < 0) { /* yikes - system clock before epoch! */ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: expired"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) { if (require_principal) { *reason = "Certificate lacks principal list"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } else if (name != NULL) { principal_matches = 0; for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) { principal_matches = 1; break; } } if (!principal_matches) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed " "principal"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } return 0; } size_t sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *cert, char *s, size_t l) { char from[32], to[32], ret[64]; time_t tt; struct tm *tm; *from = *to = '\0'; if (cert->valid_after == 0 && cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) return strlcpy(s, "forever", l); if (cert->valid_after != 0) { /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ tt = cert->valid_after > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : cert->valid_after; tm = localtime(&tt); strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); } if (cert->valid_before != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ tt = cert->valid_before > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : cert->valid_before; tm = localtime(&tt); strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); } if (cert->valid_after == 0) snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to); else if (cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from); else snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to); return strlcpy(s, ret, l); } int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key); struct sshbuf *b = NULL; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *rsa_d, *rsa_iqmp, *rsa_p, *rsa_q; const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key, *dsa_priv_key; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0) return r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0) goto out; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q); RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp); if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_d); RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q); RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp); if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_DSA: DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g); DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, &dsa_priv_key); if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, NULL, &dsa_priv_key); if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0) goto out; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0) goto out; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ED25519_SK: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0) goto out; break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: if (key->xmss_name == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 || (r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_XMSS_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0 || key->xmss_name == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 || (r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } /* * success (but we still need to append the output to buf after * possibly re-shielding the private key) */ r = 0; out: if (was_shielded) r = sshkey_shield_private(key); if (r == 0) r = sshbuf_putb(buf, b); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } int sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(key, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); } int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp) { char *tname = NULL, *curve = NULL, *xmss_name = NULL; struct sshkey *k = NULL; size_t pklen = 0, sklen = 0; int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_char *ed25519_pk = NULL, *ed25519_sk = NULL; u_char *xmss_pk = NULL, *xmss_sk = NULL; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL BIGNUM *exponent = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_iqmp = NULL, *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL; BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL; BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (kp != NULL) *kp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0) goto out; type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_g)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_pub_key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_priv_key)) != 0) goto out; if (!DSA_set0_pqg(k->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */ break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_priv_key)) != 0) goto out; if (k->type != type) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, NULL, dsa_priv_key)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */ break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; goto out; } k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); if (k->ecdsa == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &exponent))) goto out; if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 || (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &exponent)) != 0) goto out; if (k->type != type || k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 || (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK: if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); if (k->ecdsa == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0) goto out; if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_q)) != 0) goto out; if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */ if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_q)) != 0) goto out; if (k->type != type) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, rsa_d)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */ if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0) goto out; if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk; ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; break; case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0) goto out; if (k->type != type) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk; ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; /* transferred */ break; case KEY_ED25519_SK: if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0) goto out; if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0) goto out; k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; ed25519_pk = NULL; break; case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0) goto out; if (k->type != type) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0) goto out; k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; ed25519_pk = NULL; /* transferred */ break; #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, xmss_name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_sk, &sklen)) != 0) goto out; if (pklen != sshkey_xmss_pklen(k) || sklen != sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } k->xmss_pk = xmss_pk; k->xmss_sk = xmss_sk; xmss_pk = xmss_sk = NULL; /* optional internal state */ if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(k, buf)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_XMSS_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_sk, &sklen)) != 0) goto out; if (k->type != type || strcmp(xmss_name, k->xmss_name) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (pklen != sshkey_xmss_pklen(k) || sklen != sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } k->xmss_pk = xmss_pk; k->xmss_sk = xmss_sk; xmss_pk = xmss_sk = NULL; /* optional internal state */ if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(k, buf)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ default: r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; goto out; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* enable blinding */ switch (k->type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } break; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* success */ r = 0; if (kp != NULL) { *kp = k; k = NULL; } out: free(tname); free(curve); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL BN_clear_free(exponent); BN_clear_free(dsa_p); BN_clear_free(dsa_q); BN_clear_free(dsa_g); BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key); BN_clear_free(dsa_priv_key); BN_clear_free(rsa_n); BN_clear_free(rsa_e); BN_clear_free(rsa_d); BN_clear_free(rsa_p); BN_clear_free(rsa_q); BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ sshkey_free(k); freezero(ed25519_pk, pklen); freezero(ed25519_sk, sklen); free(xmss_name); freezero(xmss_pk, pklen); freezero(xmss_sk, sklen); return r; } #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public) { EC_POINT *nq = NULL; BIGNUM *order = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *tmp = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; /* * NB. This assumes OpenSSL has already verified that the public * point lies on the curve. This is done by EC_POINT_oct2point() * implicitly calling EC_POINT_is_on_curve(). If this code is ever * reachable with public points not unmarshalled using * EC_POINT_oct2point then the caller will need to explicitly check. */ /* * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint() * refuses to load GF2m points. */ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_prime_field) goto out; /* Q != infinity */ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public)) goto out; if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL || (y = BN_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL) != 1 || EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public, x, y, NULL) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 || BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) goto out; /* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */ if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, NULL) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1) goto out; /* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0) goto out; ret = 0; out: BN_clear_free(x); BN_clear_free(y); BN_clear_free(order); BN_clear_free(tmp); EC_POINT_free(nq); return ret; } int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key) { BIGNUM *order = NULL, *tmp = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, NULL) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) goto out; /* private < order - 1 */ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0) goto out; ret = 0; out: BN_clear_free(order); BN_clear_free(tmp); return ret; } void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) { BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL; if (point == NULL) { fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr); return; } if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL || (y = BN_new()) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_new failed\n", __func__); goto out; } if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_prime_field) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__); goto out; } if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, NULL) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n", __func__); goto out; } fputs("x=", stderr); BN_print_fp(stderr, x); fputs("\ny=", stderr); BN_print_fp(stderr, y); fputs("\n", stderr); out: BN_clear_free(x); BN_clear_free(y); } void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key) { const BIGNUM *exponent; sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)); fputs("exponent=", stderr); if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL) fputs("(NULL)", stderr); else BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)); fputs("\n", stderr); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ static int sshkey_private_to_blob2(struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername, int rounds) { u_char *cp, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL; u_char salt[SALT_LEN]; char *b64 = NULL; size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen; u_int check; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL; const struct sshcipher *cipher; const char *kdfname = KDFNAME; struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL; if (rounds <= 0) rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS; if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) { ciphername = "none"; kdfname = "none"; } else if (ciphername == NULL) ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME; if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) { arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN); if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0) goto out; } else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) { /* Unsupported KDF type */ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 || /* number of keys */ (r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0) goto out; /* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */ /* Random check bytes */ check = arc4random(); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0) goto out; /* append private key and comment*/ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(prv, encrypted, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0) goto out; /* padding */ i = 0; while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0) goto out; } /* length in destination buffer */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0) goto out; /* encrypt */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(blob); /* assemble uuencoded key */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded, blob, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(kdf); sshbuf_free(encoded); sshbuf_free(encrypted); cipher_free(ciphercontext); explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt)); if (key != NULL) { explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); free(key); } if (pubkeyblob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen); free(pubkeyblob); } if (b64 != NULL) { explicit_bzero(b64, strlen(b64)); free(b64); } return r; } static int sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { char *comment = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL; const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL; const u_char *cp; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t encoded_len; size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0; struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL; struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL; struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL; struct sshkey *k = NULL; u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp, pad, last; u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* check preamble */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob); encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob); if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) || memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN; encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN; /* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */ while (encoded_len > 0) { if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0) goto out; } last = *cp; encoded_len--; cp++; if (last == '\n') { if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN && memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) { /* \0 terminate */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0) goto out; break; } } } if (encoded_len == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* decode base64 */ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, (char *)sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0) goto out; /* check magic */ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) || memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* parse public portion of key */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* pubkey */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0) goto out; if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { /* passphrase required */ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } if (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (nkeys != 1) { /* XXX only one key supported */ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* check size of encrypted key blob */ blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* setup key */ keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0) goto out; if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < authlen || sshbuf_len(decoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* decrypt private portion of key */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded), encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) { /* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */ if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* there should be no trailing data */ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* check check bytes */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0) goto out; if (check1 != check2) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } /* Load the private key and comment */ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* Check deterministic padding */ i = 0; while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0) goto out; if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* XXX decode pubkey and check against private */ /* success */ r = 0; if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = k; k = NULL; } if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } out: pad = 0; cipher_free(ciphercontext); free(ciphername); free(kdfname); free(comment); if (salt != NULL) { explicit_bzero(salt, slen); free(salt); } if (key != NULL) { explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); free(key); } sshbuf_free(encoded); sshbuf_free(decoded); sshbuf_free(kdf); sshbuf_free(decrypted); sshkey_free(k); return r; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* convert SSH v2 key to PEM or PKCS#8 format */ static int sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf, int format, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment) { int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key); int success, r; int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase); u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL; char *bptr; BIO *bio = NULL; struct sshbuf *blob; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; if (len > 0 && len <= 4) return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT; if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 && (pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0) goto out; switch (key->type) { case KEY_DSA: if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) { success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa, cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); } else { success = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa); } break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) { success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa, cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); } else { success = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa); } break; #endif case KEY_RSA: if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) { success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa, cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); } else { success = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa); } break; default: success = 0; break; } if (success == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8) { if ((success = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL)) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } } if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: if (was_shielded) r = sshkey_shield_private(key); if (r == 0) r = sshbuf_putb(buf, blob); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); sshbuf_free(blob); BIO_free(bio); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */ int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds) { switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_RSA: break; /* see below */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_SK: #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_ECDSA_SK: #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds); default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL switch (format) { case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH: return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds); case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM: case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8: return sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(key, blob, format, passphrase, comment); default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static int translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err) { int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err); switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) { case ERR_LIB_PEM: switch (pem_reason) { case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ: case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD: case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT: return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } case ERR_LIB_EVP: switch (pem_reason) { case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT: return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; #ifdef EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR: #endif case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR: #ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR: #endif return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; default: return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } case ERR_LIB_ASN1: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } static void clear_libcrypto_errors(void) { while (ERR_get_error() != 0) ; } /* * Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether * passphrase is required/incorrect. */ static int convert_libcrypto_error(void) { /* * Some password errors are reported at the beginning * of the error queue. */ if (translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_error()) == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; return translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_last_error()); } static int pem_passphrase_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) { char *p = (char *)u; size_t len; if (p == NULL || (len = strlen(p)) == 0) return -1; if (size < 0 || len > (size_t)size) return -1; memcpy(buf, p, len); return (int)len; } static int sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp) { EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; struct sshkey *prv = NULL; BIO *bio = NULL; int r; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) != (int)sshbuf_len(blob)) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } clear_libcrypto_errors(); if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, pem_passphrase_cb, (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) { /* * libcrypto may return various ASN.1 errors when attempting * to parse a key with an incorrect passphrase. * Treat all format errors as "incorrect passphrase" if a * passphrase was supplied. */ if (passphrase != NULL && *passphrase != '\0') r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; else r = convert_libcrypto_error(); goto out; } if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA && (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) { if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk); prv->type = KEY_RSA; #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8); #endif if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0) goto out; } else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA && (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) { if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk); prv->type = KEY_DSA; #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC } else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_EC && (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) { if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk); prv->type = KEY_ECDSA; prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa); if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 || sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL || sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 || sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } # ifdef DEBUG_PK if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL) sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa); # endif #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ } else { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } r = 0; if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = prv; prv = NULL; } out: BIO_free(bio); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); sshkey_free(prv); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_RSA: return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type, passphrase, keyp); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: #ifdef WITH_XMSS case KEY_XMSS: #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp); case KEY_UNSPEC: r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp); /* Do not fallback to PEM parser if only passphrase is wrong. */ if (r == 0 || r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) return r; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type, passphrase, keyp); #else return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } } int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC, passphrase, keyp, commentp); } void sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *details) { freezero(details, sizeof(*details)); } #ifdef WITH_XMSS /* * serialize the key with the current state and forward the state * maxsign times. */ int sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b, u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr) { int r, rupdate; if (maxsign == 0 || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS) return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(k, pr)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, maxsign)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: if ((rupdate = sshkey_xmss_update_state(k, pr)) != 0) { if (r == 0) r = rupdate; } return r; } u_int32_t sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k) { if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS) return sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k); return 0; } int sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign) { if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; return sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign); } int sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename) { if (k == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS) return 0; if (filename == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((k->xmss_filename = strdup(filename)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } #else int sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b, u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr) { return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); } u_int32_t sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k) { return 0; } int sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign) { return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } int sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename) { if (k == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; return 0; } #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/sshkey.h010064400017500001750000000274741362136622600131560ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.44 2019/12/30 09:23:28 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef SSHKEY_H #define SSHKEY_H #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # include # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ # define BIGNUM void # define RSA void # define DSA void # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 1024 #define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE (1 << 20) struct sshbuf; /* Key types */ enum sshkey_types { KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, KEY_RSA_CERT, KEY_DSA_CERT, KEY_ECDSA_CERT, KEY_ED25519_CERT, KEY_XMSS, KEY_XMSS_CERT, KEY_ECDSA_SK, KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, KEY_ED25519_SK, KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT, KEY_UNSPEC }; /* Default fingerprint hash */ #define SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 /* Fingerprint representation formats */ enum sshkey_fp_rep { SSH_FP_DEFAULT = 0, SSH_FP_HEX, SSH_FP_BASE64, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE, SSH_FP_RANDOMART }; /* Private key serialisation formats, used on the wire */ enum sshkey_serialize_rep { SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT = 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE = 1, /* only state is serialized */ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL = 2, /* include keys for saving to disk */ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD = 3, /* everything, for encrypting in ram */ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254, /* minimal information */ }; /* Private key disk formats */ enum sshkey_private_format { SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH = 0, SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM = 1, SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 = 2, }; /* key is stored in external hardware */ #define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001 #define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256 /* XXX opaquify? */ struct sshkey_cert { struct sshbuf *certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */ u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */ u_int64_t serial; char *key_id; u_int nprincipals; char **principals; u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before; struct sshbuf *critical; struct sshbuf *extensions; struct sshkey *signature_key; char *signature_type; }; /* XXX opaquify? */ struct sshkey { int type; int flags; /* KEY_RSA */ RSA *rsa; /* KEY_DSA */ DSA *dsa; /* KEY_ECDSA and KEY_ECDSA_SK */ int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */ EC_KEY *ecdsa; /* KEY_ED25519 and KEY_ED25519_SK */ u_char *ed25519_sk; u_char *ed25519_pk; /* KEY_XMSS */ char *xmss_name; char *xmss_filename; /* for state file updates */ void *xmss_state; /* depends on xmss_name, opaque */ u_char *xmss_sk; u_char *xmss_pk; /* KEY_ECDSA_SK and KEY_ED25519_SK */ char *sk_application; uint8_t sk_flags; struct sshbuf *sk_key_handle; struct sshbuf *sk_reserved; /* Certificates */ struct sshkey_cert *cert; /* Private key shielding */ u_char *shielded_private; size_t shielded_len; u_char *shield_prekey; size_t shield_prekey_len; }; #define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES #define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES /* Additional fields contained in signature */ struct sshkey_sig_details { uint32_t sk_counter; /* U2F signature counter */ uint8_t sk_flags; /* U2F signature flags; see ssh-sk.h */ }; struct sshkey *sshkey_new(int); void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *); char *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *, int, enum sshkey_fp_rep); int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp); const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *); const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **); u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp); int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); int sshkey_type_plain(int); int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int, const char *, const char **); size_t sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *, char *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__, 2, 3))); int sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *, const char *); int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *); /* Variant allowing use of a custom signature function (e.g. for ssh-agent) */ typedef int sshkey_certify_signer(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int, void *); int sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, sshkey_certify_signer *, void *); int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *); int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *); const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int); u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int); int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int); int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *); int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid); int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *); const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *); const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int); char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char); int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **); int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, enum sshkey_serialize_rep); int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int); int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); int sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *); const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *); int sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **); /* for debug */ void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *); /* private key parsing and serialisation */ int sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf); int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep); int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp); /* private key file format parsing and serialisation */ int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds); int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); /* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */ int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *); /* stateful keys (e.g. XMSS) */ #ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS typedef void sshkey_printfn(const char *, ...); #else typedef void sshkey_printfn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); #endif int sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *, const char *); int sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *, u_int32_t); u_int32_t sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t, sshkey_printfn *); int sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr); void sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *); #ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *ident); int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg); int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp); int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp); int ssh_xmss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_xmss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); #endif #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) # undef RSA # undef DSA # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #endif #endif /* SSHKEY_H */ openssh-8.2p1/sshlogin.c010064400017500001750000000124011362136622600134510ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.34 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does. We cannot * easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are * several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of * login the current system has. Also, we want to be able to execute commands * on a tty. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshlogin.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "loginrec.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern ServerOptions options; /* * Returns the time when the user last logged in. Returns 0 if the * information is not available. This must be called before record_login. * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf. */ time_t get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname, char *buf, size_t bufsize) { struct logininfo li; login_get_lastlog(&li, uid); strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize); return (time_t)li.tv_sec; } /* * Generate and store last login message. This must be done before * login_login() is called and lastlog is updated. */ static void store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid) { #ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG char *time_string, hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX+1] = ""; time_t last_login_time; int r; if (!options.print_lastlog) return; # ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG time_string = sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(user, uid); if (time_string != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, time_string, strlen(time_string))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(time_string); } # else last_login_time = get_last_login_time(uid, user, hostname, sizeof(hostname)); if (last_login_time != 0) { time_string = ctime(&last_login_time); time_string[strcspn(time_string, "\n")] = '\0'; if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0) r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Last login: %s\r\n", time_string); else r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, hostname); if (r != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } # endif /* CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG */ #endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */ } /* * Records that the user has logged in. I wish these parts of operating * systems were more standardized. */ void record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid, const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) { struct logininfo *li; /* save previous login details before writing new */ store_lastlog_message(user, uid); li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty); login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen); login_login(li); login_free_entry(li); } #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX void record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) { struct logininfo *li; li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname); login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen); login_utmp_only(li); login_free_entry(li); } #endif /* Records that the user has logged out. */ void record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user) { struct logininfo *li; li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, tty); login_logout(li); login_free_entry(li); } openssh-8.2p1/sshlogin.h010064400017500001750000000016471362136622600134700ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.h,v 1.8 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ void record_login(pid_t, const char *, const char *, uid_t, const char *, struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); void record_logout(pid_t, const char *, const char *); time_t get_last_login_time(uid_t, const char *, char *, size_t); #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX void record_utmp_only(pid_t, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); #endif openssh-8.2p1/sshpty.c010064400017500001750000000132531362136622600131630ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.34 2019/07/04 16:20:10 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include #include "sshpty.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #ifdef HAVE_PTY_H # include #endif #ifndef O_NOCTTY #define O_NOCTTY 0 #endif #ifdef __APPLE__ # include # if (MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5) # define __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ # endif #endif /* * Allocates and opens a pty. Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or * nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated. On success, open file * descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are * returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters). */ int pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) { /* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */ char *name; int i; i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i == -1) { error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } name = ttyname(*ttyfd); if (!name) fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails."); strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); /* possible truncation */ return 1; } /* Releases the tty. Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */ void pty_release(const char *tty) { #if !defined(__APPLE_PRIVPTY__) && !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) == -1) error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) == -1) error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); #endif /* !__APPLE_PRIVPTY__ && !HAVE_OPENPTY */ } /* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */ void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty) { int fd; /* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCNOTTY fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) { (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); close(fd); } #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ if (setsid() == -1) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* * Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling * tty. */ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) { error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty."); close(fd); } /* Make it our controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCSCTTY debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY."); if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0) error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif /* TIOCSCTTY */ #ifdef NEED_SETPGRP if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0) error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno)); #endif /* NEED_SETPGRP */ fd = open(tty, O_RDWR); if (fd == -1) error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); else close(fd); /* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY); if (fd == -1) error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else close(fd); } /* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */ void pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col, u_int xpixel, u_int ypixel) { struct winsize w; /* may truncate u_int -> u_short */ w.ws_row = row; w.ws_col = col; w.ws_xpixel = xpixel; w.ws_ypixel = ypixel; (void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w); } void pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty) { struct group *grp; gid_t gid; mode_t mode; struct stat st; /* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */ grp = getgrnam("tty"); if (grp == NULL) debug("%s: no tty group", __func__); gid = (grp != NULL) ? grp->gr_gid : pw->pw_gid; mode = (grp != NULL) ? 0620 : 0600; /* * Change owner and mode of the tty as required. * Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/ * tty is owned by root. */ if (stat(tty, &st) == -1) fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty); #endif if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) { if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) == -1) { if (errno == EROFS && (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) debug("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid, strerror(errno)); else fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid, strerror(errno)); } } if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) { if (chmod(tty, mode) == -1) { if (errno == EROFS && (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0) debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno)); else fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno)); } } } /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ void disconnect_controlling_tty(void) { #ifdef TIOCNOTTY int fd; if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) { (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); close(fd); } #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ } openssh-8.2p1/sshpty.h010064400017500001750000000020351362136622600131640ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.h,v 1.13 2016/11/29 03:54:50 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for allocating a pseudo-terminal and making it the controlling * tty. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include struct termios *get_saved_tio(void); void leave_raw_mode(int); void enter_raw_mode(int); int pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t); void pty_release(const char *); void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *); void pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int); void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *); void disconnect_controlling_tty(void); openssh-8.2p1/sshsig.c010064400017500001750000000653741362136622600131440ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshsig.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "match.h" #include "digest.h" #define SIG_VERSION 0x01 #define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG" #define MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE) - 1) #define BEGIN_SIGNATURE "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\n" #define END_SIGNATURE "-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----" #define RSA_SIGN_ALG "rsa-sha2-512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */ #define RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256" #define HASHALG_DEFAULT "sha512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */ #define HASHALG_ALLOWED "sha256,sha512" int sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out) { struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *out = NULL; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, BEGIN_SIGNATURE, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) { error("%s: sshbuf_putf failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_dtob64(blob, buf, 1)) != 0) { error("%s: Couldn't base64 encode signature blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, END_SIGNATURE, sizeof(END_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '\n')) != 0) { error("%s: sshbuf_put failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* success */ *out = buf; buf = NULL; /* transferred */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } int sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out) { int r; size_t eoffset = 0; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; struct sshbuf *sbuf = NULL; char *b64 = NULL; if ((sbuf = sshbuf_fromb(sig)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(sbuf, 0, BEGIN_SIGNATURE, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) { error("Couldn't parse signature: missing header"); goto done; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sbuf, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) { error("%s: sshbuf_consume failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((r = sshbuf_find(sbuf, 0, "\n" END_SIGNATURE, sizeof("\n" END_SIGNATURE)-1, &eoffset)) != 0) { error("Couldn't parse signature: missing footer"); goto done; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(sbuf, sshbuf_len(sbuf)-eoffset)) != 0) { error("%s: sshbuf_consume failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((b64 = sshbuf_dup_string(sbuf)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_new() failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, b64)) != 0) { error("Couldn't decode signature: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } /* success */ *out = buf; r = 0; buf = NULL; /* transferred */ done: sshbuf_free(buf); sshbuf_free(sbuf); free(b64); return r; } static int sshsig_wrap_sign(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, const char *sk_provider, const struct sshbuf *h_message, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) { int r; size_t slen = 0; u_char *sig = NULL; struct sshbuf *blob = NULL; struct sshbuf *tosign = NULL; const char *sign_alg = NULL; if ((tosign = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(tosign, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, sig_namespace)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(tosign, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, hashalg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(tosign, h_message)) != 0) { error("Couldn't construct message to sign: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } /* If using RSA keys then default to a good signature algorithm */ if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) sign_alg = RSA_SIGN_ALG; if (signer != NULL) { if ((r = signer(key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign), sign_alg, sk_provider, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) { error("Couldn't sign message: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } } else { if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign), sign_alg, sk_provider, 0)) != 0) { error("Couldn't sign message: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } } if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(blob, SIG_VERSION)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, blob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, sig_namespace)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, hashalg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, sig, slen)) != 0) { error("Couldn't populate blob: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } *out = blob; blob = NULL; r = 0; done: free(sig); sshbuf_free(blob); sshbuf_free(tosign); return r; } /* Check preamble and version. */ static int sshsig_parse_preamble(struct sshbuf *buf) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; uint32_t sversion; if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(buf, 0, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_consume(buf, (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE)-1))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &sversion)) != 0) { error("Couldn't verify signature: invalid format"); return r; } if (sversion > SIG_VERSION) { error("Signature version %lu is larger than supported " "version %u", (unsigned long)sversion, SIG_VERSION); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } return 0; } static int sshsig_check_hashalg(const char *hashalg) { if (hashalg == NULL || match_pattern_list(hashalg, HASHALG_ALLOWED, 0) == 1) return 0; error("%s: unsupported hash algorithm \"%.100s\"", __func__, hashalg); return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; } static int sshsig_peek_hashalg(struct sshbuf *signature, char **hashalgp) { struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; char *hashalg = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (hashalgp != NULL) *hashalgp = NULL; if ((buf = sshbuf_fromb(signature)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(buf)) != 0) goto done; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &hashalg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { error("Couldn't parse signature blob: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } /* success */ r = 0; *hashalgp = hashalg; hashalg = NULL; done: free(hashalg); sshbuf_free(buf); return r; } static int sshsig_wrap_verify(struct sshbuf *signature, const char *hashalg, const struct sshbuf *h_message, const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL, *toverify = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; const u_char *sig; char *got_namespace = NULL, *sigtype = NULL, *sig_hashalg = NULL; size_t siglen; debug("%s: verify message length %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(h_message)); if (sig_details != NULL) *sig_details = NULL; if (sign_keyp != NULL) *sign_keyp = NULL; if ((toverify = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(toverify, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, expect_namespace)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(toverify, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, hashalg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(toverify, h_message)) != 0) { error("Couldn't construct message to verify: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0) goto done; if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &got_namespace, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(signature, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &sig_hashalg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(signature, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) { error("Couldn't parse signature blob: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if (sshbuf_len(signature) != 0) { error("Signature contains trailing data"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto done; } if (strcmp(expect_namespace, got_namespace) != 0) { error("Couldn't verify signature: namespace does not match"); debug("%s: expected namespace \"%s\" received \"%s\"", __func__, expect_namespace, got_namespace); r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto done; } if (strcmp(hashalg, sig_hashalg) != 0) { error("Couldn't verify signature: hash algorithm mismatch"); debug("%s: expected algorithm \"%s\" received \"%s\"", __func__, hashalg, sig_hashalg); r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto done; } /* Ensure that RSA keys use an acceptable signature algorithm */ if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) { if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0) { error("Couldn't verify signature: unable to get " "signature type: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if (match_pattern_list(sigtype, RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED, 0) != 1) { error("Couldn't verify signature: unsupported RSA " "signature algorithm %s", sigtype); r = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; goto done; } } if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(toverify), sshbuf_len(toverify), NULL, 0, sig_details)) != 0) { error("Signature verification failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto done; } /* success */ r = 0; if (sign_keyp != NULL) { *sign_keyp = key; key = NULL; /* transferred */ } done: free(got_namespace); free(sigtype); free(sig_hashalg); sshbuf_free(buf); sshbuf_free(toverify); sshkey_free(key); return r; } static int hash_buffer(const struct sshbuf *m, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp) { char *hex, hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; int alg, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; *bp = NULL; memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0) return r; if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) { error("%s: can't look up hash algorithm %s", __func__, hashalg); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(alg, m, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) { error("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return r; } if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) { debug3("%s: final hash: %s", __func__, hex); freezero(hex, strlen(hex)); } if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) { error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } *bp = b; b = NULL; /* transferred */ /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); return 0; } int sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, const char *sk_provider, const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (hashalg == NULL) hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT; if (out != NULL) *out = NULL; if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) { error("%s: hash_buffer failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, b, sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } int sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature, const struct sshbuf *message, const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; char *hashalg = NULL; if (sig_details != NULL) *sig_details = NULL; if (sign_keyp != NULL) *sign_keyp = NULL; if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0) return r; debug("%s: signature made with hash \"%s\"", __func__, hashalg); if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) { error("%s: hash_buffer failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace, sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); free(hashalg); return r; } static int hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp) { char *hex, rbuf[8192], hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ssize_t n, total = 0; struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx; int alg, oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; *bp = NULL; memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0) return r; if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) { error("%s: can't look up hash algorithm %s", __func__, hashalg); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if ((ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL) { error("%s: ssh_digest_start failed", __func__); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } for (;;) { if ((n = read(fd, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf))) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) continue; oerrno = errno; error("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); ssh_digest_free(ctx); errno = oerrno; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } else if (n == 0) { debug2("%s: hashed %zu bytes", __func__, total); break; /* EOF */ } total += (size_t)n; if ((r = ssh_digest_update(ctx, rbuf, (size_t)n)) != 0) { error("%s: ssh_digest_update: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } } if ((r = ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) { error("%s: ssh_digest_final: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) { debug3("%s: final hash: %s", __func__, hex); freezero(hex, strlen(hex)); } if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) { error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } *bp = b; b = NULL; /* transferred */ /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); ssh_digest_free(ctx); explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); return 0; } int sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, const char *sk_provider, int fd, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (hashalg == NULL) hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT; if (out != NULL) *out = NULL; if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) { error("%s: hash_file failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return r; } if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, b, sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } int sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd, const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; char *hashalg = NULL; if (sig_details != NULL) *sig_details = NULL; if (sign_keyp != NULL) *sign_keyp = NULL; if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0) return r; debug("%s: signature made with hash \"%s\"", __func__, hashalg); if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) { error("%s: hash_file failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace, sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); free(hashalg); return r; } struct sshsigopt { int ca; char *namespaces; }; struct sshsigopt * sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts, const char *path, u_long linenum, const char **errstrp) { struct sshsigopt *ret; int r; const char *errstr = NULL; if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; if (opts == NULL || *opts == '\0') return ret; /* Empty options yields empty options :) */ while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') { /* flag options */ if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) { ret->ca = 1; } else if (opt_match(&opts, "namespaces")) { if (ret->namespaces != NULL) { errstr = "multiple \"namespaces\" clauses"; goto fail; } ret->namespaces = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr); if (ret->namespaces == NULL) goto fail; } /* * Skip the comma, and move to the next option * (or break out if there are no more). */ if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t') break; /* End of options. */ /* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */ if (*opts != ',') { errstr = "unknown key option"; goto fail; } opts++; if (*opts == '\0') { errstr = "unexpected end-of-options"; goto fail; } } /* success */ return ret; fail: if (errstrp != NULL) *errstrp = errstr; sshsigopt_free(ret); return NULL; } void sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts) { if (opts == NULL) return; free(opts->namespaces); free(opts); } static int parse_principals_key_and_options(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line, const char *required_principal, char **principalsp, struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshsigopt **sigoptsp) { char *opts = NULL, *tmp, *cp, *principals = NULL; const char *reason = NULL; struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (principalsp != NULL) *principalsp = NULL; if (sigoptsp != NULL) *sigoptsp = NULL; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; cp = line; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */ if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; /* blank or all-comment line */ /* format: identity[,identity...] [option[,option...]] key */ if ((tmp = strdelimw(&cp)) == NULL) { error("%s:%lu: invalid line", path, linenum); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((principals = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) { error("%s: strdup failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* * Bail out early if we're looking for a particular principal and this * line does not list it. */ if (required_principal != NULL) { if (match_pattern_list(required_principal, principals, 0) != 1) { /* principal didn't match */ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; goto out; } debug("%s: %s:%lu: matched principal \"%s\"", __func__, path, linenum, required_principal); } if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) { /* no key? Check for options */ opts = cp; if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) { error("%s:%lu: invalid options", path, linenum); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } *cp++ = '\0'; skip_space(&cp); if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) { error("%s:%lu: invalid key", path, linenum); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } debug3("%s:%lu: options %s", path, linenum, opts == NULL ? "" : opts); if ((sigopts = sshsigopt_parse(opts, path, linenum, &reason)) == NULL) { error("%s:%lu: bad options: %s", path, linenum, reason); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* success */ if (principalsp != NULL) { *principalsp = principals; principals = NULL; /* transferred */ } if (sigoptsp != NULL) { *sigoptsp = sigopts; sigopts = NULL; /* transferred */ } if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = key; key = NULL; /* transferred */ } r = 0; out: free(principals); sshsigopt_free(sigopts); sshkey_free(key); return r; } static int check_allowed_keys_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line, const struct sshkey *sign_key, const char *principal, const char *sig_namespace) { struct sshkey *found_key = NULL; int r, found = 0; const char *reason = NULL; struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL; /* Parse the line */ if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line, principal, NULL, &found_key, &sigopts)) != 0) { /* error already logged */ goto done; } /* Check whether options preclude the use of this key */ if (sigopts->namespaces != NULL && match_pattern_list(sig_namespace, sigopts->namespaces, 0) != 1) { error("%s:%lu: key is not permitted for use in signature " "namespace \"%s\"", path, linenum, sig_namespace); goto done; } if (!sigopts->ca && sshkey_equal(found_key, sign_key)) { /* Exact match of key */ debug("%s:%lu: matched key and principal", path, linenum); /* success */ found = 1; } else if (sigopts->ca && sshkey_is_cert(sign_key) && sshkey_equal_public(sign_key->cert->signature_key, found_key)) { /* Match of certificate's CA key */ if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(sign_key, 0, 1, principal, &reason)) != 0) { error("%s:%lu: certificate not authorized: %s", path, linenum, reason); goto done; } debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key", path, linenum); /* success */ found = 1; } else { /* Principal matched but key didn't */ goto done; } done: sshkey_free(found_key); sshsigopt_free(sigopts); return found ? 0 : SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; } int sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key, const char *principal, const char *sig_namespace) { FILE *f = NULL; char *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; u_long linenum = 0; int r, oerrno; /* Check key and principal against file */ if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) { oerrno = errno; error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s", path, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { linenum++; r = check_allowed_keys_line(path, linenum, line, sign_key, principal, sig_namespace); free(line); line = NULL; if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) continue; else if (r == 0) { /* success */ fclose(f); return 0; } else break; } /* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */ fclose(f); free(line); return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r; } static int cert_filter_principals(const char *path, u_long linenum, char **principalsp, const struct sshkey *cert) { char *cp, *oprincipals, *principals; const char *reason; struct sshbuf *nprincipals; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, success = 0; oprincipals = principals = *principalsp; *principalsp = NULL; if ((nprincipals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; while ((cp = strsep(&principals, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') { if (strcspn(cp, "!?*") != strlen(cp)) { debug("%s:%lu: principal \"%s\" not authorized: " "contains wildcards", path, linenum, cp); continue; } /* Check against principals list in certificate */ if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(cert, 0, 1, cp, &reason)) != 0) { debug("%s:%lu: principal \"%s\" not authorized: %s", path, linenum, cp, reason); continue; } if ((r = sshbuf_putf(nprincipals, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(nprincipals) != 0 ? "," : "", cp)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } } if (sshbuf_len(nprincipals) == 0) { error("%s:%lu: no valid principals found", path, linenum); r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; goto out; } if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } /* success */ success = 1; *principalsp = principals; out: sshbuf_free(nprincipals); free(oprincipals); return success ? 0 : r; } static int get_matching_principals_from_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line, const struct sshkey *sign_key, char **principalsp) { struct sshkey *found_key = NULL; char *principals = NULL; int r, found = 0; struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL; if (principalsp != NULL) *principalsp = NULL; /* Parse the line */ if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line, NULL, &principals, &found_key, &sigopts)) != 0) { /* error already logged */ goto done; } if (!sigopts->ca && sshkey_equal(found_key, sign_key)) { /* Exact match of key */ debug("%s:%lu: matched key", path, linenum); /* success */ found = 1; } else if (sigopts->ca && sshkey_is_cert(sign_key) && sshkey_equal_public(sign_key->cert->signature_key, found_key)) { /* Remove principals listed in file but not allowed by cert */ if ((r = cert_filter_principals(path, linenum, &principals, sign_key)) != 0) { /* error already displayed */ debug("%s:%lu: cert_filter_principals: %s", path, linenum, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key", path, linenum); /* success */ found = 1; } else { /* Key didn't match */ goto done; } done: if (found) { *principalsp = principals; principals = NULL; /* transferred */ } free(principals); sshkey_free(found_key); sshsigopt_free(sigopts); return found ? 0 : SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; } int sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key, char **principals) { FILE *f = NULL; char *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; u_long linenum = 0; int r, oerrno; if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) { oerrno = errno; error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s", path, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { linenum++; r = get_matching_principals_from_line(path, linenum, line, sign_key, principals); free(line); line = NULL; if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) continue; else if (r == 0) { /* success */ fclose(f); return 0; } else break; } free(line); /* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */ if (ferror(f) != 0) { oerrno = errno; fclose(f); error("Unable to read allowed keys file \"%s\": %s", path, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } fclose(f); return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r; } int sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey) { struct sshkey *pk = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; if (pubkey != NULL) *pubkey = NULL; if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &pk)) != 0) return r; *pubkey = pk; pk = NULL; return 0; } openssh-8.2p1/sshsig.h010064400017500001750000000072061362136622600131370ustar00djmdjm/* * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef SSHSIG_H #define SSHSIG_H struct sshbuf; struct sshkey; struct sshsigopt; struct sshkey_sig_details; typedef int sshsig_signer(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int, void *); /* Buffer-oriented API */ /* * Creates a detached SSH signature for a given buffer. * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. * out is populated with the detached signature, or NULL on failure. */ int sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, const char *sk_provider, const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx); /* * Verifies that a detached signature is valid and optionally returns key * used to sign via argument. * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature, const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details); /* File/FD-oriented API */ /* * Creates a detached SSH signature for a given file. * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. * out is populated with the detached signature, or NULL on failure. */ int sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, const char *sk_provider, int fd, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx); /* * Verifies that a detached signature over a file is valid and optionally * returns key used to sign via argument. * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details); /* Utility functions */ /* * Return a base64 encoded "ASCII armoured" version of a raw signature. */ int sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out); /* * Decode a base64 encoded armoured signature to a raw signature. */ int sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out); /* * Checks whether a particular key/principal/namespace is permitted by * an allowed_keys file. Returns 0 on success. */ int sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key, const char *principal, const char *ns); /* Parse zero or more allowed_keys signature options */ struct sshsigopt *sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts, const char *path, u_long linenum, const char **errstrp); /* Free signature options */ void sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts); /* Get public key from signature */ int sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey); /* Find principal in allowed_keys file, given a sshkey. Returns * 0 on success. */ int sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key, char **principal); #endif /* SSHSIG_H */ openssh-8.2p1/sshtty.c010064400017500001750000000057131362136622600131710ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: sshtty.c,v 1.14 2010/01/09 05:04:24 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "sshpty.h" static struct termios _saved_tio; static int _in_raw_mode = 0; struct termios * get_saved_tio(void) { return _in_raw_mode ? &_saved_tio : NULL; } void leave_raw_mode(int quiet) { if (!_in_raw_mode) return; if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &_saved_tio) == -1) { if (!quiet) perror("tcsetattr"); } else _in_raw_mode = 0; } void enter_raw_mode(int quiet) { struct termios tio; if (tcgetattr(fileno(stdin), &tio) == -1) { if (!quiet) perror("tcgetattr"); return; } _saved_tio = tio; tio.c_iflag |= IGNPAR; tio.c_iflag &= ~(ISTRIP | INLCR | IGNCR | ICRNL | IXON | IXANY | IXOFF); #ifdef IUCLC tio.c_iflag &= ~IUCLC; #endif tio.c_lflag &= ~(ISIG | ICANON | ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL); #ifdef IEXTEN tio.c_lflag &= ~IEXTEN; #endif tio.c_oflag &= ~OPOST; tio.c_cc[VMIN] = 1; tio.c_cc[VTIME] = 0; if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &tio) == -1) { if (!quiet) perror("tcsetattr"); } else _in_raw_mode = 1; } openssh-8.2p1/survey.sh.in010064400017500001750000000032711362136622600137620ustar00djmdjm#!/bin/sh # # Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any # purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above # copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES # WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR # ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES # WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN # ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. host="@host@" AWK="@AWK@" CC="@CC@" CPP="@CPP@" CFLAGS="@CFLAGS@" CPPFLAGS="@CPPFLAGS@" LDFLAGS="@LDFLAGS@" LIBS="@LIBS@" # Note format: # identifier: [data] CRCR echo "openssh-survey-version: 1" echo echo "openssh-version: `./ssh -V 2>&1`" echo configinv=`$AWK '/^ \\\$.*configure/' config.log | sed 's/^ \\\$ //g'` echo "configure-invocation: $configinv" echo echo "host: $host" echo echo "uname: `uname`" echo echo "uname-r: `uname -r`" echo echo "uname-m: `uname -m`" echo echo "uname-p: `uname -p`" echo echo "oslevel: `oslevel 2>/dev/null`" echo echo "oslevel-r: `oslevel -r 2>/dev/null`" echo echo "cc: $CC" echo echo "cflags: $CFLAGS" echo echo "cppflags: $CPPFLAGS" echo echo "ldflags: $LDFLAGS" echo echo "libs: $LIBS" echo echo "ccver-v: `$CC -v 2>&1 | sed '/^[ \t]*$/d'`" echo echo "ccver-V: `$CC -V 2>&1 | sed '/^[ \t]*$/d'`" echo echo "cppdefines:" ${CPP} -dM - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves. * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Encoding and decoding of terminal modes in a portable way. * Much of the format is defined in ttymodes.h; it is included multiple times * into this file with the appropriate macro definitions to generate the * suitable code. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "compat.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #define TTY_OP_END 0 /* * uint32 (u_int) follows speed. */ #define TTY_OP_ISPEED 128 #define TTY_OP_OSPEED 129 /* * Converts POSIX speed_t to a baud rate. The values of the * constants for speed_t are not themselves portable. */ static int speed_to_baud(speed_t speed) { switch (speed) { case B0: return 0; case B50: return 50; case B75: return 75; case B110: return 110; case B134: return 134; case B150: return 150; case B200: return 200; case B300: return 300; case B600: return 600; case B1200: return 1200; case B1800: return 1800; case B2400: return 2400; case B4800: return 4800; case B9600: return 9600; #ifdef B19200 case B19200: return 19200; #else /* B19200 */ #ifdef EXTA case EXTA: return 19200; #endif /* EXTA */ #endif /* B19200 */ #ifdef B38400 case B38400: return 38400; #else /* B38400 */ #ifdef EXTB case EXTB: return 38400; #endif /* EXTB */ #endif /* B38400 */ #ifdef B7200 case B7200: return 7200; #endif /* B7200 */ #ifdef B14400 case B14400: return 14400; #endif /* B14400 */ #ifdef B28800 case B28800: return 28800; #endif /* B28800 */ #ifdef B57600 case B57600: return 57600; #endif /* B57600 */ #ifdef B76800 case B76800: return 76800; #endif /* B76800 */ #ifdef B115200 case B115200: return 115200; #endif /* B115200 */ #ifdef B230400 case B230400: return 230400; #endif /* B230400 */ default: return 9600; } } /* * Converts a numeric baud rate to a POSIX speed_t. */ static speed_t baud_to_speed(int baud) { switch (baud) { case 0: return B0; case 50: return B50; case 75: return B75; case 110: return B110; case 134: return B134; case 150: return B150; case 200: return B200; case 300: return B300; case 600: return B600; case 1200: return B1200; case 1800: return B1800; case 2400: return B2400; case 4800: return B4800; case 9600: return B9600; #ifdef B19200 case 19200: return B19200; #else /* B19200 */ #ifdef EXTA case 19200: return EXTA; #endif /* EXTA */ #endif /* B19200 */ #ifdef B38400 case 38400: return B38400; #else /* B38400 */ #ifdef EXTB case 38400: return EXTB; #endif /* EXTB */ #endif /* B38400 */ #ifdef B7200 case 7200: return B7200; #endif /* B7200 */ #ifdef B14400 case 14400: return B14400; #endif /* B14400 */ #ifdef B28800 case 28800: return B28800; #endif /* B28800 */ #ifdef B57600 case 57600: return B57600; #endif /* B57600 */ #ifdef B76800 case 76800: return B76800; #endif /* B76800 */ #ifdef B115200 case 115200: return B115200; #endif /* B115200 */ #ifdef B230400 case 230400: return B230400; #endif /* B230400 */ default: return B9600; } } /* * Encode a special character into SSH line format. */ static u_int special_char_encode(cc_t c) { #ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE if (c == _POSIX_VDISABLE) return 255; #endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */ return c; } /* * Decode a special character from SSH line format. */ static cc_t special_char_decode(u_int c) { #ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE if (c == 255) return _POSIX_VDISABLE; #endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */ return c; } /* * Encodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd * or tiop in a portable manner, and appends the modes to a packet * being constructed. */ void ssh_tty_make_modes(struct ssh *ssh, int fd, struct termios *tiop) { struct termios tio; struct sshbuf *buf; int r, ibaud, obaud; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (tiop == NULL) { if (fd == -1) { debug("%s: no fd or tio", __func__); goto end; } if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) { logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno)); goto end; } } else tio = *tiop; /* Store input and output baud rates. */ obaud = speed_to_baud(cfgetospeed(&tio)); ibaud = speed_to_baud(cfgetispeed(&tio)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_OSPEED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, obaud)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_ISPEED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, ibaud)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Store values of mode flags. */ #define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, OP)) != 0 || \ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, \ special_char_encode(tio.c_cc[NAME]))) != 0) \ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ #define SSH_TTYMODE_IUTF8 42 /* for SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE */ #define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \ if (OP == SSH_TTYMODE_IUTF8 && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE)) { \ debug3("%s: SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE", __func__); \ } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, OP)) != 0 || \ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0))) != 0) \ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ #include "ttymodes.h" #undef TTYCHAR #undef TTYMODE end: /* Mark end of mode data. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_END)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(buf); } /* * Decodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd in a portable * manner from a packet being read. */ void ssh_tty_parse_modes(struct ssh *ssh, int fd) { struct termios tio; struct sshbuf *buf; const u_char *data; u_char opcode; u_int baud, u; int r, failure = 0; size_t len; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (len == 0) return; if ((buf = sshbuf_from(data, len)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); return; } /* * Get old attributes for the terminal. We will modify these * flags. I am hoping that if there are any machine-specific * modes, they will initially have reasonable values. */ if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) { logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno)); failure = -1; } while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &opcode)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (opcode) { case TTY_OP_END: goto set; case TTY_OP_ISPEED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &baud)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (failure != -1 && cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1) error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud); break; case TTY_OP_OSPEED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &baud)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (failure != -1 && cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1) error("cfsetospeed failed for %d", baud); break; #define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \ case OP: \ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &u)) != 0) \ fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, \ ssh_err(r)); \ tio.c_cc[NAME] = special_char_decode(u); \ break; #define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \ case OP: \ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &u)) != 0) \ fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, \ ssh_err(r)); \ if (u) \ tio.FIELD |= NAME; \ else \ tio.FIELD &= ~NAME; \ break; #include "ttymodes.h" #undef TTYCHAR #undef TTYMODE default: debug("Ignoring unsupported tty mode opcode %d (0x%x)", opcode, opcode); /* * SSH2: * Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have a uint32 * argument. * Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and cause parsing * to stop. */ if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); break; } else { logit("%s: unknown opcode %d", __func__, opcode); goto set; } } } set: len = sshbuf_len(buf); sshbuf_free(buf); if (len > 0) { logit("%s: %zu bytes left", __func__, len); return; /* Don't process bytes passed */ } if (failure == -1) return; /* Packet parsed ok but tcgetattr() failed */ /* Set the new modes for the terminal. */ if (tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tio) == -1) logit("Setting tty modes failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } openssh-8.2p1/ttymodes.h010064400017500001750000000115471362136622600135120ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.16 2017/04/30 23:26:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves. * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * The tty mode description is a string, consisting of * opcode-arguments pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0). * Opcodes 1-159 have uint32 arguments. * Opcodes 160-255 are not yet defined and cause parsing to stop (they * should only be used after any other data). * * The client puts in the string any modes it knows about, and the * server ignores any modes it does not know about. This allows some degree * of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a posix-like * tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as well, but might * require reimplementing as mode names would likely be different. */ /* * Some constants and prototypes are defined in packet.h; this file * is only intended for including from ttymodes.c. */ /* termios macro */ /* name, op */ TTYCHAR(VINTR, 1) TTYCHAR(VQUIT, 2) TTYCHAR(VERASE, 3) #if defined(VKILL) TTYCHAR(VKILL, 4) #endif /* VKILL */ TTYCHAR(VEOF, 5) #if defined(VEOL) TTYCHAR(VEOL, 6) #endif /* VEOL */ #ifdef VEOL2 TTYCHAR(VEOL2, 7) #endif /* VEOL2 */ TTYCHAR(VSTART, 8) TTYCHAR(VSTOP, 9) #if defined(VSUSP) TTYCHAR(VSUSP, 10) #endif /* VSUSP */ #if defined(VDSUSP) TTYCHAR(VDSUSP, 11) #endif /* VDSUSP */ #if defined(VREPRINT) TTYCHAR(VREPRINT, 12) #endif /* VREPRINT */ #if defined(VWERASE) TTYCHAR(VWERASE, 13) #endif /* VWERASE */ #if defined(VLNEXT) TTYCHAR(VLNEXT, 14) #endif /* VLNEXT */ #if defined(VFLUSH) TTYCHAR(VFLUSH, 15) #endif /* VFLUSH */ #ifdef VSWTCH TTYCHAR(VSWTCH, 16) #endif /* VSWTCH */ #if defined(VSTATUS) TTYCHAR(VSTATUS, 17) #endif /* VSTATUS */ #ifdef VDISCARD TTYCHAR(VDISCARD, 18) #endif /* VDISCARD */ /* name, field, op */ TTYMODE(IGNPAR, c_iflag, 30) TTYMODE(PARMRK, c_iflag, 31) TTYMODE(INPCK, c_iflag, 32) TTYMODE(ISTRIP, c_iflag, 33) TTYMODE(INLCR, c_iflag, 34) TTYMODE(IGNCR, c_iflag, 35) TTYMODE(ICRNL, c_iflag, 36) #if defined(IUCLC) TTYMODE(IUCLC, c_iflag, 37) #endif TTYMODE(IXON, c_iflag, 38) TTYMODE(IXANY, c_iflag, 39) TTYMODE(IXOFF, c_iflag, 40) #ifdef IMAXBEL TTYMODE(IMAXBEL,c_iflag, 41) #endif /* IMAXBEL */ #ifdef IUTF8 TTYMODE(IUTF8, c_iflag, 42) #endif /* IUTF8 */ TTYMODE(ISIG, c_lflag, 50) TTYMODE(ICANON, c_lflag, 51) #ifdef XCASE TTYMODE(XCASE, c_lflag, 52) #endif TTYMODE(ECHO, c_lflag, 53) TTYMODE(ECHOE, c_lflag, 54) TTYMODE(ECHOK, c_lflag, 55) TTYMODE(ECHONL, c_lflag, 56) TTYMODE(NOFLSH, c_lflag, 57) TTYMODE(TOSTOP, c_lflag, 58) #ifdef IEXTEN TTYMODE(IEXTEN, c_lflag, 59) #endif /* IEXTEN */ #if defined(ECHOCTL) TTYMODE(ECHOCTL,c_lflag, 60) #endif /* ECHOCTL */ #ifdef ECHOKE TTYMODE(ECHOKE, c_lflag, 61) #endif /* ECHOKE */ #if defined(PENDIN) TTYMODE(PENDIN, c_lflag, 62) #endif /* PENDIN */ TTYMODE(OPOST, c_oflag, 70) #if defined(OLCUC) TTYMODE(OLCUC, c_oflag, 71) #endif #ifdef ONLCR TTYMODE(ONLCR, c_oflag, 72) #endif #ifdef OCRNL TTYMODE(OCRNL, c_oflag, 73) #endif #ifdef ONOCR TTYMODE(ONOCR, c_oflag, 74) #endif #ifdef ONLRET TTYMODE(ONLRET, c_oflag, 75) #endif TTYMODE(CS7, c_cflag, 90) TTYMODE(CS8, c_cflag, 91) TTYMODE(PARENB, c_cflag, 92) TTYMODE(PARODD, c_cflag, 93) openssh-8.2p1/uidswap.c010064400017500001750000000164111362136622600133040ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.42 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code for uid-swapping. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases: * 1. euid=0, ruid=0 * 2. euid=0, ruid!=0 * 3. euid!=0, ruid!=0 * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has * POSIX saved uids or not. */ #if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) /* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that is not part of the posix specification. */ #define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID /* Saved effective uid. */ static uid_t saved_euid = 0; static gid_t saved_egid = 0; #endif /* Saved effective uid. */ static int privileged = 0; static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; static uid_t user_groups_uid; static gid_t *saved_egroups = NULL, *user_groups = NULL; static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1; /* * Temporarily changes to the given uid. If the effective user * id is not root, this does nothing. This call cannot be nested. */ void temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) { /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */ #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID saved_euid = geteuid(); saved_egid = getegid(); debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (saved_euid != 0) { privileged = 0; return; } #endif #else if (geteuid() != 0) { privileged = 0; return; } #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ privileged = 1; temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1; saved_egroupslen = getgroups(0, NULL); if (saved_egroupslen == -1) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (saved_egroupslen > 0) { saved_egroups = xreallocarray(saved_egroups, saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t)); if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) == -1) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } else { /* saved_egroupslen == 0 */ free(saved_egroups); saved_egroups = NULL; } /* set and save the user's groups */ if (user_groupslen == -1 || user_groups_uid != pw->pw_uid) { if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); user_groupslen = getgroups(0, NULL); if (user_groupslen == -1) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (user_groupslen > 0) { user_groups = xreallocarray(user_groups, user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t)); if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) == -1) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } else { /* user_groupslen == 0 */ free(user_groups); user_groups = NULL; } user_groups_uid = pw->pw_uid; } /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */ if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) == -1) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */ if (setgid(getegid()) == -1) debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno)); /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */ if (setuid(geteuid()) == -1) debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno)); #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) == -1) fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); } /* * Restores to the original (privileged) uid. */ void restore_uid(void) { /* it's a no-op unless privileged */ if (!privileged) { debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)"); return; } if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective) fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective"); #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */ if (seteuid(saved_euid) == -1) fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno)); if (setegid(saved_egid) == -1) fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno)); #else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ /* * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value. * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid * as well. */ if (setuid(getuid()) == -1) fatal("%s: setuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setgid(getgid()) == -1) fatal("%s: setgid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) == -1) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; } /* * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid. This cannot be * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective. */ void permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw) { #ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST uid_t old_uid = getuid(); gid_t old_gid = getgid(); #endif if (pw == NULL) fatal("permanently_set_uid: no user given"); if (temporarily_use_uid_effective) fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective"); debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid); if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); #ifdef __APPLE__ /* * OS X requires initgroups after setgid to opt back into * memberd support for >16 supplemental groups. */ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) fatal("initgroups %.100s %u: %.100s", pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); #endif if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1) fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); #ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST /* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */ if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid && pw->pw_uid != 0 && (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1)) fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__); #endif /* Verify GID drop was successful */ if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) { fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)", __func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(), (u_int)pw->pw_gid); } #ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */ if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid && (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1)) fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__); #endif /* Verify UID drop was successful */ if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) { fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)", __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(), (u_int)pw->pw_uid); } } openssh-8.2p1/uidswap.h010064400017500001750000000012501362136622600133040ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.h,v 1.14 2018/07/18 11:34:05 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ void temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *); void restore_uid(void); void permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *); openssh-8.2p1/umac.c010064400017500001750000001316701362136622600125620ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.18 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */ /* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- * * umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication * * Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18 * * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage. * * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission. * * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) * * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES ///////////////////////////////// * * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB * * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte * aligned * * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be * zeroed. * * 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and * rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU * Public lisence at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is * the third. * * 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes * produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why. * /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN #define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 8 /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16 */ #endif #if UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 4 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 8 && \ UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 12 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 16 # error UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN must be defined to 4, 8, 12 or 16 #endif /* #define FORCE_C_ONLY 1 ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd */ /* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */ /* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */ /* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */ /* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable authenticated encryption */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "umac.h" #include "misc.h" /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- Primitive Data Types --- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The following assumptions may need change on your system */ typedef u_int8_t UINT8; /* 1 byte */ typedef u_int16_t UINT16; /* 2 byte */ typedef u_int32_t UINT32; /* 4 byte */ typedef u_int64_t UINT64; /* 8 bytes */ typedef unsigned int UWORD; /* Register */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #define UMAC_KEY_LEN 16 /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */ /* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner. */ /* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must */ /* be set true if the host computer is little-endian. */ #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN #define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1 #else #define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0 #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b))) /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) #define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32(p) #define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32(p,v) #else #define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32_le(p) #define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32_le(p,v) #endif #define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p) (get_u32_le(p)) #define STORE_UINT32_BIG(p,v) put_u32(p, v) /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */ #define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16 /* OpenSSL's AES */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL # include #endif typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1]; #define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \ AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key) #define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \ AES_set_encrypt_key((const u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key) #else #include "rijndael.h" #define AES_ROUNDS ((UMAC_KEY_LEN / 4) + 6) typedef UINT8 aes_int_key[AES_ROUNDS+1][4][4]; /* AES internal */ #define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \ rijndaelEncrypt((u32 *)(int_key), AES_ROUNDS, (u8 *)(in), (u8 *)(out)) #define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \ rijndaelKeySetupEnc((u32 *)(int_key), (const unsigned char *)(key), \ UMAC_KEY_LEN*8) #endif /* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter * mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes * an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of * 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'bufp'. Each distinct * 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream. */ static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes) { UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0}; UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)bufp; int i; /* Setup the initial value */ in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx; in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1; while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) { aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key); memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN); in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i; nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN; dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN; } if (nbytes) { aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key); memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes); } explicit_bzero(in_buf, sizeof(in_buf)); explicit_bzero(out_buf, sizeof(out_buf)); } /* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom * function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and * xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce. * This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces. */ typedef struct { UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* Previous AES output is saved */ UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* The AES input making above cache */ aes_int_key prf_key; /* Expanded AES key for PDF */ } pdf_ctx; static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key) { UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN]; kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN); aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key); /* Initialize pdf and cache */ memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce)); aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); } static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8]) { /* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes * of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st * element, then we may have the result in the cache already. */ #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) #define LOW_BIT_MASK 3 #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) #define LOW_BIT_MASK 1 #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8) #define LOW_BIT_MASK 0 #endif union { UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4]; UINT32 align; } t; #if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0 int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK; #endif *(UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[1]; t.tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */ if ( (((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) || (((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) ) { ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0]; ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0]; aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key); } #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) *((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx]; #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) *((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx]; #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12) ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0]; ((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2]; #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0]; ((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1]; #endif } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper * and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website. * The interface to this implementation has two * versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed * in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second * allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the * muliple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as * many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the * hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output. * Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine * must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to * the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is * optimized and should be preferred whenever the multiple-buffer interface * is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's * responsibility to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result. * * The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and * must be called once, before any other PDF routine. */ /* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They * expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines * produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call, * allowing the parallel implementation of the streams. */ #define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied */ #define L1_KEY_LEN 1024 /* Internal key bytes */ #define L1_KEY_SHIFT 16 /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */ #define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY 32 /* pad message to boundary multiple */ #define ALLOC_BOUNDARY 16 /* Keep buffers aligned to this */ #define HASH_BUF_BYTES 64 /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple */ typedef struct { UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */ UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */ int next_data_empty; /* Bookkeeping variable for data buffer. */ int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorporated. */ UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */ } nh_ctx; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and * then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp", * "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32). Key * is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup. */ { UINT64 h; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7; h = *((UINT64 *)hp); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); *((UINT64 *)hp) = h; } #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, * reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call. */ { UINT64 h1,h2; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, k8,k9,k10,k11; h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; } #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call. */ { UINT64 h1,h2,h3; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15; h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15); h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4)); h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5)); h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6)); h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7)); k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15; d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3; } #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call. */ { UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15, k16,k17,k18,k19; h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2); h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15); k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19); h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4)); h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4)); h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5)); h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5)); h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6)); h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6)); h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7)); h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7)); k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15; k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19; d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3; ((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4; } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #endif /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes) /* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes * as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a * multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset * appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already. */ { UINT8 *key; key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed; nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes) /* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to */ /* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing. */ { UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw; if (bpw == 4) { UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf; do { *p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p); p++; } while (--iters); } else if (bpw == 8) { UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf; UINT32 t; do { t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1); p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p); p[0] = t; p += 2; } while (--iters); } } #define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z)) #else #define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0) /* Do nothing */ #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc) /* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */ { hc->bytes_hashed = 0; hc->next_data_empty = 0; hc->state[0] = 0; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) hc->state[1] = 0; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) hc->state[2] = 0; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) hc->state[3] = 0; #endif } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key) /* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing. */ { kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key)); endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key)); nh_reset(hc); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes) /* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an */ /* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES. */ { UINT32 i,j; j = hc->next_data_empty; if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) { if (j) { i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j; memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i); nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES); nbytes -= i; buf += i; hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES; } if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) { i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1); nh_transform(hc, buf, i); nbytes -= i; buf += i; hc->bytes_hashed += i; } j = 0; } memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes); hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes; } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes) { /* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */ if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) { while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) { *p = 0; nbytes--; p++; } while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) { *(UWORD *)p = 0; nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD); p += sizeof(UWORD); } } while (nbytes) { *p = 0; nbytes--; p++; } } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result) /* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration * into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any * bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the * NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number * of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result". * If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated. */ { int nh_len, nbits; if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) { nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty, nh_len - hc->next_data_empty); nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len); hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty; } else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) { nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY); nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len); } nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3); ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits; #endif nh_reset(hc); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len, UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result) /* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent. * Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is * well aligned */ { UINT32 nbits; /* Initialize the hash state */ nbits = (unpadded_len << 3); ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits; #endif nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first * hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer * unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial- * layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output. * * UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data * buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the * UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary. * When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls * uhash_final() which * calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation * the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine, * uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and * uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be * used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary. * * The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and * must be called once, before any other UHASH routine. */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* Primes and masks */ #define p36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull) /* 2^36 - 5 */ #define p64 ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull) /* 2^64 - 59 */ #define m36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull) /* The low 36 of 64 bits */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ typedef struct uhash_ctx { nh_ctx hash; /* Hash context for L1 NH hash */ UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS]; /* p64 poly keys */ UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS]; /* poly hash result */ UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4]; /* Inner-product keys */ UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS]; /* Inner-product translation */ UINT32 msg_len; /* Total length of data passed */ /* to uhash */ } uhash_ctx; typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t; /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one * word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64 * require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit * the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to * be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation * patches any errant values. */ static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data) { UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32), key_lo = (UINT32)key, cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32), cur_lo = (UINT32)cur, x_lo, x_hi; UINT64 X,T,res; X = MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo); x_lo = (UINT32)X; x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32); res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo); T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32); res += T; if (res < T) res += 59; res += data; if (res < data) res += 59; return res; } /* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this * implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle * the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to * 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24 * bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB). */ static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[]) { int i; UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in; for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) { hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1); hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59)); } else { hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]); } } } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash * produces a result not necessarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner- * product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and * multiplies each with a 36 bit key. */ static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data) { t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48); t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32); t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16); t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data); return t; } static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t) { /* Divisionless modular reduction */ UINT64 ret; ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36); if (ret >= p36) ret -= p36; /* return least significant 32 bits */ return (UINT32)(ret); } /* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then * the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the * NH output. */ static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res) { UINT64 t; UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res; t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]); #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]); #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]); #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]); #endif } /* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then * the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the * polyhash output. */ static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res) { int i; UINT64 t; for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { /* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */ if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64) ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64; t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]); } } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* Reset uhash context for next hash session */ static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc) { nh_reset(&pc->hash); pc->msg_len = 0; pc->poly_accum[0] = 1; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) pc->poly_accum[1] = 1; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) pc->poly_accum[2] = 1; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) pc->poly_accum[3] = 1; #endif return 1; } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context, * initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner- * product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native * loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation. */ static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key) { int i; UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)]; /* Zero the entire uhash context */ memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx)); /* Initialize the L1 hash */ nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key); /* Setup L2 hash variables */ kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { /* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not * used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a * little-endian computer. */ memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8); endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8); /* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */ ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu; ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1; /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */ } /* Setup L3-1 hash variables */ kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64), 4*sizeof(UINT64)); endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64), sizeof(ahc->ip_keys)); for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++) ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36; /* Bring into Z_p36 */ /* Setup L3-2 hash variables */ /* Fill buffer with index 4 key */ kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32)); endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32), STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32)); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[]) { /* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */ uhash_ctx_t ctx; u_char bytes_to_add; aes_int_key prf_key; ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY); if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY - ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1)); ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add); *((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add; } aes_key_setup(key,prf_key); uhash_init(ctx, prf_key); } return (ctx); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx) { /* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */ u_char bytes_to_sub; if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1); ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub); } free(ctx); } return (1); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, const u_char *input, long len) /* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and * hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output. */ { UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining; UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS]; UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf; if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) { nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len); ctx->msg_len += len; } else { bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN; if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN) bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN; if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) { /* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function */ /* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */ /* bytes to complete the current nh_block. */ if (bytes_hashed) { bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed); nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining); nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining; poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); len -= bytes_remaining; input += bytes_remaining; } /* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */ while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) { nh(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result); ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN; len -= L1_KEY_LEN; input += L1_KEY_LEN; poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); } } /* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */ if (len) { nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len); ctx->msg_len += len; } } return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res) /* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */ { UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS]; UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf; if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) { if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) { nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); } ip_long(ctx, res); } else { nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res); } uhash_reset(ctx); return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res) /* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */ /* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed. */ { UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)]; UINT32 nh_len; int extra_zeroes_needed; /* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip * the polyhash. */ if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) { if (len == 0) /* If zero length messages will not */ nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; /* be seen, comment out this case */ else nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len; zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed); nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result); ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res); } else { /* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH * output to poly_hash(). */ do { nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result); poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result); len -= L1_KEY_LEN; msg += L1_KEY_LEN; } while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN); if (len) { nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len; zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed); nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result); poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result); } ip_long(ahc, res); } uhash_reset(ahc); return 1; } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where * the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer, * and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a * time. The all-at-once is more optimaized than the sequential version and * should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required. */ struct umac_ctx { uhash_ctx hash; /* Hash function for message compression */ pdf_ctx pdf; /* PDF for hashed output */ void *free_ptr; /* Address to free this struct via */ } umac_ctx; /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx) /* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication. */ { uhash_reset(&ctx->hash); return (1); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx) /* Deallocate the ctx structure */ { if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr; explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY); free(ctx); } return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[]) /* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables, * generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary. */ { struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx; size_t bytes_to_add; aes_int_key prf_key; octx = ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY); if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY - ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1)); ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add); } ctx->free_ptr = octx; aes_key_setup(key, prf_key); pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key); uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key); explicit_bzero(prf_key, sizeof(prf_key)); } return (ctx); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]) /* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */ { uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag); pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (const UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag); return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len) /* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and */ /* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */ /* output buffer is full. */ { uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len); return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, long len, u_char tag[], u_char nonce[8]) /* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final(). */ { uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag); pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag); return (1); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ openssh-8.2p1/umac.h010064400017500001750000000111311362136622600125540ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: umac.h,v 1.4 2019/06/07 14:18:48 dtucker Exp $ */ /* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- * * umac.h -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication * * Version 0.93a of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 14 * * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage. * * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Ted Krovetz * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission. * * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) * * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES ///////////////////////////////// * * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB * * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte * aligned * * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be * zeroed. * * 4) Two free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and * rijndael-alg-fst.h. * Brian Gladman's version is distributed with GNU Public license * and can be found at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. * /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */ #ifndef HEADER_UMAC_H #define HEADER_UMAC_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[]); /* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables, * generate subkeys from key. */ #if 0 int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx); /* Reset a umac_ctx to begin authenicating a new message */ #endif int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len); /* Incorporate len bytes pointed to by input into context ctx */ int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]); /* Incorporate any pending data and the ctr value, and return tag. * This function returns error code if ctr < 0. */ int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx); /* Deallocate the context structure */ #if 0 int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, long len, u_char tag[], u_char nonce[8]); /* All-in-one implementation of the functions Reset, Update and Final */ #endif /* uhash.h */ #if 0 typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t; /* The uhash_ctx structure is defined by the implementation of the */ /* UHASH functions. */ uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[16]); /* Dynamically allocate a uhash_ctx struct and generate subkeys using */ /* the kdf and kdf_key passed in. If kdf_key_len is 0 then RC6 is */ /* used to generate key with a fixed key. If kdf_key_len > 0 but kdf */ /* is NULL then the first 16 bytes pointed at by kdf_key is used as a */ /* key for an RC6 based KDF. */ int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx); int uhash_set_params(uhash_ctx_t ctx, void *params); int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t ctx); int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *input, long len); int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char output[]); int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *input, long len, u_char output[]); #endif /* matching umac-128 API, we reuse umac_ctx, since it's opaque */ struct umac_ctx *umac128_new(const u_char key[]); int umac128_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len); int umac128_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]); int umac128_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HEADER_UMAC_H */ openssh-8.2p1/umac128.c010064400017500001750000000004221362136622600130030ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: umac128.c,v 1.2 2018/02/08 04:12:32 dtucker Exp $ */ #define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 16 #define umac_new umac128_new #define umac_update umac128_update #define umac_final umac128_final #define umac_delete umac128_delete #define umac_ctx umac128_ctx #include "umac.c" openssh-8.2p1/utf8.c010064400017500001750000000201351362136622600125140ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.8 2018/08/21 13:56:27 schwarze Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * Utility functions for multibyte-character handling, * in particular to sanitize untrusted strings for terminal output. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_WCHAR_H # include #endif #include "utf8.h" static int dangerous_locale(void); static int grow_dst(char **, size_t *, size_t, char **, size_t); static int vasnmprintf(char **, size_t, int *, const char *, va_list); /* * For US-ASCII and UTF-8 encodings, we can safely recover from * encoding errors and from non-printable characters. For any * other encodings, err to the side of caution and abort parsing: * For state-dependent encodings, recovery is impossible. * For arbitrary encodings, replacement of non-printable * characters would be non-trivial and too fragile. * The comments indicate what nl_langinfo(CODESET) * returns for US-ASCII on various operating systems. */ static int dangerous_locale(void) { char *loc; loc = nl_langinfo(CODESET); return strcmp(loc, "UTF-8") != 0 && strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") != 0 && /* OpenBSD */ strcmp(loc, "ANSI_X3.4-1968") != 0 && /* Linux */ strcmp(loc, "ISO8859-1") != 0 && /* AIX */ strcmp(loc, "646") != 0 && /* Solaris, NetBSD */ strcmp(loc, "") != 0; /* Solaris 6 */ } static int grow_dst(char **dst, size_t *sz, size_t maxsz, char **dp, size_t need) { char *tp; size_t tsz; if (*dp + need < *dst + *sz) return 0; tsz = *sz + 128; if (tsz > maxsz) tsz = maxsz; if ((tp = recallocarray(*dst, *sz, tsz, 1)) == NULL) return -1; *dp = tp + (*dp - *dst); *dst = tp; *sz = tsz; return 0; } /* * The following two functions limit the number of bytes written, * including the terminating '\0', to sz. Unless wp is NULL, * they limit the number of display columns occupied to *wp. * Whichever is reached first terminates the output string. * To stay close to the standard interfaces, they return the number of * non-NUL bytes that would have been written if both were unlimited. * If wp is NULL, newline, carriage return, and tab are allowed; * otherwise, the actual number of columns occupied by what was * written is returned in *wp. */ static int vasnmprintf(char **str, size_t maxsz, int *wp, const char *fmt, va_list ap) { char *src; /* Source string returned from vasprintf. */ char *sp; /* Pointer into src. */ char *dst; /* Destination string to be returned. */ char *dp; /* Pointer into dst. */ char *tp; /* Temporary pointer for dst. */ size_t sz; /* Number of bytes allocated for dst. */ wchar_t wc; /* Wide character at sp. */ int len; /* Number of bytes in the character at sp. */ int ret; /* Number of bytes needed to format src. */ int width; /* Display width of the character wc. */ int total_width, max_width, print; src = NULL; if ((ret = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap)) <= 0) goto fail; sz = strlen(src) + 1; if ((dst = malloc(sz)) == NULL) { free(src); ret = -1; goto fail; } if (maxsz > INT_MAX) maxsz = INT_MAX; sp = src; dp = dst; ret = 0; print = 1; total_width = 0; max_width = wp == NULL ? INT_MAX : *wp; while (*sp != '\0') { if ((len = mbtowc(&wc, sp, MB_CUR_MAX)) == -1) { (void)mbtowc(NULL, NULL, MB_CUR_MAX); if (dangerous_locale()) { ret = -1; break; } len = 1; width = -1; } else if (wp == NULL && (wc == L'\n' || wc == L'\r' || wc == L'\t')) { /* * Don't use width uninitialized; the actual * value doesn't matter because total_width * is only returned for wp != NULL. */ width = 0; } else if ((width = wcwidth(wc)) == -1 && dangerous_locale()) { ret = -1; break; } /* Valid, printable character. */ if (width >= 0) { if (print && (dp - dst >= (int)maxsz - len || total_width > max_width - width)) print = 0; if (print) { if (grow_dst(&dst, &sz, maxsz, &dp, len) == -1) { ret = -1; break; } total_width += width; memcpy(dp, sp, len); dp += len; } sp += len; if (ret >= 0) ret += len; continue; } /* Escaping required. */ while (len > 0) { if (print && (dp - dst >= (int)maxsz - 4 || total_width > max_width - 4)) print = 0; if (print) { if (grow_dst(&dst, &sz, maxsz, &dp, 4) == -1) { ret = -1; break; } tp = vis(dp, *sp, VIS_OCTAL | VIS_ALL, 0); width = tp - dp; total_width += width; dp = tp; } else width = 4; len--; sp++; if (ret >= 0) ret += width; } if (len > 0) break; } free(src); *dp = '\0'; *str = dst; if (wp != NULL) *wp = total_width; /* * If the string was truncated by the width limit but * would have fit into the size limit, the only sane way * to report the problem is using the return value, such * that the usual idiom "if (ret < 0 || ret >= sz) error" * works as expected. */ if (ret < (int)maxsz && !print) ret = -1; return ret; fail: if (wp != NULL) *wp = 0; if (ret == 0) { *str = src; return 0; } else { *str = NULL; return -1; } } int snmprintf(char *str, size_t sz, int *wp, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; int ret; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vasnmprintf(&cp, sz, wp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (cp != NULL) { (void)strlcpy(str, cp, sz); free(cp); } else *str = '\0'; return ret; } /* * To stay close to the standard interfaces, the following functions * return the number of non-NUL bytes written. */ int vfmprintf(FILE *stream, const char *fmt, va_list ap) { char *str; int ret; if ((ret = vasnmprintf(&str, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap)) < 0) return -1; if (fputs(str, stream) == EOF) ret = -1; free(str); return ret; } int fmprintf(FILE *stream, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int ret; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vfmprintf(stream, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } int mprintf(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int ret; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vfmprintf(stdout, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } /* * Set up libc for multibyte output in the user's chosen locale. * * XXX: we are known to have problems with Turkish (i/I confusion) so we * deliberately fall back to the C locale for now. Longer term we should * always prefer to select C.[encoding] if possible, but there's no * standardisation in locales between systems, so we'll need to survey * what's out there first. */ void msetlocale(void) { const char *vars[] = { "LC_ALL", "LC_CTYPE", "LANG", NULL }; char *cp; int i; /* * We can't yet cope with dotless/dotted I in Turkish locales, * so fall back to the C locale for these. */ for (i = 0; vars[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((cp = getenv(vars[i])) == NULL) continue; if (strncasecmp(cp, "TR", 2) != 0) break; /* * If we're in a UTF-8 locale then prefer to use * the C.UTF-8 locale (or equivalent) if it exists. */ if ((strcasestr(cp, "UTF-8") != NULL || strcasestr(cp, "UTF8") != NULL) && (setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C.UTF-8") != NULL || setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "POSIX.UTF-8") != NULL)) return; setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C"); return; } /* We can handle this locale */ setlocale(LC_CTYPE, ""); } openssh-8.2p1/utf8.h010064400017500001750000000022541362136622600125230ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: utf8.h,v 1.1 2016/05/25 23:48:45 schwarze Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ int mprintf(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); int fmprintf(FILE *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); int vfmprintf(FILE *, const char *, va_list); int snmprintf(char *, size_t, int *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5))); void msetlocale(void); openssh-8.2p1/verify.c010064400017500001750000000012341362136622600131310ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: verify.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain, Author: Daniel J. Bernstein * Copied from nacl-20110221/crypto_verify/32/ref/verify.c */ #include "includes.h" #include "crypto_api.h" int crypto_verify_32(const unsigned char *x,const unsigned char *y) { unsigned int differentbits = 0; #define F(i) differentbits |= x[i] ^ y[i]; F(0) F(1) F(2) F(3) F(4) F(5) F(6) F(7) F(8) F(9) F(10) F(11) F(12) F(13) F(14) F(15) F(16) F(17) F(18) F(19) F(20) F(21) F(22) F(23) F(24) F(25) F(26) F(27) F(28) F(29) F(30) F(31) return (1 & ((differentbits - 1) >> 8)) - 1; } openssh-8.2p1/version.h010064400017500001750000000002521362136622600133160ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.86 2020/02/14 00:39:20 djm Exp $ */ #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.2" #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE openssh-8.2p1/xmalloc.c010064400017500001750000000047241362136622600132730ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.36 2019/11/12 22:32:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #if defined(__OpenBSD__) char *malloc_options = "S"; #endif /* __OpenBSD__ */ void * xmalloc(size_t size) { void *ptr; if (size == 0) fatal("xmalloc: zero size"); ptr = malloc(size); if (ptr == NULL) fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size); return ptr; } void * xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size) { void *ptr; if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0) fatal("xcalloc: zero size"); if (SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_MAX"); ptr = calloc(nmemb, size); if (ptr == NULL) fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size * nmemb); return ptr; } void * xreallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) { void *new_ptr; new_ptr = reallocarray(ptr, nmemb, size); if (new_ptr == NULL) fatal("xreallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)", nmemb, size); return new_ptr; } void * xrecallocarray(void *ptr, size_t onmemb, size_t nmemb, size_t size) { void *new_ptr; new_ptr = recallocarray(ptr, onmemb, nmemb, size); if (new_ptr == NULL) fatal("xrecallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)", nmemb, size); return new_ptr; } char * xstrdup(const char *str) { size_t len; char *cp; len = strlen(str) + 1; cp = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(cp, str, len); return cp; } int xvasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, va_list ap) { int i; i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap); if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL) fatal("xvasprintf: could not allocate memory"); return i; } int xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int i; va_start(ap, fmt); i = xvasprintf(ret, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return i; } openssh-8.2p1/xmalloc.h010064400017500001750000000022071362136622600132720ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.19 2019/11/12 22:32:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo * * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ void *xmalloc(size_t); void *xcalloc(size_t, size_t); void *xreallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); void *xrecallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t); char *xstrdup(const char *); int xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); int xvasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); openssh-8.2p1/xmss_commons.c010064400017500001750000000011671362136622600143570ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: xmss_commons.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ /* xmss_commons.c 20160722 Andreas Hülsing Joost Rijneveld Public domain. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_XMSS #include "xmss_commons.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif void to_byte(unsigned char *out, unsigned long long in, uint32_t bytes) { int32_t i; for (i = bytes-1; i >= 0; i--) { out[i] = in & 0xff; in = in >> 8; } } #if 0 void hexdump(const unsigned char *a, size_t len) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) printf("%02x", a[i]); } #endif #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/xmss_commons.h010064400017500001750000000007021362136622600143560ustar00djmdjm#ifdef WITH_XMSS /* $OpenBSD: xmss_commons.h,v 1.3 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ /* xmss_commons.h 20160722 Andreas Hülsing Joost Rijneveld Public domain. */ #ifndef XMSS_COMMONS_H #define XMSS_COMMONS_H #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #endif void to_byte(unsigned char *output, unsigned long long in, uint32_t bytes); #if 0 void hexdump(const unsigned char *a, size_t len); #endif #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/xmss_fast.c010064400017500001750000001002451362136622600136360ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: xmss_fast.c,v 1.3 2018/03/22 07:06:11 markus Exp $ */ /* xmss_fast.c version 20160722 Andreas Hülsing Joost Rijneveld Public domain. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_XMSS #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include "xmss_fast.h" #include "crypto_api.h" #include "xmss_wots.h" #include "xmss_hash.h" #include "xmss_commons.h" #include "xmss_hash_address.h" // For testing #include "stdio.h" /** * Used for pseudorandom keygeneration, * generates the seed for the WOTS keypair at address addr * * takes n byte sk_seed and returns n byte seed using 32 byte address addr. */ static void get_seed(unsigned char *seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed, int n, uint32_t addr[8]) { unsigned char bytes[32]; // Make sure that chain addr, hash addr, and key bit are 0! setChainADRS(addr,0); setHashADRS(addr,0); setKeyAndMask(addr,0); // Generate pseudorandom value addr_to_byte(bytes, addr); prf(seed, bytes, sk_seed, n); } /** * Initialize xmss params struct * parameter names are the same as in the draft * parameter k is K as used in the BDS algorithm */ int xmss_set_params(xmss_params *params, int n, int h, int w, int k) { if (k >= h || k < 2 || (h - k) % 2) { fprintf(stderr, "For BDS traversal, H - K must be even, with H > K >= 2!\n"); return 1; } params->h = h; params->n = n; params->k = k; wots_params wots_par; wots_set_params(&wots_par, n, w); params->wots_par = wots_par; return 0; } /** * Initialize BDS state struct * parameter names are the same as used in the description of the BDS traversal */ void xmss_set_bds_state(bds_state *state, unsigned char *stack, int stackoffset, unsigned char *stacklevels, unsigned char *auth, unsigned char *keep, treehash_inst *treehash, unsigned char *retain, int next_leaf) { state->stack = stack; state->stackoffset = stackoffset; state->stacklevels = stacklevels; state->auth = auth; state->keep = keep; state->treehash = treehash; state->retain = retain; state->next_leaf = next_leaf; } /** * Initialize xmssmt_params struct * parameter names are the same as in the draft * * Especially h is the total tree height, i.e. the XMSS trees have height h/d */ int xmssmt_set_params(xmssmt_params *params, int n, int h, int d, int w, int k) { if (h % d) { fprintf(stderr, "d must divide h without remainder!\n"); return 1; } params->h = h; params->d = d; params->n = n; params->index_len = (h + 7) / 8; xmss_params xmss_par; if (xmss_set_params(&xmss_par, n, (h/d), w, k)) { return 1; } params->xmss_par = xmss_par; return 0; } /** * Computes a leaf from a WOTS public key using an L-tree. */ static void l_tree(unsigned char *leaf, unsigned char *wots_pk, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) { unsigned int l = params->wots_par.len; unsigned int n = params->n; uint32_t i = 0; uint32_t height = 0; uint32_t bound; //ADRS.setTreeHeight(0); setTreeHeight(addr, height); while (l > 1) { bound = l >> 1; //floor(l / 2); for (i = 0; i < bound; i++) { //ADRS.setTreeIndex(i); setTreeIndex(addr, i); //wots_pk[i] = RAND_HASH(pk[2i], pk[2i + 1], SEED, ADRS); hash_h(wots_pk+i*n, wots_pk+i*2*n, pub_seed, addr, n); } //if ( l % 2 == 1 ) { if (l & 1) { //pk[floor(l / 2) + 1] = pk[l]; memcpy(wots_pk+(l>>1)*n, wots_pk+(l-1)*n, n); //l = ceil(l / 2); l=(l>>1)+1; } else { //l = ceil(l / 2); l=(l>>1); } //ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1); height++; setTreeHeight(addr, height); } //return pk[0]; memcpy(leaf, wots_pk, n); } /** * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair, then computes leaf using l_tree. As this happens position independent, we only require that addr encodes the right ltree-address. */ static void gen_leaf_wots(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t ltree_addr[8], uint32_t ots_addr[8]) { unsigned char seed[params->n]; unsigned char pk[params->wots_par.keysize]; get_seed(seed, sk_seed, params->n, ots_addr); wots_pkgen(pk, seed, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); l_tree(leaf, pk, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr); } static int treehash_minheight_on_stack(bds_state* state, const xmss_params *params, const treehash_inst *treehash) { unsigned int r = params->h, i; for (i = 0; i < treehash->stackusage; i++) { if (state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset - i - 1] < r) { r = state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset - i - 1]; } } return r; } /** * Merkle's TreeHash algorithm. The address only needs to initialize the first 78 bits of addr. Everything else will be set by treehash. * Currently only used for key generation. * */ static void treehash_setup(unsigned char *node, int height, int index, bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) { unsigned int idx = index; unsigned int n = params->n; unsigned int h = params->h; unsigned int k = params->k; // use three different addresses because at this point we use all three formats in parallel uint32_t ots_addr[8]; uint32_t ltree_addr[8]; uint32_t node_addr[8]; // only copy layer and tree address parts memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12); // type = ots setType(ots_addr, 0); memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12); setType(ltree_addr, 1); memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12); setType(node_addr, 2); uint32_t lastnode, i; unsigned char stack[(height+1)*n]; unsigned int stacklevels[height+1]; unsigned int stackoffset=0; unsigned int nodeh; lastnode = idx+(1<treehash[i].h = i; state->treehash[i].completed = 1; state->treehash[i].stackusage = 0; } i = 0; for (; idx < lastnode; idx++) { setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx); setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx); gen_leaf_wots(stack+stackoffset*n, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr); stacklevels[stackoffset] = 0; stackoffset++; if (h - k > 0 && i == 3) { memcpy(state->treehash[0].node, stack+stackoffset*n, n); } while (stackoffset>1 && stacklevels[stackoffset-1] == stacklevels[stackoffset-2]) { nodeh = stacklevels[stackoffset-1]; if (i >> nodeh == 1) { memcpy(state->auth + nodeh*n, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n); } else { if (nodeh < h - k && i >> nodeh == 3) { memcpy(state->treehash[nodeh].node, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n); } else if (nodeh >= h - k) { memcpy(state->retain + ((1 << (h - 1 - nodeh)) + nodeh - h + (((i >> nodeh) - 3) >> 1)) * n, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n); } } setTreeHeight(node_addr, stacklevels[stackoffset-1]); setTreeIndex(node_addr, (idx >> (stacklevels[stackoffset-1]+1))); hash_h(stack+(stackoffset-2)*n, stack+(stackoffset-2)*n, pub_seed, node_addr, n); stacklevels[stackoffset-2]++; stackoffset--; } i++; } for (i = 0; i < n; i++) node[i] = stack[i]; } static void treehash_update(treehash_inst *treehash, bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) { int n = params->n; uint32_t ots_addr[8]; uint32_t ltree_addr[8]; uint32_t node_addr[8]; // only copy layer and tree address parts memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12); // type = ots setType(ots_addr, 0); memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12); setType(ltree_addr, 1); memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12); setType(node_addr, 2); setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, treehash->next_idx); setOTSADRS(ots_addr, treehash->next_idx); unsigned char nodebuffer[2 * n]; unsigned int nodeheight = 0; gen_leaf_wots(nodebuffer, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr); while (treehash->stackusage > 0 && state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1] == nodeheight) { memcpy(nodebuffer + n, nodebuffer, n); memcpy(nodebuffer, state->stack + (state->stackoffset-1)*n, n); setTreeHeight(node_addr, nodeheight); setTreeIndex(node_addr, (treehash->next_idx >> (nodeheight+1))); hash_h(nodebuffer, nodebuffer, pub_seed, node_addr, n); nodeheight++; treehash->stackusage--; state->stackoffset--; } if (nodeheight == treehash->h) { // this also implies stackusage == 0 memcpy(treehash->node, nodebuffer, n); treehash->completed = 1; } else { memcpy(state->stack + state->stackoffset*n, nodebuffer, n); treehash->stackusage++; state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset] = nodeheight; state->stackoffset++; treehash->next_idx++; } } /** * Computes a root node given a leaf and an authapth */ static void validate_authpath(unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf, unsigned long leafidx, const unsigned char *authpath, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) { unsigned int n = params->n; uint32_t i, j; unsigned char buffer[2*n]; // If leafidx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child and authpath has to go to the left. // Otherwise, it is the other way around if (leafidx & 1) { for (j = 0; j < n; j++) buffer[n+j] = leaf[j]; for (j = 0; j < n; j++) buffer[j] = authpath[j]; } else { for (j = 0; j < n; j++) buffer[j] = leaf[j]; for (j = 0; j < n; j++) buffer[n+j] = authpath[j]; } authpath += n; for (i=0; i < params->h-1; i++) { setTreeHeight(addr, i); leafidx >>= 1; setTreeIndex(addr, leafidx); if (leafidx&1) { hash_h(buffer+n, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n); for (j = 0; j < n; j++) buffer[j] = authpath[j]; } else { hash_h(buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n); for (j = 0; j < n; j++) buffer[j+n] = authpath[j]; } authpath += n; } setTreeHeight(addr, (params->h-1)); leafidx >>= 1; setTreeIndex(addr, leafidx); hash_h(root, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n); } /** * Performs one treehash update on the instance that needs it the most. * Returns 1 if such an instance was not found **/ static char bds_treehash_update(bds_state *state, unsigned int updates, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) { uint32_t i, j; unsigned int level, l_min, low; unsigned int h = params->h; unsigned int k = params->k; unsigned int used = 0; for (j = 0; j < updates; j++) { l_min = h; level = h - k; for (i = 0; i < h - k; i++) { if (state->treehash[i].completed) { low = h; } else if (state->treehash[i].stackusage == 0) { low = i; } else { low = treehash_minheight_on_stack(state, params, &(state->treehash[i])); } if (low < l_min) { level = i; l_min = low; } } if (level == h - k) { break; } treehash_update(&(state->treehash[level]), state, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, addr); used++; } return updates - used; } /** * Updates the state (typically NEXT_i) by adding a leaf and updating the stack * Returns 1 if all leaf nodes have already been processed **/ static char bds_state_update(bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) { uint32_t ltree_addr[8]; uint32_t node_addr[8]; uint32_t ots_addr[8]; int n = params->n; int h = params->h; int k = params->k; int nodeh; int idx = state->next_leaf; if (idx == 1 << h) { return 1; } // only copy layer and tree address parts memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12); // type = ots setType(ots_addr, 0); memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12); setType(ltree_addr, 1); memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12); setType(node_addr, 2); setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx); setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx); gen_leaf_wots(state->stack+state->stackoffset*n, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr); state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset] = 0; state->stackoffset++; if (h - k > 0 && idx == 3) { memcpy(state->treehash[0].node, state->stack+state->stackoffset*n, n); } while (state->stackoffset>1 && state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1] == state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-2]) { nodeh = state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1]; if (idx >> nodeh == 1) { memcpy(state->auth + nodeh*n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n); } else { if (nodeh < h - k && idx >> nodeh == 3) { memcpy(state->treehash[nodeh].node, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n); } else if (nodeh >= h - k) { memcpy(state->retain + ((1 << (h - 1 - nodeh)) + nodeh - h + (((idx >> nodeh) - 3) >> 1)) * n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n); } } setTreeHeight(node_addr, state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1]); setTreeIndex(node_addr, (idx >> (state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1]+1))); hash_h(state->stack+(state->stackoffset-2)*n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-2)*n, pub_seed, node_addr, n); state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-2]++; state->stackoffset--; } state->next_leaf++; return 0; } /** * Returns the auth path for node leaf_idx and computes the auth path for the * next leaf node, using the algorithm described by Buchmann, Dahmen and Szydlo * in "Post Quantum Cryptography", Springer 2009. */ static void bds_round(bds_state *state, const unsigned long leaf_idx, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) { unsigned int i; unsigned int n = params->n; unsigned int h = params->h; unsigned int k = params->k; unsigned int tau = h; unsigned int startidx; unsigned int offset, rowidx; unsigned char buf[2 * n]; uint32_t ots_addr[8]; uint32_t ltree_addr[8]; uint32_t node_addr[8]; // only copy layer and tree address parts memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12); // type = ots setType(ots_addr, 0); memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12); setType(ltree_addr, 1); memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12); setType(node_addr, 2); for (i = 0; i < h; i++) { if (! ((leaf_idx >> i) & 1)) { tau = i; break; } } if (tau > 0) { memcpy(buf, state->auth + (tau-1) * n, n); // we need to do this before refreshing state->keep to prevent overwriting memcpy(buf + n, state->keep + ((tau-1) >> 1) * n, n); } if (!((leaf_idx >> (tau + 1)) & 1) && (tau < h - 1)) { memcpy(state->keep + (tau >> 1)*n, state->auth + tau*n, n); } if (tau == 0) { setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, leaf_idx); setOTSADRS(ots_addr, leaf_idx); gen_leaf_wots(state->auth, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr); } else { setTreeHeight(node_addr, (tau-1)); setTreeIndex(node_addr, leaf_idx >> tau); hash_h(state->auth + tau * n, buf, pub_seed, node_addr, n); for (i = 0; i < tau; i++) { if (i < h - k) { memcpy(state->auth + i * n, state->treehash[i].node, n); } else { offset = (1 << (h - 1 - i)) + i - h; rowidx = ((leaf_idx >> i) - 1) >> 1; memcpy(state->auth + i * n, state->retain + (offset + rowidx) * n, n); } } for (i = 0; i < ((tau < h - k) ? tau : (h - k)); i++) { startidx = leaf_idx + 1 + 3 * (1 << i); if (startidx < 1U << h) { state->treehash[i].h = i; state->treehash[i].next_idx = startidx; state->treehash[i].completed = 0; state->treehash[i].stackusage = 0; } } } } /* * Generates a XMSS key pair for a given parameter set. * Format sk: [(32bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root] * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid. */ int xmss_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, xmss_params *params) { unsigned int n = params->n; // Set idx = 0 sk[0] = 0; sk[1] = 0; sk[2] = 0; sk[3] = 0; // Init SK_SEED (n byte), SK_PRF (n byte), and PUB_SEED (n byte) randombytes(sk+4, 3*n); // Copy PUB_SEED to public key memcpy(pk+n, sk+4+2*n, n); uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; // Compute root treehash_setup(pk, params->h, 0, state, sk+4, params, sk+4+2*n, addr); // copy root to sk memcpy(sk+4+3*n, pk, n); return 0; } /** * Signs a message. * Returns * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND * 2. an updated secret key! * */ int xmss_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmss_params *params) { unsigned int h = params->h; unsigned int n = params->n; unsigned int k = params->k; uint16_t i = 0; // Extract SK unsigned long idx = ((unsigned long)sk[0] << 24) | ((unsigned long)sk[1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)sk[2] << 8) | sk[3]; unsigned char sk_seed[n]; memcpy(sk_seed, sk+4, n); unsigned char sk_prf[n]; memcpy(sk_prf, sk+4+n, n); unsigned char pub_seed[n]; memcpy(pub_seed, sk+4+2*n, n); // index as 32 bytes string unsigned char idx_bytes_32[32]; to_byte(idx_bytes_32, idx, 32); unsigned char hash_key[3*n]; // Update SK sk[0] = ((idx + 1) >> 24) & 255; sk[1] = ((idx + 1) >> 16) & 255; sk[2] = ((idx + 1) >> 8) & 255; sk[3] = (idx + 1) & 255; // -- Secret key for this non-forward-secure version is now updated. // -- A productive implementation should use a file handle instead and write the updated secret key at this point! // Init working params unsigned char R[n]; unsigned char msg_h[n]; unsigned char ots_seed[n]; uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; // --------------------------------- // Message Hashing // --------------------------------- // Message Hash: // First compute pseudorandom value prf(R, idx_bytes_32, sk_prf, n); // Generate hash key (R || root || idx) memcpy(hash_key, R, n); memcpy(hash_key+n, sk+4+3*n, n); to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n); // Then use it for message digest h_msg(msg_h, msg, msglen, hash_key, 3*n, n); // Start collecting signature *sig_msg_len = 0; // Copy index to signature sig_msg[0] = (idx >> 24) & 255; sig_msg[1] = (idx >> 16) & 255; sig_msg[2] = (idx >> 8) & 255; sig_msg[3] = idx & 255; sig_msg += 4; *sig_msg_len += 4; // Copy R to signature for (i = 0; i < n; i++) sig_msg[i] = R[i]; sig_msg += n; *sig_msg_len += n; // ---------------------------------- // Now we start to "really sign" // ---------------------------------- // Prepare Address setType(ots_addr, 0); setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx); // Compute seed for OTS key pair get_seed(ots_seed, sk_seed, n, ots_addr); // Compute WOTS signature wots_sign(sig_msg, msg_h, ots_seed, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); sig_msg += params->wots_par.keysize; *sig_msg_len += params->wots_par.keysize; // the auth path was already computed during the previous round memcpy(sig_msg, state->auth, h*n); if (idx < (1U << h) - 1) { bds_round(state, idx, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ots_addr); bds_treehash_update(state, (h - k) >> 1, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ots_addr); } /* TODO: save key/bds state here! */ sig_msg += params->h*n; *sig_msg_len += params->h*n; //Whipe secret elements? //zerobytes(tsk, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES); memcpy(sig_msg, msg, msglen); *sig_msg_len += msglen; return 0; } /** * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key. */ int xmss_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmss_params *params) { unsigned int n = params->n; unsigned long long i, m_len; unsigned long idx=0; unsigned char wots_pk[params->wots_par.keysize]; unsigned char pkhash[n]; unsigned char root[n]; unsigned char msg_h[n]; unsigned char hash_key[3*n]; unsigned char pub_seed[n]; memcpy(pub_seed, pk+n, n); // Init addresses uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; uint32_t ltree_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; uint32_t node_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; setType(ots_addr, 0); setType(ltree_addr, 1); setType(node_addr, 2); // Extract index idx = ((unsigned long)sig_msg[0] << 24) | ((unsigned long)sig_msg[1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)sig_msg[2] << 8) | sig_msg[3]; printf("verify:: idx = %lu\n", idx); // Generate hash key (R || root || idx) memcpy(hash_key, sig_msg+4,n); memcpy(hash_key+n, pk, n); to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n); sig_msg += (n+4); sig_msg_len -= (n+4); // hash message unsigned long long tmp_sig_len = params->wots_par.keysize+params->h*n; m_len = sig_msg_len - tmp_sig_len; h_msg(msg_h, sig_msg + tmp_sig_len, m_len, hash_key, 3*n, n); //----------------------- // Verify signature //----------------------- // Prepare Address setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx); // Check WOTS signature wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, msg_h, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); sig_msg += params->wots_par.keysize; sig_msg_len -= params->wots_par.keysize; // Compute Ltree setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx); l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr); // Compute root validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx, sig_msg, params, pub_seed, node_addr); sig_msg += params->h*n; sig_msg_len -= params->h*n; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) if (root[i] != pk[i]) goto fail; *msglen = sig_msg_len; for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++) msg[i] = sig_msg[i]; return 0; fail: *msglen = sig_msg_len; for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++) msg[i] = 0; *msglen = -1; return -1; } /* * Generates a XMSSMT key pair for a given parameter set. * Format sk: [(ceil(h/8) bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root] * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid. */ int xmssmt_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, xmssmt_params *params) { unsigned int n = params->n; unsigned int i; unsigned char ots_seed[params->n]; // Set idx = 0 for (i = 0; i < params->index_len; i++) { sk[i] = 0; } // Init SK_SEED (n byte), SK_PRF (n byte), and PUB_SEED (n byte) randombytes(sk+params->index_len, 3*n); // Copy PUB_SEED to public key memcpy(pk+n, sk+params->index_len+2*n, n); // Set address to point on the single tree on layer d-1 uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; setLayerADRS(addr, (params->d-1)); // Set up state and compute wots signatures for all but topmost tree root for (i = 0; i < params->d - 1; i++) { // Compute seed for OTS key pair treehash_setup(pk, params->xmss_par.h, 0, states + i, sk+params->index_len, &(params->xmss_par), pk+n, addr); setLayerADRS(addr, (i+1)); get_seed(ots_seed, sk+params->index_len, n, addr); wots_sign(wots_sigs + i*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, pk, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pk+n, addr); } treehash_setup(pk, params->xmss_par.h, 0, states + i, sk+params->index_len, &(params->xmss_par), pk+n, addr); memcpy(sk+params->index_len+3*n, pk, n); return 0; } /** * Signs a message. * Returns * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND * 2. an updated secret key! * */ int xmssmt_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmssmt_params *params) { unsigned int n = params->n; unsigned int tree_h = params->xmss_par.h; unsigned int h = params->h; unsigned int k = params->xmss_par.k; unsigned int idx_len = params->index_len; uint64_t idx_tree; uint32_t idx_leaf; uint64_t i, j; int needswap_upto = -1; unsigned int updates; unsigned char sk_seed[n]; unsigned char sk_prf[n]; unsigned char pub_seed[n]; // Init working params unsigned char R[n]; unsigned char msg_h[n]; unsigned char hash_key[3*n]; unsigned char ots_seed[n]; uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; unsigned char idx_bytes_32[32]; bds_state tmp; // Extract SK unsigned long long idx = 0; for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) { idx |= ((unsigned long long)sk[i]) << 8*(idx_len - 1 - i); } memcpy(sk_seed, sk+idx_len, n); memcpy(sk_prf, sk+idx_len+n, n); memcpy(pub_seed, sk+idx_len+2*n, n); // Update SK for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) { sk[i] = ((idx + 1) >> 8*(idx_len - 1 - i)) & 255; } // -- Secret key for this non-forward-secure version is now updated. // -- A productive implementation should use a file handle instead and write the updated secret key at this point! // --------------------------------- // Message Hashing // --------------------------------- // Message Hash: // First compute pseudorandom value to_byte(idx_bytes_32, idx, 32); prf(R, idx_bytes_32, sk_prf, n); // Generate hash key (R || root || idx) memcpy(hash_key, R, n); memcpy(hash_key+n, sk+idx_len+3*n, n); to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n); // Then use it for message digest h_msg(msg_h, msg, msglen, hash_key, 3*n, n); // Start collecting signature *sig_msg_len = 0; // Copy index to signature for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) { sig_msg[i] = (idx >> 8*(idx_len - 1 - i)) & 255; } sig_msg += idx_len; *sig_msg_len += idx_len; // Copy R to signature for (i = 0; i < n; i++) sig_msg[i] = R[i]; sig_msg += n; *sig_msg_len += n; // ---------------------------------- // Now we start to "really sign" // ---------------------------------- // Handle lowest layer separately as it is slightly different... // Prepare Address setType(ots_addr, 0); idx_tree = idx >> tree_h; idx_leaf = (idx & ((1 << tree_h)-1)); setLayerADRS(ots_addr, 0); setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree); setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf); // Compute seed for OTS key pair get_seed(ots_seed, sk_seed, n, ots_addr); // Compute WOTS signature wots_sign(sig_msg, msg_h, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; *sig_msg_len += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; memcpy(sig_msg, states[0].auth, tree_h*n); sig_msg += tree_h*n; *sig_msg_len += tree_h*n; // prepare signature of remaining layers for (i = 1; i < params->d; i++) { // put WOTS signature in place memcpy(sig_msg, wots_sigs + (i-1)*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize); sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; *sig_msg_len += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; // put AUTH nodes in place memcpy(sig_msg, states[i].auth, tree_h*n); sig_msg += tree_h*n; *sig_msg_len += tree_h*n; } updates = (tree_h - k) >> 1; setTreeADRS(addr, (idx_tree + 1)); // mandatory update for NEXT_0 (does not count towards h-k/2) if NEXT_0 exists if ((1 + idx_tree) * (1 << tree_h) + idx_leaf < (1ULL << h)) { bds_state_update(&states[params->d], sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr); } for (i = 0; i < params->d; i++) { // check if we're not at the end of a tree if (! (((idx + 1) & ((1ULL << ((i+1)*tree_h)) - 1)) == 0)) { idx_leaf = (idx >> (tree_h * i)) & ((1 << tree_h)-1); idx_tree = (idx >> (tree_h * (i+1))); setLayerADRS(addr, i); setTreeADRS(addr, idx_tree); if (i == (unsigned int) (needswap_upto + 1)) { bds_round(&states[i], idx_leaf, sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr); } updates = bds_treehash_update(&states[i], updates, sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr); setTreeADRS(addr, (idx_tree + 1)); // if a NEXT-tree exists for this level; if ((1 + idx_tree) * (1 << tree_h) + idx_leaf < (1ULL << (h - tree_h * i))) { if (i > 0 && updates > 0 && states[params->d + i].next_leaf < (1ULL << h)) { bds_state_update(&states[params->d + i], sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr); updates--; } } } else if (idx < (1ULL << h) - 1) { memcpy(&tmp, states+params->d + i, sizeof(bds_state)); memcpy(states+params->d + i, states + i, sizeof(bds_state)); memcpy(states + i, &tmp, sizeof(bds_state)); setLayerADRS(ots_addr, (i+1)); setTreeADRS(ots_addr, ((idx + 1) >> ((i+2) * tree_h))); setOTSADRS(ots_addr, (((idx >> ((i+1) * tree_h)) + 1) & ((1 << tree_h)-1))); get_seed(ots_seed, sk+params->index_len, n, ots_addr); wots_sign(wots_sigs + i*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, states[i].stack, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); states[params->d + i].stackoffset = 0; states[params->d + i].next_leaf = 0; updates--; // WOTS-signing counts as one update needswap_upto = i; for (j = 0; j < tree_h-k; j++) { states[i].treehash[j].completed = 1; } } } //Whipe secret elements? //zerobytes(tsk, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES); memcpy(sig_msg, msg, msglen); *sig_msg_len += msglen; return 0; } /** * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key. */ int xmssmt_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmssmt_params *params) { unsigned int n = params->n; unsigned int tree_h = params->xmss_par.h; unsigned int idx_len = params->index_len; uint64_t idx_tree; uint32_t idx_leaf; unsigned long long i, m_len; unsigned long long idx=0; unsigned char wots_pk[params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize]; unsigned char pkhash[n]; unsigned char root[n]; unsigned char msg_h[n]; unsigned char hash_key[3*n]; unsigned char pub_seed[n]; memcpy(pub_seed, pk+n, n); // Init addresses uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; uint32_t ltree_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; uint32_t node_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; // Extract index for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) { idx |= ((unsigned long long)sig_msg[i]) << (8*(idx_len - 1 - i)); } printf("verify:: idx = %llu\n", idx); sig_msg += idx_len; sig_msg_len -= idx_len; // Generate hash key (R || root || idx) memcpy(hash_key, sig_msg,n); memcpy(hash_key+n, pk, n); to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n); sig_msg += n; sig_msg_len -= n; // hash message (recall, R is now on pole position at sig_msg unsigned long long tmp_sig_len = (params->d * params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize) + (params->h * n); m_len = sig_msg_len - tmp_sig_len; h_msg(msg_h, sig_msg + tmp_sig_len, m_len, hash_key, 3*n, n); //----------------------- // Verify signature //----------------------- // Prepare Address idx_tree = idx >> tree_h; idx_leaf = (idx & ((1 << tree_h)-1)); setLayerADRS(ots_addr, 0); setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree); setType(ots_addr, 0); memcpy(ltree_addr, ots_addr, 12); setType(ltree_addr, 1); memcpy(node_addr, ltree_addr, 12); setType(node_addr, 2); setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf); // Check WOTS signature wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, msg_h, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; sig_msg_len -= params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; // Compute Ltree setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx_leaf); l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, ltree_addr); // Compute root validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx_leaf, sig_msg, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, node_addr); sig_msg += tree_h*n; sig_msg_len -= tree_h*n; for (i = 1; i < params->d; i++) { // Prepare Address idx_leaf = (idx_tree & ((1 << tree_h)-1)); idx_tree = idx_tree >> tree_h; setLayerADRS(ots_addr, i); setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree); setType(ots_addr, 0); memcpy(ltree_addr, ots_addr, 12); setType(ltree_addr, 1); memcpy(node_addr, ltree_addr, 12); setType(node_addr, 2); setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf); // Check WOTS signature wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, root, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; sig_msg_len -= params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; // Compute Ltree setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx_leaf); l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, ltree_addr); // Compute root validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx_leaf, sig_msg, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, node_addr); sig_msg += tree_h*n; sig_msg_len -= tree_h*n; } for (i = 0; i < n; i++) if (root[i] != pk[i]) goto fail; *msglen = sig_msg_len; for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++) msg[i] = sig_msg[i]; return 0; fail: *msglen = sig_msg_len; for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++) msg[i] = 0; *msglen = -1; return -1; } #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/xmss_fast.h010064400017500001750000000072201362136622600136420ustar00djmdjm#ifdef WITH_XMSS /* $OpenBSD: xmss_fast.h,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ /* xmss_fast.h version 20160722 Andreas Hülsing Joost Rijneveld Public domain. */ #include "xmss_wots.h" #ifndef XMSS_H #define XMSS_H typedef struct{ unsigned int level; unsigned long long subtree; unsigned int subleaf; } leafaddr; typedef struct{ wots_params wots_par; unsigned int n; unsigned int h; unsigned int k; } xmss_params; typedef struct{ xmss_params xmss_par; unsigned int n; unsigned int h; unsigned int d; unsigned int index_len; } xmssmt_params; typedef struct{ unsigned int h; unsigned int next_idx; unsigned int stackusage; unsigned char completed; unsigned char *node; } treehash_inst; typedef struct { unsigned char *stack; unsigned int stackoffset; unsigned char *stacklevels; unsigned char *auth; unsigned char *keep; treehash_inst *treehash; unsigned char *retain; unsigned int next_leaf; } bds_state; /** * Initialize BDS state struct * parameter names are the same as used in the description of the BDS traversal */ void xmss_set_bds_state(bds_state *state, unsigned char *stack, int stackoffset, unsigned char *stacklevels, unsigned char *auth, unsigned char *keep, treehash_inst *treehash, unsigned char *retain, int next_leaf); /** * Initializes parameter set. * Needed, for any of the other methods. */ int xmss_set_params(xmss_params *params, int n, int h, int w, int k); /** * Initialize xmssmt_params struct * parameter names are the same as in the draft * * Especially h is the total tree height, i.e. the XMSS trees have height h/d */ int xmssmt_set_params(xmssmt_params *params, int n, int h, int d, int w, int k); /** * Generates a XMSS key pair for a given parameter set. * Format sk: [(32bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root] * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid. */ int xmss_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, xmss_params *params); /** * Signs a message. * Returns * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND * 2. an updated secret key! * */ int xmss_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg,unsigned long long msglen, const xmss_params *params); /** * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key. * * Note: msg and msglen are pure outputs which carry the message in case verification succeeds. The (input) message is assumed to be within sig_msg which has the form (sig||msg). */ int xmss_sign_open(unsigned char *msg,unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg,unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmss_params *params); /* * Generates a XMSSMT key pair for a given parameter set. * Format sk: [(ceil(h/8) bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root] * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid. */ int xmssmt_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, xmssmt_params *params); /** * Signs a message. * Returns * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND * 2. an updated secret key! * */ int xmssmt_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, unsigned char *wots_sigs, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmssmt_params *params); /** * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key. */ int xmssmt_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmssmt_params *params); #endif #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/xmss_hash.c010064400017500001750000000065531362136622600136330ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ /* hash.c version 20160722 Andreas Hülsing Joost Rijneveld Public domain. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_XMSS #include "xmss_hash_address.h" #include "xmss_commons.h" #include "xmss_hash.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include int core_hash_SHA2(unsigned char *, const unsigned int, const unsigned char *, unsigned int, const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, unsigned int); unsigned char* addr_to_byte(unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]){ #if IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN==1 int i = 0; for(i=0;i<8;i++) to_byte(bytes+i*4, addr[i],4); return bytes; #else memcpy(bytes, addr, 32); return bytes; #endif } int core_hash_SHA2(unsigned char *out, const unsigned int type, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, unsigned int n){ unsigned long long i = 0; unsigned char buf[inlen + n + keylen]; // Input is (toByte(X, 32) || KEY || M) // set toByte to_byte(buf, type, n); for (i=0; i < keylen; i++) { buf[i+n] = key[i]; } for (i=0; i < inlen; i++) { buf[keylen + n + i] = in[i]; } if (n == 32) { SHA256(buf, inlen + keylen + n, out); return 0; } else { if (n == 64) { SHA512(buf, inlen + keylen + n, out); return 0; } } return 1; } /** * Implements PRF */ int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen) { return core_hash_SHA2(out, 3, key, keylen, in, 32, keylen); } /* * Implemts H_msg */ int h_msg(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n) { if (keylen != 3*n){ // H_msg takes 3n-bit keys, but n does not match the keylength of keylen return -1; } return core_hash_SHA2(out, 2, key, keylen, in, inlen, n); } /** * We assume the left half is in in[0]...in[n-1] */ int hash_h(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n) { unsigned char buf[2*n]; unsigned char key[n]; unsigned char bitmask[2*n]; unsigned char byte_addr[32]; unsigned int i; setKeyAndMask(addr, 0); addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr); prf(key, byte_addr, pub_seed, n); // Use MSB order setKeyAndMask(addr, 1); addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr); prf(bitmask, byte_addr, pub_seed, n); setKeyAndMask(addr, 2); addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr); prf(bitmask+n, byte_addr, pub_seed, n); for (i = 0; i < 2*n; i++) { buf[i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i]; } return core_hash_SHA2(out, 1, key, n, buf, 2*n, n); } int hash_f(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n) { unsigned char buf[n]; unsigned char key[n]; unsigned char bitmask[n]; unsigned char byte_addr[32]; unsigned int i; setKeyAndMask(addr, 0); addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr); prf(key, byte_addr, pub_seed, n); setKeyAndMask(addr, 1); addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr); prf(bitmask, byte_addr, pub_seed, n); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { buf[i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i]; } return core_hash_SHA2(out, 0, key, n, buf, n, n); } #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/xmss_hash.h010064400017500001750000000015111362136622600136250ustar00djmdjm#ifdef WITH_XMSS /* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.h,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ /* hash.h version 20160722 Andreas Hülsing Joost Rijneveld Public domain. */ #ifndef HASH_H #define HASH_H #define IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN 1 unsigned char* addr_to_byte(unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]); int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen); int h_msg(unsigned char *out,const unsigned char *in,unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n); int hash_h(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n); int hash_f(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n); #endif #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/xmss_hash_address.c010064400017500001750000000023151362136622600153300ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash_address.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ /* hash_address.c version 20160722 Andreas Hülsing Joost Rijneveld Public domain. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_XMSS #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include "xmss_hash_address.h" /* prototypes */ void setLayerADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t layer){ adrs[0] = layer; } void setTreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint64_t tree){ adrs[1] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32); adrs[2] = (uint32_t) tree; } void setType(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t type){ adrs[3] = type; int i; for(i = 4; i < 8; i++){ adrs[i] = 0; } } void setKeyAndMask(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t keyAndMask){ adrs[7] = keyAndMask; } // OTS void setOTSADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ots){ adrs[4] = ots; } void setChainADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t chain){ adrs[5] = chain; } void setHashADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t hash){ adrs[6] = hash; } // L-tree void setLtreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ltree){ adrs[4] = ltree; } // Hash Tree & L-tree void setTreeHeight(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeHeight){ adrs[5] = treeHeight; } void setTreeIndex(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeIndex){ adrs[6] = treeIndex; } #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/xmss_hash_address.h010064400017500001750000000015041362136622600153340ustar00djmdjm#ifdef WITH_XMSS /* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash_address.h,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ /* hash_address.h version 20160722 Andreas Hülsing Joost Rijneveld Public domain. */ #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif void setLayerADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t layer); void setTreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint64_t tree); void setType(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t type); void setKeyAndMask(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t keyAndMask); // OTS void setOTSADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ots); void setChainADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t chain); void setHashADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t hash); // L-tree void setLtreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ltree); // Hash Tree & L-tree void setTreeHeight(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeHeight); void setTreeIndex(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeIndex); #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/xmss_wots.c010064400017500001750000000113621362136622600136760ustar00djmdjm/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.c,v 1.3 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */ /* wots.c version 20160722 Andreas Hülsing Joost Rijneveld Public domain. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_XMSS #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include "xmss_commons.h" #include "xmss_hash.h" #include "xmss_wots.h" #include "xmss_hash_address.h" /* libm-free version of log2() for wots */ static inline int wots_log2(uint32_t v) { int b; for (b = sizeof (v) * CHAR_BIT - 1; b >= 0; b--) { if ((1U << b) & v) { return b; } } return 0; } void wots_set_params(wots_params *params, int n, int w) { params->n = n; params->w = w; params->log_w = wots_log2(params->w); params->len_1 = (CHAR_BIT * n) / params->log_w; params->len_2 = (wots_log2(params->len_1 * (w - 1)) / params->log_w) + 1; params->len = params->len_1 + params->len_2; params->keysize = params->len * params->n; } /** * Helper method for pseudorandom key generation * Expands an n-byte array into a len*n byte array * this is done using PRF */ static void expand_seed(unsigned char *outseeds, const unsigned char *inseed, const wots_params *params) { uint32_t i = 0; unsigned char ctr[32]; for(i = 0; i < params->len; i++){ to_byte(ctr, i, 32); prf((outseeds + (i*params->n)), ctr, inseed, params->n); } } /** * Computes the chaining function. * out and in have to be n-byte arrays * * interprets in as start-th value of the chain * addr has to contain the address of the chain */ static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int start, unsigned int steps, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) { uint32_t i, j; for (j = 0; j < params->n; j++) out[j] = in[j]; for (i = start; i < (start+steps) && i < params->w; i++) { setHashADRS(addr, i); hash_f(out, out, pub_seed, addr, params->n); } } /** * base_w algorithm as described in draft. * * */ static void base_w(int *output, const int out_len, const unsigned char *input, const wots_params *params) { int in = 0; int out = 0; uint32_t total = 0; int bits = 0; int consumed = 0; for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) { if (bits == 0) { total = input[in]; in++; bits += 8; } bits -= params->log_w; output[out] = (total >> bits) & (params->w - 1); out++; } } void wots_pkgen(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) { uint32_t i; expand_seed(pk, sk, params); for (i=0; i < params->len; i++) { setChainADRS(addr, i); gen_chain(pk+i*params->n, pk+i*params->n, 0, params->w-1, params, pub_seed, addr); } } int wots_sign(unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) { //int basew[params->len]; int csum = 0; uint32_t i = 0; int *basew = calloc(params->len, sizeof(int)); if (basew == NULL) return -1; base_w(basew, params->len_1, msg, params); for (i=0; i < params->len_1; i++) { csum += params->w - 1 - basew[i]; } csum = csum << (8 - ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) % 8)); int len_2_bytes = ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) + 7) / 8; unsigned char csum_bytes[len_2_bytes]; to_byte(csum_bytes, csum, len_2_bytes); int csum_basew[params->len_2]; base_w(csum_basew, params->len_2, csum_bytes, params); for (i = 0; i < params->len_2; i++) { basew[params->len_1 + i] = csum_basew[i]; } expand_seed(sig, sk, params); for (i = 0; i < params->len; i++) { setChainADRS(addr, i); gen_chain(sig+i*params->n, sig+i*params->n, 0, basew[i], params, pub_seed, addr); } free(basew); return 0; } int wots_pkFromSig(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) { int csum = 0; uint32_t i = 0; int *basew = calloc(params->len, sizeof(int)); if (basew == NULL) return -1; base_w(basew, params->len_1, msg, params); for (i=0; i < params->len_1; i++) { csum += params->w - 1 - basew[i]; } csum = csum << (8 - ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) % 8)); int len_2_bytes = ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) + 7) / 8; unsigned char csum_bytes[len_2_bytes]; to_byte(csum_bytes, csum, len_2_bytes); int csum_basew[params->len_2]; base_w(csum_basew, params->len_2, csum_bytes, params); for (i = 0; i < params->len_2; i++) { basew[params->len_1 + i] = csum_basew[i]; } for (i=0; i < params->len; i++) { setChainADRS(addr, i); gen_chain(pk+i*params->n, sig+i*params->n, basew[i], params->w-1-basew[i], params, pub_seed, addr); } free(basew); return 0; } #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/xmss_wots.h010064400017500001750000000035631362136622600137070ustar00djmdjm#ifdef WITH_XMSS /* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.h,v 1.3 2018/02/26 12:14:53 dtucker Exp $ */ /* wots.h version 20160722 Andreas Hülsing Joost Rijneveld Public domain. */ #ifndef WOTS_H #define WOTS_H #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include "stdint.h" #endif /** * WOTS parameter set * * Meaning as defined in draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-02 */ typedef struct { uint32_t len_1; uint32_t len_2; uint32_t len; uint32_t n; uint32_t w; uint32_t log_w; uint32_t keysize; } wots_params; /** * Set the WOTS parameters, * only m, n, w are required as inputs, * len, len_1, and len_2 are computed from those. * * Assumes w is a power of 2 */ void wots_set_params(wots_params *params, int n, int w); /** * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32byte seed for the secret key, expands it to a full WOTS secret key and computes the corresponding public key. * For this it takes the seed pub_seed which is used to generate bitmasks and hash keys and the address of this WOTS key pair addr * * params, must have been initialized before using wots_set params for params ! This is not done in this function * * Places the computed public key at address pk. */ void wots_pkgen(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]); /** * Takes a m-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the secret key to compute a signature that is placed at "sig". * */ int wots_sign(unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]); /** * Takes a WOTS signature, a m-byte message and computes a WOTS public key that it places at pk. * */ int wots_pkFromSig(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]); #endif #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ openssh-8.2p1/ChangeLog010064400017500001750000014550011362136673100132420ustar00djmdjmcommit 8aa3455b16fddea4c0144a7c4a1edb10ec67dcc8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 14 00:39:20 2020 +0000 upstream: openssh-8.2 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a1340ff65fad0d84b997ac58dd1b393dec7c19b commit 72f0ce33f0d5a37f31bad5800d1eb2fbdb732de6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Feb 12 09:28:35 2020 +1100 crank version numbers commit b763ed05bd1f1f15ae1727c86a4498546bc36ca8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 11 12:51:24 2020 +1100 Minor documentation update: - remove duplication of dependency information (it's all in INSTALL). - SSHFP is now an RFC. commit 14ccfdb7248e33b1dc8bbac1425ace4598e094cb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Feb 9 11:23:35 2020 +1100 Check if UINT32_MAX is defined before redefining. commit be075110c735a451fd9d79a864e01e2e0d9f19d2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 7 15:07:27 2020 +1100 typo; reported by Phil Pennock commit 963d71851e727ffdd2a97fe0898fad61d4a70ba1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 7 03:57:31 2020 +0000 upstream: sync the description of the $SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable with that of the SecurityKeyProvider ssh/sshd_config(5) directive, as the latter was more descriptive. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0488f09530524a7e53afca6b6e1780598022552f commit d4d9e1d40514e2746f9e05335d646512ea1020c6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 7 03:54:44 2020 +0000 upstream: Add ssh -Q key-sig for all key and signature types. Teach ssh -Q to accept ssh_config(5) and sshd_config(5) algorithm keywords as an alias for the corresponding query. Man page help jmc@, ok djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e110aee3db2fc4bc5bee2d893b7128fd622e0f8 commit fd68dc27864b099b552a6d9d507ca4b83afd6a76 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 7 03:27:54 2020 +0000 upstream: fix two PIN entry bugs on FIDO keygen: 1) it would allow more than the intended number of prompts (3) and 2) it would SEGV too many incorrect PINs were entered; based on patch by Gabriel Kihlman OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c0011f28ba8bd8adf2014424b64960333da1718 commit 96bd895a0a0b3a36f81c14db8c91513578fc5563 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 6 22:48:23 2020 +0000 upstream: When using HostkeyAlgorithms to merely append or remove algorithms from the default set (i.e. HostkeyAlgorithms=+/-...), retain the default behaviour of preferring those algorithms that have existing keys in known_hosts; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 040e7fcc38ea00146b5d224ce31ce7a1795ee6ed commit c7288486731734a864b58d024b1395029b55bbc5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 6 22:46:31 2020 +0000 upstream: expand HostkeyAlgorithms prior to config dump, matching other algorithm lists; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a66f0fca8cc5ce30405a2867bc115fff600671d0 commit a6ac5d36efc072b15690c65039754f8e44247bdf Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 6 22:34:58 2020 +0000 upstream: Add Include to the list of permitted keywords after a Match keyword. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 342e940538b13dd41e0fa167dc9ab192b9f6e2eb commit a47f6a6c0e06628eed0c2a08dc31a8923bcc37ba Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 6 22:30:54 2020 +0000 upstream: Replace "security key" with "authenticator" in program messages. This replaces "security key" in error/usage/verbose messages and distinguishes between "authenticator" and "authenticator-hosted key". ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c63800e9c340c59440a054cde9790a78f18592e commit 849a9b87144f8a5b1771de6c85e44bfeb86be9a9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 6 11:28:14 2020 +1100 Don't look for UINT32_MAX in inttypes.h ... unless we are actually going to use it. Fixes build on HP-UX without the potential impact to other platforms of a header change shortly before release. commit a2437f8ed0c3be54ddd21630a93c68ebd168286f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 6 12:02:22 2020 +1100 depend commit 9716e8c4956acdd7b223d1642bfa376e07e7503d Author: Michael Forney Date: Wed Nov 27 19:17:26 2019 -0800 Fix sha2 MAKE_CLONE no-op definition The point of the dummy declaration is so that MAKE_CLONE(...) can have a trailing semicolon without introducing an empty declaration. So, the macro replacement text should *not* have a trailing semicolon, just like DEF_WEAK. commit d596b1d30dc158915a3979fa409d21ff2465b6ee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 4 09:58:04 2020 +0000 upstream: require FIDO application strings to start with "ssh:"; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 94e9c1c066d42b76f035a3d58250a32b14000afb commit 501f3582438cb2cb1cb92be0f17be490ae96fb23 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 3 23:47:57 2020 +0000 upstream: revert enabling UpdateHostKeys by default - there are still corner cases we need to address; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff7ad941bfdc49fb1d8baa95fd0717a61adcad57 commit 072f3b832d2a4db8d9880effcb6c4d0dad676504 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 3 08:15:37 2020 +0000 upstream: use better markup for challenge and write-attestation, and rejig the challenge text a little; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f351e6da9edfdc907d5c3fdaf2e9ff3ab0a7a6f commit 262eb05a22cb1fabc3bc1746c220566490b80229 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 3 21:22:15 2020 +1100 mention libfido2 in dependencies section commit ccd3b247d59d3bde16c3bef0ea888213fbd6da86 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 3 19:40:12 2020 +1100 add clock_gettime64(2) to sandbox allowed syscalls bz3093 commit adffbe1c645ad2887ba0b6d24c194aa7a40c5735 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 2 09:45:34 2020 +0000 upstream: Output (none) in debug in the case in the CheckHostIP=no case as suggested by markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ab9117ee5261cbbd1868717fcc3142eea6385cf commit 58c819096a2167983e55ae686486ce317b69b2d1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 2 09:22:22 2020 +0000 upstream: Prevent possible null pointer deref of ip_str in debug. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37b252e2e6f690efed6682437ef75734dbc8addf commit 0facae7bc8d3f8f9d02d0f6bed3d163ff7f39806 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 2 07:36:50 2020 +0000 upstream: shuffle the challenge keyword to keep the -O list sorted; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08efad608b790949a9a048d65578fae9ed5845fe commit 6fb3dd0ccda1c26b06223b87bcd1cab9ec8ec3cc Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Feb 1 06:53:12 2020 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c42851cdc88583402b4ab2b110a6348563626d3 commit 92725d4d3fde675acc0ca040b48f3d0c7be73b7f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 1 17:25:09 2020 +1100 Use sys-queue.h from compat library. Fixes build on platforms that don't have sys/queue.h (eg MUSL). commit 677d0ece67634262b3b96c3cd6410b19f3a603b7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 23:25:08 2020 +0000 upstream: regress test for sshd_config Include directive; from Jakub Jelen OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0d9224de3297c7a5f51ba68d6e3725a2a9345fa4 commit d4f4cdd681ab6408a98419f398b75a55497ed324 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 23:13:04 2020 +0000 upstream: whitespace OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 564cf7a5407ecf5da2d94ec15474e07427986772 commit 245399dfb3ecebc6abfc2ef4ee2e650fa9f6942b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 23:11:25 2020 +0000 upstream: force early logging to stderr if debug_flag (-d) is set; avoids missing messages from re-exec config passing OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02484b8241c1f49010e7a543a7098e6910a8c9ff commit 7365f28a66d1c443723fbe6f4a2612ea6002901e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 23:08:08 2020 +0000 upstream: mistake in previous: filling the incorrect buffer OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 862ee84bd4b97b529f64aec5d800c3dcde952e3a commit c2bd7f74b0e0f3a3ee9d19ac549e6ba89013abaf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 22:42:45 2020 +0000 upstream: Add a sshd_config "Include" directive to allow inclusion of files. This has sensible semantics wrt Match blocks and accepts glob(3) patterns to specify the included files. Based on patch by Jakub Jelen in bz2468; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36ed0e845b872e33f03355b936a4fff02d5794ff commit ba261a1dd33266168ead4f8f40446dcece4d1600 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 22:25:59 2020 +0000 upstream: spelling fix; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c079523c4b161725a4b15dd06348186da912402 commit 771891a044f763be0711493eca14b6b0082e030f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 30 22:25:34 2020 +0000 upstream: document changed default for UpdateHostKeys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25c390b21d142f78ac0106241d13441c4265fd2c commit d53a518536c552672c00e8892e2aea28f664148c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 30 22:19:32 2020 +0000 upstream: enable UpdateKnownHosts=yes if the configuration specifies only the default known_hosts files, otherwise select UpdateKnownHosts=ask; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab401a5ec4a33d2e1a9449eae6202e4b6d427df7 commit bb63ff844e818d188da4fed3c016e0a4eecbbf25 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 30 18:54:42 2020 +1100 Look in inttypes.h for UINT32_MAX. Should prevent warnings on at least some AIX versions. commit afeb6a960da23f0a5cbc4b80cca107c7504e932a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 30 07:21:38 2020 +0000 upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() instead of plain fatal() for ssh_packet_write_poll() failures here too as the former yields better error messages; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f7a6ca95bc2b716c2e948fc1370753be772d8e3 commit 65d6fd0a8a6f31c3ddf0c1192429a176575cf701 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:57 2020 +0000 upstream: check the return value of ssh_packet_write_poll() and call sshpkt_fatal() if it fails; avoid potential busy-loop under some circumstances. Based on patch by Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c79fe5cf4f0cd8074cb6db257c1394d5139408ec commit dce74eab0c0f9010dc84c62500a17771d0131ff3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:05 2020 +0000 upstream: have sshpkt_fatal() save/restore errno before we potentially call strerror() (via ssh_err()); ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5590df31d21405498c848245b85c24acb84ad787 commit 14ef4efe2bf4180e085ea6738fdbebc199458b0c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 29 08:17:49 2020 +0000 upstream: markus suggests a simplification to previous OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10bbfb6607ebbb9a018dcd163f0964941adf58de commit 101ebc3a8cfa78d2e615afffbef9861bbbabf1ff Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 29 07:51:30 2020 +0000 upstream: give more context to UpdateHostKeys messages, mentioning that the changes are validated by the existing trusted host key. Prompted by espie@ feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b3d95f4a45f2692f4143b9e77bb241184dbb8dc5 commit 24c0f752adf9021277a7b0a84931bb5fe48ea379 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 28 08:01:34 2020 +0000 upstream: changes to support FIDO attestation Allow writing to disk the attestation certificate that is generated by the FIDO token at key enrollment time. These certificates may be used by an out-of-band workflow to prove that a particular key is held in trustworthy hardware. Allow passing in a challenge that will be sent to the card during key enrollment. These are needed to build an attestation workflow that resists replay attacks. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 457dc3c3d689ba39eed328f0817ed9b91a5f78f6 commit 156bef36f93a48212383235bb8e3d71eaf2b2777 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 28 07:24:15 2020 +0000 upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask when in quiet mode; "work for me" matthieu@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60d7b5eb91accf935ed9852650a826d86db2ddc7 commit ec8a759b4045e54d6b38e690ffee4cbffc53c7b7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 28 12:57:25 2020 +1100 compat for missing IPTOS_DSCP_LE in system headers commit 4594c7627680c4f41c2ad5fe412e55b7cc79b10c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 28 01:49:36 2020 +0000 upstream: make IPTOS_DSCP_LE available via IPQoS directive; bz2986, based on patch by veegish AT cyberstorm.mu OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9902bf4fbb4ea51de2193ac2b1d965bc5d99c425 commit da22216b5db3613325aa7b639f40dc017e4c6f69 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 27 20:51:32 2020 +0000 upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask if command is specified; ok djm@ sthen@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5bcc45eadb78896637d4143d289f1e42c2ef5d7 commit 1e1db0544fdd788e2e3fc21d972a7ccb7de6b4ae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000 upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0 commit 0d1144769151edf65f74aee9a4c8545c37861695 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 26 15:09:15 2020 +1100 Move definition of UINT32_MAX. This allows us to always define it if needed not just if we also define the type ourself. commit f73ab8a811bc874c2fb403012aa8e4bfdcaf5ec7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000 upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0 commit 0373f9eba2b63455dceedbd3ac3d5dca306789ff Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 26 14:09:17 2020 +1100 Include signal.h to prevent redefintion of _NSIG. commit 638a45b5c1e20a8539100ca44166caad8abf26f8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 26 13:40:51 2020 +1100 Wrap stdint.h in tests inside HAVE_STDINT_H. commit 74dfc2c859c906eaab1f88a27fd883115ffb928f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 26 00:14:45 2020 +0000 upstream: for UpdateHostKeys, don't report errors for unsupported key types - just ignore them. spotted by and ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91769e443f6197c983932fc8ae9d39948727d473 commit b59618246c332e251160be0f1e0e88a7d4e2b0ae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 26 00:13:20 2020 +0000 upstream: downgrade error() for missing subsequent known_hosts files to debug() as it was intended to be; spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18cfea382cb52f2da761be524e309cc3d5354ef9 commit 469df611f778eec5950d556aabfe1d4efc227915 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 23:33:27 2020 +0000 upstream: clarify that BatchMode applies to all interactive prompts (e.g. host key confirmation) and not just password prompts. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97b001883d89d3fb1620d2e6b747c14a26aa9818 commit de40876c4a5d7c519d3d7253557572fdfc13db76 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 23:28:06 2020 +0000 upstream: tidy headers; some junk snuck into sshbuf-misc.c and sshbuf-io.c doesn't need SSHBUF_INTERNAL set OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27a724d2e0b2619c1a1490f44093bbd73580d9e6 commit 6a107606355fa9547884cad6740e6144a7a7955b Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 26 10:28:21 2020 +1100 depend commit 59d01f1d720ebede4da42882f592d1093dac7adc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 23:13:09 2020 +0000 upstream: improve the error message for u2f enrollment errors by making ssh-keygen be solely responsible for printing the error message and convertint some more common error responses from the middleware to a useful ssherr.h status code. more detail remains visible via -v of course. also remove indepedent copy of sk-api.h declarations in sk-usbhid.c and just include it. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a8ffa870d9a3e0cfd76544bcdeef5c9fb1f1bb commit 99aa8035554ddb976348d2a9253ab3653019728d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 23:02:13 2020 +0000 upstream: factor out reading/writing sshbufs to dedicated functions; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc09e5f1950b7acc91b8fdf8015347782d2ecd3d commit 065064fcf455778b0918f783033b374d4ba37a92 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 22:49:38 2020 +0000 upstream: add a comment describing the ranges of channel IDs that we use; requested by markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83a1f09810ffa3a96a55fbe32675b34ba739e56b commit 69334996ae203c51c70bf01d414c918a44618f8e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 22:41:01 2020 +0000 upstream: make sshd_config:ClientAliveCountMax=0 disable the connection killing behaviour, rather than killing the connection after sending the first liveness test probe (regardless of whether the client was responsive) bz2627; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5af79c35f4c9fa280643b6852f524bfcd9bccdaf commit bf986a9e2792555e0879a3145fa18d2b49436c74 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 22:36:22 2020 +0000 upstream: clarify order of AllowUsers/DenyUsers vs AllowGroups/DenyGroups; bz1690, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5637584ec30db9cf64822460f41b3e42c8f9facd commit 022ce92fa0daa9d78830baeb2bd2dc3f83c724ba Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 07:17:18 2020 +0000 upstream: when AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains no comment, add the key to the agent with the key's path as the comment. bz2564 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8dd8ca9340d7017631a27f4ed5358a4cfddec16f commit 0b813436bbf6546638b10c1fa71f54691bcf5e63 Author: tedu@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 07:09:14 2020 +0000 upstream: group14-sha1 is no longer a default algorithm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a96f04d5e9c2ff760c6799579dc44f69b4ff431d commit 3432b6e05d5c583c91c566c5708fed487cec79ac Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 07:02:51 2020 +0000 upstream: reword HashKnownHosts description a little more; some people found the wording confusing (bz#2560) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac30896598694f07d498828690aecd424c496988 commit f80d7d6aa98d6eddc5df02412efee6db75673d4c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 07:01:00 2020 +0000 upstream: weaken the language for what HashKnownHosts provides with regards to known_hosts name privacy, it's not practical for this option to offer any guarantee that hostnames cannot be recovered from a disclosed known_hosts file (e.g. by brute force). OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13f1e3285f8acf7244e9770074296bcf446c6972 commit 846446bf3e7421e6671a4afd074bdf15eecd7832 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 06:40:20 2020 +0000 upstream: the GatewayPorts vs -R listen address selection logic is still confusing people, so add another comment explaining the special handling of "localhost"; bz#3258 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6bf0f0fbf1c7092bf0dbd9c6eab105970b5b53a commit 734f2f83f5ff86f2967a99d67be9ce22dd0394dd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 06:03:10 2020 +0000 upstream: mention that permitopen=/PermitOpen do no name to address translation; prompted by bz3099 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0dda8e54d566b29855e76bebf9cfecce573f5c23 commit e1e97cae19ff07b7a7f7e82556bc048c3c54af63 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jan 25 16:30:22 2020 +1100 include tunnel device path in error message commit 0ecd20bc9f0b9c7c697c9eb014613516c8f65834 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 04:48:26 2020 +0000 upstream: unrevert this: > revision 1.217 > date: 2019/11/27 03:34:04; author: dtucker; state: Exp; lines: +5 -7; commitid: wkiMn49XJyjzoJIs; > Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check and cast that were > left over from the type conversion. Noted by t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in > bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@ Darren was right the first time; ok dtucker@ "agreed" markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 641dd1b99a6bbd85b7160da462ae1be83432c7c8 commit a0c81d2402eedc514b9c9f25ef9604eb0576b86a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 02:57:53 2020 +0000 upstream: Move setting $NC into test-exec since it's now used by multiple tests, and in -portable we use our own local copy to avoid portability problems. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ceb78445fcaac317bec2fc51b3f0d9589048c114 commit e16dfa94f86358033531c4a97dcb51508ef84d49 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jan 25 13:05:42 2020 +1100 Put EC key export inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. Fixes link error when building against an OpenSSL that does not have ECC. commit 94a2e5951b374e1a89761ceaff72e66eb1946807 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 00:27:56 2020 +0000 upstream: Wait a bit longer for the multiplex master to become ready since on very slow hosts the current delay is not sufficient and the test will fail. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6d90c7475d67ac3a95610b64af700629ece51a48 commit b2df804f571d77b07059f087b90955ffbc2f67d4 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 10:08:17 2020 +0000 upstream: Add a connection test for proxycommand. This would have caught the problem caused by ssh.c rev 1.507 wherein Host and Hostname were swapped. Prompted by beck@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d218500ae6aca4c479c27318fb5b09ebc00f7aae commit c6f06fd38a257b9fcc7d6760f8fb6d505dccb628 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 00:22:31 2020 +0000 upstream: set UpdateKnownHosts=ask by default; bz#2894; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f09cb3177f3a14c96428e14f347e976a8a531fee commit 7955633a554397bc24913cec9fd7285002935f7e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 00:21:08 2020 +0000 upstream: allow UpdateKnownHosts=yes to function when multiple known_hosts files are in use. When updating host keys, ssh will now search subsequent known_hosts files, but will add new/changed host keys to the first specified file only. bz#2738 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ded6d878a03e57d5aa20bab9c31f92e929dbc6c commit e5a278a62ab49dffe96929fa8d8506c6928dba90 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 00:06:48 2020 +0000 upstream: process security key provider via realpath() in agent, avoids malicious client from being able to cause agent to load arbitrary libraries into ssh-sk-helper. reported by puck AT puckipedia.com; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1086643df1b7eee4870825c687cf0c26a6145d1c commit 89a8d4525e8edd9958ed3df60cf683551142eae0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 00:03:36 2020 +0000 upstream: expose PKCS#11 key labels/X.509 subjects as comments Extract the key label or X.509 subject string when PKCS#11 keys are retrieved from the token and plumb this through to places where it may be used as a comment. based on https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/138 by Danielle Church feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cae1fda10d9e10971dea29520916e27cfec7ca35 commit a8c05c640873621681ab64d2e47a314592d5efa2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 23:56:01 2020 +0000 upstream: tweak proctitle to include sshd arguments, as these are frequently used to distinguish between multiple independent instances of the server. New proctitle looks like this: $ pgrep -lf sshd 12844 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config [listener] 0 of 10-100 startups requested by sthen@ and aja@; ok aja@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf235a561c655a3524a82003cf7244ecb48ccc1e commit 8075fccbd4f70a4371acabcfb47562471ff0de6f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 23:54:40 2020 +0000 upstream: add xextendf() to extend a string with a format (reallocating as necessary). ok aja@ as part of a larger diff OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30796b50d330b3e0e201747fe40cdf9aa70a77f9 commit d15c8adf2c6f1a6b4845131074383eb9c3d05c3d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 05:33:01 2020 +0000 upstream: minor tweaks to ssh-keygen -Y find-principals: emit matched principals one per line to stdout rather than as comma- separated and with a free-text preamble (easy confusion opportunity) emit "not found" error to stderr fix up argument testing for -Y operations and improve error message for unsupported operations OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d9c9a671ab07fc04a48f543edfa85eae77da69c commit c3368a5d5ec368ef6bdf9971d6330ca0e3bdca06 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 00:28:57 2020 +0000 upstream: remove ssh-rsa (SHA1) from the list of allowed CA signature algorithms ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da3481fca8c81e6951f319a86b7be67502237f57 commit 4a41d245d6b13bd3882c8dc058dbd2e2b39a9f67 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 00:27:04 2020 +0000 upstream: when signing a certificate with an RSA key, default to a safe signature algorithm (rsa-sha-512) if not is explicitly specified by the user; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e05f638f0be6c0266e1d3d799716b461011e83a9 commit 8dfb6a202c96cdf037c8ce05e53e32e0e0b7b454 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 00:00:31 2020 +0000 upstream: allow PEM export of DSA and ECDSA keys; bz3091, patch from Jakub Jelen ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a58edec8b9f07acab4b962a71a5125830d321b51 commit 72a8bea2d748c8bd7f076a8b39a52082c79ae95f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 23:31:52 2020 +0000 upstream: ssh-keygen -Y find-principals fixes based on feedback from Markus: use "principals" instead of principal, as allowed_signers lines may list multiple. When the signing key is a certificate, emit only principals that match the certificate principal list. NB. the command -Y name changes: "find-principal" => "find-principals" ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab575946ff9a55624cd4e811bfd338bf3b1d0faf commit 0585b5697201f5d8b32e6f1b0fee7e188268d30d Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 01:29:23 2020 +0000 upstream: Do not warn about permissions on symlinks. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 339d4cbae224bd8743ffad9c3afb0cf3cb66c357 commit 415192348a5737a960f6d1b292a17b64d55b542c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 11:19:12 2020 +0000 upstream: Handle zlib compression being disabled now that it's optional. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0af4fbc5168e62f89d0350de524bff1cb00e707a commit fbce7c1a898ae75286349822950682cf46346121 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 10:53:04 2020 +0000 upstream: Fix typo in comment. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1d7a6553208bf439378fd1cf686a828aceb353a commit ba247af8e9e302910e22881ef9d307a8afeef036 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 10:19:59 2020 +0000 upstream: When checking for unsafe directories, ignore non-directories (ie symlinks, where permissions are not relevant). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fb6cfc8b022becb62b2dcb99ed3f072b3326e501 commit 74deb7029be4c00810443114aac9308875a81dae Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 23 22:17:24 2020 +1100 zlib is now optional. commit 633a2af47ee90291aaf93969aeee1e5046074c7c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 23 22:16:51 2020 +1100 Plumb WITH_ZLIB into configure. This allows zlib support to be disabled by ./configure --without-zlib. commit 7f8e66fea8c4e2a910df9067cb7638999b7764d5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 10:24:29 2020 +0000 upstream: Make zlib optional. This adds a "ZLIB" build time option that allows building without zlib compression and associated options. With feedback from markus@, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44c6e1133a90fd15a3aa865bdedc53bab28b7910 commit 69ac4e33023b379e9a8e9b4b6aeeffa6d1fcf6fa Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 07:54:04 2020 +0000 upstream: remove trailing period characters from pub/priv key pathnames - they make them needlessly more difficult to cut and paste without error; ok markus@ & dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abdcfd1a5723fcac0711feee7665edc66ae2335a commit 945bf52c3c815d95b1e842ebf6c910c3524bd5bb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 23 21:06:45 2020 +1100 Fix a couple of mysig_t leftovers. commit 84226b447d45fe4542613de68c2ca59a890d7c01 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 23 18:55:24 2020 +1100 Remove mysignal wrapper. We switched the main code to use sigaction(), so the wrapper is no longer used. commit 5533c2fb7ef21172fa3708d66b03faa2c6b3d93f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 07:16:38 2020 +0000 upstream: new sentence, new line; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6c3f2f36ec77e99198619b38a9f146655281925 commit 3bf2a6ac791d64046a537335a0f1d5e43579c5ad Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 07:10:22 2020 +0000 upstream: Replace all calls to signal(2) with a wrapper around sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce the potential for short read/write operations. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e047663fd77a40d7b07bdabe68529df51fd2519 commit e027c044c796f3a01081a91bee55741204283f28 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 04:54:34 2020 +0000 upstream: missing header change from previous; spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 321ce74c0a5bbd0f02fa3f20cb5cf2a952c6b96f commit 7e1323102b1b04eef391b01e180710a2d408a7ab Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 03:42:41 2020 +0000 upstream: Check for and warn about StrictModes permission problems. ok tb@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4841704ccdee50ee7efc6035bc686695c6ac2991 commit 84de1c27f845d15c859db44e7070a46f45504b66 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 03:35:07 2020 +0000 upstream: Also test PuTTY chacha20. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7af6a0e8763b05f1f8eee6bca5f31fcb16151040 commit c7ed15a39695ecd5f1f21842d8d9cd22246d4ee2 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 03:24:38 2020 +0000 upstream: Also test PuTTY ecdh kex methods. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec4017dce612131842398a03e93007a869c2c133 commit c4b3a128954ee1b7fbcbda167baf8aca1a3d1c84 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 02:46:49 2020 +0000 upstream: Remove unsupported algorithms from list of defaults at run time and remove ifdef and distinct settings for OPENSSL=no case. This will make things much simpler for -portable where the exact set of algos depends on the configuration of both OpenSSH and the libcrypto it's linked against (if any). ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0116d0183dcafc7a9c40ba5fe9127805c5dfdd2 commit 56cffcc09f8a2e661d2ba02e61364ae6f998b2b1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 02:43:48 2020 +0000 upstream: add a new signature operations "find-principal" to look up the principal associated with a signature from an allowed-signers file. Work by Sebastian Kinne; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f782cc7e18e38fcfafa62af53246a1dcfe74e5d commit 65cf8730de6876a56595eef296e07a86c52534a6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 07:38:30 2020 +0000 upstream: Ignore whitespace when checking explict fingerprint. When confirming a host key using the fingerprint itself, ignore leading and trailing whitespace. ok deraadt@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cafd7f803bbdcd40c3a8f8f1a77747e6b6d8c011 commit 8d3af6ebdf524b34087a0a3ae415b5141ba10572 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 07:31:27 2020 +0000 upstream: Increase keyscan timeout from default. On slow hosts 3 concurrent keyscans can hit the default 5 second timeout, so increase to 15 seconds. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 16383dec166af369b7fb9948572856f5d544c93f commit 6c30c9adbeeed09a8a9e7a69974cfa1f1ddd1e9e Author: tedu@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 04:58:23 2020 +0000 upstream: remove diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 from default kex to see what happens. general mostly ok OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 216b7b8462d2ef5f4531f26cb2cb839b2153dad9 commit 4a32c0ca44a2dc2a358f69b5d43c08e528b44b39 Author: claudio@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 04:51:51 2020 +0000 upstream: For ssh-keygen -lF only add a space after key fingerprint when there is a comment. This makes copy-paste of fingerprints into ssh easier. OK djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa01d95624f65c1eb4dc7c575d20d77c78010dfd commit 37d3b736506760e4ebc7fe56255f7b8ea823a00c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 04:49:16 2020 +0000 upstream: some __func__ and strerror(errno) here; no functional change OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ddd5f848b99ea560b31d3fba99ceed66cef37 commit e2031b05c74c98b141179ceab13a323cf17d01e5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 02:25:21 2020 +0000 upstream: factor out parsing of allowed-signers lines OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ee6aeff608371826019ea85e55bfa87f79d06e commit 47160e1de8c2f638f0ef41cef42c976417b61778 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 22 10:30:13 2020 +1100 unbreak fuzzer support for recent ssh-sk.h changes commit 70d38c3cfd4550e8ee66cc3bf1b91aa339c91df5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 22:39:57 2020 +0000 upstream: expose the number of currently-authenticating connections along with the MaxStartups limit in the proctitle; suggestion from Philipp Marek, w/ feedback from Craig Miskell ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a6db2dc1641a5df8eddf7d6652176e359dffb3 commit a78c66d5d2144bd49779bc80a647346bd3d7233d Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 12:40:04 2020 +0000 upstream: document the default value of the ControlPersist option; ok dtucker@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0788e7f2b5a9d4e36d3d2ab378f73329320fef66 commit b46a6325849e40aa2e4b0d962a6f00f708f6576a Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 22 09:28:32 2020 +1100 remove accidental change in f8c11461 commit 80d3bebcab96fe1d177e45906e10db16895da01d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 11:06:09 2020 +0000 upstream: don't #ifdef out the KRL code when compiling without libcrypto support; it works just fine and disabling it breaks a few tests. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f6272c4241eb4b04de78b012fe98b2b555ad44 commit f8c11461aa6db168fc5e7eeae448b4cbbf59642a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 08:06:27 2020 +0000 upstream: pass SSH_SK_HELPER explicitly past $SUDO to avoid it getting cleared; with dtucker@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 03178a0580324bf0dff28f7eac6c3edbc5407f8e commit b5fcb0ac1cc0ef01aeec1c089146298654ab3ae0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 07:07:31 2020 +0000 upstream: check access(ssh-sk-helper, X_OK) to provide friendly error message for misconfigured helper paths OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061bcc262155d12e726305c91394ac0aaf1f8341 commit 56bced43c14dc6fa2bfa1816007e441644105609 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 06:09:56 2020 +0000 upstream: Document sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org. Patch from jtesta@positronsecurity.com via github PR#151. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3d48168623045c258245c340a5a2af7dbb74edc commit 4a05d789b86314fef7303824f69defbc6b96ed60 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:56 2020 +0000 upstream: fix ssh-keygen not displaying authenticator touch prompt; reported by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04d4f582fc194eb3897ebcbfe286c49958ba2859 commit 881aded0389d999375f926051491a944c6d8752b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:27 2020 +0000 upstream: a little more verbosity in sign_and_send_pubkey() debug messages OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6da47a0e6373f6683006f49bc2a516d197655508 commit b715fdc71bbd009d0caff691ab3fc04903c4aee8 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 18 21:16:43 2020 +0000 upstream: one more replacement "(security) key" -> "(FIDO) authenticator" OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 031bca03c1d1f878ab929facd561911f1bc68dfd commit 84911da1beeb6ed258a43468efb316cd39fb6855 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 18 15:45:41 2020 +0000 upstream: undo merge error and replace the term "security key" again OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 341749062c089cc360a7877e9ee3a887aecde395 commit e8c06c4ee708720efec12cd1a6f78a3c6d76b7f0 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 17 20:13:47 2020 +0000 upstream: Document loading of resident keys from a FIDO authenticator. * Rename -O to -K to keep "-O option" available. * Document -K. * Trim usage() message down to synopsis, like all other commands. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 015c2c4b28f8e19107adc80351b44b23bca4c78a commit 0d005d6372a067b59123dec8fc6dc905f2c09e1e Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 14 15:07:30 2020 +0000 upstream: sync ssh-keygen.1 and ssh-keygen's usage() with each other and reality ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdf64454f2c3604c25977c944e5b6262a3bcce92 commit b8a4ca2ebfddab862f7eb1ea2a07fb9f70330429 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 11 16:23:10 2020 +0000 upstream: revise the fix for reversed arguments on expand_proxy_command() Always put 'host' before 'host_arg' for consistency. ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ba5b25472779f1b1957295fcc6907bb961472a3 commit 57b181eaf2d34fd0a1b51ab30cb6983df784de5a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 10 23:43:26 2020 +0000 upstream: pass the log-on-stderr flag and log level through to ssh-sk-helper, making debugging a bit easier. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e7aea6bf5770d3f38b7c7bba891069256c5a49a commit a8bd5fdbdb7581afc7123a042a7cd6ca25357388 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 21 12:32:16 2020 +1100 Wrap copy_environment_blacklist() in #ifdef It's only needed for USE_PAM or HAVE_CYGWIN cases and will cause compiler warnings otherwise. commit 10ecc647fc1db8d2dde9f6b9b826b201dfc48b62 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 21 12:20:05 2020 +1100 depend commit b3f7009c9ffa5891283ed96e043001e09934a8d4 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 11:56:48 2020 +0100 Fix missing prototype warning for copy_environment This function is only used in this file, and only on Cygwin, so make it static and hide it behind HAVE_CYGWIN. Prevents missing prototype warning. commit 0c428c0e991e2c4fabc48cf5d9b8f84c9412e0c3 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 13:58:11 2020 +0100 configure.ac: fix ldns test When running ./configure --with-ldns, if ldns-config cannot be found, we add -Iyes/include to CPPFLAGS and -Lyes/lib to LDFLAGS. Fix that. commit 6089abf715e2784751c9f62697e09bb103295b93 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 12:13:26 2020 +0100 Make sshpam_password_change_required static. sshpam_password_change_required is only used in auth-pam.c, so make it static to prevent a mising prototype warning. commit 5a9b9c82851b7bc219dc3a65962a80803c76c102 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 12:24:51 2020 +0100 sandbox-darwin.c: fix missing prototypes. Include the right header just like the other sandbox files. Fixes missing prototype warnings for ssh_sandbox_* functions. commit 335dc93526942a650f6c69666b3f6ca44d0a2910 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 11:09:27 2020 +0100 Fix a few warnings when on Mac OS X. Include stdlib.h for calloc, malloc, free and setenv. commit 0488dc2d3050ea1a99ef5cf44afc50ffbf3f1315 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 10:32:23 2020 +0100 Fix building without openssl. This fixes the following when there are no openssl headers on the system: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c:34:10: fatal error: 'openssl/bn.h' file not found commit e6b7157b4ef29c83ec3a2d1d7c927e4b8898f9bb Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Wed Jan 15 16:08:55 2020 +0100 Add config.log to .gitignore commit 515e10ddf9644010b88cfd7ecf601f4306d42232 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Wed Jan 15 16:16:31 2020 +0100 Fix typo in README.md, s/crytpo/crypto/ commit 1af3354aea3c4bfa5b5ecfb5d1ff3ad231c2073c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jan 15 16:22:36 2020 +1100 Wrap stdint.h in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. commit 429170f273ce1b0140f8111a45ba69390d98de3a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 14 14:41:47 2020 +1100 Wrap stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H. commit a0989b60211b6f1c2313e1397c526d883a23a075 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 14 14:26:41 2020 +1100 Include compat header for definitions. commit e0cedcad51fe02683943bf4f1ad2961aa3f35313 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 14 09:42:52 2020 +1100 Improve search for 'struct timespec'. Make struct timespec test consistent with existing timeval test. Include time.h for timespec in compat header where required. commit acaf9e058594310001ce64468ed2923dc6323e81 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 14 12:43:03 2020 +1100 Update depend to remove rmd160.h. commit 26b2675b0c3e3efea11a52609073aec01736ec84 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 14 07:24:46 2020 +1100 Remove configure test & compat code for ripemd160. RIPEMD160 support was removed upstream in 2017, however we still had a configure test and compat code for it, so clean those up now. commit ed3ad71b17adcd1fb4431d145f53cee1c6a1135e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 9 03:28:38 2020 +0000 upstream: fix reversed arguments on expand_proxy_command(); spotted by anton@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db1c32478a01dfbc9c4db171de0f25907bea5775 commit cd53476383f0cf475f40ba8ac8deb6b76dd5ce4e Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 6 07:43:28 2020 +0000 upstream: put the fido options in a list, and tidy up the text a little; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 491ce15ae52a88b7a6a2b3b6708a14b4aacdeebb commit 30f704ebc0e9e32b3d12f5d9e8c1b705fdde2c89 Author: Jeremy Drake Date: Fri Oct 11 18:31:05 2019 -0700 Deny (non-fatal) ipc in preauth privsep child. As noted in openssh/openssh-portable#149, i386 does not have have _NR_shmget etc. Instead, it has a single ipc syscall (see man 2 ipc, https://linux.die.net/man/2/ipc). Add this syscall, if present, to the list of syscalls that seccomp will deny non-fatally. commit b110cefdfbf5a20f49b774a55062d6ded2fb6e22 Author: Khem Raj Date: Tue Jan 7 16:26:45 2020 -0800 seccomp: Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox. This helps sshd accept connections on mips platforms with upcoming glibc ( 2.31 ) commit 3cc60c899a92a469e5118310ba6b74cb57215618 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 6 02:39:30 2020 +0000 upstream: missing else in check_enroll_options() OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e058fb918fda56ddbbf0bee910101004cec421d4 commit ff5784e2698d6c41e9f39ce4df24968c1beeb2bb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 6 02:24:28 2020 +0000 upstream: fix error message OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1eb52025658eb78ea6223181e552862198d3d505 commit dd2acc8b862c09751621995fba2d5fa6f4e24cc9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 6 02:07:50 2020 +0000 upstream: adapt sk-dummy to SK API changes also, make it pull prototypes directly from sk-api.c and #error if the expected version changes. This will make any future regress test breakage because of SK API changes much more apparent OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 79b07055de4feb988e31da71a89051ad5969829d commit c312ca077cd2a6c15545cd6b4d34ee2f69289174 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 6 02:00:46 2020 +0000 upstream: Extends the SK API to accept a set of key/value options for all operations. These are intended to future-proof the API a little by making it easier to specify additional fields for without having to change the API version for each. At present, only two options are defined: one to explicitly specify the device for an operation (rather than accepting the middleware's autoselection) and another to specify the FIDO2 username that may be used when generating a resident key. These new options may be invoked at key generation time via ssh-keygen -O This also implements a suggestion from Markus to avoid "int" in favour of uint32_t for the algorithm argument in the API, to make implementation of ssh-sk-client/helper a little easier. feedback, fixes and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 973ce11704609022ab36abbdeb6bc23c8001eabc commit 2ab335712d084d9ccaf3f53afc3fa9535329da87 Author: beck@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 5 16:28:22 2020 +0000 upstream: fix CanonicalizeHostname, broken by rev 1.507 Issue noticed and reported by Pierre-Olivier Martel ok dtucker@ markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 749f3168ec520609c35b0c4e1984e5fa47f16094 commit 69e44ba701b90b0f530d64c3fe4363ea86e50cd3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jan 6 09:02:53 2020 +1100 Fix typo: 'you' -> 'your'. bz#3108 from jmckitrick@gmail.com. commit 7652a57662969bd5c61448b3843ec6d407ad12be Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jan 6 08:56:46 2020 +1100 Remove auth-skey.c. S/Key support was removed in OpenSSH 7.8 but this file was missed. commit c593cc5e826c9f4ec506e22b629d37cabfaacff9 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 3 07:33:33 2020 +0000 upstream: the download resident keys option is -K (upper) not -k (lower); ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71dc28a3e1fa7c553844abc508845bcf5766e091 commit ff31f15773ee173502eec4d7861ec56f26bba381 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 3 03:02:26 2020 +0000 upstream: what bozo decided to use 2020 as a future date in a regress test? OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b953df5a7e14081ff6cf495d4e8d40e153cbc3a commit 680eb7749a39d0e4d046e66cac4e51e8e3640b75 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 3 02:46:19 2020 +0000 upstream: implement recent SK API change to support resident keys and PIN prompting in the dummy middleware that we use for the tests. Should fix breakage spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 379cf9eabfea57aaf7f3f59dafde59889566c484 commit 86834fe6b54ac57b8528c30cf0b27e5cac5b7af7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 2 13:25:38 2020 +0000 upstream: Update keygen moduli screen test to match recent command line option change to ssh-keygen(1). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 744a72755004377e9669b662c13c6aa9ead8a0c3 commit 9039971887cccd95b209c479296f772a3a93e8e7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 2 22:40:09 2020 +0000 upstream: ability to download FIDO2 resident keys from a token via "ssh-keygen -K". This will save public/private keys into the current directory. This is handy if you move a token between hosts. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d57c1f9802f7850f00a117a1d36682a6c6d10da6 commit 878ba4350d57e905d6bb1865d8ff31bdfe5deab4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 2 22:38:33 2020 +0000 upstream: add sshkey_save_public(), to save a public key; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5d6f96a966d10d7fa689ff9aa9e1d6767ad5a076 commit 3b1382ffd5e71eff78db8cef0f3cada22ff29409 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 16:10:00 2019 +0000 upstream: simplify the list for moduli options - no need for -compact; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6492c72280482c6d072be46236b365cb359fc280 commit 0248ec7c763dee9ff730a589e3d166eac5c74d7c Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 2 13:41:31 2020 +1100 ssh-sk-null.cc needs extern "C" {} commit 5ca4b414effe4b56f0cfe3058c92391aa8a43871 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 2 10:56:29 2020 +1100 add dummy ssh-sk API for linking with fuzzers commit c4b2664be7ba25e4c233315b25212dec29b727ab Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Dec 30 21:04:09 2019 +1100 refresh depend commit 3093d12ff80927cf45da08d9f262a26680fb14ee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:49:52 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove the -x option currently used for FIDO/U2F-specific key flags. Instead these flags may be specified via -O. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f23ebde2a8a7e1bf860a51055a711cffb8c328c1 commit ef65e7dbaa8fac3245aa2bfc9f7e09be7cba0d9d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:25:29 2019 +0000 upstream: document SK API changes in PROTOCOL.u2f ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52622363c103a3c4d3d546050480ffe978a32186 commit 43ce96427b76c4918e39af654e2fc9ee18d5d478 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:45 2019 +0000 upstream: translate and return error codes; retry on bad PIN Define some well-known error codes in the SK API and pass them back via ssh-sk-helper. Use the new "wrong PIN" error code to retry PIN prompting during ssh-keygen of resident keys. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9663c6a2bb7a0bc8deaccc6c30d9a2983b481620 commit d433596736a2cd4818f538be11fc94783f5c5236 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:03 2019 +0000 upstream: improve some error messages; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ccd8ddabb8df4f995107dd3b7ea58220e93cb81 commit c54cd1892c3e7f268b21e1f07ada9f0d9816ffc0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:23:28 2019 +0000 upstream: SK API and sk-helper error/PIN passing Allow passing a PIN via the SK API (API major crank) and let the ssh-sk-helper API follow. Also enhance the ssh-sk-helper API to support passing back an error code instead of a complete reply. Will be used to signal "wrong PIN", etc. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1bd6b0a2421646919a0c139b8183ad76d28fb71 commit 79fe22d9bc2868c5118f032ec1200ac9c2e3aaef Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:22:49 2019 +0000 upstream: implement loading resident keys in ssh-add "ssh-add -O" will load resident keys from a FIDO2 token and add them to a ssh-agent. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 608104ae957a7d65cb84e0a3a26c8f60e0df3290 commit 27753a8e21887d47fe6b5c78a4aed0efe558a850 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:59 2019 +0000 upstream: implement loading of resident keys in ssh-sk-helper feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b273c23769ea182c55c4a7b8f9cbd9181722011a commit 14cea36df397677b8f8568204300ef654114fd76 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:16 2019 +0000 upstream: resident keys support in SK API Adds a sk_load_resident_keys() function to the security key API that accepts a security key provider and a PIN and returns a list of keys. Implement support for this in the usbhid middleware. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67e984e4e87f4999ce447a6178c4249a9174eff0 commit 2fe05fcb4a2695f190b4fcf27770b655586ab349 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:20:36 2019 +0000 upstream: Factor out parsing of struct sk_enroll_response We'll reuse this for extracting resident keys from a device. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bc1efd9c6897eac4df0983746cf6578c1542273 commit 4532bd01d57ee13c3ca881eceac1bf9da96a4d7e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:19:52 2019 +0000 upstream: basic support for generating FIDO2 resident keys "ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk|ed25519-sk -x resident" will generate a device-resident key. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e1b3c56a4b11d85047bd6c6c705b7eef4d58431 commit 3e60d18fba1b502c21d64fc7e81d80bcd08a2092 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 03:30:09 2019 +0000 upstream: remove single-letter flags for moduli options Move all moduli generation options to live under the -O flag. Frees up seven single-letter flags. NB. this change break existing ssh-keygen commandline syntax for moduli- related operations. Very few people use these fortunately. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d498f3eaf28128484826a4fcb343612764927935 commit 1e645fe767f27725dc7fd7864526de34683f7daf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 03:28:41 2019 +0000 upstream: prepare for use of ssh-keygen -O flag beyond certs Move list of available certificate options in ssh-keygen.1 to the CERTIFICATES section. Collect options specified by -O but delay parsing/validation of certificate options until we're sure that we're acting as a CA. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33e6bcc29cfca43606f6fa09bd84b955ee3a4106 commit 20ccd854245c598e2b47cc9f8d4955d645195055 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 27 08:28:44 2019 +0000 upstream: sort -Y internally in the options list, as is already done in synopsis; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86d033c5764404057616690d7be992e445b42274 commit 5b6c954751dd3677466cda7adb92e4f05446c96c Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 27 08:25:07 2019 +0000 upstream: in the options list, sort -Y and -y; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24c2e6a3aeab6e050a0271ffc73fdff91c10dcaa commit 141df487ba699cfd1ec3dcd98186e7c956e99024 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sat Dec 21 20:22:34 2019 +0000 upstream: Replace the term "security key" with "(FIDO) authenticator". The polysemous use of "key" was too confusing. Input from markus@. ok jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12eea973a44c8232af89f86e4269d71ae900ca8f commit fbd9729d4eadf2f7097b6017156387ac64302453 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Dec 21 02:33:07 2019 +0000 upstream: unit tests for ForwardAgent=/path; from Eric Chiang OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f693f78290b2c17725dab2c614dffe4a88c8da commit e5b7cf8edca7e843adc125621e1dab14507f430a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 16 02:39:05 2019 +0000 upstream: test security key host keys in addition to user keys OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fb45326106669a27e4bf150575c321806e275b1 commit 40be78f503277bd91c958fa25ea9ef918a2ffd3d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Dec 21 02:19:13 2019 +0000 upstream: Allow forwarding a different agent socket to the path specified by $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, by extending the existing ForwardAgent option to accepting an explicit path or the name of an environment variable in addition to yes/no. Patch by Eric Chiang, manpage by me; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98f2ed80bf34ea54d8b2ddd19ac14ebbf40e9265 commit 416f15372bfb5be1709a0ad1d00ef5d8ebfb9e0e Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 20 20:28:55 2019 +0000 upstream: SSH U2F keys can now be used as host keys. Fix a garden path sentence. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67d7971ca1a020acd6c151426c54bd29d784bd6b commit 68010acbcfe36167b3eece3115f3a502535f80df Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 20 02:42:42 2019 +0000 upstream: Move always unsupported keywords to be grouped with the other ones. Move oSecurityProvider to match the order in the OpCodes enum. Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061e4505861ec1e02ba3a63e3d1b3be3cad458ec commit 8784b02dc49e1c98df4e7aca466be2f652ed4ad1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 20 02:29:21 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove obsolete opcodes from the configuation enum. Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 395c202228872ce8d9044cc08552ac969f51e01b commit 345be6091bdc9be09c90a937d1320f97c01fab2a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 20 02:11:38 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove now-obsolete config options from example in comment. Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35862beb0927b1cb0af476ec23cc07f6e3006101 commit ae024b22c4fd68e7f39681d605585889f9511108 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 19 15:09:30 2019 +0000 upstream: Document that security key-hosted keys can act as host keys. Update the list of default host key algorithms in ssh_config.5 and sshd_config.5. Copy the description of the SecurityKeyProvider option to sshd_config.5. ok jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edadf3566ab5e94582df4377fee3b8b702c7eca0 commit bc2dc091e0ac4ff6245c43a61ebe12c7e9ea0b7f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 19 03:50:01 2019 +0000 upstream: "Forward security" -> "Forward secrecy" since that's the correct term. Add "MAC" since we use that acronym in other man pages. ok naddy@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35529e511788586725fb63bda3459e10738c5f5 commit e905f7260d72bc0e33ef5f10a0db737ff6e77ba7 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 17 16:21:07 2019 +0000 upstream: cut obsolete lists of crypto algorithms from outline of how SSH works ok markus@ jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e34973f232ab48c4d4f5d07df48d501708b9160 commit f65cf1163ff01531ae02f3f9210391d0d692f699 Author: tobhe@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 16 13:58:53 2019 +0000 upstream: strdup may return NULL if memory allocation fails. Use the safer xstrdup which fatals on allocation failures. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b608d387120630753cbcb8110e0b019c0c9a0d0 commit 57634bfc5708477826c0be265ddc59b9d83e4886 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 16 03:16:58 2019 +0000 upstream: sort sk-* methods behind their plain key methods cousins for now OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c97e22c2b28c0d12ee389b8b4ef5f2ada7908828 commit b8df8fe920e697edcc69c520390b78c3b7ad9d84 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Dec 17 19:46:15 2019 +1100 Mac OS X has PAM too. commit bf8de8b8251af69b5ce96a8faa69145af156af4d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Dec 17 19:37:06 2019 +1100 Show portable tarball pattern in example. commit a19ef613e98141cc37c8acdeebe285b9dbe2531e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Dec 17 19:35:59 2019 +1100 OpenSSL is now optional. commit 1a7217ac063e48cf0082895aeee81ed2b8a57191 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 15 18:58:33 2019 +0000 upstream: adapt to ssh-sk-client change OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 40481999a5928d635ab2e5b029e8239c112005ea commit a7fc1df246e80bfdabd09b069b91c72f9c578ca8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Dec 11 18:47:14 2019 +0000 upstream: it's no longer possible to disable privilege separation in sshd, so don't double the tests' work by trying both off/on OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d366665466dbd09e9b707305da884be3e7619c68 commit 3145d38ea06820a66c0f5e068f49af14fd2b7ac1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 15 20:59:23 2019 +0000 upstream: don't treat HostKeyAgent=none as a path either; avoids spurious warnings from the cfgparse regress test OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba49ea7a5c92b8a16cb9c2e975dbb163853afc54 commit 747e25192f436e71dd39e15d65aa32bca967533a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 15 20:57:15 2019 +0000 upstream: do not attempt to find an absolute path for sshd_config SecurityKeyProvider=internal - unbreaks cfgparse regress test OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2ddcf525c0dc3c8339522360c10b3c70f1fd641 commit 9b6e30b96b094ad787511a5b989253e3b8fe1789 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 15 19:47:10 2019 +0000 upstream: allow ssh-keyscan to find security key hostkeys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1fe822a7f714df19a7e7184e3a3bbfbf546811d3 commit 56584cce75f3d20aaa30befc7cbd331d922927f3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 15 18:57:30 2019 +0000 upstream: allow security keys to act as host keys as well as user keys. Previously we didn't do this because we didn't want to expose the attack surface presented by USB and FIDO protocol handling, but now that this is insulated behind ssh-sk-helper there is less risk. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77b068dd133b8d87e0f010987bd5131e640ee64c commit 5af6fd5461bb709304e6979c8b7856c7af921c9e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Dec 16 13:55:56 2019 +1100 Allow clock_nanosleep_time64 in seccomp sandbox. Needed on Linux ARM. bz#3100, patch from jjelen@redhat.com. commit fff8ff6dd580e1a72ba09a6775d185175cdc8d13 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Dec 15 18:27:02 2019 +1100 Put SK ECDSA bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. Fixes build when linking against OpenSSLs built with no-ec. commit 9244990ecdcfa36bb9371058111685b05f201c1e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 14 09:21:46 2019 +1100 remove a bunch of ENABLE_SK #ifdefs The ssh-sk-helper client API gives us a nice place to disable security key support when it is wasn't enabled at compile time, so we don't need to check everywere. Also, verification of security key signatures can remain enabled all the time - it has no additional dependencies. So sshd can accept security key pubkeys in authorized_keys, etc regardless of the host's support for dlopen, etc. commit a33ab1688b5c460a7e2a301418241ce1b13b2638 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 14 09:15:06 2019 +1100 ssh-sk-client.c needs includes.h commit 633778d567ad50b63d2a3bca5e1b97d279d236d9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 14 08:40:33 2019 +1100 only link ssh-sk-helper against libfido2 commit 7b47b40b170db4d6f41da0479575f6d99dd7228a Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 14 08:20:52 2019 +1100 adapt Makefile to ssh-sk-client everywhere commit f45f3a8a12e2bee601046b916e6c5cd6eae08048 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 14 07:53:11 2019 +1100 fixup commit d21434766764d5babf99fc3937c19b625c0f6334 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 13 20:16:56 2019 +0000 upstream: actually commit the ssh-sk-helper client code; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd2ea776a5bbbf4d452989d3c3054cf25a5e0589 commit 611073fb40ecaf4ac65094e403edea3a08deb700 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 13 19:11:14 2019 +0000 upstream: perform security key enrollment via ssh-sk-helper too. This means that ssh-keygen no longer needs to link against ssh-sk-helper, and only ssh-sk-helper needs libfido2 and /dev/uhid* access; feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9464233fab95708d2ff059f8bee29c0d1f270800 commit 612b1dd1ec91ffb1e01f58cca0c6eb1d47bf4423 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:37 2019 +0000 upstream: allow sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, NULL); ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91482c1ada9adb283165d48dafbb88ae91c657bd commit b52ec0ba3983859514aa7b57d6100fa9759fe696 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:10 2019 +0000 upstream: use ssh-sk-helper for all security key signing operations This extracts and refactors the client interface for ssh-sk-helper from ssh-agent and generalises it for use by the other programs. This means that most OpenSSH tools no longer need to link against libfido2 or directly interact with /dev/uhid* requested by, feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1abcd3aea9a7460eccfbf8ca154cdfa62f1dc93f commit c33d46868c3d88e04a92610cdb429094aeeb5847 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Dec 11 22:19:47 2019 +0000 upstream: add a note about the 'extensions' field in the signed object OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67c01e0565b258e0818c1ccfe1f1aeaf9a0d4c7b commit a62f4e1960691f3aeb1f972e009788b29e2ae464 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 10 23:37:31 2019 +0000 upstream: some more corrections for documentation problems spotted by Ron Frederick document certifiate private key format correct flags type for sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc4e9a1ed7f9f7f9dd83e2e2c59327912e933e74 commit 22d4beb79622fc82d7111ac941269861fc7aef8d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 10 23:21:56 2019 +0000 upstream: loading security keys into ssh-agent used the extension constraint "sk-provider@openssh.com", not "sk@openssh.com"; spotted by Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbfba09edbe023abadd5f59c1492df9073b0e51d commit 75f7f22a43799f6d25dffd9d6683de1601da05a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 10 22:43:19 2019 +0000 upstream: add security key types to list of keys allowed to act as CAs; spotted by Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bb0dfff927b4f7aa70679f983f84c69d45656c3 commit 516605f2d596884cedc2beed6b262716ec76f63d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 10 22:37:20 2019 +0000 upstream: when acting as a CA and using a security key as the CA key, remind the user to touch they key to authorise the signature. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe58733edd367362f9766b526a8b56827cc439c1 commit c4036fe75ea5a4d03a2a40be1f3660dcbbfa01b2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 10 22:36:08 2019 +0000 upstream: chop some unnecessary and confusing verbiage from the security key protocol description; feedback from Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 048c9483027fbf9c995e5a51b3ac502989085a42 commit 59175a350fe1091af7528b2971e3273aa7ca7295 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 6 03:06:08 2019 +0000 upstream: fix setting of $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT - it shouldn't be set when asking passphrases, only when confirming the use of a key (i.e. for ssh-agent keys added with "ssh-add -c keyfile") OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6643c82960d9427d5972eb702c917b3b838ecf89 commit 36eaa356d391a23a2d4e3a8aaa0223abc70b9822 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 6 02:55:21 2019 +0000 upstream: bring the __func__ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71a3a45b0fe1b8f680ff95cf264aa81f7abbff67 commit 483cc723d1ff3b7fdafc6239348040a608ebc78d Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 30 07:07:59 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak the Nd lines for a bit of consistency; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 876651bdde06bc1e72dd4bd7ad599f42a6ce5a16 commit afffd310360b155df2133d1f5f1ab2f4e939b570 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 11 13:22:06 2019 +1100 Check if memmem is declared in system headers. If the system (or one of the dependencies) implements memmem but does not define the header, we would not declare it either resulting in compiler warnings. Check for declaration explicitly. bz#3102. commit ad8cd420797695f3b580aea1034b9de60bede9b9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 11 13:12:01 2019 +1100 Sort depends. commit 5e3abff39e01817f6866494416f2ada25c316018 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 11 13:09:34 2019 +1100 Sort .depend when rebuilding. This makes diffs more stable between makedepend implementations. commit 5df9d1f5c0943367d9b68435f4c82224ce11a73f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 11 13:06:43 2019 +1100 Update depend to include sk files. commit 9a967c5bbfca35835165f7d8a6165009f5b21872 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Dec 9 20:25:26 2019 +1100 Describe how to build libcrypto as PIC. While there, move the OpenSSL 1.1.0g caveat closer to the other version information. commit b66fa5da25c4b5b67cf9f0ce7af513f5a6a6a686 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Dec 9 17:23:22 2019 +1100 Recommend running LibreSSL or OpenSSL self-tests. commit fa7924008e838cded7e8a561356ffe5e06e0ed64 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Dec 6 14:17:26 2019 +1100 Wrap ECC specific bits in ifdef. Fixes tests when built against an OpenSSL configured with no-ec. commit 2ff822eabd7d4461743f22d3b9ba35ab76069df5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 29 20:21:36 2019 +1100 Wrap sha2.h include in ifdef. Fixes build --without-openssl on at least Fedora. commit 443848155ffcda65a6077aac118c861b503a093f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 29 15:10:21 2019 +1100 compile sk-dummy.so with no-PIE version of LDFLAGS This lets it pick up the -L path to libcrypto for example. commit 37f5b5346e4cc6a894245aa89d2930649bb7045b Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 29 14:48:46 2019 +1100 includes.h for sk-dummy.c, dummy commit b218055e59a7c1a1816f7a55ca18e3f3c05d63a4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 29 12:32:23 2019 +1100 (yet) another x-platform fix for sk-dummy.so Check for -fPIC support from compiler Compile libopenbsd-compat -fPIC Don't mix -fPIE and -fPIC when compiling commit 0dedb703adcd98d0dbc4479f5f312a2bd3df2850 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 29 11:53:57 2019 +1100 needs includes.h for WITH_OPENSSL commit ef3853bb94c2c72e7eda0de6cec0bcb1da62058f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 29 11:52:23 2019 +1100 another attempt at sk-dummy.so working x-platform include a fatal() implementation to satisfy libopenbsd-compat clean up .lo and .so files .gitignore .lo and .so files commit d46ac56f1cbd5a855a2d5e7309f90d383dcf6431 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 29 00:13:29 2019 +0000 upstream: lots of dependencies go away here with ed25519 no longer needing the ssh_digest API. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 785847ec78cb580d141e29abce351a436d6b5d49 commit 7404b81f25a4a7847380c0f0cf7f1bea5f0a5cd3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 29 00:11:21 2019 +0000 upstream: perform hashing directly in crypto_hash_sha512() using libcrypto or libc SHA512 functions rather than calling ssh_digest_memory(); avoids many dependencies on ssh code that complicate standalone use of ed25519, as we want to do in sk-dummy.so OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a3c37593d3ba7add037b587cec44aaea088496d commit d39a865b7af93a7a9b5a64cf7cf0ef4396c80ba3 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 28 12:24:31 2019 +0000 upstream: improve the text for -A a little; input from naddy and djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9cdfb1d6dbb9887c4bf3bb25f9c7a94294c988d commit 9a0e01bd0c61f553ead96b5af84abd73865847b8 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 28 12:23:25 2019 +0000 upstream: reshuffle the text to read better; input from naddy, djmc, and dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0b2aca2b67614dda3d6618ea097bf0610c35013 commit 5ca52c0f2e5e7f7d01d8d557b994b5c2087bed00 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 28 18:09:07 2019 +1100 $< doesn't work as` I thought; explicily list objs commit 18e84bfdc5906a73405c3b42d7f840013bbffe34 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 28 05:20:54 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak wording OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd002ca1599b71331faca735ff5f6de29e32222e commit 8ef5bf9d03aa0f047711cff47f5ffbe3b33ff8c9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 28 13:12:30 2019 +1100 missing .SUFFIXES line makes make sad commit 323da82b8ea993b7f2c5793fd53b4f5ca105d19d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 28 09:53:42 2019 +1100 (hopefully) fix out of tree builds of sk-dummy.so commit d8b2838c5d19bf409d44ede4d32df8ee47aeb4cd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 27 22:32:11 2019 +0000 upstream: remove stray semicolon after closing brace of function; from Michael Forney OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fda95acb799bb160d15e205ee126117cf33da3a7 commit 6e1d1bbf5a3eca875005e0c87f341a0a03799809 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 27 05:38:43 2019 +0000 upstream: Revert previous commit. The channels code still uses int in many places for channel ids so the INT_MAX check still makes sense. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 532e4b644791b826956c3c61d6ac6da39bac84bf commit 48989244658b9748b6801034ff4ffbdfc6b1520f Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Nov 27 16:03:12 2019 +1100 wire sk-dummy.so into test suite commit f79364bacaebde4f1c260318ab460fceacace02f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 27 05:00:17 2019 +0000 upstream: use error()+_exit() instead of fatal() to avoid running cleanup handlers in child process; spotted via weird regress failures in portable OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6902a9bb3987c7d347774444f7979b8a9ba7f412 commit 70ec5e5e2681bcd409a9df94a2fec6f57a750945 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 27 03:34:04 2019 +0000 upstream: Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check and cast that were left over from the type conversion. Noted by t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3ad105b6a905284e780b1fd7ff118e1c346e90b5 commit ad44ca81bea83657d558aaef5a1d789a9032bac3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 26 23:43:10 2019 +0000 upstream: test FIDO2/U2F key types; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 367e06d5a260407619b4b113ea0bd7004a435474 commit c6efa8a91af1d4fdb43909a23a0a4ffa012155ad Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 26 23:41:23 2019 +0000 upstream: add dummy security key middleware based on work by markus@ This will allow us to test U2F/FIDO2 support in OpenSSH without requiring real hardware. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88b309464b8850c320cf7513f26d97ee1fdf9aae commit 8635afa1cdc21366d61730d943f3cf61861899c8 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 26 22:42:26 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4c097364c75da320f1b291568db830fb1ee4883 commit e0d38ae9bc8c0de421605b9021d8144e4d8ff22b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 26 03:04:27 2019 +0000 upstream: more debugging; behind DEBUG_SK OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a978896227118557505999ddefc1f4c839818b60 commit 9281d4311b8abc63b88259f354944c53f9b0b3c7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 25 21:47:49 2019 +1100 unbreak fuzzers for recent security key changes commit c5f1cc993597fed0a9013743556b1567f476c677 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 10:32:35 2019 +0000 upstream: unbreak tests for recent security key changes OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2cdf2fcae9962ca4d711338f3ceec3c1391bdf95 commit 64988266820cc90a45a21672be9d762cbde8d34d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 06:53:04 2019 +0000 upstream: unbreak after security key support landed OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3ab578b0dbeb2aa6d9969b54a9c1bad329c0dcba commit e65e25c81e22ea622e89a142a303726a3882384f Author: tb@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 21 05:18:47 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove workaround for broken 'openssl rsa -text' output that was fixed in libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c r1.24. ok dtucker inoguchi OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c260edfac177daa8fcce90141587cf04a95c4f5f commit 21377ec2a9378579ba4b44a681af7bbca77581f4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 10:23:36 2019 +0000 upstream: redundant test OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38fa7806c528a590d91ae560e67bd8b246c2d7a3 commit 664deef95a2e770812533439b8bdd3f3c291ae59 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:51 2019 +0000 upstream: document the "no-touch-required" certificate extension; ok markus, feedback deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47640122b13f825e9c404ea99803b2372246579d commit 26cb128b31efdd5395153f4943f5be3eddc07033 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:27 2019 +0000 upstream: Print a key touch reminder when generating a security key. Most keys require a touch to authorize the operation. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe8b23edbf33e1bb81741b9f25e9a63be5f6b68 commit daeaf4136927c2a82af1399022103d67ff03f74a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:55:58 2019 +0000 upstream: allow "ssh-keygen -x no-touch-required" when generating a security key keypair to request one that does not require a touch for each authentication attempt. The default remains to require touch. feedback deraadt; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 887e7084b2e89c0c62d1598ac378aad8e434bcbd commit 2e71263b80fec7ad977e098004fef7d122169d40 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:54:23 2019 +0000 upstream: add a "no-touch-required" option for authorized_keys and a similar extension for certificates. This option disables the default requirement that security key signatures attest that the user touched their key to authorize them. feedback deraadt, ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1fb56151ba68d55d554d0f6d3d4dba0cf1a452e commit 0fddf2967ac51d518e300408a0d7e6adf4cd2634 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:52:46 2019 +0000 upstream: Add a sshd_config PubkeyAuthOptions directive This directive has a single valid option "no-touch-required" that causes sshd to skip checking whether user presence was tested before a security key signature was made (usually by the user touching the key). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46e434a49802d4ed82bc0aa38cb985c198c407de commit b7e74ea072919b31391bc0f5ff653f80b9f5e84f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:51:37 2019 +0000 upstream: Add new structure for signature options This is populated during signature verification with additional fields that are present in and covered by the signature. At the moment, it is only used to record security key-specific options, especially the flags field. with and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 338a1f0e04904008836130bedb9ece4faafd4e49 commit d2b0f88178ec9e3f11b606bf1004ac2fe541a2c3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:38:17 2019 +0000 upstream: memleak in error path OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93488431bf02dde85a854429362695d2d43d9112 commit e2c0a21ade5e0bd7f0aab08d7eb9457f086681e9 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 22 06:50:30 2019 +0000 upstream: Wait for FD to be readable or writeable during a nonblocking connect, not just readable. Prevents a timeout when the server doesn't immediately send a banner (eg multiplexers like sslh) but is also slightly quicker for other connections since, unlike ssh1, ssh2 doesn't specify that the client should parse the server banner before sending its own. Patch from mnissler@chromium.org, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aba9cd8480d1d9dd31d0ca0422ea155c26c5df1d commit 2f95d43dc222ce194622b706682e8de07c9cfb42 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 20 16:34:11 2019 +1100 Include openssl compat header. Fixes warning for ECDSA_SIG_set0 on OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1. commit a70d92f236576c032a45c39e68ca0d71e958d19d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 19 22:23:19 2019 +0000 upstream: adjust on-wire signature encoding for ecdsa-sk keys to better match ec25519-sk keys. Discussed with markus@ and Sebastian Kinne NB. if you are depending on security keys (already?) then make sure you update both your clients and servers. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 53d88d8211f0dd02a7954d3af72017b1a79c0679 commit 26369a5f7d9c4e4ef44a3e04910126e1bcea43d8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 19 22:21:15 2019 +0000 upstream: a little more information from the monitor when signature verification fails. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6a30071e0518cac512f9e10be3dc3500e2003f3 commit 4402d6c9b5bf128dcfae2429f1d41cdaa8849b6b Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 19 16:02:32 2019 +0000 upstream: revert previous: naddy pointed out what's meant to happen. rethink needed... OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb0fede8123ea7f725fd65e00d49241c40bd3421 commit 88056f881315233e990e4e04a815f8f96b4674e1 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 19 14:54:47 2019 +0000 upstream: -c and -s do not make sense with -k; reshuffle -k into the main synopsis/usage; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f881ba253da015398ae8758d973e3390754869bc commit 2cf262c21f35296c2ff718cfdb52e0473a1c3983 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 23:17:48 2019 +0000 upstream: document '$' environment variable expansion for SecurityKeyProvider; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 76db507ebd336a573e1cd4146cc40019332c5799 commit f0edda81c5ebccffcce52b182c3033531a1aab71 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 23:16:49 2019 +0000 upstream: more missing mentions of ed25519-sk; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f242e53366f61697dffd53af881bc5daf78230ff commit 189550f5bc85148e85f4caa1f6b2fc623149a4ee Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 16:10:05 2019 +0000 upstream: additional missing stdarg.h includes when built without WITH_OPENSSL; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 881f9a2c4e2239849cee8bbf4faec9bab128f55b commit 723a5369864b338c48d22854bc2bb4ee5c083deb Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 16:08:57 2019 +0000 upstream: add the missing WITH_OPENSSL ifdefs after the ED25519-SK addition; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9545e1c273e506cf70e328cbb9d0129b6d62474 commit 478f4f98e4e93ae4ed1a8911dec4e5b75ea10f30 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Nov 19 08:52:24 2019 +1100 remove all EC algs from proposals, no just sk ones ok dtucker@ commit 6a7ef310da100f876a257b7367e3b0766dac3994 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 18 22:22:04 2019 +1100 filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto. commit 64f56f1d1af3947a71a4c391f2c08747d19ee591 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 09:15:17 2019 +0000 upstream: LibreSSL change the format for openssl rsa -text output from "publicExponent" to "Exponent" so accept either. with djm. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b7e6c4bf700029a31c98be14600d4472fe0467e6 commit 4bfc0503ad94a2a7190686a89649567c20b8534f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 06:58:00 2019 +0000 upstream: fix a bug that prevented serialisation of ed25519-sk keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 066682b79333159cac04fcbe03ebd9c8dcc152a9 commit d88205417084f523107fbe1bc92061635cd57fd2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:36 2019 +0000 upstream: Fix incorrect error message when key certification fails OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7771bd77ee73f7116df37c734c41192943a73cee commit 740c4bc9875cbb4b9fc03fd5eac19df080f20df5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:02 2019 +0000 upstream: fix bug that prevented certification of ed25519-sk keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c8cc6f5de2cdd0ee3a81c3a9dee8d862645996 commit 85409cbb505d8c463ab6e2284b4039764c7243de Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 06:24:17 2019 +0000 upstream: allow *-sk key types to be turned into certificates OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd365ee343934862286d0b011aa77fa739d2a945 commit e2e1283404e06a22ac6135d057199e70dcadb8dd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 04:55:02 2019 +0000 upstream: mention ed25519-sk key/cert types here too; prompted by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e281977e4a4f121f3470517cbd5e483eee37b818 commit 97dc5d1d82865a7d20f1eb193b5c62ce684024e5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 04:50:45 2019 +0000 upstream: mention ed25519-sk in places where it is accepted; prompted by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 076d386739ebe7336c2137e583bc7a5c9538a442 commit 130664344862a8c7afd3e24d8d36ce40af41a99f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 04:34:47 2019 +0000 upstream: document ed25519-sk pubkey, private key and certificate formats OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 795a7c1c80315412e701bef90e31e376ea2f3c88 commit 71856e1142fc01628ce53098f8cfc74765464b35 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 04:29:50 2019 +0000 upstream: correct order or ecdsa-sk private key fields OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d4a0c13226a79f0080ce6cbe74f73b03ed8092e commit 93fa2a6649ae3e0626cbff25c985a4573d63e3f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 04:16:53 2019 +0000 upstream: correct description of fields in pub/private keys (was missing curve name); spotted by Sebastian Kinne OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a11340dc7ed16200342d384fb45ecd4fcce26e7 commit b497e920b409250309c4abe64229237b8f2730ba Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 18 15:05:04 2019 +1100 Teach the GTK2/3 ssh-askpass the new prompt hints ssh/ssh-agent now sets a hint environment variable $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT when running the askpass program. This is intended to allow the askpass to vary its UI across the three cases it supports: asking for a passphrase, confirming the use of a key and (recently) reminding a user to touch their security key. This adapts the gnome-ssh-askpass[23] to use these hints. Specifically, for SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=confirm it will skip the text input box and show only "yes"/"no" buttons. For SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=none (used to remind users to tap their security key), it shows only a "close" button. Help wanted: adapt the other askpass programs in active use, including x11-ssh-askpass, lxqt-openssh-askpass, etc. commit 857f49e91eeae6feb781ef5f5e26c38ca3d953ec Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Nov 18 14:15:26 2019 +1100 Move ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. Found by -Wimplicit-fallthrough: one ECC case was not inside the ifdef. ok djm@ commit 6cf1c40096a79e5eedcf897c7cdb46bb32d4a3ee Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Nov 18 14:14:18 2019 +1100 Enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough if supported Suggested by djm. commit 103c51fd5f5ddc01cd6b5c1132e711765b921bf5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 01:59:48 2019 +0000 upstream: missing break in getopt switch; spotted by Sebastian Kinne OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f002dbf14dba5586e8407e90f0141148ade8e8fc commit 9a1225e8ca2ce1fe809910874935302234399a6d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 16 23:17:20 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak debug message OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bf336d3be0b7e3dd97920d7e7471146a281d2b9 commit 4103a3ec7c68493dbc4f0994a229507e943a86d3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 16 22:42:30 2019 +0000 upstream: a little debug() in the security key interface OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c70300609a5c8b19707207bb7ad4109e963b0e8 commit 05daa211de926f66f50b7380d637f84dc6341574 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 16 22:36:48 2019 +0000 upstream: always use ssh-sk-helper, even for the internal USB HID support. This avoid the need for a wpath pledge in ssh-agent. reported by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19f799c4d020b870741d221335dbfa5e76691c23 commit d431778a561d90131814f986b646299f9af33c8c Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 15:41:01 2019 +0000 upstream: fix typos in sk_enroll OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faa9bf779e008b3e64e2eb1344d9b7d83b3c4487 commit af90aec0443ec51e6b2d804cb91771d3905f8a6f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 11:16:28 2019 +0000 upstream: double word; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43d09bafa4ea9002078cb30ca9adc3dcc0b9c2b9 commit fd1a96490cef7f945a1b3b5df4e90c8a1070f425 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 06:00:20 2019 +0000 upstream: remove most uses of BN_CTX We weren't following the rules re BN_CTX_start/BN_CTX_end and the places we were using it didn't benefit from its use anyway. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea9ba6c0d2e6f6adfe00b309a8f41842fe12fc7a commit 39b87104cdd47baf79ef77dc81de62cea07d119f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 15 18:56:54 2019 +1100 Add wrappers for other ultrix headers. Wrappers protect against multiple inclusions for headers that don't do it themselves. commit 134a74f4e0cf750931f1125beb2a3f40c54c8809 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 15 18:55:13 2019 +1100 Add SSIZE_MAX when we define ssize_t. commit 9c6d0a3a1ed77989d8c5436d8c3cc6c7045c0197 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 15 17:13:19 2019 +1100 Remove ultrix realpath hack. commit c63fba5e3472307167850bbd84187186af7fa9f0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 05:37:27 2019 +0000 upstream: unshield security key privkey before attempting signature in agent. spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb67d451665385b8a0a55371231c50aac67b91d2 commit d165bb5396e3f718480e6039ca2cf77f5a2c2885 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 05:26:56 2019 +0000 upstream: rewrite c99-ism OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0c70cca29cfa7e6d9f7ec1d6d5dabea112499b3 commit 03e06dd0e6e1c0a9f4b4b9de7def8a44dcbf93a7 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 05:25:52 2019 +0000 upstream: only clang understands those new -W options OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0 commit 5c0bc273cba53f822b7d777bbb6c35d160d3b505 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:08:00 2019 +1100 configure flag to built-in security key support Require --with-security-key-builtin before enabling the built-in security key support (and consequent dependency on libfido2). commit fbcb9a7fa55300b8bd4c18bee024c6104c5a25d7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:06:30 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.48 date: 2019/02/04 16:45:40; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +16 -17; commitid: cpNtVC7erojNyctw; Make gl_pathc, gl_matchc and gl_offs size_t in glob_t to match POSIX. This requires a libc major version bump. OK deraadt@ commit 2cfb11abac85885de0cb888bbeb9a3e4303105ea Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:05:07 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.47 date: 2017/05/08 14:53:27; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +34 -21; commitid: sYfxfyUHAfarP8sE; Fix exponential CPU use with repeated '*' operators by changing '*' handling to be interative instead of recursive. Fix by Yves Orton, ported to OpenBSD glob.c by Ray Lai. OK tb@ commit 228dd595c7882bb9b161dbb7d4dca15c8a5f03f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:04:28 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.46 date: 2015/12/28 22:08:18; author: mmcc; state: Exp; lines: +5 -9; commitid: 0uXuF2O13NH9q2e1; Remove NULL-checks before free() and a few related dead assignments. ok and valuable input from millert@ commit a16f748690139b9f452485d97511ad5e578f59b2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:43 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.44 date: 2015/09/14 16:09:13; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +3 -5; commitid: iWfSX2BIn0sLw62l; remove null check before free. from Michael McConville ok semarie commit fd37cdeafe25adfcdc752280f535d28de7997ff1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:27 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.43 date: 2015/06/13 16:57:04; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; commitid: zOUKuqWBdOPOz1SZ; in glob() initialize the glob_t before the first failure check. from j@pureftpd.org ok millert stsp commit fd62769c3882adea118dccaff80a06009874a2d1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:01:20 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.42 date: 2015/02/05 12:59:57; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +2 -1; commitid: DTQbfd4poqBW8iSJ; Include stdint.h, not limits.h to get SIZE_MAX. OK guenther@ commit 2b6cba7ee2b8b36f393be739c860a9d2e5d8eb48 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:00:07 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.41 date: 2014/10/08 05:35:27; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -3; commitid: JwTGarRLHQKDgPh2; obvious realloc -> reallocarray conversion commit ab3600665387ae34785498558c4409e27f495b0b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 04:12:32 2019 +0000 upstream: don't consult dlopen whitelist for internal security key provider; spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfe5fbd17e4ff95dd85b9212181652b54444192e commit 19f8ec428db835f68c1cfd63587e9880ccd6486c Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 15:08:28 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.40 date: 2013/09/30 12:02:34; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +14 -15; Use PATH_MAX, NAME_MAX and LOGIN_NAME_MAX not MAXPATHNAMELEN, MAXNAMLEN or MAXLOGNAME where possible. OK deraadt@ commit bb7413db98e418d4af791244660abf6c829783f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 15:07:30 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.39 date: 2012/01/20 07:09:42; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; the glob stat limit is way too low. bump to 2048. while here, failed stats should count against the limit too. ok deraadt sthen stsp commit 01362cf7cb979525c014714e2bccf799a46e772e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 03:41:57 2019 +0000 upstream: U2F tokens may return FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED when probed to see if they own a key handle. Handle this case so the find_device() look can work for them. Reported by Michael Forney OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ccd5b30a6ddfe4dba228b7159bf168601bd9166 commit cf62307bc9758105913dcb91b418e4968ac2244d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 15 14:01:00 2019 +1100 Add libfido2 to INSTALL. commit 69fbda1894349d1f420c842dfcbcc883239d1aa7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 15 13:42:15 2019 +1100 libcrypto is now optional. commit 45ffa369886e37930776d7c15dd8b973242d6ecc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 02:38:07 2019 +0000 upstream: show the "please touch your security key" notifier when using the (default) build-in security key support. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4707643aaa7124501d14e92d1364b20f312a6428 commit 49dc9fa928d77807c53bdc2898db7fb515fe5eb3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 02:37:24 2019 +0000 upstream: close the "touch your security key" notifier on the error path too OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7628bf80505c1aefbb1de7abc8bb5ee51826829 commit 22a82712e89bf17c27427aeba15795fb4011a0c2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 02:20:06 2019 +0000 upstream: correct function name in debug message OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2482c99d2ce448f39282493050f8a01e3ffc39ab commit 018e2902a65c22faded215a7c588492c948f108c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 00:32:40 2019 +0000 upstream: follow existing askpass logic for security key notifier: fall back to _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT if no $SSH_ASKPASS environment variable is set. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cda753726b13fb797bf7a9f7a0b3022d9ade4520 commit 575d0042a94997c1eeb86a6dcfb30b3c7bdbcba3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 14 21:56:52 2019 +0000 upstream: remove debugging goop that snuck in to last commit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e commit 63a5b24f2dbdc9a4bf2182ac3db26731ddc617e8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 11:21:26 2019 +1100 don't fatal if libfido2 not found spotted by dtucker@ commit 129952a81c00c332721b4ba3ede868c720ad7f4e Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 11:17:12 2019 +1100 correct object dependency commit 6bff9521ab9a9f7396d635755c342b72373bb4f9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 14 21:27:29 2019 +0000 upstream: directly support U2F/FIDO2 security keys in OpenSSH by linking against the (previously external) USB HID middleware. The dlopen() capability still exists for alternate middlewares, e.g. for Bluetooth, NFC and test/debugging. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14446cf170ac0351f0d4792ba0bca53024930069 commit 4f5e331cb8e11face3025aa6578662dde489c3ad Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 22:00:21 2019 +0000 upstream: in order to be able to figure out the number of signatures left on a shielded key, we need to transfer the number of signatures left from the private to the public key. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a5d0d260aeace47d372695fdae383ce9b962574 commit dffd02e297e6c2a4e86775f293eb1b0ff01fb3df Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 20:25:45 2019 +0000 upstream: fix check for sig_s; noted by qsa at qualys.com OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34198084e4afb424a859f52c04bb2c9668a52867 commit fc173aeb1526d4268db89ec5dfebaf8750dd26cd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 11:25:11 2019 +0000 upstream: When clients get denied by MaxStartups, send a noification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to RFC4253 section 4.2. ok djm@ deraadt@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dabcb722d54dea18eafb336d50b733af4f9c63 commit bf219920b70cafbf29ebc9890ef67d0efa54e738 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 07:53:10 2019 +0000 upstream: fix shield/unshield for xmss keys: - in ssh-agent we need to delay the call to shield until we have received key specific options. - when serializing xmss keys for shield we need to deal with all optional components (e.g. state might not be loaded). ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cc2db82524b209468eb176d6b4d6b9486422f41f commit 40598b85d72a509566b7b2a6d57676c7231fed34 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 05:42:26 2019 +0000 upstream: remove size_t gl_pathc < 0 test, it is invalid. the return value from glob() is sufficient. discussed with djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c91203322db9caaf7efaf5ae90c794a91070be3c commit 72687c8e7c38736e3e64e833ee7aa8f9cd9efed1 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 04:47:52 2019 +0000 upstream: stdarg.h required more broadly; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5b15674cde1b54d6dbbae8faf30d47e6e5d6513 commit 1e0b248d47c96be944868a735553af8482300a07 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 14 16:08:17 2019 +1100 Put sshsk_sign call inside ifdef ENABLE_SK. Fixes build against OpenSSL configured without ECC. commit 546274a6f89489d2e6be8a8b62f2bb63c87a61fd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 23:27:31 2019 +1100 Remove duplicate __NR_clock_nanosleep commit b1c82f4b8adf3f42476d8a1f292df33fb7aa1a56 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 23:19:35 2019 +1100 seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() in sandbox. seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() to make OpenSSH working with latest glibc. Patch from Jakub Jelen via bz #3093. commit 2b523d23804c13cb68db135b919fcf312c42b580 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 11:56:56 2019 +1100 Include stdarg.h for va_list in xmalloc.h. commit 245dcbdca5374296bdb9c48be6e24bdf6b1c0af7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 11:19:26 2019 +1100 Put headers inside ifdef _AIX. Prevents compile errors due to missing definitions (eg va_list) on non-AIX platforms. commit a4cc579c6ad2b2e54bdd6cc0d5e12c2288113a56 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 10:41:41 2019 +1100 Fix comment in match_usergroup_pattern_list. Spotted by balu.gajjala@gmail.com via bz#3092. commit fccff339cab5aa66f2554e0188b83f980683490b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 22:38:19 2019 +0000 upstream: allow an empty attestation certificate returned by a security key enrollment - these are possible for tokens that only offer self- attestation. This also needs support from the middleware. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 135eeeb937088ef6830a25ca0bbe678dfd2c57cc commit e44bb61824e36d0d181a08489c16c378c486a974 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 22:36:44 2019 +0000 upstream: security keys typically need to be tapped/touched in order to perform a signature operation. Notify the user when this is expected via the TTY (if available) or $SSH_ASKPASS if we can. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef90a99a85d4a2a07217a58efb4df8444818609 commit 4671211068441519011ac0e38c588317f4157ba1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 22:35:02 2019 +0000 upstream: pass SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT hint to y/n key confirm too OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08d46712e5e5f1bad0aea68e7717b7bec1ab8959 commit 5d1c1590d736694f41b03e686045f08fcae20d62 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 22:34:20 2019 +0000 upstream: dd API for performing one-shot notifications via tty or SSH_ASKPASS OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9484aea33aff5b62ce3642bf259546c7639f23f3 commit 166927fd410823eec8a7b2472463db51e0e6fef5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 22:32:48 2019 +0000 upstream: add xvasprintf() OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5e3671c05c121993b034db935bce1a7aa372247 commit 782093ec6cf64cc6c4078410093359869ea9329f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 09:08:55 2019 +1100 Remove leftover if statement from sync. commit b556cc3cbf0c43f073bb41bba4e92ca709a1ec13 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:40 2019 +0000 upstream: remove extra layer for ed25519 signature; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7672d9d0278b4bf656a12d3aab0c0bfe92a8ae47 commit 3fcf69ace19e75cf9dcd7206f396adfcb29611a8 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:00 2019 +0000 upstream: check sig_r and sig_s for ssh-sk keys; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a1e6a85b5f465d447a3800f739e35c5b74e0abc commit 2c55744a56de0ffc81fe445a1e7fc5cd308712b3 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:33:08 2019 +0000 upstream: enable ed25519 support; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a399c5b3ef15bd8efb916110cf5a9e0b554ab7e commit fd1a3b5e38721b1d69aae2d9de1a1d9155dfa5c7 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:32:30 2019 +0000 upstream: update sk-api to version 2 for ed25519 support; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77aa4d5b6ab17987d8a600907b49573940a0044a commit 7c32b51edbed5bd57870249c0a45dffd06be0002 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:45 2019 +0000 upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_assemble(); ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af9ec838b9bc643786310b5caefc4ca4754e68c6 commit fe05a36dc0ea884c8c2395d53d804fe4f4202b26 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:18 2019 +0000 upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_inner_sig(); ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f422d0052c6d948fe0e4b04bc961f37fdffa0910 commit e03a29e6554cd0c9cdbac0dae53dd79e6eb4ea47 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:50 2019 +0000 upstream: rename sshsk_ecdsa_sign() to sshsk_sign(); ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1524042e09d81e54c4470d7bfcc0194c5b46fe19 commit bc7b5d6187de625c086b5f639b25bbad17bbabfc Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:21 2019 +0000 upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_inner_sig(); ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07e41997b542f670a15d7e2807143fe01efef584 commit cef84a062db8cfeece26f067235dc440f6992c17 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:54 2019 +0000 upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(); ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2313761a3a84ccfe032874d638d3c363e0f14026 commit 7c096c456f33f3d2682736d4735cc10e790276e9 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:24 2019 +0000 upstream: implement ssh-ed25519-sk verification; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37906d93948a1e3d237c20e713d6ca8fbf7d13f6 commit ba5fb02bed1e556d0ce7b1740ae8a5f87b737491 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Nov 13 08:48:30 2019 +1100 ignore ssh-sk-helper commit 78c96498947f711141f493a40d202c482cc59438 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 11 19:53:37 2019 +0000 upstream: skip demanding -fstack-protector-all on hppa. we never wrote a stack protector for reverse-stack architectures, and i don't think anyone else did either. a warning per compiled file is just annoying. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada commit aa1c9e37789f999979fe59df74ce5c8424861ac8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 8 03:54:02 2019 +0000 upstream: duplicate 'x' character in getopt(3) optstring OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c81caa0cb5798de3621eca16b7dd22e5d0d8a7 commit aa4c640dc362816d63584a16e786d5e314e24390 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 7 08:38:38 2019 +0000 upstream: Fill in missing man page bits for U2F security key support: Mention the new key types, the ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk file, ssh's SecurityKeyProvider keyword, the SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable, and ssh-keygen's new -w and -x options. Copy the ssh-sk-helper man page from ssh-pkcs11-helper with minimal substitutions. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef2e8f83d0c0ce11ad9b8c28945747e5ca337ac4 commit b236b27d6dada7f0542214003632b4e9b7aa1380 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 3 00:10:43 2019 +1100 Put sftp-realpath in libssh.a and remove it from the specific binary targets. commit 382c18c20cdcec45b5d21ff25b4a5e0df91a68c4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 3 00:09:21 2019 +1100 statfs might be defined in sys/mount.h. eg on old NetBSDs. commit 03ffc0951c305c8e3b5fdc260d65312a57f8f7ea Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 2 23:25:01 2019 +1100 Put stdint.h inside ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. commit 19cb64c4b42d4312ce12091fd9436dbd6898998c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 2 22:45:44 2019 +1100 Rebuild .depend. commit 3611bfe89b92ada5914526d8ff0919aeb967cfa7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 2 22:42:05 2019 +1100 Define __BSD_VISIBLE in fnmatch.h. .. since we use symbols defined only when it is when using the compat fnmatch. commit f5cc5816aaddb8eca3cba193f53e99d6a0b37d05 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 2 16:39:38 2019 +1100 Only enable U2F if OpenSSL supports ECC. This requires moving the U2F bits to below the OpenSSL parts so we have the required information. ok djm@ commit ad38406fc95fa223b0ef2edf8ff50508f8ab1cb6 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 12:10:43 2019 +0000 upstream: fix miscellaneous text problems; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0cbf411a14d8fa0b269b69cbb1b4fc0ca699fe9f commit 9cac151c2dc76b8e5b727b2fa216f572e372170f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 18:26:07 2019 +1100 Add flags needed to build and work on Ultrix. commit 0e3c5bc50907d2058407641b5a3581b7eda91b7e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 18:24:29 2019 +1100 Hook up fnmatch for platforms that don't have it. commit b56dbfd9d967e5b6ce7be9f81f206112e19e1030 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 18:17:42 2019 +1100 Add missing bracket in realpath macro. commit 59ccb56f15e5e530e7c1b5a0b361749d8c6217d5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 17:32:47 2019 +1100 Import fnmatch.c from OpenBSD. commit 79d46de9fbea0f3c0e8ae7cf84effaba089071b0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 15:22:32 2019 +1100 Use sftp_realpath if no native realpath. commit bb4f003ed8c5f61ec74a66bcedc8ab19bf5b35c4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 15:06:16 2019 +1100 Configure flags for haiku from haikuports. Should build with the default flags with ./configure commit 4332b4fe49360679647a8705bc08f4e81323f6b4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 03:54:33 2019 +0000 upstream: fix a race condition in the SIGCHILD handler that could turn in to a kill(-1); bz3084, reported by Gao Rui, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac2742e04a69d4c34223505b6a32f6d686e18896 commit 03f9205f0fb49ea2507eacc143737a8511ae5a4e Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 1 14:49:25 2019 +1100 conditionalise SK sign/verify on ENABLE_SK Spotted by Darren and his faux-Vax commit 5eb7b9563ff818e17de24231bf2d347d9db302c5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 14:41:07 2019 +1100 Add prototype for localtime_r if needed. commit d500b59a825f6a58f2abf7b04eb1992d81e45d58 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 13:42:12 2019 +1100 Check if IP_TOS is defined before using. commit 764d51e04460ec0da12e05e4777bc90c116accb9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 1 13:34:49 2019 +1100 autoconf pieces for U2F support Mostly following existing logic for PKCS#11 - turning off support when either libcrypto or dlopen(3) are unavailable. commit 45f17a159acfc5a8e450bfbcc2cffe72950ed7a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 02:32:05 2019 +0000 upstream: remove duplicate PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG on !WITH_OPENSSL path OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95a7cafad2a4665d57cabacc28031fabc0bea9fc commit db8d13f7925da7337df87248995c533e111637ec Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 02:06:52 2019 +0000 upstream: more additional source files OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8eaa25fb901594aee23b76eda99dca5b8db94c6f commit f89c5df65dd307739ff22319c2cf847d3b0c5ab4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 02:04:25 2019 +0000 upstream: additional source files here too OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8809f8e1c8f7459e7096ab6b58d8e56cb2f483fd commit 02275afa1ecbfbd39f27d34c97090e76bec232ec Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 02:03:27 2019 +0000 upstream: additional source files here too OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 09297e484327f911fd353489518cceaa0c1b95ce commit dfc8f01b9886c7999e6e20acf3f7492cb8c80796 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 01:57:59 2019 +0000 upstream: adapt to extra sshkey_sign() argument and additional dependencies OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7a25604968486c4d6f81d06e8fbc7d17519de50e commit afa59e26eeb44a93f36f043f60b936eaddae77c4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 01:55:41 2019 +0000 upstream: skip security-key key types for tests until we have a dummy U2F middleware to use. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 37200462b44334a4ad45e6a1f7ad1bd717521a95 commit de871e4daf346a712c78fa4ab8f18b231a47cb85 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 00:52:35 2019 +0000 upstream: sort; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8264b0be01ec5a60602bd50fd49cc3c81162ea16 commit 2aae149a34b1b5dfbef423d3b7999a96818969bb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:37:33 2019 +0000 upstream: undo debugging bits that shouldn't have been committed OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf commit 3420e0464bd0e8fedcfa5fd20ad37bdc740ad5b4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 1 09:24:58 2019 +1100 depend commit b923a90abc7bccb11a513dc8b5c0f13a0ea9682c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:28:27 2019 +0000 upstream: fix -Wshadow warning OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3441eb04f872a00c2483c11a5f1570dfe775103c commit 9a14c64c38fc14d0029f1c7bc70cf62cc7f0fdf9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:23:19 2019 +0000 upstream: Refactor signing - use sshkey_sign for everything, including the new U2F signatures. Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this change is mechanically adding that. Suggested by / ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c commit 07da39f71d36fb547749a5b16aa8892e621a7e4a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:22:01 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh-agent support for U2F/FIDO keys feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb544a44bc32e45d2ec8bf652db2046f38360acb commit eebec620c9519c4839d781c4d5b6082152998f82 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:20:38 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh AddKeysToAgent support for U2F/FIDO keys feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac08e45c7f995fa71f8d661b3f582e38cc0a2f91 commit 486164d060314a7f8bca2a00f53be9e900c5e74d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:56 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh-add support for U2F/FIDO keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f88a5181c982687afedf3130c6ab2bba60f7644 commit b9dd14d3091e31fb836f69873d3aa622eb7b4a1c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:14 2019 +0000 upstream: add new agent key constraint for U2F/FIDO provider feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d880c380170704280b4003860a1744d286c7a172 commit 884416bdb10468f1252e4d7c13d51b43dccba7f6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:18:28 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh client support for U2F/FIDO keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb2cfa6cf7419a1895e06e398ea6d41516c5b0bc commit 01a0670f69c5b86e471e033b92145d6c7cc77c58 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:49 2019 +0000 upstream: Separate myproposal.h userauth pubkey types U2F/FIDO keys are not supported for host authentication, so we need a separate list for user keys. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe2e6ab85f9f2338866e5af8ca2d312abbf0429 commit 23f38c2d8cda3fad24e214e1f0133c42435b54ee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:09 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh-keygen support for generating U2F/FIDO keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce04f2b497ac9dd8c327f76f1e6c724fb1d1b37 commit ed3467c1e16b7396ff7fcf12d2769261512935ec Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:16:20 2019 +0000 upstream: U2F/FIDO middleware interface Supports enrolling (generating) keys and signatures. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73d1dd5939454f9c7bd840f48236cba41e8ad592 commit 02bb0768a937e50bbb236efc2bbdddb1991b1c85 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:15:14 2019 +0000 upstream: Initial infrastructure for U2F/FIDO support Key library support: including allocation, marshalling public/private keys and certificates, signature validation. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a17615ba15e0f7932ac4360cb18fc9a9544e68c7 commit 57ecc10628b04c384cbba2fbc87d38b74cd1199d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:14:17 2019 +0000 upstream: Protocol documentation for U2F/FIDO keys in OpenSSH OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8f3247317c2909870593aeb306dff848bc427915 commit f4fdcd2b7a2bbf5d8770d44565173ca5158d4dcb Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 1 08:36:16 2019 +1100 Missing unit test files commit 1bcd1169c5221688418fa38606e9c69055b72451 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Oct 29 19:45:03 2019 +1100 Add implementation of localtime_r. commit 2046ed16c1202431b0307674c33a123a113e8297 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 29 07:47:27 2019 +0000 upstream: Signal handler cleanup: remove leftover support for unreliable signals and now-unneeded save and restore of errno. ok deraadt@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01dd8a1ebdd991c8629ba1f5237283341a93cd88 commit 70fc9a6ca4dd33cb2dd400a4dad5db9683a3d284 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 22 08:50:35 2019 +0000 upstream: fixes from lucas; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c4bfd2806c5bbc753788ffe19c5ee13aaf418b2 commit 702368aa4381c3b482368257ac574a87b5a80938 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 22 07:06:35 2019 +0000 upstream: Import regenerated moduli file. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987 commit 5fe81da22652f8caa63e9e3a1af519a85d36337e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 21:19:47 2019 +1100 Fix ifdefs to not mask needed bits. commit 7694e9d2fb5785bbdd0920dce7a160bd79feaf00 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 17:05:36 2019 +1100 Only use RLIMIT_NOFILE if it's defined. commit d561b0b2fa2531b4cc3bc70a7d657c6485c9fd0b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 16:09:04 2019 +1100 Make sure we have struct statfs before using. commit 2912596aecfcf48e5115c7a906d1e664f7717a4b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 16:06:59 2019 +1100 Define UINT32_MAX if needed. commit 7169e31121e8c8cc729b55154deb722ae495b316 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 16:00:45 2019 +1100 Move utimensat definition into timespec section. Since utimensat uses struct timespec, move it to the section where we define struct timespec when needed. commit 850ec1773d656cbff44d78a79e369dc262ce5853 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 15:57:22 2019 +1100 Wrap OpenSSL bits in WITH_OPENSSL. commit 6fc7e1c6fec3ba589869ae98e968c0e5e2e4695b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 15:53:25 2019 +1100 Wrap poll.h includes in HAVE_POLL_H. commit 9239a18f96905cc1a353e861e33af093652f24e7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Oct 24 14:39:49 2019 +1100 Add a function call stackprotector tests. Including a function call in the test programs for the gcc stack protector flag tests exercises more of the compiler and makes it more likely it'll detect problems. commit b9705393be4612fd5e29d0cd8e7cf2b66ed19eb7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Oct 22 18:09:22 2019 +1100 Import regenerated moduli file. commit 76ed2199491397e0f9902ade80d5271e4a9b2630 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 16 06:05:39 2019 +0000 upstream: potential NULL dereference for revoked hostkeys; reported by krishnaiah bommu OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35ff685e7cc9dd2e3fe2e3dfcdcb9bc5c79f6506 commit 6500c3bc71bf4fe14972c1177e6b93f1164d07a4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 16 06:03:30 2019 +0000 upstream: free buf before return; reported by krishnaiah bommu OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 091bb23a6e913af5d4f72c50030b53ce1cef4de1 commit d7d116b6d9e6cb79cc235e9801caa683d3db3181 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 14 06:00:02 2019 +0000 upstream: memleak in error path; spotted by oss-fuzz, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6ed260cbbc297ab157ad63931802fb1ef7a4266 commit 9b9e3ca6945351eefb821ff783a4a8e6d9b98b9a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Oct 11 14:12:16 2019 +1100 Re-add SA_RESTART to mysignal. This makes mysignal implement reliable BSD semantics according to Stevens' APUE. This was first attempted in 2001 but was reverted due to problems with HP-UX 10.20 and select() and possibly grantpt(). Modern systems should be fine with it, but if any current platforms have a problem with it now we can disable it just for those. ok djm@ commit 0bd312a362168c1eae3cd6b3889395a78e6fd0f8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Oct 10 09:42:03 2019 +1100 Fix ifdef typo for declaration of memmem. Fixes build on IRIX. bz#3081. commit 01ce1cd402d5eecde2bba35b67e08f5b266b37fd Author: Abhishek Arya Date: Tue Oct 8 20:19:18 2019 -0700 Update README.md commit 1ba130ac8fb2884307f658126f04578f8aef409e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 9 13:49:35 2019 +1100 add a fuzzer for private key parsing commit cdf1d0a9f5d18535e0a18ff34860e81a6d83aa5c Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 9 11:31:03 2019 +1100 prepare for 8.1 release commit 3b4e56d740b74324e2d7542957cad5a11518f455 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:57 2019 +0000 upstream: openssh-8.1 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3356bb34e2aa287f0e6d6773c9ae659dc680147d commit 29e0ecd9b4eb3b9f305e2240351f0c59cad9ef81 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:42 2019 +0000 upstream: fix an unreachable integer overflow similar to the XMSS case, and some other NULL dereferences found by fuzzing. fix with and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f81adbb95ef887ce586953e1cb225fa45c7a47b commit a546b17bbaeb12beac4c9aeed56f74a42b18a93a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 9 00:02:57 2019 +0000 upstream: fix integer overflow in XMSS private key parsing. Reported by Adam Zabrocki via SecuriTeam's SSH program. Note that this code is experimental and not compiled by default. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd0361896d15e8a1bac495ac583ff065ffca2be1 commit c2cc25480ba36ab48c1a577bebb12493865aad87 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 8 22:40:39 2019 +0000 upstream: Correct type for end-of-list sentinel; fixes initializer warnings on some platforms. ok deraadt. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a990dbc2dac25bdfa07e79321349c73fd991efa2 commit e827aedf8818e75c0016b47ed8fc231427457c43 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 7 23:10:38 2019 +0000 upstream: reversed test yielded incorrect debug message OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78bb512d04cfc238adb2c5b7504ac93eecf523b3 commit 8ca491d29fbe26e5909ce22b344c0a848dc28d55 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 8 17:05:57 2019 +1100 depend commit 86a0323374cbd404629e75bb320b3fa1c16aaa6b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Oct 9 09:36:06 2019 +1100 Make MAKE_CLONE no-op macro more correct. Similar to the previous change to DEF_WEAK, some compilers don't like the empty statement, so convert into a no-op function prototype. commit cfc1897a2002ec6c4dc879b24e8b3153c87ea2cf Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 9 09:06:35 2019 +1100 wrap stdint.h include in HAVE_STDINT_H make the indenting a little more consistent too.. Fixes Solaris 2.6; reported by Tom G. Christensen commit 13b3369830a43b89a503915216a23816d1b25744 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 8 15:32:02 2019 +1100 avoid "return (value)" in void-declared function spotted by Tim Rice; ok dtucker commit 0c7f8d2326d812b371f7afd63aff846973ec80a4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Oct 8 14:44:50 2019 +1100 Make DEF_WEAK more likely to be correct. Completely nop-ing out DEF_WEAK leaves an empty statemment which some compilers don't like. Replace with a no-op function template. ok djm@ commit b1e79ea8fae9c252399677a28707661d85c7d00c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 6 11:49:50 2019 +0000 upstream: Instead of running sed over the whole log to remove CRs, remove them only where it's needed (and confuses test(1) on at least OS X in portable). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a6ab9b4bd1d33770feaf01b2dfb96f9e4189d2d0 commit 8dc7d6b75a7f746fdd056acd41dffc0a13557a4c Author: Eduardo Barretto Date: Tue May 9 13:33:30 2017 -0300 Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390) The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto commit 07f2c7f34951c04d2cd796ac6c80e47c56c4969e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 4 04:31:59 2019 +0000 upstream: fix memory leak in error path; bz#3074 patch from krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d031853f3ecf47b35a0669588f4d9d8e3b307b3c commit b7fbc75e119170f4d15c94a7fda4a1050e0871d6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 4 04:13:39 2019 +0000 upstream: space OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 350648bcf00a2454e7ef998b7d88e42552b348ac commit 643ab68c79ac1644f4a31e36928c2bfc8a51db3c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 4 03:39:19 2019 +0000 upstream: more sshsig regress tests: check key revocation, the check-novalidate signature test mode and signing keys in ssh-agent. From Sebastian Kinne (slightly tweaked) OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b39566f5cec70140674658cdcedf38752a52e2e2 commit 714031a10bbe378a395a93cf1040f4ee1451f45f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 4 03:26:58 2019 +0000 upstream: Check for gmtime failure in moduli generation. Based on patch from krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c6a4cde0022188ac83737de08da0e875704eeaa commit 6918974405cc28ed977f802fd97a9c9a9b2e141b Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 3 17:07:50 2019 +0000 upstream: use a more common options order in SYNOPSIS and sync usage(); while here, no need for Bk/Ek; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38715c3f10b166f599a2283eb7bc14860211bb90 commit feff96b7d4c0b99307f0459cbff128aede4a8984 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 2 09:50:50 2019 +0000 upstream: thinko in previous; spotted by Mantas =?UTF-8?q?=20Mikul=C4=97nas?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffa3f5a45e09752fc47d9041e2203ee2ec15b24d commit b5a89eec410967d6b712665f8cf0cb632928d74b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 2 08:07:13 2019 +0000 upstream: make signature format match PROTOCO =?UTF-8?q?=20as=20a=20string,=20not=20raw=20bytes.=20Spotted=20by=20Manta?= =?UTF-8?q?s=20Mikul=C4=97nas?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80fcc6d52893f80c6de2bedd65353cebfebcfa8f commit dc6f81ee94995deb11bbf7e19801022c5f6fd90a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 2 08:05:50 2019 +0000 upstream: ban empty namespace strings for s =?UTF-8?q?shsig;=20spotted=20by=20Mantas=20Mikul=C4=97nas?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c5bcf40bed8f4e826230176f4aa353c52aeb698 commit fa5bd8107e0e2b3e1e184f55d0f9320c119f65f0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Oct 2 14:30:55 2019 +1000 Put ssherr.h back as it's actually needed. commit 3ef92a657444f172b61f92d5da66d94fa8265602 Author: Lonnie Abelbeck Date: Tue Oct 1 09:05:09 2019 -0500 Deny (non-fatal) shmget/shmat/shmdt in preauth privsep child. New wait_random_seeded() function on OpenSSL 1.1.1d uses shmget, shmat, and shmdt in the preauth codepath, deny (non-fatal) in seccomp_filter sandbox. commit edd1d3a6261aecbf9a55944fd7be1db83571b46e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 2 10:54:28 2019 +1000 remove duplicate #includes Prompted by Jakub Jelen commit 13c508dfed9f25e6e54c984ad00a74ef08539e70 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 2 10:51:15 2019 +1000 typo in comment commit d0c3ac427f6c52b872d6617421421dd791664445 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 2 00:42:30 2019 +0000 upstream: remove some duplicate #includes OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed6827ab921eff8027669848ef4f70dc1da4098c commit 084682786d9275552ee93857cb36e43c446ce92c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 1 10:22:53 2019 +0000 upstream: revert unconditional forced login implemented in r1.41 of ssh-pkcs11.c; r1.45 added a forced login as a fallback for cases where the token returns no objects and this is less disruptive for users of tokens directly in ssh (rather than via ssh-agent) and in ssh-keygen bz3006, patch from Jakub Jelen; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33d6df589b072094384631ff93b1030103b3d02e commit 6c91d42cce3f055917dc3fd2c305dfc5b3b584b3 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sun Sep 29 16:31:57 2019 +0000 upstream: group and sort single letter options; ok deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1480e760a2b582f79696cdcff70098e23fc603f commit 3b44bf39ff4d7ef5d50861e2e9dda62d2926d2fe Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 27 20:03:24 2019 +0000 upstream: fix the DH-GEX text in -a; because this required a comma, i added a comma to the first part, for balance... OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c3464e9e82a41e8cdfe8f0a16d94266e43dbb58 commit 3e53ef28fab53094e3b19622ba0e9c3d5fe71273 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 24 12:50:46 2019 +0000 upstream: identity_file[] should be PATH_MAX, not the arbitrary number 1024 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e775f94ad47ce9ab37bd1410d7cf3b7ea98b11b7 commit 90d4b2541e8c907793233d9cbd4963f7624f4174 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 20 18:50:58 2019 +0000 upstream: new sentence, new line; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35ca5ec07be460e95e7406af12eee04a77b6698 commit fbec7dba01b70b49ac47f56031310865dff86200 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Sep 30 18:01:12 2019 +1000 Include stdio.h for snprintf. Patch from vapier@gentoo.org. commit 0a403bfde71c4b82147473298d3a60b4171468bd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Sep 30 14:11:42 2019 +1000 Add SKIP_LTESTS for skipping specific tests. commit 4d59f7a5169c451ebf559aedec031ac9da2bf80c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 27 05:25:12 2019 +0000 upstream: Test for empty result in expected bits. Remove CRs from log as they confuse tools on some platforms. Re-enable the 3des-cbc test. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: edf536d4f29fc1ba412889b37247a47f1b49d250 commit 7c817d129e2d48fc8a6f7965339313023ec45765 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Sep 27 15:26:22 2019 +1000 Re-enable dhgex test. Since we've added larger fallback groups to dh.c this test will pass even if there is no moduli file installed on the system. commit c1e0a32fa852de6d1c82ece4f76add0ab0ca0eae Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Sep 24 21:17:20 2019 +1000 Add more ToS bits, currently only used by netcat. commit 5a273a33ca1410351cb484af7db7c13e8b4e8e4e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Sep 19 15:41:23 2019 +1000 Privsep is now required. commit 8aa2aa3cd4d27d14e74b247c773696349472ef20 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Sep 16 03:23:02 2019 +0000 upstream: Allow testing signature syntax and validity without verifying that a signature came from a trusted signer. To discourage accidental or unintentional use, this is invoked by the deliberately ugly option name "check-novalidate" from Sebastian Kinne OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cea42c36ab7d6b70890e2d8635c1b5b943adcc0b commit 7047d5afe3103f0f07966c05b810682d92add359 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 13 04:52:34 2019 +0000 upstream: clarify that IdentitiesOnly also applies to the default ~/.ssh/id_* keys; bz#3062 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 604be570e04646f0f4a17026f8b2aada6a585dfa commit b36ee3fcb2f1601693b1b7fd60dd6bd96006ea75 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 13 04:36:43 2019 +0000 upstream: Plug mem leaks on error paths, based in part on github pr#120 from David Carlier. ok djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c57adeb1022a8148fc86e5a88837b3b156dbdb7e commit 2aefdf1aef906cf7548a2e5927d35aacb55948d4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 13 04:31:19 2019 +0000 upstream: whitespace OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a71dd5f4cae8d61e0ac631a862589fb2bfd700 commit fbe24b142915331ceb2a3a76be3dc5b6d204fddf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 13 04:27:35 2019 +0000 upstream: allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings From Zachary Harmany via github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/118 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7eebf1b7695f50c66d42053d352a4db9e8fb84b6 commit 2ce1d11600e13bee0667d6b717ffcc18a057b821 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 13 04:07:42 2019 +0000 upstream: clarify that ConnectTimeout applies both to the TCP connection and to the protocol handshake/KEX. From Jean-Charles Longuet via Github PR140 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce1766abc6da080f0d88c09c2c5585a32b2256bf commit df780114278f406ef7cb2278802a2660092fff09 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Sep 9 02:31:19 2019 +0000 upstream: Fix potential truncation warning. ok deraadt. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d87b7e3a94ec935e8194e7fce41815e22804c3ff commit ec0e6243660bf2df30c620a6a0d83eded376c9c6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Sep 13 13:14:39 2019 +1000 memleak of buffer in sshpam_query coverity report via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@ commit c17e4638e5592688264fc0349f61bfc7b4425aa5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Sep 13 13:12:42 2019 +1000 explicitly test set[ug]id() return values Legacy !_POSIX_SAVED_IDS path only; coverity report via Ed Maste ok dtucker@ commit 91a2135f32acdd6378476c5bae475a6e7811a6a2 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 6 14:45:34 2019 +0000 upstream: Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the default set by starting the list with the '^' character, e.g. HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519 Ciphers ^aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com ok djm@ dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e1996fac0dc8a4b0d0ff58395135848287f6f97 commit c8bdd2db77ac2369d5cdee237656f266c8f41552 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 6 07:53:40 2019 +0000 upstream: key conversion should fail for !openssl builds, not fall through to the key generation code OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b957436adc43c4941e61d61958a193a708bc83c9 commit 823f6c37eb2d8191d45539f7b6fa877a4cb4ed3d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 6 06:08:11 2019 +0000 upstream: typo in previous OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c3b94110864771a6b80a0d8acaca34037c3c96e commit 6a710d3e06fd375e2c2ae02546b9541c488a2cdb Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Sep 8 14:48:11 2019 +1000 needs time.h for --without-openssl commit f61f29afda6c71eda26effa54d3c2e5306fd0833 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 7 19:25:00 2019 +1000 make unittests pass for no-openssl case commit 105e1c9218940eb53473f55a9177652d889ddbad Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 6 05:59:41 2019 +0000 upstream: avoid compiling certain files that deeply depend on libcrypto when WITH_OPENSSL isn't set OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061 commit 670104b923dd97b1c06c0659aef7c3e52af571b2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 6 05:23:55 2019 +0000 upstream: fixes for !WITH_OPENSSL compilation; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fd68eaa9e0f7482b5d4c7e8d740aed4770a839f commit be02d7cbde3d211ec2ed2320a1f7d86b2339d758 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 6 04:53:27 2019 +0000 upstream: lots of things were relying on libcrypto headers to transitively include various system headers (mostly stdlib.h); include them explicitly OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b522f4f2d844f78bf1cc4f3f4cc392e177b2080 commit d05aaaaadcad592abfaa44540928e0c61ef72ebb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 6 03:30:42 2019 +0000 upstream: remove leakmalloc reference; we used this early when refactoring but not since OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb28ebda8f7c490b87b37954044a6cdd43a7eb2c commit 1268f0bcd8fc844ac6c27167888443c8350005eb Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 6 04:24:06 2019 +0000 upstream: Check for RSA support before using it for the user key, otherwise use ed25519 which is supported when built without OpenSSL. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d23ddfe83c5062f00ac845d463f19a2ec78c0f7 commit fd7a2dec652b9efc8e97f03f118f935dce732c60 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Sep 6 14:07:10 2019 +1000 Provide explicit path to configure-check. On some platforms (at least OpenBSD) make won't search VPATH for target files, so building out-of-tree will fail at configure-check. Provide explicit path. ok djm@ commit 00865c29690003b4523cc09a0e104724b9f911a4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 6 01:58:50 2019 +0000 upstream: better error code for bad arguments; inspired by OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfc263b6041de7f0ed921a1de0b81ddebfab1e0a commit afdf27f5aceb4973b9f5308f4310c6e3fd8db1fb Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 5 21:38:40 2019 +1000 revert config.h/config.h.in freshness checks turns out autoreconf and configure don't touch some files if their content doesn't change, so the mtime can't be relied upon in a makefile rule commit a97609e850c57bd2cc2fe7e175fc35cb865bc834 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 5 20:54:39 2019 +1000 extend autoconf freshness test make it cover config.h.in and config.h separately commit 182297c10edb21c4856c6a38326fd04d81de41a5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 5 20:34:54 2019 +1000 check that configure/config.h is up to date Ensure they are newer than the configure.ac / aclocal.m4 source commit 7d6034bd020248e9fc0f8c39c71c858debd0d0c1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 5 10:05:51 2019 +0000 upstream: if a PKCS#11 token returns no keys then try to login and refetch them. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen; bz#2430 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab53bd6ddd54dd09e54a8bfbed1a984496f08b43 commit 76f09bd95917862101b740afb19f4db5ccc752bf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 5 09:35:19 2019 +0000 upstream: sprinkle in some explicit errors here, otherwise the percolate all the way up to dispatch_run_fatal() and lose all meaninful context to help with bz#3063; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b2da83bb1c4a3471444b7910b2120ae36438a0a commit 0ea332497b2b2fc3995f72f6bafe9d664c0195b3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 5 09:25:13 2019 +0000 upstream: only send ext_info for KEX_INITIAL; bz#2929 ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f5c6062f6863769f5447c6346f78c05d2e4a63 commit f23d91f9fa7f6f42e70404e000fac88aebfe3076 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 5 05:47:23 2019 +0000 upstream: macro fix; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e891dd6c7996114cb32f0924cb7898ab55efde6e commit 8b57337c1c1506df2bb9f039d0628a6de618566b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 5 15:46:39 2019 +1000 update fuzzing makefile to more recent clang commit ae631ad77daf8fd39723d15a687cd4b1482cbae8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 5 15:45:32 2019 +1000 fuzzer for sshsig allowed_signers option parsing commit 69159afe24120c97e5ebaf81016c85968afb903e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 5 05:42:59 2019 +0000 upstream: memleak on error path; found by libfuzzer OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34d44cb0fb5bdb5fcbc6b02b804e71b20a7a5fc7 commit bab6feb01f9924758ca7129dba708298a53dde5f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 5 04:55:32 2019 +0000 upstream: expose allowed_signers options parsing code in header for fuzzing rename to make more consistent with philosophically-similar auth options parsing API. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c67600ef04187f98e2912ca57b60c22a8025b7c commit 4f9d75fbafde83d428e291516f8ce98e6b3a7c4b Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 4 20:31:15 2019 +0000 upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics. Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus character to remove from or append to the default list, respectively. Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix, so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for all options supporting these semantics. Fix instances missed in first commit. ok jmc@ kn@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7112522430a54fb9f15a7a26d26190ed84d5e417 commit db1e6f60f03641b2d17e0ab062242609f4ed4598 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 4 05:56:54 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0abd728aef6b5b35f6db43176aa83b7e3bf3ce27 commit 0f44e5956c7c816f6600f2a47be4d7bb5a8d711d Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 20:51:49 2019 +0000 upstream: repair typo and editing mishap OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d125ab720ca71ccf9baf83e08ddc8c12a328597e commit f4846dfc6a79f84bbc6356ae3184f142bacedc24 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 5 11:09:28 2019 +1000 Fuzzer harness for sshsig commit b08a6bc1cc7750c6f8a425d1cdbd86552fffc637 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Sep 3 18:45:42 2019 +1000 oops; missed including the actual file commit 1a72c0dd89f09754df443c9576dde624a17d7dd0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Sep 3 18:44:10 2019 +1000 portability fixes for sshsig commit 6d6427d01304d967e58544cf1c71d2b4394c0522 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:45 2019 +0000 upstream: regress test for sshsig; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c0974f2cdae8d9599b9d76a09680bae55d8a8b commit 59650f0eaf65115afe04c39abfb93a4fc994ec55 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:06 2019 +0000 upstream: only add plain keys to prevent any certs laying around from confusing the test. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b8f1508f822bc560b98dea910e61ecd76f34100f commit d637c4aee6f9b5280c13c020d7653444ac1fcaa5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:35:27 2019 +0000 upstream: sshsig tweaks and improvements from and suggested by Markus ok markus/me OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea4f46ad5a16b27af96e08c4877423918c4253e9 commit 2a9c9f7272c1e8665155118fe6536bebdafb6166 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:34:19 2019 +0000 upstream: sshsig: lightweight signature and verification ability for OpenSSH This adds a simple manual signature scheme to OpenSSH. Signatures can be made and verified using ssh-keygen -Y sign|verify Signatures embed the key used to make them. At verification time, this is matched via principal name against an authorized_keys-like list of allowed signers. Mostly by Sebastian Kinne w/ some tweaks by me ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ab568e7114c933346616392579d72be65a4b8fb commit 5485f8d50a5bc46aeed829075ebf5d9c617027ea Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:32:11 2019 +0000 upstream: move authorized_keys option parsing helpsers to misc.c and make them public; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c18bcb2a687227b3478377c981c2d56af2638ea2 commit f8df0413f0a057b6a3d3dd7bd8bc7c5d80911d3a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:31:20 2019 +0000 upstream: make get_sigtype public as sshkey_get_sigtype(); ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f8cdbec63350490d2249f41112c5780d1cfbb8 commit dd8002fbe63d903ffea5be7b7f5fc2714acab4a0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:30:47 2019 +0000 upstream: move advance_past_options to authfile.c and make it public; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edda2fbba2c5b1f48e60f857a2010479e80c5f3c commit c72d78ccbe642e08591a626e5de18381489716e0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:58 2019 +0000 upstream: move skip_space() to misc.c and make it public; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caa77e8a3b210948e29ad3e28c5db00852961eae commit 06af3583f46e2c327fdd44d8a95b8b4e8dfd8db5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:15 2019 +0000 upstream: authfd: add function to check if key is in agent This commit adds a helper function which allows the caller to check if a given public key is present in ssh-agent. work by Sebastian Kinne; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d43c5826353e1fdc1af71eb42961b30782c7bd13 commit 2ab5a8464870cc4b29ddbe849bbbc255729437bf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:28:30 2019 +0000 upstream: fix memleak in ssh_free_identitylist(); ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa51f77ae2c5330a1f61b2d22933f24a443f9abf commit 85443f165b4169b2a448b3e24bc1d4dc5b3156a4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 3 08:27:52 2019 +0000 upstream: factor out confirm_overwrite(); ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 304e95381b39c774c8fced7e5328b106a3ff0400 commit 9a396e33685633581c67d5ad9664570ef95281f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Sep 2 23:46:46 2019 +0000 upstream: constify an argument OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 724bafc9f993746ad4303e95bede2c030de6233b commit b52c0c2e64988277a35a955a474d944967059aeb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Sep 2 00:19:25 2019 +0000 upstream: downgrade PKCS#11 "provider returned no slots" warning from log level error to debug. This is common when attempting to enumerate keys on smartcard readers with no cards plugged in. bz#3058 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb8839ddeb77c271390488af1b771041d43e49c6 commit 0713322e18162463c5ab5ddfb9f935055ca775d8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Sep 1 23:47:32 2019 +0000 upstream: print comment when printing pubkey from private bz#3052; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a91b2a8d5f1053d34d7fce44523c53fb534ba914 commit 368f1cc2fbd6ad10c66bc1b67c2c04aebf8a04a8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Sep 2 10:28:42 2019 +1000 fixed test in OSX closefrom() replacement from likan_999.student AT sina.com commit 6b7c53498def19a14dd9587bf521ab6dbee8988f Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Sep 2 10:22:02 2019 +1000 retain Solaris PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY in sftp-server Dropping this privilege removes the ability to create hard links to files owned by other users. This is required for the legacy sftp rename operation. bz#3036; approach ok Alex Wilson (the original author of the Solaris sandbox/pledge replacement code) commit e50f808712393e86d69e42e9847cdf8d473412d7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 30 05:08:28 2019 +0000 upstream: Use ed25519 for most hostkey rotation tests since it's supported even when built without OpenSSL. Use RSA for the secondary type test if supported, otherwise skip it. Fixes this test for !OpenSSL builds. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 101cb34a84fd974c623bdb2e496f25a6e91be109 commit 5e4796c47dd8d6c38fb2ff0b3e817525fed6040d Author: bluhm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 22 21:47:27 2019 +0000 upstream: Test did not compile due to missing symbols. Add source sshbuf-misc.c to regress as it was done in ssh make file. from Moritz Buhl OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5 commit e0e7e3d0e26f2c30697e6d0cfc293414908963c7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 30 14:26:19 2019 +1000 tweak warning flags Enable -Wextra if compiler supports it Set -Wno-error=format-truncation if available to prevent expected string truncations in openbsd-compat from breaking -Werror builds commit 28744182cf90e0073b76a9e98de58a47e688b2c4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 30 13:21:38 2019 +1000 proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() for OS X Refactor closefrom() to use a single brute-force close() loop fallback. Based on patch from likan_999.student@sina.com in bz#3049. ok dtucker@ commit dc2ca588144f088a54febebfde3414568dc73d5f Author: kn@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 16 11:16:32 2019 +0000 upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus character to remove from or append to the default list respectively. Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix, so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for all options supporting this semantics (those that provide a list of available elements via "ssh -Q ..."). Input and OK jmc OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fdd175b0e5f5cb10ab3f26ccc38a93bb6515d57 commit c4736f39e66729ce2bf5b06ee6b391e092b48f47 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 16 06:35:27 2019 +0000 upstream: include sshbuf-misc.c in SRCS_BASE OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474 commit d0e51810f332fe44ebdba41113aacf319d35f5a5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Aug 24 15:12:11 2019 +1000 Fix pasto in fallback code. There is no parameter called "pathname", it should simply be "path". bz#3059, patch from samuel at cendio.se. commit e83c989bfd9fc9838b7dfb711d1dc6da81814045 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 23 10:19:30 2019 +1000 use SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK to limit mmap protections Restrict to PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE), i.e. exclude PROT_EXEC commit f6906f9bf12c968debec3671bbf19926ff8a235b Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 23 10:08:48 2019 +1000 allow mprotect(2) with PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE) only Used by some hardened heap allocators. Requested by Yegor Timoshenko in https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/142 commit e3b6c966b79c3ea5d51b923c3bbdc41e13b96ea0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 16 06:13:15 2019 +0000 upstream: switch percent_expand() to use sshbuf instead of a limited fixed buffer; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3f9ef20bca5ef5058b48c1cac67c53b9a1d15711 commit 9ab5b9474779ac4f581d402ae397f871ed16b383 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 9 05:05:54 2019 +0000 upstream: produce a useful error message if the user's shell is set incorrectly during "match exec" processing. bz#2791 reported by Dario Bertini; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf9eddd6a6be726cb73bd9c3936f3888cd85c03d commit 8fdbc7247f432578abaaca1b72a0dbf5058d67e5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 9 04:24:03 2019 +0000 upstream: Change description of TCPKeepAlive from "inactive" to "unresponsive" to clarify what it checks for. Patch from jblaine at kickflop.net via github pr#129, ok djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3682f8ec7227f5697945daa25d11ce2d933899e9 commit 7afc45c3ed72672690014dc432edc223b23ae288 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 8 08:02:57 2019 +0000 upstream: Allow the maximimum uint32 value for the argument passed to -b which allows better error messages from later validation. bz#3050, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10adf6876b2401b3dc02da580ebf67af05861673 commit c31e4f5fb3915c040061981a67224de7650ab34b Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 5 21:45:27 2019 +0000 upstream: Many key types are supported now, so take care to check the size restrictions and apply the default size only to the matching key type. tweak and ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b825de92d79cc4cba19b298c61e99909488ff57e commit 6b39a7b49ebacec4e70e24bfc8ea2f11057aac22 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 5 11:50:33 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove now-redundant perm_ok arg since sshkey_load_private_type will now return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS in that case. Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07916a17ed0a252591b71e7fb4be2599cb5b0c77 commit d46075b923bf25e6f25959a3f5b458852161cb3e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Aug 5 21:36:48 2019 +1000 Fix mem leak in unit test. Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com. commit c4ffb72593c08921cf9291bc05a5ef1d0aaa6891 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 2 01:41:24 2019 +0000 upstream: fix some memleaks in test_helper code bz#3037 from Jitendra Sharma OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 71440fa9186f5842a65ce9a27159385c6cb6f751 commit 6e76e69dc0c7712e9ac599af34bd091b0e7dcdb5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 2 01:23:19 2019 +0000 upstream: typo; from Christian Hesse OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 82f6de7438ea7ee5a14f44fdf5058ed57688fdc3 commit 49fa065a1bfaeb88a59abdfa4432d3b9c35b0655 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 30 05:04:49 2019 +0000 upstream: let sshbuf_find/cmp take a void* for the search/comparison argument, instead of a u_char*. Saves callers needing to cast. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d63b69b7c5dd570963e682f758f5a47b825605ed commit 7adf6c430d6fc17901e167bc0789d31638f5c2f8 Author: mestre@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 24 08:57:00 2019 +0000 upstream: When using a combination of a Yubikey+GnuPG+remote forwarding the gpg-agent (and options ControlMaster+RemoteForward in ssh_config(5)) then the codepath taken will call mux_client_request_session -> mm_send_fd -> sendmsg(2). Since sendmsg(2) is not allowed in that codepath then pledge(2) kills the process. The solution is to add "sendfd" to pledge(2), which is not too bad considering a little bit later we reduce pledge(2) to only "stdio proc tty" in that codepath. Problem reported and diff provided by Timothy Brown OK deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ce38b6542bbec00e441595d0a178e970a9472ac commit 0e2fe18acc1da853a9120c2e9af68e8d05e6503e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 23 23:06:57 2019 +0000 upstream: Fix typo in CASignatureAlgorithms wherein what should be a comma is a dot. Patch from hnj2 via github pr#141. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f5a460438ff1af09aab483c0a70065309445f0 commit e93ffd1a19fc47c49d68ae2fb332433690ecd389 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 29 16:04:01 2019 +1000 Report success of individual tests as well as all. This puts the "all tests passed" message back at the end where the test harnesses can find it. commit 2ad5b36b18bddf2965fe60384c29b3f1d451b4ed Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jul 29 09:49:23 2019 +1000 convert to UTF-8; from Mike Frysinger commit d31e7c937ba0b97534f373cf5dea34675bcec602 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 26 04:22:21 2019 +0000 upstream: Restrict limit-keytype to types supported by build. This means we have to skip a couple tests when only one key type is supported. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 22d05befb9c7ce21ce8dc22acf1ffe9e2ef2e95e commit 0967a233b8a28907ae8a4a6773c89f21d2ace11b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jul 25 18:36:28 2019 +1000 Remove override disabling DH-GEX. The DH-GEX override doesn't work when build without OpenSSL, and we'll prefer curve25519 these days, removing the need for it. commit 061407efc19b41ab4a7485e5adcff2a12befacdb Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 25 09:17:35 2019 +0000 upstream: Only use supported key types during KRL test, preferring ed25519 since it's supported by both OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL builds. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9f2bb3eadd50fcc8245b1bd8fd6f0e53602f71aa commit 47f8ff1fa5b76790c1d785815fd13ee6009f8012 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 25 08:48:11 2019 +0000 upstream: Switch keys-command test from rsa to ed25519 since it's supported for both OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL builds. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 174be4be876edd493e4a5c851e5bc579885e7a0a commit 1e94afdfa8df774ab7dd3bad52912b636dc31bbd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 25 08:28:15 2019 +0000 upstream: Make certificate tests work with the supported key algorithms. Allows tests to pass when built without OpenSSL. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 617169a6dd9d06db3697a449d9a26c284eca20fc commit 26bf693661a48b97b6023f702b2af643676ac21a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 23 13:49:14 2019 +0000 upstream: Construct list of key types to test based on the types supported by the binaries. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fcbd115efacec8ab0ecbdb3faef79ac696cb1d62 commit 773c55b3d1230e8f7714a1b33873c37b85049c74 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 23 13:32:48 2019 +0000 upstream: Only use DSA key type in tests if binaries support it. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 770e31fe61dc33ed8eea9c04ce839b33ddb4dc96 commit 159e987a54d92ccd73875e7581ffc64e8927a715 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 24 14:21:19 2019 +1000 Split test targets further. Splits test into file-tests, t-exec, unit and interop-tests and their respective dependencies. Should allow running any set individually without having to build the other dependencies that are not needed for that specific test. commit 520d4550a2470106d63e30079bb05ce82f3a4f7d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 24 11:20:18 2019 +1000 Add lib dependencies for regress binary targets. commit 4e8d0dd78d5f6142841a07dc8b8c6b4730eaf587 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 24 00:12:51 2019 +1000 Make "unit" a dependency of "test". commit 4317b2a0480e293e58ba115e47b49d3a384b6568 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 23 23:24:47 2019 +1000 upstream rev 1.28: fix comment typo. commit e0055af2bd39fdb44566ff6594147664e1fac8b8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 23 23:06:22 2019 +1000 Split regress-binaries into two targets. Split the binaries for the unit tests out into a regress-unit-binaries target, and add a dependency on it for only the unit tests. This allows us to run the integration tests only ("make t-exec") without building the unit tests, which allows us to run a subset of the tests when building --without-openssl without trying (and failing) to build the unit tests. This means there are two targets for "unit" which I *think* is valid (it works in testing, and makedepend will generate Makefiles of this form)a but I could be wrong. commit 7cdf9fdcf11aaaa98c2bd22c92882ea559e772ad Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 23 08:19:29 2019 +0000 upstream: Skip DH group generation test if binaries don't support DH-GEX. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7c918230d969ecf7656babd6191a74526bffbffd commit 3a3eab8bb0da3d2f0f32cb85a1a268bcca6e4d69 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 23 07:55:29 2019 +0000 upstream: Only test conversion of key types supported by the binaries. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e3f0938a0a7407e2dfbb90abc3ec979ab6e8eeea commit 7e66b7d98c6e3f48a1918c3e1940c9b11b10ec63 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 23 07:39:43 2019 +0000 upstream: Only add ssh-dss to allowed key types if it's supported by the binary. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 395a54cab16e9e4ece9aec047ab257954eebd413 commit fd0684b319e664d8821dc4ca3026126dfea3ccf4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 23 22:36:39 2019 +1000 Remove sys/cdefs.h include. It's not needed on -portable (that's handled by includes.h) and not all platforms have it. commit 9634ffbf29b3c2493e69d10b37077b09a8cbf5ff Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 23 22:25:44 2019 +1000 Add headers to prevent warnings w/out OpenSSL. commit 2ea60312e1c08dea88982fec68244f89a40912ff Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 23 22:11:50 2019 +1000 Include stdlib.h for free() and calloc(). commit 11cba2a4523fda447e2554ea457484655bedc831 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 23 21:51:22 2019 +1000 Re-apply portability changes to current sha2.{c,h}. Rather than attempt to apply 14 years' worth of changes to OpenBSD's sha2 I imported the current versions directly then re-applied the portability changes. This also allowed re-syncing digest-libc.c against upstream. commit 09159594a3bbd363429ee6fafde57ce77986dd7c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 23 20:27:51 2019 +1000 Import current sha2.c and sha2.h from OpenBSD. These are not changed from their original state, the next commit will re-apply the portable changes. commit 2e6035b900cc9d7432d95084e03993d1b426f812 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 23 08:11:22 2019 +1000 Rename valgrind "errors" to "failures". When valgrind is enabled, test-exec.sh counts the number of invocations that valgrind detects failures in, not the total number of errors detected. This makes the name to be more accurate. commit e82c9bb9ffa65725cc2e03ea81cb79ce3387f66b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 19 18:51:18 2019 +1000 Skip running sftp-chroot under Valgrind. commit 41e22c2e05cb950b704945ac9408f6109c9b7848 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 20 09:50:58 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove the sleeps and thus races from the forwarding test. They were originally required to work with Protocol 1, but now we can use ssh -N and the control socket without the sleeps. While there, suppress output fro the control exit commands. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c51a1d651242f12c90074c18c61008a74c1c790 commit 0423043c5e54293f4dd56041304fd0046c317be9 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 20 09:37:31 2019 +0000 upstream: Allow SLEEPTIME to be overridden. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1596ab168729954be3d219933b2d01cc93687e76 commit d466b6a5cfba17a83c7aae9f584ab164e2ece0a1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 20 09:14:40 2019 +0000 upstream: Move sleep time into a variable so that we can increase it for platforms or configurations that are much slower then usual. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88586cabc800062c260d0b876bdcd4ca3f58a872 commit b4a7c9d2b5f928e0b902b580d35dc8b244a3aae0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 19 03:45:44 2019 +0000 upstream: add regression tests for scp for out-of-destination path file creation by Harry Sintonen via Jakub Jelen in bz3007 OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 01ae5fbc6ce400b2df5a84dc3152a9e31f354c07 commit bca0582063f148c7ddf409ec51435a5a726bee4c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 19 03:38:01 2019 +0000 upstream: Accept the verbose flag when searching for host keys in known hosts (i.e. "ssh-keygen -vF host") to print the matching host's random- art signature too. bz#3003 "amusing, pretty" deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 686221a5447d6507f40a2ffba5393984d889891f commit 5299a09fa2879a068af200c91028fcfa9283c0f0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 19 13:50:25 2019 +1000 Revert one dependency per line change. It turns out that having such a large number of lines in the .depend file will cause the memory usage of awk during AC_SUBST to blow up on at least NetBSD's awk, causing configure to fail. commit 01dddb231f23b4a7b616f9d33a0b9d937f9eaf0e Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 19 13:19:19 2019 +1000 fix SIGWINCH delivery of Solaris for mux sessions Remove PRIV_PROC_SESSION which was limiting ability to send SIGWINCH signals to other sessions. bz#3030; report and fix from Darren Moffat commit 05500af21d27c1a3ddac232b018cc23da7b1ee95 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 19 13:20:03 2019 +1000 Force dependencies one per line. Force makedepend to output one dependency per line, which will make reading diffs against it much easier. ok djm@ commit b5bc5d016bbb83eb7f8e685390044e78b1ea1427 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 19 13:18:07 2019 +1000 make depend. commit 65333f7454365fe40f7367630e7dd10903b9d99e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 19 13:16:11 2019 +1000 Show when skipping valgrind for a test. commit fccb7eb3436da8ef3dcd22e5936ba1abc7ae6730 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 19 10:41:56 2019 +1000 Enable connect-privsep test with valgrind. connect-privsep seems to work OK with valgrind now so don't skip valgrind on it. commit d7423017265c5ae6d0be39340feb6c9f016b1f71 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 19 07:43:07 2019 +1000 Show valgrind results and error counts. commit 22b9b3e944880db906c6ac5527c4228bd92b293a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jul 18 13:40:12 2019 +1000 Fix format string integer type in error message. commit ed46a0c0705895834d3f47a46faa89c2a71b760a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 18 13:26:00 2019 +0000 upstream: fix off-by-one in sshbuf_dtob64() base64 wrapping that could cause extra newlines to be appended at the end of the base64 text (ugly, but harmless). Found and fixed by Sebastian Kinne OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fe290bd68f706ed8f986a7704ca5a2bd32d7b68 commit a192021fedead23c375077f92346336d531f8cad Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jul 18 11:09:38 2019 +1000 Fail tests if Valgrind enabled and reports errors. Also dump the failing valgrind report to stdout (not the cleanest solution, but better than nothing). commit d1c491ecb939ee10b341fa7bb6205dff19d297e5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jul 18 10:17:54 2019 +1000 Allow low-priv tests to write to pipe dir. When running regression tests with Valgrind and SUDO, the low-priv agent tests need to be able to create pipes in the appropriate directory. commit 8a5bb3e78191cc206f970c26d2a26c949971e91a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 17 21:24:55 2019 +1000 Put valgrind vgdb files to a specific directory. Valgrind by default puts vgdb files and pipes under /tmp, however it is not always able to clean them up, which can cause test failures when there's a pid/file collision. Using a specific directory ensures that we can clean up and start clean. commit f8829fe57fb0479d6103cfe1190095da3c032c6d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 16 22:16:49 2019 +0000 upstream: adapt to sshbuf_dtob64() change OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 82374a83edf0955fd1477169eee3f5d6467405a6 commit 1254fcbb2f005f745f2265016ee9fa52e16d37b0 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 16 03:21:54 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove ssh1 files from CLEANFILES since ssh1 no longer supported. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5b9ae869dc669bac05939b4a2fdf44ee067acfa0 commit 9dc81a5adabc9a7d611ed2e63fbf4c85d43b15c6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 16 02:09:29 2019 +0000 upstream: Update names of host key files in CLEANFILES to match recent changes to the tests. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 28743052de3acf70b06f18333561497cd47c4ecf commit e44e4ad1190db22ed407a79f32a8cff5bcd2b815 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jul 16 23:26:53 2019 +1000 depend commit 16dd8b2c78a0de106c7429e2a294d203f6bda3c7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 16 13:18:39 2019 +0000 upstream: remove mostly vestigal uuencode.[ch]; moving the only unique functionality there (wrapping of base64-encoded data) to sshbuf functions; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dba6735d88c57232f6fccec8a08bdcfea44ac4c commit 45478898f9590b5cc8bc7104e573b84be67443b0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 16 09:20:23 2019 +1000 Hook memmem compat code into build. This fixes builds on platforms that don't have it (at least old DragonFly, probably others). commit c7bd4617293a903bd3fac3394a7e72d439af49a5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 16 09:07:18 2019 +1000 Import memmem.c from OpenBSD. commit 477e2a3be8b10df76e8d76f0427b043280d73d68 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 15 13:12:02 2019 +0000 upstream: unit tests for sshbuf_cmp() and sshbuf_find(); ok markus OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b52d36bc3ab6dc158c1e59a9a4735f821cf9e1fd commit eb0d8e708a1f958aecd2d6e2ff2450af488d4c2a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 15 13:16:29 2019 +0000 upstream: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save private keys to disk. The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single round of MD5 as a KDF). adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1 commit e18a27eedccb024acb3cd9820b650a5dff323f01 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 15 13:11:38 2019 +0000 upstream: two more bounds-checking sshbuf counterparts to common string operations: sshbuf_cmp() (bcmp-like) and sshbuf_find() (memmem like) feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd071ec2485c7198074a168ff363a0d6052a706a commit bc551dfebb55845537b1095cf3ccd01640a147b7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 15 12:52:45 2019 +1000 Clear valgrind-out dir to prevent collisions. commit 5db9ba718e983661a9114ae1418f6e412d1f52d5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 15 12:02:27 2019 +1000 Allow agent tests to write to valgrind dir. commit 121e48fa5305f41f0477d9908e3d862987a68a84 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jul 14 23:33:19 2019 +0000 upstream: unit tests for sshbuf_peek/poke bounds-checked random access functions. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 034c4284b1da6b12e25c762a6b958efacdafbaef commit 101d164723ffbc38f8036b6f3ea3bfef771ba250 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jul 14 23:32:27 2019 +0000 upstream: add some functions to perform random-access read/write operations inside buffers with bounds checking. Intended to replace manual pointer arithmetic wherever possible. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91771fde7732738f1ffed078aa5d3bee6d198409 commit 7250879c72d28275a53f2f220e49646c3e42ef18 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 12 04:08:39 2019 +0000 upstream: include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX proposal; allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that disable olde SHA1 ssh-rsa. bz#3029 from Jakub Jelen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f95ebf76a150c2f727ca4780fb2599d50bbab7a commit a0876bd994cab9ba6e47ba2a163a4417c7597487 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 12 03:56:21 2019 +0000 upstream: print explicit "not modified" message if a file was requested for resumed download but was considered already complete. bz#2978 ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f32084b26a662f16215ee4ca4a403d67e49ab986 commit b9b0f2ac9625933db53a35b1c1ce423876630558 Author: tb@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 10 07:04:27 2019 +0000 upstream: Fix a typo and make move right to the closest end of a word just like moves left to the closest beginning of a word. ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6afe01b05ed52d8b12eb1fda6e9af5afb5e198ee commit 8729498a5d239980a91d32f031b34e8c58c52f62 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 10 09:43:19 2019 +1000 fix typo that prevented detection of Linux VRF Reported by hexiaowen AT huawei.com commit 5b2b79ff7c057ee101518545727ed3023372891d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 9 04:15:00 2019 +0000 upstream: cap the number of permiopen/permitlisten directives we're willing to parse on a single authorized_keys line; ok deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a43a752c2555d26aa3fc754805a476f6e3e30f46 commit eb0b51dac408fadd1fd13fa6d726ab8fdfcc4152 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 8 17:27:26 2019 +1000 Move log.h include inside ifdefs. Fixes build on some other platforms that don't have va_list immediately available (eg NetBSD). commit 43702f8e6fa22a258e25c4dd950baaae0bc656b7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 6 23:07:04 2019 +1000 Include log.h for debug() and friends. Should fix some compiler warnings on IRIX (bz#3032). commit 53a6ebf1445a857f5e487b18ee5e5830a9575149 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jul 8 13:44:32 2019 +1000 sftp-realpath.c needs includes.h commit 4efe1adf05ee5d3fce44320fcff68735891f4ee6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jul 8 13:38:39 2019 +1000 remove realpath() compat replacement We shipped a BSD implementation of realpath() because sftp-server depended on its behaviour. OpenBSD is now moving to a more strictly POSIX-compliant realpath(2), so sftp-server now unconditionally requires its own BSD-style realpath implementation. As such, there is no need to carry another independant implementation in openbsd-compat. ok dtucker@ commit 696fb4298e80f2ebcd188986a91b49af3b7ca14c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jul 7 01:05:00 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove some set but never used variables. ok daraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 824baf9c59afc66a4637017e397b9b74a41684e7 commit 156e9e85e92b46ca90226605d9eff49e8ec31b22 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 5 12:35:40 2019 +0000 upstream: still compile uuencode.c, unbreaks build OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f commit cec9ee527a12b1f6c2e0a1c155fec64a38d71cf6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 5 07:32:01 2019 +0000 upstream: revert header removal that snuck into previous OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3919cdd58989786660b8269b325646ef8856428e commit 569b650f93b561c09c655f83f128e1dfffe74101 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 5 04:55:40 2019 +0000 upstream: add a local implementation of BSD realpath() for sftp-server use ahead of OpenBSD's realpath changing to match POSIX; ok deraadt@ (thanks for snaps testing) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f8cbf7ed8679f6237264301d104ecec64885d55 commit b8e2b797362526437e0642a6c2f2970d794f2561 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 6 13:13:57 2019 +1000 Add prototype for strnlen to prevent warnings. commit 4c3e00b1ed7e596610f34590eb5d54ee50d77878 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 6 13:02:34 2019 +1000 Cast *ID types to unsigned long when printing. UID and GID types vary by platform so cast to u_long and use %lu when printing them to prevent warnings. commit 2753521e899f30d1d58b5da0b4e68fde6fcf341e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 6 12:54:43 2019 +1000 Add prototype for compat strndup.(bz#3032). commit 01a1e21cd55d99293c8ff8ed7c590f2ee440da43 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 6 12:00:41 2019 +1000 Add missing bracket in EGD seeding code. When configured --with-prngd-socket the code had a missing bracket after an API change. Fix that and a couple of warnings. bz#3032 , from ole.weidner at protonmail.ch commit e187b1d4607392cf2c19243afe0d0311a4ff3591 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 5 04:19:39 2019 +0000 upstream: Add (recently added) rsa_oldfmt to CLEANFILES. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 405beda94e32aa6cc9c80969152fab91f7c54bd3 commit 74b541bfabdcb57c1683cd9b3f1d1f4d5e41563e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 5 04:12:46 2019 +0000 upstream: Adapt the PuTTY/Conch tests to new key names. A recent regress change (2a9b3a2ce411d16cda9c79ab713c55f65b0ec257 in portable) broke the PuTTY and Twisted Conch interop tests, because the key they want to use is now called ssh-rsa rather than rsa. Adapt the tests to the new file names. bz#3020, patch from cjwatson at debian.org. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fd342a37db4d55aa4ec85316f73082c8eb96e64e commit de08335a4cfaa9b7081e94ea4a8b7153c230546d Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 5 04:03:13 2019 +0000 upstream: Add a sleep to allow forwards to come up. Currently when the multiplex client requests a forward it returns once the request has been sent but not necessarily when the forward is up. This causes intermittent text failures due to this race, so add some sleeps to mitigate this until we can fix it properly. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 384c7d209d2443d25ea941d7f677e932621fb253 commit 4d249284729f864faa2e8f3e015f9a41b674544a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 5 14:58:57 2019 +1000 Remove nc stderr redirection to resync w/OpenBSD. commit c5cfa90e03432181ffcc7ad3f9f815179bd0c626 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 5 13:21:45 2019 +1000 Do not fatal on failed lookup of group "tty". Some platforms (eg AIX and Cygwin) do not have a "tty" group. In those cases we will fall back to making the tty device the user's primary group, so do not fatal if the group lookup fails. ok djm@ commit 8b4cc4bdc8a70bf209a274fa2b2a49c1e3c8d8a2 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 4 16:20:10 2019 +0000 upstream: fatal() if getgrnam() cannot find "tty" OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d148c1c052fa0ed7d105b5428b5c1bab91630048 commit 48cccc275c6a1e91d3f80fdb0dc0d5baf529aeca Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 4 16:16:51 2019 +0000 upstream: stat() returns precisely -1 to indicate error OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 668e8d022ed4ab847747214f64119e5865365fa1 commit 8142fcaf9ed8ff66252deecbfd29fc59d5f2df4f Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 3 03:24:02 2019 +0000 upstream: snprintf/vsnprintf return < 0 on error, rather than -1. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a261c421140a0639bb2b66bbceca72bf8239749d commit 4d28fa78abce2890e136281950633fae2066cc29 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 28 13:35:04 2019 +0000 upstream: When system calls indicate an error they return -1, not some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all (most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this strictness helps us in the future. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075 commit e8c974043c1648eab0ad67a7ba6a3e444fe79d2d Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 28 05:44:09 2019 +0000 upstream: asprintf returns -1, not an arbitrary value < 0. Also upon error the (very sloppy specification) leaves an undefined value in *ret, so it is wrong to inspect it, the error condition is enough. discussed a little with nicm, and then much more with millert until we were exasperated OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29258fa51edf8115d244b9d4b84028487bf8923e commit 1b2d55d15c6240c15a1e1cf4203b82e54a766272 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 28 01:23:50 2019 +0000 upstream: oops, from asou OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 702e765d1639b732370d8f003bb84a1c71c4d0c6 commit 5cdbaa78fcb718c39af4522d98016ad89d065427 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 27 18:03:37 2019 +0000 upstream: Some asprintf() calls were checked < 0, rather than the precise == -1. ok millert nicm tb, etc OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caecf8f57938685c04f125515b9f2806ad408d53 commit b2e3e57be4a933d9464bccbe592573725765486f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 27 06:29:35 2019 +0000 upstream: fix NULL deference (bzero) on err =?UTF-8?q?or=20path=20added=20in=20last=20commit;=20spotted=20by=20Reynir?= =?UTF-8?q?=20Bj=C3=B6rnsson?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit ok deraadt@ markus@ tb@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b11b084bcc551b2c630560eb08618dd501027bbd commit 58ceacdcbaebefc77d120712de55c6fc6aa32bb1 Author: Jitendra Sharma Date: Fri Jun 21 09:54:17 2019 +0530 Update README doc to include missing test cases Readme regress document is missing various individual tests, which are supported currently. Update README to include those test cases. commit 7959330a554051b5587f8af3fec0c2c0d5820f64 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 26 22:29:43 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove unneeded unlink of xauthfile o =?UTF-8?q?n=20error=20path.=20=20From=20Erik=20Sj=C3=B6lund=20via=20githu?= =?UTF-8?q?b,=20ok=20djm@=20deraadt@?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 62a4893cf83b29a4bbfedc40e7067c25c203e632 commit 8de52eb224143783a49f9bddd9ab7800022a8276 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jun 23 12:21:46 2019 +0000 upstream: fix mismatch proto/decl from key shielding change; spotted via oss-fuzz OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ea0ba05ded2c5557507bd844cd446e5c8b5b3b7 commit 1dfadb9b57c2985c95838a0292d1c2f6a501896e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 21 04:21:45 2019 +0000 upstream: adapt for key shielding API changes (const removal) OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 298890bc52f0cd09dba76dc1022fabe89bc0ded6 commit 4f7a56d5e02e3d04ab69eac1213817a7536d0562 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 21 04:21:04 2019 +0000 upstream: Add protection for private keys at rest in RAM against speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of random data (currently 16KB). Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely. Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or when being saved/serialised. Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer architecture has become less unsafe. been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@ ok dtucker@ deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4 commit 4cd6b12cc9c10bf59c8b425041f3ea5091285a0f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 21 03:19:59 2019 +0000 upstream: print the correct AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand rather than an uninitialised variable; spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02802018784250f68202f01c8561de82e17b0638 commit 5f68ab436b0e01751d564e9a9041e6ac3673e45a Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 19 20:12:44 2019 +0000 upstream: from tim: - for reput, it is remote-path which is optional, not local-path - sync help from deraadt: - prefer -R and undocument -r (but add a comment for future editors) from schwarze: - prefer -p and undocument -P (as above. the comment was schwarze's too) more: - add the -f flag to reput and reget - sort help (i can;t remember who suggested this originally) djm and deraadt were ok with earlier versions of this; tim and schwarze ok OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c699b53b46111f5c57eed4533f132e7e58bacdd commit 99bcbbc77fbd5a5027031f42a5931b21b07c947e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 14 04:03:48 2019 +0000 upstream: check for convtime() refusing to accept times that resolve to LONG_MAX Reported by Kirk Wolf bz2977; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 15c9fe87be1ec241d24707006a31123d3a3117e0 commit e5cccb2410247c9b8151b9510a876abdf5424b24 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Apr 28 22:53:26 2019 +0000 upstream: Add unit tests for user@host and URI parsing. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 69d5b6f278e04ed32377046f7692c714c2d07a68 commit 0bb7e38834e3f9886302bbaea630a6b0f8cfb520 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 18 18:57:16 2019 +0000 upstream: Add tests for sshd -T -C with Match. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d4c34916fe20d717692f10ef50b5ae5a271c12c7 commit 73eb6cef41daba0359c1888e4756108d41b4e819 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jun 16 12:55:27 2019 +1000 Include stdio.h for vsnprintf. Patch from mforney at mforney.org. commit adcaf40fd0a180e6cb5798317fdf479b52e3c09a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jun 8 09:07:04 2019 +1000 upstream rev 1.27: fix integer overflow. Cast bitcount to u_in64_t before bit shifting to prevent integer overflow on 32bit platforms which cause incorrect results when adding a block >=512M in size. sha1 patch from ante84 at gmail.com via openssh github, sha2 with djm@, ok tedu@ commit 7689048e6103d3c34cba24ac5aeea7bf8405d19a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jun 8 09:06:06 2019 +1000 upstream rev 1.25: add DEF_WEAK. Wrap blowfish, sha*, md5, and rmd160 so that internal calls go direct ok deraadt@ commit 55f3153393ac7e072a4b4b21b194864460d8f44a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jun 8 09:02:24 2019 +1000 upstream rev 1.25: add sys/types.h commit 10974f986fa842a3a3a693e3d5761072540002b4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jun 8 09:01:14 2019 +1000 upstream: Use explicit_bzero instead of memset in hash Final and End functions. OK deraadt@ djm@ commit cb8f56570f70b00abae4267d4bcce2bfae7dfff6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 14 04:13:58 2019 +0000 upstream: slightly more instructive error message when the user specifies multiple -J options on the commandline. bz3015 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 181c15a65cac3b575819bc8d9a56212c3c748179 commit 2317ce4b0ed7d8c4b0c684e2d47bff5006bd1178 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 14 03:51:47 2019 +0000 upstream: process agent requests for RSA certificate private keys using correct signature algorithm when requested. Patch from Jakub Jelen in bz3016 ok dtucker markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61f86efbeb4a1857a3e91298c1ccc6cf49b79624 commit c95b90d40170473825904be561b1eafba354f376 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 14 03:39:59 2019 +0000 upstream: for public key authentication, check AuthorizedKeysFiles files before consulting AuthorizedKeysCommand; ok dtucker markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13652998bea5cb93668999c39c3c48e8429db8b3 commit a5a53914989ddd3521b6edc452bc3291784a4f4f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 14 03:28:19 2019 +0000 upstream: if passed a bad fd, log what it was OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 582e2bd05854e49365195b58989b68ac67f09140 commit 7349149da1074d82b71722338e05b6a282f126cc Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 12 11:31:50 2019 +0000 upstream: Hostname->HostName cleanup; from lauri tirkkonen ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ade73629ede63b691f36f9a929f943d4e7a44e4 commit 76af9c57387243556d38935555c227d0b34062c5 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 12 05:53:21 2019 +0000 upstream: deraadt noticed some inconsistency in the way we denote the "Hostname" and "X11UseLocalhost" keywords; this makes things consistent (effectively reversing my commit of yesterday); ok deraadt markus djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 255c02adb29186ac91dcf47dfad7adb1b1e54667 commit d1bbfdd932db9b9b799db865ee1ff50060dfc895 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 11 13:39:40 2019 +0000 upstream: consistent lettering for "HostName" keyword; from lauri tirkkonen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c267a1257ed7482b13ef550837b6496e657d563 commit fc0340f7c4ee29bfb12bd1de9f99defa797e16b4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jun 8 00:10:59 2019 +1000 Typo fixes in error messages. Patch from knweiss at gmail.com via github pull req #97 (portable- specific parts). commit 4b7dd22b02b64b1ededd3c0e98a6e7ae21e31d38 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 7 14:18:48 2019 +0000 upstream: Typo and spelling fixes in comments and error messages. Patch from knweiss at gmail.com via -portable. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2577465442f761a39703762c4f87a8dfcb918b4b commit 130ef0695e1731392ca33831939fe89e8b70cc17 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jun 8 00:47:07 2019 +1000 Include missed bits from previous sync. commit 25e3bccbaa63d27b9d5e09c123f1eb28594d2bd6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 7 03:47:12 2019 +0000 upstream: Check for user@host when parsing sftp target. This allows user@[1.2.3.4] to work without a path in addition to with one. bz#2999, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d989217110932490ba8ce92127a9a6838878928b commit 0323d9b619d512f80c57575b810a05791891f657 Author: otto@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 6 05:13:13 2019 +0000 upstream: Replace calls to ssh_malloc_init() by a static init of malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok guenther@ dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b commit c586d2d3129265ea64b12960c379d634bccb6535 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 31 03:20:07 2019 +0000 upstream: fix ssh-keysign fd handling problem introduced in r1.304 caused by a typo (STDIN_FILENO vs STDERR_FILENO) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a0b4be7bef23963afe24150e24bf014fdd9cb0 commit 410b231aa41ff830b2f5b09b5aaf5e5cdc1ab86b Author: lum@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 29 08:30:26 2019 +0000 upstream: Make the standard output messages of both methods of changing a key pair's comments (using -c and -C) more applicable to both methods. ok and suggestions djm@ dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b379338118109eb36e14a65bc0a12735205b3de6 commit 2b3402dc9f1d9b0df70291b424f36e436cdfa7e0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jun 8 00:03:07 2019 +1000 Always clean up before and after utimensat test. commit 182898192d4b720e4faeafd5b39c2cfb3b92aa21 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 7 23:47:37 2019 +1000 Update utimensat test. POSIX specifies that when given a symlink, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW should update the symlink and not the destination. The compat code doesn't have a way to do this, so where possible it fails instead of following a symlink when explicitly asked not to. Instead of checking for an explicit failure, check that it does not update the destination, which both the real and compat implmentations should honour. Inspired by github pull req #125 from chutzpah at gentoo.org. commit d220b675205185e0b4d6b6524acc2e5c599ef0e2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 7 14:26:54 2019 +1000 Have pthread_create return errno on failure. According to POSIX, pthread_create returns the failure reason in the non-zero function return code so make the fork wrapper do that. Matches previous change. commit 1bd4f7f25f653e0cadb2e6f25d79bc3c35c6aa4d Author: Elliott Hughes Date: Thu Apr 25 13:36:27 2019 -0700 pthread_create(3) returns positive values on failure. Found by inspection after finding similar bugs in other code used by Android. commit b3a77b25e5f7880222b179431a74fad76d2cf60c Author: Harald Freudenberger Date: Fri May 24 10:11:15 2019 +0200 allow s390 specific ioctl for ecc hardware support Adding another s390 specific ioctl to be able to support ECC hardware acceleration to the sandbox seccomp filter rules. Now the ibmca openssl engine provides elliptic curve cryptography support with the help of libica and CCA crypto cards. This is done via jet another ioctl call to the zcrypt device driver and so there is a need to enable this on the openssl sandbox. Code is s390 specific and has been tested, verified and reviewed. Please note that I am also the originator of the previous changes in that area. I posted these changes to Eduardo and he forwarded the patches to the openssl community. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer commit 2459df9aa11820f8092a8651aeb381af7ebbccb1 Author: Sorin Adrian Savu Date: Sun May 26 21:50:08 2019 +0300 openssl-devel is obsoleted by libssl-devel openssl-devel is no longer installable via the cygwin setup and it's hidden by default, so you can't see the replacement very easy. commit 85ceb0e64bff672558fc87958cd548f135c83cdd Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 20 06:01:59 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42f39f22f53cfcb913bce401ae0f1bb93e08dd6c commit 30615295609f5c57b3137b3021fe63bfa45c1985 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 20 00:25:55 2019 +0000 upstream: embiggen format buffer size for certificate serial number so that it will fit a full 64 bit integer. bz#3012 from Manoel Domingues Junior OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a51f3013056d05b976e5af6b978dcb9e27bbc12b commit 476e3551b2952ef73acc43d995e832539bf9bc4d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 20 00:20:35 2019 +0000 upstream: When signing certificates with an RSA key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH < 7.2 unless the default is overridden. Document the ability of the ssh-keygen -t flag to override the signature algorithm when signing certificates, and the new default. ok deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 400c9c15013978204c2cb80f294b03ae4cfc8b95 commit 606077ee1e77af5908431d003fb28461ef7be092 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 17 13:14:12 2019 +1000 Add no-op implementation of pam_putenv. Some platforms such as HP-UX do not have pam_putenv. Currently the calls are ifdef'ed out, but a new one was recently added. Remove the ifdefs and add a no-op implementation. bz#3008, ok djm. commit 1ac98be8724c9789d770ddb8e7f0dbf1b55e05a0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 17 12:42:17 2019 +1000 Use the correct macro for SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS. commit 97370f6c2c3b825f8c577b7e6c00b1a98d30a6cf Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 17 10:54:51 2019 +1000 Fix building w/out ECC. Ifdef out ECC specific code so that that it'll build against an OpenSSL configured w/out ECC. With & ok djm@ commit 633703babf8d9a88da85f23b800e1b88dec7cdbd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 17 10:50:29 2019 +1000 Conditionalize ECDH methods in CA algos. When building against an OpenSSL configured without ECC, don't include those algos in CASignatureAlgorithms. ok djm@ commit 5c8d14c512f5d413095b22bdba08a6bb990f1e97 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 16 08:47:27 2019 +0000 upstream: Move a variable declaration to the block where it's used to make things a little tidier for -portable. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 616379861be95619e5358768b7dee4793e2f3a75 commit a1d29cc36a5e6eeabc935065a8780e1ba5b67014 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 15 04:43:31 2019 +0000 upstream: When doing the fork+exec'ing for ssh-keysign, rearrange the socket into fd3, so as to not mistakenly leak other fd forward accidentally. ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24cc753f5aa2c6a7d0fbf62766adbc75cd785296 commit db7606d4a62fee67b0cb2f32dfcbd7b3642bfef5 Author: schwarze@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 14 12:47:17 2019 +0000 upstream: Delete some .Sx macros that were used in a wrong way. Part of a patch from Stephen Gregoratto . OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15501ed13c595f135e7610b1a5d8345ccdb513b7 commit cb4accb1233865d9151f8a50cc5f0c61a3fd4077 Author: florian@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 10 18:55:17 2019 +0000 upstream: For PermitOpen violations add the remote host and port to be able to find out from where the request was comming. Add the same logging for PermitListen violations which where not logged at all. Pointed out by Robert Kisteleki (robert AT ripe.net) input markus OK deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a7d0f1b7175504c0d1dca8d9aca1588b66448c8 commit cd16aceec148d55088fc8df6be88335578d85258 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu May 16 07:53:20 2019 +1000 Add OpenSSL 1.1.1 to the supported list. Clarify the language around prngd and egd. commit 6fd4aa2aafbce90acb11a328ca0aa0696cb01c6b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed May 15 16:19:14 2019 +1000 Fix typo in man page formatter selector. commit 285546b73e2c172565c992a695927ac8cf3b4cc6 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 10 15:04:42 2019 +1000 Use "doc" man page format if mandoc present. Previously configure would not select the "doc" man page format if mandoc was present but nroff was not. This checks for mandoc first and removes a now-superflous AC_PATH_PROG. Based on a patch from vehk at vehk.de and feedback from schwarze at usta.de. commit 62dd70613b77b229f53db3cc1c3e8a206fa2b582 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 3 06:06:30 2019 +0000 upstream: Use the correct (according to POSIX) format for left-justification in snmprintf. bz#3002, patch from velemas at gmail.com, ok markus@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65d252b799be0cc8f68b6c47cece0a57bb00fea7 commit 62be1ffe5ffc68cfaac183320503c00a8c72e0b1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 3 04:11:00 2019 +0000 upstream: Free channel objects on exit path. Patch from markus at blueflash.cc, ok deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbe4db381603909482211ffdd2b48abd72169117 commit 1c554a5d94b9de6bd5374e2992a5662746cc39ba Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 3 03:27:38 2019 +0000 upstream: Free host on exit path. Patch from markus at blueflash.cc, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c54e9945d93c4ce28350d8b9fa8b71f744ef2b5a commit 99043bd64e5e0f427173f4fa83ef25a4676624a3 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 3 03:25:18 2019 +0000 upstream: Wrap XMSS including in ifdef. Patch from markus at blueflash.cc, ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3b34fc35cf12d33bde91ac03633210a3bc0f8b5 commit 8fcfb7789c43a19d24162a7a4055cd09ee951b34 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 26 08:37:17 2019 +0000 upstream: Import regenerated moduli. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff commit 3a7db919d5dd09f797971b3cf8ee301767459774 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 23 11:56:41 2019 +0000 upstream: Use the LogLevel typdef instead of int where appropriate. Patch from Markus Schmidt via openssh-unix-dev, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c0f0f458e3da7807806b35e3eb5c1e8403c968a commit d7c6e38b87efab1f140745fd8b1106b82e6e4a68 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 19 05:47:44 2019 +0000 upstream: Document new default RSA key size. From sebastiaanlokhorst at gmail.com via bz#2997. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdd62ff5d4d649d2147904e91bf7cefa82fe11e1 commit e826bbcafe26dac349a8593da5569e82faa45ab8 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 18 18:56:16 2019 +0000 upstream: When running sshd -T, assume any attibute not provided by -C does not match, which allows it to work when sshd_config contains a Match directive with or without -C. bz#2858, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a701f0a33e3bc96753cfda2fe0b0378520b82eb commit 5696512d7ad57e85e89f8011ce8dec617be686aa Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 18 07:32:56 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove crc32.{c,h} which were only used by the now-gone SSH1 protocol. Patch from yumkam at gmail.com, ok deraadt. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cceda5876c5ba6b4d8abcd52335329198cee3240 commit 34e87fb5d9ce607f5701ab4c31d837ad8133e2d1 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 30 12:27:57 2019 +1000 Remove unused variables from RLIMIT_NOFILE test. commit 35e82e62c1ef53cfa457473a4c4d957d6197371a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 26 18:38:27 2019 +1000 Import regenerated moduli. commit 5590f53f99219e95dc23b0ebd220f19a6f46b101 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 26 18:22:10 2019 +1000 Whitespace resync w/OpenBSD. Patch from markus at blueflash.cc via openssh-unix-dev. commit b7b8334914fb9397a6725f3b5d2de999b0bb69ac Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 26 18:06:34 2019 +1000 Don't install duplicate STREAMS modules on Solaris Check if STREAMS modules are already installed on pty before installing since when compiling with XPG>=4 they will likely be installed already. Prevents hangs and duplicate lines on the terminal. bz#2945 and bz#2998, patch from djm@ commit fd0fa130ecf06d7d092932adcd5d77f1549bfc8d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Apr 18 08:52:57 2019 +1000 makedepend commit 5de397a876b587ba05a9169237deffdc71f273b0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 5 11:29:51 2019 -0700 second thoughts: leave README in place A number of contrib/* files refer to the existing README so let's leave it in place for release and add the new markdown version in parallel. I'll get rid of README after release. commit 5d3127d9274519b25ed10e320f45045ba8d7f3be Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 5 11:29:31 2019 -0700 Revert "rewrite README" This reverts commit 9444d82678cb7781820da4d1c23b3c2b9fb1e12f. commit 9444d82678cb7781820da4d1c23b3c2b9fb1e12f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 5 11:21:48 2019 -0700 rewrite README Include basic build instructions and comments on commonly-used build- time flags, links to the manual pages and other resources. Now in Markdown format for better viewing on github, etc. commit a924de0c4908902433813ba205bee1446bd1a157 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 5 03:41:52 2019 +1100 update versions commit 312dcee739bca5d6878c536537b2a8a497314b75 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 3 15:48:45 2019 +0000 upstream: openssh-8.0 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5aafdf218679dab982fea20771afd643be9a127b commit 885bc114692046d55e2a170b932bdc0092fa3456 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Apr 4 02:47:40 2019 +1100 session: Do not use removed API from Jakub Jelen commit 9d7b2882b0c9a5e9bf8312ce4075bf178e2b98be Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 29 11:31:40 2019 +0000 upstream: when logging/fataling on error, include a bit more detail than just the function name and the error message OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd72d7eba2215fcb89be516c378f633ea5bcca9f commit 79a87d32783d6c9db40af8f35e091d9d30365ae7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 3 06:27:45 2019 +1100 Remove "struct ssh" from sys_auth_record_login. It's not needed, and is not available from the call site in loginrec.c Should only affect AIX, spotted by Kevin Brott. commit 138c0d52cdc90f9895333b82fc57d81cce7a3d90 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 2 18:21:35 2019 +1100 Adapt custom_failed_login to new prototype. Spotted by Kevin Brott. commit a0ca4009ab2f0b1007ec8ab6864dbf9b760a8ed5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Apr 1 20:07:23 2019 +1100 Add includes.h for compat layer. Should fix build on AIX 7.2. commit 00991151786ce9b1d577bdad1f83a81d19c8236d Author: Tim Rice Date: Sun Mar 31 22:14:22 2019 -0700 Stop USL compilers for erroring with "integral constant expression expected" commit 43f47ebbdd4037b569c23b8f4f7981f53b567f1d Author: Tim Rice Date: Sun Mar 31 19:22:19 2019 -0700 Only use O_NOFOLLOW in fchownat and fchmodat if defined commit 342d6e51589b184c337cccfc4c788b60ff8b3765 Author: Jakub Jelen Date: Fri Mar 29 12:29:41 2019 +0100 Adjust softhsm2 path on Fedora Linux for regress The SoftHSM lives in Fedora in /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so commit f5abb05f8c7358dacdcb866fe2813f6d8efd5830 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Mar 28 09:26:14 2019 +1100 Only use O_NOFOLLOW in utimensat if defined. Fixes build on systems that don't have it (Solaris <=9) Found by Tom G. Christensen. commit 786cd4c1837fdc3fe7b4befe54a3f37db7df8715 Author: Corinna Vinschen Date: Wed Mar 27 18:18:21 2019 +0100 drop old Cygwin considerations - Cygwin supports non-DOS characters in filenames - Cygwin does not support Windows XP anymore Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen commit 21da87f439b48a85b951ef1518fe85ac0273e719 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 27 09:29:14 2019 +0000 upstream: fix interaction between ClientAliveInterval and RekeyLimit that could cause connection to close incorrectly; Report and patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2757; ok dtucker@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 17229a8a65bd8e6c2080318ec2b7a61e1aede3fb commit 4f0019a9afdb4a94d83b75e82dbbbe0cbe826c56 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 25 22:34:52 2019 +0000 upstream: Fix authentication failures when "AuthenticationMethods any" in a Match block overrides a more restrictive global default. Spotted by jmc@, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90a4fe2ab81d0eeeb8fdfc21af81f7eabda6666 commit d6e5def308610f194c0ec3ef97a34a3e9630e190 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 25 22:33:44 2019 +0000 upstream: whitespace OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 106e853ae8a477e8385bc53824d3884a8159db07 commit 26e0cef07b04479537c971dec898741df1290fe5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 25 16:19:44 2019 +0000 upstream: Expand comment to document rationale for default key sizes. "seems worthwhile" deraadt. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72e5c0983d7da1fb72f191870f36cb58263a2456 commit f47269ea67eb4ff87454bf0d2a03e55532786482 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 25 15:49:00 2019 +0000 upstream: Increase the default RSA key size to 3072 bits. Based on the estimates from NIST Special Publication 800-57, 3k bits provides security equivalent to 128 bits which is the smallest symmetric cipher we enable by default. ok markus@ deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 461dd32ebe808f88f4fc3ec74749b0e6bef2276b commit 62949c5b37af28d8490d94866e314a76be683a5e Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 22 20:58:34 2019 +0000 upstream: full stop in the wrong place; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 478a0567c83553a2aebf95d0f1bd67ac1b1253e4 commit 1b1332b5bb975d759a50b37f0e8bc8cfb07a0bb0 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 16 19:14:21 2019 +0000 upstream: benno helped me clean up the tcp forwarding section; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d4bec27edefde636fb632b7f0b7c656b9c7b7f08 commit 2aee9a49f668092ac5c9d34e904ef7a9722e541d Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 8 17:24:43 2019 +0000 upstream: fix use-after-free in ssh-pkcs11; found by hshoexer w/AFL OpenBSD-Commit-ID: febce81cca72b71f70513fbee4ff52ca050f675c commit 9edbd7821e6837e98e7e95546cede804dac96754 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Mar 14 10:17:28 2019 +1100 Fix build when configured --without-openssl. ok djm@ commit 825ab32f0d04a791e9d19d743c61ff8ed9b4d8e5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Mar 14 08:51:17 2019 +1100 On Cygwin run sshd as SYSTEM where possible. Seteuid now creates user token using S4U. We don't create a token from scratch anymore, so we don't need the "Create a process token" privilege. The service can run under SYSTEM again... ...unless Cygwin is running on Windows Vista or Windows 7 in the WOW64 32 bit emulation layer. It turns out that WOW64 on these systems didn't implement MsV1_0 S4U Logon so we still need the fallback to NtCreateToken for these systems. Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen commit a212107bfdf4d3e870ab7a443e4d906e5b9578c3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Mar 13 10:49:16 2019 +1100 Replace alloca with xcalloc. The latter checks for memory exhaustion and integer overflow and may be at a less predictable place. Sanity check by vinschen at redhat.com, ok djm@ commit daa7505aadca68ba1a2c70cbdfce423208eb91ee Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Mar 12 09:19:19 2019 +1100 Use Cygwin-specific matching only for users+groups. Patch from vinschen at redhat.com, updated a little by me. commit fd10cf027b56f9aaa80c9e3844626a05066589a4 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 6 22:14:23 2019 +0000 upstream: Move checks for lists of users or groups into their own function. This is a no-op on OpenBSD but will make things easier in -portable, eg on systems where these checks should be case-insensitive. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bc9c8d98670e23f8eaaaefe29c1f98e7ba0487e commit ab5fee8eb6a011002fd9e32b1597f02aa8804a25 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 6 21:06:59 2019 +0000 upstream: Reset last-seen time when sending a keepalive. Prevents sending two keepalives successively and prematurely terminating connection when ClientAliveCount=1. While there, collapse two similar tests into one. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 043670d201dfe222537a2a4bed16ce1087de5ddd commit c13b74530f9f1d9df7aeae012004b31b2de4438e Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 5 16:17:12 2019 +0000 upstream: PKCS#11 support is no longer limited to RSA; ok benno@ kn@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a9bec64d530aed5f434a960e7515a3e80cbc826 commit e9552d6043db7cd170ac6ba1b4d2c7a5eb2c3201 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 1 03:29:32 2019 +0000 upstream: in ssh_set_newkeys(), mention the direction that we're keying in debug messages. Previously it would be difficult to tell which direction it was talking about OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2b71bfcceb2a7389b9d0b497fb2122a406a522d commit 76a24b3fa193a9ca3e47a8779d497cb06500798b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 1 02:32:39 2019 +0000 upstream: Fix two race conditions in sshd relating to SIGHUP: 1. Recently-forked child processes will briefly remain listening to listen_socks. If the main server sshd process completes its restart via execv() before these sockets are closed by the child processes then it can fail to listen at the desired addresses/ports and/or fail to restart. 2. When a SIGHUP is received, there may be forked child processes that are awaiting their reexecution state. If the main server sshd process restarts before passing this state, these child processes will yield errors and use a fallback path of reading the current sshd_config from the filesystem rather than use the one that sshd was started with. To fix both of these cases, we reuse the startup_pipes that are shared between the main server sshd and forked children. Previously this was used solely to implement tracking of pre-auth child processes for MaxStartups, but this extends the messaging over these pipes to include a child->parent message that the parent process is safe to restart. This message is sent from the child after it has completed its preliminaries: closing listen_socks and receiving its reexec state. bz#2953, reported by Michal Koutný; ok markus@ dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7df09eacfa3ce13e9a7b1e9f17276ecc924d65ab commit de817e9dfab99473017d28cdf69e60397d00ea21 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 1 02:16:47 2019 +0000 upstream: mention PKCS11Provide=none, reword a little and remove mention of RSA keys only (since we support ECDSA now and might support others in the future). Inspired by Jakub Jelen via bz#2974 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92e3686561bf624ccc64ab320c96c9e9a263aa5 commit 95a8058c1a90a27acbb91392ba206854abc85226 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 1 02:08:50 2019 +0000 upstream: let PKCS11Provider=none do what users expect print PKCS11Provider instead of obsolete SmartcardDevice in config dump. bz#2974 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c303d6f0230a33aa2dd92dc9b68843d56a64f846 commit 8e7bac35aa576d2fd7560836da83733e864ce649 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 27 19:37:01 2019 +0000 upstream: dup stdout/in for proxycommand=-, otherwise stdout might be redirected to /dev/null; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97dfce4c47ed4055042de8ebde85b7d88793e595 commit 9b61130fbd95d196bce81ebeca94a4cb7c0d5ba0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Feb 23 08:20:43 2019 +0000 upstream: openssh-7.9 accidentally reused the server's algorithm lists in the client for KEX, ciphers and MACs. The ciphers and MACs were identical between the client and server, but the error accidentially disabled the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method. This fixes the client code to use the correct method list, but because nobody complained, it also disables the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method. Reported by nuxi AT vault24.org via bz#2697; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e30c33a23c10fd536fefa120e86af1842e33fd57 commit 37638c752041d591371900df820f070037878a2d Author: Corinna Vinschen Date: Wed Feb 20 13:41:25 2019 +0100 Cygwin: implement case-insensitive Unicode user and group name matching The previous revert enabled case-insensitive user names again. This patch implements the case-insensitive user and group name matching. To allow Unicode chars, implement the matcher using wchar_t chars in Cygwin-specific code. Keep the generic code changes as small as possible. Cygwin: implement case-insensitive Unicode user and group name matching Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen commit bed1d43698807a07bb4ddb93a46b0bd84b9970b3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 22 15:21:21 2019 +1100 Revert unintended parts of previous commit. commit f02afa350afac1b2f2d1413259a27a4ba1e2ca24 Author: Corinna Vinschen Date: Wed Feb 20 13:41:24 2019 +0100 Revert "[auth.c] On Cygwin, refuse usernames that have differences in case" This reverts commit acc9b29486dfd649dfda474e5c1a03b317449f1c. Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen commit 4c55b674835478eb80a1a7aeae588aa654e2a433 Author: Corinna Vinschen Date: Sat Feb 16 14:13:43 2019 +0100 Add tags to .gitignore Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen commit 625b62634c33eaef4b80d07529954fe5c6435fe5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 22 03:37:11 2019 +0000 upstream: perform removal of agent-forwarding directory in forward setup error path with user's privileged. This is a no-op as this code always runs with user privilege now that we no longer support running sshd with privilege separation disabled, but as long as the privsep skeleton is there we should follow the rules. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit bz#2969 with patch from Erik Sjölund OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b708401a5a8d6133c865d7698d9852210dca846 commit d9ecfaba0b2f1887d20e4368230632e709ca83be Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 18 07:02:34 2019 +0000 upstream: sync the description of ~/.ssh/config with djm's updated description in ssh.1; issue pointed out by andreas kahari ok dtucker djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b01ef0ae2c6328165150badae317ec92e52b01c commit 38e83e4f219c752ebb1560633b73f06f0392018b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 12 23:53:10 2019 +0000 upstream: fix regression in r1.302 reported by naddy@ - only the first public key from the agent was being attempted for use. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07116aea521a04888718b2157f1ca723b2f46c8d commit 5c68ea8da790d711e6dd5f4c30d089c54032c59a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 11 09:44:42 2019 +0000 upstream: cleanup GSSAPI authentication context after completion of the authmethod. Move function-static GSSAPI state to the client Authctxt structure. Make static a bunch of functions that aren't used outside this file. Based on patch from Markus Schmidt ; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 497fb792c0ddb4f1ba631b6eed526861f115dbe5 commit a8c807f1956f81a92a758d3d0237d0ff06d0be5d Author: benno@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 10 16:35:41 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh-keygen -D pkcs11.so needs to initialize pkcs11 interactive, so it can ask for the smartcards PIN. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1be7ccf88f1876e0fc4d7c9b3f96019ac5655bab commit 3d896c157c722bc47adca51a58dca859225b5874 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 10 11:15:52 2019 +0000 upstream: when checking that filenames sent by the server side match what the client requested, be prepared to handle shell-style brace alternations, e.g. "{foo,bar}". "looks good to me" millert@ + in snaps for the last week courtesy deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b1ce7639b0b25b2248e3a30f561a548f6815f3e commit 318e4f8548a4f5c0c913f61e27d4fc21ffb1eaae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 10 11:10:57 2019 +0000 upstream: syslog when connection is dropped for attempting to run a command when ForceCommand=internal-sftp is in effect; bz2960; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c87fa66d7fc6c0fffa3a3c28e8ab5e8dde234b8 commit 2ff2e19653b8c0798b8b8eff209651bdb1be2761 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 8 14:53:35 2019 +1100 don't set $MAIL if UsePam=yes PAM typically specifies the user environment if it's enabled, so don't second guess. bz#2937; ok dtucker@ commit 03e92dd27d491fe6d1a54e7b2f44ef1b0a916e52 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 8 14:50:36 2019 +1100 use same close logic for stderr as stdout Avoids sending SIGPIPE to child processes after their parent exits if they attempt to write to stderr. Analysis and patch from JD Paul; patch reworked by Jakub Jelen and myself. bz#2071; ok dtucker@ commit 8c53d409baeeaf652c0c125a9b164edc9dbeb6de Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 5 11:35:56 2019 +0000 upstream: Adapt code in the non-USE_PIPES codepath to the new packet API. This code is not normally reachable since USE_PIPES is always defined. bz#2961, patch from adrian.fita at gmail com. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d8428d678d1d5eb4bb21921df34e8173e6d238a commit 7a7fdca78de4b4774950be056099e579ef595414 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 4 23:37:54 2019 +0000 upstream: fix NULL-deref crash in PKCS#11 code when attempting login to a token requiring a PIN; reported by benno@ fix mostly by markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 438d0b114b1b4ba25a9869733db1921209aa9a31 commit cac302a4b42a988e54d32eb254b29b79b648dbf5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 4 02:39:42 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove obsolete "Protocol" from commented out examples. Patch from samy.mahmoudi at gmail com. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16aede33dae299725a03abdac5dcb4d73f5d0cbf commit 483b3b638500fd498b4b529356e5a0e18cf76891 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 1 03:52:23 2019 +0000 upstream: Save connection timeout and restore for 2nd and subsequent attempts, preventing them from having no timeout. bz#2918, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4977f1d0521d9b6bba0c9a20d3d226cefac48292 commit 5f004620fdc1b2108139300ee12f4014530fb559 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 30 19:51:15 2019 +0000 upstream: Add authors for public domain sntrup4591761 code; confirmed by Daniel J. Bernstein OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4621f22b8b8ef13e063c852af5e54dbbfa413c1 commit 2c21b75a7be6ebdcbceaebb43157c48dbb36f3d8 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 27 07:14:11 2019 +0000 upstream: add -T to usage(); OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7ae14d9436c64e1bd05022329187ea3a0ce1899 commit 19a0f0529d3df04118da829528cac7ceff380b24 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 28 03:50:39 2019 +0000 upstream: The test sshd_config in in $OBJ. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1e5d908a286d8e7de3a15a0020c8857f3a7c9172 commit 8fe25440206319d15b52d12b948a5dfdec14dca3 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 28 03:28:10 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove leftover debugging. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d86c3d4867e46b35af3fd2ac8c96df0ffdcfeb9 commit e30d32364d12c351eec9e14be6c61116f9d6cc90 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 28 00:12:36 2019 +0000 upstream: Enable ssh-dss for the agent test. Disable it for the certificate test. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 388c1e03e1def539d350f139b37d69f12334668d commit ffdde469ed56249f5dc8af98da468dde35531398 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 28 00:08:26 2019 +0000 upstream: Count the number of key types instead of assuming there are only two. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0998702c41235782cf0beee396ec49b5056eaed9 commit 1d05b4adcba08ab068466e5c08dee2f5417ec53a Author: Corinna Vinschen Date: Sat Jan 26 23:42:40 2019 +0100 Cygwin: only tweak sshd_config file if it's new, drop creating sshd user The sshd_config tweaks were executed even if the old file was still in place. Fix that. Also disable sshd user creation. It's not used on Cygwin. commit 89843de0c4c733501f6b4f988098e6e06963df37 Author: Corinna Vinschen Date: Sat Jan 26 23:03:12 2019 +0100 Cygwin: Change service name to cygsshd Microsoft hijacked the sshd service name without asking. commit 2a9b3a2ce411d16cda9c79ab713c55f65b0ec257 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 27 06:30:53 2019 +0000 upstream: Generate all key supported key types and enable for keyscan test. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 72f72ff49946c61bc949e1692dd9e3d71370891b commit 391ffc4b9d31fa1f4ad566499fef9176ff8a07dc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 26 22:41:28 2019 +0000 upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user. This checking provides some protection against a malicious server sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules. For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check. reported by Harry Sintonen fix approach suggested by markus@; has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda commit c2c18a39683db382a15b438632afab3f551d50ce Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 26 22:35:01 2019 +0000 upstream: make ssh-keyscan return a non-zero exit status if it finds no keys. bz#2903 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89f1081fb81d950ebb48e6e73d21807b2723d488 commit 05b9a466700b44d49492edc2aa415fc2e8913dfe Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 24 17:00:29 2019 +0000 upstream: Accept the host key fingerprint as a synonym for "yes" when accepting an unknown host key. This allows you to paste a fingerprint obtained out of band into the yes/no prompt and have the client do the comparison for you. ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c47d10b9f43d3d345e044fd9ec09709583a2767 commit bdc6c63c80b55bcbaa66b5fde31c1cb1d09a41eb Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 24 16:52:17 2019 +0000 upstream: Have progressmeter force an update at the beginning and end of each transfer. Fixes the problem recently introduces where very quick transfers do not display the progressmeter at all. Spotted by naddy@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 68dc46c259e8fdd4f5db3ec2a130f8e4590a7a9a commit 258e6ca003e47f944688ad8b8de087b58a7d966c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 24 02:42:23 2019 +0000 upstream: Check for both EAGAIN and EWOULDBLOCK. This is a no-op in OpenBSD (they are the same value) but makes things easier in -portable where they may be distinct values. "sigh ok" deraadt@ (ID sync only, portable already had this change). OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91f2bc7c0ecec905915ed59fa37feb9cc90e17d7 commit 281ce042579b834cdc1e74314f1fb2eeb75d2612 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 24 02:34:52 2019 +0000 upstream: Always initialize 2nd arg to hpdelim2. It populates that *ONLY IF* there's a delimiter. If there's not (the common case) it checked uninitialized memory, which usually passed, but if not would cause spurious failures when the uninitialized memory happens to contain "/". ok deraadt. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4291611eaf2a53d4c92f4a57c7f267c9f944e0d3 commit d05ea255678d9402beda4416cd0360f3e5dfe938 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 23 21:50:56 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove support for obsolete host/port syntax. host/port was added in 2001 as an alternative to host:port syntax for the benefit of IPv6 users. These days there are establised standards for this like [::1]:22 and the slash syntax is easily mistaken for CIDR notation, which OpenSSH now supports for some things. Remove the slash notation from ListenAddress and PermitOpen. bz#2335, patch from jjelen at redhat.com, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fae5f4e23c51a368d6b2d98376069ac2b10ad4b7 commit 177d6c80c557a5e060cd343a0c116a2f1a7f43db Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 23 20:48:52 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove duplicate word. bz#2958, patch from jjelen at redhat.com OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cca3965a8333f2b6aae48b79ec1d72f7a830dd2c commit be3e6cba95dffe5fcf190c713525b48c837e7875 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 23 09:49:00 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove 3 as a guess for possible generator during moduli generation. It's not mentioned in RFC4419 and it's not possible for Sophie-Germain primes greater than 5. bz#2330, from Christian Wittenhorst , ok djm@ tb@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1467652e6802ad3333b0959282d8d49dfe22c8cd commit 8976f1c4b2721c26e878151f52bdf346dfe2d54c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 23 08:01:46 2019 +0000 upstream: Sanitize scp filenames via snmprintf. To do this we move the progressmeter formatting outside of signal handler context and have the atomicio callback called for EINTR too. bz#2434 with contributions from djm and jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af61c1f70e4f3bd8ab140b9f1fa699481db57d8 commit 6249451f381755f792c6b9e2c2f80cdc699c14e2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 24 10:00:20 2019 +1100 For broken read/readv comparisons, poll(RW). In the cases where we can't compare to read or readv function pointers for some reason we currently ifdef out the poll() used to block while waiting for reads or writes, falling back to busy waiting. This restores the poll() in this case, but has it always check for read or write, removing an inline ifdef in the process. commit 5cb503dff4db251520e8bf7d23b9c97c06eee031 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 24 09:55:16 2019 +1100 Include unistd.h for strmode(). commit f236ca2741f29b5c443c0b2db3aa9afb9ad9befe Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 24 09:50:58 2019 +1100 Also undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE. Prevents macro redefinition warning on at least NetBSD 6.1. commit be063945e4e7d46b1734d973bf244c350fae172a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 23 04:51:02 2019 +0000 upstream: allow auto-incrementing certificate serial number for certs signed in a single commandline. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39881087641efb8cd83c7ec13b9c98280633f45b commit 851f80328931975fe68f71af363c4537cb896da2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 23 04:16:22 2019 +0000 upstream: move a bunch of global flag variables to main(); make the rest static OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa431d92584e81fe99f95882f4c56b43fe3242dc commit 2265402dc7d701a9aca9f8a7b7b0fd45b65c479f Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 23 13:03:16 2019 +1100 depend commit 2c223878e53cc46def760add459f5f7c4fb43e35 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 23 02:01:10 2019 +0000 upstream: switch mainloop from select(2) to poll(2); ok deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37645419a330037d297f6f0adc3b3663e7ae7b2e commit bb956eaa94757ad058ff43631c3a7d6c94d38c2f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 23 00:30:41 2019 +0000 upstream: pass most arguments to the KEX hash functions as sshbuf rather than pointer+length; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef0c89c52ccc89817a13a5205725148a28492bf7 commit d691588b8e29622c66abf8932362b522cf7f4051 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 22 22:58:50 2019 +0000 upstream: backoff reading messages from active connections when the input buffer is too full to read one, or if the output buffer is too full to enqueue a response; feedback & ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df3c5b6d57c968975875de40d8955cbfed05a6c8 commit f99ef8de967949a1fc25a5c28263ea32736e5943 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 22 20:48:01 2019 +0000 upstream: add -m to usage(); reminded by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bca476a5236e8f94210290b3e6a507af0434613e commit 41923ce06ac149453debe472238e0cca7d5a2e5f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 22 12:03:58 2019 +0000 upstream: Correct some bugs in PKCS#11 token PIN handling at initial login, the attempt at reading the PIN could be skipped in some cases especially on devices with integrated PIN readers. based on patch from Daniel Kucera in bz#2652; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fad70a61c60610afe8bb0db538c90e343e75e58e commit 2162171ad517501ba511fa9f8191945d01857bb4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 22 12:00:50 2019 +0000 upstream: Support keys that set the CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE by requring a fresh login after the C_SignInit operation. based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2638; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a76e66996ba7c0923b46b74d46d499b811786661 commit 7a2cb18a215b2cb335da3dc99489c52a91f4925b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 22 11:51:25 2019 +0000 upstream: Mention that configuration for the destination host is not applied to any ProxyJump/-J hosts. This has confused a few people... OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 03f4f641df6ca236c1bfc69836a256b873db868b commit ecd2f33cb772db4fa76776543599f1c1ab6f9fa0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 22 11:40:42 2019 +0000 upstream: Include -m in the synopsis for a few more commands that support it Be more explicit in the description of -m about where it may be used Prompted by Jakub Jelen in bz2904 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b398ac5e05d8a6356710d0ff114536c9d71046c commit ff5d2cf4ca373bb4002eef395ed2cbe2ff0826c1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 22 11:26:16 2019 +0000 upstream: print the full pubkey being attempted at loglevel >= debug2; bz2939 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac0fe5ca1429ebf4d460bad602adc96de0d7e290 commit 180b520e2bab33b566b4b0cbac7d5f9940935011 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 22 11:19:42 2019 +0000 upstream: clarify: ssh-keygen -e only writes public keys, never private OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7de7ff6d274d82febf9feb641e2415ffd6a30bfb commit c45616a199c322ca674315de88e788f1d2596e26 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 22 11:00:15 2019 +0000 upstream: mention the new vs. old key formats in the introduction and give some hints on how keys may be converted or written in the old format. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c90a9f92eddc249e07fad1204d0e15c8aa13823 commit fd8eb1383a34c986a00ef13d745ae9bd3ea21760 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 22 06:58:31 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2a80e389da8e7ed71978643d8cbaa8605b597a8 commit 68e924d5473c00057f8532af57741d258c478223 Author: tb@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 23:55:12 2019 +0000 upstream: Forgot to add -J to the synopsis. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26d95e409a0b72526526fc56ca1caca5cc3d3c5e commit 622dedf1a884f2927a9121e672bd9955e12ba108 Author: tb@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 22:50:42 2019 +0000 upstream: Add a -J option as a shortcut for -o Proxyjump= to scp(1) and sftp(1) to match ssh(1)'s interface. ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a75bc2d5f329caa7229a7e9fe346c4f41c2663fc commit c882d74652800150d538e22c80dd2bd3cdd5fae2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 22 20:38:40 2019 +1100 Allow building against OpenSSL dev (3.x) version. commit d5520393572eb24aa0e001a1c61f49b104396e45 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 22 10:50:40 2019 +1100 typo commit 2de9cec54230998ab10161576f77860a2559ccb7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 22 10:49:52 2019 +1100 add missing header commit 533cfb01e49a2a30354e191669dc3159e03e99a7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 22:18:24 2019 +0000 upstream: switch sntrup implementation source from supercop to libpqcrypto; the latter is almost identical but doesn't rely on signed underflow to implement an optimised integer sort; from markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd09bbf0e0fcef1bedca69fdf7990dc360567cf8 commit d50ab3cd6fb859888a26b4d4e333239b4f6bf573 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 22 00:02:23 2019 +1100 new files need includes.h commit c7670b091a7174760d619ef6738b4f26b2093301 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 12:53:35 2019 +0000 upstream: add "-v" flags to ssh-add and ssh-pkcs11-helper to turn up debug verbosity. Make ssh-agent turn on ssh-pkcs11-helper's verbosity when it is run in debug mode ("ssh-agent -d"), so we get to see errors from the PKCS#11 code. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a798643c6a92a508df6bd121253ba1c8bee659d commit 49d8c8e214d39acf752903566b105d06c565442a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 12:50:12 2019 +0000 upstream: adapt to changes in KEX APIs and file removals OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 54d6857e7c58999c7a6d40942ab0fed3529f43ca commit 35ecc53a83f8e8baab2e37549addfd05c73c30f1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 12:35:20 2019 +0000 upstream: adapt to changes in KEX API and file removals OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 92cad022d3b0d11e08f3e0055d6a14b8f994c0d7 commit 7d69aae64c35868cc4f644583ab973113a79480e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 12:29:35 2019 +0000 upstream: adapt to bignum1 API removal and bignum2 API change OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cea6ff270f3d560de86b355a87a2c95b55a5ca63 commit beab553f0a9578ef9bffe28b2c779725e77b39ec Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 09:13:41 2019 +0000 upstream: remove hack to use non-system libcrypto OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce72487327eee4dfae1ab0212a1f33871fe0809f commit 4dc06bd57996f1a46b4c3bababe0d09bc89098f7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jan 21 23:14:04 2019 +1100 depend commit 70edd73edc4df54e5eee50cd27c25427b34612f8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 12:08:13 2019 +0000 upstream: fix reversed arguments to kex_load_hostkey(); manifested as errors in cert-hostkey.sh regress failures. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12dab63850b844f84d5a67e86d9e21a42fba93ba commit f1185abbf0c9108e639297addc77f8757ee00eb3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 11:22:00 2019 +0000 upstream: forgot to cvs add this file in previous series of commits; grrr OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bcff316c3e7da8fd15333e05d244442c3aaa66b0 commit 7bef390b625bdc080f0fd4499ef03cef60fca4fa Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:44:21 2019 +0000 upstream: nothing shall escape this purge OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4795b0ff142b45448f7e15f3c2f77a947191b217 commit aaca72d6f1279b842066e07bff797019efeb2c23 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:40:11 2019 +0000 upstream: rename kex->kem_client_pub -> kex->client_pub now that KEM has been renamed to kexgen from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fac6da5dc63530ad0da537db022a9a4cfbe8bed8 commit 70867e1ca2eb08bbd494fe9c568df4fd3b35b867 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:38:54 2019 +0000 upstream: merge kexkem[cs] into kexgen from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 87d886b7f1812ff9355fda1435f6ea9b71a0ac89 commit 71e67fff946396caa110a7964da23480757258ff Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:35:09 2019 +0000 upstream: pass values used in KEX hash computation as sshbuf rather than pointer+len suggested by me; implemented by markus@ ok me OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 994f33c464f4a9e0f1d21909fa3e379f5a0910f0 commit 4b83e2a2cc0c12e671a77eaba1c1245894f4e884 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:33:49 2019 +0000 upstream: remove kex_derive_keys_bn wrapper; no unused since the DH-like KEX methods have moved to KEM from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bde9809103832f349545e4f5bb733d316db9a060 commit 92dda34e373832f34a1944e5d9ebbebb184dedc1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:29:56 2019 +0000 upstream: use KEM API for vanilla ECDH from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6fbff96339a929835536b5730585d1d6057a352c commit b72357217cbe510a3ae155307a7be6b9181f1d1b Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jan 21 23:11:21 2019 +1100 fixup missing ssherr.h commit 9c9c97e14fe190931f341876ad98213e1e1dc19f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:28:01 2019 +0000 upstream: use KEM API for vanilla DH KEX from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af56466426b08a8be275412ae2743319e3d277c9 commit 2f6a9ddbbf6ca8623c53c323ff17fb6d68d66970 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:24:09 2019 +0000 upstream: use KEM API for vanilla c25519 KEX OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38d937b85ff770886379dd66a8f32ab0c1c35c1f commit dfd591618cdf2c96727ac0eb65f89cf54af0d97e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:20:12 2019 +0000 upstream: Add support for a PQC KEX/KEM: sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org using the Streamlined NTRU Prime 4591^761 implementation from SUPERCOP coupled with X25519 as a stop-loss. Not enabled by default. introduce KEM API; a simplified framework for DH-ish KEX methods. from markus@ feedback & ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d687f76cffd3561dd73eb302d17a1c3bf321d1a7 commit b1b2ff4ed559051d1035419f8f236275fa66d5d6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:07:22 2019 +0000 upstream: factor out kex_verify_hostkey() - again, duplicated almost exactly across client and server for several KEX methods. from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e4a16d949dadde002a0aacf6d280a684e20829c commit bb39bafb6dc520cc097780f4611a52da7f19c3e2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:05:09 2019 +0000 upstream: factor out kex_load_hostkey() - this is duplicated in both the client and server implementations for most KEX methods. from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8232fa7c21fbfbcaf838313b0c166dc6c8762f3c commit dec5e9d33891e3bc3f1395d7db0e56fdc7f86dfc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:03:37 2019 +0000 upstream: factor out kex_dh_compute_key() - it's shared between plain DH KEX and DH GEX in both the client and server implementations from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12186e18791fffcd4642c82e7e0cfdd7ea37e2ec commit e93bd98eab79b9a78f64ee8dd4dffc4d3979c7ae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 10:00:23 2019 +0000 upstream: factor out DH keygen; it's identical between the client and the server from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2be57f6a0d44f1ab2c8de2b1b5d6f530c387fae9 commit 5ae3f6d314465026d028af82609c1d49ad197655 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 09:55:52 2019 +0000 upstream: save the derived session id in kex_derive_keys() rather than making each kex method implementation do it. from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d61ade9c8d1e13f665f8663c552abff8c8a30673 commit 7be8572b32a15d5c3dba897f252e2e04e991c307 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 09:54:11 2019 +0000 upstream: Make sshpkt_get_bignum2() allocate the bignum it is parsing rather than make the caller do it. Saves a lot of boilerplate code. from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 576bf784f9a240f5a1401f7005364e59aed3bce9 commit 803178bd5da7e72be94ba5b4c4c196d4b542da4d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 09:52:25 2019 +0000 upstream: remove obsolete (SSH v.1) sshbuf_get/put_bignum1 functions from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0380b1b2d9de063de3c5a097481a622e6a04943e commit f3ebaffd8714be31d4345f90af64992de4b3bba2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 09:49:37 2019 +0000 upstream: fix all-zero check in kexc25519_shared_key from markus@ ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60b1d364e0d9d34d1d1ef1620cb92e36cf06712d commit 9d1a9771d0ad3a83af733bf3d2650b53f43c269f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 07:09:10 2019 +0000 upstream: - -T was added to the first synopsis by mistake - since "..." denotes optional, no need to surround it in [] ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 918f6d8eed4e0d8d9ef5eadae1b8983d796f0e25 commit 2f0bad2bf85391dbb41315ab55032ec522660617 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jan 21 21:28:27 2019 +1100 Make --with-rpath take a flag instead of yes/no. Linkers need various flags for -rpath and similar, so make --with-rpath take an optional flag argument which is passed to the linker. ok djm@ commit 23490a6c970ea1d03581a3b4208f2eb7a675f453 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jan 21 15:05:43 2019 +1100 fix previous test commit b6dd3277f2c49f9584a2097bc792e8f480397e87 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jan 21 13:50:17 2019 +1100 Wrap ECC static globals in EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW too. commit b2eb9db35b7191613f2f4b934d57b25938bb34b3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jan 21 12:53:40 2019 +1100 pass TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER to regress tests commit ba58a529f45b3dae2db68607d8c54ae96e90e705 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jan 21 12:31:29 2019 +1100 make agent-pkcs11 search harder for softhsm2.so commit 662be40c62339ab645113c930ce689466f028938 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 02:05:38 2019 +0000 upstream: always print the caller's error message in ossl_error(), even when there are no libcrypto errors to report. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09ebaa8f706e0eccedd209775baa1eee2ada806a commit ce46c3a077dfb4c531ccffcfff03f37775725b75 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 02:01:03 2019 +0000 upstream: get the ex_data (pkcs11_key object) back from the keys at the index at which it was inserted, rather than assuming index 0 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f3a6ce0346c8014e895e50423bef16401510aa8 commit 0a5f2ea35626022299ece3c8817a1abe8cf37b3e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 01:05:00 2019 +0000 upstream: GSSAPI code got missed when converting to new packet API OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37e4f06ab4a0f4214430ff462ba91acba28b7851 commit 2efcf812b4c1555ca3aff744820a3b3bccd68298 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jan 21 11:57:21 2019 +1100 Fix -Wunused when compiling PKCS#11 without ECDSA commit 3c0c657ed7cd335fc05c0852d88232ca7e92a5d9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:26:44 2019 +0000 upstream: allow override of ssh-pkcs11-helper binary via $TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER from markus@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7382a3d76746f5a792d106912a5819fd5e49e469 commit 760ae37b4505453c6fa4faf1aa39a8671ab053af Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:25:25 2019 +0000 upstream: adapt agent-pkcs11.sh test to softhsm2 and add support for ECDSA keys work by markus@, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1ebc2be0e88eff1b6d8be2f9c00cdc60723509fe commit b2ce8b31a1f974a13e6d12e0a0c132b50bc45115 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:24:19 2019 +0000 upstream: add "extra:" target to run some extra tests that are not enabled by default (currently includes agent-pkcs11.sh); from markus@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9a969e1adcd117fea174d368dcb9c61eb50a2a3c commit 632976418d60b7193597bbc6ac7ca33981a41aab Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 21 00:47:34 2019 +0000 upstream: use ECDSA_SIG_set0() instead of poking signature values into structure directly; the latter works on LibreSSL but not on OpenSSL. From portable. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b22a1919d9cee907d3f8a029167f70a481891c6 commit 5de6ac2bad11175135d9b819b3546db0ca0b4878 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jan 21 11:44:19 2019 +1100 remove HAVE_DLOPEN that snuck in portable doesn't use this commit e2cb445d786f7572da2af93e3433308eaed1093a Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jan 21 11:32:28 2019 +1100 conditionalise ECDSA PKCS#11 support Require EC_KEY_METHOD support in libcrypto, evidenced by presence of EC_KEY_METHOD_new() function. commit fcb1b0937182d0137a3c357c89735d0dc5869d54 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:12:35 2019 +0000 upstream: we use singleton pkcs#11 RSA_METHOD and EC_KEY_METHOD now, so there is no need to keep a copy of each in the pkcs11_key object. work by markus@, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43b4856516e45c0595f17a8e95b2daee05f12faa commit 6529409e85890cd6df7e5e81d04e393b1d2e4b0b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:11:11 2019 +0000 upstream: KNF previous; from markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3dfe35e25b310c3968b1e4e53a0cb1d03bda5395 commit 58622a8c82f4e2aad630580543f51ba537c1f39e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:10:33 2019 +0000 upstream: use OpenSSL's RSA reference counting hooks to implicitly clean up pkcs11_key objects when their owning RSA object's reference count drops to zero. Simplifies the cleanup path and makes it more like ECDSA's work by markus@, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74b9c98f405cd78f7148e9e4a4982336cd3df25c commit f118542fc82a3b3ab0360955b33bc5a271ea709f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:08:24 2019 +0000 upstream: make the PKCS#11 RSA code more like the new PKCS#11 ECDSA code: use a single custom RSA_METHOD instead of a method per key suggested by me, but markus@ did all the work. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8aafcebe923dc742fc5537a995cee549d07e4b2e commit 445cfce49dfc904c6b8ab25afa2f43130296c1a5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:05:52 2019 +0000 upstream: fix leak of ECDSA pkcs11_key objects work by markus, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fc0c4f1d640aaa5f19b8d70f37ea19b8ad284a1 commit 8a2467583f0b5760787273796ec929190c3f16ee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:03:26 2019 +0000 upstream: use EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY() instead of direct access of EC_KEY internals as that won't work on OpenSSL work by markus@, feedback and ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a99cdb89fbd6f5155ef8c521c99dc66e2612700 commit 24757c1ae309324e98d50e5935478655be04e549 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:01:59 2019 +0000 upstream: cleanup PKCS#11 ECDSA pubkey loading: the returned object should never have a DER header work by markus; feedback and ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b617fa585eddbbf0b1245b58b7a3c4b8d613db17 commit 749aef30321595435ddacef2f31d7a8f2b289309 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 23:00:12 2019 +0000 upstream: cleanup unnecessary code in ECDSA pkcs#11 signature work by markus@, feedback and ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: affa5ca7d58d59fbd16169f77771dcdbd2b0306d commit 0c50992af49b562970dd0ba3f8f151f1119e260e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 22:57:45 2019 +0000 upstream: cleanup pkcs#11 client code: use sshkey_new in instead of stack- allocating a sshkey work by markus@, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a048eb6ec8aa7fa97330af927022c0da77521f91 commit 854bd8674ee5074a239f7cadf757d55454802e41 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 22:54:30 2019 +0000 upstream: allow override of the pkcs#11 helper binary via $SSH_PKCS11_HELPER; needed for regress tests. work by markus@, ok me OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f78d8185500bd7c37aeaf7bd27336db62f0f7a83 commit 93f02107f44d63a016d8c23ebd2ca9205c495c48 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 22:51:37 2019 +0000 upstream: add support for ECDSA keys in PKCS#11 tokens Work by markus@ and Pedro Martelletto, feedback and ok me@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a37d651e221341376636056512bddfc16efb4424 commit aa22c20e0c36c2fc610cfcc793b0d14079c38814 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 22:03:29 2019 +0000 upstream: add option to test whether keys in an agent are usable, by performing a signature and a verification using each key "ssh-add -T pubkey [...]" work by markus@, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931b888a600b6a883f65375bd5f73a4776c6d19b commit a36b0b14a12971086034d53c0c3dfbad07665abe Author: tb@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 02:01:59 2019 +0000 upstream: Fix BN_is_prime_* calls in SSH, the API returns -1 on error. Found thanks to BoringSSL's commit 53409ee3d7595ed37da472bc73b010cd2c8a5ffd by David Benjamin. ok djm, dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ee832be3c44b1337f76b8562ec6d203f3b072f8 commit ec4776bb01dd8d61fddc7d2a31ab10bf3d3d829a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 20 01:12:40 2019 +0000 upstream: DH-GEX min value is now specified in RFC8270. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1229d0feb1d0ecefe05bf67a17578b263e991acc commit c90a7928c4191303e76a8c58b9008d464287ae1b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jan 21 09:22:36 2019 +1100 Check for cc before gcc. If cc is something other than gcc and is the system compiler prefer using that, unless otherwise told via $CC. ok djm@ commit 9b655dc9c9a353f0a527f0c6c43a5e35653c9503 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 20 14:55:27 2019 +1100 last bits of old packet API / active_state global commit 3f0786bbe73609ac96e5a0d91425ee21129f8e04 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 20 10:22:18 2019 +1100 remove PAM dependencies on old packet API Requires some caching of values, because the PAM code isn't always called with packet context. commit 08f66d9f17e12c1140d1f1cf5c4dce67e915d3cc Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 20 09:58:45 2019 +1100 remove vestiges of old packet API from loginrec.c commit c327813ea1d740e3e367109c17873815aba1328e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 20 09:45:38 2019 +1100 depend commit 135e302cfdbe91817294317c337cc38c3ff01cba Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 22:30:52 2019 +0000 upstream: fix error in refactor: use ssh_packet_disconnect() instead of sshpkt_error(). The first one logs the error and exits (what we want) instead of just logging and blundering on. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39f51b43641dce9ce0f408ea6c0e6e077e2e91ae commit 245c6a0b220b58686ee35bc5fc1c359e9be2faaa Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:45:31 2019 +0000 upstream: remove last traces of old packet API! with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bd10437026423eb8245636ad34797a20fbafd7d commit 04c091fc199f17dacf8921df0a06634b454e2722 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:43:56 2019 +0000 upstream: remove last references to active_state with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78619a50ea7e4ca2f3b54d4658b3227277490ba2 commit ec00f918b8ad90295044266c433340a8adc93452 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:43:07 2019 +0000 upstream: convert monitor.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61ecd154bd9804461a0cf5f495a29d919e0014d5 commit 6350e0316981489d4205952d6904d6fedba5bfe0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:42:30 2019 +0000 upstream: convert sshd.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea569d3eaf9b5cf1bad52779fbfa5fa0b28af891 commit a5e2ad88acff2b7d131ee6d5dc5d339b0f8c6a6d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:41:53 2019 +0000 upstream: convert session.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fae817207e23099ddd248960c984f7b7f26ea68e commit 3a00a921590d4c4b7e96df11bb10e6f9253ad45e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:41:18 2019 +0000 upstream: convert auth.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e10359f614ff522b52a3f05eec576257794e8e4 commit 7ec5cb4d15ed2f2c5c9f5d00e6b361d136fc1e2d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:40:48 2019 +0000 upstream: convert serverloop.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c92dd19b55457541478f95c0d6b318426d86d885 commit 64c9598ac05332d1327cbf55334dee4172d216c4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:40:21 2019 +0000 upstream: convert the remainder of sshconnect2.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0986d324f2ceb5e8a12ac21c1bb10b3b4b1e0f71 commit bc5e1169d101d16e3a5962a928db2bc49a8ef5a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:39:12 2019 +0000 upstream: convert the remainder of clientloop.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce2fbbacb86a290f31da1e7bf04cddf2bdae3d1e commit 5ebce136a6105f084db8f0d7ee41981d42daec40 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 20 09:44:53 2019 +1100 upstream: convert auth2.c to new packet API OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed831bb95ad228c6791bc18b60ce7a2edef2c999 commit 172a592a53ebe8649c4ac0d7946e6c08eb151af6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:37:48 2019 +0000 upstream: convert servconf.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 126553aecca302c9e02fd77e333b9cb217e623b4 commit 8cc7a679d29cf6ecccfa08191e688c7f81ef95c2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:37:13 2019 +0000 upstream: convert channels.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b8279b56113cbd4011fc91315c0796b63dc862c commit 06232038c794c7dfcb087be0ab0b3e65b09fd396 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:36:38 2019 +0000 upstream: convert sshconnect.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 222337cf6c96c347f1022d976fac74b4257c061f commit 25b2ed667216314471bb66752442c55b95792dc3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:36:06 2019 +0000 upstream: convert ssh.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb146878b24e85c2a09ee171afa6797c166a2e21 commit e3128b38623eef2fa8d6e7ae934d3bd08c7e973e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:35:25 2019 +0000 upstream: convert mux.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e3893937bae66416e984b282d8f0f800aafd802 commit ed1df7226caf3a943a36d580d4d4e9275f8a61ee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:34:45 2019 +0000 upstream: convert sshconnect2.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cb869e0d6e03539f943235641ea070cae2ebc58 commit 23f22a4aaa923c61ec49a99ebaa383656e87fa40 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:33:57 2019 +0000 upstream: convert clientloop.c to new packet API with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 497b36500191f452a22abf283aa8d4a9abaee7fa commit ad60b1179c9682ca5aef0b346f99ef68cbbbc4e5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:33:13 2019 +0000 upstream: allow sshpkt_fatal() to take a varargs format; we'll use this to give packet-related fatal error messages more context (esp. the remote endpoint) ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de57211f9543426b515a8a10a4f481666b2b2a50 commit 0fa174ebe129f3d0aeaf4e2d1dd8de745870d0ff Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 21:31:32 2019 +0000 upstream: begin landing remaining refactoring of packet parsing API, started almost exactly six years ago. This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent steps. with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c98a6b38f6911fd1ae025a1ec57807fb4d4ef4 commit 4ae7f80dfd02f2bde912a67c9f338f61e90fa79f Author: tb@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 19 04:15:56 2019 +0000 upstream: Print an \r in front of the password prompt so parts of a password that was entered too early are likely clobbered by the prompt. Idea from doas. from and ok djm "i like it" deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5fb97c68df6d8b09ab37f77bca1d84d799c4084e commit a6258e5dc314c7d504ac9f0fbc3be96475581dbe Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 18 11:09:01 2019 +1100 Add minimal fchownat and fchmodat implementations. Fixes builds on at least OS X Lion, NetBSD 6 and Solaris 10. commit 091093d25802b87d3b2b09f2c88d9f33e1ae5562 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 18 12:11:42 2019 +1300 Add a minimal implementation of utimensat(). Some systems (eg older OS X) do not have utimensat, so provide minimal implementation in compat layer. Fixes build on at least El Capitan. commit 609644027dde1f82213699cb6599e584c7efcb75 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 1 22:20:16 2019 +0000 upstream: regress bits for banner processing refactor (this test was depending on ssh returning a particular error message for banner parsing failure) reminded by bluhm@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f24fc303d40931157431df589b386abf5e1be575 commit f47d72ddad75b93d3cbc781718b0fa9046c03df8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 17 04:45:09 2019 +0000 upstream: tun_fwd_ifnames variable should b =?UTF-8?q?e=20extern;=20from=20Hanno=20B=C3=B6ck?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d53dede6e521161bf04d39d09947db6253a38271 commit 943d0965263cae1c080ce5a9d0b5aa341885e55d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 17 04:20:53 2019 +0000 upstream: include time.h for time(3)/nanosleep(2); from Ian McKellar OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6412ccd06a88f65b207a1089345f51fa1244ea51 commit dbb4dec6d5d671b5e9d67ef02162a610ad052068 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 17 01:50:24 2019 +0000 upstream: many of the global variables in this file can be made static; patch from Markus Schmidt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3db619f67beb53257b21bac0e92b4fb7d5d5737 commit 60d8c84e0887514c99c9ce071965fafaa1c3d34a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 16 23:23:45 2019 +0000 upstream: Add "-h" flag to sftp chown/chgrp/chmod commands to request they do not follow symlinks. Requires recently-committed lsetstat@openssh.com extension on the server side. ok markus@ dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f93bb3f6f7eb2fb7ef1e59126e72714f1626d604 commit dbbc7e0eab7262f34b8e0cd6efecd1c77b905ed0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 16 23:22:10 2019 +0000 upstream: add support for a "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension. This replicates the functionality of the existing SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT operation but does not follow symlinks. Based on a patch from Bert Haverkamp in bz#2067 but with more attribute modifications supported. ok markus@ dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7234f6e90db19655d55d936a115ee4ccb6aaf80 commit 4a526941d328fc3d97068c6a4cbd9b71b70fe5e1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 4 03:27:50 2019 +0000 upstream: eliminate function-static attempt counters for passwd/kbdint authmethods by moving them to the client authctxt; Patch from Markus Schmidt, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4df4404a5d5416eb056f68e0e2f4fa91ba3b3f7f commit 8a8183474c41bd6cebaa917346b549af2239ba2f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 4 03:23:00 2019 +0000 upstream: fix memory leak of ciphercontext when rekeying; bz#2942 Patch from Markus Schmidt; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7877f1b82e249986f1ef98d0ae76ce987d332bdd commit 5bed70afce0907b6217418d0655724c99b683d93 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 1 23:10:53 2019 +0000 upstream: static on global vars, const on handler tables that contain function pointers; from Mike Frysinger OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef2305e50d3caa6326286db43cf2cfaf03960e0 commit 007a88b48c97d092ed2f501bbdcb70d9925277be Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 27 23:02:11 2018 +0000 upstream: Request RSA-SHA2 signatures for rsa-sha2-{256|512}-cert-v01@openssh.com cert algorithms; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: afc6f7ca216ccd821656d1c911d2a3deed685033 commit eb347d086c35428c47fe52b34588cbbc9b49d9a6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 27 03:37:49 2018 +0000 upstream: ssh_packet_set_state() now frees ssh->kex implicitly, so don't do explicit kex_free() beforehand OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f2f73bad47f62a2040ccba0a72cadcb12eda49cf commit bb542f0cf6f7511a22a08c492861e256a82376a9 Author: tedu@openbsd.org Date: Sat Dec 15 00:50:21 2018 +0000 upstream: remove unused and problematic sudo clean. ok espie OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ca90c20a15a85b661e13e98b80c10e65cd662f7b commit 0a843d9a0e805f14653a555f5c7a8ba99d62c12d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 27 03:25:24 2018 +0000 upstream: move client/server SSH-* banners to buffers under ssh->kex and factor out the banner exchange. This eliminates some common code from the client and server. Also be more strict about handling \r characters - these should only be accepted immediately before \n (pointed out by Jann Horn). Inspired by a patch from Markus Schmidt. (lots of) feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cc7885487a6754f63641d7d3279b0941890275b commit 434b587afe41c19391821e7392005068fda76248 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 7 04:36:09 2018 +0000 upstream: Fix calculation of initial bandwidth limits. Account for written bytes before the initial timer check so that the first buffer written is accounted. Set the threshold after which the timer is checked such that the limit starts being computed as soon as possible, ie after the second buffer is written. This prevents an initial burst of traffic and provides a more accurate bandwidth limit. bz#2927, ok djm. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff3ef76e4e43040ec198c2718d5682c36b255cb6 commit a6a0788cbbe8dfce2819ee43b09c80725742e21c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 7 03:39:40 2018 +0000 upstream: only consider the ext-info-c extension during the initial KEX. It shouldn't be sent in subsequent ones, but if it is present we should ignore it. This prevents sshd from sending a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO for REKEX for buggy these clients. Reported by Jakub Jelen via bz2929; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91564118547f7807030ec537480303e2371902f9 commit 63bba57a32c5bb6158d57cf4c47022daf89c14a0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 7 03:33:18 2018 +0000 upstream: fix option letter pasto in previous OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e26c8bf2f2a808f3c47960e1e490d2990167ec39 commit 737e4edd82406595815efadc28ed5161b8b0c01a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 7 03:32:26 2018 +0000 upstream: mention that the ssh-keygen -F (find host in authorized_keys) and -R (remove host from authorized_keys) options may accept either a bare hostname or a [hostname]:port combo. bz#2935 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5535cf4ce78375968b0d2cd7aa316fa3eb176780 commit 8a22ffaa13391cfe5b40316d938fe0fb931e9296 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Dec 7 15:41:16 2018 +1100 expose $SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment This makes the connection 4-tuple available to PAM modules that wish to use it in decision-making. bz#2741 commit a784fa8c7a7b084d63bae82ccfea902131bb45c5 Author: Kevin Adler Date: Wed Dec 12 22:12:45 2018 -0600 Don't pass loginmsg by address now that it's an sshbuf* In 120a1ec74, loginmsg was changed from the legacy Buffer type to struct sshbuf*, but it missed changing calls to sys_auth_allowed_user and sys_auth_record_login which passed loginmsg by address. Now that it's a pointer, just pass it directly. This only affects AIX, unless there are out of tree users. commit 285310b897969a63ef224d39e7cc2b7316d86940 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 7 02:31:20 2018 +0000 upstream: no need to allocate channels_pre/channels_post in channel_init_channels() as we do it anyway in channel_handler_init() that we call at the end of the function. Fix from Markus Schmidt via bz#2938 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74893638af49e3734f1e33a54af1b7ea533373ed commit 87d6cf1cbc91df6815db8fe0acc7c910bc3d18e4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 30 02:24:52 2018 +0000 upstream: don't attempt to connect to empty SSH_AUTH_SOCK; bz#293 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e8fc8f19f14b21adef7109e0faa583d87c0e929 commit 91b19198c3f604f5eef2c56dbe36f29478243141 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 28 06:00:38 2018 +0000 upstream: don't truncate user or host name in "user@host's OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6ca01a8d58004b7f2cac0b1b7ce8f87e425e360 commit dd0cf6318d9b4b3533bda1e3bc021b2cd7246b7a Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 23 06:58:28 2018 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08f096922eb00c98251501c193ff9e83fbb5de4f commit 8a85f5458d1c802471ca899c97f89946f6666e61 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 25 21:44:05 2018 +1100 Include stdio.h for FILE if needed. commit 16fb23f25454991272bfe4598cc05d20fcd25116 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 25 14:05:57 2018 +1100 Reverse order of OpenSSL init functions. Try the new init function (OPENSSL_init_crypto) before falling back to the old one (OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms). commit 98f878d2272bf8dff21f2a0265d963c29e33fed2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 25 14:05:08 2018 +1100 Improve OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms check. OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() may be a macro so check for that too. commit 9e34e0c59ab04514f9de9934a772283f7f372afe Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 23 05:08:07 2018 +0000 upstream: add a ssh_config "Match final" predicate Matches in same pass as "Match canonical" but doesn't require hostname canonicalisation be enabled. bz#2906 ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fba1dfe9f6e0cabcd0e2b3be13f7a434199beffa commit 4da58d58736b065b1182b563d10ad6765d811c6d Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 23 02:53:57 2018 +0000 upstream: Remove now-unneeded ifdef SIGINFO around handler since it is now always used for SIGUSR1 even when SIGINFO is not defined. This will make things simpler in -portable. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4ff0265b335820b0646d37beb93f036ded0dc43f commit c721d5877509875c8515df0215fa1dab862013bc Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 23 14:11:20 2018 +1100 Move RANDOM_SEED_SIZE outside ifdef. RANDOM_SEED_SIZE is used by both the OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL code This fixes the build with configureed --without-openssl. commit deb51552c3ce7ce72c8d0232e4f36f2e7c118c7d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 22 19:59:28 2018 +1100 Resync with OpenBSD by pulling in an ifdef SIGINFO. commit 28c7b2cd050f4416bfcf3869a20e3ea138aa52fe Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 23 10:45:20 2018 +1100 fix configure test for OpenSSL version square brackets in case statements may be eaten by autoconf. Report and fix from Filipp Gunbin; tweaked by naddy@ commit 42c5ec4b97b6a1bae70f323952d0646af16ce710 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 23 10:40:06 2018 +1100 refactor libcrypto initialisation Don't call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() unless OpenSSL actually supports it. Move all libcrypto initialisation to a single function, and call that from seed_rng() that is called early in each tool's main(). Prompted by patch from Rosen Penev commit 5b60b6c02009547a3e2a99d4886965de2a4719da Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 22 08:59:11 2018 +0000 upstream: Output info on SIGUSR1 as well as SIGINFO to resync with portable. (ID sync only). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 699d153e2de22dce51a1b270c40a98472d1a1b16 commit e4ae345dc75b34fd870c2e8690d831d2c1088eb7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 22 08:48:32 2018 +0000 upstream: Append pid to temp files in /var/run and set a cleanup trap for them. This allows multiple instances of tests to run without colliding. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 57add105ecdfc54752d8003acdd99eb68c3e0b4c commit f72d0f52effca5aa20a193217346615ecd3eed53 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 31 11:09:27 2018 +0000 upstream: UsePrivilegeSeparation no is deprecated test "yes" and "sandbox". OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 80e685ed8990766527dc629b1affc09a75bfe2da commit 35d0e5fefc419bddcbe09d7fc163d8cd3417125b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 17 23:28:05 2018 +0000 upstream: add some knobs: UNITTEST_FAST?= no # Skip slow tests (e.g. less intensive fuzzing). UNITTEST_SLOW?= no # Include slower tests (e.g. more intensive fuzzing). UNITTEST_VERBOSE?= no # Verbose test output (inc. per-test names). useful if you want to run the tests as a smoke test to exercise the functionality without waiting for all the fuzzers to run. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e04d82ebec86068198cd903acf1c67563c57315e commit c1941293d9422a14dda372b4c21895e72aa7a063 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 22 15:52:26 2018 +1100 Resync Makefile.inc with upstream. It's unused in -portable, but having it out of sync makes other syncs fail to apply. commit 928f1231f65f88cd4c73e6e0edd63d2cf6295d77 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 19 04:12:32 2018 +0000 upstream: silence (to log level debug2) failure messages when loading the default hostkeys. Hostkeys explicitly specified in the configuration or on the command-line are still reported as errors, and failure to load at least one host key remains a fatal error. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Based on patch from Dag-Erling Smørgrav via https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/103 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffc2e35a75d1008effaf05a5e27425041c27b684 commit 7fca94edbe8ca9f879da9fdd2afd959c4180f4c7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Nov 18 22:43:29 2018 +0000 upstream: Fix inverted logic for redirecting ProxyCommand stderr to /dev/null. Fixes mosh in proxycommand mode that was broken by the previous ProxyCommand change that was reported by matthieu@. ok djm@ danj@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6fc9641bc250221a0a81c6beb2e72d603f8add6 commit ccef7c4faf914993b53035cd2b25ce02ab039c9d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 16 06:17:38 2018 +0000 upstream: redirect stderr of ProxyCommands to /dev/null when ssh is started with ControlPersist; based on patch from Steffen Prohaska OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bcaa14a03ae80369d31021271ec75dce2597957 commit 15182fd96845a03216d7ac5a2cf31c4e77e406e3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 16 06:10:29 2018 +0000 upstream: make grandparent-parent-child sshbuf chains robust to use-after-free faults if the ancestors are freed before the descendents. Nothing in OpenSSH uses this deallocation pattern. Reported by Jann Horn OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d93501d1d2734245aac802a252b9bb2eccdba0f2 commit 2a35862e664afde774d4a72497d394fe7306ccb5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 16 03:26:01 2018 +0000 upstream: use path_absolute() for pathname checks; from Manoj Ampalam OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 482ce71a5ea5c5f3bc4d00fd719481a6a584d925 commit d0d1dfa55be1c5c0d77ab3096b198a64235f936d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 16 14:11:44 2018 +1100 Test for OPENSSL_init_crypto before using. Check for the presence of OPENSSL_init_crypto and all the flags we want before trying to use it (bz#2931). commit 6010c0303a422a9c5fa8860c061bf7105eb7f8b2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 16 03:03:10 2018 +0000 upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer to the current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9 commit aaed635e3a401cfcc4cc97f33788179c458901c3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 16 02:46:20 2018 +0000 upstream: fix bug in client that was keeping a redundant ssh-agent socket around for the life of the connection; bz#2912; reported by Simon Tatham; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ded588301183d343dce3e8c5fc1398e35058478 commit e76135e3007f1564427b2956c628923d8dc2f75a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 16 02:43:56 2018 +0000 upstream: fix bug in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options. If only RSA-SHA2 siganture types were specified, then authentication would always fail for RSA keys as the monitor checks only the base key (not the signature algorithm) type against *AcceptedKeyTypes. bz#2746; reported by Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117bc3dc54578dbdb515a1d3732988cb5b00461b commit 5c1a63562cac0574c226224075b0829a50b48c9d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 16 02:30:20 2018 +0000 upstream: support a prefix of '@' to suppress echo of sftp batch commands; bz#2926; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d635636bc84aeae796467e059f7634de990a79d commit 90ef45f7aac33eaf55ec344e101548a01e570f29 Author: schwarze@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 13 07:22:45 2018 +0000 upstream: fix markup error (missing blank before delimiter); from Mike Frysinger OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bc5392f795ca86318d695e0947eaf71a5a4f6d9 commit 960e7c672dc106f3b759c081de3edb4d1138b36e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 9 02:57:58 2018 +0000 upstream: typo in error message; caught by Debian lintian, via Colin Watson OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bff614c7bd1f4ca491a84e9b5999f848d0d66758 commit 81f1620c836e6c79c0823ba44acca605226a80f1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 9 02:56:22 2018 +0000 upstream: correct local variable name; from yawang AT microsoft.com OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0c228390856a215bb66319c89cb3959d3af8c87 commit 1293740e800fa2e5ccd38842a2e4970c6f3b9831 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 31 11:20:05 2018 +0000 upstream: Import new moduli. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403 commit 46925ae28e53fc9add336a4fcdb7ed4b86c3591c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 26 01:23:03 2018 +0000 upstream: mention ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com in list of cert key type at start of doc OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b46b0149256d67f05f2d5d01e160634ed1a67324 commit 8d8340e2c215155637fe19cb1a837f71b2d55f7b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 16 13:32:13 2018 +1100 Remove fallback check for /usr/local/ssl. If configure could not find a working OpenSSL installation it would fall back to checking in /usr/local/ssl. This made sense back when systems did not ship with OpenSSL, but most do and OpenSSL 1.1 doesn't use that as a default any more. The fallback behaviour also meant that if you pointed --with-ssl-dir at a specific directory and it didn't work, it would silently use either the system libs or the ones in /usr/local/ssl. If you want to use /usr/local/ssl you'll need to pass configure --with-ssl-dir=/usr/local/ssl. ok djm@ commit ce93472134fb22eff73edbcd173a21ae38889331 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 16 12:44:01 2018 +1100 Fix check for OpenSSL 1.0.1 exactly. Both INSTALL and configure.ac claim OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 is supported; fix compile-time check for 1.0.1 to match. commit f2970868f86161a22b2c377057fa3891863a692a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 11 15:58:20 2018 +1100 Improve warnings in cygwin service setup. bz#2922, patch from vinschen at redhat.com. commit bd2d54fc1eee84bf87158a1277a50e6c8a303339 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 11 15:54:54 2018 +1100 Remove hardcoded service name in cygwin setup. bz#2922, patch from Christian.Lupien at USherbrooke.ca, sanity check by vinschen at redhat.com. commit d0153c77bf7964e694f1d26c56c41a571b8e9466 Author: Dag-Erling Smørgrav Date: Tue Oct 9 23:03:40 2018 +0200 AC_CHECK_SIZEOF() no longer needs a second argument. commit 9b47b083ca9d866249ada9f02dbd57c87b13806e Author: Manoj Ampalam Date: Thu Nov 8 22:41:59 2018 -0800 Fix error message w/out nistp521. Correct error message when OpenSSL doesn't support certain ECDSA key lengths. commit 624d19ac2d56fa86a22417c35536caceb3be346f Author: Eneas U de Queiroz Date: Tue Oct 9 16:17:42 2018 -0300 fix compilation with openssl built without ECC ECDSA code in openssh-compat.h and libressl-api-compat.c needs to be guarded by OPENSSL_HAS_ECC Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz commit 1801cd11d99d05a66ab5248c0555f55909a355ce Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 8 15:03:11 2018 +1100 Simplify OpenSSL 1.1 function checks. Replace AC_SEARCH_LIBS checks for OpenSSL 1.1 functions with a single AC_CHECK_FUNCS. ok djm@ commit bc32f118d484e4d71d2a0828fd4eab7e4176c9af Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Nov 5 17:31:24 2018 +1100 Fix pasto for HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV. Prevents unnecessary redefinition. Patch from mforney at mforney.org. commit 3719df60c66abc4b47200d41f571d67772f293ba Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Oct 31 22:21:03 2018 +1100 Import new moduli. commit 595605d4abede475339d6a1f07a8cc674c11d1c3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Oct 28 15:18:13 2018 +1100 Update check for minimum OpenSSL version. commit 6ab75aba340d827140d7ba719787aabaf39a0355 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Oct 28 15:16:31 2018 +1100 Update required OpenSSL versions to match current. commit c801b0e38eae99427f37869370151b78f8e15c5d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Oct 28 14:34:12 2018 +1100 Use detected version functions in openssl compat. Use detected functions in compat layer instead of guessing based on versions. Really fixes builds with LibreSSL, not just configure. commit 262d81a259d4aa1507c709ec9d5caa21c7740722 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Oct 27 16:45:59 2018 +1100 Check for the existence of openssl version funcs. Check for the existence of openssl version functions and use the ones detected instead of trying to guess based on the int32 version identifier. Fixes builds with LibreSSL. commit 406a24b25d6a2bdd70cacd16de7e899dcb2a8829 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Oct 26 13:43:28 2018 +1100 fix builds on OpenSSL <= 1.0.x I thought OpenSSL 1.0.x offered the new-style OpenSSL_version_num() API to obtain version number, but they don't. commit 859754bdeb41373d372e36b5dc89c547453addb3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 23 17:10:41 2018 +1100 remove remaining references to SSLeay Prompted by Rosen Penev commit b9fea45a68946c8dfeace72ad1f6657c18f2a98a Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 23 17:10:35 2018 +1100 regen depend commit a65784c9f9c5d00cf1a0e235090170abc8d07c73 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 23 05:56:35 2018 +0000 upstream: refer to OpenSSL not SSLeay; we're old, but we don't have to act it OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ca38d11f8ed19e61a55108d1e892d696cee08ec commit c0a35265907533be10ca151ac797f34ae0d68969 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Oct 22 11:22:50 2018 +1100 fix compile for openssl 1.0.x w/ --with-ssl-engine bz#2921, patch from cotequeiroz commit 31b49525168245abe16ad49d7b7f519786b53a38 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 22 20:05:18 2018 +1100 Include openssl compatibility. Patch from rosenp at gmail.com via openssh-unix-dev. commit a4fc253f5f44f0e4c47aafe2a17d2c46481d3c04 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 19 03:12:42 2018 +0000 upstream: when printing certificate contents "ssh-keygen -Lf /path/certificate", include the algorithm that the CA used to sign the cert. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ea20b5048a851a7a0758dcb9777a211a2c0dddd commit 83b3d99d2b47321b7ebb8db6f6ea04f3808bc069 Author: florian@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 15 11:28:50 2018 +0000 upstream: struct sockaddr_storage is guaranteed to be large enough, no need to check the size. OK kn, deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0aa56e92eb49c79f495b31a5093109ec5841f439 commit aede1c34243a6f7feae2fb2cb686ade5f9be6f3d Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 17 11:01:20 2018 +1100 Require OpenSSL 1.1.x series 1.1.0g or greater Previous versions have a bug with EVP_CipherInit() when passed a NULL EVP_CIPHER, per https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613 ok dtucker@ commit 08300c211409c212e010fe2e2f2883e573a04ce2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 17 08:12:02 2018 +1100 unbreak compilation with --with-ssl-engine Missing last argument to OPENSSL_init_crypto() commit 1673274aee67ce0eb6f00578b6f3d2bcbd58f937 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Oct 16 14:45:57 2018 +1100 Remove gcc spectre mitigation flags. Current impementions of the gcc spectre mitigation flags cause miscompilations when combined with other flags and do not provide much protection. Found by fweimer at redhat.com, ok djm@ commit 4e23deefd7959ef83c73ed9cce574423438f6133 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 16 10:51:52 2018 +1100 Avoid deprecated OPENSSL_config when using 1.1.x OpenSSL 1.1.x soft-deprecated OPENSSL_config in favour of OPENSSL_init_crypto; pointed out by Jakub Jelen commit 797cdd9c8468ed1125ce60d590ae3f1397866af4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Oct 12 16:58:47 2018 +1100 Don't avoid our *sprintf replacements. Don't let systems with broken printf(3) avoid our replacements via asprintf(3)/vasprintf(3) calling libc internally. From djm@ commit e526127cbd2f8ad88fb41229df0c9b850c722830 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Oct 12 16:43:35 2018 +1100 Check if snprintf understands %zu. If the platforms snprintf and friends don't understand %zu, use the compat replacement. Prevents segfaults on those platforms. commit cf39f875191708c5f2f1a3c1c9019f106e74aea3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Oct 12 09:48:05 2018 +1100 remove stale link, tweak commit a7205e68decf7de2005810853b4ce6b222b65e2a Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Oct 12 09:47:20 2018 +1100 update version numbers ahead of release commit 1a4a9cf80f5b92b9d1dadd0bfa8867c04d195391 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 11 03:48:04 2018 +0000 upstream: don't send new-style rsa-sha2-*-cert-v01@openssh.com names to older OpenSSH that can't handle them. spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 662bbc402e3d7c9b6c322806269698106a6ae631 commit dc8ddcdf1a95e011c263486c25869bb5bf4e30ec Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 11 13:08:59 2018 +1100 update depends commit 26841ac265603fd2253e6832e03602823dbb4022 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 11 13:02:11 2018 +1100 some more duplicated key algorithm lines From Adam Eijdenberg commit 5d9d17603bfbb620195a4581025052832b4c4adc Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 11 11:56:36 2018 +1100 fix duplicated algorithm specification lines Spotted by Adam Eijdenberg commit ebfafd9c7a5b2a7fb515ee95dbe0e44e11d0a663 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 11 00:52:46 2018 +0000 upstream: typo in plain RSA algorithm counterpart names for certificates; spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfcdeb6f4fc9e7607f5096574c8f118f2e709e00 commit c29b111e7d87c2324ff71c80653dd8da168c13b9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 11 11:29:35 2018 +1100 check pw_passwd != NULL here too Again, for systems with broken NIS implementations. Prompted by coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com commit fe8e8f349a553ef4c567acd418aac769a82b7729 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 11 11:03:15 2018 +1100 check for NULL return from shadow_pw() probably unreachable on this platform; pointed out by coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com commit acc59cbe7a1fb169e1c3caba65a39bd74d6e030d Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 10 16:43:49 2018 +0000 upstream: introducing openssh 7.9 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42d526a9fe01a40dd299ac58014d3349adf40e25 commit 12731158c75c8760a8bea06350eeb3e763fe1a07 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 11 10:29:29 2018 +1100 supply callback to PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey OpenSSL 1.1.0i has changed the behaviour of their PEM APIs, so that empty passphrases are interpreted differently. This probabalistically breaks loading some keys, because the PEM format is terrible and doesn't include a proper MAC. Avoid this by providing a basic callback to avoid passing empty passphrases to OpenSSL in cases where one is required. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2913; ok dtucker@ commit d1d301a1dd5d6cc3a9ed93ab7ab09dda4cb456e0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 10 14:57:00 2018 +1100 in pick_salt() avoid dereference of NULL passwords Apparently some NIS implementations can leave pw->pw_passwd (or the shadow equivalent) NULL. bz#2909; based on patch from Todd Eigenschink commit edbb6febccee084d212fdc0cb05b40cb1c646ab1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 9 05:42:23 2018 +0000 upstream: Treat all PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() errors when a passphrase is specified as "incorrect passphrase" instead of trying to choose between that and "invalid format". libcrypto can return ASN1 parsing errors rather than the expected decrypt error in certain infrequent cases when trying to decrypt/parse PEM private keys when supplied with an invalid passphrase. Report and repro recipe from Thomas Deutschmann in bz#2901 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b1d4cd92395f9743f81c0d23aab2524109580870 commit 2581333d564d8697837729b3d07d45738eaf5a54 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 5 14:26:09 2018 +0000 upstream: Support using service names for port numbers. * Try to resolve a port specification with getservbyname(3) if a numeric conversion fails. * Make the "Port" option in ssh_config handle its argument as a port rather than a plain integer. ok dtucker@ deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7f03633133205ab3dfbc67f9df7475fabae660d commit e0d6501e86734c48c8c503f81e1c0926e98c5c4c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 4 07:47:35 2018 +0000 upstream: when the peer sends a channel-close message, make sure we close the local extended read fd (stderr) along with the regular read fd (stdout). Avoids weird stuck processed in multiplexing mode. Report and analysis by Nelson Elhage and Geoffrey Thomas in bz#2863 ok dtucker@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a48a2467fe938de4de69d2e7193d5fa701f12ae9 commit 6f1aabb128246f445e33b8844fad3de9cb1d18cb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 4 01:04:52 2018 +0000 upstream: factor out channel status formatting from channel_open_message() so we can use it in other debug messages OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c3903ca28fcabad57f566c9d0045b41ab7d52ba commit f1dd179e122bdfdb7ca3072d9603607740efda05 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 4 00:10:11 2018 +0000 upstream: include a little more information about the status and disposition of channel's extended (stderr) fd; makes debugging some things a bit easier. No behaviour change. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 483eb6467dc7d5dbca8eb109c453e7a43075f7ce commit 2d1428b11c8b6f616f070f2ecedce12328526944 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 4 00:04:41 2018 +0000 upstream: explicit_bzero here to be consistent with other kex*.c; report from coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90f146c5b5f5b1408700395e394f70b440856cb commit 5eff5b858e717e901e6af6596306a114de9f79f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 3 06:38:35 2018 +0000 upstream: Allow ssh_config IdentityAgent directive to accept environment variable names as well as explicit paths. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f0996e103876c53d8c9dd51dcce9889d700767b commit a46ac4d86b25414d78b632e8173578b37e5f8a83 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 2 12:51:58 2018 +0000 upstream: mention INFO@openssh.com for sending SIGINFO OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132471eeb0df658210afd27852fe65131b26e900 commit ff3a411cae0b484274b7900ef52ff4dad3e12876 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 2 22:49:40 2018 +1000 only support SIGINFO on systems with SIGINFO commit cd98925c6405e972dc9f211afc7e75e838abe81c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 2 12:40:07 2018 +0000 upstream: Add server support for signalling sessions via the SSH channel/ session protocol. Signalling is only supported to sesssions that are not subsystems and were not started with a forced command. Long requested in bz#1424 Based on a patch from markus@ and reworked by dtucker@; ok markus@ dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bea826f575862eaac569c4bedd1056a268be1c3 commit dba50258333f2604a87848762af07ba2cc40407a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 26 07:32:44 2018 +0000 upstream: remove big ugly TODO comment from start of file. Some of the mentioned tasks are obsolete and, of the remainder, most are already captured in PROTOCOL.mux where they better belong OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16d9d76dee42a5bb651c9d6740f7f0ef68aeb407 commit 92b61a38ee9b765f5049f03cd1143e13f3878905 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 26 07:30:05 2018 +0000 upstream: Document mux proxy mode; added by Markus in openssh-7.4 Also add a little bit of information about the overall packet format OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdb6f6ea8580ef96792e270cae7857786ad84a95 commit 9d883a1ce4f89b175fd77405ff32674620703fb2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 26 01:48:57 2018 +0000 upstream: s/process_mux_master/mux_master_process/ in mux master function names, Gives better symmetry with the existing mux_client_*() names and makes it more obvious when a message comes from the master vs client (they are interleved in ControlMaster=auto mode). no functional change beyond prefixing a could of log messages with __func__ where they were previously lacking. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b01f7c3fdf92692e1713a822a89dc499333daf75 commit c2fa53cd6462da82d3a851dc3a4a3f6b920337c8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Sep 22 14:41:24 2018 +1000 Remove unused variable in _ssh_compat_fflush. commit d1b3540c21212624af907488960d703c7d987b42 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Sep 20 18:08:43 2018 +1000 Import updated moduli. commit b5e412a8993ad17b9e1141c78408df15d3d987e1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 21 12:46:22 2018 +0000 upstream: Allow ssh_config ForwardX11Timeout=0 to disable the timeout and allow X11 connections in untrusted mode indefinitely. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ceed3f540b48e5803f933e59a03b20db10c69 commit cb24d9fcc901429d77211f274031653476864ec6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 21 12:23:17 2018 +0000 upstream: when compiled with GSSAPI support, cache supported method OIDs by calling ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids() regardless of whether GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the main config. This avoids sandbox violations for configurations that enable GSSAPI auth later, e.g. Match user djm GSSAPIAuthentication yes bz#2107; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5dd42d87c74e27cfb712b15b0f97ab20e0afd1d commit bbc8af72ba68da014d4de6e21a85eb5123384226 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 21 12:20:12 2018 +0000 upstream: In sshkey_in_file(), ignore keys that are considered for being too short (i.e. SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH). These keys will not be considered to be "in the file". This allows key revocation lists to contain short keys without the entire revocation list being considered invalid. bz#2897; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9f3d857d07194a42ad7e62889a74dc3f9d9924b commit 383a33d160cefbfd1b40fef81f72eadbf9303a66 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 21 03:11:36 2018 +0000 upstream: Treat connections with ProxyJump specified the same as ones with a ProxyCommand set with regards to hostname canonicalisation (i.e. don't try to canonicalise the hostname unless CanonicalizeHostname is set to 'always'). Patch from Sven Wegener via bz#2896 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 527ff501cf98bf65fb4b29ed0cb847dda10f4d37 commit 0cbed248ed81584129b67c348dbb801660f25a6a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 20 23:40:16 2018 +0000 upstream: actually make CASignatureAlgorithms available as a config option OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93fa7ff58314ed7b1ab7744090a6a91232e6ae52 commit 62528870c0ec48cd86a37dd7320fb85886c3e6ee Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 20 08:07:03 2018 +0000 upstream: Import updated moduli. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40 commit e6933a2ffa0659d57f3c7b7c457b2c62b2a84613 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 20 06:58:48 2018 +0000 upstream: reorder CASignatureAlgorithms, and add them to the various -o lists; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ecb88baecc3c54988b4d1654446ea033da359288 commit aa083aa9624ea7b764d5a81c4c676719a1a3e42b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 20 03:31:49 2018 +0000 upstream: fix "ssh -Q sig" to show correct signature algorithm list (it was erroneously showing certificate algorithms); prompted by markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdee002f2f0c21456979deeb887fc889afb154d commit ecac7e1f7add6b28874959a11f2238d149dc2c07 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 20 03:30:44 2018 +0000 upstream: add CASignatureAlgorithms option for the client, allowing it to specify which signature algorithms may be used by CAs when signing certificates. Useful if you want to ban RSA/SHA1; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9159e5e9f67504829bf53ff222057307a6e3230f commit 86e5737c39153af134158f24d0cab5827cbd5852 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 20 03:28:06 2018 +0000 upstream: Add sshd_config CASignatureAlgorithms option to allow control over which signature algorithms a CA may use when signing certificates. In particular, this allows a sshd to ban certificates signed with RSA/SHA1. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b05c86ef8b52b913ed48d54a9b9c1a7714d96bac commit f80e68ea7d62e2dfafc12f1a60ab544ae4033a0f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 19 02:03:02 2018 +0000 upstream: Make "ssh-add -q" do what it says on the tin: silence output from successful operations. Based on patch from Thijs van Dijk; ok dtucker@ deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4f754ecc055c10af166116ce7515104aa8522e1 commit 5e532320e9e51de720d5f3cc2596e95d29f6e98f Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Mon Sep 17 15:40:14 2018 +0000 upstream: When choosing a prime from the moduli file, avoid re-using the linenum variable for something that is not a line number to avoid the confusion that resulted in the bug in rev. 1.64. This also lets us pass the actual linenum to parse_prime() so the error messages include the correct line number. OK markus@ some time ago. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d8e5d3e924d6e8eb70053e3defa23c151a00084 commit cce8cbe0ed7d1ba3a575310e0b63c193326ae616 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Sep 15 19:44:06 2018 +1000 Fix openssl-1.1 fallout for --without-openssl. ok djm@ commit 149519b9f201dac755f3cba4789f4d76fecf0ee1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 15 19:37:48 2018 +1000 add futex(2) syscall to seccomp sandbox Apparently needed for some glibc/openssl combinations. Patch from Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz commit 4488ae1a6940af704c4dbf70f55bf2f756a16536 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 15 19:36:55 2018 +1000 really add source for authopt_fuzz this time commit 9201784b4a257c8345fbd740bcbdd70054885707 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 15 19:35:40 2018 +1000 remove accidentally checked-in authopt_fuzz binary commit beb9e522dc7717df08179f9e59f36b361bfa14ab Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 14 05:26:27 2018 +0000 upstream: second try, deals properly with missing and private-only Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and received during public key authentication. This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message now contains (where available) the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether the key is hosted in an agent or a token. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1c6a8e9cfc4e108c359db77f24f9a40e1e25ea7 commit 6bc5a24ac867bfdc3ed615589d69ac640f51674b Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Sep 14 15:16:34 2018 +1000 fuzzer harness for authorized_keys option parsing commit 6c8b82fc6929b6a9a3f645151b6ec26c5507d9ef Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 14 04:44:04 2018 +0000 upstream: revert following; deals badly with agent keys revision 1.285 date: 2018/09/14 04:17:12; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +47 -26; commitid: lflGFcNb2X2HebaK; Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and received during public key authentication. This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether the key is hosted in an agent or a token. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e496bd004e452d4b051f33ed9ae6a54ab918f56d commit 6da046f9c3374ce7e269ded15d8ff8bc45017301 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:44 2018 +0000 upstream: garbage-collect moribund ssh_new_private() API. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c05bf13b094093dfa01848a9306c82eb6e95f6c commit 1f24ac5fc05252ceb1c1d0e8cab6a283b883c780 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:12 2018 +0000 upstream: Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and received during public key authentication. This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether the key is hosted in an agent or a token. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a01d59285a8a7e01185bb0a43316084b4f06a1f commit 488c9325bb7233e975dbfbf89fa055edc3d3eddc Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 13 15:23:32 2018 +0000 upstream: Fix warnings caused by user_from_uid() and group_from_gid() now returning const char *. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5fe571ea77cfa7b9035062829ab05eb87d7cc6f commit 0aa1f230846ebce698e52051a107f3127024a05a Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Sep 14 10:31:47 2018 +1000 allow SIGUSR1 as synonym for SIGINFO Lets users on those unfortunate operating systems that lack SIGINFO still be able to obtain progress information from unit tests :) commit d64e78526596f098096113fcf148216798c327ff Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 13 19:05:48 2018 +1000 add compat header commit a3fd8074e2e2f06602e25618721f9556c731312c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 13 09:03:20 2018 +0000 upstream: missed a bit of openssl-1.0.x API in this unittest OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a73a54d7f7381856a3f3a2d25947bee7a9a5dbc9 commit 86e0a9f3d249d5580390daf58e015e68b01cef10 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 13 05:06:51 2018 +0000 upstream: use only openssl-1.1.x API here too OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ae877064597c349954b1b443769723563cecbc8f commit 48f54b9d12c1c79fba333bc86d455d8f4cda8cfc Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 13 12:13:50 2018 +1000 adapt -portable to OpenSSL 1.1x API Polyfill missing API with replacement functions extracted from LibreSSL commit 86112951d63d48839f035b5795be62635a463f99 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 13 12:12:42 2018 +1000 forgot to stage these test files in commit d70d061 commit 482d23bcacdd3664f21cc82a5135f66fc598275f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Sep 13 02:08:33 2018 +0000 upstream: hold our collective noses and use the openssl-1.1.x API in OpenSSH; feedback and ok tb@ jsing@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cacbcac87ce5da0d3ca7ef1b38a6f7fb349e4417 commit d70d061828730a56636ab6f1f24fe4a8ccefcfc1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 12 01:36:45 2018 +0000 upstream: Include certs with multiple RSA signature variants in test data Ensure that cert->signature_key is populated correctly OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 56e68f70fe46cb3a193ca207385bdb301fd6603a commit f803b2682992cfededd40c91818b653b5d923ef5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 12 01:23:48 2018 +0000 upstream: test revocation by explicit hash and by fingerprint OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 079c18a9ab9663f4af419327c759fc1e2bc78fd8 commit 2de78bc7da70e1338b32feeefcc6045cf49efcd4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 12 01:22:43 2018 +0000 upstream: s/sshkey_demote/sshkey_from_private/g OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 782bde7407d94a87aa8d1db7c23750e09d4443c4 commit 41c115a5ea1cb79a6a3182773c58a23f760e8076 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Sep 12 16:50:01 2018 +1000 delete the correct thing; kexfuzz binary commit f0fcd7e65087db8c2496f13ed39d772f8e38b088 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 12 06:18:59 2018 +0000 upstream: fix edit mistake; spotted by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd724e1c52c9d6084f4cd260ec7e1b2b138261c6 commit 4cc259bac699f4d2a5c52b92230f9e488c88a223 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 12 01:34:02 2018 +0000 upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list of signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes ssh-dsa. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4 commit ba9e788315b1f6a350f910cb2a9e95b2ce584e89 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 12 01:32:54 2018 +0000 upstream: add sshkey_check_cert_sigtype() that checks a cert->signature_type against a supplied whitelist; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caadb8073292ed7a9535e5adc067d11d356d9302 commit a70fd4ad7bd9f2ed223ff635a3d41e483057f23b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 12 01:31:30 2018 +0000 upstream: add cert->signature_type field and keep it in sync with certificate signature wrt loading and certification operations; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8b8b9f76b66707a0cd926109c4383db8f664df3 commit 357128ac48630a9970e3af0e6ff820300a28da47 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 12 01:30:10 2018 +0000 upstream: Add "ssh -Q sig" to allow listing supported signature algorithms ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a8c6eb6c249dc37823ba5081fce64876d10fe2b commit 9405c6214f667be604a820c6823b27d0ea77937d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 12 01:21:34 2018 +0000 upstream: allow key revocation by SHA256 hash and allow ssh-keygen to create KRLs using SHA256/base64 key fingerprints; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0590fd34e7f1141f2873ab3acc57442560e6a94 commit 50e2687ee0941c0ea216d6ffea370ffd2c1f14b9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 12 01:19:12 2018 +0000 upstream: log certificate fingerprint in authentication success/failure message (previously we logged only key ID and CA key fingerprint). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8ef2d172b7f1ddbcce26d6434b2de6d94f6c05d commit de37ca909487d23e5844aca289b3f5e75d3f1e1f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 7 04:26:56 2018 +0000 upstream: Add FALLTHROUGH comments where appropriate. Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c48eb457be697a19d6d2950c6d0879f3ccc851d3 commit 247766cd3111d5d8c6ea39833a3257ca8fb820f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 7 01:42:54 2018 +0000 upstream: ssh -MM requires confirmation for all operations that change the multiplexing state, not just new sessions. mention that confirmation is checked via ssh-askpass OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f1b45551ebb9cc5c9a4fe54ad3b23ce90f1f5c2 commit db8bb80e3ac1bcb3e1305d846cd98c6b869bf03f Author: mestre@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 28 12:25:53 2018 +0000 upstream: fix misplaced parenthesis inside if-clause. it's harmless and the only issue is showing an unknown error (since it's not defined) during fatal(), if it ever an error occurs inside that condition. OK deraadt@ markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: acb0a8e6936bfbe590504752d01d1d251a7101d8 commit 086cc614f550b7d4f100c95e472a6b6b823938ab Author: mestre@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 28 12:17:45 2018 +0000 upstream: fix build with DEBUG_PK enabled OK dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ec1568cf27726e9638a0415481c20c406e7b441c commit 2678833013e97f8b18f09779b7f70bcbf5eb2ab2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Sep 7 14:41:53 2018 +1000 Handle ngroups>_SC_NGROUPS_MAX. Based on github pull request #99 from Darren Maffat at Oracle: Solaris' getgrouplist considers _SC_NGROUPS_MAX more of a guideline and can return a larger number of groups. In this case, retry getgrouplist with a larger array and defer allocating groups_byname. ok djm@ commit 039bf2a81797b8f3af6058d34005a4896a363221 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Sep 7 14:06:57 2018 +1000 Initial len for the fmt=NULL case. Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687. (OpenSSH never calls setproctitle with a null format so len is always initialized). commit ea9c06e11d2e8fb2f4d5e02f8a41e23d2bd31ca9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Sep 7 14:01:39 2018 +1000 Include stdlib.h. Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687. commit 9617816dbe73ec4d65075f4d897443f63a97c87f Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Aug 27 13:08:01 2018 +1000 document some more regress control env variables Specifically SKIP_UNIT, USE_VALGRING and LTESTS. Sort the list of environment variables. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen commit 71508e06fab14bc415a79a08f5535ad7bffa93d9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 23 15:41:42 2018 +1000 shorten temporary SSH_REGRESS_TMP path Previous path was exceeding max socket length on at least one platform (OSX) commit 26739cf5bdc9030a583b41ae5261dedd862060f0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 23 13:06:02 2018 +1000 rebuild dependencies commit ff729025c7463cf5d0a8d1ca1823306e48c6d4cf Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 23 13:03:32 2018 +1000 fix path in distclean target Patch from Jakub Jelen commit 7fef173c28f7462dcd8ee017fdf12b5073f54c02 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 23 03:01:08 2018 +0000 upstream: memleak introduced in r1.83; from Colin Watson OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c019104c280cbd549a264a7217b67665e5732dc commit b8ae02a2896778b8984c7f51566c7f0f56fa8b56 Author: schwarze@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 21 13:56:27 2018 +0000 upstream: AIX reports the CODESET as "ISO8859-1" in the POSIX locale. Treating that as a safe encoding is OK because even when other systems return that string for real ISO8859-1, it is still safe in the sense that it is ASCII-compatible and stateless. Issue reported by Val dot Baranov at duke dot edu. Additional information provided by Michael dot Felt at felt dot demon dot nl. Tested by Michael Felt on AIX 6.1 and by Val Baranov on AIX 7.1. Tweak and OK djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36f1210e0b229817d10eb490d6038f507b8256a7 commit bc44ee088ad269d232e514f037c87ada4c2fd3f0 Author: Tim Rice Date: Tue Aug 21 08:57:24 2018 -0700 modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c remove obsolete and un-needed include commit 829fc28a9c54e3f812ee7248c7a3e31eeb4f0b3a Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Aug 20 15:57:29 2018 +1000 Missing unistd.h for regress/mkdtemp.c commit c8313e492355a368a91799131520d92743d8d16c Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 17 05:45:20 2018 +1000 update version numbers in anticipation of release commit 477b49a34b89f506f4794b35e3c70b3e2e83cd38 Author: Corinna Vinschen Date: Mon Aug 13 17:08:51 2018 +0200 configure: work around GCC shortcoming on Cygwin Cygwin's latest 7.x GCC allows to specify -mfunction-return=thunk as well as -mindirect-branch=thunk on the command line, albeit producing invalid code, leading to an error at link stage. The check in configure.ac only checks if the option is present, but not if it produces valid code. This patch fixes it by special-casing Cygwin. Another solution may be to change these to linker checks. Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen commit b0917945efa374be7648d67dbbaaff323ab39edc Author: Corinna Vinschen Date: Mon Aug 13 17:05:05 2018 +0200 cygwin: add missing stdarg.h include Further header file standarization in Cygwin uncovered a lazy indirect include in bsd-cygwin_util.c Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen commit c3903c38b0fd168ab3d925c2b129d1a599593426 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 13 02:41:05 2018 +0000 upstream: revert compat.[ch] section of the following change. It causes double-free under some circumstances. -- date: 2018/07/31 03:07:24; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +33 -18; commitid: f7g4UI8eeOXReTPh; fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen in bz#2366 feedback and ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e77547f60fdb5e2ffe23e2e4733c54d8d2d1137 commit 1b9dd4aa15208100fbc3650f33ea052255578282 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Aug 12 20:19:13 2018 +0000 upstream: better diagnosics on alg list assembly errors; ok deraadt@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a557e74b839daf13cc105924d2af06a1560faee commit e36a5f61b0f5bebf6d49c215d228cd99dfe86e28 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 11 18:08:45 2018 -0700 Some AIX fixes; report from Michael Felt commit 2f4766ceefe6657c5ad5fe92d13c411872acae0e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 10 01:35:49 2018 +0000 upstream: The script that cooks up PuTTY format host keys does not understand the new key format so convert back to old format to create the PuTTY key and remove it once done. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a449a18846c3a144bc645135b551ba6177e38d3 commit e1b26ce504662a5d5b991091228984ccfd25f280 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 10 00:44:01 2018 +0000 upstream: improve OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 40d839db0977b4e7ac8b647b16d5411d4faf2f60 commit 7c712966a3139622f7fb55045368d05de4e6782c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 10 00:42:29 2018 +0000 upstream: Describe pubkey format, prompted by bz#2853 While I'm here, describe and link to the remaining local PROTOCOL.* docs that weren't already mentioned (PROTOCOL.key, PROTOCOL.krl and PROTOCOL.mux) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a900f9b994ba4d53e7aeb467d44d75829fd1231 commit ef100a2c5a8ed83afac0b8f36520815803da227a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 10 00:27:15 2018 +0000 upstream: fix numbering OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc7a1764dff23fa4c5ff0e3379c9c4d5b63c9596 commit ed7bd5d93fe14c7bd90febd29b858ea985d14d45 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 8 01:16:01 2018 +0000 upstream: Use new private key format by default. This format is suported by OpenSSH >= 6.5 (released January 2014), so it should be supported by most OpenSSH versions in active use. It is possible to convert new-format private keys to the older format using "ssh-keygen -f /path/key -pm PEM". ok deraadt dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3bd4f2509a2103bfa2f710733426af3ad6d8ab8 commit 967226a1bdde59ea137e8f0df871854ff7b91366 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 4 00:55:06 2018 +0000 upstream: invalidate dh->priv_key after freeing it in error path; avoids unlikely double-free later. Reported by Viktor Dukhovni via https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/96 feedback jsing@ tb@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e317eb17c3e05500ae851f279ef6486f0457c805 commit 74287f5df9966a0648b4a68417451dd18f079ab8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 31 03:10:27 2018 +0000 upstream: delay bailout for invalid authentic =?UTF-8?q?ating=20user=20until=20after=20the=20packet=20containing=20the?= =?UTF-8?q?=20request=20has=20been=20fully=20parsed.=20Reported=20by=20Dar?= =?UTF-8?q?iusz=20Tytko=20and=20Micha=C5=82=20Sajdak;=20ok=20deraadt?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4891882fbe413f230fe8ac8a37349b03bd0b70d commit 1a66079c0669813306cc69e5776a4acd9fb49015 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 31 03:07:24 2018 +0000 upstream: fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen in bz#2366 feedback and ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8402bbae67d578bedbadb0ce68ff7c5a136ef563 commit 87f08be054b7eeadbb9cdeb3fb4872be79ccf218 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 20 13:18:28 2018 +1000 Remove support for S/Key Most people will 1) be using modern multi-factor authentication methods like TOTP/OATH etc and 2) be getting support for multi-factor authentication via PAM or BSD Auth. commit 5d14019ba2ff54acbfd20a6b9b96bb860a8c7c31 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 27 12:03:17 2018 +0000 upstream: avoid expensive channel_open_message() calls; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aea3b5512ad681cd8710367d743e8a753d4425d9 commit e655ee04a3cb7999dbf9641b25192353e2b69418 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 27 05:34:42 2018 +0000 upstream: Now that ssh can't be setuid, remove the original_real_uid and original_effective_uid globals and replace with calls to plain getuid(). ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92561c0cd418d34e6841e20ba09160583e27b68c commit 73ddb25bae4c33a0db361ac13f2e3a60d7c6c4a5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 27 05:13:02 2018 +0000 upstream: Remove uid checks from low port binds. Now that ssh cannot be setuid and sshd always has privsep on, we can remove the uid checks for low port binds and just let the system do the check. We leave a sanity check for the !privsep case so long as the code is stil there. with & ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9535cfdbd1cd54486fdbedfaee44ce4367ec7ca0 commit c12033e102760d043bc5c98e6c8180e4d331b0df Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 27 03:55:22 2018 +0000 upstream: ssh(1) no longer supports being setuid root. Remove reference to crc32 which went with protocol 1. Pointed out by deraadt@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8763c25fd96ed91dd1abdab5667fd2e27e377b6 commit 4492e2ec4e1956a277ef507f51d66e5c2aafaaf8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 27 14:15:28 2018 +1000 correct snprintf truncation check in closefrom() Truncation cannot happen unless the system has set PATH_MAX to some nonsensically low value. bz#2862, patch from Daniel Le commit 149cab325a8599a003364ed833f878449c15f259 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 27 13:46:06 2018 +1000 Include stdarg.h in mkdtemp for va_list. commit 6728f31bdfdc864d192773c32465b1860e23f556 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 25 17:12:35 2018 +0000 upstream: Don't redefine Makefile choices which come correct from bsd.*.mk ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f commit 21fd477a855753c1a8e450963669e28e39c3b5d2 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 25 13:56:23 2018 +0000 upstream: fix indent; Clemens Goessnitzer OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5149a6d92b264d35f879d24608087b254857a83 commit 8e433c2083db8664c41499ee146448ea7ebe7dbf Author: beck@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 25 13:10:56 2018 +0000 upstream: Use the caller provided (copied) pwent struct in load_public_identity_files instead of calling getpwuid() again and discarding the argument. This prevents a client crash where tilde_expand_filename calls getpwuid() again before the pwent pointer is used. Issue noticed and reported by Pierre-Olivier Martel ok djm@ deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a067d74b5b098763736c94cc1368de8ea3f0b157 commit e2127abb105ae72b6fda64fff150e6b24b3f1317 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 23 19:53:55 2018 +0000 upstream: oops, failed to notice that SEE ALSO got messed up; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61c1306542cefdc6e59ac331751afe961557427d commit ddf1b797c2d26bbbc9d410aa4f484cbe94673587 Author: kn@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 23 19:02:49 2018 +0000 upstream: Point to glob in section 7 for the actual list of special characters instead the C API in section 3. OK millert jmc nicm, "the right idea" deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a74fd215488c382809e4d041613aeba4a4b1ffc6 commit 01c98d9661d0ed6156e8602b650f72eed9fc4d12 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jul 22 12:16:59 2018 +0000 upstream: Switch authorized_keys example from ssh-dss to ssh-rsa since the former is no longer enabled by default. Pointed out by Daniel A. Maierhofer, ok jmc OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a196cef53d7524e0c9b58cdbc1b5609debaf8c7 commit 472269f8fe19343971c2d08f504ab5cbb8234b33 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 20 05:01:10 2018 +0000 upstream: slightly-clearer description for AuthenticationMethods - the lists have comma-separated elements; bz#2663 from Hans Meier OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931c983d0fde4764d0942fb2c2b5017635993b5a commit c59aca8adbdf7f5597084ad360a19bedb3f80970 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 20 14:53:42 2018 +1000 Create control sockets in clean temp directories Adds a regress/mkdtemp tool and uses it to create empty temp directories for tests needing control sockets. Patch from Colin Watson via bz#2660; ok dtucker commit 6ad8648e83e4f4ace37b742a05c2a6b6b872514e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 20 03:46:34 2018 +0000 upstream: remove unused zlib.h OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d274a9b467c7958df12668b49144056819f79f1 commit 3ba6e6883527fe517b6e4a824876e2fe62af22fc Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 19 23:03:16 2018 +0000 upstream: Fix typo in comment. From Alexandru Iacob via github. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eff4ec07c6c8c5483533da43a4dda37d72ef7f1d commit c77bc73c91bc656e343a1961756e09dd1b170820 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 20 13:48:51 2018 +1000 Explicitly include openssl before zlib. Some versions of OpenSSL have "free_func" in their headers, which zlib typedefs. Including openssl after zlib (eg via sshkey.h) results in "syntax error before `free_func'", which this fixes. commit 95d41e90eafcd1286a901e8e361e4a37b98aeb52 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 19 10:28:47 2018 +0000 upstream: Deprecate UsePrivilegedPort now that support for running ssh(1) setuid has been removed, remove supporting code and clean up references to it in the man pages We have not shipped ssh(1) the setuid bit since 2002. If ayone really needs to make connections from a low port number this can be implemented via a small setuid ProxyCommand. ok markus@ jmc@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d03364610b7123ae4c6792f5274bd147b6de717e commit 258dc8bb07dfb35a46e52b0822a2c5b7027df60a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 18 11:34:04 2018 +0000 upstream: Remove support for running ssh(1) setuid and fatal if attempted. Do not link uidwap.c into ssh any more. Neuters UsePrivilegedPort, which will be marked as deprecated shortly. ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4ba5bf9c096f57a6ed15b713a1d7e9e2e373c42 commit ac590760b251506b0a152551abbf8e8d6dc2f527 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 16 22:25:01 2018 +0000 upstream: Slot 0 in the hostbased key array was previously RSA1, but that is now gone and the slot is unused so remove it. Remove two now-unused macros, and add an array bounds check to the two remaining ones (array is statically sized, so mostly a safety check on future changes). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e4c0ca6cc1d8daeccead2aa56192a3f9d5e1e7a commit 26efc2f5df0e3bcf6a6bbdd0506fd682d60c2145 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 16 11:05:41 2018 +0000 upstream: Remove support for loading HostBasedAuthentication keys directly in ssh(1) and always use ssh-keysign. This removes one of the few remaining reasons why ssh(1) might be setuid. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97f01e1448707129a20d75f86bad5d27c3cf0b7d commit 3eb7f1038d17af7aea3c2c62d1e30cd545607640 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 16 07:06:50 2018 +0000 upstream: keep options.identity_file_userprovided array in sync when we load keys, fixing some spurious error messages; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c63e3d5200ee2cf9e35bda98de847302566c6a00 commit 2f131e1b34502aa19f345e89cabf6fa3fc097f09 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:59 2018 +0000 upstream: memleak in unittest; found by valgrind OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 168c23b0fb09fc3d0b438628990d3fd9260a8a5e commit de2997a4cf22ca0a524f0e5b451693c583e2fd89 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:13 2018 +0000 upstream: memleaks; found by valgrind OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ba22be53e753c899545f771e8399fc93cd844 commit 61cc0003eb37fa07603c969c12b7c795caa498f3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 14 16:49:01 2018 +1000 Undef a few new macros in sys-queue.h. Prevents macro redefinition warnings on OSX. commit 30a2c213877a54a44dfdffb6ca8db70be5b457e0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 13 13:40:20 2018 +1000 Include unistd.h for geteuid declaration. commit 1dd32c23f2a85714dfafe2a9cc516971d187caa4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 13 13:38:10 2018 +1000 Fallout from buffer conversion in AUDIT_EVENTS. Supply missing "int r" and fix error path for sshbuf_new(). commit 7449c178e943e5c4f6c8416a4e41d93b70c11c9e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:50 2018 +0000 upstream: make this use ssh_proxy rather than starting/stopping a daemon for each testcase OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 608b7655ea65b1ba8fff5a13ce9caa60ef0c8166 commit dbab02f9208d9baa134cec1d007054ec82b96ca9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:19 2018 +0000 upstream: fix leaks in unit test; with this, all unit tests are leak free (as far as valgrind can spot anyway) OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b824d8b27998365379963440e5d18b95ca03aa17 commit 2f6accff5085eb79b0dbe262d8b85ed017d1a51c Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 13 11:39:25 2018 +1000 Enable leak checks for unit tests with valgrind Leave the leak checking on unconditionally when running with valgrind. The unit tests are leak-free and I want them to stay that way. commit e46cfbd9db5e907b821bf4fd0184d4dab99815ee Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 13 11:38:59 2018 +1000 increase timeout to match cfgmatch.sh lets test pass under valgrind (on my workstation at least) commit 6aa1bf475cf3e7a2149acc5a1e80e904749f064c Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 12 14:54:18 2018 +1000 rm regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o in distclean target commit eef1447ddb559c03725a23d4aa6d03f40e8b0049 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:26 2018 +1000 repair !WITH_OPENSSL build commit 4d3b2f36fd831941d1627ac587faae37b6d3570f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:14 2018 +1000 missing headers commit 3f420a692b293921216549c1099c2e46ff284eae Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jul 12 14:57:46 2018 +1000 Remove key.h from portable files too. Commit 5467fbcb removed key.h so stop including it in portable files too. Fixes builds on lots of platforms. commit e2c4af311543093f16005c10044f7e06af0426f0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 12 04:35:25 2018 +0000 upstream: remove prototype to long-gone function OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0414642ac7ce01d176b9f359091a66a8bbb640bd commit 394a842e60674bf8ee5130b9f15b01452a0b0285 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 11 18:55:11 2018 +0000 upstream: treat ssh_packet_write_wait() errors as fatal; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f88ba43c9d54ed2d911218aa8d3f6285430629c3 commit 5467fbcb09528ecdcb914f4f2452216c24796790 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 11 18:53:29 2018 +0000 upstream: remove legacy key emulation layer; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b1f9619259e222bbd4fe9a8d3a0973eafb9dd8d commit 5dc4c59d5441a19c99e7945779f7ec9051126c25 Author: martijn@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 11 08:19:35 2018 +0000 upstream: s/wuth/with/ in comment OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9de41468afd75f54a7f47809d2ad664aa577902c commit 1c688801e9dd7f9889fb2a29bc2b6fbfbc35a11f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 11 12:12:38 2018 +1000 Include stdlib.h for declaration of free. Fixes build with -Werror on at least Fedora and probably others. commit fccfa239def497615f92ed28acc57cfe63da3666 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 11 10:19:56 2018 +1000 VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS logic was backwards :( commit 416287d45fcde0a8e66eee8b99aa73bd58607588 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 11 10:10:26 2018 +1000 Fix sshbuf_new error path in skey. commit 7aab109b8b90a353c1af780524f1ac0d3af47bab Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 11 10:06:18 2018 +1000 Supply missing third arg in skey. During the change to the new buffer api the third arg to sshbuf_get_cstring was ommitted. Fixes build when configured with skey. commit 380320bb72cc353a901790ab04b6287fd335dc4a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 11 10:03:34 2018 +1000 Supply some more missing "int r" in skey commit d20720d373d8563ee737d1a45dc5e0804d622dbc Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 11 09:56:36 2018 +1000 disable valgrind memleak checking by default Add VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS knob to turn it back on. commit 79c9d35018f3a5e30ae437880b669aa8636cd3cd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 11 09:54:00 2018 +1000 Supply missing "int r" in skey code. commit 984bacfaacbbe31c35191b828fb5b5b2f0362c36 Author: sf@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 10 09:36:58 2018 +0000 upstream: re-remove some pre-auth compression bits This time, make sure to not remove things that are necessary for pre-auth compression on the client. Add a comment that pre-auth compression is still supported in the client. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 282c6fec7201f18a5c333bbb68d9339734d2f784 commit 120a1ec74e8d9d29f4eb9a27972ddd22351ddef9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jul 10 19:39:52 2018 +1000 Adapt portable to legacy buffer API removal commit 0f3958c1e6ffb8ea4ba27e2a97a00326fce23246 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 10 09:13:30 2018 +0000 upstream: kerberos/gssapi fixes for buffer removal OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdf56fec95801e4563c47f21696f04cd8b60c4c commit c74ae8e7c45f325f3387abd48fa7dfef07a08069 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 10 06:45:29 2018 +0000 upstream: buffer.[ch] and bufaux.c are no more OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1a1852284e554f39525eb4d4891b207cfb3d3a0 commit a881e5a133d661eca923fb0633a03152ab2b70b2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 10 06:43:52 2018 +0000 upstream: one mention of Buffer that almost got away :) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30d7c27a90b4544ad5dfacf654595710cd499f02 commit 49f47e656b60bcd1d1db98d88105295f4b4e600d Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 21:59:10 2018 +0000 upstream: replace cast with call to sshbuf_mutable_ptr(); ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dfe9d29fa93d9231645c89084f7217304f7ba29 commit cb30cd47041edb03476be1c8ef7bc1f4b69d1555 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 21:56:06 2018 +0000 upstream: remove legacy buffer API emulation layer; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2dd5dc17cbc23195be4299fa93be2707a0e08ad9 commit 235c7c4e3bf046982c2d8242f30aacffa01073d1 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 21:53:45 2018 +0000 upstream: sshd: switch monitor to sshbuf API; lots of help & ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d89bd02d33974fd35ca0b8940d88572227b34a48 commit b8d9214d969775e409e1408ecdf0d58fad99b344 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 21:37:55 2018 +0000 upstream: sshd: switch GSSAPI to sshbuf API; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e48449ab4be3f006f7ba33c66241b7d652973e30 commit c7d39ac8dc3587c5f05bdd5bcd098eb5c201c0c8 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 21:35:50 2018 +0000 upstream: sshd: switch authentication to sshbuf API; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 880aa06bce4b140781e836bb56bec34873290641 commit c3cb7790e9efb14ba74b2d9f543ad593b3d55b31 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 21:29:36 2018 +0000 upstream: sshd: switch config to sshbuf API; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72b02017bac7feac48c9dceff8355056bea300bd commit 2808d18ca47ad3d251836c555f0e22aaca03d15c Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 21:26:02 2018 +0000 upstream: sshd: switch loginmsg to sshbuf API; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3cb4e54bff15c593602d95cc43e32ee1a4bac42 commit 89dd615b8b531979be63f05f9d5624367c9b28e6 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 21:20:26 2018 +0000 upstream: ttymodes: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5df340c5965e822c9da21e19579d08dea3cbe429 commit f4608a7065480516ab46214f554e5f853fb7870f Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 21:18:10 2018 +0000 upstream: client: switch mux to sshbuf API; with & ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5948fb98d704f9c4e075b92edda64e0290b5feb2 commit cecee2d607099a7bba0a84803e2325d15be4277b Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 21:03:30 2018 +0000 upstream: client: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60cb0356114acc7625ab85105f6f6a7cd44a8d05 commit ff55f4ad898137d4703e7a2bcc81167dfe8e9324 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 20:39:28 2018 +0000 upstream: pkcs11: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98cc4e800f1617c51caf59a6cb3006f14492db79 commit 168b46f405d6736960ba7930389eecb9b6710b7e Author: sf@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 9 13:37:10 2018 +0000 upstream: Revert previous two commits It turns out we still support pre-auth compression on the client. Therefore revert the previous two commits: date: 2018/07/06 09:06:14; author: sf; commitid: yZVYKIRtUZWD9CmE; Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB Only delayed compression is supported nowadays. ok markus@ date: 2018/07/06 09:05:01; author: sf; commitid: rEGuT5UgI9f6kddP; Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression Support for this has been removed in 2016. COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdfef526357e4e1483c86cf599491b2dafb77772 commit ab39267fa1243d02b6c330615539fc4b21e17dc4 Author: sf@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 6 09:06:14 2018 +0000 upstream: Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB Only delayed compression is supported nowadays. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b1dbaf3d9a4085aaa10fec0b7a4364396561821 commit 95db395d2e56a6f868193aead6cadb2493f036c6 Author: sf@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 6 09:05:01 2018 +0000 upstream: Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression Support for this has been removed in 2016. COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a99616c832627157113fcb0cf5a752daf2e6b58 commit f28a4d5cd24c4aa177e96b4f96957991e552cb70 Author: sf@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 6 09:03:02 2018 +0000 upstream: Remove unused ssh_packet_start_compression() ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d34cf2f59aca5422021ae2857190578187dc2b4 commit 872517ddbb72deaff31d4760f28f2b0a1c16358f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 6 13:32:02 2018 +1000 Defer setting bufsiz in getdelim. Do not write to bufsiz until we are sure the malloc has succeeded, in case any callers rely on it (which they shouldn't). ok djm@ commit 3deb56f7190a414dc264e21e087a934fa1847283 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jul 5 13:32:01 2018 +1000 Fix other callers of read_environment_file. read_environment_file recently gained an extra argument Some platform specific code also calls it so add the argument to those too. Fixes build on Solaris and AIX. commit 314908f451e6b2d4ccf6212ad246fa4619c721d3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:45 2018 +0000 upstream: deal with API rename: match_filter_list() => match_filter_blacklist() OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2da342be913efeb51806351af906fab01ba4367f commit 89f54cdf6b9cf1cf5528fd33897f1443913ddfb4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:12 2018 +0000 upstream: exercise new expansion behaviour of PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and, by proxy, test kex_assemble_names() ok markus@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 292978902e14d5729aa87e492dd166c842f72736 commit 187633f24c71564e970681c8906df5a6017dcccf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 3 13:53:26 2018 +0000 upstream: add a comment that could have saved me 45 minutes of wild goose chasing OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d469b29ffadd3402c090e21b792d627d46fa5297 commit 312d2f2861a2598ed08587cb6c45c0e98a85408f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 4 13:49:31 2018 +0000 upstream: repair PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes (and friends) after RSA signature work - returns ability to add/remove/specify algorithms by wildcard. Algorithm lists are now fully expanded when the server/client configs are finalised, so errors are reported early and the config dumps (e.g. "ssh -G ...") now list the actual algorithms selected. Clarify that, while wildcards are accepted in algorithm lists, they aren't full pattern-lists that support negation. (lots of) feedback, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8894c5c81f399a002f02ff4fe6b4fa46b1f3207 commit 303af5803bd74bf05d375c04e1a83b40c30b2be5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 3 11:43:49 2018 +0000 upstream: some magic for RSA-SHA2 checks OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e5a9b11368ff6d86e7b25ad10ebe43359b471cd4 commit 7d68e262944c1fff1574600fe0e5e92ec8b398f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jul 3 23:27:11 2018 +1000 depend commit b4d4eda633af433d20232cbf7e855ceac8b83fe5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 3 13:20:25 2018 +0000 upstream: some finesse to fix RSA-SHA2 certificate authentication for certs hosted in ssh-agent OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5fd5edd726137dda2d020e1cdebc464110a010f commit d78b75df4a57e0f92295f24298e5f2930e71c172 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 3 13:07:58 2018 +0000 upstream: check correct variable; unbreak agent keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c36981fdf1f3ce04966d3310826a3e1e6233d93e commit 2f30300c5e15929d0e34013f38d73e857f445e12 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 3 11:42:12 2018 +0000 upstream: crank version number to 7.8; needed for new compat flag for prior version; part of RSA-SHA2 strictification, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 84a11fc0efd2674c050712336b5093f5d408e32b commit 4ba0d54794814ec0de1ec87987d0c3b89379b436 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 3 11:39:54 2018 +0000 upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signature In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH matches the one in the signature itself. In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature. Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms (previously they selected supported key types). This allows these options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2. Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures with certificate keys. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde commit 95344c257412b51199ead18d54eaed5bafb75617 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 3 10:59:35 2018 +0000 upstream: allow sshd_config PermitUserEnvironment to accept a pattern-list of whitelisted environment variable names in addition to yes|no. bz#1800, feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77dc2b468e0bf04b53f333434ba257008a1fdf24 commit 6f56fe4b9578b0627667f8bce69d4d938a88324c Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 26 11:23:59 2018 +0000 upstream: Fix "WARNING: line 6 disappeared in /etc/moduli, giving up" when choosing a prime. An extra increment of linenum snuck in as part of the conversion to getline(). OK djm@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0019225cb52ed621b71cd9f19ee2e78e57e3dd38 commit 1eee79a11c1b3594f055b01e387c49c9a6e80005 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 2 14:13:30 2018 +0000 upstream: One ampersand is enough to backgroud an process. OpenBSD doesn't seem to mind, but some platforms in -portable object to the second. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d6c3e404871764343761dc25c3bbe29c2621ff74 commit 6301e6c787d4e26bfae1119ab4f747bbcaa94e44 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 2 21:16:58 2018 +1000 Add implementation of getline. Add getline for the benefit of platforms that don't have it. Sourced from NetBSD (OpenBSD's implementation is a little too chummy with the internals of FILE). commit 84623e0037628f9992839063151f7a9f5f13099a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 26 02:02:36 2018 +0000 upstream: whitespace OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9276951caf4daf555f6d262e95720e7f79244572 commit 90e51d672711c19a36573be1785caf35019ae7a8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 25 22:28:33 2018 +0000 upstream: fix NULL dereference in open_listen_match_tcpip() OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c968c1d29e392352383c0f9681fcc1e93620c4a9 commit f535ff922a67d9fcc5ee69d060d1b21c8bb01d14 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 19 05:36:57 2018 +0000 upstream: spelling; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db542918185243bea17202383a581851736553cc commit 80e199d6175904152aafc5c297096c3e18297691 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 19 03:02:17 2018 +0000 upstream: test PermitListen with bare port numbers OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4b50a02dfb0ccaca08247f3877c444126ba901b3 commit 87ddd676da0f3abd08b778b12b53b91b670dc93c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 19 02:59:41 2018 +0000 upstream: allow bare port numbers to appear in PermitListen directives, e.g. PermitListen 2222 8080 is equivalent to: PermitListen *:2222 *:8080 Some bonus manpage improvements, mostly from markus@ "looks fine" markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6546b0cc5aab7f53d65ad0a348ca0ae591d6dd24 commit 26f96ca10ad0ec5da9b05b99de1e1ccea15a11be Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 15 07:01:11 2018 +0000 upstream: invalidate supplemental group cache used by temporarily_use_uid() when the target uid differs; could cause failure to read authorized_keys under some configurations. patch by Jakub Jelen via bz2873; ok dtucker, markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48a345f0ee90f6c465a078eb5e89566b23abd8a1 commit 89a85d724765b6b82e0135ee5a1181fdcccea9c6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jun 10 23:45:41 2018 +0000 upstream: unbreak SendEnv; patch from tb@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc808daced813242563b80976e1478de95940056 commit acf4260f0951f89c64e1ebbc4c92f451768871ad Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jun 9 06:36:31 2018 +0000 upstream: sort previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27d80d8b8ca99bc33971dee905e8ffd0053ec411 commit 1678d4236451060b735cb242d2e26e1ac99f0947 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jun 9 03:18:11 2018 +0000 upstream: slightly better wording re handing of $TERM, from Jakub Jelen via bz2386 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14bea3f069a93c8be66a7b97794255a91fece964 commit 28013759f09ed3ebf7e8335e83a62936bd7a7f47 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jun 9 03:03:10 2018 +0000 upstream: add a SetEnv directive for sshd_config to allow an administrator to explicitly specify environment variables set in sessions started by sshd. These override the default environment and any variables set by user configuration (PermitUserEnvironment, etc), but not the SSH_* variables set by sshd itself. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6a96c0001ccd7dd211df6cae9e961c20fd718c0 commit 7082bb58a2eb878d23ec674587c742e5e9673c36 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jun 9 03:01:12 2018 +0000 upstream: add a SetEnv directive to ssh_config that allows setting environment variables for the remote session (subject to the server accepting them) refactor SendEnv to remove the arbitrary limit of variable names. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfbb00d9b0e10c1ffff1d83424351fd961d1f2be commit 3b9798bda15bd3f598f5ef07595d64e23504da91 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jun 9 02:58:02 2018 +0000 upstream: reorder child environment preparation so that variables read from ~/.ssh/environment (if enabled) do not override SSH_* variables set by the server. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59f9d4c213cdcef2ef21f4b4ae006594dcf2aa7a commit 0368889f82f63c82ff8db9f8c944d89e7c657db4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 8 03:35:36 2018 +0000 upstream: fix incorrect expansion of %i in load_public_identity_files(); reported by Roumen Petrov OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a827289e77149b5e0850d72a350c8b0300e7ef25 commit 027607fc2db6a0475a3380f8d95c635482714cb0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 8 01:55:40 2018 +0000 upstream: fix some over-long lines and __func__ up some debug messages OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c70a60b4c8207d9f242fc2351941ba50916bb267 commit 6ff6fda705bc204456a5fa12518dde6e8790bb02 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 7 11:26:14 2018 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f98f16af10b28e24bcecb806cb71ea994b648fd6 commit f2c06ab8dd90582030991f631a2715216bf45e5a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 8 17:43:36 2018 +1000 Remove ability to override $LD. Since autoconf always uses $CC to link C programs, allowing users to override LD caused mismatches between what LD_LINK_IFELSE thought worked and what ld thought worked. If you do need to do this kind of thing you need to set a compiler flag such as gcc's -fuse-ld in LDFLAGS. commit e1542a80797b4ea40a91d2896efdcc76a57056d2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 8 13:55:59 2018 +1000 Better detection of unsupported compiler options. Should prevent "unsupported -Wl,-z,retpoline" warnings during linking. ok djm@ commit 57379dbd013ad32ee3f9989bf5f5741065428360 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 7 14:29:43 2018 +0000 upstream: test the correct configuration option name OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 492279ea9f65657f97a970e0e7c7fd0b339fee23 commit 6d41815e202fbd6182c79780b6cc90e1ec1c9981 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 7 09:26:42 2018 +0000 upstream: some permitlisten fixes from markus@ that I missed in my insomnia-fueled commits last night OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26f23622e928996086e85b1419cc1c0f136e359c commit 4319f7a868d86d435fa07112fcb6153895d03a7f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 7 04:46:34 2018 +0000 upstream: permitlisten/PermitListen unit test from Markus OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ab12eb42f0e14926980441cf7c058a6d1d832ea5 commit fa09076410ffc2d34d454145af23c790d728921e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 7 04:31:51 2018 +0000 upstream: fix regression caused by recent permitlisten option commit: authorized_keys lines that contained permitopen/permitlisten were being treated as invalid. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef41d63a5a477b405d142dc925b67d9e7aaa31b commit 7f90635216851f6cb4bf3999e98b825f85d604f8 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 6 18:29:18 2018 +0000 upstream: switch config file parsing to getline(3) as this avoids static limits noted by gerhard@; ok dtucker@, djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6d702eabef0fa12e5a1d75c334a8c8b325298b5c commit 392db2bc83215986a91c0b65feb0e40e7619ce7e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 6 18:25:33 2018 +0000 upstream: regress test for PermitOpen OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce8b5f28fc039f09bb297fc4a92319e65982ddaf commit 803d896ef30758135e2f438bdd1a0be27989e018 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:15 2018 +0000 upstream: man bits for permitlisten authorized_keys option OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86910af8f781a4ac5980fea125442eb25466dd78 commit 04df43208b5b460d7360e1598f876b92a32f5922 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:00 2018 +0000 upstream: man bits for PermitListen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35b200cba4e46a16a4db6a80ef11838ab0fad67c commit 93c06ab6b77514e0447fe4f1d822afcbb2a9be08 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 6 18:23:32 2018 +0000 upstream: permitlisten option for authorized_keys; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8650883018d7aa893173d703379e4456a222c672 commit 115063a6647007286cc8ca70abfd2a7585f26ccc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 6 18:22:41 2018 +0000 upstream: Add a PermitListen directive to control which server-side addresses may be listened on when the client requests remote forwarding (ssh -R). This is the converse of the existing PermitOpen directive and this includes some refactoring to share much of its implementation. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15a931238c61a3f2ac74ea18a98c933e358e277f commit 7703ae5f5d42eb302ded51705166ff6e19c92892 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 6 16:04:29 2018 +1000 Use ssh-keygen -A to generate missing host keys. Instead of testing for each specific key type, use ssh-keygen -A to generate any missing host key types. commit e8d59fef1098e24f408248dc64e5c8efa5d01f3c Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 1 06:23:10 2018 +0000 upstream: add missing punctuation after %i in ssh_config.5, and make the grammatical format in sshd_config.5 match that in ssh_config.5; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e325663b9342f3d556e223e5306e0d5fa1a74fa0 commit a1f737d6a99314e291a87856122cb4dbaf64c641 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 1 05:52:26 2018 +0000 upstream: oops - further adjustment to text neccessary; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23585576c807743112ab956be0fb3c786bdef025 commit 294028493471e0bd0c7ffe55dc0c0a67cba6ec41 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 1 05:50:18 2018 +0000 upstream: %U needs to be escaped; tweak text; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30887b73ece257273fb619ab6f4e86dc92ddc15e commit e5019da3c5a31e6e729a565f2b886a80c4be96cc Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 1 04:31:48 2018 +0000 upstream: Apply umask to all incoming files and directories not just files. This makes sure it gets applied to directories too, and prevents a race where files get chmodded after creation. bz#2839, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3168ee6c7c39093adac4fd71039600cfa296203b commit a1dcafc41c376332493b9385ee39f9754dc145ec Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 1 03:52:37 2018 +0000 upstream: Adapt to extra default verboisity from ssh-keygen when searching for and hashing known_hosts entries in a single operation (ssh-keygen -HF ...) Patch from Anton Kremenetsky OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 519585a4de35c4611285bd6a7272766c229b19dd commit 76f314c75dffd4a55839d50ee23622edad52c168 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 22 00:22:49 2018 +0000 upstream: Add TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL variable, to force all failures to instantly abort the test. Useful in capturing clean logs for individual failure cases. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: feba18cf338c2328b9601bd4093cabdd9baa3af1 commit 065c8c055df8d83ae7c92e5e524a579d87668aab Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 11 03:51:06 2018 +0000 upstream: Clean up comment. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6adb35f384d447e7dcb9f170d4f0d546d3973e10 commit 01b048c8eba3b021701bd0ab26257fc82903cba8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 1 04:21:29 2018 +0000 upstream: whitespace OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5edb5e843ddc9b73a8e46518899be41d5709add commit 854ae209f992465a276de0b5f10ef770510c2418 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 1 04:05:29 2018 +0000 upstream: make ssh_remote_ipaddr() capable of being called after the ssh->state has been torn down; bz#2773 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 167f12523613ca3d16d7716a690e7afa307dc7eb commit 3e088aaf236ef35beeef3c9be93fd53700df5861 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 1 03:51:34 2018 +0000 upstream: return correct exit code when searching for and hashing known_hosts entries in a single operation (ssh-keygen -HF hostname); bz2772 Report and fix from Anton Kremenetsky OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac10ca13eb9bb0bc50fcd42ad11c56c317437b58 commit 9c935dd9bf05628826ad2495d3e8bdf3d3271c21 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 1 03:33:53 2018 +0000 upstream: make UID available as a %-expansion everywhere that the username is available currently. In the client this is via %i, in the server %U (since %i was already used in the client in some places for this, but used for something different in the server); bz#2870, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e912b0213713316cb55db194b3a6415b3d4b95 commit d8748b91d1d6c108c0c260ed41fa55f37b9ef34b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 1 03:11:49 2018 +0000 upstream: prefer argv0 to "ssh" when re-executing ssh for ProxyJump directive; bz2831, feedback and ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3cec709a131499fbb0c1ea8a0a9e0b0915ce769e commit fbb4b5fd4f8e0bb89732670a01954e18b69e15ba Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 25 07:11:01 2018 +0000 upstream: Do not ban PTY allocation when a sshd session is restricted because the user password is expired as it breaks password change dialog. regression in openssh-7.7 reported by Daniel Wagner OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fc09c584c6f1964b00595e3abe7f83db4d90d73 commit f6a59a22b0c157c4c4e5fd7232f868138223be64 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 25 04:25:46 2018 +0000 upstream: Fix return value confusion in several functions (readdir, download and fsync). These should return -1 on error, not a sftp status code. patch from Petr Cerny in bz#2871 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 651aa0220ad23c9167d9297a436162d741f97a09 commit 1da5934b860ac0378d52d3035b22b6670f6a967e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 25 03:20:59 2018 +0000 upstream: If select() fails in ssh_packet_read_seqnr go directly to the error path instead of trying to read from the socket on the way out, which resets errno and causes the true error to be misreported. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2614edaadbd05a957aa977728aa7a030af7c6f0a commit 4ef75926ef517d539f2c7aac3188b09f315c86a7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri May 25 13:36:58 2018 +1000 Permit getuid()/geteuid() syscalls. Requested for Linux/s390; patch from Eduardo Barretto via bz#2752; ok dtucker commit 4b22fd8ecefd059a66140be67f352eb6145a9d88 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 22 00:13:26 2018 +0000 upstream: support ProxyJump=none to disable ProxyJump functionality; bz#2869 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c06ee08eb78451b5837fcfd8cbebc5ff3a67a01 commit f41bcd70f55b4f0fc4d8e1039cb361ac922b23fb Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 15 05:40:11 2018 +0000 upstream: correct keyowrd name (permitemptypasswords); from brendan macdonell OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef1bdbc936b2ea693ee37a4c20a94d4d43f5fda3 commit f18bc97151340127859634d20d79fd39ec8a7f39 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 11 04:01:11 2018 +0000 upstream: Emphasise that -w implicitly sets Tunnel=point-to-point and that users should specify an explicit Tunnel directive if they don't want this. bz#2365. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a8d9c67ae213ead180481900dbbb3e04864560d commit 32e4e94e1511fe0020fbfbb62399d31b2d22a801 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon May 14 14:40:08 2018 +1000 sync fmt_scaled.c revision 1.17 date: 2018/05/14 04:39:04; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +5 -2; commitid: 53zY8GjViUBnWo8Z; constrain fractional part to [0-9] (less confusing to static analysis); ok ian@ commit 54268d589e85ecc43d3eba8d83f327bdada9d696 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri May 11 14:04:40 2018 +1000 fix key-options.sh on platforms without openpty(3) Skip the pty tests if the platform lacks openpty(3) and has to chown(2) the pty device explicitly. This typically requires root permissions that this test lacks. bz#2856 ok dtucker@ commit b2140a739be4c3b43cc1dc08322dca39a1e39d20 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 11 03:38:51 2018 +0000 upstream: implement EMFILE mitigation for ssh-agent: remember the fd rlimit and stop accepting new connections when it is exceeded (with some grace). Accept is resumed when enough connections are closed. bz#2576. feedback deraadt; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a85d9cec7b85741961e7116a49f8dae777911ea commit fdba503fdfc647ee8a244002f1581e869c1f3d90 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 11 03:22:55 2018 +0000 upstream: Explicit cast when snprintf'ing an uint64. Prevents warnings on platforms where int64 is long not long long. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c5359e2fbfce11dea2d93f7bc257e84419bd001 commit e7751aa4094d51a9bc00778aa8d07e22934c55ee Author: bluhm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 26 14:47:03 2018 +0000 upstream: Since the previous commit, ssh regress test sftp-chroot was failing. The sftp program terminated with the wrong exit code as sftp called fatal() instad of exit(0). So when the sigchld handler waits for the child, remember that it was found. Then don't expect that main() can wait again. OK dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfafd940c0de5297940c71ddf362053db0232266 commit 7c15301841e2e9d37cae732400de63ae9c0961d6 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Apr 29 17:54:12 2018 +1000 Use includes.h instead of config.h. This ensures it picks up the definition of DEF_WEAK, the lack of which can cause compile errors in some cases (eg modern AIX). From michael at felt.demon.nl. commit cec338967a666b7c8ad8b88175f2faeddf268116 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Apr 19 09:53:14 2018 +1000 Omit 3des-cbc if OpenSSL built without DES. Patch from hongxu.jia at windriver.com, ok djm@ commit a575ddd58835759393d2dddd16ebe5abdb56485e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 16 22:50:44 2018 +0000 upstream: Disable SSH2_MSG_DEBUG messages for Twisted Conch clients without version numbers since they choke on them under some circumstances. https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9422 via Colin Watson Newer Conch versions have a version number in their ident string and handle debug messages okay. https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9424 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6cf7be262af0419c58ddae11324d9c0dc1577539 commit 390c7000a8946db565b66eab9e52fb11948711fa Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 14 21:50:41 2018 +0000 upstream: don't free the %C expansion, it's used later for LocalCommand OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 857b5cb37b2d856bfdfce61289a415257a487fb1 commit 3455f1e7c48e2e549192998d330214975b9b1dc7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 13 05:04:12 2018 +0000 upstream: notify user immediately when underlying ssh process dies; patch from Thomas Kuthan in bz2719; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78fac88c2f08054d1fc5162c43c24162b131cf78 commit 1c5b4bc827f4abc3e65888cda061ad5edf1b8c7c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 13 16:23:57 2018 +1000 Allow nanosleep in preauth privsep child. The new timing attack mitigation code uses nanosleep in the preauth codepath, allow in systrace andbox too. commit 0e73428038d5ecfa5d2a28cff26661502a7aff4e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 13 16:06:29 2018 +1000 Allow nanosleep in preauth privsep child. The new timing attack mitigation code uses nanosleep in the preauth codepath, allow in sandbox. commit e9d910b0289c820852f7afa67f584cef1c05fe95 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 13 03:57:26 2018 +0000 upstream: Defend against user enumeration timing attacks. This establishes a minimum time for each failed authentication attempt (5ms) and adds a per-user constant derived from a host secret (0-4ms). Based on work by joona.kannisto at tut.fi, ok markus@ djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b7845b355bb7381703339c8fb0e57e81a20ae5ca commit d97874cbd909eb706886cd0cdd418f812c119ef9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 13 13:43:55 2018 +1000 Using "==" in shell tests is not portable. Patch from rsbecker at nexbridge.com. commit cfb1d9bc76734681e3dea532a1504fcd466fbe91 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 13 13:38:06 2018 +1000 Fix tunnel forwarding broken in 7.7p1 bz2855, ok dtucker@ commit afa6e79b76fb52a0c09a29688b5c0d125eb08302 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 13 13:31:42 2018 +1000 prefer to use getrandom() for PRNG seeding Only applies when built --without-openssl. Thanks Jann Horn for reminder. commit 575fac34a97f69bc217b235f81de9f8f433eceed Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 13 13:13:33 2018 +1000 Revert $REGRESSTMP changes. Revert 3fd2d229 and subsequent changes as they turned out to be a portability hassle. commit 10479cc2a4acd6faaf643eb305233b49d70c31c1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Apr 10 10:19:02 2018 +1000 Many typo fixes from Karsten Weiss Spotted using https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell commit 907da2f88519b34189fd03fac96de0c52d448233 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 10 00:14:10 2018 +0000 upstream: more typos spotted by Karsten Weiss using codespell OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d906a2aea0663810a658b7d0bc61a1d2907d4d69 commit 37e5f4a7ab9a8026e5fc2f47dafb0f1b123d39e9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 10 00:13:27 2018 +0000 upstream: make this a bit more portable-friendly OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 62f7b9e055e8dfaab92b3825f158beeb4ca3f963 commit 001aa55484852370488786bd40e9fdad4b465811 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 10 00:10:49 2018 +0000 upstream: lots of typos in comments/docs. Patch from Karsten Weiss after checking with codespell tool (https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 373222f12d7ab606598a2d36840c60be93568528 commit 260ede2787fe80b18b8d5920455b4fb268519c7d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 9 23:54:49 2018 +0000 upstream: don't kill ssh-agent's listening socket entriely if we fail to accept a connection; bz#2837, patch from Lukas Kuster OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52413f5069179bebf30d38f524afe1a2133c738f commit ebc8b4656f9b0f834a642a9fb3c9fbca86a61838 Author: tj@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 9 20:41:22 2018 +0000 upstream: the UseLogin option was removed, so remove it here too. ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7080be73a64d68e21f22f5408a67a0ba8b1b6b06 commit 3e36f281851fc8e9c996b33f108b2ae167314fbe Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sun Apr 8 07:36:02 2018 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b9c23022ea7b9dddb62864de4e906000f9d7474 commit 8368571efd6693c5c57f850e23a2372acf3f865f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 7 13:50:10 2018 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38e347b6f8e888f5e0700d01abb1eba7caa154f9 commit 555294a7279914ae6795b71bedf4e6011b7636df Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 6 13:02:39 2018 +0000 upstream: Allow "SendEnv -PATTERN" to clear environment variables previously labeled for sendind. bz#1285 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f6fec9e3d0f366f15903094fbe1754cb359a0df9 commit 40f5f03544a07ebd2003b443d42e85cb51d94d59 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 6 04:15:45 2018 +0000 upstream: relax checking of authorized_keys environment="..." options to allow underscores in variable names (regression introduced in 7.7). bz2851, ok deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69690ffe0c97ff393f2c76d25b4b3d2ed4e4ac9c commit 30fd7f9af0f553aaa2eeda5a1f53f26cfc222b5e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 6 03:51:27 2018 +0000 upstream: add a couple of missed options to the config dump; patch from Jakub Jelen via bz2835 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5970adadf6ef206bee0dddfc75d24c2019861446 commit 8d6829be324452d2acd282d5f8ceb0adaa89a4de Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 6 03:34:27 2018 +0000 upstream: ssh does not accept -oInclude=... on the commandline, the Include keyword is for configuration files only. bz#2840, patch from Jakub Jelen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 32d052b4a7a7f22df35fe3f71c368c02b02cacb0 commit 00c5222ddc0c8edcaa4ea45ac03befdc8013d137 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 5 22:54:28 2018 +0000 upstream: We don't offer CBC cipher by default any more. Spotted by Renaud Allard (via otto@) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a559b1eef741557dd959ae378b665a2977d92dca commit 5ee8448ad7c306f05a9f56769f95336a8269f379 Author: job@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 4 15:12:17 2018 +0000 upstream: Update default IPQoS in ssh(1), sshd(8) to DSCP AF21 for interactive and CS1 for bulk AF21 was selected as this is the highest priority within the low-latency service class (and it is higher than what we have today). SSH is elastic and time-sensitive data, where a user is waiting for a response via the network in order to continue with a task at hand. As such, these flows should be considered foreground traffic, with delays or drops to such traffic directly impacting user-productivity. For bulk SSH traffic, the CS1 "Lower Effort" marker was chosen to enable networks implementing a scavanger/lower-than-best effort class to discriminate scp(1) below normal activities, such as web surfing. In general this type of bulk SSH traffic is a background activity. An advantage of using "AF21" for interactive SSH and "CS1" for bulk SSH is that they are recognisable values on all common platforms (IANA https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/dscp-registry.xml), and for AF21 specifically a definition of the intended behavior exists https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4594#section-4.7 in addition to the definition of the Assured Forwarding PHB group https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2597, and for CS1 (Lower Effort) there is https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3662 The first three bits of "AF21" map to the equivalent IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE 802.11e, MPLS EXP/CoS and IP Precedence value of 2 (also known as "Immediate", or "AC_BE"), and CS1's first 3 bits map to IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE 802.11e, MPLS/CoS and IP Precedence value 1 ("Background" or "AC_BK"). OK deraadt@, "no objection" djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d11d2a4484f461524ef0c20870523dfcdeb52181 commit 424b544fbda963f973da80f884717c3e0a513288 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 3 02:14:08 2018 +0000 upstream: Import regenerated moduli file. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e commit 323f66ce934df2da551f256f37d69822428e1ca1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 6 04:18:35 2018 +0000 upstream: Add test for username options parsing order, prompted by bz#2849. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6985cd32f38596882a3ac172ff8c510693b65283 commit e8f474554e3bda102a797a2fbab0594ccc66f097 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 6 14:11:44 2018 +1000 Expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 to PAM auth modules bz#2408, patch from Radoslaw Ejsmont; ok dtucker@ commit 014ba209cf4c6a159baa30ecebbaddfa97da7100 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 3 12:18:00 2018 +1000 Import regenerated moduli file. commit a0349a1cc4a18967ad1dbff5389bcdf9da098814 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Apr 2 15:38:28 2018 +1000 update versions in .spec files commit 816ad38f79792f5617e3913be306ddb27e91091c Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Apr 2 15:38:20 2018 +1000 update version number commit 2c71ca1dd1efe458cb7dee3f8a1a566f913182c2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Mar 30 18:23:07 2018 +1100 Disable native strndup and strnlen on AIX. On at least some revisions of AIX, strndup returns unterminated strings under some conditions, apparently because strnlen returns incorrect values in those cases. Disable both on AIX and use the replacements from openbsd-compat. Fixes problem with ECDSA keys there, ok djm. commit 6b5a17bc14e896e3904dc58d889b58934cfacd24 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Mar 26 13:12:44 2018 +1100 Include ssh_api.h for struct ssh. struct ssh is needed by implementations of sys_auth_passwd() that were converted in commit bba02a50. Needed to fix build on AIX, I assume for the other platforms too (although it should be harmless if not needed). commit bc3f80e4d191b8e48650045dfa8a682cd3aabd4d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Mar 26 12:58:09 2018 +1100 Remove UNICOS code missed during removal. Fixes compile error on AIX. commit 9d57762c24882e2f000a21a0ffc8c5908a1fa738 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 24 19:29:03 2018 +0000 upstream: openssh-7.7 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 274e614352460b9802c905f38fb5ea7ed5db3d41 commit 4b7d8acdbbceef247dc035e611e577174ed8a87e Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Mar 26 09:37:02 2018 +1100 Remove authinfo.sh test dependency on printenv Some platforms lack printenv in the default $PATH. Reported by Tom G. Christensen commit 4afeaf3dcb7dc70efd98fcfcb0ed28a6b40b820e Author: Tim Rice Date: Sun Mar 25 10:00:21 2018 -0700 Use libiaf on all sysv5 systems commit bba02a5094b3db228ceac41cb4bfca165d0735f3 Author: Tim Rice Date: Sun Mar 25 09:17:33 2018 -0700 modified: auth-sia.c modified: openbsd-compat/port-aix.c modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c propogate changes to auth-passwd.c in commit 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3 to other providers of sys_auth_passwd() commit d7a7a39168bdfe273587bf85d779d60569100a3f Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 24 19:29:03 2018 +0000 upstream: openssh-7.7 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 274e614352460b9802c905f38fb5ea7ed5db3d41 commit 9efcaaac314c611c6c0326e8bac5b486c424bbd2 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 24 19:28:43 2018 +0000 upstream: fix bogus warning when signing cert keys using agent; from djm; ok deraadt dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12e50836ba2040042383a8b71e12d7ea06e9633d commit 393436024d2e4b4c7a01f9cfa5854e7437896d11 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Mar 25 09:40:46 2018 +1100 Replace /dev/stdin with "-". For some reason sftp -b doesn't work with /dev/stdin on Cygwin, as noted and suggested by vinschen at redhat.com. commit b5974de1a1d419e316ffb6524b1b277dda2f3b49 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Mar 23 13:21:14 2018 +1100 Provide $OBJ to paths in PuTTY interop tests. commit dc31e79454e9b9140b33ad380565fdb59b9c4f33 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 16 09:06:31 2018 +0000 upstream: Tell puttygen to use /dev/urandom instead of /dev/random. On OpenBSD they are both non-blocking, but on many other -portable platforms it blocks, stalling tests. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 397d0d4c719c353f24d79f5b14775e0cfdf0e1cc commit cb1f94431ef319cd48618b8b771b58739a8210cf Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Mar 22 07:06:11 2018 +0000 upstream: ssh/xmss: fix build; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9374ca41d4497f1c673ab681cc33f6e7c5dd186 commit 27979da9e4074322611355598f69175b9ff10d39 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Mar 22 07:05:48 2018 +0000 upstream: ssh/xmss: fix deserialize for certs; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f44c41636c16ec83502039828beaf521c057dddc commit c6cb2565c9285eb54fa9dfbb3890f5464aff410f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Mar 22 17:00:28 2018 +1100 Save $? before case statement. In some shells (FreeBSD 9, ash) the case statement resets $?, so save for later testing. commit 4c4e7f783b43b264c247233acb887ee10ed4ce4d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 14 05:35:40 2018 +0000 upstream: rename recently-added "valid-before" key restriction to "expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509; pointed out by jsing@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ac8b41dbfd90cffd525d58350c327195b0937793 commit 500396b204c58e78ad9d081516a365a9f28dc3fd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 12 00:56:03 2018 +0000 upstream: check valid-before option in authorized_keys OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7e1e4a84f7f099a290e5a4cbf4196f90ff2d7e11 commit a76b5d26c2a51d7dd7a5164e683ab3f4419be215 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 12 00:54:04 2018 +0000 upstream: explicitly specify RSA/SHA-2 keytype here too OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74d7b24e8c72c27af6b481198344eb077e993a62 commit 3a43297ce29d37c64e37c7e21282cb219e28d3d1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 12 00:52:57 2018 +0000 upstream: exlicitly include RSA/SHA-2 keytypes in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes here OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 954d19e0032a74e31697fb1dc7e7d3d1b2d65fe9 commit 037fdc1dc2d68e1d43f9c9e2586c02cabc8f7cc8 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 14 06:56:20 2018 +0000 upstream: sort expiry-time; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c7d82ee1e63e26ceb2b3d3a16514019f984f6bf commit abc0fa38c9bc136871f28e452c3465c3051fc785 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 14 05:35:40 2018 +0000 upstream: rename recently-added "valid-before" key restriction to "expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509; pointed out by jsing@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 376939466a1f562f3950a22314bc6505733aaae6 commit bf0fbf2b11a44f06a64b620af7d01ff171c28e13 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 12 00:52:01 2018 +0000 upstream: add valid-before="[time]" authorized_keys option. A simple way of giving a key an expiry date. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1793b4dd5184fa87f42ed33c7b0f4f02bc877947 commit fbd733ab7adc907118a6cf56c08ed90c7000043f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Mar 12 19:17:26 2018 +1100 Add AC_LANG_PROGRAM to AC_COMPILE_IFELSE. The recently added MIPS ABI tests need AC_LANG_PROGRAM to prevent warnings from autoconf. Pointed out by klausz at haus-gisela.de. commit c7c458e8261b04d161763cd333d74e7a5842e917 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 7 23:53:08 2018 +0000 upstream: revert recent strdelim() change, it causes problems with some configs. revision 1.124 date: 2018/03/02 03:02:11; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +19 -8; commitid: nNRsCijZiGG6SUTT; Allow escaped quotes \" and \' in ssh_config and sshd_config quotes option strings. bz#1596 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c40b1b81206d713c06b49d8477402c86babda5 commit 0bcd871ccdf3baf2b642509ba4773d5be067cfa2 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 5 07:03:18 2018 +0000 upstream: move the input format details to -f; remove the output format details and point to sshd(8), where it is documented; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95f17e47dae02a6ac7329708c8c893d4cad0004a commit 45011511a09e03493568506ce32f4891a174a3bd Author: Vicente Olivert Riera Date: Tue Jun 20 16:42:28 2017 +0100 configure.ac: properly set seccomp_audit_arch for MIPS64 Currently seccomp_audit_arch is set to AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 or AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 (depending on the endinness) when openssh is built for MIPS64. However, that's only valid for n64 ABI. The right macros for n32 ABI defined in seccomp.h are AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32 and AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, for big and little endian respectively. Because of that an sshd built for MIPS64 n32 rejects connection attempts and the output of strace reveals that the problem is related to seccomp audit: [pid 194] prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, {len=57, filter=0x555d5da0}) = 0 [pid 194] write(7, "\0\0\0]\0\0\0\5\0\0\0Ulist_hostkey_types: "..., 97) = ? [pid 193] <... poll resumed> ) = 2 ([{fd=5, revents=POLLIN|POLLHUP}, {fd=6, revents=POLLHUP}]) [pid 194] +++ killed by SIGSYS +++ This patch fixes that problem by setting the right value to seccomp_audit_arch taking into account the MIPS64 ABI. Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera commit 580086704c31de91dc7ba040a28e416bf1fefbca Author: Vicente Olivert Riera Date: Tue Jun 20 16:42:11 2017 +0100 configure.ac: detect MIPS ABI Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera commit cd4e937aa701f70366cd5b5969af525dff6fdf15 Author: Alan Yee Date: Wed Mar 7 15:12:14 2018 -0800 Use https URLs for links that support it. commit c0a0c3fc4a76b682db22146b28ddc46566db1ce9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Mar 5 20:03:07 2018 +1100 Disable UTMPX on SunOS4. commit 58fd4c5c0140f6636227ca7acbb149ab0c2509b9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Mar 5 19:28:08 2018 +1100 Check for and work around buggy fflush(NULL). Some really old platforms (eg SunOS4) segfault on fflush(NULL) so check for and work around. With klausz at haus-gisela.de. commit 71e48bc7945f867029e50e06c665c66aed6d3c64 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Mar 5 10:22:32 2018 +1100 Remove extra XMSS #endif Extra #endif breaks compile with -DWITH_XMSS. Pointed out by Jack Schmidt via github. commit 055e09e2212ff52067786bf6d794ca9512ff7f0c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 3 06:37:53 2018 +0000 upstream: Update RSA minimum modulus size to 1024. sshkey.h rev 1.18 bumped the minimum from 768 to 1024, update man page accordingly. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27563ab4e866cd2aac40a5247876f6787c08a338 commit 7e4fadd3248d6bb7d39d6688c76a613d35d2efc1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Mar 4 01:46:48 2018 +0000 upstream: for the pty control tests, just check that the PTY path points to something in /dev (rather than checking the device node itself); makes life easier for portable, where systems with dynamic ptys can delete nodes before we get around to testing their existence. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b1e455b821e62572bccd98102f8dd9d09bb94994 commit 13ef4cf53f24753fe920832b990b25c9c9cd0530 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Mar 3 16:21:20 2018 +1100 Update PAM password change to new opts API. commit 33561e68e0b27366cb769295a077aabc6a49d2a1 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Mar 3 14:56:09 2018 +1100 Add strndup for platforms that need it. Some platforms don't have strndup, which includes Solaris 10, NetBSD 3 and FreeBSD 6. commit e8a17feba95eef424303fb94441008f6c5347aaf Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Mar 3 14:49:07 2018 +1100 Flatten and alphabetize object file lists. This will make maintenance and changes easier. "no objection" tim@ commit de1920d743d295f50e6905e5957c4172c038e8eb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 3 03:16:17 2018 +0000 upstream: unit tests for new authorized_keys options API OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 820f9ec9c6301f6ca330ad4052d85f0e67d0bdc1 commit dc3e92df17556dc5b0ab19cee8dcb2a6ba348717 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 2 02:53:27 2018 +0000 upstream: fix testing of pty option, include positive test and testing of restrict keyword OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4268f27c2706a0a95e725d9518c5bcbec9814c6d commit 3d1edd1ebbc0aabea8bbe61903060f37137f7c61 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 2 02:51:55 2018 +0000 upstream: better testing for port-forwarding and restrict flags in authorized_keys OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ee771df8955f2735df54746872c6228aff381daa commit 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 3 03:15:51 2018 +0000 upstream: switch over to the new authorized_keys options API and remove the legacy one. Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state between key file lines. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df commit 90c4bec8b5f9ec4c003ae4abdf13fc7766f00c8b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 3 03:06:02 2018 +0000 upstream: Introduce a new API for handling authorized_keys options. This API parses options to a dedicated structure rather than the old API's approach of setting global state. It also includes support for merging options, e.g. from authorized_keys, authorized_principals and/or certificates. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98badda102cd575210d7802943e93a34232c80a2 commit 26074380767e639ef89321610e146ae11016b385 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 3 03:01:50 2018 +0000 upstream: warn when the agent returns a signature type that was different to what was requested. This might happen when an old/non-OpenSSH agent is asked to make a rsa-sha2-256/512 signature but only supports ssh-rsa. bz#2799 feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760c0f9438c5c58abc16b5f98008ff2d95cb13ce commit f493d2b0b66fb003ed29f31dd66ff1aeb64be1fc Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 2 21:40:15 2018 +0000 upstream: apply a lick of paint; tweaks/ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 518a6736338045e0037f503c21027d958d05e703 commit 713d9cb510e0e7759398716cbe6dcf43e574be71 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 2 03:02:11 2018 +0000 upstream: Allow escaped quotes \" and \' in ssh_config and sshd_config quotes option strings. bz#1596 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd3a29fc2dc905e8780198e5a6a30b096de1a1cb commit 94b4e2d29afaaaef89a95289b16c18bf5627f7cd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 2 02:08:03 2018 +0000 upstream: refactor sshkey_read() to make it a little more, err, readable. ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e9247b5762fdac3b6335dc606d3822121714c28 commit 5886b92968b360623491699247caddfb77a74d80 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Mar 1 20:32:16 2018 +0000 upstream: missing #ifdef for _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE; report by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9039cb69a3f9886bfef096891a9e7fcbd620280b commit 3b36bed3d26f17f6a2b7e036e01777770fe1bcd4 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 26 12:14:53 2018 +0000 upstream: Remove unneeded (local) include. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132812dd2296b1caa8cb07d2408afc28e4e60f93 commit 27b9f3950e0289e225b57b7b880a8f1859dcd70b Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 26 03:56:44 2018 +0000 upstream: Add $OpenBSD$ markers to xmss files to help keep synced with portable. ok djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5233a27aafd1dfadad4b957225f95ae51eb365c1 commit afd830847a82ebbd5aeab05bad6d2c8ce74df1cd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 26 03:03:05 2018 +0000 upstream: Add newline at end of file to prevent compiler warnings. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52f247d4eafe840c7c14c8befa71a760a8eeb063 commit 941e0d3e9bb8d5e4eb70cc694441445faf037c84 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 28 19:59:35 2018 +1100 Add WITH_XMSS, move to prevent conflicts. Add #ifdef WITH_XMSS to ssh-xmss.c, move it in the other files to after includes.h so it's less likely to conflict and will pick up WITH_XMSS if added to config.h. commit a10d8552d0d2438da4ed539275abcbf557d1e7a8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 27 14:45:17 2018 +1100 Conditionally compile XMSS code. The XMSS code is currently experimental and, unlike the rest of OpenSSH cannot currently be compiled with a c89 compiler. commit 146c3bd28c8dbee9c4b06465d9c9facab96b1e9b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 26 12:51:29 2018 +1100 Check dlopen has RTLD_NOW before enabling pkcs11. commit 1323f120d06a26074c4d154fcbe7f49bcad3d741 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 27 08:41:25 2018 +1100 Check for attributes on prototype args. Some compilers (gcc 2.9.53, 3.0 and probably others, see gcc bug #3481) do not accept __attribute__ on function pointer prototype args. Check for this and hide them if they're not accepted. commit f0b245b0439e600fab782d19e97980e9f2c2533c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 26 11:43:48 2018 +1100 Check if HAVE_DECL_BZERO correctly. commit c7ef4a399155e1621a532cc5e08e6fa773658dd4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 26 17:42:56 2018 +1100 Wrap in #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. commit ac53ce46cf8165cbda7f57ee045f9f32e1e92b31 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 26 16:24:23 2018 +1100 Replace $(CURDIR) with $(PWD). The former doesn't work on Solaris or BSDs. commit 534b2680a15d14e7e60274d5b29b812d44cc5a44 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 26 14:51:59 2018 +1100 Comment out hexdump(). Nothing currently uses them but they cause conflicts on at least FreeBSD, possibly others. ok djm@ commit 5aea4aa522f61bb2f34c3055a7de203909dfae77 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 26 14:39:14 2018 +1100 typo: missing ; commit cd3ab57f9b388f8b1abf601dc4d78ff82d83b75e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 26 14:37:06 2018 +1100 Hook up flock() compat code. Also a couple of minor changes: fail if we can't lock instead of silently succeeding, and apply a couple of minor style fixes. commit b087998d1ba90dd1ddb6bfdb17873dc3e7392798 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 26 14:27:02 2018 +1100 Import flock() compat from NetBSD. From NetBSD's src/trunk/tools/compat/flock.c, no OpenSSH changes yet. commit 89212533dde6798324e835b1499084658df4579e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 26 12:32:14 2018 +1100 Fix breakage when REGRESSTMP not set. BUILDDIR is not set where used for REGRESSTMP, use make's CURDIR instead. Pointed out by djm@. commit f885474137df4b89498c0b8834c2ac72c47aa4bd Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 26 12:18:14 2018 +1100 XMSS-related files get includes.h commit 612faa34c72e421cdc9e63f624526bae62d557cc Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 26 12:17:55 2018 +1100 object files end with .o - not .c commit bda709b8e13d3eef19e69c2d1684139e3af728f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 26 12:17:22 2018 +1100 avoid inclusion of deprecated selinux/flask.h Use string_to_security_class() instead. commit 2e396439365c4ca352cac222717d09b14f8a0dfd Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 26 11:48:27 2018 +1100 updatedepend commit 1b11ea7c58cd5c59838b5fa574cd456d6047b2d4 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 23 15:58:37 2018 +0000 upstream: Add experimental support for PQC XMSS keys (Extended Hash-Based Signatures) The code is not compiled in by default (see WITH_XMSS in Makefile.inc) Joint work with stefan-lukas_gazdag at genua.eu See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-12 ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef3eccb96762a5d6f135d7daeef608df7776a7ac commit 7d330a1ac02076de98cfc8fda05353d57b603755 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 23 07:38:09 2018 +0000 upstream: some cleanup for BindInterface and ssh-keyscan; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a719ebeae22a166adf05bea5009add7075acc8c commit c7b5a47e3b9db9a0f0198f9c90c705f6307afc2b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Feb 25 23:55:41 2018 +1100 Invert sense of getpgrp test. AC_FUNC_GETPGRP tests if getpgrp(0) works, which it does if it's not declared. Instead, test if the zero-arg version we want to use works. commit b39593a6de5290650a01adf8699c6460570403c2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Feb 25 13:25:15 2018 +1100 Add no-op getsid implmentation. commit 11057564eb6ab8fd987de50c3d7f394c6f6632b7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Feb 25 11:22:57 2018 +1100 bsd-statvfs: include sys/vfs.h, check for f_flags. commit e9dede06e5bc582a4aeb5b1cd5a7a640d7de3609 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Feb 25 10:20:31 2018 +1100 Handle calloc(0,x) where different from malloc. Configure assumes that if malloc(0) returns null then calloc(0,n) also does. On some old platforms (SunOS4) malloc behaves as expected (as determined by AC_FUNC_MALLOC) but calloc doesn't. Test for this at configure time and activate the replacement function if found, plus handle this case in rpl_calloc. commit 2eb4041493fd2635ffdc64a852d02b38c4955e0b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 24 21:06:48 2018 +1100 Add prototype for readv if needed. commit 6c8c9a615b6d31db8a87bc25033f053d5b0a831e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 24 20:46:37 2018 +1100 Check for raise and supply if needed. commit a9004425a032d7a7141a5437cfabfd02431e2a74 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 24 20:25:22 2018 +1100 Check for bzero and supply if needed. Since explicit_bzero uses it via an indirect it needs to be a function not just a macro. commit 1a348359e4d2876203b5255941bae348557f4f54 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 23 05:14:05 2018 +0000 upstream: Add ssh-keyscan -D option to make it print its results in SSHFP format bz#2821, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 831446b582e0f298ca15c9d99c415c899e392221 commit 3e19fb976a47b44b3d7c4f8355269f7f2c5dd82c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 23 04:18:46 2018 +0000 upstream: Add missing braces. Caught by the tinderbox's -Werror=misleading-indentation, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d44656af594c3b2366eb87d6abcef83e1c88a6ca commit b59162da99399d89bd57f71c170c0003c55b1583 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 23 15:20:42 2018 +1100 Check for ifaddrs.h for BindInterface. BindInterface required getifaddr and friends so disable if not available (eg Solaris 10). We should be able to add support for some systems with a bit more work but this gets the building again. commit a8dd6fe0aa10b6866830b4688a73ef966f0aed88 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 23 14:19:11 2018 +1100 space before tab in previous commit b5e9263c7704247f9624c8f5c458e9181fcdbc09 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 9 03:40:22 2018 +0000 upstream: Replace fatal with exit in the case that we do not have $SUDO set. Prevents test failures when neither sudo nor doas are configured. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6a0464decc4f8ac7d6eded556a032b0fc521bc7b commit 3e9d3192ad43758ef761c5b0aa3ac5ccf8121ef2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 23 14:10:53 2018 +1100 Use portable syntax for REGRESSTMP. commit 73282b61187883a2b2bb48e087fdda1d751d6059 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 23 03:03:00 2018 +0000 upstream: unbreak interop test after SSHv1 purge; patch from Colin Watson via bz#2823 OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 807d30a597756ed6612bdf46dfebca74f49cb31a commit f8985dde5f46aedade0373365cbf86ed3f1aead2 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 9 03:42:57 2018 +0000 upstream: Skip sftp-chroot test when SUDO not set instead of fatal(). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cd4b5f1109b0dc09af4e5ea7d4968c43fbcbde88 commit df88551c02d4e3445c44ff67ba8757cff718609a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 9 03:40:22 2018 +0000 upstream: Replace fatal with exit in the case that we do not have $SUDO set. Prevents test failures when neither sudo nor doas are configured. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6a0464decc4f8ac7d6eded556a032b0fc521bc7b commit 3b252c20b19f093e87363de197f1100b79705dd3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 8 08:46:20 2018 +0000 upstream: some helpers to check verbose/quiet mode OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e736aac39e563f5360a0935080a71d5fdcb976de commit ac2e3026bbee1367e4cda34765d1106099be3287 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 23 02:34:33 2018 +0000 upstream: Add BindInterface ssh_config directive and -B command-line argument to ssh(1) that directs it to bind its outgoing connection to the address of the specified network interface. BindInterface prefers to use addresses that aren't loopback or link- local, but will fall back to those if no other addresses of the required family are available on that interface. Based on patch by Mike Manning in bz#2820, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5064d285c2851f773dd736a2c342aa384fbf713 commit fcdb9d777839a3fa034b3bc3067ba8c1f6886679 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 19 00:55:02 2018 +0000 upstream: emphasise that the hostkey rotation may send key types that the client may not support, and that the client should simply disregard such keys (this is what ssh does already). OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f8ffbc32ac8d12be8f913d7c0ea55bef8622bf commit ce066f688dc166506c082dac41ca686066e3de5f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 22 20:45:09 2018 +1100 Add headers for sys/audit.h. On some older platforms (at least sunos4, probably others) sys/audit.h requires some other headers. Patch from klausz at haus-gisela.de. commit 3fd2d2291a695c96a54269deae079bacce6e3fb9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 19 18:37:40 2018 +1100 Add REGRESSTMP make var override. Defaults to original location ($srcdir/regress) but allows overriding if desired, eg a directory in /tmp. commit f8338428588f3ecb5243c86336eccaa28809f97e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Feb 18 15:53:15 2018 +1100 Remove now-unused check for getrusage. getrusage was used in ssh-rand-helper but that's now long gone. Patch from klauszh at haus-gisela.de. commit 8570177195f6a4b3173c0a25484a83641ee3faa6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 16 04:43:11 2018 +0000 upstream: Don't send IUTF8 to servers that don't like them. Some SSH servers eg "ConfD" drop the connection if the client sends the new IUTF8 (RFC8160) terminal mode even if it's not set. Add a bug bit for such servers and avoid sending IUTF8 to them. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26425855402d870c3c0a90491e72e2a8a342ceda commit f6dc2ba3c9d12be53057b9371f5109ec553a399f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 16 17:32:28 2018 +1100 freezero should check for NULL. commit 680321f3eb46773883111e234b3c262142ff7c5b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 16 02:40:45 2018 +0000 upstream: Mention recent DH KEX methods: diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 From Jakub Jelen via bz#2826 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51bf769f06e55447f4bfa7306949e62d2401907a commit 88c50a5ae20902715f0fca306bb9c38514f71679 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 16 02:32:40 2018 +0000 upstream: stop loading DSA keys by default, remove sshd_config stanza and manpage bits; from Colin Watson via bz#2662, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d33a849f481684ff655c140f5eb1b4acda8c5c09 commit d2b3db2860c962927def39a52f67f1c23f7b201a Author: jsing@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 14 16:27:24 2018 +0000 upstream: Ensure that D mod (P-1) and D mod (Q-1) are calculated in constant time. This avoids a potential side channel timing leak. ok djm@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71ff3c16be03290e63d8edab8fac053d8a82968c commit 4270efad7048535b4f250f493d70f9acfb201593 Author: jsing@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 14 16:03:32 2018 +0000 upstream: Some obvious freezero() conversions. This also zeros an ed25519_pk when it was not being zeroed previously. ok djm@ dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c196a3c85c23ac0bd9b11bcadaedd90b7a2ce82 commit affa6ba67ffccc30b85d6e98f36eb5afd9386882 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 15 22:32:04 2018 +1100 Remove execute bit from modpipe.c. commit 9879dca438526ae6dfd656fecb26b0558c29c731 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 15 22:26:16 2018 +1100 Update prngd link to point to sourceforge. commit b6973fa5152b1a0bafd2417b7c3ad96f6e87d014 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 15 22:22:38 2018 +1100 Remove references to UNICOS. commit f1ca487940449f0b64f38f1da575078257609966 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 15 22:18:37 2018 +1100 Remove extra newline. commit 6d4e980f3cf27f409489cf89cd46c21501b13731 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 15 22:16:54 2018 +1100 OpenSSH's builtin entropy gathering is long gone. commit 389125b25d1a1d7f22e907463b7e8eca74af79ea Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 15 21:43:01 2018 +1100 Replace remaining mysignal() with signal(). These seem to have been missed during the replacement of mysignal with #define signal in commit 5ade9ab. Both include the requisite headers to pick up the #define. commit 265d88d4e61e352de6791733c8b29fa3d7d0c26d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 15 20:06:19 2018 +1100 Remove remaining now-obsolete cvs $Ids. commit 015749e9b1d2f6e14733466d19ba72f014d0845c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 15 17:01:54 2018 +1100 Regenerate dependencies after UNICOS removal. commit ddc0f3814881ea279a6b6d4d98e03afc60ae1ed7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 13 09:10:46 2018 +1100 Remove UNICOS support. The code required to support it is quite invasive to the mainline code that is synced with upstream and is an ongoing maintenance burden. Both the hardware and software are literal museum pieces these days and we could not find anyone still running OpenSSH on one. openssh-8.2p1/moduli.0010064400017500001750000000065661362136673300130530ustar00djmdjmMODULI(5) File Formats Manual MODULI(5) NAME moduli M-bM-^@M-^S Diffie-Hellman moduli DESCRIPTION The /etc/moduli file contains prime numbers and generators for use by sshd(8) in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method. New moduli may be generated with ssh-keygen(1) using a two-step process. An initial candidate generation pass, using ssh-keygen -G, calculates numbers that are likely to be useful. A second primality testing pass, using ssh-keygen -T, provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers are prime and are safe for use in Diffie-Hellman operations by sshd(8). This moduli format is used as the output from each pass. The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus, containing seven space-separated fields. These fields are as follows: timestamp The time that the modulus was last processed as YYYYMMDDHHMMSS. type Decimal number specifying the internal structure of the prime modulus. Supported types are: 0 Unknown, not tested. 2 "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime. 4 Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime. Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1) are Sophie Germain primes (type 4). Further primality testing with ssh-keygen(1) produces safe prime moduli (type 2) that are ready for use in sshd(8). Other types are not used by OpenSSH. tests Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests that the number has been subjected to represented as a bitmask of the following values: 0x00 Not tested. 0x01 Composite number M-bM-^@M-^S not prime. 0x02 Sieve of Eratosthenes. 0x04 Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests. The ssh-keygen(1) moduli candidate generation uses the Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02). Subsequent ssh-keygen(1) primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests (flag 0x04). trials Decimal number indicating the number of primality trials that have been performed on the modulus. size Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in bits. generator The recommended generator for use with this modulus (hexadecimal). modulus The modulus itself in hexadecimal. When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, sshd(8) first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher. sshd(8) then randomly selects a modulus from /etc/moduli that best meets the size requirement. SEE ALSO ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) STANDARDS M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006, 2006. OpenBSD 6.6 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/scp.0010064400017500001750000000161461362136673300123420ustar00djmdjmSCP(1) General Commands Manual SCP(1) NAME scp M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH secure file copy SYNOPSIS scp [-346BCpqrTv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target DESCRIPTION scp copies files between hosts on a network. It uses ssh(1) for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security as ssh(1). scp will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for authentication. The source and target may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host with optional path in the form [user@]host:[path], or a URI in the form scp://[user@]host[:port][/path]. Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file names containing M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y as host specifiers. When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a port may only be specified on the target if the -3 option is used. The options are as follows: -3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host. Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the progress meter. -4 Forces scp to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces scp to use IPv6 addresses only. -B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases). -C Compression enable. Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable compression. -c cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -F ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -i identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -J destination Connect to the target host by first making an scp connection to the jump host described by destination and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -l limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. -o ssh_option Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate scp command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_config(5). AddressFamily BatchMode BindAddress BindInterface CanonicalDomains CanonicalizeFallbackLocal CanonicalizeHostname CanonicalizeMaxDots CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs CASignatureAlgorithms CertificateFile ChallengeResponseAuthentication CheckHostIP Ciphers Compression ConnectionAttempts ConnectTimeout ControlMaster ControlPath ControlPersist GlobalKnownHostsFile GSSAPIAuthentication GSSAPIDelegateCredentials HashKnownHosts Host HostbasedAuthentication HostbasedKeyTypes HostKeyAlgorithms HostKeyAlias Hostname IdentitiesOnly IdentityAgent IdentityFile IPQoS KbdInteractiveAuthentication KbdInteractiveDevices KexAlgorithms LogLevel MACs NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost NumberOfPasswordPrompts PasswordAuthentication PKCS11Provider Port PreferredAuthentications ProxyCommand ProxyJump PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes PubkeyAuthentication RekeyLimit SendEnv ServerAliveInterval ServerAliveCountMax SetEnv StrictHostKeyChecking TCPKeepAlive UpdateHostKeys User UserKnownHostsFile VerifyHostKeyDNS -P port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that this option is written with a capital M-bM-^@M-^XPM-bM-^@M-^Y, because -p is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file. -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original file. -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from ssh(1). -r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that scp follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. -S program Name of program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand ssh(1) options. -T Disable strict filename checking. By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory scp checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files. Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected. This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that the server will not send unexpected filenames. -v Verbose mode. Causes scp and ssh(1) to print debugging messages about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. EXIT STATUS The scp utility exitsM-BM- 0 on success, andM-BM- >0 if an error occurs. SEE ALSO sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8) HISTORY scp is based on the rcp program in BSD source code from the Regents of the University of California. AUTHORS Timo Rinne Tatu Ylonen OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/ssh-add.0010064400017500001750000000140331362136673400130720ustar00djmdjmSSH-ADD(1) General Commands Manual SSH-ADD(1) NAME ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the OpenSSH authentication agent SYNOPSIS ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-S provider] [-t life] [file ...] ssh-add -s pkcs11 ssh-add -e pkcs11 ssh-add -T pubkey ... DESCRIPTION ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent, ssh-agent(1). When run without arguments, it adds the files ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk. After loading a private key, ssh-add will try to load corresponding certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the name of the private key file. Alternative file names can be given on the command line. If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. ssh-add retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given. The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to work. The options are as follows: -c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed by ssh-askpass(1). Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from ssh-askpass(1), rather than text entered into the requester. -D Deletes all identities from the agent. -d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent. If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and their corresponding certificates will be removed. Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent. If no public key is found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry. -E fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. -K Load resident keys from a FIDO authenticator. -k When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private keys only and skip certificates. -L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented by the agent. -l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent. -q Be quiet after a successful operation. -S provider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when adding FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the internal USB HID support. -s pkcs11 Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. -T pubkey ... Tests whether the private keys that correspond to the specified pubkey files are usable by performing sign and verify operations on each. -t life Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in sshd_config(5). -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-add to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging problems. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. -X Unlock the agent. -x Lock the agent with a password. ENVIRONMENT DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh-add does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by SSH_ASKPASS (by default M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-askpassM-bM-^@M-^]) and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling ssh-add from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.) SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the agent. SSH_SK_PROVIDER Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. FILES ~/.ssh/id_dsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user. Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others. EXIT STATUS Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent. SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-askpass(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. OpenBSD 6.6 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/ssh-agent.0010064400017500001750000000130031362136673400134340ustar00djmdjmSSH-AGENT(1) General Commands Manual SSH-AGENT(1) NAME ssh-agent M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH authentication agent SYNOPSIS ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-P provider_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]] ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k DESCRIPTION ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication. Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines using ssh(1). The options are as follows: -a bind_address Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address. The default is $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.. -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout. This is the default if SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell. -D Foreground mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will not fork. -d Debug mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will not fork and will write debug information to standard error. -E fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. -k Kill the current agent (given by the SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable). -P provider_whitelist Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 and FIDO authenticator shared libraries that may be used with the -S or -s options to ssh-add(1). Libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for a description of pattern-list syntax. The default whitelist is M-bM-^@M-^\/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*M-bM-^@M-^]. -s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout. This is the default if SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell. -t life Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in sshd_config(5). A lifetime specified for an identity with ssh-add(1) overrides this value. Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever. command [arg ...] If a command (and optional arguments) is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent. The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line terminates. There are two main ways to get an agent set up. The first is at the start of an X session, where all other windows or programs are started as children of the ssh-agent program. The agent starts a command under which its environment variables are exported, for example ssh-agent xterm &. When the command terminates, so does the agent. The second method is used for a login session. When ssh-agent is started, it prints the shell commands required to set its environment variables, which in turn can be evaluated in the calling shell, for example eval `ssh-agent -s`. In both cases, ssh(1) looks at these environment variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent. The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using ssh-add(1) or by ssh(1) when AddKeysToAgent is set in ssh_config(5). Multiple identities may be stored in ssh-agent concurrently and ssh(1) will automatically use them if present. ssh-add(1) is also used to remove keys from ssh-agent and to query the keys that are held in one. Connections to ssh-agent may be forwarded from further remote hosts using the -A option to ssh(1) (but see the caveats documented therein), avoiding the need for authentication data to be stored on other machines. Authentication passphrases and private keys never go over the network: the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote connections and the result is returned to the requester, allowing the user access to their identities anywhere in the network in a secure fashion. ENVIRONMENT SSH_AGENT_PID When ssh-agent starts, it stores the name of the agent's process ID (PID) in this variable. SSH_AUTH_SOCK When ssh-agent starts, it creates a UNIX-domain socket and stores its pathname in this variable. It is accessible only to the current user, but is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user. FILES $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent. UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. OpenBSD 6.6 December 21, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/ssh-keygen.0010064400017500001750000001154171362136673400136340ustar00djmdjmSSH-KEYGEN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYGEN(1) NAME ssh-keygen M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH authentication key utility SYNOPSIS ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] [-m format] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option] [-w provider] ssh-keygen -p [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-P old_passphrase] ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format] ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format] ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -c [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase] ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -D pkcs11 ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file] ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file] ssh-keygen -K [-w provider] ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file] ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider] [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ... ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -A [-f prefix_path] ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number] file ... ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ... ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file ... ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity -n namespace -s signature_file [-r revocation_file] DESCRIPTION ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for ssh(1). ssh-keygen can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2. The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option. If invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key. ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group exchange (DH-GEX). See the MODULI GENERATION section for details. Finally, ssh-keygen can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk or ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in /etc/rc. Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same name but M-bM-^@M-^\.pubM-bM-^@M-^] appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non- alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using the -p option. There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public key copied to other machines. ssh-keygen will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format. This format is preferred as it offers better protection for keys at rest as well as allowing storage of key comments within the private key file itself. The key comment may be useful to help identify the key. The comment is initialized to M-bM-^@M-^\user@hostM-bM-^@M-^] when the key is created, but can be changed using the -c option. It is still possible for ssh-keygen to write the previously-used PEM format private keys using the -m flag. This may be used when generating new keys, and existing new-format keys may be converted using this option in conjunction with the -p (change passphrase) flag. After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should be placed to be activated. The options are as follows: -A For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment. If -f has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the default path for the resulting host key files. This is used by /etc/rc to generate new host keys. -a rounds When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function) rounds used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). -B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file. -b bits Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits. Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys, the -b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will fail. ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length and the -b flag will be ignored. -C comment Provides a new comment. -c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files. The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment. -D pkcs11 Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. When used in combination with -s, this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the CERTIFICATES section for details). -E fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. -e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by the -m option. The default export format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including several commercial SSH implementations. -F hostname | [hostname]:port Search for the specified hostname (with optional port number) in a known_hosts file, listing any occurrences found. This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be used in conjunction with the -H option to print found keys in a hashed format. -f filename Specifies the filename of the key file. -g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the -r command. -H Hash a known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix. These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non- hashed names. -h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user certificate. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details. -I certificate_identity Specify the key identity when signing a public key. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details. -i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows importing keys from other software, including several commercial SSH implementations. The default import format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. -K Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator. Public and private key files will be written to the current directory for each downloaded key. -k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, ssh-keygen will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the -f flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line. Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or using the format described in the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section. -L Prints the contents of one or more certificates. -l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. For RSA and DSA keys ssh-keygen tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. If combined with -v, a visual ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint. -M generate Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) parameters for eventual use by the M-bM-^@M-^Xdiffie-hellman-group-exchange-*M-bM-^@M-^Y key exchange methods. The numbers generated by this operation must be further screened before use. See the MODULI GENERATION section for more information. -M screen Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange. This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they are safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group generators. The results of this operation may be added to the /etc/moduli file. See the MODULI GENERATION section for more information. -m key_format Specify a key format for key generation, the -i (import), -e (export) conversion options, and the -p change passphrase operation. The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH private key and PEM private key formats. The supported key formats are: M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^] (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), M-bM-^@M-^\PKCS8M-bM-^@M-^] (PKCS8 public or private key) or M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] (PEM public key). By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. Setting a format of M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] when generating or updating a supported private key type will cause the key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format. -N new_passphrase Provides the new passphrase. -n principals Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details. -O option Specify a key/value option. These are specific to the operation that ssh-keygen has been requested to perform. When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the CERTIFICATES section may be specified here. When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the options listed in the MODULI GENERATION section may be specified. When generating a key that will be hosted on a FIDO authenticator, this flag may be used to specify key-specific options. Those supported at present are: application Override the default FIDO application/origin string of M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^]. This may be useful when generating host or domain-specific resident keys. The specified application string must begin with M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^]. challenge=path Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be passed to the FIDO token during key generation. The challenge string may be used as part of an out-of-band protocol for key enrollment (a random challenge is used by default). device Explicitly specify a fido(4) device to use, rather than letting the token middleware select one. no-touch-required Indicate that the generated private key should not require touch events (user presence) when making signatures. Note that sshd(8) will refuse such signatures by default, unless overridden via an authorized_keys option. resident Indicate that the key should be stored on the FIDO authenticator itself. Resident keys may be supported on FIDO2 tokens and typically require that a PIN be set on the token prior to generation. Resident keys may be loaded off the token using ssh-add(1). user A username to be associated with a resident key, overriding the empty default username. Specifying a username may be useful when generating multiple resident keys for the same application name. write-attestation=path May be used at key generation time to record the attestation certificate returned from FIDO tokens during key generation. By default this information is discarded. The -O option may be specified multiple times. -P passphrase Provides the (old) passphrase. -p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the new passphrase. -Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL. -q Silence ssh-keygen. -R hostname | [hostname]:port Removes all keys belonging to the specified hostname (with optional port number) from a known_hosts file. This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the -H option above). -r hostname Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named hostname for the specified public key file. -s ca_key Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details. When generating a KRL, -s specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial number. See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. -t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-skM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519-skM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^]. This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when signing certificates using an RSA CA key. The available RSA signature variants are M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^] (SHA1 signatures, not recommended), M-bM-^@M-^\rsa-sha2-256M-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\rsa-sha2-512M-bM-^@M-^] (the default). -U When used in combination with -s, this option indicates that a CA key resides in a ssh-agent(1). See the CERTIFICATES section for more information. -u Update a KRL. When specified with -k, keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL being created. -V validity_interval Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval. The start time may be specified as the string M-bM-^@M-^\alwaysM-bM-^@M-^] to indicate the certificate has no specified start time, a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format, a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by an interval in the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time, a relative time starting with a plus character or the string M-bM-^@M-^\foreverM-bM-^@M-^] to indicate that the certificate has no expirty date. For example: M-bM-^@M-^\+52w1dM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now), M-bM-^@M-^\-4w:+4wM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now), M-bM-^@M-^\20100101123000:20110101123000M-bM-^@M-^] (valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), M-bM-^@M-^\-1d:20110101M-bM-^@M-^] (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011). M-bM-^@M-^\-1m:foreverM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from one minute ago and never expiring). -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli generation. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. -w provider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the internal USB HID support. -Y find-principals Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a signature, provided using the -s flag in an authorized signers file provided using the -f flag. The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the ALLOWED SIGNERS section below. If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned on standard output. -Y check-novalidate Checks that a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign has a valid structure. This does not validate if a signature comes from an authorized signer. When testing a signature, ssh-keygen accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using -n. A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the -s flag. Successful testing of the signature is signalled by ssh-keygen returning a zero exit status. -Y sign Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key. When signing, ssh-keygen accepts zero or more files to sign on the command-line - if no files are specified then ssh-keygen will sign data presented on standard input. Signatures are written to the path of the input file with M-bM-^@M-^\.sigM-bM-^@M-^] appended, or to standard output if the message to be signed was read from standard input. The key used for signing is specified using the -f option and may refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private half available via ssh-agent(1). An additional signature namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across different domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be provided via the -n flag. Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and may include: M-bM-^@M-^\fileM-bM-^@M-^] for file signing, M-bM-^@M-^\emailM-bM-^@M-^] for email signing. For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces. -Y verify Request to verify a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign as described above. When verifying a signature, ssh-keygen accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using -n. A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the -s flag, along with the identity of the signer using -I and a list of allowed signers via the -f flag. The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the ALLOWED SIGNERS section below. A file containing revoked keys can be passed using the -r flag. The revocation file may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. Successful verification by an authorized signer is signalled by ssh-keygen returning a zero exit status. -y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout. -z serial_number Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. If the serial_number is prefixed with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the serial number will be incremented for each certificate signed on a single command-line. The default serial number is zero. When generating a KRL, the -z flag is used to specify a KRL version number. MODULI GENERATION ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive process). Generation of primes is performed using the -M generate option. The desired length of the primes may be specified by the -O bits option. For example: # ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired length range. This may be overridden using the -O start option, which specifies a different start point (in hex). Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for suitability. This may be performed using the -M screen option. In this mode ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the -f option). For example: # ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048 By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests. This may be overridden using the -O prime-tests option. The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the -O generator option. Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5. Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/moduli. It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of a connection share common moduli. A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via the -O flag: lines=number Exit after screening the specified number of lines while performing DH candidate screening. start-line=line-number Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH candidate screening. checkpoint=filename Write the last line processed to the specified file while performing DH candidate screening. This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been processed if the job is restarted. memory=mbytes Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. start=hex-value Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. generator=value Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX. CERTIFICATES ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys. Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8). ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host. User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate: $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub The resultant certificate will be placed in /path/to/user_key-cert.pub. A host certificate requires the -h option: $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub. It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument to -s: $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a ssh-agent(1). This is indicated by the -U flag and, again, the CA key must be identified by its public half. $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate is used for authentication. Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals: $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific command. The options that are valid for user certificates are: clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may be added individually. critical:name[=contents] extension:name[=contents] Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension. The specified name should include a domain suffix, e.g. M-bM-^@M-^\name@example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. If contents is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no contents (usually indicating a flag). Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them, whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused. force-command=command Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or command specified by the user when the certificate is used for authentication. no-agent-forwarding Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default). no-port-forwarding Disable port forwarding (permitted by default). no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default). no-user-rc Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by default). no-x11-forwarding Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default). permit-agent-forwarding Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding. permit-port-forwarding Allows port forwarding. permit-pty Allows PTY allocation. permit-user-rc Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8). permit-X11-forwarding Allows X11 forwarding. no-touch-required Do not require signatures made using this key require demonstration of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the authenticator). This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk. source-address=address_list Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid. The address_list is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format. At present, no standard options are valid for host keys. Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The -V option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from UNIX Epoch to the distant future. For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1). Please refer to those manual pages for details. KEY REVOCATION LISTS ssh-keygen is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being revoked by serial number. KRLs may be generated using the -k flag. This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or not available). Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some directive-specific information. serial: serial_number[-serial_number] Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option. id: key_id Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option. key: public_key Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key. sha1: public_key Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL. sha256: public_key Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the KRL. KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9. hash: fingerprint Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a sshd(8) authentication log message or the ssh-keygen -l flag. Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9. KRLs may be updated using the -u flag in addition to -k. When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the KRL, adding to those already there. It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key (or keys). The -Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the command line. If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered) then ssh-keygen will exit with a non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked. ALLOWED SIGNERS When verifying signatures, ssh-keygen uses a simple list of identities and keys to determine whether a signature comes from an authorized source. This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in sshd(8). Each line of the file contains the following space-separated fields: principals, options, keytype, base64-encoded key. Empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are ignored as comments. The principals field is a pattern-list (See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5)) consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns that are accepted for signing. When verifying, the identity presented via the -I option must match a principals pattern in order for the corresponding key to be considered acceptable for verification. The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): cert-authority Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority (CA) and that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for verification. namespaces="namespace-list" Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this key. If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded in the signature object and presented on the verification command-line must match the specified list before the key will be considered acceptable. When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file and the principals embedded in the certificate itself. An example allowed signers file: # Comments allowed at start of line user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1... # A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain. *@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4... # A key that is accepted only for file signing. user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41... ENVIRONMENT SSH_SK_PROVIDER Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. FILES ~/.ssh/id_dsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt is made. ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for authentication. The contents of this file should be added to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format is described in moduli(5). SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), moduli(5), sshd(8) The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006. AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. OpenBSD 6.6 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/ssh-keyscan.0010064400017500001750000000100131362136673400137710ustar00djmdjmSSH-KEYSCAN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYSCAN(1) NAME ssh-keyscan M-bM-^@M-^S gather SSH public keys from servers SYNOPSIS ssh-keyscan [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type] [host | addrlist namelist] DESCRIPTION ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying ssh_known_hosts files, the format of which is documented in sshd(8). ssh-keyscan provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl scripts. ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of 1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those hosts are down or do not run sshd(8). For scanning, one does not need login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning process involve any encryption. The options are as follows: -4 Force ssh-keyscan to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Force ssh-keyscan to use IPv6 addresses only. -c Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys. -D Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records. The default is to print keys in a format usable as a ssh(1) known_hosts file. -f file Read hosts or M-bM-^@M-^\addrlist namelistM-bM-^@M-^] pairs from file, one per line. If M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y is supplied instead of a filename, ssh-keyscan will read from the standard input. Input is expected in the format: 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 -H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may be used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. -p port Connect to port on the remote host. -T timeout Set the timeout for connection attempts. If timeout seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the last time anything was read from that host, the connection is closed and the host in question considered unavailable. The default is 5 seconds. -t type Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. The possible values are M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^]. Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas. The default is to fetch M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^] keys. -v Verbose mode: print debugging messages about progress. If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk, ssh-keyscan can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created. FILES /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts EXAMPLES Print the RSA host key for machine hostname: $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname Find all hosts from the file ssh_hosts which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file ssh_known_hosts: $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \ sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts - SEE ALSO ssh(1), sshd(8) Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, 2006. AUTHORS David Mazieres wrote the initial version, and Wayne Davison added support for protocol version 2. OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/ssh.0010064400017500001750000001411501362136673400123450ustar00djmdjmSSH(1) General Commands Manual SSH(1) NAME ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH remote login client SYNOPSIS ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command] DESCRIPTION ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and UNIX-domain sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel. ssh connects and logs into the specified destination, which may be specified as either [user@]hostname or a URI of the form ssh://[user@]hostname[:port]. The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods (see below). If a command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. The options are as follows: -4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only. -A Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent such as ssh-agent(1). This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. A safer alternative may be to use a jump host (see -J). -a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. -B bind_interface Bind to the address of bind_interface before attempting to connect to the destination host. This is only useful on systems with more than one address. -b bind_address Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. -C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by gzip(1). Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the Compression option. -c cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in ssh_config(5) for more information. -D [bind_address:]port Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding. This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. -E log_file Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error. -e escape_char Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y). The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape character followed by a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y) closes the connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent. -F configfile Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config. -f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution. This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm. If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. -G Causes ssh to print its configuration after evaluating Host and Match blocks and exit. -g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified on the master process. -I pkcs11 Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication. -i identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have multiple -i options (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the CertificateFile directive, ssh will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to identity filenames. -J destination Connect to the target host by first making a ssh connection to the jump host described by destination and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive. Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line generally apply to the destination host and not any specified jump hosts. Use ~/.ssh/config to specify configuration for jump hosts. -K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. -k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport -L [bind_address:]port:remote_socket -L local_socket:host:hostport -L local_socket:remote_socket Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address, or to a Unix socket. Whenever a connection is made to the local port or socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to either host port hostport, or the Unix socket remote_socket, from the remote machine. Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. -l login_name Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. -M Places the ssh client into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode for connection sharing. Multiple -M options places ssh into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode but with confirmation required using ssh-askpass(1) before each operation that changes the multiplexing state (e.g. opening a new session). Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for details. -m mac_spec A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms, specified in order of preference. See the MACs keyword for more information. -N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just forwarding ports. -n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh program will be put in the background. (This does not work if ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f option.) -O ctl_cmd Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: M-bM-^@M-^\checkM-bM-^@M-^] (check that the master process is running), M-bM-^@M-^\forwardM-bM-^@M-^] (request forwardings without command execution), M-bM-^@M-^\cancelM-bM-^@M-^] (cancel forwardings), M-bM-^@M-^\exitM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to exit), and M-bM-^@M-^\stopM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests). -o option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_config(5). AddKeysToAgent AddressFamily BatchMode BindAddress CanonicalDomains CanonicalizeFallbackLocal CanonicalizeHostname CanonicalizeMaxDots CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs CASignatureAlgorithms CertificateFile ChallengeResponseAuthentication CheckHostIP Ciphers ClearAllForwardings Compression ConnectionAttempts ConnectTimeout ControlMaster ControlPath ControlPersist DynamicForward EscapeChar ExitOnForwardFailure FingerprintHash ForwardAgent ForwardX11 ForwardX11Timeout ForwardX11Trusted GatewayPorts GlobalKnownHostsFile GSSAPIAuthentication GSSAPIDelegateCredentials HashKnownHosts Host HostbasedAuthentication HostbasedKeyTypes HostKeyAlgorithms HostKeyAlias Hostname IdentitiesOnly IdentityAgent IdentityFile IPQoS KbdInteractiveAuthentication KbdInteractiveDevices KexAlgorithms LocalCommand LocalForward LogLevel MACs Match NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost NumberOfPasswordPrompts PasswordAuthentication PermitLocalCommand PKCS11Provider Port PreferredAuthentications ProxyCommand ProxyJump ProxyUseFdpass PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes PubkeyAuthentication RekeyLimit RemoteCommand RemoteForward RequestTTY SendEnv ServerAliveInterval ServerAliveCountMax SetEnv StreamLocalBindMask StreamLocalBindUnlink StrictHostKeyChecking TCPKeepAlive Tunnel TunnelDevice UpdateHostKeys User UserKnownHostsFile VerifyHostKeyDNS VisualHostKey XAuthLocation -p port Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. -Q query_option Queries ssh for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2. The available features are: cipher (supported symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption), help (supported query terms for use with the -Q flag), mac (supported message integrity codes), kex (key exchange algorithms), key (key types), key-cert (certificate key types), key-plain (non-certificate key types), key-sig (all key types and signature algorithms), protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions), and sig (supported signature algorithms). Alternatively, any keyword from ssh_config(5) or sshd_config(5) that takes an algorithm list may be used as an alias for the corresponding query_option. -q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport -R [bind_address:]port:local_socket -R remote_socket:host:hostport -R remote_socket:local_socket -R [bind_address:]port Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made from the local machine to either an explicit destination specified by host port hostport, or local_socket, or, if no explicit destination was specified, ssh will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward connections to the destinations requested by the remote SOCKS client. Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y, indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)). If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be printed to the standard output. -S ctl_path Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing, or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing. Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for details. -s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (e.g. sftp(1)). The subsystem is specified as the remote command. -T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. -t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty. -V Display the version number and exit. -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. -W host:port Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N, -T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings, though these can be overridden in the configuration file or using -o command line options. -w local_tun[:remote_tun] Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4) devices between the client (local_tun) and the server (remote_tun). The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. See also the Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5). If the Tunnel directive is unset, it will be set to the default tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^]. If a different Tunnel forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before -w. -X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for more information. -x Disables X11 forwarding. -Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. -y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By default this information is sent to stderr. ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2. The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, and password authentication. Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though PreferredAuthentications can be used to change the default order. Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login. Additionally, the server must be able to verify the client's host key (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts, below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.] Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. The HISTORY section of ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a different method. These may be viewed by increasing the LogLevel to DEBUG or higher (e.g. by using the -v flag). The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores the private key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's home directory. The user should then copy the public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine. The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this, the user can log in without giving the password. A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority can be used in place of many public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for more information. The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) and (optionally) the AddKeysToAgent directive in ssh_config(5) for more information. Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Examples of challenge-response authentication include BSD Authentication (see login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems). Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed. When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. If an interactive session is requested ssh by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one. The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour. If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape characters noted below. If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used. The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. ESCAPE CHARACTERS When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character. A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below. The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option. The supported escapes (assuming the default M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y) are: ~. Disconnect. ~^Z Background ssh. ~# List forwarded connections. ~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate. ~? Display a list of escape characters. ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful if the peer supports it). ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above). It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with -KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings. !command allows the user to execute a local command if the PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5). Basic help is available, using the -h option. ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful if the peer supports it). ~V Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written to stderr. ~v Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written to stderr. TCP FORWARDING Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail server; another is going through firewalls. In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC client, even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly support encrypted communication. This works as follows: the user connects to the remote host using ssh, specifying the ports to be used to forward the connection. After that it is possible to start the program locally, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote server. The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client to an IRC server at M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^], joining channel M-bM-^@M-^\#usersM-bM-^@M-^], nickname M-bM-^@M-^\pinkyM-bM-^@M-^], using the standard IRC port, 6667: $ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 $ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1 The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command M-bM-^@M-^\sleep 10M-bM-^@M-^] is specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the program which is going to use the tunnel. If no connections are made within the time specified, ssh will exit. X11 FORWARDING If the ForwardX11 variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY. Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration files. The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because ssh creates a M-bM-^@M-^\proxyM-bM-^@M-^] X server on the server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted channel. ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). If the ForwardAgent variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side. VERIFYING HOST KEYS When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined using ssh-keygen(1): $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match. Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all known hosts, the following command line can be used: $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented. In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, M-bM-^@M-^\host.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for host.example.com: $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries: $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com Finally the client connects: $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com [...] Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information. SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic). The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it. On the client: # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 On the server: # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user M-bM-^@M-^\janeM-bM-^@M-^] and on tun device 2 from user M-bM-^@M-^\johnM-bM-^@M-^], if PermitRootLogin is set to M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^]: tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and isakmpd(8). ENVIRONMENT ssh will normally set the following environment variables: DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to point to a value of the form M-bM-^@M-^\hostname:nM-bM-^@M-^], where M-bM-^@M-^\hostnameM-bM-^@M-^] indicates the host where the shell runs, and M-bM-^@M-^XnM-bM-^@M-^Y is an integer M-bM-^IM-% 1. ssh uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manually copy any required authorization cookies). HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory. LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with systems that use this variable. MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox. PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when compiling ssh. SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling ssh from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.) SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the agent. SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The variable contains four space- separated values: client IP address, client port number, server IP address, and server port number. SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if a forced command is executed. It can be used to extract the original arguments. SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated with the current shell or command. If the current session has no tty, this variable is not set. SSH_TUNNEL Optionally set by sshd(8) to contain the interface names assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested by the client. SSH_USER_AUTH Optionally set by sshd(8), this variable may contain a pathname to a file that lists the authentication methods successfully used when the session was established, including any public keys that were used. TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connections). USER Set to the name of the user logging in. Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format M-bM-^@M-^\VARNAME=valueM-bM-^@M-^] to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5). FILES ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8) reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. ~/.ssh/environment Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see ENVIRONMENT, above. ~/.ssh/id_dsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using AES-128. ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file. ~/.ssh/rc Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the sshd(8) manual page for more information. /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It should only be writable by root. /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are used for host-based authentication. /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file. /etc/ssh/sshrc Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the sshd(8) manual page for more information. EXIT STATUS ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred. SEE ALSO scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1), tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8) STANDARDS S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, RFC 4251, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, RFC 4252, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC 4254, January 2006. J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006. F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006. J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006. M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006. B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006. M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006. J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, November 2006. D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009. A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99). AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. OpenBSD 6.6 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/sshd.0010064400017500001750000001024271362136673400125150ustar00djmdjmSSHD(8) System Manager's Manual SSHD(8) NAME sshd M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH daemon SYNOPSIS sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_certificate_file] [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len] DESCRIPTION sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1). Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. sshd listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, and data exchange. sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file (by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values specified in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd. The options are as follows: -4 Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only. -C connection_spec Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test mode. If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are M-bM-^@M-^\addr,M-bM-^@M-^] M-bM-^@M-^\userM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\hostM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\laddrM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\lportM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\rdomainM-bM-^@M-^] and correspond to source address, user, resolved source host name, local address, local port number and routing domain respectively. -c host_certificate_file Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration directive. -D When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd. -d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard error, and does not put itself in the background. The server also will not fork and will only process one connection. This option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple -d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. -E log_file Append debug logs to log_file instead of the system log. -e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. -f config_file Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is /etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no configuration file. -g login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. -h host_key_file Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key. It is possible to have multiple host key files for the different host key algorithms. -i Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8). -o option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5). -p port Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports specified in the configuration file with the Port option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports. -q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. -T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit. Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more -C options. -t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating sshd reliably as configuration options may change. -u len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying -u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into the utmp file. -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include HostbasedAuthentication and using a from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in AllowUsers or DenyUsers. AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only. Each host has a host-specific key, used to identify the host. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public host key. The client compares the host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC). Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password authentication. Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups . The definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( M-bM-^@M-^X*LK*M-bM-^@M-^Y on Solaris and UnixWare, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y on HP-UX, containing M-bM-^@M-^XNologinM-bM-^@M-^Y on Tru64, a leading M-bM-^@M-^X*LOCKED*M-bM-^@M-^Y on FreeBSD and a leading M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y on most Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to something other than these values (eg M-bM-^@M-^XNPM-bM-^@M-^Y or M-bM-^@M-^X*NP*M-bM-^@M-^Y ). If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the secure channel. After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the client, and both sides exit. LOGIN PROCESS When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following: 1. If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section). 2. If the login is on a tty, records login time. 3. Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits (unless root). 4. Changes to run with normal user privileges. 5. Sets up basic environment. 6. Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment. See the PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5). 7. Changes to user's home directory. 8. If ~/.ssh/rc exists and the sshd_config(5) PermitUserRC option is set, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it; otherwise runs xauth. The M-bM-^@M-^\rcM-bM-^@M-^] files are given the X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See SSHRC, below. 9. Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the system password database. SSHRC If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard input (and DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call xauth(1) because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies. The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to: if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie fi | xauth -q - fi If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public key authentication; if this option is not specified, the default is ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2. Each line of the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are ignored as comments). Public keys consist of the following space- separated fields: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is optional. The supported key types are: sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com ssh-ed25519 ssh-dss ssh-rsa The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key). Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the id_dsa.pub, id_ecdsa.pub, id_ecdsa_sk.pub, id_ed25519.pub, id_ed25519_sk.pub, or the id_rsa.pub file and edit it. sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits. The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): agent-forwarding Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the restrict option. cert-authority Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the restrict key option. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive. If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the two commands are identical. environment="NAME=value" Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option. expiry-time="timespec" Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted. The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time in the system time-zone. from="pattern-list" Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). no-agent-forwarding Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. no-port-forwarding Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option. no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). no-user-rc Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc. no-X11-forwarding Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. permitlisten="[host:]port" Limit remote port forwarding with the ssh(1) -R option such that it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple permitlisten options may be applied separated by commas. Hostnames may include wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in ssh_config(5). A port specification of * matches any port. Note that the setting of GatewayPorts may further restrict listen addresses. Note that ssh(1) will send a hostname of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] if a listen host was not specified when the forwarding was requested, and that this name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\::1M-bM-^@M-^]. permitopen="host:port" Limit local port forwarding with the ssh(1) -L option such that it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or addresses. A port specification of * matches any port. port-forwarding Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the restrict option. principals="principals" On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate signers using the cert-authority option. pty Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the restrict option. no-touch-required Do not require demonstration of user presence for signatures made using this key. This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk. restrict Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding, as well as disabling PTY allocation and execution of ~/.ssh/rc. If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files they will be included in this set. tunnel="n" Force a tun(4) device on the server. Without this option, the next available device will be used if the client requests a tunnel. user-rc Enables execution of ~/.ssh/rc previously disabled by the restrict option. X11-forwarding Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the restrict option. An example authorized_keys file: # Comments allowed at start of line ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa AAAAC3...51R== example.net permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa AAAAB5...21S== permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitopen="localhost:22000" ssh-rsa AAAAB5...21S== tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== jane@example.net restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv== user@example.net restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5== user@example.net no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInN...Ko== user@example.net SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, its key is added to the per-user file. Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional), hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The fields are separated by spaces. The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, or M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker should be used on a key line. Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. When sshd is authenticating a client, such as when using HostbasedAuthentication, this will be the canonical client host name. When ssh(1) is authenticating a server, this will be the host name given by the user, the value of the ssh(1) HostkeyAlias if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the ssh(1) CanonicalizeHostname option was used. A pattern may also be preceded by M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within M-bM-^@M-^X[M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X]M-bM-^@M-^Y brackets then followed by M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y and a non-standard port number. Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed hostnames start with a M-bM-^@M-^X|M-bM-^@M-^Y character. Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard operators may be applied. The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub. The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are ignored as comments. When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^] marker described above. The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, for example when it is known that the associated private key has been stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^] marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from ssh(1) when they are encountered. It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file. Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking, for example, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host names to their hashed representations. An example ssh_known_hosts file: # Comments allowed at start of line closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A hashed hostname |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A revoked key @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... FILES ~/.hushlogin This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and /etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by Banner. ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for more information). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described above. The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. ~/.ssh/environment This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y), and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option. ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not be, world-readable. ~/.ssh/rc Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)). It should only be writable by root. /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange" key exchange method. The file format is described in moduli(5). If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will be used. /etc/motd See motd(5). /etc/nologin If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be world-readable. /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Note that sshd does not start if these files are group/world-accessible. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their contents should match the respective private parts. These files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. These files are created using ssh-keygen(1). /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and should be world-readable. /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for sshd. The file format and configuration options are described in sshd_config(5). /etc/ssh/sshrc Similar to ~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. /var/empty chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root and not group or world- writable. /var/run/sshd.pid Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world- readable. SEE ALSO scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), login.conf(5), moduli(5), sshd_config(5), inetd(8), sftp-server(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. OpenBSD 6.6 January 25, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/sftp-server.0010064400017500001750000000103561362136673400140330ustar00djmdjmSFTP-SERVER(8) System Manager's Manual SFTP-SERVER(8) NAME sftp-server M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SFTP server subsystem SYNOPSIS sftp-server [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level] [-P blacklisted_requests] [-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask] sftp-server -Q protocol_feature DESCRIPTION sftp-server is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to stdout and expects client requests from stdin. sftp-server is not intended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem option. Command-line flags to sftp-server should be specified in the Subsystem declaration. See sshd_config(5) for more information. Valid options are: -d start_directory specifies an alternate starting directory for users. The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %d is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. The default is to use the user's home directory. This option is useful in conjunction with the sshd_config(5) ChrootDirectory option. -e Causes sftp-server to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging. -f log_facility Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from sftp-server. The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. -h Displays sftp-server usage information. -l log_level Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server. The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. The default is ERROR. -P blacklisted_requests Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by the server. sftp-server will reply to any blacklisted request with a failure. The -Q flag can be used to determine the supported request types. If both a blacklist and a whitelist are specified, then the blacklist is applied before the whitelist. -p whitelisted_requests Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted by the server. All request types that are not on the whitelist will be logged and replied to with a failure message. Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted. -Q protocol_feature Query protocol features supported by sftp-server. At present the only feature that may be queried is M-bM-^@M-^\requestsM-bM-^@M-^], which may be used for black or whitelisting (flags -P and -p respectively). -R Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode. Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied. -u umask Sets an explicit umask(2) to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the user's default mask. On some systems, sftp-server must be able to access /dev/log for logging to work, and use of sftp-server in a chroot configuration therefore requires that syslogd(8) establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory. SEE ALSO sftp(1), ssh(1), sshd_config(5), sshd(8) T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh- filexfer-02.txt, October 2001, work in progress material. HISTORY sftp-server first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8. AUTHORS Markus Friedl OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/sftp.0010064400017500001750000000404011362136673400125210ustar00djmdjmSFTP(1) General Commands Manual SFTP(1) NAME sftp M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH secure file transfer SYNOPSIS sftp [-46aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server] destination DESCRIPTION sftp is a file transfer program, similar to ftp(1), which performs all operations over an encrypted ssh(1) transport. It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and compression. The destination may be specified either as [user@]host[:path] or as a URI in the form sftp://[user@]host[:port][/path]. If the destination includes a path and it is not a directory, sftp will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after successful interactive authentication. If no path is specified, or if the path is a directory, sftp will log in to the specified host and enter interactive command mode, changing to the remote directory if one was specified. An optional trailing slash can be used to force the path to be interpreted as a directory. Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host names from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity. The options are as follows: -4 Forces sftp to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces sftp to use IPv6 addresses only. -a Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting existing partial or complete copies of files. If the partial contents differ from those being transferred, then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. -B buffer_size Specify the size of the buffer that sftp uses when transferring files. Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes. -b batchfile Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile instead of stdin. Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details). A batchfile of M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y may be used to indicate standard input. sftp will abort if any of the following commands fail: get, put, reget, reput, rename, ln, rm, mkdir, chdir, ls, lchdir, chmod, chown, chgrp, lpwd, df, symlink, and lmkdir. Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character (for example, -rm /tmp/blah*). Echo of the command may be suppressed by prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X@M-bM-^@M-^Y character. These two prefixes may be combined in any order, for example -@ls /bsd. -C Enables compression (via ssh's -C flag). -c cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -D sftp_server_path Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via ssh(1)). This option may be useful in debugging the client and server. -F ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh(1). This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -f Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer. When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. -i identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -J destination Connect to the target host by first making an sftp connection to the jump host described by destination and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -l limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. -o ssh_option Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate sftp command-line flag. For example, to specify an alternate port use: sftp -oPort=24. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_config(5). AddressFamily BatchMode BindAddress BindInterface CanonicalDomains CanonicalizeFallbackLocal CanonicalizeHostname CanonicalizeMaxDots CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs CASignatureAlgorithms CertificateFile ChallengeResponseAuthentication CheckHostIP Ciphers Compression ConnectionAttempts ConnectTimeout ControlMaster ControlPath ControlPersist GlobalKnownHostsFile GSSAPIAuthentication GSSAPIDelegateCredentials HashKnownHosts Host HostbasedAuthentication HostbasedKeyTypes HostKeyAlgorithms HostKeyAlias Hostname IdentitiesOnly IdentityAgent IdentityFile IPQoS KbdInteractiveAuthentication KbdInteractiveDevices KexAlgorithms LogLevel MACs NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost NumberOfPasswordPrompts PasswordAuthentication PKCS11Provider Port PreferredAuthentications ProxyCommand ProxyJump PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes PubkeyAuthentication RekeyLimit SendEnv ServerAliveInterval ServerAliveCountMax SetEnv StrictHostKeyChecking TCPKeepAlive UpdateHostKeys User UserKnownHostsFile VerifyHostKeyDNS -P port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original files transferred. -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from ssh(1). -R num_requests Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time. Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests. -r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. -S program Name of the program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand ssh(1) options. -s subsystem | sftp_server Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on the remote host. A path is useful when the remote sshd(8) does not have an sftp subsystem configured. -v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh. INTERACTIVE COMMANDS Once in interactive mode, sftp understands a set of commands similar to those of ftp(1). Commands are case insensitive. Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes. Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by glob(3) must be escaped with backslashes (M-bM-^@M-^X\M-bM-^@M-^Y). bye Quit sftp. cd [path] Change remote directory to path. If path is not specified, then change directory to the one the session started in. chgrp [-h] grp path Change group of file path to grp. If the -h flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed. path may contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files. grp must be a numeric GID. chmod [-h] mode path Change permissions of file path to mode. If the -h flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed. path may contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files. chown [-h] own path Change owner of file path to own. If the -h flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed. path may contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files. own must be a numeric UID. df [-hi] [path] Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory (or path if specified). If the -h flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable" suffixes. The -i flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information. This command is only supported on servers that implement the M-bM-^@M-^\statvfs@openssh.comM-bM-^@M-^] extension. exit Quit sftp. get [-afpR] remote-path [local-path] Retrieve the remote-path and store it on the local machine. If the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the remote machine. remote-path may contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files. If it does and local-path is specified, then local-path must specify a directory. If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy. If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. If the -f flag is specified, then fsync(2) will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk. If the -p flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are copied too. If the -R flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. help Display help text. lcd [path] Change local directory to path. If path is not specified, then change directory to the local user's home directory. lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing of either path or current directory if path is not specified. ls-options may contain any flags supported by the local system's ls(1) command. path may contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files. lmkdir path Create local directory specified by path. ln [-s] oldpath newpath Create a link from oldpath to newpath. If the -s flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a hard link. lpwd Print local working directory. ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display a remote directory listing of either path or the current directory if path is not specified. path may contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files. The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of ls accordingly: -1 Produce single columnar output. -a List files beginning with a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y). -f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is lexicographical. -h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024, M=1048576, etc.). -l Display additional details including permissions and ownership information. -n Produce a long listing with user and group information presented numerically. -r Reverse the sort order of the listing. -S Sort the listing by file size. -t Sort the listing by last modification time. lumask umask Set local umask to umask. mkdir path Create remote directory specified by path. progress Toggle display of progress meter. put [-afpR] local-path [remote-path] Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the local machine. local-path may contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files. If it does and remote-path is specified, then remote-path must specify a directory. If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the remote file matches the local copy. If the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. If the -f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call fsync(2) after the file has been transferred. Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. If the -p flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are copied too. If the -R flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. pwd Display remote working directory. quit Quit sftp. reget [-fpR] remote-path [local-path] Resume download of remote-path. Equivalent to get with the -a flag set. reput [-fpR] local-path [remote-path] Resume upload of local-path. Equivalent to put with the -a flag set. rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file from oldpath to newpath. rm path Delete remote file specified by path. rmdir path Remove remote directory specified by path. symlink oldpath newpath Create a symbolic link from oldpath to newpath. version Display the sftp protocol version. !command Execute command in local shell. ! Escape to local shell. ? Synonym for help. SEE ALSO ftp(1), ls(1), scp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), glob(7), sftp-server(8), sshd(8) T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh- filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material. OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/ssh-keysign.0010064400017500001750000000034741362136673400140220ustar00djmdjmSSH-KEYSIGN(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-KEYSIGN(8) NAME ssh-keysign M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH helper for host-based authentication SYNOPSIS ssh-keysign DESCRIPTION ssh-keysign is used by ssh(1) to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature required during host-based authentication. ssh-keysign is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the global client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config by setting EnableSSHKeysign to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. ssh-keysign is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh(1). See ssh(1) and sshd(8) for more information about host-based authentication. FILES /etc/ssh/ssh_config Controls whether ssh-keysign is enabled. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to generate the digital signature. They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Since they are readable only by root, ssh-keysign must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate information corresponding with the private keys above. SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8) HISTORY ssh-keysign first appeared in OpenBSD 3.2. AUTHORS Markus Friedl OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0010064400017500001750000000020571362136673400147240ustar00djmdjmSSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) NAME ssh-pkcs11-helper M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH helper for PKCS#11 support SYNOPSIS ssh-pkcs11-helper [-v] DESCRIPTION ssh-pkcs11-helper is used by ssh-agent(1) to access keys provided by a PKCS#11 token. ssh-pkcs11-helper is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh-agent(1). A single option is supported: -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-pkcs11-helper to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging problems. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. Note that ssh-agent(1) will automatically pass the -v flag to ssh-pkcs11-helper when it has itself been placed in debug mode. SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1) HISTORY ssh-pkcs11-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 4.7. AUTHORS Markus Friedl OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/ssh-sk-helper.0010064400017500001750000000020221362136673400142270ustar00djmdjmSSH-SK-HELPER(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-SK-HELPER(8) NAME ssh-sk-helper M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH helper for FIDO authenticator support SYNOPSIS ssh-sk-helper [-v] DESCRIPTION ssh-sk-helper is used by ssh-agent(1) to access keys provided by a FIDO authenticator. ssh-sk-helper is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh-agent(1). A single option is supported: -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-sk-helper to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging problems. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. Note that ssh-agent(1) will automatically pass the -v flag to ssh-sk-helper when it has itself been placed in debug mode. SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1) HISTORY ssh-sk-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 6.7. AUTHORS Damien Miller OpenBSD 6.6 December 21, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.0010064400017500001750000001661461362136673500140530ustar00djmdjmSSHD_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSHD_CONFIG(5) NAME sshd_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH daemon configuration file DESCRIPTION sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword- argument pairs, one per line. For each keyword, the first obtained value will be used. Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to represent arguments containing spaces. The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): AcceptEnv Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into the session's environ(7). See SendEnv and SetEnv in ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. The TERM environment variable is always accepted whenever the client requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept any environment variables. AddressFamily Specifies which address family should be used by sshd(8). Valid arguments are any (the default), inet (use IPv4 only), or inet6 (use IPv6 only). AllowAgentForwarding Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted. The default is yes. Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. AllowGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order: DenyGroups, AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. AllowStreamLocalForwarding Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted. The available options are yes (the default) or all to allow StreamLocal forwarding, no to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding, local to allow local (from the perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. AllowTcpForwarding Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available options are yes (the default) or all to allow TCP forwarding, no to prevent all TCP forwarding, local to allow local (from the perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. AllowUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format. The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. AuthenticationMethods Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be followed by one or more lists of comma-separated authentication method names, or by the single string any to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication method. If the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least one of these lists. For example, "publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive" would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by either password or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this example it would not be possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive authentication before public key. For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon followed by the device identifier bsdauth or pam. depending on the server configuration. For example, "keyboard-interactive:bsdauth" would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the bsdauth device. If the publickey method is listed more than once, sshd(8) verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for subsequent authentications. For example, "publickey,publickey" requires successful authentication using two different public keys. Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. The available authentication methods are: "gssapi-with-mic", "hostbased", "keyboard-interactive", "none" (used for access to password-less accounts when PermitEmptyPasswords is enabled), "password" and "publickey". AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used. The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)). If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual AuthorizedKeysFile files. By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. AuthorizedKeysCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not, then sshd(8) will refuse to start. AuthorizedKeysFile Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of sshd(8). Arguments to AuthorizedKeysFile accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. After expansion, AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. Alternately this option may be set to none to skip checking for user keys in files. The default is ".ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2". AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed certificate principals as per AuthorizedPrincipalsFile. The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used. The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized principals commands. If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified but AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then sshd(8) will refuse to start. AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a key listed in TrustedUserCAKeys, this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in sshd(8)). Empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are ignored. Arguments to AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. After expansion, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. The default is none, i.e. not to use a principals file M-bM-^@M-^S in this case, the username of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. Note that AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in TrustedUserCAKeys and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, though the principals= key option offers a similar facility (see sshd(8) for details). Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before authentication is allowed. If the argument is none then no banner is displayed. By default, no banner is displayed. CASignatureAlgorithms Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for public key or host-based authentication. ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via PAM or through authentication styles supported in login.conf(5)) The default is yes. ChrootDirectory Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after authentication. At session startup sshd(8) checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot, sshd(8) changes the working directory to the user's home directory. Arguments to ChrootDirectory accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and directories to support the user's session. For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4), stderr(4), and tty(4) devices. For file transfer sessions using SFTP no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process sftp-server is used, though sessions which use logging may require /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for details). For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect. The default is none, indicating not to chroot(2). Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma- separated. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set. The supported ciphers are: 3des-cbc aes128-cbc aes192-cbc aes256-cbc aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com The default is: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using "ssh -Q cipher". ClientAliveCountMax Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent without sshd(8) receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive. The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive. The default value is 3. If ClientAliveInterval is set to 15, and ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. Setting a zero ClientAliveCountMax disables connection termination. ClientAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, sshd(8) will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. Compression Specifies whether compression is enabled after the user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be yes, delayed (a legacy synonym for yes) or no. The default is yes. DenyGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order: DenyGroups, AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. DenyUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format. The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. DisableForwarding Disables all forwarding features, including X11, ssh-agent(1), TCP and StreamLocal. This option overrides all other forwarding- related options and may simplify restricted configurations. ExposeAuthInfo Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user. The location of the file is exposed to the user session through the SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable. The default is no. FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: md5 and sha256. The default is sha256. ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand, ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. It is most useful inside a Match block. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command of internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process SFTP server that requires no support files when used with ChrootDirectory. The default is none. GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports forwarded for the client. By default, sshd(8) binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to connect. The argument may be no to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only, yes to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or clientspecified to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is no. GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is no. GSSAPICleanupCredentials Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is yes. GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to yes then the client must authenticate against the host service on the current hostname. If set to no then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. The default is yes. HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes". HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful public key client host authentication is allowed (host-based authentication). The default is no. HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts, ~/.rhosts, and /etc/hosts.equiv files during HostbasedAuthentication. A setting of yes means that sshd(8) uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is no. HostCertificate Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified by HostKey. The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to load any certificates. HostKey Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The defaults are /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key. Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file if it is group/world- accessible and that the HostKeyAlgorithms option restricts which of the keys are actually used by sshd(8). It is possible to have multiple host key files. It is also possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case operations on the private key will be delegated to an ssh-agent(1). HostKeyAgent Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an agent that has access to the private host keys. If the string "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the host key algorithms that the server offers. The default for this option is: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms". IgnoreRhosts Specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used in HostbasedAuthentication. /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The default is yes. IgnoreUserKnownHosts Specifies whether sshd(8) should ignore the user's ~/.ssh/known_hosts during HostbasedAuthentication and use only the system-wide known hosts file /etc/ssh/known_hosts. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Include Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(7) wildcards. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in /etc/ssh. An Include directive may appear inside a Match block to perform conditional inclusion. IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22, af23, af31, af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3, cs4, cs5, cs6, cs7, ef, le, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a numeric value, or none to use the operating system default. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is af21 (Low-Latency Data) for interactive sessions and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non- interactive sessions. KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be yes or no. The default is to use whatever value ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to (by default yes). KerberosAuthentication Specifies whether the password provided by the user for PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default is no. KerberosGetAFSToken If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. The default is no. KerberosOrLocalPasswd If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism such as /etc/passwd. The default is yes. KerberosTicketCleanup Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache file on logout. The default is yes. KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the default set. The supported algorithms are: curve25519-sha256 curve25519-sha256@libssh.org diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdh-sha2-nistp521 sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org The default is: curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using "ssh -Q KexAlgorithms". ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The following forms may be used: ListenAddress hostname|address [rdomain domain] ListenAddress hostname:port [rdomain domain] ListenAddress IPv4_address:port [rdomain domain] ListenAddress [hostname|address]:port [rdomain domain] The optional rdomain qualifier requests sshd(8) listen in an explicit routing domain. If port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local addresses on the current default routing domain. Multiple ListenAddress options are permitted. For more information on routing domains, see rdomain(4). LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. The default is 120 seconds. LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from sshd(8). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The supported MACs are: hmac-md5 hmac-md5-96 hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com umac-64-etm@openssh.com umac-128-etm@openssh.com The default is: umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using "ssh -Q mac". Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those set in the global section of the config file, until either another Match line or the end of the file. If a keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is applied. The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token All which matches all criteria. The available criteria are User, Group, Host, LocalAddress, LocalPort, RDomain, and Address (with RDomain representing the rdomain(4) on which the connection was received). The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma- separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5). The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, such as 192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32. Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example, 192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively. Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv, AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowStreamLocalForwarding, AllowTcpForwarding, AllowUsers, AuthenticationMethods, AuthorizedKeysCommand, AuthorizedKeysCommandUser, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner, ChrootDirectory, ClientAliveCountMax, ClientAliveInterval, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand, GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, Include, IPQoS, KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication, LogLevel, MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitListen, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, PermitTTY, PermitTunnel, PermitUserRC, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, PubkeyAuthentication, RekeyLimit, RevokedKeys, RDomain, SetEnv, StreamLocalBindMask, StreamLocalBindUnlink, TrustedUserCAKeys, X11DisplayOffset, X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalhost. MaxAuthTries Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6. MaxSessions Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp) sessions permitted per network connection. Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection multiplexing. Setting MaxSessions to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting forwarding. The default is 10. MaxStartups Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100. Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the three colon separated values start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60"). sshd(8) will refuse connection attempts with a probability of rate/100 (30%) if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches full (60). PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The default is yes. PermitEmptyPasswords When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default is no. PermitListen Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port forwarding may listen. The listen specification must be one of the following forms: PermitListen port PermitListen host:port Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any listen requests. An argument of none can be used to prohibit all listen requests. The host name may contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in ssh_config(5). The wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can also be used in place of a port number to allow all ports. By default all port forwarding listen requests are permitted. Note that the GatewayPorts option may further restrict which addresses may be listened on. Note also that ssh(1) will request a listen host of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] if no listen host was specifically requested, and this name is treated differently to explicit localhost addresses of M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\::1M-bM-^@M-^]. PermitOpen Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: PermitOpen host:port PermitOpen IPv4_addr:port PermitOpen [IPv6_addr]:port Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively. Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied names. By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument must be yes, prohibit-password, forced-commands-only, or no. The default is prohibit-password. If this option is set to prohibit-password (or its deprecated alias, without-password), password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root. If this option is set to forced-commands-only, root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled for root. If this option is set to no, root is not allowed to log in. PermitTTY Specifies whether pty(4) allocation is permitted. The default is yes. PermitTunnel Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed. The argument must be yes, point-to-point (layer 3), ethernet (layer 2), or no. Specifying yes permits both point-to-point and ethernet. The default is no. Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected tun(4) device must allow access to the user. PermitUserEnvironment Specifies whether ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by sshd(8). Valid options are yes, no or a pattern-list specifying which environment variable names to accept (for example "LANG,LC_*"). The default is no. Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as LD_PRELOAD. PermitUserRC Specifies whether any ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is yes. PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH daemon, or none to not write one. The default is /var/run/sshd.pid. Port Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on. The default is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also ListenAddress. PrintLastLog Specifies whether sshd(8) should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default is yes. PrintMotd Specifies whether sshd(8) should print /etc/motd when a user logs in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the shell, /etc/profile, or equivalent.) The default is yes. PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes". PubkeyAuthOptions Sets one or more public key authentication options. Two option keywords are currently supported: none (the default; indicating no additional options are enabled) and touch-required. The touch-required option causes public key authentication using a FIDO authenticator algorithm (i.e. ecdsa-sk or ed25519-sk) to always require the signature to attest that a physically present user explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching the authenticator). By default, sshd(8) requires user presence unless overridden with an authorized_keys option. The touch-required flag disables this override. This option has no effect for other, non-authenticator public key types. PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is yes. RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section. The default value for RekeyLimit is default none, which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. RevokedKeys Specifies revoked public keys file, or none to not use one. Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). RDomain Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after authentication has completed. The user session, as well and any forwarded or listening IP sockets, will be bound to this rdomain(4). If the routing domain is set to %D, then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied. SecurityKeyProvider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. SetEnv Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started by sshd(8) as M-bM-^@M-^\NAME=VALUEM-bM-^@M-^]. The environment value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace characters). Environment variables set by SetEnv override the default environment and any variables specified by the user via AcceptEnv or PermitUserEnvironment. StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix- domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. The argument must be yes or no. The default is no. StrictModes Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is yes. Note that this does not apply to ChrootDirectory, whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. Subsystem Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments) to execute upon subsystem request. The command sftp-server implements the SFTP file transfer subsystem. Alternately the name internal-sftp implements an in-process SFTP server. This may simplify configurations using ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients. By default no subsystems are defined. SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving "ghost" users and consuming server resources. The default is yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice if the network goes down or the client host crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to no. TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or none to not use one. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are allowed. If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted for authentication using TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1). UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name, and to check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the very same IP address. If this option is set to no (the default) then only addresses and not host names may be used in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys from and sshd_config Match Host directives. UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to yes this will enable PAM authentication using ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types. Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication. If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a non-root user. The default is no. VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default is none. X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11 forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must be yes or no. The default is no. When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the server and to client displays if the sshd(8) proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see X11UseLocalhost), though this is not the default. Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see the warnings for ForwardX11 in ssh_config(5)). A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a no setting. Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. X11UseLocalhost Specifies whether sshd(8) should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the hostname part of the DISPLAY environment variable to localhost. This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function with this configuration. X11UseLocalhost may be set to no to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard address. The argument must be yes or no. The default is yes. XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program, or none to not use one. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. TIME FORMATS sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is one of the following: M-bM-^_M-(noneM-bM-^_M-) seconds s | S seconds m | M minutes h | H hours d | D days w | W weeks Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time value. Time format examples: 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) 10m 10 minutes 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) TOKENS Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at runtime: %% A literal M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y. %D The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received. %F The fingerprint of the CA key. %f The fingerprint of the key or certificate. %h The home directory of the user. %i The key ID in the certificate. %K The base64-encoded CA key. %k The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication. %s The serial number of the certificate. %T The type of the CA key. %t The key or certificate type. %U The numeric user ID of the target user. %u The username. AuthorizedKeysCommand accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u. AuthorizedKeysFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u. AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. ChrootDirectory accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. RoutingDomain accepts the token %D. FILES /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for sshd(8). This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not necessary) that it be world-readable. SEE ALSO sftp-server(8), sshd(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. OpenBSD 6.6 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.0010064400017500001750000001722051362136673500137000ustar00djmdjmSSH_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSH_CONFIG(5) NAME ssh_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH client configuration file DESCRIPTION ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: 1. command-line options 2. user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config) 3. system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections separated by Host specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for exceptions). Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host- specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end. The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to represent arguments containing spaces. Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one M-bM-^@M-^X=M-bM-^@M-^Y; the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option. The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is usually the hostname argument given on the command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname keyword for exceptions). A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). If a negated entry is matched, then the Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard matches. See PATTERNS for more information on patterns. Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria or the single token all which always matches. The available criteria keywords are: canonical, final, exec, host, originalhost, user, and localuser. The all criteria must appear alone or immediately after canonical or final. Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but all, canonical, and final require an argument. Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). The canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the CanonicalizeHostname option). This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host names only. The final keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed (regardless of whether CanonicalizeHostname is enabled), and matches only during this final pass. If CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, then canonical and final match during the same pass. The exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted. Arguments to exec accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma- separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the PATTERNS section. The criteria for the host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the Hostname or CanonicalizeHostname options. The originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line. The user keyword matches against the target username on the remote host. The localuser keyword matches against the name of the local user running ssh(1) (this keyword may be useful in system-wide ssh_config files). AddKeysToAgent Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running ssh-agent(1). If this option is set to yes and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to the agent with the default lifetime, as if by ssh-add(1). If this option is set to ask, ssh(1) will require confirmation using the SSH_ASKPASS program before adding a key (see ssh-add(1) for details). If this option is set to confirm, each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the -c option was specified to ssh-add(1). If this option is set to no, no keys are added to the agent. The argument must be yes, confirm, ask, or no (the default). AddressFamily Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid arguments are any (the default), inet (use IPv4 only), or inet6 (use IPv6 only). BatchMode If set to yes, user interaction such as password prompts and host key confirmation requests will be disabled. This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present to interact with ssh(1). The argument must be yes or no (the default). BindAddress Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. BindInterface Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine as the source address of the connection. CanonicalDomains When CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified destination host. CanonicalizeFallbackLocal Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails. The default, yes, will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search rules. A value of no will cause ssh(1) to fail instantly if CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains specified by CanonicalDomains. CanonicalizeHostname Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. The default, no, is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to yes then, for connections that do not use a ProxyCommand or ProxyJump, ssh(1) will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line using the CanonicalDomains suffixes and CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If CanonicalizeHostname is set to always, then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too. If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching Host and Match stanzas. CanonicalizeMaxDots Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before canonicalization is disabled. The default, 1, allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more arguments of source_domain_list:target_domain_list, where source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization, and target_domain_list is a pattern- list of domains that they may resolve to. For example, "*.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com" will allow hostnames matching "*.a.example.com" to be canonicalized to names in the "*.b.example.com" or "*.c.example.com" domains. CASignatureAlgorithms Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa ssh(1) will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those specified. CertificateFile Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read. A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order to use this certificate either from an IdentityFile directive or -i flag to ssh(1), via ssh-agent(1), or via a PKCS11Provider or SecurityKeyProvider. Arguments to CertificateFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS section. It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence. Multiple CertificateFile directives will add to the list of certificates used for authentication. ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no. CheckHostIP If set to yes (the default), ssh(1) will additionally check the host IP address in the known_hosts file. This allows it to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add addresses of destination hosts to ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the process, regardless of the setting of StrictHostKeyChecking. If the option is set to no, the check will not be executed. Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set. The supported ciphers are: 3des-cbc aes128-cbc aes192-cbc aes256-cbc aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com The default is: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using "ssh -Q cipher". ClearAllForwardings Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings specified in the configuration files or on the command line be cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and sftp(1). The argument must be yes or no (the default). Compression Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be yes or no (the default). ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1. ConnectTimeout Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and to performing the initial SSH protocol handshake and key exchange. ControlMaster Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. When set to yes, ssh(1) will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the ControlPath argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same ControlPath with ControlMaster set to no (the default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. Setting this to ask will cause ssh(1) to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using ssh-askpass(1). If the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh(1) will continue without connecting to a master instance. X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents. Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already exist. These options are: auto and autoask. The latter requires confirmation like the ask option. ControlPath Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the string none to disable connection sharing. Arguments to ControlPath may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS section. It is recommended that any ControlPath used for opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not writable by other users. This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified. ControlPersist When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the master connection should remain open in the background (waiting for future client connections) after the initial client connection has been closed. If set to no (the default), then the master connection will not be placed into the background, and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to yes or 0, then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the "ssh -O exit"). If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in sshd_config(5), then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the specified time. DynamicForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. The argument must be [bind_address:]port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. EnableSSHKeysign Setting this option to yes in the global client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program ssh-keysign(8) during HostbasedAuthentication. The argument must be yes or no (the default). This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. See ssh-keysign(8) for more information. EscapeChar Sets the escape character (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y). The escape character can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character, M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y followed by a letter, or none to disable the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary data). ExitOnForwardFailure Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g. if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port). Note that ExitOnForwardFailure does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not, for example, cause ssh(1) to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail. The argument must be yes or no (the default). FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: md5 and sha256 (the default). ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument may be yes, no (the default), an explicit path to an agent socket or the name of an environment variable (beginning with M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y) in which to find the path. Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. ForwardX11 Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set. The argument must be yes or no (the default). X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled. ForwardX11Timeout Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). X11 connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused. Setting ForwardX11Timeout to zero will disable the timeout and permit X11 forwarding for the life of the connection. The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has elapsed. ForwardX11Trusted If this option is set to yes, remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. If this option is set to no (the default), remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the xauth(1) token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this time. See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local forwarded ports. By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. The argument must be yes or no (the default). GlobalKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2. GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is no. GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is no. HashKnownHosts Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts. These hashed names may be used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not visually reveal identifying information if the file's contents are disclosed. The default is no. Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1). HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key authentication. The argument must be yes or no (the default). HostbasedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types. HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the host key algorithms that the client wants to use in order of preference. Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified to prefer their algorithms. The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms". HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key database files and when validating host certificates. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. Hostname Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. Arguments to Hostname accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in Hostname specifications). The default is the name given on the command line. IdentitiesOnly Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the configured authentication identity and certificate files (either the default files, or those explicitly configured in the ssh_config files or passed on the ssh(1) command-line), even if ssh-agent(1) or a PKCS11Provider or SecurityKeyProvider offers more identities. The argument to this keyword must be yes or no (the default). This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. IdentityAgent Specifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the authentication agent. This option overrides the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable and can be used to select a specific agent. Setting the socket name to none disables the use of an authentication agent. If the string "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. Otherwise if the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the location of the socket. Arguments to IdentityAgent may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS section. IdentityFile Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator- hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is set. If no certificates have been explicitly specified by CertificateFile, ssh(1) will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of a specified IdentityFile. Arguments to IdentityFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS section. It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these identities will be tried in sequence. Multiple IdentityFile directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other configuration directives). IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with IdentitiesOnly to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication. IdentityFile may also be used in conjunction with CertificateFile in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with the identity. IgnoreUnknown Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to suppress errors if ssh_config contains options that are unrecognised by ssh(1). It is recommended that IgnoreUnknown be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied to unknown options that appear before it. Include Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(7) wildcards and, for user configurations, shell-like M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y references to user home directories. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in ~/.ssh if included in a user configuration file or /etc/ssh if included from the system configuration file. Include directive may appear inside a Match or Host block to perform conditional inclusion. IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22, af23, af31, af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3, cs4, cs5, cs6, cs7, ef, le, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a numeric value, or none to use the operating system default. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is af21 (Low-Latency Data) for interactive sessions and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non- interactive sessions. KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no. KbdInteractiveDevices Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated. The default is to use the server specified list. The methods available vary depending on what the server supports. For an OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: bsdauth and pam. KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the default set. The default is: curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using "ssh -Q kex". LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. Arguments to LocalCommand accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the session of the ssh(1) that spawned it. It should not be used for interactive commands. This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been enabled. LocalForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from ssh(1). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output. MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma- separated. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The default is: umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using "ssh -Q mac". NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses). The argument to this keyword must be yes or no (the default). NumberOfPasswordPrompts Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3. PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no. PermitLocalCommand Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1). The argument must be yes or no (the default). PKCS11Provider Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or none to indicate that no provider should be used (the default). The argument to this keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library ssh(1) should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication. Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The default is 22. PreferredAuthentications Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g. keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g. password). The default is: gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed using the user's shell M-bM-^@M-^XexecM-bM-^@M-^Y directive to avoid a lingering shell process. Arguments to ProxyCommand accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. The command can be basically anything, and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an sshd(8) server running on some machine, or execute sshd -i somewhere. Host key management will be done using the Hostname of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting the command to none disables this option entirely. Note that CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command. This directive is useful in conjunction with nc(1) and its proxy support. For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0: ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p ProxyJump Specifies one or more jump proxies as either [user@]host[:port] or an ssh URI. Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be visited sequentially. Setting this option will cause ssh(1) to connect to the target host by first making a ssh(1) connection to the specified ProxyJump host and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there. Note that this option will compete with the ProxyCommand option - whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the other from taking effect. Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either supplied via the command-line or the configuration file) is not generally applied to jump hosts. ~/.ssh/config should be used if specific configuration is required for jump hosts. ProxyUseFdpass Specifies that ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor back to ssh(1) instead of continuing to execute and pass data. The default is no. PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default instead of replacing it. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes". PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no. RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The default value for RekeyLimit is default none, which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. RemoteCommand Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. Arguments to RemoteCommand accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over the secure channel. The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port If forwarding to a specific destination then the second argument must be host:hostport, otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote forwarding will be established as a SOCKS proxy. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. If the port argument is 0, the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses. If the bind_address is M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)). RequestTTY Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The argument may be one of: no (never request a TTY), yes (always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), force (always request a TTY) or auto (request a TTY when opening a login session). This option mirrors the -t and -T flags for ssh(1). RevokedHostKeys Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). SecurityKeyProvider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the path to the library. SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent to the server. The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note that the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv directives. See PATTERNS for more information on patterns. It is possible to clear previously set SendEnv variable names by prefixing patterns with -. The default is not to send any environment variables. ServerAliveCountMax Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server. If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive. The default value is 3. If, for example, ServerAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds. ServerAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the server, ssh(1) will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. SetEnv Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to be sent to the server. Similarly to SendEnv, the server must be prepared to accept the environment variable. StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix- domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. The argument must be yes or no (the default). StrictHostKeyChecking If this flag is set to yes, ssh(1) will never automatically add host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, though it can be annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\accept-newM-bM-^@M-^] then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files, but will not permit connections to hosts with changed host keys. If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\offM-bM-^@M-^], ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files and allow connections to hosts with changed hostkeys to proceed, subject to some restrictions. If this flag is set to ask (the default), new host keys will be added to the user known host files only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from ssh(1). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is USER. TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. The default is yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to no. See also ServerAliveInterval for protocol-level keepalives. Tunnel Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the server. The argument must be yes, point-to-point (layer 3), ethernet (layer 2), or no (the default). Specifying yes requests the default tunnel mode, which is point-to-point. TunnelDevice Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun) and the server (remote_tun). The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun]. The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword any, which uses the next available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to any. The default is any:any. UpdateHostKeys Specifies whether ssh(1) should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has completed and add them to UserKnownHostsFile. The argument must be yes, no or ask. This option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement public keys before old ones are removed. Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user. UpdateHostKeys is enabled by default if the user has not overridden the default UserKnownHostsFile setting, otherwise UpdateHostKeys will be set to ask. If UpdateHostKeys is set to ask, then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file. Confirmation is currently incompatible with ControlPersist, and will be disabled if it is enabled. Presently, only sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the "hostkeys@openssh.com" protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys. User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. This saves the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the command line. UserKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.ssh/known_hosts2. VerifyHostKeyDNS Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource records. If this option is set to yes, the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to ask. If this option is set to ask, information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm new host keys according to the StrictHostKeyChecking option. The default is no. See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1). VisualHostKey If this flag is set to yes, an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this flag is set to no (the default), no fingerprint strings are printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys. XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. PATTERNS A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y (a wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y (a wildcard that matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the ".co.uk" set of domains, the following pattern could be used: Host *.co.uk The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range: Host 192.168.0.? A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization except from the "dialup" pool, the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used: from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com" Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself. For example, attempting to match "host3" against the following pattern- list will fail: from="!host1,!host2" The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match, such as a wildcard: from="!host1,!host2,*" TOKENS Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at runtime: %% A literal M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y. %C Hash of %l%h%p%r. %d Local user's home directory. %h The remote hostname. %i The local user ID. %L The local hostname. %l The local hostname, including the domain name. %n The original remote hostname, as given on the command line. %p The remote port. %r The remote username. %T The local tun(4) or tap(4) network interface assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested, or "NONE" otherwise. %u The local username. Match exec accepts the tokens %%, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. CertificateFile accepts the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u. ControlPath accepts the tokens %%, %C, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. Hostname accepts the tokens %% and %h. IdentityAgent and IdentityFile accept the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u. LocalCommand accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, %T, and %u. ProxyCommand accepts the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r. RemoteCommand accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. FILES ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for those values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file. This file must be world-readable. SEE ALSO ssh(1) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. OpenBSD 6.6 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6 openssh-8.2p1/configure010075500017500001750000020700601362136675200134010ustar00djmdjm#! /bin/sh # From configure.ac Revision: 1.583 . # Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles. # Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69 for OpenSSH Portable. # # Report bugs to . # # # Copyright (C) 1992-1996, 1998-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. # # # This configure script is free software; the Free Software Foundation # gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it. ## -------------------- ## ## M4sh Initialization. ## ## -------------------- ## # Be more Bourne compatible DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then : emulate sh NULLCMD=: # Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which # is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature. alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"' setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST else case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in #( *posix*) : set -o posix ;; #( *) : ;; esac fi as_nl=' ' export as_nl # Printing a long string crashes Solaris 7 /usr/bin/printf. as_echo='\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\' as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo # Prefer a ksh shell builtin over an external printf program on Solaris, # but without wasting forks for bash or zsh. if test -z "$BASH_VERSION$ZSH_VERSION" \ && (test "X`print -r -- $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then as_echo='print -r --' as_echo_n='print -rn --' elif (test "X`printf %s $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then as_echo='printf %s\n' as_echo_n='printf %s' else if test "X`(/usr/ucb/echo -n -n $as_echo) 2>/dev/null`" = "X-n $as_echo"; then as_echo_body='eval /usr/ucb/echo -n "$1$as_nl"' as_echo_n='/usr/ucb/echo -n' else as_echo_body='eval expr "X$1" : "X\\(.*\\)"' as_echo_n_body='eval arg=$1; case $arg in #( *"$as_nl"*) expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)$as_nl"; arg=`expr "X$arg" : ".*$as_nl\\(.*\\)"`;; esac; expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)" | tr -d "$as_nl" ' export as_echo_n_body as_echo_n='sh -c $as_echo_n_body as_echo' fi export as_echo_body as_echo='sh -c $as_echo_body as_echo' fi # The user is always right. if test "${PATH_SEPARATOR+set}" != set; then PATH_SEPARATOR=: (PATH='/bin;/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 && { (PATH='/bin:/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 || PATH_SEPARATOR=';' } fi # IFS # We need space, tab and new line, in precisely that order. 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="$ac_ct_RANLIB" # Let the user override the test. else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="ranlib" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS fi fi ac_ct_RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_RANLIB" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_ct_RANLIB" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi if test "x$ac_ct_RANLIB" = x; then RANLIB=":" else case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in yes:) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} ac_tool_warned=yes ;; esac RANLIB=$ac_ct_RANLIB fi else RANLIB="$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB" fi # Find a good install program. We prefer a C program (faster), # so one script is as good as another. But avoid the broken or # incompatible versions: # SysV /etc/install, /usr/sbin/install # SunOS /usr/etc/install # IRIX /sbin/install # AIX /bin/install # AmigaOS /C/install, which installs bootblocks on floppy discs # AIX 4 /usr/bin/installbsd, which doesn't work without a -g flag # AFS /usr/afsws/bin/install, which mishandles nonexistent args # SVR4 /usr/ucb/install, which tries to use the nonexistent group "staff" # OS/2's system install, which has a completely different semantic # ./install, which can be erroneously created by make from ./install.sh. # Reject install programs that cannot install multiple files. { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a BSD-compatible install" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for a BSD-compatible install... " >&6; } if test -z "$INSTALL"; then if ${ac_cv_path_install+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. # Account for people who put trailing slashes in PATH elements. case $as_dir/ in #(( ./ | .// | /[cC]/* | \ /etc/* | /usr/sbin/* | /usr/etc/* | /sbin/* | /usr/afsws/bin/* | \ ?:[\\/]os2[\\/]install[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]OS2[\\/]INSTALL[\\/]* | \ /usr/ucb/* ) ;; *) # OSF1 and SCO ODT 3.0 have their own names for install. # Don't use installbsd from OSF since it installs stuff as root # by default. for ac_prog in ginstall scoinst install; do for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"; then if test $ac_prog = install && grep dspmsg "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then # AIX install. It has an incompatible calling convention. : elif test $ac_prog = install && grep pwplus "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then # program-specific install script used by HP pwplus--don't use. : else rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir echo one > conftest.one echo two > conftest.two mkdir conftest.dir if "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" -c conftest.one conftest.two "`pwd`/conftest.dir" && test -s conftest.one && test -s conftest.two && test -s conftest.dir/conftest.one && test -s conftest.dir/conftest.two then ac_cv_path_install="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext -c" break 3 fi fi fi done done ;; esac done IFS=$as_save_IFS rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir fi if test "${ac_cv_path_install+set}" = set; then INSTALL=$ac_cv_path_install else # As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a # value for INSTALL within a source directory, because that will # break other packages using the cache if that directory is # removed, or if the value is a relative name. INSTALL=$ac_install_sh fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $INSTALL" >&5 $as_echo "$INSTALL" >&6; } # Use test -z because SunOS4 sh mishandles braces in ${var-val}. # It thinks the first close brace ends the variable substitution. test -z "$INSTALL_PROGRAM" && INSTALL_PROGRAM='${INSTALL}' test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCRIPT='${INSTALL}' test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644' { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for egrep... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1 then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E" else if test -z "$EGREP"; then ac_path_EGREP_found=false # Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_prog in egrep; do for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_EGREP" || continue # Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found. # Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in *GNU*) ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;; *) ac_count=0 $as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in" while : do cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp" mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in" cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl" $as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl" "$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count fi # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough test $ac_count -gt 10 && break done rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;; esac $ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3 done done done IFS=$as_save_IFS if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5 fi else ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP fi fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; } EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP" { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a thread-safe mkdir -p" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for a thread-safe mkdir -p... " >&6; } if test -z "$MKDIR_P"; then if ${ac_cv_path_mkdir+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/opt/sfw/bin do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_prog in mkdir gmkdir; do for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" || continue case `"$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" --version 2>&1` in #( 'mkdir (GNU coreutils) '* | \ 'mkdir (coreutils) '* | \ 'mkdir (fileutils) '4.1*) ac_cv_path_mkdir=$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext break 3;; esac done done done IFS=$as_save_IFS fi test -d ./--version && rmdir ./--version if test "${ac_cv_path_mkdir+set}" = set; then MKDIR_P="$ac_cv_path_mkdir -p" else # As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a # value for MKDIR_P within a source directory, because that will # break other packages using the cache if that directory is # removed, or if the value is a relative name. MKDIR_P="$ac_install_sh -d" fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MKDIR_P" >&5 $as_echo "$MKDIR_P" >&6; } if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then for ac_prog in ar do # Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_prog_AR+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if test -n "$AR"; then ac_cv_prog_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test. else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_prog_AR="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS fi fi AR=$ac_cv_prog_AR if test -n "$AR"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AR" >&5 $as_echo "$AR" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi test -n "$AR" && break done fi if test -z "$AR"; then ac_ct_AR=$AR for ac_prog in ar do # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_ct_AR" # Let the user override the test. else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_prog" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS fi fi ac_ct_AR=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_AR" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_ct_AR" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi test -n "$ac_ct_AR" && break done if test "x$ac_ct_AR" = x; then AR="" else case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in yes:) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} ac_tool_warned=yes ;; esac AR=$ac_ct_AR fi fi # Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy cat; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_CAT+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $CAT in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_CAT="$CAT" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_CAT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi CAT=$ac_cv_path_CAT if test -n "$CAT"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CAT" >&5 $as_echo "$CAT" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "kill", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy kill; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_KILL+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $KILL in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_KILL="$KILL" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_KILL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi KILL=$ac_cv_path_KILL if test -n "$KILL"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KILL" >&5 $as_echo "$KILL" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "sed", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy sed; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_SED+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $SED in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_SED="$SED" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_SED="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi SED=$ac_cv_path_SED if test -n "$SED"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SED" >&5 $as_echo "$SED" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "ent", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ent; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_ENT+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $ENT in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_ENT="$ENT" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_ENT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi ENT=$ac_cv_path_ENT if test -n "$ENT"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ENT" >&5 $as_echo "$ENT" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "bash", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy bash; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 $as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "ksh", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ksh; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 $as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy sh; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 $as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy sh; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi SH=$ac_cv_path_SH if test -n "$SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SH" >&5 $as_echo "$SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "groff", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy groff; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_GROFF+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $GROFF in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_GROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi GROFF=$ac_cv_path_GROFF if test -n "$GROFF"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GROFF" >&5 $as_echo "$GROFF" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "nroff awf", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy nroff awf; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_NROFF+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $NROFF in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF if test -n "$NROFF"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NROFF" >&5 $as_echo "$NROFF" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "mandoc", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy mandoc; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_MANDOC+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $MANDOC in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$MANDOC" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi MANDOC=$ac_cv_path_MANDOC if test -n "$MANDOC"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MANDOC" >&5 $as_echo "$MANDOC" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi TEST_SHELL=sh if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$MANDOC" elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc" elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: no manpage formatter found" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: no manpage formatter found" >&2;} MANFMT="false" fi # Extract the first word of "groupadd", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy groupadd; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="groupadd" ;; esac fi PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG if test -n "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&5 $as_echo "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "useradd", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy useradd; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PATH_USERADD_PROG in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$PATH_USERADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="useradd" ;; esac fi PATH_USERADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG if test -n "$PATH_USERADD_PROG"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&5 $as_echo "$PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "pkgmk", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy pkgmk; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" # Let the user override the test. else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="yes" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" && ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="no" fi fi MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED=$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&5 $as_echo "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi if test -x /sbin/sh; then STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh else STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh fi # System features # Check whether --enable-largefile was given. if test "${enable_largefile+set}" = set; then : enableval=$enable_largefile; fi if test "$enable_largefile" != no; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for special C compiler options needed for large files" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for special C compiler options needed for large files... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=no if test "$GCC" != yes; then ac_save_CC=$CC while :; do # IRIX 6.2 and later do not support large files by default, # so use the C compiler's -n32 option if that helps. cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext CC="$CC -n32" if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=' -n32'; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext break done CC=$ac_save_CC rm -f conftest.$ac_ext fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&6; } if test "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" != no; then CC=$CC$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else while :; do cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=no; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64 #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=64; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=unknown break done fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&6; } case $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits in #( no | unknown) ;; *) cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits _ACEOF ;; esac rm -rf conftest* if test $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits = unknown; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_sys_large_files+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else while :; do cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_large_files=no; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #define _LARGE_FILES 1 #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_large_files=1; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext ac_cv_sys_large_files=unknown break done fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&6; } case $ac_cv_sys_large_files in #( no | unknown) ;; *) cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define _LARGE_FILES $ac_cv_sys_large_files _ACEOF ;; esac rm -rf conftest* fi fi if test -z "$AR" ; then as_fn_error $? "*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***" "$LINENO" 5 fi # Extract the first word of "passwd", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy passwd; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PATH_PASSWD_PROG in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi PATH_PASSWD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG if test -n "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&5 $as_echo "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" _ACEOF fi LD="$CC" { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for inline" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for inline... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_c_inline+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_cv_c_inline=no for ac_kw in inline __inline__ __inline; do cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #ifndef __cplusplus typedef int foo_t; static $ac_kw foo_t static_foo () {return 0; } $ac_kw foo_t foo () {return 0; } #endif _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_c_inline=$ac_kw fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext test "$ac_cv_c_inline" != no && break done fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_inline" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_c_inline" >&6; } case $ac_cv_c_inline in inline | yes) ;; *) case $ac_cv_c_inline in no) ac_val=;; *) ac_val=$ac_cv_c_inline;; esac cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #ifndef __cplusplus #define inline $ac_val #endif _ACEOF ;; esac ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes; then : have_llong_max=1 fi ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" "ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" " #include #include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" = xyes; then : have_systr_policy_kill=1 fi ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "RLIMIT_NPROC" "ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" " #include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /**/" >>confdefs.h fi ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" " #include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" = xyes; then : have_linux_no_new_privs=1 fi openssl=yes # Check whether --with-openssl was given. if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_openssl; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl=no fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography... " >&6; } if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define WITH_OPENSSL 1 _ACEOF else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi use_stack_protector=1 use_toolchain_hardening=1 # Check whether --with-stackprotect was given. if test "${with_stackprotect+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_stackprotect; if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_stack_protector=0 fi fi # Check whether --with-hardening was given. if test "${with_hardening+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_hardening; if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_toolchain_hardening=0 fi fi # We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is # on by default" for things like -fPIE. { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports -Werror" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports -Werror... " >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ int main(void) { return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } WERROR="-Werror" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } WERROR="" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe... " >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -pipe" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pipe" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option... " >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunknown-warning-option" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunknown-warning-option" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-error=format-truncation" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-error=format-truncation... " >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wno-error=format-truncation" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wno-error=format-truncation" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments... " >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Qunused-arguments" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Qunused-arguments" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall... " >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wall" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wall" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wextra" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wextra... " >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wextra" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wextra" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith... " >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-arith" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-arith" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized... " >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wuninitialized" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wuninitialized" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare... " >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsign-compare" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsign-compare" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security... 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" >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign... 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" >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wimplicit-fallthrough" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wimplicit-fallthrough" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing... 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if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval" fi fi # Check whether --with-cflags-after was given. if test "${with_cflags_after+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_cflags_after; if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" fi fi # Check whether --with-cppflags was given. if test "${with_cppflags+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_cppflags; if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval" fi fi # Check whether --with-ldflags was given. if test "${with_ldflags+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_ldflags; if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval" fi fi # Check whether --with-ldflags-after was given. if test "${with_ldflags_after+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_ldflags_after; if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" fi fi # Check whether --with-libs was given. if test "${with_libs+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_libs; if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LIBS="$LIBS $withval" fi fi # Check whether --with-Werror was given. if test "${with_Werror+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_Werror; if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then werror_flags="-Werror" if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then werror_flags="$withval" fi fi fi for ac_header in \ blf.h \ bstring.h \ crypt.h \ crypto/sha2.h \ dirent.h \ endian.h \ elf.h \ err.h \ features.h \ fcntl.h \ floatingpoint.h \ fnmatch.h \ getopt.h \ glob.h \ ia.h \ iaf.h \ ifaddrs.h \ inttypes.h \ langinfo.h \ limits.h \ locale.h \ login.h \ maillock.h \ ndir.h \ net/if_tun.h \ netdb.h \ netgroup.h \ pam/pam_appl.h \ paths.h \ poll.h \ pty.h \ readpassphrase.h \ rpc/types.h \ security/pam_appl.h \ sha2.h \ shadow.h \ stddef.h \ stdint.h \ string.h \ strings.h \ sys/bitypes.h \ sys/bsdtty.h \ sys/cdefs.h \ sys/dir.h \ sys/file.h \ sys/mman.h \ sys/label.h \ sys/ndir.h \ sys/poll.h \ sys/prctl.h \ sys/pstat.h \ sys/ptrace.h \ sys/random.h \ sys/select.h \ sys/stat.h \ sys/stream.h \ sys/stropts.h \ sys/strtio.h \ sys/statvfs.h \ sys/sysmacros.h \ sys/time.h \ sys/timers.h \ sys/vfs.h \ time.h \ tmpdir.h \ ttyent.h \ ucred.h \ unistd.h \ usersec.h \ util.h \ utime.h \ utmp.h \ utmpx.h \ vis.h \ wchar.h \ do : as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h] # to be included first. for ac_header in sys/audit.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_audit_h" " #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H # include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_audit_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h for ac_header in sys/capsicum.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/capsicum.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" " #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h. # sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h for ac_header in net/route.h sys/sysctl.h do : as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" " #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include " if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris for ac_header in lastlog.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "lastlog.h" "ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" " #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LASTLOG_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris for ac_header in sys/ptms.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/ptms.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" " #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H # include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD for ac_header in login_cap.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "login_cap.h" "ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" " #include " if test "x$ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h for ac_header in sys/mount.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/mount.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" " #include " if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h for ac_header in sys/un.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/un.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" " #include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # Messages for features tested for in target-specific section SIA_MSG="no" SPC_MSG="no" SP_MSG="no" SPP_MSG="no" # Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both # the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris). 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Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char strcasecmp (); int main () { return strcasecmp (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=yes else ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" = xyes; then : LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" fi fi for ac_func in utimes do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utimes" "ac_cv_func_utimes" if test "x$ac_cv_func_utimes" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_UTIMES 1 _ACEOF else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utimes in -lc89" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for utimes in -lc89... 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"BSM enabled and required function not found" "$LINENO" 5 fi done # These are optional for ac_func in getaudit_addr aug_get_machine do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done $as_echo "#define USE_BSM_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf" $as_echo "#define BROKEN_BSM_API 1" >>confdefs.h fi ;; linux) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: linux" >&5 $as_echo "linux" >&6; } AUDIT_MODULE=linux for ac_header in libaudit.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libaudit.h" "ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" "$ac_includes_default" if test "x$ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H 1 _ACEOF fi done SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit" $as_echo "#define USE_LINUX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h ;; debug) AUDIT_MODULE=debug { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: debug" >&5 $as_echo "debug" >&6; } $as_echo "#define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 1" >>confdefs.h ;; no) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } ;; *) as_fn_error $? "Unknown audit module $withval" "$LINENO" 5 ;; esac fi # Check whether --with-pie was given. if test "${with_pie+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_pie; if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then use_pie=yes fi fi if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off. use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gcc >= 4.x" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for gcc >= 4.x... 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" >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include int main () { ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } LIBS="$saved_LIBS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext for ac_func in \ BN_is_prime_ex \ DSA_generate_parameters_ex \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl \ EVP_DigestFinal_ex \ EVP_DigestInit_ex \ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \ EVP_MD_CTX_init \ HMAC_CTX_init \ RSA_generate_key_ex \ RSA_get_default_method \ do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro. ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" if test "x$ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS 1" >>confdefs.h else ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "ac_cv_have_decl_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "#include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS 1" >>confdefs.h fi fi # LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API for ac_func in \ OPENSSL_init_crypto \ DH_get0_key \ DH_get0_pqg \ DH_set0_key \ DH_set_length \ DH_set0_pqg \ DSA_get0_key \ DSA_get0_pqg \ DSA_set0_key \ DSA_set0_pqg \ DSA_SIG_get0 \ DSA_SIG_set0 \ ECDSA_SIG_get0 \ ECDSA_SIG_set0 \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \ RSA_get0_crt_params \ RSA_get0_factors \ RSA_get0_key \ RSA_set0_crt_params \ RSA_set0_factors \ RSA_set0_key \ RSA_meth_free \ RSA_meth_dup \ RSA_meth_set1_name \ RSA_meth_get_finish \ RSA_meth_set_priv_enc \ RSA_meth_set_priv_dec \ RSA_meth_set_finish \ EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA \ EVP_MD_CTX_new \ EVP_MD_CTX_free \ do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include int main () { ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } $as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1" >>confdefs.h else as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL ENGINE support not found" "$LINENO" 5 fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES 1" >>confdefs.h fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL || EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1" >>confdefs.h else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1" >>confdefs.h else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \ aes128-gcm@openssh.com \ aes256-gcm@openssh.com" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) exit(0); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, # because the system crypt() is more featureful. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char crypt (); int main () { return crypt (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes else ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LIBCRYPT 1 _ACEOF LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" fi fi # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the # version in OpenSSL. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char crypt (); int main () { return crypt (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes else ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt" fi fi for ac_func in crypt DES_crypt do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # Check for SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 support in OpenSSL for ac_func in EVP_sha256 EVP_sha384 EVP_sha512 do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } enable_nistp256=1 else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } enable_nistp384=1 else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional... " >&6; } if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} enable_nistp521=1 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ exit(e == NULL || m == NULL); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } enable_nistp521=1 else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#" TEST_SSH_ECC=no if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \ test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1" >>confdefs.h for ac_func in EC_KEY_METHOD_new do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EC_KEY_METHOD_new" "ac_cv_func_EC_KEY_METHOD_new" if test "x$ac_cv_func_EC_KEY_METHOD_new" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW 1 _ACEOF fi done openssl_ecc=yes else openssl_ecc=no fi if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1" >>confdefs.h TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1" >>confdefs.h TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1" >>confdefs.h TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char crypt (); int main () { return crypt (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes else ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt" fi for ac_func in crypt do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "crypt" "ac_cv_func_crypt" if test "x$ac_cv_func_crypt" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_CRYPT 1 _ACEOF fi done fi # PKCS11/U2F depend on OpenSSL and dlopen(). enable_pkcs11=yes enable_sk=yes if test "x$openssl" != "xyes" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing libcrypto" enable_sk="disabled; missing libcrypto" fi if test "x$openssl_ecc" != "xyes" ; then enable_sk="disabled; OpenSSL has no ECC support" fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != "xyes" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing dlopen(3)" enable_sk="disabled; missing dlopen(3)" fi if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" != "xyes" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW" enable_sk="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW" fi if test ! -z "$disable_pkcs11" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled by user" fi if test ! -z "$disable_sk" ; then enable_sk="disabled by user" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to enable PKCS11" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether to enable PKCS11... " >&6; } if test "x$enable_pkcs11" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define ENABLE_PKCS11 /**/" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $enable_pkcs11" >&5 $as_echo "$enable_pkcs11" >&6; } { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to enable U2F" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether to enable U2F... " >&6; } if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define ENABLE_SK /**/" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $enable_sk" >&5 $as_echo "$enable_sk" >&6; } # Now check for built-in security key support. if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_sk_internal" = "xyes" ; then if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PKGCONFIG in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG if test -n "$PKGCONFIG"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKGCONFIG" >&5 $as_echo "$PKGCONFIG" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi fi if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"; then ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$PKGCONFIG # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... 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"seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function" "$LINENO" 5 SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter" $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1" >>confdefs.h elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header" "$LINENO" 5 test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" "$LINENO" 5 SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1" >>confdefs.h elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? 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"Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t" "$LINENO" 5 fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&5 $as_echo "$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&6; } cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define socklen_t $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "sig_atomic_t" "ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" "#include " if test "x$ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsblkcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" " #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsfilcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" " #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct statfs" "f_files" "ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_files" " #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_files" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct statfs" "f_flags" "ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_flags" " #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_flags" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_addr_t" "ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" "#include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_port_t" "ac_cv_type_in_port_t" "#include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_port_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1 _ACEOF fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for size_t" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for size_t... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_struct_timespec+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME # include # include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include # else # include # endif #endif int main () { struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = 1; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="yes" else ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1" >>confdefs.h have_struct_timespec=1 fi # We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail. if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install" echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing." echo "" exit 1; else if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;} else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF main() { char buf[50]; char expected_out[50]; int mazsize = 50 ; #if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; #else long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; #endif strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) exit(1); exit(0); } #else main() { exit(0); } #endif _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : true else $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h fi rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext fi fi # look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmp.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmp.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmp.h... 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" >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_pid" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmp.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmp.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmp.h... " >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmpx.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmp.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h... " >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmp.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmp.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmp.h... " >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmpx.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmp.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h... " >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmpx.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. 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"SELinux support requires libselinux library" "$LINENO" 5 fi SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" for ac_func in getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done LIBS="$save_LIBS" fi fi # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support KRB5_MSG="no" # Check whether --with-kerberos5 was given. if test "${with_kerberos5+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_kerberos5; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then KRB5ROOT="/usr/local" else KRB5ROOT=${withval} fi $as_echo "#define KRB5 1" >>confdefs.h KRB5_MSG="yes" if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}krb5-config; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-ldes $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lgssapi_krb5 $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char gss_init_sec_context (); int main () { return gss_init_sec_context (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=yes else ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lgssapi $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. 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`writev', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_WRITEV /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL__GETLONG /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT /* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */ #undef HAVE_DES_CRYPT /* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */ #undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX /* Define if you have /dev/ptc */ #undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC /* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_key' function. */ #undef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY /* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_pqg' function. */ #undef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG /* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_key' function. */ #undef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY /* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_pqg' function. */ #undef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG /* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set_length' function. */ #undef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_DIRENT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */ #undef HAVE_DIRFD /* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */ #undef HAVE_DIRNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `dlopen' function. */ #undef HAVE_DLOPEN /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_key' function. */ #undef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_pqg' function. */ #undef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_key' function. */ #undef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_pqg' function. */ #undef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_get0' function. */ #undef HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_set0' function. */ #undef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 /* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_get0' function. */ #undef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 /* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_set0' function. */ #undef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EC_KEY_METHOD_new' function. */ #undef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_ELF_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */ #undef HAVE_ENDGRENT /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */ #undef HAVE_ENDUTENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */ #undef HAVE_ENDUTXENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `err' function. */ #undef HAVE_ERR /* Define to 1 if you have the `errx' function. */ #undef HAVE_ERRX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_ERR_H /* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */ #undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_free' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_new' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha384' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_SHA384 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha512' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_SHA512 /* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP /* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */ #undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */ #undef HAVE_FCHMOD /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmodat' function. */ #undef HAVE_FCHMODAT /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */ #undef HAVE_FCHOWN /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchownat' function. */ #undef HAVE_FCHOWNAT /* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */ #undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_FCNTL_H /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */ #undef HAVE_FD_MASK /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_FEATURES_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `flock' function. */ #undef HAVE_FLOCK /* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */ #undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED /* Define to 1 if you have the `fnmatch' function. */ #undef HAVE_FNMATCH /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_FNMATCH_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO /* Define to 1 if you have the `freezero' function. */ #undef HAVE_FREEZERO /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */ #undef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */ #undef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */ #undef HAVE_FSTATFS /* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */ #undef HAVE_FSTATVFS /* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */ #undef HAVE_FUTIMES /* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */ #undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR /* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETCWD /* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST /* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETGRSET /* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `getline' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETLINE /* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETLUID /* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO /* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETOPT /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GETOPT_H /* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */ #undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET /* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */ #undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETPEEREID /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETPGID /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETPGRP /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETPWANAM /* Define to 1 if you have the `getrandom' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETRANDOM /* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT /* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */ #undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `getsid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETSID /* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY /* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETTTYENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTID /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTLINE /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTXENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTXID /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTXLINE /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTXUSER /* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */ #undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL /* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */ #undef HAVE_GLOB /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GLOB_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H /* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */ #undef HAVE_HEADER_AD /* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */ #undef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT /* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_IAF_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_IA_H /* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_IFADDRS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */ #undef HAVE_INET_ATON /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */ #undef HAVE_INET_NTOA /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */ #undef HAVE_INET_NTOP /* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */ #undef HAVE_INNETGR /* define if you have int64_t data type */ #undef HAVE_INT64_T /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */ #undef HAVE_INTMAX_T /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H /* define if you have intxx_t data type */ #undef HAVE_INTXX_T /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */ #undef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */ #undef HAVE_IN_PORT_T /* Define if you have isblank(3C). */ #undef HAVE_ISBLANK /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */ #undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */ #undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */ #undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H /* Define if you want ldns support */ #undef HAVE_LDNS /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */ #undef HAVE_LIBBSM /* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */ #undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT /* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */ #undef HAVE_LIBDL /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LIBGEN_H /* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */ #undef HAVE_LIBIAF /* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */ #undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */ #undef HAVE_LIBPAM /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LIBPROC_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */ #undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */ #undef HAVE_LIBXNET /* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */ #undef HAVE_LIBZ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LIMITS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `llabs' function. */ #undef HAVE_LLABS /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LOCALE_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `localtime_r' function. */ #undef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R /* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */ #undef HAVE_LOGIN /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */ #undef HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LOGIN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */ #undef HAVE_LOGOUT /* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */ #undef HAVE_LOGWTMP /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */ #undef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */ #undef HAVE_LONG_LONG /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H /* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `malloc' function, and to 0 otherwise. */ #undef HAVE_MALLOC /* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */ #undef HAVE_MBLEN /* Define to 1 if you have the `mbtowc' function. */ #undef HAVE_MBTOWC /* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */ #undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT /* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */ #undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS /* Define to 1 if you have the `memmem' function. */ #undef HAVE_MEMMEM /* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */ #undef HAVE_MEMMOVE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_MEMORY_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */ #undef HAVE_MEMSET_S /* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */ #undef HAVE_MKDTEMP /* define if you have mode_t data type */ #undef HAVE_MODE_T /* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */ #undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_NDIR_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_NETDB_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H /* Define if you are on NeXT */ #undef HAVE_NEXT /* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO /* Define to 1 if you have the `nl_langinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO /* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */ #undef HAVE_NSLEEP /* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO /* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to pam_strerror */ #undef HAVE_OLD_PAM /* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */ #undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R /* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */ #undef HAVE_OPENPTY /* as a macro */ #undef HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS /* Define to 1 if you have the `OPENSSL_init_crypto' function. */ #undef HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO /* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version' function. */ #undef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION /* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version_num' function. */ #undef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM /* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */ #undef HAVE_OSF_SIA /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */ #undef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */ #undef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_PATHS_H /* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP /* define if you have pid_t data type */ #undef HAVE_PID_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `pledge' function. */ #undef HAVE_PLEDGE /* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */ #undef HAVE_POLL /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_POLL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */ #undef HAVE_PRCTL /* Define to 1 if you have the `priv_basicset' function. */ #undef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_PRIV_H /* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */ #undef HAVE_PROC_PID /* Define to 1 if you have the `proc_pidinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO /* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */ #undef HAVE_PSTAT /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_PTY_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */ #undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE /* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */ #undef HAVE_PUTUTXLINE /* Define to 1 if you have the `raise' function. */ #undef HAVE_RAISE /* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */ #undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H /* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `realloc' function, and to 0 otherwise. */ #undef HAVE_REALLOC /* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */ #undef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY /* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */ #undef HAVE_REALPATH /* Define to 1 if you have the `recallocarray' function. */ #undef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY /* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */ #undef HAVE_RECVMSG /* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */ #undef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */ #undef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_crt_params' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_factors' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_key' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_dup' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_free' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_get_finish' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set1_name' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_finish' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_dec' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_enc' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_crt_params' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_factors' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_key' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */ #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT /* define if you have sa_family_t data type */ #undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */ #undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED /* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */ #undef HAVE_SECUREWARE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */ #undef HAVE_SENDMSG /* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB /* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE /* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETEGID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETENV /* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETEUID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETGROUPENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETGROUPS /* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETLINEBUF /* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETLOGIN /* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETLUID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETPASSENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETPCRED /* Define to 1 if you have the `setpflags' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETPFLAGS /* Define to 1 if you have the `setppriv' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETPPRIV /* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETREGID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETRESGID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETRESUID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETREUID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETSID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETUTENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETUTXDB /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETUTXENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETVBUF /* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */ #undef HAVE_SET_ID /* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256Update' function. */ #undef HAVE_SHA256UPDATE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SHA2_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA384Update' function. */ #undef HAVE_SHA384UPDATE /* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA512Update' function. */ #undef HAVE_SHA512UPDATE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SHADOW_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */ #undef HAVE_SIGACTION /* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */ #undef HAVE_SIGVEC /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */ #undef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T /* define if you have size_t data type */ #undef HAVE_SIZE_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */ #undef HAVE_SNPRINTF /* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */ #undef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR /* Have PEERCRED socket option */ #undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED /* define if you have ssize_t data type */ #undef HAVE_SSIZE_T /* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ #undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS /* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */ #undef HAVE_STATFS /* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */ #undef HAVE_STATVFS /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_STDDEF_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_STDINT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_STDLIB_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `strcasestr' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRCASESTR /* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRDUP /* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRERROR /* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRFTIME /* Silly mkstemp() */ #undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_STRINGS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_STRING_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRLCAT /* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRLCPY /* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRMODE /* Define to 1 if you have the `strndup' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRNDUP /* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRNLEN /* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRNVIS /* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRPTIME /* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRSEP /* Define to 1 if you have the `strsignal' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRSIGNAL /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRTOLL /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRTONUM /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRTOUL /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRTOULL /* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO /* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR /* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE /* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS /* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE /* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS /* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 /* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is a member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID /* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE /* Define to 1 if `f_files' is a member of `struct statfs'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES /* Define to 1 if `f_flags' is a member of `struct statfs'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS /* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE /* Define to 1 if `st_mtim' is a member of `struct stat'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM /* Define to 1 if `st_mtime' is a member of `struct stat'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME /* define if you have struct timespec */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC /* define if you have struct timeval */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL /* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */ #undef HAVE_SWAP32 /* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */ #undef HAVE_SYSCONF /* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H /* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */ #undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H /* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */ #undef HAVE_SYS_NERR /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H /* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */ #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */ #undef HAVE_TCGETPGRP /* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */ #undef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK /* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */ #undef HAVE_TIME /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_TIME_H /* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */ #undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */ #undef HAVE_TRUNCATE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_TTYENT_H /* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX /* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UCRED_H /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */ #undef HAVE_UINTMAX_T /* define if you have uintxx_t data type */ #undef HAVE_UINTXX_T /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UNISTD_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */ #undef HAVE_UNSETENV /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */ #undef HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG /* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */ #undef HAVE_UPDWTMP /* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */ #undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_USERSEC_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */ #undef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID /* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */ #undef HAVE_USLEEP /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UTIL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `utimensat' function. */ #undef HAVE_UTIMENSAT /* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */ #undef HAVE_UTIMES /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UTIME_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */ #undef HAVE_UTMPNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */ #undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UTMPX_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UTMP_H /* define if you have u_char data type */ #undef HAVE_U_CHAR /* define if you have u_int data type */ #undef HAVE_U_INT /* define if you have u_int64_t data type */ #undef HAVE_U_INT64_T /* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */ #undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */ #undef HAVE_VASPRINTF /* Define if va_copy exists */ #undef HAVE_VA_COPY /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_VIS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */ #undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF /* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */ #undef HAVE_WAITPID /* Define to 1 if you have the `warn' function. */ #undef HAVE_WARN /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_WCHAR_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `wcwidth' function. */ #undef HAVE_WCWIDTH /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */ #undef HAVE__GETLONG /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */ #undef HAVE__GETPTY /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */ #undef HAVE__GETSHORT /* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */ #undef HAVE__RES_EXTERN /* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */ #undef HAVE___B64_NTOP /* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */ #undef HAVE___B64_PTON /* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */ #undef HAVE___FUNCTION__ /* Define if libc defines __progname */ #undef HAVE___PROGNAME /* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ #undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS /* Define if __va_copy exists */ #undef HAVE___VA_COPY /* Define if compiler implements __func__ */ #undef HAVE___func__ /* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */ #undef HEIMDAL /* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */ #undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY /* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */ #undef IPV4_IN_IPV6 /* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */ #undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN /* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */ #undef KRB5 /* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */ #undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE /* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP. */ #undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO /* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */ #undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST /* max value of long long calculated by configure */ #undef LLONG_MAX /* min value of long long calculated by configure */ #undef LLONG_MIN /* Account locked with pw(1) */ #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX /* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */ #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING /* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */ #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR /* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */ #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX /* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */ #undef MAIL_DIRECTORY /* Need setpgrp to for controlling tty */ #undef NEED_SETPGRP /* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args */ #undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS /* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */ #undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE /* Define to disable UID restoration test */ #undef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST /* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */ #undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS /* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */ #undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID /* OpenSSL has ECC */ #undef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC /* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */ #undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 /* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */ #undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 /* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */ #undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 /* libcrypto has EVP AES CTR */ #undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR /* libcrypto has EVP AES GCM */ #undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM /* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */ #undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES /* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */ #undef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY /* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */ #undef PACKAGE_BUGREPORT /* Define to the full name of this package. */ #undef PACKAGE_NAME /* Define to the full name and version of this package. */ #undef PACKAGE_STRING /* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */ #undef PACKAGE_TARNAME /* Define to the home page for this package. */ #undef PACKAGE_URL /* Define to the version of this package. */ #undef PACKAGE_VERSION /* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */ #undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE /* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */ #undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE /* must supply username to passwd */ #undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME /* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */ #undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID /* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */ #undef PRNGD_PORT /* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */ #undef PRNGD_SOCKET /* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */ #undef PTY_ZEROREAD /* Sandbox using capsicum */ #undef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM /* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */ #undef SANDBOX_DARWIN /* no privsep sandboxing */ #undef SANDBOX_NULL /* Sandbox using pledge(2) */ #undef SANDBOX_PLEDGE /* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */ #undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT /* Sandbox using seccomp filter */ #undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER /* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */ #undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE /* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */ #undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE /* Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges */ #undef SANDBOX_SOLARIS /* Sandbox using systrace(4) */ #undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE /* Specify the system call convention in use */ #undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH /* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */ #undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID /* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */ #undef SIZEOF_INT /* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */ #undef SIZEOF_LONG_INT /* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */ #undef SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT /* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */ #undef SIZEOF_SHORT_INT /* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */ #undef SNPRINTF_CONST /* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c */ #undef SPT_TYPE /* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */ #undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY /* sshd PAM service name */ #undef SSHD_PAM_SERVICE /* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */ #undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID /* Use audit debugging module */ #undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */ #undef SSH_IOBUFSZ /* non-privileged user for privilege separation */ #undef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER /* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */ #undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF /* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */ #undef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD /* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */ #undef SSH_TUN_LINUX /* No layer 2 tunnel support */ #undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2 /* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */ #undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD /* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */ #undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF /* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */ #undef STDC_HEADERS /* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */ #undef SUPERUSER_PATH /* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */ #undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND /* Support routing domains using Linux VRF */ #undef SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX /* Define to 1 if you can safely include both and . */ #undef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME /* Support passwords > 8 chars */ #undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS /* Specify default $PATH */ #undef USER_PATH /* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */ #undef USE_AFS /* Use BSM audit module */ #undef USE_BSM_AUDIT /* Use btmp to log bad logins */ #undef USE_BTMP /* Use libedit for sftp */ #undef USE_LIBEDIT /* Use Linux audit module */ #undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT /* Enable OpenSSL engine support */ #undef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE /* Define if you want to enable PAM support */ #undef USE_PAM /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */ #undef USE_PIPES /* Define if you have Solaris privileges */ #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS /* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */ #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS /* Define if you have Solaris projects */ #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS /* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */ #undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY /* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */ #undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE /* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session management, not C arrays) */ #undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY /* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */ #undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT /* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */ #undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS /* Define if you want IRIX project management */ #undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT /* use libcrypto for cryptography */ #undef WITH_OPENSSL /* Define if you want SELinux support. */ #undef WITH_SELINUX /* Enable zlib */ #undef WITH_ZLIB /* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */ #if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD # if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__ # define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1 # endif #else # ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN # undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN # endif #endif /* Define if xauth is found in your path */ #undef XAUTH_PATH /* Enable large inode numbers on Mac OS X 10.5. */ #ifndef _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE # define _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE 1 #endif /* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */ #undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS /* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */ #undef _LARGE_FILES /* log for bad login attempts */ #undef _PATH_BTMP /* Full path of your "passwd" program */ #undef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG /* Specify location of ssh.pid */ #undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR /* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */ #undef __res_state /* Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used. */ #undef calloc /* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */ #ifndef __cplusplus #undef inline #endif /* Define to rpl_malloc if the replacement function should be used. */ #undef malloc /* Define to rpl_realloc if the replacement function should be used. */ #undef realloc /* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */ #undef socklen_t